**Matching and Market Design**

Matteo Triossi

Cómo asignar personas u objetos a otras personas o empresas es un importante problema de la teoría de la elección social. Podemos citar varios ejemplos relevantes como la asignación de estudiantes a las escuelas, las admisiones a las universidades universidad y la donación de órganos.   
La teoría del matching que tiene una importante tradición y un conjunto bien definido de herramientas.

El objetivo de este curso es acercar los estudiantes a la teoría y las aplicaciones de esta teoría y ponerlos en contacto con la investigación de frontera sobre tales argumentos. Vamos a utilizar la mayor parte de nuestro tiempo a discutir problemas reales y relevantes en la teoría de la asignación (por ejemplo: asignación de estudiantes a escuela, de trabajadores a empresas, de órganos de donantes vivos a enfermos, etc.), artículos que buscan solucionar estos problemas y posibles nuevas preguntas. Haremos énfasis en los desarrollos más recientes de la disciplina. Por lo tanto, algunas secciones de este programa pueden estar sujetas a cambios.

Semanas 1. Mercados bilaterales: una introducción.

Semana 2 Diseño de mercados laborales: National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).

Semana 3. Elección de escuelas: resultados básicos y desarrollos recientes.

Semanas 4 y 5. Equidad. Matching con preferencias complejas.

En el caso, improbable, en que alcance el tiempo se podrán agregar argumentos de Mercados Unilaterales como métodos de asignación para la asignación de órganos de donantes vivos.

**Evaluación**

A lo largo del curso se asignarán tres tareas.

Además los estudiantes presentarán artículos académicos de teoría de la asignación.

De manera optativa, pueden entregar un trabajo final donde se traten algunos desarrollos recientes de la teoría o bien un proyecto de trabajo de investigación original.

Se espera que los estudiantes atiendan el "Workshop en Matching and Market Design" del 5 y 6 Diciembre organizado en el Departamento.

La formula para calcular la nota final es max {6 (NT + NP)/14 + NTF/7, 6 (NT + NTF)/14 + NP/7}

Donde

NT = promedio nota tareas;

NP = Nota presentación;

NTF = Nota trabajo final.

Si observan, NTF se puede remplazar con la NP y no es posible asegurarse 7 sin NT, NTF, y NP.

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**Web**

Al Roth's website <http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html>

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