Diminished Parties

Democratic Representation in Contemporary Latin America

Edited by

JUAN PABLO LUNA
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

RAFAEL PIÑEIRO RODRÍGUEZ
Universidad Católica del Uruguay

FERNANDO ROSENBLATT
Universidad Diego Portales

GABRIEL VOMMARO
Universidad Nacional de San Martín/CONICET

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781316513187
DOI: 10.1017/9781009072045

© Cambridge University Press 2022

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-316-51318-7 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

List of Figures — *page* x
List of Tables — xi
List of Contributors — xii
Acknowledgments — xviii
List of Abbreviations — xx

1 Introduction
Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez, Fernando Rosenblatt, and Gabriel Vommaro — 1
Parties and Democracy: A Necessary Reassessment — 4
Conceptualization, Operationalization, and Measurement — 7
Typology of Political Parties and Diminished Subtypes — 17
Overview — 23

2 The Case of Uruguay's Frente Amplio
Verónica Pérez Bentancur, Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Fernando Rosenblatt — 29
Introduction — 29
The FA as a Political Party — 32
Horizontal Coordination — 35
The Party Coordinates in Electoral Campaigns — 35
The Party Coordinates in Office — 37
Vertical Interest Aggregation — 38
The Party Electorally Mobilizes Collective Interests — 39
Intermediation and Channeling of Collective Demands — 42

Conclusions: The FA Organizational Structure and Democratic Representation 46

3 Horizontal Coordination and Vertical Aggregation Mechanisms of the PRO in Argentina and Its Subnational Variations
Gabriel Vommaro 48
Introduction 48
The Difficult Construction of a Competitive Right-Wing Party in Argentina 50
Horizontal Coordination: Centralized Control and Partisan Division of Labor 53
Vertical Interest Aggregation: Partisan Means and Territorial Implementation 58
Subnational Variations: From Political Party to Unrooted Party 61
Conclusions 67

4 Bolivia's Movement toward Socialism: A Political Party Based on and Anchored in Social Movements
Santiago Anria 70
Introduction 70
Movement-Based Parties 72
The MAS as a Movement-Based Party 75
Origins and Evolution 77
Weak Party Structures 81
Horizontal Coordination and Vertical Interest Aggregation 83
Candidate Selection 83
Policymaking 87
Conclusions 90

5 The Complex Interaction between Vertical Interest Aggregation and Horizontal Coordination: The PRD and MORENA in Mexico
Hélène Combes 93
Introduction 93
New Parties in a Partial Democracy 96
The PRD 96
MORENA 98
Impact of Vertical Aggregation on Horizontal Coordination 101
From Construction to Institutionalization (1989–1997) 101
Consolidation that Weakened the PRD and Promoted Divisions 104

Mexico's Parties and Democratic Representation 108
Conclusions 110

6 PLN and PAC: Two Costa Rican Parties with Constituencies Evolving in Opposite Directions
Ronald Alfaro-Redondo and Steffan Gómez-Campos 111
Introduction 111
Brief Historical Background of the PLN and the PAC 112
Horizontal Coordination in the PLN and the PAC 113
In Elections 114
Between Elections 115
Vertical Integration in the PLN and the PAC 120
Intermediation and Channeling of Collective Demands 121
Electoral Mobilizing of Collective Interests 122
Conclusions 126

7 The Case of the Traditional Parties in Paraguay
Diego Abente Brun 129
Introduction 129
From Political to Electoral Machines 130
Vertical Interest Aggregation 136
Horizontal Coordination 144
Conclusions 148

8 The Colombian Liberal Party and Conservative Party: From Political Parties to Diminished Subtypes
Laura Wills-Otero, Bibiana Ortega, and Viviana Sarmiento 151
Introduction 151
Origins and Trajectory 152
Horizontal Coordination 159
Horizontal Coordination during Elections 160
Horizontal Coordination between Elections 164
Vertical Interest Aggregation 168
Electoral Mobilization of Collective Interests 168
Existence of Formal and Informal Links with Civil Society Organizations 169
Conclusions 171

9 "Normal" Parties in Extraordinary Times: The Case of Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular in Venezuela
Jennifer Cyr 173
Introduction 173
Classifying Primero Justicia 174
Horizontal Coordination 176
Horizontal Coordination during Elections 176

Horizontal Coordination between Elections 177
Vertical Interest Aggregation 178
Primero Justicia, by Way of Conclusion 182
Classifying Voluntad Popular 182
Horizontal Coordination 183
Horizontal Coordination during Elections 183
Horizontal Coordination between Elections 185
Vertical Interest Aggregation 186
Voluntad Popular, by Way of Conclusion 188
The Challenges of Party Building in Nondemocracies 189
The Struggle to Exercise Power 189
Repression, Polarization, and Opposition Coordination 191
Conclusions 195

10 Diminished by Design: Ecuador's Alianza PAIS
Catherine M. Conaghan 197
Introduction 197
From Movement to Government 201
State over Party 206
Leader-Controlled Coordination 210
From *Correismo* to *Morenismo* 213
Lost Decade: Representation Relegated 217

11 The Chilean PPD: A Loose Confederation of Leaders
Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez, Fernando Rosenblatt, and Sergio Toro Maureira 220
Introduction 220
The Context of the Birth and the Evolution of the PPD 222
The PPD as a Group of Independents 225
Horizontal Coordination 226
Vertical Interest Aggregation 232
Conclusions 234

12 *Fujimorismo* and the Limits of Democratic Representation in Peru, 2006–2020
Alberto Vergara and María Claudia Augusto 236
Introduction 236
Brief Historical Background 237
Horizontal Coordination: From Mystique to Fratricidal Confrontation 238
Vertical Aggregation: Organization and Ideas 247
A Programmatic Vehicle? 248
The Party Organization 252
Fujimorismo in Reality 255

Parties and Democracy: Beyond Horizontal and Vertical Capacities 260
Conclusions 261

13 The Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza: Guatemala's Only True Political Party?
Omar Sanchez-Sibony and Jonatán Lemus 264
Introduction 264
The Origins and Early Trajectory of the UNE 265
Horizontal Coordination in the UNE 268
UNE's Candidate Selection: Personalistic and Clientelistic Dynamics 269
Scant Coordination between Center and Local UNE Governments 273
Party Discipline in Congress 274
Vertical Aggregation 275
Mobilization of Collective Interests 275
The UNE in Power: The Nonintermediation of Social Demands 280
Conclusions 285
Appendix: List of Interviewees 288

14 Conclusions
Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez, Fernando Rosenblatt, and Gabriel Vommaro 289

References 299
Name Index 326
Organization Index 329
Subject Index 334

Figures

1.1	Political party attributes	*page* 9
1.2	Indicators of horizontal coordination	12
1.3	Indicators of vertical interest aggregation	14
1.4	A typology of political parties and diminished subtypes	19
1.5	Empirical distribution of types	22
6.1	Basic party structure specified by electoral law	118
6.2	Winning Political Party by Constituency, 2002–2018	124
6.3	Classification of *Votómetro* responses by party affiliation and in terms of economic and cultural values	127
8.1	Local elections	158
8.2	National elections	159
11.1	Seats and votes, 1993–2017	223
11.2	PPD's percentage of the vote in municipal elections, 1992–2016	224
11.3	Rice index evolution	229
11.4	Loyalty index evolution	231
12.1	Perceived characteristics attributed to Keiko Fujimori	250
12.2	Fujimorista candidates and electoral success, 2010–2018	254
13.1	Votes in congressional elections, 1985–2019	270
13.2	Key moments in UNE party switching, 2001–2019	276

Tables

1.1 Component and overall party index scores *page* 18
3.1 Appointment of PRO leaders to elective and nonelective positions according to level of partisan involvement 57
3.2 Appointment of PRO leaders to elective and nonelective positions, by faction 57
3.3 Number of districts in which the PRO competed in national elections, according to electoral labels, 2003–2013 65
4.1 Representatives' occupations prior to being elected to Congress 86
5.1 Profile of López Obrador's supporters 99
7.1 Level of partisanship, 2017 135
7.2 Number of municipalities won by party 141
7.3 Party share votes in national elections (presidential, senate, and representatives) 144
8.1 Number of lists registered for the senate election, 1986–1998 163
8.2 Number and type of lists registered by the PL and the PC in legislative elections, 2006–2018 163
10.1 Vote percentage for the AP candidates in national-level elections and AP-endorsed positions in referendums 198
11.1 Adherents by party 225
12.1 Composition of presidential tickets 241
12.2 Composition of the FP's CEN 242
12.3 Perceived programmatic attributes of *Fujimorismo* 249
12.4 Average intention to vote (percentage) for *Fujimorismo* by level of government, 2010–2018 253
13.1 Electoral performance of the UNE, 2003–2019 269

Contributors

DIEGO ABENTE BRUN is Professor and Director of the Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University since 2019. Previously, he was Professor of Political Science at Miami University of Ohio (1984–93). He has authored and edited more than forty books, chapters, and articles in academic journals such as *Comparative Politics*, *Latin American Research Review*, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, and *Journal of Inter-American Affairs*. During the period between his two academic positions, he spent ten years in government as Senator, Ambassador, and Minister of Justice and Labour in Paraguay and over a decade in democracy promotion and the OAS.

RONALD ALFARO-REDONDO received his PhD in political science from the University of Pittsburgh and is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Costa Rica. His research emphasizes electoral politics, electoral systems, political parties, voter turnout, public opinion, and political culture. His research has been published in *Electoral Studies*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, and *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*. His book *Divide y votarás* was published in 2019 by the University of Costa Rica and Programa Estado de la Nación.

SANTIAGO ANRIA is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies at Dickinson College. His research focuses on social movements and parties in Latin America and has appeared in journals including *Comparative Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Journal of*

Democracy, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, and *Latin American Politics and Society*. He is the author of *When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge University Press 2018).

MARÍA CLAUDIA AUGUSTO earned a degree in political science and government at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, where she is a teaching assistant. From 2017 to 2019 she worked as a research assistant at Universidad del Pacífico, Perú. Her research focuses on state capacity, political representation, and subnational politics.

HÉLÈNE COMBES earned a PhD in political science from Université la Sorbonne Nouvelle and is CNRS researcher at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Studies (CERI). Since 2017, she has been Editor-in-Chief of the academic journal *Critique Internationale*. Her research focuses on political parties and social movements in Latin America, particularly in Mexico. She has authored and coedited several books, including *Faire parti: Trajectoires de gauche au Mexique* (Karthala 2011); *Pensar y mirar la protesta* (coedited with Sergio Tamayo and Michael Voegtli, Ediciones de la UAM 2015); *Les lieux de la colère: Occuper l’ñce pour contester de Madrid à Sanaa* (coedited with David Garibay and Camille Goirand, Karthala 2016); and *El clientelismo político* (with Gabriel Vommaro, Siglo XXI 2017).

CATHERINE M. CONAGHAN is Professor Emerita of Political Studies and an Andean specialist at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario. Her research on parties, interest groups, and regimes has included extensive fieldwork in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. She has been a visiting scholar at Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, American University, and the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-Ecuador. She was appointed as the visiting Knapp Chair at the University of San Diego in 2000 and as the Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Latin American Politics at Queen’s University (2013–18).

JENNIFER CYR is Associate Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies at the University of Arizona. She examines representation, identity, and institutional change in Latin America and studies the integration of qualitative methods into mixed-methods research. She has published two books with Cambridge University Press: *The Fates of Political Parties: Institutional Crisis, Continuity, and Change in Latin America* (2017) and *Focus Groups for the Social Science Researcher*

(2019). She has also published in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Comparative Politics*, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, *Quality & Quantity*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *Sociological Methods and Research*, and *Revista de Ciencia Política*.

STEFFAN GÓMEZ-CAMPOS received his MSc in transition studies at Giessen University, Germany, and is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Costa Rica. His research focuses on democracy and development, political parties, elections, data mining, and data visualization. His research has been published in *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, and *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*.

JONATÁN LEMUS is currently a PhD student in political science at the University of Texas at Austin. From 2016 to 2019 he was a lecturer at the Universidad Francisco Marroquin, where he taught courses on comparative politics. He graduated from Harvard University with a BA in government in 2012 and holds a Master's degree in business administration from UNIS Business School. He previously worked as Director of Research at the CACIF business association (2014–16), consultant at Rafael Landívar University (2014) and as a researcher at the Association for Research and Social Studies (ASIES) in Guatemala (2012–13). His publications include "The private sector and political parties: Guatemala, a case study" which appeared in the *Journal of Politics and Society*. His academic interests focus on political parties and judicial politics. Mr. Lemus frequently provides political analysis and opinion to various Guatemalan newspaper and television outlets.

JUAN PABLO LUNA is Professor of Political Science at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. He received his PhD in political science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of *Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies* (Oxford University Press 2014) and co-authored *Latin American Party Systems* (Cambridge University Press 2010). In 2014, he coedited along with Cristobal Rovira *The Resilience of the Latin American Right* (Johns Hopkins University).

BIBIANA ORTEGA is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Colombia. She received her Master's degree and PhD in political science from Universidad de los Andes, her Master's in sociology and Bachelor in political science from Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and her Master's in public

administration and management from the INAP-Universidad de Alcalá, Spain. Her research interests include the relationship between politics and religion, especially the evangelical political parties, as well as political participation of women, elections and political parties, and Colombian politics.

VERÓNICA PÉREZ BENTANCUR received her PhD in political science at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina, and is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Departamento de Ciencia Política, Universidad de la República, Uruguay. Her research focuses on Latin American politics, political parties, and gender and politics. Her research has been published in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Gender and Politics*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, and *Revista Debates*. In collaboration with Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez and Fernando Rosenblatt, she has coauthored *How Party Activism Survives: Uruguay's Frente Amplio*, published in 2020 by Cambridge University Press. This book received the Leon Epstein Outstanding Book Award from the Political Organizations and Parties section of the American Political Science Association.

RAFAEL PIÑEIRO RODRÍGUEZ received his PhD in political science from Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and is Associate Professor at the Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Católica del Uruguay. His research focuses on transparency, party financing, and party organizations. He has published in *Governance*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Party Politics*, *Government Information Quarterly*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, *Latin American Research Review*, *Journal of Democracy*, *Política y Gobierno*, and *Revista de Ciencia Política*, among others. In collaboration with Verónica Pérez Bentancur and Fernando Rosenblatt, he has coauthored *How Party Activism Survives: Uruguay's Frente Amplio*, published in 2020 by Cambridge University Press. This book received the Leon Epstein Outstanding Book Award from the Political Organizations and Parties section of the American Political Science Association.

FERNANDO ROSENBLATT received his PhD in political science from Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Diego Portales. He has published in *Perspectives on Politics*, *Governance*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Party Politics*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, *Latin American Research Review*, *Democratization*, *Política y Gobierno*, and *Revista de*

Ciencia Política. His book *Party Vibrancy and Democracy in Latin America* was published in 2018 by Oxford University Press. In collaboration with Verónica Pérez and Rafael Piñeiro, he has coauthored *How Party Activism Survives: Uruguay's Frente Amplio*, published in 2020 by Cambridge University Press. This book received the Leon Epstein Outstanding Book Award from the Political Organizations and Parties section of the American Political Science Association.

OMAR SANCHEZ-SIBONY is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas State University. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Oxford and holds Master's degrees from the London School of Economics and Georgetown University. His research focuses on the politics of economic reform, taxation, party systems, and competitive authoritarianism in Latin America. He has published on these topics in journals such as *Party Politics*, *Democratization*, *World Development*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, and others. His first book was *Mobilizing Resources in Latin America: The Political Economy of Tax Reform* (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) and his recently completed book *Democracies without Parties: the Case of Peru* is forthcoming from Palgrave Macmillan. He is the editor of a two-volume work in progress on Guatemala's democratic institutions and state-society relations.

VIVIANA SARMIENTO works as a researcher at *Congreso Visible*, the legislative observatory of the Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. She received a BA in political science, from Universidad de los Andes, and an MSc in politics and communications from the London School of Economics (2018). Her research focuses on elections, political parties, and legislative studies.

SERGIO TORO MAUREIRA is Associate Professor and President of the Information Center for Democracy at the Universidad de Concepción, Chile. He studies the logic of representation in Latin American political systems and the science of information for public policies and has directed nationally (FONDECYT, FONDEF, etc.) and internationally (UNDP, IDB) funded projects on both subjects. His work has been published in the *Journal of Legislative Studies*, *Electoral Studies*, *European Journal of Political Economy*, *Latin American Research Bulletin*, and *World Political Science Review*, among others. From 2014 to 2016 he served as the elected president of the Chilean Association of Political Science.

ALBERTO VERGARA teaches in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the Universidad del Pacífico in Lima, Peru. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Montreal. His two most recent books are *Acercamientos al Perú de hoy desde las ciencias sociales*, coedited with Felipe Portocarrero (Fondo editorial de la Universidad del Pacífico 2019), and *Politics after Violence: Legacies of the Shining Path Conflict in Peru* coedited with Hillel Soifer (Texas University Press 2019).

GABRIEL VOMMARO is Full Professor at the Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales, University of San Martín and researcher in the Argentinian National Research Council. He received his PhD from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. He has published on political activism and political parties, political clientelism and the state, and political communication. His books include *La larga marcha de Cambiemos* (Siglo XXI 2017), *Mundo PRO* (Planeta 2015) with S. Morresi and A. Bellotti; and *Sociologie du clientélisme* (La découverte 2015; with H. Combes). His research has been published in *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, *Party Politics*, and *Journal of Latin American Studies*, among others.

LAURA WILLS-OTERO is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia. She received her PhD from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include institutional change, political parties' internal features and electoral trajectories, subnational politics, and legislative studies. She focuses on Latin American politics, and particularly on Colombian politics. Her work has been published in the *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2020) and in the journals *Party Politics*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, and *Colombia Internacional*, among others.

Acknowledgments

This book was possible thanks to the invaluable commitment of all the contributors. We are grateful for the various sources of funding that we received for this project. Fernando Rosenblatt acknowledges support from ANID Fondecyt #1190072 and ANID REDI #170101. Juan Pablo Luna acknowledges support from ANID Fondecyt #1190345; the Millennium Institute for Research on Violence and Democracy – VIODEMOS; and the Center for Applied Ecology and Sustainability (CAPES), Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile. Fernando Rosenblatt and Juan Pablo Luna also acknowledge the support they received from the Millennium Institute for Foundational Research on Data – Code ICN17_002. Rafael Piñeiro thanks the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores of the Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación of Uruguay (ANII) for financial support associated with the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (SNI_2015_2_1006237). Gabriel Vommaro acknowledges support from the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica, PICT 2010047 and from the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) of Argentina.

We also express our deepest gratitude to Sara Doskow, our editor at Cambridge University Press. Her guidance and support throughout the process was invaluable in moving the project forward and to completion. Chapter 1 was published in the journal *Party Politics* as an article entitled, "Political Parties, Diminished Sub-types and Democracy," 2021, Vol. 27 (2) 294–307. We are thankful to the journal's editor, Paul Webb, for permission to reproduce the paper here. David Schwartz provided valuable editing services and help with many

aspects of the book, all of which greatly improved our work. The editors also want to thank Ursula Acton for her excellent professional work during the copy editing stage.

The project has been enriched by thoughtful comments contributed by many generous colleagues. In 2018, for example, we organized a workshop at the Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. We are deeply grateful to Santiago Anria, Laura Wills-Otero, and Verónica Pérez Bentancur for the time they devoted to helping us develop our theoretical framework. We presented early versions of different chapters of this book at the 2019 annual conference of the Latin American Studies Association, where we received thoughtful remarks from Kenneth Roberts. In 2019, we also presented our framework at the seminar of the Observatorio de Partidos Políticos, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, organized by Juan Manuel Abal Medina, Gerardo Scherlis, and Carlos Varetto. In 2021, Gerardo Munck organized a mini-workshop to discuss the introduction and conclusion to this book. Besides Munck's own comments and critiques, we benefited from comments and reactions by Ana Arjona, Agustina Giraudy, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Andreas Schedler, Alisha Holland, Candelaria Garay, Daniel Brinks, Deborah Yashar, Kent Eaton, Lucas González, María Paula Saffon, Maritza Paredes, Paula Muñoz, Richard Snyder, Sandra Ley, Sebastian Mazzuca, and Silvia Otero-Bahamon. We also thank the two anonymous reviewers of the book and two anonymous reviewers of the paper published in *Party Politics* Volume 27 #2. Their comments helped us to streamline the theory and improve the empirical analysis.

Finally, we thank our families and friends, too numerous to mention, for the many ways they have supported us throughout this project.

Abbreviations

AD	Acción Democrática (Democratic Action)
ALDF	Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal (Legislative Assembly of the Federal District)
AMLO	Andrés Manuel López Obrador
ANAPO	Alianza Nacional Popular (National Popular Alliance)
ANN	Alianza Nueva Nación (New Nation Alliance)
ANR	Asociación Nacional Republicana (National Republican Association)
AP	Movimiento Alianza PAIS (PAIS Alliance Movement)
APRA	Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Revolutionary Popular Alliance)
ARI	Argentina por una República de Iguales (Argentina for a Republic of Equals)
AU	Asamblea Uruguay (Uruguayan Assembly)
CC	Coalición Cívica (Civic Coalition)
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CEN	Comité Ejecutivo Nacional (National Executive Committee)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CICIG	Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala)
CIDOB	Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (Bolivian Confederation of Eastern Indigenous Peoples)

CNE	Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council)
CNI	Congreso Nacional Indígena (National Indigenous Congress)
CNMCIOB-BS	Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia – Bartolina Sisa (Bartolina Sisa National Confederation of Campesino, Indigenous, and Native Women of Bolivia)
CNOC	Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinal (National Coordinator of Peasants Organizations)
CNT	Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (National Workers Convention)
COMUDE	Consejos Municipales de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural (Municipal Councils of Urban and Rural Development)
CON	Congreso Nacional Ordinario (Regular National Congress)
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador)
CONAMAQ	Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu)
CONIC	Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (National Indigenous and Peasants Coordinator)
COS	Colectivo de Organizaciones Sociales (Social Organizations Collective)
CRC	Comités de la Revolución Ciudadana (Citizens' Revolution Committees)
CREO	Movimiento Creando Oportunidades (Creating Opportunities Movement)
CSCIB	Confederación Sindical Intercultural de Comunidades de Bolivia (Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia)
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unique Confederation of Rural Laborer of Bolivia)

CUC	Comité de Unidad Campesina (Peasants' Unity Committee)
CUT	Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores (Unitary Workers' Confederation)
DC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DGEEC	Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos (General Office of Statistics, Surveys and Census)
DSV	Double Simultaneous Vote
EDE	Encuentro por la Democracia y la Equidad (Meeting for Democracy and Equity)
EFA	Equipo Federal de Activistas (Federal Team of Activists)
EMA	Equipos Municipales de Activistas (Municipal Teams of Activists)
ENA	Equipo Nacional de Activistas (National Team of Activists)
EPA	Equipos Parroquiales de Activistas (Parrish Teams of Activists)
ERA	Equipo Regional de Activistas (Regional Teams of Activists)
FA	Frente Amplio (Broad Front)
FAES	Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales (Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies)
FAP	Frente Amplio Progresista (Broad Progressive Front)
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército Popular (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FEI	Federación de Indios (Indigenous Federation)
FENACLE	Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (National Confederation of Peasants, Indigenous, and Black Organizations)
FLS	Frente Líber Seregni (Líber Seregni Front)
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front)
FN	Frente Nacional (National Front)

FONAPAZ	Fondo Nacional para la Paz (National Fund for Peace)
FP	Fuerza Popular (Popular Strength)
Frepaso	Frente País Solidario (Solidary Country Front)
FRG	Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (Guatemalan Republican Front)
GANA	Gran Alianza Nacional (Grand National Alliance)
INE	Instituto Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Institute, Mexico)
IRI	International Republican Institute
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism)
MAS-U	Movimiento al Socialismo – Unzaguista (Movement toward Socialism – Unzaguista)
MIFAPRO	Mi Familia Progresa (My Family Progresses)
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MODIN	Movimiento por la Dignidad Nacional (Movement for the National Dignity)
MORENA	Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (National Regeneration Movement)
MPD	Movimiento Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Movement)
MPP	Movimiento de Participación Popular (Popular Participation Movement)
MRL	Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (Liberal Revolutionary Movement)
MUD	Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (Democratic Unity Roundtable)
MUP	Movimiento Urbano Popular (Popular Urban Movement)
MVR	Movimiento Quinta República (Fifth Republic Movement)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OTAC	Oficina Técnica de Atención al Candidato (Technical Office of Candidate Support)
PAC	Partido de Acción Ciudadana (Citizen Action Party)
PAIS	Movimiento Patria Altiva y Soberana (Proud Sovereign Country Movement)
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party)

PC	Partido Conservador (Conservative Party)
PCCh	Partido Comunista de Chile (Communist Party, Chile)
PCU	Partido Comunista del Uruguay (Communist Party)
PDC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Uruguay (Christian Democratic Party)
PdelT	Partido del Trabajo (Party of Work)
PDVSA	Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (Venezuelan Oil Company)
PEMEX	Petróleos Mexicanos (Mexican Oil Company)
PEN	Programa Estado de la Nación (State of the Nation Program)
PIT-CNT	Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores – Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (Interunion Workers Plenary – National Workers Convention)
PJ	Primero Justicia (Justice First)
PL	Partido Liberal (Liberal Party)
PLN	Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party)
PLRA	Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (Authentic Radical Liberal Party)
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement)
PN	Partido Nacional (National Party)
PND	Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Plan)
PPD	Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy)
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution)
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
PRN	Partido Restauración Nacional (National Restoration Party)
PRO	Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal)
PSC	Partido Social Cristiano (Social Christian Party)
PSCh	Partido Socialista de Chile (Chilean Socialist Party)
PSD	Partido Socialista Democrático (Democratic Socialist Party)
PSFA	Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio (Socialist Party-Broad Front)

PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party)
PSU	Partido Socialista del Uruguay (Socialist Party of Uruguay)
PSUV	Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party)
PUSC	Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (United Social Christian Party)
PVP	Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo (Party for the Victory of the People)
Recrear	Recrear para el Crecimiento (Recreate for Growth)
RED	Asociación Red de Maestros y Maestras (Teachers' Network Association)
RENAP	Registro Nacional de las Personas (National People's Registry)
RN	Renovación Nacional (National Renewal)
SDL	Fortalecimiento y Transparencia de la Democracia (Strengthening and Transparency of Democracy Law)
SERVEL	Servicio Electoral (Electoral Service, Chile)
SOCMA	Macri Societies Corporation
TIPNIS	Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park)
TSJE	Tribunal Superior de Justicia Electoral (Supreme Electoral Justice Court)
UAM	Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (Autonomous Metropolitan University, México)
UASP	Unidad de Acción Sindical y Popular (Popular and Union Action Unity)
UCeDe	Unión del Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre)
UCR	Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union)
UDI	Unión Demócrata Independiente (Democratic Independent Union)

UNE	Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (National Unity of Hope)
UNT	Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Time)
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)
VP	Voluntad Popular (Popular Will)

1

Introduction

Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez, Fernando Rosenblatt, and Gabriel Vommaro

More often than not, contemporary works on political parties start by referring to Schattschneider's now-famous dictum concerning democracy's need for political parties. At the same time, many authors have identified parties that, in democratic contexts, fail in various ways to fulfill the function of democratic representation. Mainstream political science has defined a political party as a group of candidates who compete in elections (Downs 1957 and Schlesinger 1994, among many others). This minimal definition has important analytical implications. When analyzing electoral politics, we run the risk of looking for parties – and thus, finding them – without realizing that what we have found, empirically, is only weakly related to democratic representation. In this introduction to the edited volume we present a thick definition of political parties to provide a conceptual framework for classifying different diminished subtypes of political parties in democratic regimes. The volume builds upon the rich literature concerning political parties that highlights the ways in which many party organizations are failing to fulfill their representational role in contemporary democracies. The empirical chapters that follow this introduction apply our conceptual framework to analyze seventeen parties in twelve Latin American countries.

Minimalist definitions of political party (i.e., Schlesinger's 1994) seem disconnected from reality, that is, the proliferation of electoral vehicles that do not function as parties. The sole attribute of the minimalist definition of a political party is not theoretically linked to a central aspect of democracy, namely the representation of social interests and values. As Kitschelt (2000) claims, parties "in the institutional sense" can be defined as in the minimalist definition. However, parties in the "functional sense"

are those that “solve problems of collective action and of collective choice” (848). The conventional minimalist definition of political party fails to capture two main attributes of parties: horizontal coordination of ambitious politicians and vertical interest aggregation. However, the party politics literature has emphasized the horizontal coordination of ambitious politicians (Aldrich 1995)[1] while the vertical aggregation of collective interests has been problematized in the political sociology literature (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Schwartz 1990). Vertical interest aggregation is also related to parties’ expressive function (Sartori 1976).

The mainstream definition of political party assigns the same analytical category (political party) to very different empirical objects. This approach does not distinguish between different kinds of political parties. Recent empirical research conflates political organizations that a thicker theoretical perspective would consider dissimilar entities that have different effects on the democratic process. As Sartori (1976) stresses, the minimalist definition does not suffice to adequately differentiate the various kinds of political organization. The minimalist definition of political party also lacks predictive or explanatory capacity. In this edited volume, we seek to analyze Latin America’s recent party trajectories as an empirical reference for exploring a new conceptual framework for studying political parties, one that includes diminished subtypes. Although we draw our empirical examples from Latin America, our framework is applicable to any region.

There is a recent body of research that has sought to unpack the black box of party organizations (Anria 2018; Bolleyer and Ruth 2018; Calvo and Murillo 2019; Cyr 2017; Levitsky et al. 2016; Luna 2014; Madrid 2012; Pérez Bentancur, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt 2020; Rosenblatt 2018; Vommaro and Morresi 2015). Notwithstanding this renewed interest in the study of party organizations in Latin America, there remains a significant lack of theorized mechanisms and attributes of the concept of political party that connect parties to democratic representation. In her *Annual Review* article, Stokes (1999) claims that it remains unsettled whether parties are good for democracy or instead a necessary evil (244). The author rightly notes that this relationship heavily depends on the definition of democracy: “Do parties reveal and aggregate voters’ preferences such that governments are responsive to citizens? Or do

[1] Aldrich (1995) emphasizes that parties, as political institutions, solve collective action and social choice problems within the government and for electoral mobilization.

parties form oligopolies of competitors with interests and preferences at odds with those of voters?" (Stokes 1999, 248–249).

The literature has identified various pitfalls party organizations encounter in various contexts and thus has highlighted the fact that many parties do not fulfill the expectation of contributing to democratic representation. However, the weak conceptualization of diminished political party subtypes lessens the analytical value of the study of parties. These problems of conceptualization neglect an important way in which political parties differ not simply in degree but in kind.[2] Moreover, the literature tends to conflate the age of a party with its degree of consolidation qua political party. An electoral vehicle might emerge as a political party and over time lose its ability to either coordinate horizontally or to vertically aggregate interests. Conversely, an electoral vehicle might gain those capacities over time. The minimalist conceptualization implies a static view that omits consideration of the changes organizations undergo over time. While the literature on democratic regimes has developed the notion of diminished subtypes of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Goertz 2006), there exists no such parallel in the party politics literature. In this introductory chapter we suggest a new typology of political parties that combines the two main attributes mentioned here: horizontal coordination of ambitious politicians, and vertical aggregation to electorally mobilize collective interests and to intermediate and channel collective demands – for example, by simplifying and clarifying political preferences for the citizens.

Our work is an attempt to remedy the lack of conceptualization of diminished subtypes in the political parties' literature. This helps to clarify analytical differences between failed parties that other authors have already described (and even explained) but have not yet conceptualized. In so doing, we revise the concept of political party in relation to its contributions to democratic accountability. On that basis, we propose a typology of political parties that includes diminished subtypes – with each type having different implications for democratic accountability – and we propose analytical strategies to empirically distinguish between them. The ultimate goal of our framework is to highlight how not all electoral vehicles – not even those with stable labels – are theoretically

[2] The reliance on an operationalization that measures changes in degree is not inconsistent with a conceptual view that identifies thresholds below (above) which causes qualitative change. Indeed, our measurement attempt, presented in Table 1.1, relies on a set of indicators that track differences in degree.

equivalent and thus do not contribute equally to democratic representation. While the absence of stable parties hinders democratic representation, the presence of stable electoral vehicles cannot fully guarantee the smooth operation of representation. Thus, our theoretical and conceptual contribution has concrete analytical consequences that reshape the debate concerning political parties.

PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY: A NECESSARY REASSESSMENT

What is the theoretical and empirical relationship between political parties and democracy? If democracy is simply the competition between groups of people for votes and access to government (i.e., a vision that some associate with Schumpeter's vision of democratic competition), then defining a political party as a group of individuals who compete in elections to access office and receive a handful of votes – the minimal definition of "political party" employed in mainstream postwar political science (c.f. Downs 1957; Sartori 1976; Schlesinger 1994) – would suffice to ensure a positive relationship between parties and democracy. This implies functions that are necessary for democracy, such as the recruitment and nomination of candidates that fosters elite-level socialization. Thus, if electoral competition, in and of itself, automatically engenders the representation of citizens' preferences, the type of party is irrelevant. As agents in such competition, parties are automatically functional to democratic representation.[3]

If, however, one proceeds from Dahl's (1971) definition of polyarchy, the competition for votes does not necessarily lead to representation of citizens' preferences. Dahl's perspective requires that, for citizens to have equal influence in politics, certain conditions and guarantees must exist; competition among groups does not suffice for there to be a positive relationship between parties and democracy. Not all electoral vehicles that compete in elections are functional to interest representation. The types of electoral vehicles that compete in elections determine how democracy works. A party system can exist without representing or distorting citizens' preferences (Gilens 2012). Only under very specific (and unrealistic) conditions, as in the Downsian perfect information competition

[3] The notion of representation we pursue in our conceptualization is, to be sure, not the only possible one; some alternative views to the one we follow are articulated in prominent works in the literature (e.g., Pitkin 1967; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Moreover, the concepts of representation and democracy are not necessarily compatible (Pitkin 2004).

model, can it be the case that any group that competes for votes represents citizens' preferences. Yet, as Downs stressed, democracy does not function in these conditions and representation does not automatically derive from the existence of competition. In practice, in different democracies, electoral vehicles might or might not function as channels for citizen representation. Thus, according to Dahl's logic, some electoral vehicles facilitate democratic representation, while other vehicles are less sensitive to citizens' demands and interests and so channel them less effectively. This complex relationship between electoral vehicles and citizen representation has been studied extensively in the party politics literature (as will be discussed).

Democratic representation in modern societies can be analyzed as a principal-agent relationship (Michels 1999 (1911)). Different types of electoral vehicles structure the principal-agent relationship differently, with some being unable to structure it at all, given their detachment from their principals. The latter occurs in contexts where citizens can vote for a given electoral vehicle without having the ability to monitor the vehicle's actions in the aftermath. The inability to hold electoral vehicles accountable can derive from exogenous factors; that is, it may be contingent on socioeconomic conditions – poverty, inequality, or economic crises – or institutional settings, such as more autocratic contexts (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Luna 2014; Taylor-Robinson 2010). Here, however, we are interested in analyzing whether party organizations channel the principals' preferences. We claim that there are endogenous constraints that relate to the specific characteristics of each political party.

The literature has systematically argued that there exists a much more nuanced relationship between existing parties (and party systems) and democratic representation (Hicken 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Lawson and Merkl 1988; Levitsky 2003; Luna 2014; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Mainwaring 2018; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Piñeiro Rodríguez and Rosenblatt 2020; Roberts 2014b). The party politics literature has extensively considered the exogenous conditions that determine levels of representation. Developing societies, where the structural conditions for channeling citizens' preferences are unfavorable, have a wide variety of electoral vehicles with differing capacities to channel citizens' preferences (Bartolini 2000; Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt et al. 2010; Luna 2014; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Samuels and Shugart 2010; Stoll 2013; Taylor-Robinson 2010). Yet, even developed societies, with more favorable exogenous conditions, have also witnessed the emergence of

various types of political organizations that seek to perform the political representation function, and not all succeed in doing so.

The literature on party politics in developing countries in general, and in Latin America in particular, has identified various kinds of agents that compete in elections but do not contribute to democratic representation. However, this literature has not provided a conceptual discussion that theorizes the existence of diminished political party subtypes (with some exceptions, e.g., Mustillo 2007). While there exists abundant empirical evidence concerning the various failures of different party organizations in modern democracies and several theoretical arguments regarding the causes and effects of such failings, there remains a lacuna in the conceptualization of the type of parties that function as channels of democratic representation. This lack of theoretical debate concerning diminished party subtypes derives from the minimalist definition of political party. There has been little discussion in the literature as to whether this minimalist definition is useful for differentiating the various ways an agent can compete for power in a democratic process. While the minimalist definition is efficacious for encompassing different electoral vehicles, it obscures the debate about which vehicles contribute to the functioning of democracy. This is especially critical because the minimalist definition of political party works better in dialogue with a definition of democracy that privileges electoral competition as the main attribute of the regime, but it does not fit a more demanding perspective, such as Dahl's. When electoral competition does not suffice as a defining attribute of democracy, the minimalist definition of political party makes it difficult to articulate a clear-cut relationship between parties and democracy. The minimalist definition grants the label "party" to electoral vehicles that compete in elections but do not hold the status of party.

In fact, for much of the twentieth century, the relationship in Latin America between parties and democracy was problematized in terms of the acceptance of electoral competition: the movement-parties and the "illiberal" parties did not support democracy. However, in the twenty-first century, parties accept democratic competition, but they do a poor job of fulfilling their representation function. In several countries – for example, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina – many of the traditional parties have been weakened or have disappeared. Their social bases were transformed or became more heterogeneous (e.g., weakening of the industrial working class, crisis of the farming sector, emergence of new middle classes and pauperization of others, emergence and consolidation of an informal sectors). New electoral vehicles emerged in turbulent times

around electorally successful leaders (e.g., Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Mauricio Macri in Argentina, or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela), who, in some cases, exited from traditional parties (e.g., Álvaro Uribe in Colombia).

Confronting that emerging reality, several scholars turned their attention to causal factors and theories about party building, failure, and success including Anria (2018); Cyr (2017); Hunter (2010); Levitsky (2001; 2003); Levitsky et al. (2016); Lupu (2016); Madrid (2012); Tavits (2005; 2008; 2013); Samuels (2004; 2006); and Vommaro and Morresi (2015). However, the resurgence of party politics research in the last decade has not been adequately matched by a conceptual reanalysis of the empirical objects that we label as political parties. To address this gap in the literature, we reanalyze the concept of political party and its diminished subtypes, by adding or subtracting attributes to its definition. Specifically, we propose to distinguish between diminished subtypes by adding to the current mainstream minimalist definition two dimensions: horizontal coordination and vertical aggregation.

CONCEPTUALIZATION, OPERATIONALIZATION, AND MEASUREMENT

Following Goertz (2006), our conceptual analysis assumes the existence of specific links or associations between the existence of parties and democracy. Electoral vehicles that exhibit both dimensions (horizontal coordination and vertical aggregation) positively influence democratic representation. Political organizations that exhibit high levels of both dimensions reduce transaction and informational costs for citizens, who are the principals in the representation relationship.

An electoral vehicle is an association of candidates, that is, office-seekers, whose members compete in elections under the same label. Although the coalition seeks to win office, not all electoral vehicles fulfill the two basic functions necessary for a political party to be an effective means of democratic representation. A political party is, then, an electoral vehicle subtype, a more intense and less extended concept (Sartori 1970): it coordinates the activities of ambitious politicians (during campaigns and between elections) and vertically aggregates collective interests. "Electoral vehicle" is a more general concept than "political party," which occupies a lower level of abstraction (Sartori 1970). More specifically, political parties want to access office and promote policies (Strom 1990). Parties seek to win state power and impose an allocation of

resources through policies and state institutions. This is achieved by crafting social coalitions, which involves coordination during campaigns and between elections.

Parties can accomplish the two functions in very different ways and with very different organizational forms (Gunther and Diamond 2003). The literature has extensively documented different types of parties in different historical and geographical settings (i.e., with an evolutionary logic), including cadre and mass-based parties (Duverger 1954), catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966), professional-electoral parties, and cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995), among others. As opposed to these typologies, our conceptualization is independent of organizational form and assumes that different organizational arrangements can fulfill both conditions. Moreover, our framework does not imply that the linkages between the party and its constituency must necessarily be programmatic. In this vein, our idea of interest aggregation is broad. Because clientelistic politics can represent groups, it is possible to aggregate collective interests in a clientelistic manner. The horizontal coordination can be based on party members' adherence to shared rules or on a personalistic leadership. In this regard, very different parties, at different periods, such as the Radical Party in the early twentieth century, and the Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union, UDI) in Chile, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT) in Brazil, and the Partido Conservador (Conservative Party, PC) in Colombia (see Wills-Otero, Ortega, and Sarmiento this volume) throughout the twentieth century (until 1991), differ in their organizational structure and in their linkages with voters, though all accomplished the two defining functions.

Our concept of political party comprises five levels. The basic level constitutes the concept of political party itself. The secondary level introduces its main attributes. We identify two necessary and sufficient conditions that qualify an electoral vehicle as a political party in terms of democratic representation: the horizontal coordination of ambitious politicians and vertical interest aggregation. Figure 1.1 presents the structure of the concept of political party and its attributes (indicators will be presented in subsequent figures). Horizontal coordination denotes the role of parties in facilitating the coordination of ambitious politicians during campaigns and between electoral cycles. Vertical interest aggregation denotes the role of parties in the electoral mobilization and intermediation (or channeling) of collective interests and demands between elections. There is low substitutability between these two main attributes. They are separately necessary and are jointly sufficient conditions; thus,



FIGURE 1.1 Political party attributes

they interact, and both need to be present to warrant labeling a given electoral vehicle as a political party.

These two dimensions (horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation) are functional to the idea of democratic representation. Horizontal coordination implies that political parties solve collective action problems of ambitious politicians, and this benefits democratic representation by helping stabilize electoral vehicles. Many electoral vehicles can support horizontal coordination between politicians; yet this function can be achieved without considering any societal preferences. This occurs, for example, in political systems where the competition between parties is stable but does not incorporate citizen preferences and thus alienates important portions of the electorate, as Luna and Altman (2011) show for the Chilean case. Therefore, electoral vehicles should also perform vertical interest aggregation to function as a channel for democratic representation. Conversely, electoral vehicles that aggregate collective interests but do not support horizontal coordination tend to be fragmented, undisciplined, and unstable organizations.

At the third level, following Aldrich (1995), we stipulate that horizontal coordination implies coordination during electoral campaigns and between elections (i.e., in Congress and in office). During campaigns, a political party is an electoral vehicle capable of monopolizing the candidate selection process, monopolizing the electoral coordination strategy (i.e., deciding the number of candidates that will compete in each district), and providing a common electoral label. These three capabilities are necessary and sufficient attributes for coordination during elections and entail the existence of a minimum common platform. In political parties, thus, candidates must be personally or collectively validated. These attributes enable parties to propose a uniform and coherent electoral offer. This coordination can be achieved in very different ways; for example, the candidate selection process can be centralized or decentralized, and can be carried out through open primaries or by a commission (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008a). The crucial point is that a political party has the ability to coordinate action to avoid electoral losses. Between elections, a political party coordinates activity in Congress and in local governments. A political party establishes formal and informal obstacles to prevent its leaders from proposing contradictory public policies at different levels of government, and generates incentives to favor a certain amount of discipline among their legislators regarding whether to support or oppose given policies. Coordination both during and between elections is necessary and sufficient; that is, there

is low substitutability between the two instances of horizontal coordination.

Also at the third level, the electoral mobilization of collective interests and the intermediation and channeling of collective demands are the two attributes that compose vertical interest aggregation. Both are necessary and sufficient attributes of the vertical dimension and, thus, there is low substitutability between them. To serve as agents for democratic representation, political parties need to aggregate preferences during campaigns (by mobilizing collective interests) and between elections (providing a channel for articulating collective interests). Parties must be valid options for citizens and collective actors (classes, movements, social groups) in democratic elections and must channel citizens' and collective actors' demands between elections. Voters must know that by voting for a particular label they are voting for a certain type of bias in public policies and especially in distributive policies. This dimension highlights the crucial role of vertical accountability in contemporary democracies (Adams 2001; Downs 1957; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999) and both attributes, the electoral mobilization of collective interests and the intermediation and channeling of collective demands, are needed to promote what Dahl (1971) considered an essential attribute of democracy: "the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens" (1).

Figure 1.2 presents the complete conceptual tree for one of the two secondary-level attributes of a political party: horizontal coordination. It shows the two necessary and sufficient second-level attributes (coordination must occur both in elections and between elections) and it introduces a set of indicators. The figure also specifies the relationship between dimensions (or attributes) at each level and their indicators. During electoral campaigns, a party must monopolize the process of candidate selection and the electoral coordination strategy and candidates must use the common party label. We introduce two indicators, each necessary and both jointly sufficient, to determine the presence of the party's monopoly control of the candidate selection process: (1) a party authorizes candidate nomination at all levels and (2) prospective candidates accept nomination processes and the results of those processes. Parties must enforce horizontal coordination among ambitious politicians throughout a candidate selection process. This implies that the party has the power to define who can run under the party's label. Also, all prospective candidates should respect the results of the candidate selection process; for example,



FIGURE 1.2 Indicators of horizontal coordination

there should be no defections by those who were not selected. This is not related to how open or closed the rules are.

The indicator of the party's monopoly control of the electoral coordination strategy is that the party considers the restrictions of the electoral system and enforces electoral coordination among candidates. More specifically, the party must control the number of candidates to avoid a situation that might affect the party candidates' joint probability of accessing office. On some occasions, candidates have more influence in the selection processes than does the party. When this happens, candidates might end up failing to coordinate and, thus, may hinder the party's electoral performance.

Finally, the indicators for the use of a common label are: (1) candidates use the same campaign logo; or, (2) candidates use party emblems or colors; or, (3) candidates use the party's propaganda (i.e., campaign literature). In this case, there is substitutability between the different indicators as each is functionally equivalent to the other (i.e., each one captures different ways to observe the use of a common label).

Between elections, a party must coordinate in Congress and in the different local-level governments, including in local-level legislative bodies. The indicator for horizontal coordination in Congress is the observation of significant party discipline. The indicator for coordination in local-level governments is the observation of a general consistency of public policies across different units; that is, in general terms, a party must have a similar policy orientation throughout the country and while voting in Congress. This coordination distinguishes parties from electoral vehicles that only coordinate different autonomous agents for the election (national or local). An environmentalist party, for example, should consistently promote a "green" agenda in all the governmental institutions in which it has representatives. Similarly, labor-based parties oppose deregulatory labor reforms even in times of policy convergence promoting economic liberalization and state retrenchment (Murillo 2001).

Figure 1.3 presents the complete operationalization of vertical interest aggregation. The figure shows the two necessary and sufficient attributes of vertical interest aggregation: a party electorally mobilizes collective interests and it intermediates and channels collective demands. A party mobilizes collective interests when its electoral platform includes general demands of one or several of the party's constituencies or when the party has a stable core constituency. A party might not have developed a core constituency (or it might have lost it), but its electoral platform has unequivocal references to a clear constituency. These parties have



FIGURE 1.3 Indicators of vertical interest aggregation

a platform that is oriented toward formal workers but many times those workers do not vote for these parties. The family resemblance structure in this case (i.e., complete substitutability between the indicators) helps to capture these situations.

The intermediation and channeling of collective demands has two indicators: the existence of formal or informal ties with civil society organizations and the observation that party decisions are constrained by its core constituency. Both are necessary and sufficient, that is, there is low substitutability between them. Also, the attribute "existence of formal or informal ties with civil society organizations" itself has three indicators: the existence of dual membership (elites or grassroots), the existence of formal ties between the party and civil society organizations, or the existence of informal ties between the two. We allow complete substitutability between the three indicators, because each represents a different path to the same result. For example, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism, MAS) and the Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA) both have strong ties with social movements. However, the two parties build their ties in dissimilar ways. Social movements are organically part of the MAS (Anria 2018 and Anria this volume) whereas the FA's ties with social movements are informal and FA members often have dual membership in both the party and social movements (Pérez Bentancur, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt 2020 and Pérez Bentancur, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt this volume).[4]

To measure each indicator, we propose using a five-point scale where values on the scale indicate the degree to which a particular condition is satisfied, with the scale values 1–5 corresponding to 0 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent fulfillment of a given condition, respectively. For example, when a party has rules for nominating candidates, but half of the time prospective candidates do not comply with the rules, the case should receive a score of "3" on the indicator "Prospective candidates accept nomination processes and results," indicating 50 percent fulfillment of the condition. If there is no rule at all and candidates can nominate themselves, the case should receive a score of "1" on this indicator, corresponding to 0 percent fulfillment of the condition. Each

[4] Our proposed indicators of the concept should not be reified, and thus, fused with the concept and its dimensions. In other words, the indicators we have proposed and explored here should be subjected to revision and improvements in the future. For each of our indicators, there may be functional equivalents that can better capture each conceptual dimension in a different context.

indicator is normalized on a scale from 0 to 1. The overall index is computed by the aggregation rule reflecting the conceptual structure at each level. The overall index varies from 0 to 1, where "0" signifies that the case lacks any and all characteristics of a political party and "1" signifies that it exhibits all of them.

Consistent with our conceptualization of political party, we aggregated the component indices as follows. When there is complete substitutability between the indicators of an attribute, we used the maximum value. For example, the attribute "Existence of formal or informal ties with civil society organizations" has three indicators that we consider functionally equivalent measures of the attribute observed in different contexts, that is, each indicator captures a different way to fulfill the attribute (see Figure 1.3). Therefore, in a given case, the degree of fulfillment of the attribute will be determined by the highest value of the three indicators. In cases where the relationship between indicators or attributes, at different levels, is one of necessity and sufficiency, we use the geometric mean.[5] This aggregation rule allows for low substitutability. A low level of one indicator is partially compensated for by a high level of another indicator. Nonetheless, it emphasizes the necessary and sufficient conceptual structure and implies lower levels of compensation than does using the average or the maximum (Goertz 2006). Using the geometric mean mitigates the loss of additional information associated with using the minimum, and thus captures the multi-dimensionality of the concept. For example, vertical interest aggregation has two dimensions: "Electorally mobilizes collective interests" and "Intermediation and channeling of collective demands." If a case has a score of 2 on the former dimension, representing a 0.25 degree of fulfillment, and a score of 4 on the latter dimension, representing a 0.75 degree of fulfillment, the case will have an aggregate score of 0.43[6] for vertical interest aggregation.

We asked the authors of each case study in this edited volume to categorize their cases according to our conceptual scheme.[7] In the online appendix we include the codebook and the value of each indicator for

[5] The geometric mean is the nth root of the product of n numbers,

$$\overline{x} = \sqrt[n]{\pi_{i=1}^{n} x_i}.$$

[6] This value is lower than the average (0.50) and higher than the minimum (0.25). The average allows for greater substitutability, while the minimum precludes it.

[7] We also asked Germán Lodola to categorize the Argentinean Justicialist Party.

each case.[8] We considered the following cases: Propuesta Republicana, (Republican Proposal, PRO, Argentina), Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party, Argentina), MAS (Bolivia), the Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy, PPD, Chile), the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party, PL, Colombia), PC (Colombia), Partido Acción Ciudadana (Citizen Action Party, PAC, Costa Rica), Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party, PLN, Costa Rica), Movimiento Alianza PAIS (PAIS Alliance Movement, AP, Ecuador), Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (National Unity of Hope, UNE, Guatemala), Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD, Mexico), Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (National Regeneration Movement, MORENA, Mexico), Partido Colorado (Colorado Party, Paraguay), Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (Authentic Radical Liberal Party, PLRA, Paraguay), Fuerza Popular (Popular Strength, FP, Peru), the FA (Uruguay), Primero Justicia (Justice First, PJ, Venezuela) and Voluntad Popular (Popular Will, VP, Venezuela).[9]

Table 1.1 shows each party's score on the two dimensions of the political party concept as well as on the overall party index. The scores vary across almost the entire range of the measure, showing that it is sensitive to differences between cases. Overall, the cases exhibit higher ratings on the horizontal coordination dimension than on the vertical interest aggregation dimension. The former is an easier property to achieve because a party's basic raison d'etre is to solve collective action problems for politicians. However, the different cases show variance in both dimensions and this variance is independent. These results show that each dimension captures different aspects of the concept and are not redundant.

TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND DIMINISHED SUBTYPES

To capture the existence of political organizations that lack one or more of the necessary dimensions in our conception of political party, we develop a typology of electoral vehicles: political parties and diminished subtypes. While the literature has analyzed the effects of the existence of independent candidates, flash parties, etc., it has been relatively silent on

[8] See https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/1354068820923723.

[9] For the Venezuelan cases, evidence for vertical interest aggregation was drawn primarily from party statutes and interviews. Thus, the ranks were confirmed formally (in party statutes) and rhetorically (in interviews), but are difficult to assess in the Venezuelan authoritarian political context.

TABLE 1.1 *Component and overall party index scores*

Party	Horizontal coordination	Vertical interest aggregation	Party index
AP (Ecuador)	0.84	0.42	0.59
Colorado Party (Paraguay)	0.45	0.87	0.62
FA (Uruguay)	1.00	1.00	1.00
FP (Peru)	0.11	0.11	0.11
MAS (Bolivia)	0.74	0.93	0.83
MORENA (Mexico)	0.73	0.68	0.70
PAC (Costa Rica)	0.59	0.57	0.58
PC (Colombia)	0.49	0.51	0.50
Justicialist Party (Argentina)	0.35	0.93	0.57
PJ (Venezuela)	0.98	0.13	0.36
PL (Colombia)	0.47	0.35	0.41
PLN (Costa Rica)	0.87	0.68	0.77
PLRA (Paraguay)	0.18	0.39	0.27
PPD (Chile)	0.47	0.25	0.34
PRD (Mexico)	0.78	0.93	0.85
PRO (Argentina)	0.83	0.68	0.75
UNE (Guatemala)	0.10	0.13	0.12
VP (Venezuela)	0.91	0.93	0.92

Source: Authors' own construction.

diminished subtypes, in which one of the two attributes of the political party concept is absent (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Goertz 2006). Thus, these diminished subtypes are not subsets of a more general category of political party. On the contrary, these are theoretically possible variant forms of electoral vehicle, that is, political party diminished subtypes. Diminished subtypes are neither more nor less abstract than the concept of political party (Goertz 2006; Sartori 1970). The absence of one or more attributes does not imply greater abstraction or greater extension; rather, it indicates a diminished subtype. Thus, the different types in our taxonomy occupy the same level of abstraction, but diminished subtypes are cases that lack one or more of the attributes of a political party.

We identify the various possible electoral vehicles to understand the different types of political organizations and groups that compete in

elections in contemporary democracies and their effects on democratic representation. If we treat the two attributes identified in our definition of political parties as binary variables that can be either present or absent, we create a 2 × 2 conceptual space, which yields four different types of political organization, as shown in Figure 1.4.

In our framework, the political party denotes an electoral vehicle that accomplishes two essential functions: it coordinates ambitious politicians and aggregates collective interests vertically. This category encompasses long-standing parties such as the PLN in Costa Rica and the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN) in México; more recently established parties such as the FA in Uruguay, the PT in Brazil, the PRD in Mexico, and the UDI in Chile; and new parties like the PRO in Argentina, the MAS in Bolivia, and VP in Venezuela. These examples illustrate that the two attributes, horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation, can be fulfilled with different organizational structures. The PT and the FA resemble mass organic parties, while the PAN, the PRO, and the UDI resemble cadre and professional electoral parties. Also, the age of a party, an indicator commonly used to assess a party's stability, does not define its capacity to fulfill the functions associated with a political party, as we define it. For example, a political organization can be vibrant at the time of its origin, showing robust horizontal coordination and vertical aggregation of interests, such as the PRO in Argentina, but lose one or both of those attributes over time as a consequence of endogenous or exogenous crises, such as the Partido Socialista de Chile (Chilean Socialist Party, PSCh). Studies of adaptation and party collapse provide accounts of this phenomenon (Levitsky 2003; Lupu 2016), while recent works have analyzed the factors that determine political organizations' degree of vibrancy over time (Rosenblatt 2018).

A political organization can achieve harmonious coordination between its elites (both during campaigns and between elections), without having a consistent capacity to articulate collective interests. We designate this

FIGURE 1.4 A typology of political parties and diminished subtypes

		Horizontal coordination	
		No	Yes
Vertical interest aggregation	Yes	Uncoordinated party	Political party
	No	Independents	Unrooted party

electoral vehicle an unrooted party. This kind of electoral vehicle can contribute to the stability of democratic institutions, but they are weak in terms of channeling the electoral and congressional representation of social groups/interests. In Latin America, there are cases of established political groups that have a high capacity for horizontal coordination among their elites, but have substantially lost (or never developed) stable linkages with any social base. This type of vehicle generally appeals to the "citizen" and espouses a negative vision regarding the representation of different social sectors in the political arena. Usually, they are centrist vehicles but not all centrist vehicles lack a constituency. The clearest example is the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, DC) in Chile; at the time of its origin, it was a centrist party with a clear constituency.

Unrooted party elites coordinate during campaigns and between elections. These vehicles can coordinate between elections because the agreements between individual leaders are also kept in the parliamentary arena, or because one of these leaders stands as primus inter pares (e.g., by being elected president, prime minister, mayor, or because of the leader's electoral appeal), and manages to retain coordination mechanisms for incumbents based on the distribution of selective incentives and/or collective incentives associated with the persistence of the vehicle. This type of vehicle fails to build effective channels for aggregating collective interests. These are usually traditional electoral labels, such as the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, PMDB) in Brazil, activated during election season. However, the reference to a unified electoral list reflects an alliance between individual ambitious political leaders rather than the existence of a political party.

There are electoral vehicles that develop persistent ties with loyal constituencies but lack horizontal coordination mechanisms; they usually lack congressional discipline and they have problems coordinating during elections. Sometimes this lack of coordination implies uncoordinated electoral strategies between different leaders. We label this diminished subtype an uncoordinated party. The Peronists in Argentina, in the absence of strong national leaders, lack congressional discipline and are unable to coordinate in the electoral arena. However, as Levitsky (2003) shows, this diminished subtype has informal negotiation channels with mobilized groups, such as trade unions. Also, this type of diminished party subtype is more common in organizations built or developed by regional leaders, linked to local interests, who have difficulty establishing common

strategies outside the electoral arena, as happens with traditional parties in Colombia (Wills-Otero 2015).

Ambitious politicians can operate without coordinating political activity, running for office based on enabling electoral rules and/or their prestige or popularity (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016; Zavaleta 2014). This diminished subtype tends to proliferate in the context of a party system crisis, when the cost of entry to the competition is low, as occurred in Argentina during the financial and economic collapse of 2000 and 2001, in Ecuador during the emergence of Rafael Correa in 2006, or in Peru in 1990 when Fujimori won the election with Cambio 90, his electoral vehicle (Cyr 2017; Dietz and Myers 2007; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016; Seawright 2012; Zavaleta 2014). This subtype also proliferates in party systems where traditional parties have declined, opening electoral competition to individuals who have access to valuable campaign resources (money, fame, prestige) that render them competitive. In federal systems, and in systems with strong regional identities, this type of electoral vehicle often exists at the subnational level. To a certain extent, the subtype Independents represents the extreme case of stretching the party concept that we want our typology to amend.

Unpacking the different types of electoral vehicles better equips researchers to assess electoral vehicles' effects on democratic representation. In a recent edited volume, Levitsky et al. (2016) identify different cases of successful party building. The authors classify successful party building (i.e., parties that "take root") simply by considering the stability of a party label in successive elections: "We score party-building as successful when a new party wins at least 10 percent of the vote in five or more consecutive national legislative elections" (Levitsky et al. 2016, 8). Temporal bounds, while easy to measure, neglect to consider how or whether party organizations accomplish both essential functions described previously. In our conceptualization, however, the Renovación Nacional (National Renewal, RN) and the PPD of Chile do not constitute true parties but are instead diminished subtypes. In the former, there is no coordination of activity during the elections, while the "party" represents defined interests – business and rural sectors. It is thus an uncoordinated party within our conceptual framework. The latter (PPD) is a coalition of independent politicians who struggle to accomplish either of the two functions (see Piñeiro Rodríguez, Rosenblatt, and Toro Maureira this volume). Conversely, new parties such as the MAS in Bolivia (see Anria this volume) and the PRO in Argentina (see Vommaro this volume) are, indeed, successful cases of party building. In both cases, horizontal

coordination mechanisms are observed and there are vertical representation channels – with social movements or business sectors – that have been robust and persistent over time. Both new political party organizations managed to incorporate collective demands. Thus, for example, for the first time in history, the Bolivian peasantry managed to build its own party (Anria 2018), while a center-right pro-market party managed to compete for power in Argentina (Vommaro and Morresi 2015).

Figure 1.5 presents the observed values for the analyzed cases on each of the two dimensions (horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation) of the party index. We divide the panel to illustrate the classification of cases into each subtype. The classification follows the description presented here. In the upper right cell of the table, we find parties such as the FA, VP, MAS, and PRO, among others. These parties perform both functions, though to varying degrees. For example, while the MAS and the PRD are rated more highly on vertical interest aggregation, the PRO and the PLN are rated more highly on horizontal coordination. In the bottom left cell, we find Independents, such as the FP and the UNE. The Chilean PPD and the Colombian PL are borderline cases that have characteristics of both unrooted parties and independents. The Colombian PC, the Argentinean Justicialist Party, and the Paraguayan



FIGURE 1.5 Empirical distribution of types Source: Authors' own construction.

Colorado Party most closely resemble the uncoordinated party type. Finally, the Venezuelan PJ is a typical example of an unrooted party. It exhibits high levels of horizontal coordination but lacks vertical interest aggregation. Finally, the distribution of our cases seems to indicate that organizations rarely exhibit the capacity to vertically aggregate social interests without also exhibiting the capacity for horizontal coordination.

Given our emphasis on the functions parties should fulfill to satisfy horizontal coordination and vertical aggregation, our definition might be seen as a functionalist one. Yet, our argument is not functionalist because electoral vehicles can and often do fail to fulfill one or both functions. Our conceptualization is, thus, adequate to make such normatively and substantively consequential variance visible to those interested in exploring it empirically. Indeed, we identify diminished subtypes precisely in order to characterize cases that fail to fulfill one or both functions. Diminished subtypes, which are empirically pervasive in contemporary democracies, exist without fulfilling the functions our conceptualization assigns to political parties (i.e., diminished subtypes are not different forms of a political party, and they exist despite not fulfilling the functions we use to demarcate diminished subtypes from political parties). When identifying diminished subtypes, we are not moving up or down a conceptual ladder of abstraction; rather, we identify a positive pole (political party) and a negative pole (an electoral vehicle that is not a political party). Thus, for example, the absence of the two necessary dimensions – horizontal coordination and vertical aggregation – in the "independents" diminished subtype does not render "independents" a more abstract notion than that of political party. By the same token, political parties are not conceptualized as a subset of a more abstract notion of independents.

OVERVIEW

This edited volume includes chapters describing seventeen parties in twelve countries in Latin America. The case studies describe and analyze how different electoral vehicles perform or fail to perform horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation. The empirical chapters also offer a variety of cases to illustrate political parties and diminished subtypes. The volume seeks to encompass variation in the two theoretically relevant dimensions (vertical interest aggregation and horizontal coordination). The case selection also aims to include regional, organizational, and ideological variation. Additionally, the chapters provide an

overview of the evolution of each case over time. This overview is particularly instructive because it provides a dynamic perspective showing that there is no single inevitable developmental trajectory; parties that persist over time do not necessarily improve their ability to perform horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation, nor does this ability necessarily deteriorate over time.

In Chapter 2, Pérez Bentancur, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt analyze the case of the FA in Uruguay as an unusual organization. Since its foundation, the FA has exhibited a dual structure: the coalition (manifested in the factions of the party) and the movement (comprising a common grassroots structure of *Base Committees*). The FA fulfills both essential functions required to qualify as a political party: vertical interest aggregation and horizontal coordination. The coalition structure of the FA fulfills the criterion of horizontal coordination, while the grassroots activist structure accomplishes vertical interest aggregation and, in crucial decisions, promotes and ensures horizontal coordination. More critically, the coalition and the grassroots structure influence the most important policy decisions of the party's parliamentary caucus and, when the FA was in government (2005–20), the decisions of the Executive. In terms of vertical interest aggregation, the FA has developed strong and informal ties with social actors, especially with labor unions, based on leaders' and grassroots activists' dual membership.

Chapter 3 analyzes the case of the Argentinean PRO. Vommaro's analysis highlights the fact that the PRO has been able to perform both functions in the districts where the party was born (mainly in the Ciudad de Buenos Aires) but has had greater difficulty fulfilling them in the rest of the country. This shows that parties can vary across districts in how well they perform the defining attributes. The PRO established horizontal coordination through a division-of-labor mechanism. PRO leaders maintain control of the party's electoral strategy and candidate selection and allow its allies from traditional parties to capture and distribute resources to their clients. This division of labor also implies that PRO leaders rule and the allied parties mobilize voters, especially from popular sectors and from districts in the countryside. In exchange, allied party leaders receive selective incentives, such as important slots in the party lists, access to public resources, and positions in the public administration. These two groups bring different constituencies to the party. PRO leaders have strong linkages with the upper-middle- and upper-class sectors of Argentinean society. Middle- and working-class sectors are incorporated

by politicians from traditional parties who joined the PRO. This produces a logic of segmented representation (Luna 2014).

Chapter 4 develops the case of the MAS. Anria's chapter shows how a loosely organized structure can still achieve horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation. This is based on the interaction between the strong leadership of Evo Morales and the social movements and social organizations that formally integrate the party. As Anria stresses, "[The MAS] operates as a hybrid organization that combines top-down leadership by a dominant personality, weak bureaucratic development, and the bottom-up power of autonomous social mobilization" (Anria this volume). As in the case of the PRO, the MAS is heterogeneous throughout the territory. In some districts, social movements are stronger and have more influence over the party's decision-making and candidate selection, while in others the party's structure and its leadership prevail. However, in general, party leaders cannot impose their positions and must negotiate with social actors that are part of the MAS. This "contentious bargaining game" (Anria this volume) occurs through informal channels. This interaction is different from that observed in the case of the FA. In contrast to the FA, where social organizations have informal ties with the party but the party's decision-making is grounded in formal rules, social organizations are formally incorporated in the MAS but the party's policy agenda is negotiated through informal channels.

In Chapter 5, Combes analyzes the cases of the PRD and MORENA. This chapter highlights the importance of personalism as a factor that facilitates not only horizontal coordination (as in the case of the AP or the FP) but also vertical interest aggregation (as in the case of the MAS). Candidate selection is highly connected to the complex interaction that both parties have with civil society and social movements. However, the PRD and MORENA did not institutionalize their ties with social movements because they rejected the corporatist model historically observed in the PRI. In both the PRD and MORENA, vertical interest aggregation is based on informal ties linked to the recruitment of activists and candidates from social movements. In the case of the PRD, the party recruited leaders of the mobilizations against neoliberal reforms. Given the territorial concentration of the protests, this strategy limited the territorial expansion of the party. In the case of MORENA, there was an explicit strategy to control recruitment from the center.

In Chapter 6, Alfaro-Redondo and Gómez-Campos present the cases of the PLN and the PAC in Costa Rica, both classified as parties, though the PAC less clearly so. The PLN is a traditional party that has been

experiencing a process of organizational decay, especially in its ability to perform the vertical interest aggregation function. Historically, the PLN has had a developed structure and deep ties with specific constituencies, though this has been eroding since the 1990s. The PAC is a new party that also performs both functions but has so far struggled to reproduce the vertical interest aggregation function beyond its core constituency in the middle- and upper-middle-class sectors of the country's capital, San José.

Chapter 7 analyzes the Paraguayan Colorado Party and PLRA parties. Abente Brun's chapter shows how vertical interest aggregation is not necessarily programmatic. In the case of the Colorado Party, vertical interest aggregation is related to the satisfaction of particularistic demands for specific constituencies. The electoral machine of the Colorado Party was consolidated during Stroessner's authoritarian regime and operated as a tool for vertical interest aggregation. This capacity was reduced and had to adapt as the country underwent a transition to democracy. In contrast, the PLRA had operational difficulties during Stroessner's regime that limited its organizational development. Since the 1992 constitutional reform, horizontal coordination has been weakened. The power to coordinate horizontally now lies with party factions rather than with the national party directorates. The weakening of the capacity to perform horizontal coordination was aggravated by the introduction of an open list electoral system in the 2019 reform. The Paraguayan cases highlight the role that political regimes and institutional rules play in the fulfillment of both functions.

In Chapter 8, Wills-Otero, Ortega, and Sarmiento, show the secular process of erosion of the Colombian traditional parties, the PC and the PL. These parties have found it increasingly difficult to achieve horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation. The extensive history of both parties enables a long-term analysis of their evolution, and reinforces the idea advanced in this framework that a party's ability to fulfill one or both functions can change over time (this is also analyzed in the Costa Rica and Paraguay chapters). The chapter also shows the positive and negative impacts that various changes in electoral rules have had on the parties' capacity to perform horizontal coordination, as in Paraguay (see Abente Brun this volume). The electoral changes introduced in the 1991 constitutional reform facilitated the personalization of politics, while the electoral reform of 2003 and the 2005 Law that governs political blocs counterbalanced this tendency. The authors claim that the PL and the PC, in contrast to the Colorado Party in Paraguay, have difficulties promoting a programmatic aggregation of interests because of the combination of the

pervasive role of clientelism and the power of departmental or local leaders.

Chapter 9 reviews the cases of the PJ and the VP in Venezuela. Cyr's analysis introduces the challenges of party building in contexts of democratic erosion and high polarization based on *chavismo*/anti-*chavismo* logic. This context prevents opposition parties from proactively building ties with different social sectors based on programmatic stances. However, this context does not have the same effect in Cyr's two cases. The PJ developed a limited capacity to vertically aggregate interests. By contrast, the VP established bottom-up channels to incorporate interests from below. Paradoxically, the regime dynamics, that is, polarization and increasing authoritarian tendencies, hinder vertical interest aggregation but, at the same time, facilitate horizontal coordination.

In Chapter 10, Conaghan analyzes the case of the AP in Ecuador, which achieved something rare among Ecuadorian electoral vehicles: it ran candidates in every district. However, the AP did not become a political party. Since its inception, the AP was designed to concentrate power around its leader, Rafael Correa. Conaghan's analysis stresses that the AP performs horizontal coordination, yet this coordination was always imposed from above; compliance with the party's directives was a condition of obtaining access to governmental positions. Vertical interest aggregation, however, is lacking. The grassroots groups that originally supported Correa disappeared. Correa's government instead used clientelism, co-optation, and strategically targeted benefits as the main tactics to relate with civil society organizations or sectors.

In Chapter 11, Piñeiro Rodríguez, Rosenblatt, and Toro Maureira analyze the case of the Chilean PPD. The PPD exhibits horizontal coordination in Congress and in elections. However, the coordination occurs between leaders who control different territories. There is no common party organization that coordinates and integrates social interests. The structure of the party resembles a federation, where a small cadre of leaders dominates different territories and exerts control over nominations, programmatic proposals, and segmented linkages with society. The case of the PPD shows that one cannot infer simply on the basis of electoral results and the existence of partisan discipline in Congress (as a measure of horizontal coordination) that an organization has a common structure capable of developing some kind of partisan identity in society to aggregate of interests at the national level.

Chapter 12 reviews the case of the FP in Peru. Vergara and Augusto question whether vertical interest aggregation and horizontal

coordination are necessarily functional to democracy and the rule of law. The FP is an example of this dysfunctionality because, in Peru, horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation involve the incorporation of illegal interests in the political process. According to Vergara and Augusto, the FP represents these illegal interests in Congress while it neglects the party's programmatic agenda and does not effectively represent its electoral base. Moreover, the FP's congressional behavior threatens democracy, in both its republican and liberal dimensions. The FP, like the AP in Ecuador (see Conaghan this volume), depends on the power of the party leadership to co-opt candidates and to enforce discipline. This power, in turn, is determined by the electoral power of the leader in the presidential election. When the leadership seems unlikely to win election or is defeated, internal conflicts and coordination problems arise.

Chapter 13 describes the UNE in Guatemala. Sanchez-Sibony and Lemus classify this case as Independents. The UNE, as with all electoral vehicles in Guatemala, relies on local *caudillos* to fulfill the requirement of presenting candidates in every district, set forth by the electoral law. Even though the UNE has a good record of legislative discipline, it suffers from large numbers of defections in all electoral cycles. This is the main indicator of the UNE's inability to carry out horizontal coordination. Sanchez-Sibony and Lemus's chapter shows how structural conditions seriously hamper horizontal coordination and, more critically, vertical interest aggregation. The fragmentation and feebleness of social organizations in Guatemala limit the possibilities of developing programmatic linkages. Therefore, the UNE substituted clientelism in place of vertical interest aggregation to develop a limited popular constituency.

2

The Case of Uruguay's Frente Amplio

Verónica Pérez Bentancur, Rafael Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Fernando Rosenblatt

INTRODUCTION

The theoretical framework of this edited volume establishes that a political party is an electoral vehicle subtype capable of vertically aggregating collective interests and through which ambitious politicians coordinate their strategies during campaigns and between elections. As the literature has extensively documented, parties can accomplish these two functions in very different ways and with very different organizational formats (Gunther and Diamond 2003). The Uruguayan Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA) fulfills both essential functions and thus qualifies as a political party. In fact, it ranks first in the Party Index introduced in Chapter 1. Even though the FA was born as a coalition of small leftist parties and factions of the foundational Uruguayan parties, it has since its inception satisfied both conditions. The FA so far has exhibited a common organizational structure and a uniquely high level of member engagement and vitality. In fact, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) categorize the FA as the only institutionalized mass-organic leftist party in Latin America.

Until 1971, the Uruguayan party system comprised two major parties: Partido Colorado (Colorado Party) and Partido Nacional (National Party, PN).[1] Although there were other leftist parties (e.g., Socialist and Communist), they were significantly smaller. The two major parties collectively obtained around 90 percent of the votes in every democratic election prior to 1971. Contextual factors help explain the emergence of

[1] From 1931 until 1956, the PN was split in two different parties: the PN and the Partido Nacional Independiente (Independent National Party).

the FA as the unification of the left in Uruguay: the economic stagnation of the 1960s, the political context of an increasingly authoritarian government led by Jorge Pacheco Areco (1968–71), the unification in 1964 of the labor movement under the Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (National Workers Convention, CNT), the unification of grassroots-level popular organizations (in the Congreso del Pueblo – People's Congress – held in 1965), as well as the political negotiations between five important leaders from the various left-of-center parties that existed at the time.

The FA was born in 1971, as a coalition of political organizations and as a movement of self-organized grassroots activists. Thus, FA leaders and activists usually refer to the FA as a combination of "coalition and movement." The FA coalition and movement structures are synthetized in a pyramidal organization with bodies at three levels: the grassroots level, the intermediate level and the national level. This interaction between factions and grassroots activists is peculiar and promotes checks and balances and diffuse power distribution.

The horizontal coordination in the FA is generated through the factions and in the relationship between them and the common structures of the FA. Each faction autonomously conducts candidate selection for election to legislative and executive bodies and competes with other factions for party voters. They coordinate on different issues (e.g., campaign finance) for the presidential election (Acuña, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rossel 2018), the party's shared campaign, and the mobilization of activists during the campaign and on election day. In electoral campaigns, the FA factions collaborate in the distribution of resources, and ensure the availability of factions' campaign literature and ballots throughout the country. The FA factions compete among themselves even though they all use a common electoral label. The FA logo is everywhere and the party's colors (red, blue, and white) are part of the electoral campaigns of all factions. More crucially, the party articulates a common platform in the FA Congress, which is essentially FA grassroots activists. To mobilize voters throughout the territory, all factions take advantage of the organizational capacity based on a common grassroots structure.

In office, the horizontal coordination has been a central concern of party leaders. Since its inception, the FA identified unity of action as an imperative mandate for all its members, and this mandate was translated into a uniform legislative caucus. Discipline was enforced by faction leaders, by the FA caucus, and, on some important issues, by the organizational bodies of the FA. In government, the FA has also

institutionalized mechanisms to constrain the government, at both national and subnational levels.

The FA performs vertical interest aggregation through the mobilization of collective interests as well as through the intermediation and channeling of collective demands. The latter is achieved through the existence of informal ties with civil society organizations. First, FA elites and grassroots activists have dual membership; they belong to the party as well as to unions, social movements, or civil society organizations. Second, the FA organization has informal ties with these organizations. As we will show in this chapter, the FA's most important decisions must consider the opinion of its core constituency. The FA also electorally mobilizes collective interests. The party's electoral platform reflects issues that are central to unions and to various social movements (e.g., feminist, human rights, LGBT). These social movements and unions have been the core constituency of the party since its inception and remained so after the FA gained the national government.

The FA is a distinctive political party for two main reasons. First, according to Levitsky and Roberts (2011) it is the only institutionalized mass-organic leftist party in Latin America. Second, it is distinctive because it has a peculiar and complex organizational structure that affords grassroots activists a significant role in the decision-making, which affects the decisions of the party in Congress and in government (Pérez Bentancur, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt 2020). Thus, in terms of Samuels and Shugart's (2010) taxonomy, the FA works as a parliamentary party rather than as a presidential party. That is, the FA's particular organizational structure constrains its leaders because the party's major decisions need the organization's explicit support (or absence of opposition). This logic is not expected under presidential regimes where voters directly elect presidents for fixed periods and, as a result, parties are less able to control them.

Also, the FA has stable informal ties with social actors and movements, especially with the unions, as do the Social Democratic parties in Europe (Kitschelt 1994). However, the FA distinguishes itself from other parties in Latin America that built strong linkages with unions, like the Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party) in Argentina, and Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party, PT) in Brazil. The FA was born and has always been an ally of the union movement but the union movement is independent of the party (Senatore, Doglio, and Yaffé 2004). The FA also has strong relations with social movements, as does the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism,

MAS) in Bolivia (Anria 2018). However, the FA is not exactly a movement party in the way that Anria (2018) characterizes the MAS. That is, the FA is not built from the social movements (see Anria this volume). Although the FA's ties with social movements are manifested in the dual membership of many grassroots activists and in the informal linkages FA politicians at all levels have with union leaders and with social movement leaders, the FA and the social movements are entirely independent of one another.

The analysis in this chapter takes advantage of an in-depth case study of the FA. The data we refer to come from an online survey of FA activists that we post-stratified using observational population data from the FA's internal election registries. We also gathered qualitative evidence using in-depth interviews and other secondary sources (for more detail on the methods and sources of data for this research, see Pérez Bentancur, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt 2020).

This chapter will proceed as follows: We first describe the FA's particular organizational characteristics. We then show how the party accomplishes horizontal coordination and vertical interest aggregation. Throughout the chapter, we show how the peculiar organizational structure of the FA enhances democratic representation and facilitates the party's capacity to adapt to changing societal demands.

THE FA AS A POLITICAL PARTY

The FA emerged in the context of severe political crisis (Astori 2001; Nahum et al. 1993) and throughout the more than forty-eight years since its birth, it has remained a continuously vibrant party with activists (Rosenblatt 2018). Although the FA underwent a process of ideological transformation (Garcé and Yaffé 2005; Yaffé 2005), it retains its leftist ideological identity and remains the only mass-organic institutionalized leftist party in Latin America (Levitsky and Roberts 2011).

At its foundation, the FA was an alliance of small leftist parties (Partido Comunista del Uruguay, Communist Party, PCU; the Partido Socialista del Uruguay, Socialist Party, PSU; the Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Christian Democratic Party, PDC), factions from the traditional parties (like the Movimiento por el Gobierno del Pueblo, Movement for People's Government from the Colorado Party and the Herrerista Movement from the PN), and independent social and union leaders. From its inception, however, the FA was also a movement. This implied, from the very beginning, the presence of strong bottom-up participation that

materialized in Comités de Base (Base Committees).[2] Very early in the life of the party, in the national elections of 1971, an army of volunteers was responsible for a significant proportion of the time and money invested in the campaign. Base Committees function as the party's mass movement arm. They comprise grassroots activists who are not necessarily affiliated with factions. Since the party's origin, these grassroots activists have worked as volunteers and have played a key organizational and mobilization role for a party with scant resources and limited access to the media.

Grassroots activists became critical players in the party's early stages of development; they demanded participation in the decision-making structure and the coalition leaders granted it. Immediately after the constitutive act, the FA approved a series of significant documents: the Bases Programáticas de la Unidad (Programmatic Bases of Unity), approved on February 17, 1971; the Reglamento de Organización (Organizational Rules), approved on March 17, 1971; and the Compromiso Político (Political Commitment), approved on February 9, 1972 (Aguirre Bayley 2001). These documents laid the foundations for the significance of the common FA structure beyond each individual faction's organization.

After this initial stage, there occurred a period of dictatorship from 1973 to 1985. The dictatorship banned political parties, and FA's leaders (including Liber Seregni, its presidential candidate in 1971, and the party's main leader until the 90s) were imprisoned, tortured, or had to go into exile. Nevertheless, during the authoritarian regime, grassroots members were crucial to maintaining the party's vibrancy in a clandestine context. In the early years of the transition (1982–85), Base Committees reorganized in private houses and contributed, intensively, to rethinking the party's internal structure and statutes. Due to the central roles Base Committees played in the 1971 elections and in the resistance to the dictatorship, the leaders felt it natural to fulfill the promise of the Political Commitment of 1972; that is, to incorporate the party's grassroots activists within the highest decision-making structures of the FA. This commitment to incorporation materialized in the first statute of 1986.

After the authoritarian regime (1973–85), the two foundational parties (Colorado Party and PN) won the next four national elections, (in 1984,

[2] In 2015, there were over 152 active Base Committees in Montevideo, which is equivalent to one Base Committee for every 10,000 people. According to FA administrative data there were 352 Base Committees in 2015; approximately 40 percent of these were located in Montevideo and the others were located throughout the rest of the country.

1989, 1994, and 1999) and led the processes of structural adjustment and market reform. In close alliance with the union movement, the FA used mechanisms of direct democracy and social mobilization to systematically oppose the reforms (Altman 2010; Monestier 2011; Moreira 2004). The opposition to the neoliberal reforms positioned the party as the single political actor on the center-left of the ideological spectrum, pushing both traditional parties to the right-of-center (Buquet and Piñeiro 2014). Thus, Uruguay is a case of programmatic alignment (Roberts 2014).

In 2004, the FA won the presidential election for the first time. The FA initiated its first term in office (2005–10) in a country that was just overcoming a severe financial and economic crisis and which needed both to achieve financial stability and to address the "social emergency" that resulted from the economic crisis of 2002. The FA addressed these challenges and enacted structural reforms that revitalized the role of the state. These reforms promoted redistribution of income (Huber and Stephens 2012; Padrón and Wachendorfer 2017; Pribble 2013; Rossel 2016). During Tabaré Vázquez's first term (2005–10), social spending increased (Caetano and De Armas 2011). The most iconic example of increased spending was the first measure his government adopted: the enactment of a conditional cash transfer program. It was implemented to address the social emergency that erupted as a consequence of the 1999–2003 economic depression. A few years later, the program turned into a universal family-based transfer program (Pribble 2013).

Also, the first FA administration reinstated collective bargaining at the sectoral level (i.e., within various sectors of economic activity) and collective bargaining was expanded to rural workers and housekeepers. In total, over forty bills concerning workers' rights were approved (Etchemendy 2019; Senatore and Méndez 2011). Unionization rates increased, especially among private-sector employees, and the number of workers in the formal sector also increased (Padrón and Wachendorfer 2017). Additionally, the government implemented a progressive tax reform by adopting an income tax and created a national integrated health care system (Bergara 2015). Finally, the FA implemented the One Laptop Per Child program, "Plan Ceibal." José Mujica's government (2010–15) continued and expanded these policies and advanced other progressive policies. For example, during Mujica's term, the Law of Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy, same-sex marriage, and the self-cultivation and commercialization of cannabis were approved (Bidegain Ponte 2013).

The reforms enacted by the first FA governments occurred in the context of favorable economic conditions. Similar to many countries in

the region, Uruguay experienced a commodity boom. This meant high prices for food and raw materials that made the country's economy grow exponentially over the course of a decade (until 2014). Yet, this economic context changed, affecting the country's economic dynamism. The FA's third government therefore had to deal with more restrictive economic conditions, which imposed a difficult trade-off between macroeconomic equilibria and redistribution (Pérez and Piñeiro 2016).

Forty-eight years after the party's birth – after suffering political severe persecution during the authoritarian regime, after being in the opposition for more than thirty years, and after fifteen years in government – the FA retains its original dual structure. One structure pertains to the coalition of political organizations ("the coalition"), and the other institutionalizes the political role in the party of the grassroots members who are not necessarily affiliated with factions (what the FA calls "the movement"). The emergence of this dual structure in Uruguay is peculiar due to the incentives set by the electoral rules. The double simultaneous vote (DSV) allows members of an electoral alliance, such as the FA, to have complete electoral autonomy, that is, to nominate candidates for the House, Senate and – until the Constitutional Reform of 1996 – the presidency (Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes 1998; González 1991; Luján and Moraes 2017; Piñeiro and Yaffé 2004). However, the FA coalition not only nominated a single common candidate for the presidency, but also built a common grassroots structure, parallel to those of each faction. The FA organizational structure has several collective decision-making bodies, where grassroots activists are granted the right to send delegates. The vertical structure connects grassroots-level activism with the decision-making bodies and with the factions – since both the factions and the grassroots activists send representatives to the different bodies (Pérez Bentancur, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rosenblatt 2020).

HORIZONTAL COORDINATION

The Party Coordinates in Electoral Campaigns

The FA has been successful in electoral terms, obtaining 18.3 percent of the votes in the 1971 national elections, and reaching 51.7 percent in the national election of 2004. It retained the presidency and the absolute majority in both chambers of Congress in 2009 (49.6 percent of the popular vote) and 2014 (49.4 percent). In 2019, the FA lost both its majority in Congress and the presidency. In the first round

(October 2019) it received almost 10 percent less of the vote share (39.9 percent) than it received in the 2014 national elections. However, the FA remains the largest party (in terms of votes and seats) and retains the capacity to mobilize a large number of adherents in mass rallies. For example, in the last rally before the first round of the 2019 election, the FA mobilized at least 10 percent of its voters (conservative estimates put the number of rally participants at about 100,000, though the actual number of participants was likely much higher). In videos of recent and past campaigns that are easily found on Youtube, one readily observes that the FA factions use a common electoral label. The FA logo is everywhere, and the three colors (red, blue, and white) are part of the electoral campaign of all affiliated groups (factions) – although each also uses its own characteristic colors, such as green for the PSU or red and black for the Movimiento de Participación Popular (Popular Participation Movement, MPP).

The FA developed a unified electoral coordination strategy. The campaign is financed by all factions together and the FA redistributes public subsidies among the factions and the presidential ticket (Acuña, Piñeiro Rodríguez, and Rossel 2018). At the local level, the Base Committees coordinate the campaign in the territory and all the election-day logistics (e.g., providing party delegates to each poll station). Base Committees serve as resources for all the competing factions, including distributing ballots for all FA factions. Also, the Base Committees organize campaign activities with candidates of different factions, and the candidates themselves conceive of the Base Committees as a natural place to stage activities.

In terms of candidate selection, each faction nominates its own candidates for the Senate and the House. Each faction can also nominate a presidential candidate to compete in the party's primary elections. The primary election and the DSV electoral system promote high intraparty competition and reduce the need for coordination between factions or for a common electoral structure. However, the FA developed a common structure and also retained the power to authorize presidential candidates to run in the FA's primary election. The party Congress – which consists almost entirely of grassroots activists – must authorize which candidates are approved to compete in the primary election, thus monopolizing the nomination.

More critically, the FA – as opposed to the foundational parties (Colorado Party and PN) – articulates a common platform in the party Congress. To articulate the programmatic platform for the elections, Base

Committee and faction grassroots activists work on thematic committees months before the Congress, where they discuss and agree on proposals suggested by Base Committees, factions, or leaders. These proposals are then put to a vote in the plenary of the congress. Thus, in the FA, the process of programmatic articulation is deliberative and participative. This platform then constitutes the basic road map of the FA in government and also serves as a powerful tool to keep representatives accountable (see the following).

The Party Coordinates in Office

After 1971, the FA continuously improved its electoral performance until it won in 2004. As previously stated, the party has been electorally successful and has retained both the presidency and the legislative majority for three consecutive national elections. This was the result of a very sophisticated and articulated electoral coordination. This coordination has continued during the party's term in office. The party has power over the government and its legislative caucus. The latter holds regular meetings where legislators coordinate a legislative agenda.

The FA has institutionalized mechanisms to check the government and the legislative caucus. The Plenario Nacional (National Plenary) and the Mesa Política Nacional (National Political Board) have the power to determine the positions of the legislative caucus and the government.[3] The National Plenary is the highest directive body of the FA. It comprises 170 delegates. Factions and Base Committees have the same number of delegates. All delegates are elected in open internal elections with secret voting. The National Political Board, in turn, is the permanent executive body and it convenes on a weekly basis (every Friday).[4] Government authorities regularly attend party decision-making bodies. For example,

[3] Both instances also illustrate the FA's capacity to vertically aggregate interests.

[4] It comprises the president and vice-president of the party, fifteen representatives from the FA factions and eleven delegates from the Base Committees (six from Montevideo, two from Canelones, and three from the rest of the country). Decisions are mostly arrived at by consensus. If there is no consensus, decisions can also be made by majority, as long as fewer than a third of the National Political Board members oppose (article 96, Party Statutes). The National Political Board has a Secretariat where Base Committee delegates also participate. The representatives of the Base Committees to the National Political Board and to the Secretariat are chosen in Montevideo by the Group of 41, in Canelones and in the rest of the country by the delegates that attend the regional Coordinating Group meeting. In general, Base Committee delegates to the National Political Board and to the Secretariat periodically rotate.

government authorities regularly visit the National Political Board – in electoral years the frequency decreases (source: database of National Executive Board minutes). On average, every year there are eleven visits to the National Political Board by government authorities (source: FA administrative data). This is a conservative estimate because, in fact, government authorities regularly visit all the different party organizational structures (source: online survey).

In terms of party discipline in Congress, the FA established a doctrine of "imperative mandate."[5] As a result, dissenting votes in Congress are rare. Those few cases that have occurred are very well documented because, first, they were notable exceptions and, second, because the votes involved sensitive issues. Even though during the FA governments (2005–20) the opposition regularly participated in hearings (i.e., they demanded explanations from government ministers), these instances all ended without consequences for the ministers due to the alignment of the FA majority in Congress.[6]

The party also created the Agrupación Nacional de Gobierno (National Group of Government) and the Agrupación de Gobierno Departamental (Departmental Group of Government) to coordinate political decisions between the government and the party. Even though the National Group of Government was the more regular body, this aspect of the FA in government is a rare instance of coordination for a political party. Finally, the party has coordination mechanisms that come into play when the preferences of the government and of the party diverge or when there are policy disagreements among the different factions (e.g., free trade agreements, budget, tax reform, debt).

VERTICAL INTEREST AGGREGATION

The FA's distinctive trait as a party is its capacity to vertically aggregate a very complex set of interests: this operates in two ways. First, since the FA's inception, the different factions within the FA compete for votes and represent different constituencies. For example, the MPP represents the popular sectors while the different factions that compose the Frente Liber Seregni (FLS) represent the middle sectors; the former is more leftist and the latter more centrist (Luna 2014). The foundational factions came from very different ideological traditions; the PDC, for example, lies at the

[5] This was included in the Political Commitment, approved on February 9, 1972.
[6] Source: https://parlamentosite.wordpress.com/interpelaciones/#more-420.

opposite end of the spectrum from the PCU. Each faction is represented within the different organizational bodies that form the FA's complex structure, with representation based on each faction's performance in competitive internal elections. Although a faction's electoral performance in national elections is less relevant for the party's structure, it influences each faction's role in the legislative caucus and in the cabinet of the Executive.

Second, interest aggregation is also channeled through the grassroots structure. This structure is open and relies on volunteer activists. Activists interact on an ongoing basis with local-level organizations and movements, and many activists have dual membership in unions or local social organizations. These activists can convey societal demands to the very top echelons of the party at the local and national level. Faction leaders do not have the tools to control the discussion or the selection of grassroots delegates. This second form of interest aggregation does not afford direct control of factions, leaders, or party elites because the grassroots structure is not involved in the candidate selection process. Also, grassroots members' delegates in the directorate lack status or the power to distribute positions or resources.

The organizational structure comprises several collective decision-making structures. While factions have representatives throughout the FA's structure, grassroots activists are granted the right to send delegates to all the decision-making bodies. Thus, besides the existence of grassroots activism, the FA has a vertical structure that connects base-level activism with the decision-making authorities and, even more crucially, grassroots activists have a significant presence in all party decision-making organs, including in the most important ones (Congress, National Plenary, and National Political Board). Finally, grassroots activists also have developed informal institutions that complement the formal institutions and through which they coordinate their actions. This development is particularly important because factions' representatives have a structure that facilitates their coordination at the faction level. Without coordination opportunities and mechanism of their own, grassroots delegates would remain atomized and would lose relevance.

The Party Electorally Mobilizes Collective Interests

During electoral cycles, Base Committees are a tool for the FA and its constituent factions to mobilize supporters in the neighborhoods. The Base Committees have deep knowledge of the territory and thus help

organize canvassing and provide detailed information about the problems and interests in each zone. They also publicize the party and its candidates (e.g., paint walls, design and produce posters, set up stands in the local street markets, etc.). On election day, they cover many voting locales as party representatives. Although online and TV campaigns are becoming increasingly important and the level of grassroots activism is declining, grassroots activists still play a role during the electoral campaigns. This is a rare trait of party organizations in Latin America. The existence of a network of committed volunteer activists who can deploy an efficient electoral campaign in the territory is evidence of the ability of the FA to electorally mobilize collective interests. However, the suggested indicators of this ability mentioned in the Introduction to this volume can also be observed in the case of the FA.

During the programmatic and electoral realignment of the Uruguayan party system, the FA not only captured more votes, but also changed its electoral base of support (Lanzaro 2004; Luna 2007b; López Cariboni and Queirolo 2015; Moreira 2000; Moreira and Delbono 2016). As in other Latin American countries in which the left accessed government, a class-based vote gradually consolidated (Handlin 2013; Madrid 2012). Since 2009, the FA has been attracting an increasing number of voters from poor sectors, individuals oriented toward voting for the FA not only because of the leftist government's economic performance but also because of the individuals' position in the social structure.[7]

The electoral platform of the FA is defined in the party Congress. It convenes every thirty months, though occasionally the National Plenary will convene a congress outside the normal schedule to address some significant issue. The FA congresses convene many activists. In the 2016 "Rodney Arismendi" congress, more than 1,000 grassroots delegates participated. The 2018 "Compañero General Víctor Licandro y Compañera Susana Dalmás," congress convened 1,143 delegates. This congress discussed the programmatic platform for the 2019 national election.

The programmatic project of the FA was modified through internal deliberative processes and thus it occurred gradually. In fact, the ideological congress is essentially an instance of bottom-up organization. In the platform the party presented for the 2004 national election, which it

[7] Using survey data from 1989 to 2014, López Cariboni and Queirolo (2015) show that class voting models better explain the vote in the last national election than do traditional economic voting models (the latter fare better in explaining election results prior to 2009).

won, the most radical positions of the party were abandoned (Garcé and Yaffé 2005; Yaffé 2005). The organizational attributes already reviewed have also affected the way the FA carried out programmatic adaptation over the years. As opposed to what happens in parties that are mere personalistic vehicles, change for the FA has been gradual and the result of intense debate.

After the authoritarian period, the FA gradually moderated ideologically and programmatically. The late 1980s and early 1990s were years of realignment within the party and the formation of new factions, some of which continue to exist today (e.g., Asamblea Uruguay, Uruguayan Assembly, AU). Garcé and Yaffé (2005) and Yaffé (2005) indicate that the FA gradually moderated starting in 1995, adopting more centrist perspectives compared to the clearly leftist manifesto of 1971. Changes were undertaken through lively debates in party congresses and documents. This gradual and mostly deliberative process indicates a process of party adaptation. Yaffé summarizes this process, which he analyzes in detail based on party documents, as follows: "and that change should not be interpreted as a sheer operation of electoral catch-up, or a last minute opportunist turn, because it has been the result of a long and complex process of programmatic and ideological renovation" (2005, 97).[8] However, it is crucial to emphasize that this process did not involve abandoning the opposition to the neoliberal turn nor a distancing of the party from its grassroots members, the unions (Lanzaro 2008), and the social movement. In this vein, during the 1990s and 2000s, the FA's electoral platform incorporated several issues historically important to the feminist movement, including controversial positions such as support for legal abortion.

In moderating its program, the FA did not imitate the traditional parties' centrist positions or convert the party to a professional electoral machine (Moraes and Luján 2015). The party kept its stances regarding the main economic cleavages in Uruguayan politics. It retained its staunch opposition to the privatization of public utility companies. In the 1990s, as market reform process advanced during Lacalle's term (1990–95), direct democracy mechanisms were intensively used, though with varying success.[9] Notably, given the uncertain prospects of the different referenda

[8] All direct quotes that appear in the chapter were translated from Spanish by the authors. See also Lanzaro (2004).

[9] While the referendum on the Annulment of Privatization of State Companies Law successfully halted the privatization of state-owned companies, other referenda and popular

and popular initiatives and the fact that some of the proposals were not the preferred policies of FA leaders or of its main factions, the FA grassroots activists were the ones who on some occasions advocated for the use of direct democracy mechanisms. This was the case in at least two campaigns, one against allowing private investment in the state-owned petroleum company monopoly (2003) and, second, a campaign in support of a law to annul amnesty for human rights crimes (2009).

Intermediation and Channeling of Collective Demands

The FA distinguishes itself from other leftist parties in Europe and Latin America because it does not have formal ties with the union movement nor is it the political arm of a social movement. However, from the very beginning, the FA developed strong ties with social organizations, especially with the labor union movement. A first indication of this strong bond was the creation of multiple functional committees, that is, non-territorial Base Committees, based in the workplace. These grassroots groups organized workers. Second, the main decision-making body of the party has always included union leaders. For example, Héctor Rodríguez, a key leader of the People's Congress and of the unification of the union movement in Uruguay, served on the first National Political Board. Third, according to Senatore, Doglio, and Yaffé (2004), 10 percent of the first slots on the party's senatorial lists and Montevideo representative lists for the 1971 and 1984 national elections were awarded to union leaders. Fourth, in the 1984 elections (the first after the transition from the authoritarian regime), the FA ticket included for vice-president José D'Elía, the most important leader of the CNT.

At the grassroots activists level, dual membership also characterizes Base Committee attendees who also participate in unions and other civil society organizations – mainly at the local level. Some 33 percent of Base Committee activists participate in unions and 42 percent participate in neighborhood associations such as social or sport clubs, parent-teacher associations, etc. Given that these grassroots activists have a significant role throughout the party structure, their dual membership generates a bottom-up capillarity between the social movements and the party.

The FA, like every political party organization in a democratic context, experiences a tension between choosing policies and candidates that are

initiatives did not fare as well. The success of a direct democracy mechanism required the decisive support of the FA as a whole (Monestier 2011).

closer to the median voter versus those that are closer to members' preferences. The FA organizational structure limits the leaders' and government's room to maneuver. It limits the party leaders' incentives to moderate their positions because major decisions need to have the organization's explicit support or, at least, an absence of opposition. When the FA is in government, the party organization – the combination of the coalitional nature of the FA and its grassroots activist structure – also constrains the government's pursuit of crucial, substantive policies. In this party with activists and powerful (institutionalized) factional leaders, the party's decisions and the policy orientation do not depend on a leader, as in other parties with activists, such as the Justicialist Party (Levitsky 2003). This gives more stability to the party's positions and reduces the likelihood of a dramatic policy switch.

In the institutional setting in which the FA is immersed, the major challenge in the relationship between the party and the government is that the former might control the latter. Even though the party does not have institutional rules, as in parliamentary regimes, to restrict government policies, the FA has been able, directly or indirectly, to limit the FA in government. Most of the time, as expected, the party has supported the government and has taken responsibility for its actions – in theoretical terms, the exception should be the opposite. Yet, on several significant occasions, the FA structure, especially the grassroots structure in combination with the factions that participate in the FA's vertical structure, has clashed with government positions. These controversies engendered changes in government positions and prevented the government from adopting more centrist positions on these policies, positions that could eventually distance the government from the party's platform. Vetoes coming from the organization (and its parliamentary caucus) prevented the implementation of these policies but did not imply a general blockade of the FA's government agenda, nor did these vetoes create long-term conflicts between the organization and the government authorities. The following examples illustrate this phenomenon.

During the FA's first government (2005–10), a group of social organizations (including the PIT-CNT, the student movement, groups of families of people who were detained and disappeared during the dictatorship, some minor groups from the left, and intellectuals) started a campaign to hold a plebiscite to repeal the "Ley de Caducidad" (15,848 Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado, Law of the Expiration of the Punitive Pretension of the State). The Law was enacted in 1986, during the first democratic government after the authoritarian regime. It

resulted from an agreement between the Colorado Party and the PN and established amnesty for crimes committed during the authoritarian regime (1973–84) by the military and the police. Those that supported the bill argued that it was a way to pacify the country. For those opposed (the political left and some minor groups within the traditional parties), the bill gave impunity to those who committed crimes and violated human rights during the dictatorship. In 1989, civil society organizations and the FA convened a call for a referendum to repeal the Law; the referendum failed to receive the necessary votes.

In 2007, in a different political context, civil society organizations argued the need for a plebiscite to repeal the law, because repealing it through Congress (the FA had the necessary majority to do so) would not yield the desired retroactive effects and would not allow the government to put the responsible military personnel on trial. By contrast, annulling the law through a plebiscite that would establish a constitutional amendment included the retroactive effects, among which was the "negation of res judicata." It was politically difficult to argue for the annulment of the law for two main reasons: first, because the Congress of the FA prior to the 2004 national elections decided not to proceed with this since it was a delicate issue at a juncture where the FA had a good chance of winning the national elections for the first time. Second, because Tabaré Vázquez (2005–10) argued against it, claiming that he would respect his campaign promises.[10]

The position of the party on the human rights policy stance of the FA's government toward the Law of the Expiration of the Punitive Pretension of the State changed when the party took office. At the fifth Ordinary Congress of 2007, a motion was approved that called on the population to participate in the campaign, initiated by social organizations, to gather the required number of signatures to annul the Law of the Expiration of the Punitive Pretension of the State. This resolution was approved almost unanimously by the 1,400 grassroots delegates attending the Congress, and resulted from the synthesis of approximately ten different motions, all of which supported the campaign already set in motion by social organizations.[11] The position of the party was consolidated at the

[10] Montevideo Portal: http://www.montevideo.com.uy/auc.aspx?49753 (last accessed in July 20, 2016).

[11] "El FA adhirió a la anulación de la Ley de Caducidad" (The FA adhered to annulation of the Law of the Expiration of the Punitive Pretension of the State) (La República, December 17, 2007).

National Plenary on April 5, 2008 when a majority of eighty-one in favor (fifty-three abstentions and nine against) decided to support the campaign to gather the required number of signatures. The motion was introduced by the grassroots activists' delegates from Montevideo and the delegates from Base Committees from abroad.

The representatives of the grassroots members were decisive in changing the position of the party, putting it in opposition to the President's preferences. In the vote, the only factions that were in favor of supporting the signature collection campaign to repeal the Law were the minor more leftist factions, as well as the PCU and the New Space. The major factions (Mujica's MPP, the FLS of Astori, and the PSU)[12] were aligned with Tabaré Vázquez's position and voted against the FA taking part in the signatures campaign. If the decision had been in the factions' hands – in the hands of their delegates to the National Plenary – the party would have remained in line with the President's position. The grassroots activists' decision, however, made the difference. Even those grassroots delegates who were also part of the MPP or the PSU factions voted against the positions of their respective factions and therefore voted for the FA to participate in the campaign for the Annulment of the Expiration Law.[13] Thus, without the grassroots activists, the decision of the party would have been different.

The ability of the FA to obstruct the government highlights the organizational strength of the party. This distances the FA from other left-of-center parties in Latin America, even from other well-organized parties like the Brazilian PT or the Chilean Partido Socialista de Chile (Chilean Socialist Party, PSCh). Thus, as opposed to the cases of other parties in Latin America, FA party elites do not have the leverage to take the party in any direction they desire (Burgess and Levitsky 2003). In the case of the FA, activists have a significant influence over policy decisions, especially policies to which the left is particularly sensitive. The coalitional structure and the grassroots structure interact such that party decisions are constrained by the party's core constituency.

Even though the FA developed its strongest linkages with the unions, the party also developed other significant bonds with social movements.

[12] Mujica and Astori were the candidates who competed in the party's primary election to determine the presidential candidate for the 2009 national elections.

[13] See "La Ley de Caducidad: comienza campaña masiva para anularla," April 7, 2008, in El Espectador (accessed on July 20, 2016), and "Desafía el Frente Amplio a Tabaré por la amnistía," (The FA challenges Tabaré over amnesty, *Página* 12, April 7, 2008).

These bonds proved crucial in the FA's promotion of gender and sexual orientation equality legislation. For instance, discussion within the party regarding the legalization of abortion illustrates the existence of informal ties with civil society organizations and the role these ties play in constraining party decisions. Feminist activists have had a two-tier relationship with the FA. On the one hand, many feminist activists were grassroots activists in the FA; on the other hand, they had personal ties with FA leaders, especially female leaders. In 1985, during the transition to democracy, many feminists formed Cotidiano Mujer (Everyday Woman), one of the most active NGOs at the time, and they were also activists of the PCU and the Partido por la Victoria del Puebl (Party for the Victory of the People, PVP). Even though these women abandoned active participation in the FA structure, they maintained close ties with (and thus had direct access to) FA politicians, especially to the feminist caucus (Margarita Percovich, Mónica Xavier, Constanza Moreira, and Carmen Beramendi). The pregnancy-interruption law was approved in the FA second government (2010–15, Mujica's administration) and it was one of the toughest laws to approve for the left (for example, Tabaré Vázquez always opposed this bill and he vetoed it during his first government, 2005–10).

CONCLUSIONS: THE FA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION

The electoral success of the FA, its capacity to challenge the established Uruguayan foundational parties and its ability to serve as a pole of attraction for social movements was accompanied by the existence of institutionalized channels for *voice*, through which the party activists influence strategic decisions. These channels provide a means for activists to influence the party's agenda and to exercise a veto over party leaders' objectives. Activists participate in the party's strategic discussions and party leaders, when making decisions, consider the potential problems they might face if they deviate far from activists' preferences. Thus, the party grassroots members constitute a potential (or actual) threat to incumbent party elites.

In the case of the FA, activists have an institutionalized role in the decision-making structure. They have institutionalized channels that facilitate participation; more crucially, these channels enable them to exert a significant *voice* (Hirschman 1970), which imbues activists' participation with a strong sense of efficacy. Building on Pizzorno (1970),

Panebianco (1988) analyzed how selective and collective incentives affect individuals' level of engagement with parties. The term "collective incentives" refers to how leaders reproduce a party's identity and satisfy party members' need to identify with ideas and values. Selective incentives, by contrast, concern leaders' ability to distribute positions within the party or in government, or other types of patronage. While collective incentives are crucial for voters, supporters, and members, activists' willingness to continue their activism depends on a combination of both collective and selective incentives. Activists will participate as long as the party leadership provides these two types of incentives.

The FA is a dynamic organization. The coalition and movement that was born in 1971 changed over time. It changed ideologically and programmatically and its social bases broadened. The FA had to adapt to contextual transformations – as did all leftist parties in the region and in the rest of the world – including political violence, the end of the Cold War, the neoliberal turn, the epochal shift that is summarized in the idea of "globalization," financial crises, and economic crises. These processes and events are often cited as factors that in many cases explain the death of parties. The FA, like many other parties, has adapted and survived. This ability to adapt is largely attributable to the existence of a strong organizational structure that facilitates the incorporation of new demands and affords grassroots activists the belief that their engagement matters.

In sum, the FA structure not only distinguishes the party from other leftist parties in Latin America but also (and more crucially) enables the party to efficiently represent the demands of multiple social actors whose policy preferences are not always aligned with those of the main party leaders. In this way, the FA serves as a powerful vehicle to achieve democratic representation of popular interests.