CHAPTER 3

Identity Crises in the Social Sciences

Public administration is not the only social science that has grappled with questions of identity and the significance of paradigms (see, e.g., Dubnick 1999). Other social sciences have also subjected their research traditions to epistemological and ontological gauntlets in search of a paradigmatic base or precise identity through which to promote scientific rigor or "science" in their respective fields or disciplines. These debates have predominantly revolved around epistemic traditions and research methodology, and not surprisingly have pitted positivism against postpositivism—which acknowledges the value of qualitative methodologies—or other philosophies of science. As Rosenberg (2008, 1) points out, "There is no perfect agreement among economists, anthropologists, sociologists, or psychologists on what the distinctive and central problems and methods of their respective disciplines are."

To avoid tedium and repetition, given the epistemological debates in public administration presented earlier in this volume, this chapter provides only a brief overview of the discourse in other social sciences concerned with identity and paradigms. But an important point to be made is that even those branches of the social sciences (e.g., political science and sociology) that are not applied or as closely identified with practice as public administration struggle with questions of identity, paradigmatic base, and appropriate research methodology.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

In political science, intellectual squabbles over aims and research methods have long peppered the discourse (e.g., Brady and Collier 2004; deLeon 1998; Ellwood 1996; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Weimer 1992; Gunnell 1991; Ricci 1984). Many have argued that political science is more a

behavioral science (i.e., a quantitatively empirical undertaking), whereas others have maintained that it is systematic thought about politics (i.e., ethics, morality, and values). Perhaps deLeon (1998, 150) succinctly captured the factiousness as follows: "Political scientists as a discipline have spent (almost literally) countless articles and books proposing something resembling 'laws' or theories that, taken collectively or individually, have produced infinitely more confusion than clarity." To bolster his case, deLeon juxtaposes the works of a number of eminent political science philosophers, such as James Rosenau and Charles Lindblom. As deLeon (1998, 150) points out, Rosenau saw the primary purpose of political science as moving "up the ladder of generalization and construct[ing] theories that encompass and explain more and more of the phenomena that make up the universe of politics." Lindblom (1990), conversely, questioned the utility of *any* social science findings for social tasks or efforts.

As with public administration, political scientists line both sides of the gauntlet, arguing that political behavior is best understood through explanatory techniques (the positivists) or through reason, description, or prescription. Torgerson (1986, 34), for example, argues that positivism "would rigorously distance itself from the speculations of theology and metaphysics, confronting the world objectively in order to observe the facts and determine the lawful order of nature and society. The domain of mystery and ambiguity would be abandoned in order to know what could be known clearly and certainly. . . . Knowledge would replace politics." Others, such as deLeon (1998, 151), counter that "positivism is fundamentally antithetical to democratic principles and processes. Another claim is that, in its search for objectivity, it conveniently overlooks the pivotal hurly-burly of political life, and especially the contending value structures."[1]

Some political scientists have argued that qualitative research encompasses positivism. Lin (1998, 162), for example, takes this position, arguing that "positivist work seeks to identify qualitative data with propositions that can then be tested or identified in other cases. . . . Qualitative work can be positivist: It can attempt to document practices that lead consistently to one set of outcomes rather than another, to identify characteristics that commonly are related to some policy problem, or to find strategic patterns that hold across different venues and with different actors."[2]

As with public administration, myriad treatises can be offered to illustrate the dialectical exchanges over scope and methods of political science (e.g., compare King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 with Brady and Collier 2004).[3] Moreover, similar to public administration, some, like Elman (2008, 272) argue that political science has "outgrown a one-size-fits-all

approach and can be seen to encompass a rich diversity" of approaches, especially mixed methods. Elman goes on to say that political science should not "follow a single-logic-of-inference model" based in positivism. Similarly, Brady and Collier (2004, xvii) also argue for diversity in research approaches: "Crafting good social science research requires diverse methodological tools. Such tools include a variety of qualitative and quantitative approaches: small-*N* and large-*N* analyses, case studies and structural equation modeling, ethnographic field research and quantitative natural experiments, close analysis of meaning and large-scare surveys." In the end, as deLeon (1998, 150) offers, it comes down to this: "Even within the political science community, there is genuine question as to whether many of its theories are universally (or even widely) accepted, which casts some question as to its ascription of 'science.'"

THE POLICY SCIENCES

There is a persistent debate over the identity of the policy sciences, a movement or field that does not seem to have any precise definition. The term "policy sciences" was coined by the U.S. political scientist Harold Lasswell, who was seeking a better way to address policy problems within a democratic framework.[4] To Lasswell, any discipline or profession with relevance to government could be described as a policy science (deLeon 1997; Lasswell 1951). deLeon (1988, 7) refers to "policy sciences" as "an umbrella term describing a broad-gauge intellectual approach applied to the examination of societally critical problems. . . . The policy sciences, as we shall see, are problem-oriented and contextual in nature, multidisciplinary in approach, and explicitly normative in perspective. They represent a variety of approaches to understanding and resolving issues of great public importance."

Parenthetically, as deLeon (1988, 8) maintains, policy analysis "is the most noted derivative and application of the tools and methodologies of the policy sciences' approach. . . . Policy analysis is generally considered a more discrete genus under the broader umbrella of the policy sciences phylum. Quite often and unfortunately, they are used interchangeably."

Pielke (2004, 215) explicitly argues that the "policy sciences lack a distinctive identity within the policy movement, in spite of a journal, a professional society and a website (www.policysciences.org)." Moreover, his Internet search, conducted in 2004, could not identify a single graduate

program called "policy sciences." Instead, he found such programs as policy studies, policy analysis, and public affairs.

Not only the scope but also the methods of policy sciences have undergone rigorous critiques. In an incisive essay examining policy sciences' neopositivist (or logical positivist) approach, Fischer (1998, 129–30) states: "Not only is neopositivist policy science seen to have failed in its effort to develop a usable body of predictive generalizations, it has been unable to supply effective solutions to social problems. An important part of this failure is traced to outmoded epistemological assumptions. . . . In the policy sciences the attempt to separate facts and values has facilitated a technocratic form of policy analysis that emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness of means to achieve politically established goals." In short the same debates in public administration about identity, facts, values, and methodology permeate other fields such as the policy sciences and the closely related field of policy analysis.

POLICY ANALYSIS

Policy analysis evolved from such areas or fields as administrative science, management science, systems engineering, and operations research. It has assumed a host of different meanings, especially in the context of public administration (see, e.g., Denhardt 2004). And as with public administration, theory and practice have become so inextricably linked that it is virtually impossible to separate the identity of policy analysis as a profession from its academic underpinnings. It burst on the scene of public administration in about the 1960s as an action-oriented discipline designed to promote greater responsiveness to social needs through public policies (see, e.g., Henry 2006; Stillman 1991; Frederickson and Smith 2003).[5]

Policy analysis, too, suffers from a personality disorder. Some equate it with policy studies, policy evaluation, policy planning, program evaluation, or even public affairs (e.g., Pielke 2004). deLeon, as noted above, sees policy analysis as a methodological derivative of the policy sciences. He has also argued that "systems analysis" is often confused with policy analysis because of its reliance on quantitative tools and applications to address policy problems (deLeon 1988). The political scientist Thomas Dye (1976) also viewed policy analysis as empirically based methods, as opposed to normative ones, for the accumulation of knowledge about political processes.

In *Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age*, Beryl Radin (2000, 5–6) presents a host of different definitions of policy analysis, including these:

- Policy analysis is a multi-element process of assessing and analyzing the components that make up the stated "policy," or plan of action.
- Policy analysis is not an exact science but rather an art. There are numerous approaches one can take within policy analysis. One is to establish an agenda, then formulate the issues, address alternatives, set the adoption and implementation plans, and then establish a feedback vehicle.
- Policy analysis is the utilization of applied techniques, formal and informal, to arrive at one recommendation for the benefit of a client based on a prescribed policy.

It appears that one's orientation toward policy analysis varies from a disciplinary standpoint; indeed, policy analysis programs are housed in a number of different departments or schools: public administration, political science, economics, sociology, organization studies, and even business administration. This further contributes to the identity quandary.

In common parlance policy analysis as an academic endeavor tends to be equated with economic analysis and research methods. A number of scholars and researchers, including deLeon and Dye, interpret policy analysis as a discipline that is dominated by the perspective of positivist social science. Torgerson (1986, 35) argues that "policy analysis today bears the unmistakable imprint of the positivist heritage. . . . In the case of policy analysis, the influence of positivism has been pervasive not only in letter, but also in spirit."

Others, however, resist and eschew the pull of policy analysis toward quantitative empiricism and positivism. Indeed a number of eminent scholars of policy analysis—such as Beryl Radin, Aaron Wildavsky, Peter deLeon, Dvora Yanow, Eugene Bardach, Yehezkel Dror, and Thomas Kaplan, to name a few—continue an epistemic tradition grounded in qualitative empiricism.[6] And, as Durning (1999, 393) argued, "It is a mistake to portray the founders of [policy analysis] or the present leaders of the intellectual infrastructure of the discipline, as methodological zealots who have ignored other aspects of policy analysis." Quoting Quade (1975), Durning states: "'No public policy question can be answered by analysis alone, divorced from political considerations; judgment and intuition play a large role.'"

In short, as with public administration, no paradigm or single perspective governs policy analysis.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Public management and the new public management have not generally been viewed as separate disciplinary fields of the social sciences. However, they are addressed here precisely because of the identity quagmire that engulfs these areas of study and practice.[7] In fact some do not make distinctions between public management and public administration (e.g., Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Evans and Wamsley 1999), viewing management and administration as tantamount. Others see public management as a subset of public administration (e.g., Kettl and Milward 1996; Ott, Hyde, and Shafritz 1991).

Public management has taken on a variety of meanings especially in terms of practice (see, e.g., Hood 2007; Brudney, O'Toole, and Rainey 2000; Frederickson 1999; Fountain 1994; Bozeman 1993). For example, Allison (1979, 38) refers to public management as the direction and organization of such resources as personnel and financial in government to achieve desired ends. He also argued that "public management as a field of knowledge should start from problems faced by practicing public managers." Other eminent scholars of public management—including Cam Stivers, Hal Rainey, Beryl Radin, Bob Behn, Pat Ingraham, Don Kettl, and Christopher Hood, to name a few—have added their own mark to the field's theoretical core.[8] From the standpoint of practice, they have asked, for example, "What do public managers do?" or "How can public management be effectively practiced?" Public managers have been classified as policymakers, program developers, performance auditors, public executives, political strategists, and directors of budgets and human resources management. Their purpose is to improve the operation of government from the standpoint of efficiency, accountability, responsiveness, democratic organization, and the law (Rosenbloom 1983b, 1988a). There are simply innumerable accounts of what public management is or ought to be, as a profession or academic enterprise.[9]

Kettl and Milward (1996, vii, 5) explicitly state that there is no precise definition of public management: "Public management has long been a field in search of structure. Its scholars and practitioners know what it is not: It is neither traditional public administration nor policy analysis. It borrows heavily from a host of disciplines. . . . It is self-evidently important." They go on to say that as competing academic disciplines have sought to lay claim to it, the "study of public management sometimes can resemble less an accumulation of knowledge and more a family feud."

Brudney, O'Toole, and Rainey (2000, 4) argue that "during the 1980s numerous prominent scholars with a variety of academic orientations began to converge on a new topic called 'public management.'" Distinct groups defined public management differently. For example, some see it as "normative discourse about such matters as administrative responsibility, ethics and social equity." Brudney and his colleagues go on to say that another group linked to business administration approaches public management more generically, viewing it in the context of organizational theory and behavior, human resources management, and strategic management. A third group of scholars, mainly from public policy programs, views it as an executive policymaking and strategic leadership function.[10]

From the standpoint of theory, the question shifts to "How do we study what public managers do?" But like public administration, the more urgent and divisive question is "What is the *best* way to study public management?"[11] The advent of public management resembles the arrival of behaviorism in public administration. In the 1970s and 1980s newly formed schools of public policy at Harvard and Princeton universities, among others, assumed the name public management to promote strategic thinking about, for example, the public policy process. According to this train of thought, public managers ought to behave in a rational, strategic manner.

The movement of public management from a theoretical perspective can partly be viewed as a repudiation of normative techniques in public administration, perhaps in response to the new public administration. As discussed in chapter 1, the new public administration, reacting critically to the forces of behaviorism in public administration, sought to promote a normative public administration (see Frederickson 1996).[12] In a veritable tug of war, those scholars branded as public management specialists, or at least a faction of them, sought to maintain a positivist focus to public administration, as introduced by the behaviorists. If public administration was to be mired in a morass of metaphysics, hermeneutics, and phenomenology, then a coterie of scholars would hang their hats in the emergent field of public management and classify it as a positivist enterprise. This is not to say that the entire field of public management can be portrayed in this fashion. On the contrary, notable scholars—Bob Behn, Pat Ingraham, Beryl Radin, George Frederickson, Barbara Romzek, Geert Bouckaert, and Don Kettl, to name a few—demonstrate analytical rigor in a postpositivist, qualitative tradition.

The new public management (NPM) is another development in public administration or public management, and it, too, lacks a consensus over its boundaries or identity. The term was coined by Christopher Hood (1991), who initially conceived of the NPM as a convergence of management, production engineering, and public choice theory. He stated that the "NPM, like most administrative labels, is a loose term. Its usefulness lies in its convenience as a shorthand name for the set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda in many of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] group of countries from the late 1970s" (Hood 1991, 3–4). He went on to say that the NPM represented a "marriage of two different streams of ideas. One partner was the 'new institutional economies.' It was built on the now very familiar story of the post–World War II development of public choice, transactions cost theory and principal–agent theory. . . . The other partner in the 'marriage' was the latest of a set of successive waves of business-type 'managerialism' in the public sector, in the tradition of the international scientific management movement" (Hood 1991, 5–6).

The NPM has morphed into a variety of shapes, but the commonality to all is its call for the application of private-sector management tools and techniques to the public sector (see Barzelay 2001). It has been dissected as part of the reinventing government craze (see Osborne and Gaebler 1992) as well as the National Performance Review, the reforms to the federal government in the 1990s during Bill Clinton's administration, which underscored the glories of the "free market" (see Radin 2006).

The global revolution led to a burgeoning of NPM studies, with a host of scholars using the template to study government reforms internationally (e.g., Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Aucoin 1995; Zifcak 1994; Savoie 1994; Kettl 2005). Most recently some have argued that the NPM has been augmented by newer types of reforms, and indeed, that the concept itself has fallen out of fashion (Dunleavy et al. 2006). For example, Christensen and Laegreid (2007) argue that there is a "post-NPM era," whereby different contextual and structural circumstances call for more suitable types of reform, at least in an international milieu. They point out that market ideology has become institutionalized in government settings and a degree of re-regulation has occurred, thus negating the market approaches called for by early NPM precepts. In addition, they point out that the drive toward devolution as initially championed by the NPM is no longer applicable given the strengthening of the central state capacity in the countries they examine—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand. They and others argue that the post-NPM era calls for new reforms.

In terms of epistemological deliberations, the NPM has more or less been spared.[13] To be sure, scholars have relied upon a variety of research traditions in studying the NPM. But as Frederickson (1996, 268) points out, in the context of the reinventing movement, issues of methodology and epistemology have not been central or contested. He notes that "direct recounting of the experiences of others" has been a popular tool and "issues of replication, verification, and peer review are largely neglected."

SOCIOLOGY

Sociology has not been spared the proverbial dissection into whether it has a governing paradigm. Burrell and Morgan (1979) made a case that there is no single paradigm to govern sociological research; rather, there is a diversity of theoretical and epistemic approaches. They argue that research into organizational and sociological life can be best understood and governed by any of four paradigms of sociological inquiry: functionalist sociology, interpretive sociology, radical humanism, and radical structuralism. Functionalism and radical structuralism are based on objectivism, positivism, and nomothetic methods, and they promote a status quo view of society, whereas interpretive and radical humanism are based on subjectivism, with a nominalist ontology, antipositivist or postpositivist epistemology, and ideographic methodology; the latter two assume that social systems are conflicting and dynamic (Eriksson 2006). Although some argued that the different paradigms could lead to "disciplinary fragmentation" in sociology (Reed 1993), others have stated that they in effect illustrate the diversity of approaches for studying sociological phenomena (Hancock and Tyler 2001).

Crane and Small (1992, 198–99) argue that there is an identity crisis in sociology because, despite some commonalities within specialized clusters in the field, "from an intellectual point of view, there are few issues on which members of a discipline are unanimous. While subgroups that crosscut various specialties will agree about the use of certain types of methods or theories, other subgroups are likely to favor alternative approaches." Moreover, like public administration, American sociology was "institutionalized 'before it had a distinctive intellectual content, a distinctive method, or even a point of view'" (Crane and Small 1992, 199, citing Oberschall 1972, 189). Crane and Small conclude that given the diversity of scope and foci in sociology, the field is not likely to gain a consensus

on epistemological and methodological issues, and hence cannot achieve paradigmatic status.

It was the behavioral movement's seepage into the field of sociology that led to intellectual debates about appropriate methodologies for study. As with other social science disciplines, the question revolved around the applicability of behaviorist methods to sociology. A key proponent of creating a unified set of theoretical and methodological principles for sociology was George Homans.[14] His book *The Human Group* (1950) laid out the foundation for his later work—in particular his 1958 essay, "Social Behavior as Exchange"—where he underscored the significance of explanatory power to social phenomena, propounding that sociological research should be deductive and based on the philosophy of logical positivism.[15]

Others in the field very early on resisted a behaviorist orientation for sociology. For example, Ellwood (1930, 74) argued that "the main reasons why purely behavioristic interpretations of human society must be inadequate are: (1) they do not show the true nature of the human social process, which is essentially a process of intercommunication; (2) they do not show the true nature of adult human behavior, which is essentially cultural; and (3) they fail to show the true nature of human institutions, which are essentially based upon values and valuing processes."[16]

Kaboolian (1996, 75) points out that "sociology was founded amidst the larger debate over the nature of social phenomena and the principles governing scientific inquiry." Interestingly, her 1996 essay was a response to calls for other branches of the social sciences to assist public management in moving away from "'case-based,' 'descriptive,' and 'atheoretical'" discourse or study. She notes that sociology can contribute epistemological, ontological, and methodological insights into public management, but that sociology, like other social sciences, has "an obligation to produce knowledge of 'dual relevance' to the worlds of theory and practice" (Kaboolian 1996, 75). Thus, as she states, despite intellectual debates about epistemology and methodology in the field, "Sociology treats social 'things' as social constructions. . . . Reality is not only tangible but can be defined both objectively and subjectively. . . . The consequences of subjective reality can be real" (Kaboolian 1996, 76).

In sum, sociology, as with other social sciences, cannot claim a guiding paradigm with shared ontological, epistemological, and methodological beliefs.

EDUCATION

A number of researchers in education have questioned whether their field is governed by a paradigmatic base or has experienced paradigm shifts. For

example, Patton (1990, 37) argued that a paradigm does exist, given his definition of the construct as "a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world. . . . Paradigms are deeply embedded in the socialization of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. Paradigms are normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or epistemological considerations."[17]

Others changed their interpretations of an existence of a paradigm in education research over time. Lincoln and Guba, for example, in their 1985 treatise *Naturalistic Inquiry*, held that a paradigm was eminent in the field, and they continued to espouse this belief. By 2000, however, they maintained that a single paradigm in the Kuhnian sense would never emerge to govern education research (Lincoln and Guba 2000).

Looking at the issue somewhat differently, Donmoyer (2006, 11) asks whether education researchers' acceptance of qualitative methods represented a paradigm shift: "For many educational researchers working in the 1970s and early 1980s, the growing interest in and acceptance of qualitative research during that time did not represent merely the availability of new methodological options. Rather, the field's embrace of qualitative methods was seen as a sign that the field was undergoing the sort of paradigm revolution that Thomas Kuhn . . . had talked about."

Donmoyer ultimately concluded that at the time the field of education was experiencing a methodological revolution, it was appropriate to adapt the paradigmatic nomenclature advanced by Kuhn, because those who did so defined paradigm in very broad, basic terms; the "culture" at the time permitted the adaptation, according to Donmoyer. However, he argues that there can never be a paradigm because of the continued existence of a wide rift in beliefs about appropriate and relevant research traditions in the field of education. Moreover, Donmoyer (2006, 23) goes on to say that the pursuit of a paradigm "is not a viable strategy for public policy fields, including the field of education. . . . In such fields, decision-makers must consider a variety of perspectives, some of which will almost certainly be antithetical, and either find a way to balance them or choose the perspective or combination of perspectives that are appropriate for a particular situation or a particular point in time. In public policy fields, in other words, paradigm convergence is neither possible nor desirable."

PSYCHOLOGY

As with the other social sciences, psychology has also been beleaguered by questions of whether it has a paradigmatic base, and what are its appropriate methods. In a very early essay, Lipsey (1974, 406) offers this insight:

> Weimer and Palermo [1973] quite rightly reject the all-too-popular pastime among psychologists of holding psychology up to the template of T. S. Kuhn's conception of scientific development and dogmatically pronouncing it paradigmatic, nonparadigmatic, or possibly pre-paradigmatic. Given a diversity of opinion, all we get from this exercise is the "yes, it is" / "no, it's not" game continued until we grow weary and disinterested. But Weimer and Palermo's rejection of template-matching occurs by way of an argument that psychology has had a paradigm (behaviourism) and a revolution (cognitive psychology), and thus is indeed paradigmatic—and we are left with the uneasy feeling that they have slipped in one final "yes, it is" while we were not looking.

By now this epistemological bantering may seem hackneyed. Yet the debates continue in the broad field of psychology (see, e.g., Staines 2008; Franco, Friedman, and Arons 2008; Borkovec and Castonguay 1998; Chambless and Hollon 1998; Weiss 1996; Binder 1996), as they do in other social sciences.[18] Lipsey (1974, 409–10) concludes with this very telling statement about the philosophy of science in the discipline of psychology: "A view from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge . . . reveals that many religious, political, social and intellectual groups are formed around shared beliefs and values. Moreover, such belief–value constellations occasionally undergo profound and even dramatic transformation. Scientists may be distinguished from other groups by the content of their shared beliefs and values and, most importantly, by their reliance on concrete problem-solutions as models for continued inquiry. Somewhere between Buddhism and biology, we find psychology. Our task is to describe its betweenness and learn what lessons we can for its future."

CONCLUSION

A seemingly clear, albeit illogical, thread seems to run through the social sciences as they question their identity, in particular the existence of a paradigmatic base. In some circles, there is derision for qualitative research as art based, metaphysical, and nonscientific. And a sloppy syllogism has emerged: Qualitative research is soft, squishy, not empirically based, and hence nonscientific. And, unfortunately, "nonscientific" ultimately translates into *nonfundable*, making it extremely challenging to secure federal or other types of funding for research in the "soft" social sciences. In fact, the divisions among political scientists over the field's scientificity has led to a congressional proposal to the National Science Foundation to cease

funding for their projects. Republican senator Tom Coburn, the proposal's author, argues that the foundation should be prohibited from "wasting any federal research funding on political science projects" (Cohen 2009, C1). The celebrated political scientist Joseph Nye of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University has argued that "'there are parts of the academy which, in the effort to be scientific, feel we should stay away from policy' because 'it interferes with science'" (Cohen 2009, C7). Nye acknowledges that the academy views quantitative research as more scientific. But as he warns, quantitative tools push political scientists "into narrow specializations, cut off from real-world concerns. The motivation . . . has overtaken the impulse to be relevant" (Cohen 2009, C7).

Good science has somehow become conflated with quantitative empiricism, in particular positivism. Thus if it is not based in logical positivism, it is pseudoscience. The constant struggles over epistemology, ontology, and methodology have culminated in a race to the bottom, which ultimately attenuates the quality and standing of any field in the social sciences.

In short public administration, like the other social sciences, has no paradigmatic base. And unlike several other branches of the social sciences, public administration is and will always be oriented toward practice, which is imbued with politics. Thus a multitude of research traditions and methodologies will always characterize the field; the relentless effort to promote science qua positivism, particularly in applied fields, only diminishes public administration's disciplinary standing in the broader arena of higher education.

NOTES

1. Also see deLeon 1997; Dryzek 1990; Danziger 1995.

2. Also see Yanow (2003), who discusses the positivist-qualitative research tradition. The political scientists at the University of California, Berkeley, perhaps best represent this view. The approach taken in this book does not correspond with this view.

3. But see Goertz (2006), who seeks to bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative research by connecting more closely the concepts surrounding each. Also see Thomas 2008.

4. The term was elaborated upon by Lasswell and McDougal (1943). For a discussion, see Auer 2007; Fischer 1998.

5. For a discussion of the evolution of policy analysis from the standpoint of practice, see Radin (1997, 2000). As Stillman (1991, 127) points out, policy studies

began in the mid-1950s at Harvard, Berkeley, Yale, and other university departments of political science across the country. In the 1960s and early 1970s new departments and schools devoted exclusively to policy studies or analysis emerged.

6. There are others who may not classify themselves squarely in the field of policy analysis, but they have offered important alternative methods or critiques of efforts to saturate that field in a logical positivist tradition. See, e.g., Fischer 1998; Yin 2009. For early treatments, see Dror 1967; Kaplan 1986; Yanow 1987.

7. For a more detailed discussion of the history of public management and its elusive nature, see Hood 2007; Brudney, O'Toole, and Rainey 2000, 4–5.

8. See, e.g., Stivers 2000; Rainey 1990, 2003; Behn 1988, 1991, 1995, 1996; Ingraham 1995, 2007; Kettl 1993, 2005; Hood 2007. Also see, e.g., Lynn 1996; Perry 1993, 1996; Bozeman 1987, 1993; Ingraham and Romzek 1994; O'Leary 2006; O'Leary and Bingham 2009; Guy 1992, 1993.

9. As a movement, some see public management as a repudiation of the centrality of bureaucracy in executive government.

10. Conferences sponsored by the Public Management Research Association (PMRA) sought to bring together the different traditions and streams of theory around public management. Briefly, in 1991, a group of scholars from various disciplinary fields—including public management, public administration, and political science—convened a conference at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University; it was the first National Conference on Public Management Research, out of which grew the PMRA, which holds a national conference on public management biennially. As Frederickson (1999, 1–2) points out, the conference "brought together a community of scholars with a shared interest in empirical social science research on public organizations, broadly defined, and on the development of testable theories of public policy and management." For a discussion, also see Brudney, O'Toole, and Rainey 2000.

11. See Bozeman (1993), a collection of papers presented at the first National Public Management Research Conference in 1991 in Syracuse. Its main focus was on how to study public management.

12. See Riccucci 2001.

13. But see Roberts and Bradley 1999, Ventriss 2000, and Drechsler 2005, who argue that epistemologically, the NPM is predisposed to quantification. Compare with Adams 2000 and other articles in his symposium, which address the NPM from a qualitative, postmodern perspective.

14. Also see the work of Lawrence Joseph Henderson (1935), another central figure who also supported the application of behaviorist methods to sociology. Henderson's ideas are captured by Homans (1950) in *The Human Group*.

15. Also see the work of Emerson 1972.

16. Also see Ellwood 1933; MacIver 1930.

17. Also see Shulman 1986; Erickson 1986.

18. Other examples can be seen in economics—see Medema and Samuels 2003; Ferber and Nelson 1993. However, Crane and Small (1992) argue that economics is an anomalous branch of the social sciences in that there is more consensus in the field around its epistemological and methodological bases.