

The Uneven Institutionalization of a Party System: Brazil*

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Along with El Salvador and Panama, Brazil is one of the few Latin American countries that have more institutionalized party systems today than a generation ago. When the Mainwaring and Scully (1995a) volume was published, Brazil's party system was characterized by high electoral volatility, the steep electoral tailspins of the parties that governed the country from 1982 until 1992, the meteoric rise and subsequent fall of a populist who won the 1989 presidential election, frequent party switching by politicians, and weak linkages between voters and parties. In recent years, the party system has enjoyed stability in presidential and lower chamber elections. Two parties, the leftist Workers' Party (PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores) and the center-right Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira), have dominated the last six presidential elections (1994–2014), providing structure and stability to the system, including in programmatic terms. In contrast to the sharp policy shifts (Stokes 2001) that many Latin American parties pulled in the 1980s and 1990s, obfuscating traditional ideological divisions and diluting party brands (Lupu 2016), the *relative* positions of Brazilian parties have been stable – even though the PSDB and PT both shifted to the right after winning the presidency in 1994 and 2002, respectively. During a generation of the collapse of many major parties and the weakening of party systems in several Latin American countries, the Brazilian case was a counter example of increasing institutionalization from 1994 to 2014.

This institutionalization, however, is uneven and thin, and the PT's woes over the last few years have dealt a crushing blow to one of the system's pillars. Institutionalization is uneven in the sense that electoral stability has been high

* We are grateful to Oswaldo Amaral, Mariana Borges, José Antonio Cheibub, Michael Coppedge, Ann Mische, Lucas Novaes, Gabriela Ippolito O'Donnell, Bruno Reis, Guilherme Russo, David Samuels (on two occasions), and Thiago Silva for comments; to Andréa Freitas, Oswaldo Amaral, Rachel Meneguello, and the Center for Studies in Public Opinion, UNICAMP, for providing access to data; and to María Victoria De Negri for research assistance.

for the presidency and the Chamber of Deputies, but not for gubernatorial contests. Institutionalization is thin in that individual-level and organizational underpinnings of systemic-level stability are modest and are uneven across parties.¹ The PT had strong roots in society until 2014, with many party identifiers and a strong, penetrating organization. The other parties have weaker roots in society, far fewer party identifiers, and less robust organizations. Thus, at the level of individual parties, there was a gap between the solidity of the PT and the rest. This fact has important consequences for system-level stability: until 2016, the position of the PT as one of the main actors in the system was safer than that of the other parties. While PT identifiers formed a group large and loyal enough to give it a competitive edge in presidential elections, no other party had a similar contingent of partisans. Systems that are not grounded in strong partisanship and solid party organizations are more vulnerable to deinstitutionalization (Lupu 2016; Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012).

This chapter documents the change from an inchoate to a relatively institutionalized party system and then attempts to explain why it happened. Notwithstanding burgeoning scholarly interest in party system institutionalization (PSI) since 1995, there have been relatively few efforts to explain how institutionalization occurs. In part, this is because there are few clear-cut cases of the institutionalization of democratic party systems in third and fourth wave democracies; in contrast, there are several good books on the opposite phenomena: party system collapse (Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012) and/or party collapse (Lupu 2016).

Our explanation of growing PSI focuses on three factors. First, in Brazil, economic stabilization fostered party system institutionalization. Between 1980 and 1994, chronic triple and quadruple inflation that peaked at 2948% in 1990 and no net economic growth led to massive defections of politicians and huge electoral losses for three successive governing parties and coalitions: the Democratic Social Party, PDS (Partido Democrático Social), 1979–85; the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, PMDB, 1985–90; and the Party of National Reconstruction (PRN), 1990–92. The massive setbacks of these parties opened doors for others and provoked a profound reorganization of the party system. Economic stabilization in 1994 and some subsequent positive policy results under the governments of the PSDB (1995–2003) and the Workers' Party (PT) (specifically from 2003 to 2010) positioned these two parties as the major players in the system. Socioeconomic advances helped bring about greater institutionalization.

Second, changes in the formal rules of the game have supported PSI. Some early changes (just after the 1988 constitution was approved) boosted party discipline relative to the constitutional congress of 1987–88 (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999). Greater discipline helped build more cohesive party identities and loyalties. The 1995 Law of Political Parties vastly increased public funding,

¹ Zucco (2015) makes a similar argument; he speaks of “stabilization without roots.”

enabling parties to build more solid organizations. It also altered the criteria for allocating free television and radio campaign time in a way that strongly favors established parties. The change from non-concurrent to concurrent presidential and congressional elections in 1994 increased hurdles for political outsiders. In 2002, a law abolished the birthright candidate rule (*candidato nato*), by which any elected politician automatically had the right to run for reelection. The birthright candidate law meant that incumbent politicians did not need the support of parties to run for reelection, and hence they could more easily turn their backs on the leadership. These institutional changes promoted PSI.

Third, institutionalization benefitted from the consistent presence of viable contenders with clearly contrasting programmatic preferences. These programmatic differences gave voters a sense that they could choose something different within the system if other options failed them. Programmatic differentiation thereby lowered the risk of systemic collapse.

We close the chapter with some reflections on the PT's steep decline of partisans, the repudiation of the party throughout much of Brazilian society, and its steep electoral losses in 2016, and on what this augurs for the system's institutionalization. The PT was not just any old party. It won the presidency four times in a row, and in all seven presidential elections since redemocratization, it came in first or second. It gained far more partisans than other parties, and it was more organized. In important ways, it was a central pillar of the system.

BRAZIL'S CONTEMPORARY PARTIES

After twenty-one years of military rule (1964–85), Brazil returned to democracy in March 1985. The first nine years of democracy were characterized by a new Constitution (1988), years of three and four-digit inflation rates, an impeached president (Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992), and ongoing upheaval in the party system. From the successful economic stabilization plan in 1994 until the political and economic crisis that erupted in 2015, the country enjoyed a deepening of democracy, a reduction of poverty, an amelioration of long-standing stark inequalities, and more stability in the party system.

Since 1990, the congressional party system has been extremely fragmented. As of 2015, thirty-two parties were registered with the Electoral Justice² and at least another dozen have petitioned for formal recognition.³ Twenty-six have at least one representative in the Chamber of Deputies (as of November 2016).

Created in 1980, the Workers' Party (PT, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) was initially spearheaded by leftist activists and politicians; the "new" union movement that emerged in the late 1970s in greater São Paulo, mainly in the automobile industry; and grassroots Catholic activists. It was initially a small,

² www.tse.jus.br/partidos/partidos-politicos

³ https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lista_de_partidos_pol%C3%ADticos_no_Brasil

ideological socialist party with somewhat radical tendencies, with roots primarily in the state of São Paulo.⁴ It enjoyed steady electoral growth from its first election in 1982 until 2002, when Luis Inácio (Lula) da Silva was elected president. It also expanded its organization. Building upon the mobilization of a series of grassroots networks, the PT became a fully national organization by the end of the 1990s, with more than two thousand local branches across Brazil (Hunter 2010).

Even though it was still a small party, in 1989, when the first popular elections for president since 1960 took place, PT candidate Lula came in second place and made it to the runoff, where he lost with 47% of the valid vote. Lula also finished second in presidential voting in 1994 and 1998. Over time, the PT became more pragmatic, more willing to form electoral alliances that it once spurned, and more moderate. The 2002 election was an inflection point; in order to enhance his chances of winning and governing successfully, Lula moved toward the center during his campaign (Meneguello and Amaral 2008; Hunter 2010).

Lula served two terms as president, from 2003 through 2010. During his presidency, Brazil achieved considerable success in reducing poverty and inequality. During these years, the PT's social base changed toward the poor states and toward poor and less educated voters (Hunter and Power 2007; Soares and Terron 2008). Whereas previously it had fared best in the country's most developed states and among the more educated, since 2006 the PT has fared best in the poor northeastern and northern states and among the less educated.

In 2010, PT candidate Dilma Rousseff was elected president, winning decisively (56% to 44%) in the second round over PSDB candidate José Serra. She was reelected in 2014, again winning against a PSDB candidate (Aécio Neves, former governor of Brazil's second largest state, Minas Gerais) in the closest presidential election in Brazil's history (51.6% to 48.4%). In her second term, she presided over an endless stream of corruption revelations about past PT practices and over Brazil's deepest recession in decades. She was removed from office on May 12, 2016 and succeeded by her Vice-President, Michel Temer of the PMDB (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), who had defected to the opposition and worked in favor of her impeachment.

Since 1994, the PSDB has either won the presidency (1994 and 1998) or finished second and made the runoff (2002–14). It emerged in 1988 as a center-left splinter from the PMDB. In 1994, it moved to the center or center-right (Power and Zucco 2009: 230) to enhance presidential candidate Fernando Henrique Cardoso's chances of winning – which he did in a first-round landslide. Cardoso repeated the first-round landslide in 1998. The PSDB fared best among better-educated and wealthier voters and in larger cities in the

⁴ On the PT's early years, see Keck (1992) and Meneguello (1989).

2002–14 period and in the 1989 presidential election and 1990 congressional elections. During Cardoso's presidency, from 1994 until 2002, it had strong support from the poorest areas of the country (Zucco 2008), while the educated middle class tended to vote for Lula.

The PMDB was created in 1966 as the official opposition party to the military government. From 1966 to 1980, it was known as the *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement). It spearheaded growing opposition to the military, paving the way for the transition to democracy in 1985. The PMDB swept to landslide victories in the 1986 congressional and gubernatorial elections, but scores of members of congress elected on the party's label in 1986 defected to other parties in the next few years. It diluted its brand, strongly associated with redemocratization, by the end of José Sarney's government (1985–90), and it governed during a period of hyperinflation and economic turmoil. Sarney's disastrous economic policies severely impacted the party's electoral fortunes. The failure of Ulysses Guimarães's candidacy in the 1989 presidential elections, when he received 4.5% of the vote, the decrease in the party's support in lower chamber elections between 1986 and 1990 (from 48.1% to 19.3%),⁵ and the steep decline in the number of PMDB partisans were consequences of a poor governing record and brand dilution.⁶

The PMDB has never fielded a competitive presidential candidate, but it remains one of the country's largest parties in the national congress and in winning state gubernatorial posts. Since the 1990s, it has fared best in the northeast and north and among poorer voters. Ideologically, the PSDB and PMDB have been largely indistinguishable since 1994 (Lucas and Samuels 2010), anchoring the center or center-right of the spectrum. Current President Temer has been a PMDB member since the 1980s, and was the party president from 2001 to 2016.

For the first two decades of the democratic regime, there was a fourth major party, the Democrats (DEM). This party was founded with the name *Partido da Frente Liberal* (Party of the Liberal Front, PFL) in 1984–85, when many leaders of the party that had supported the military dictatorship defected. By casting their votes for opposition presidential candidate Tancredo Neves in 1985, the PFL helped bring about an orderly end to the dictatorship. A conservative party with traditional strongholds in northeastern Brazil, the PFL formed a coalition with the PSDB in the 1994 and 1998 presidential elections (both won by Cardoso of the PSDB) and again in 2006 and 2010.⁷ After Cardoso left power

⁵ Georgetown Political Database for the Americas, 1990 Legislative Elections for the Chamber of Deputies. [Internet]. Georgetown University and Organization of American States, see <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Brazil/legis1990.html>.

⁶ Mainwaring (1999) reports that in 1978, 61% of the voters in the city of São Paulo identified with the [P]MDB. By 1989, this number had fallen to 14%.

⁷ On the PFL, see Ferreira (2002: 47–134), R. Ribeiro (2014), and Tarouco (1999).

and the PT began to displace the PFL in the Northeast, in 2007, the party changed its name to DEM (Democrats) and transitioned to a younger leadership in Lula's second term in office. As recently as 2006, it was still the fourth largest party in congressional elections, but its erosion has accelerated in recent years.

In national legislative and sub-national elections, these four parties collectively win about half of the vote. There is also a large and diverse group of medium-sized parties, which we operationalize as parties receiving from 3% to 8% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and winning governorships in at least one state in recent elections. These parties stand at both the right and at the left of the ideological spectrum.⁸ On the right are the PP (Progressive Party), PTB (Brazilian Labor Party), PR (Party of the Republic), PSD (Social Democratic Party), and PSC (Social Christian Party). The first three date to the initial years of the democratic regime and have since gathered important electoral support in specific areas of the country. The PSD is a political machine that was created in 2011 as a pro-government party to accommodate politicians who had previously been members of parties that opposed the PT. After the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the party remained in the cabinet of Michel Temer. The PSC is the most successful of the parties of the new Brazilian right, with strong roots in neoPentecostal churches and other new actors such as radio announcers and police officers.

The importance of medium-sized parties is mirrored on the left side of the political spectrum. The Brazilian Socialist Party, PSB, enjoys strong electoral support in the northeast of the country, where it absorbed many of the voters and the elites of more traditional parties, such as the PFL/DEM (R. Ribeiro 2014). The *Partido Popular Socialista* (Popular Socialist Party, PPS) and *Partido Verde* (PV, Green Party) are center-left parties that have systematically won more than a dozen representatives in the country's legislature and have played important roles in presidential elections. The PV had a viable presidential candidate in 2010 with Marina Silva.⁹ Marina won 19.3% of the votes in the first round (until 2014, the best performance of any third-place presidential candidate since 1955) and was largely responsible for preventing an outright victory by Dilma Rousseff in the first round. She joined the PSB and became its presidential candidate in 2014, again running third behind the PT and PSDB candidates.

Appendix 6.1 lists the parties that are currently represented in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of the national congress. Table 6.1 shows the ten most important parties, which together win approximately three-quarters of the vote in PR contests. We rank their electoral potency according to their average performance in the most recent elections for federal deputy (2014)

⁸ This ideological ordering of Brazilian parties follows Zucco (2011).

⁹ Marina Silva is a historical leader of environmental movements in the Amazon forest. She was Lula's Environment Minister until 2008 and left the government and the PT to run for president in 2010.

TABLE 6.1 *Electoral Performance, Main Brazilian Parties, 2014–16*

Party	2014	2016	Mean of 2014 and 2016 (%)	Rank
	Chamber of Deputies (%)	City Councils (%)		
PMDB	11.0	9.4	10.2	1
PSDB	11.4	8.5	10.0	2
PT	13.9	5.5	9.2	3
PP	6.6	5.7	6.2	4
PSD	6.1	6.2	6.2	5
PSB	6.4	5.8	6.1	6
PR	5.8	4.4	5.1	7
PDT	3.6	5.7	4.7	8
DEM	4.2	4.5	4.4	9
PTB	4.0	4.4	4.2	10
Total	73.0	60.1	66.6	–

Note: Percentages refer to party's share of total valid votes cast.

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

and municipal councils (2016). Of these ten parties, two were founded under military rule (the PMDB and PP, which trace their roots to 1966) while six date to the democratic transition between 1980 and 1985 (PT, PDT, PTB, and PSB, plus arguably the PR, which is heir to the defunct Liberal Party). The PSDB was born during the constitutional assembly of 1987–88. As befits an institutionalized system, only one of the ten leading parties is a true newcomer: the PSD. Table 6.1 shows the extreme fragmentation of the party system in proportional elections. The two largest parties each win only a tenth of the national vote in municipal council elections.

STABILITY IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

In institutionalized party systems, the main contenders are stable over time. Chapter 2 of this volume proposed six indicators to assess the stability of the membership of a party system. The first two are the vote share of new parties in presidential and congressional elections. These indicators reflect the system's openness, or to put it conversely, the barriers to new contenders. In both presidential and lower chamber elections, since 1990, in Brazil new parties have had negligible electoral impact. In presidential elections, Brazil had the third lowest mean vote share for new parties for the 1990–2014 period (1.3%), among the nineteen countries included in Figure 2.1. Brazil had the seventh lowest average vote share for new parties in lower chamber elections (3.7%).

In 1980, the PT, PTB, and PDT formed. The membership of the party system changed profoundly from 1980 through 1990. In 1985 (the PFL) and 1988 (the PSDB), important new parties emerged. In contrast, no new party created after 1990 has won more than 6.2% of the lower chamber vote (the PSD in 2014). Except for the PSD and the PSDB (created in 1988), all major parties were born in the first half of the 1980s or earlier (the PMDB dates from 1966). In 2011, the PSD became the fourth largest party in the Congress, taking many of its new leaders from the Democrats and the PSDB.

In lower chamber elections, new parties won 13.8% in 1982, 26.3% in 1986, and 11.5% in 1990. Since 1994, the main contenders have been stable, as is seen in the precipitous drop in the vote share of new parties (the bottom row of Table 6.2). Except for 2014 because of the PSD, the vote share of new parties has consistently been very low.

Tables 2.2 and 2.3 in Chapter 2 displayed four indicators for the stability of the significant contenders. Election-to-election stability (Table 2.2) is the percentage of times that a party that won at least 10% of the vote surpassed that threshold again in the next election. Brazil has had high election-to-election stability of significant contenders in both presidential and lower chamber elections. Of the twenty-four times that a party won at least 10% of the lower chamber vote from 1990 to 2010, that party remained a significant contender in the following election on twenty-one occasions. Of the fourteen times that a party won at least 10% of the presidential vote from 1994 until 2010, it reached that threshold eleven times in the following election.

The indicator for medium-term stability is the number of times that all parties that ever reached the 10% threshold from 1990 to 2014 did so again as a percentage of all the times that they could have (Table 2.3). For medium-term stability, Brazil had the fifth highest score for lower chamber elections and the eighth highest for presidential elections. In sum, by all four indicators, Brazil has had relatively stable main contenders. Moreover, these indicators do not capture one of the most salient features of Brazil's party system: the stability of the main two contenders for the presidency in the last six elections (1994–2014): the PT and the PSDB.

THE STABILIZATION OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION

Another defining feature of an institutionalized party system is that the vote share of parties is relatively stable over time. This section describes the stabilization of electoral competition in presidential and lower chamber elections and notes the ongoing high levels of volatility in elections for governors. We also note the concentration of the vote on two parties in presidential elections, the exceptional fragmentation of the party system in the lower chamber, and the intermediate situation in gubernatorial elections: low fragmentation at the state level but high fragmentation when we aggregate to the national level. The differences in the party system across these three levels are so great that it

TABLE 6.2 *Presidential Election Results (% of 1st Round Valid Vote) and Effective Number of Presidential Candidates, 1989–2014*

Year	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
PRN	30.5	0.6					
PT	17.2	27.0	31.7	46.4	48.6	46.9	41.6
PDT	16.5	3.2			2.6		
PSDB	11.5	54.3	53.1	23.2	41.6	32.6	33.5
PDS	8.9	2.8					
PL	4.8						
PMDB	4.7	4.4					
PRONA		7.4	2.1				
PCB/PPS	1.1		11.0	12.0			
PSB				17.9			21.3
PSOL					6.9		1.5
PV	0.2		0.3			19.3	0.6
Others	4.8	3.1	1.9	0.5	0.3	1.2	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
ENPC	5.45	2.65	2.53	3.17	2.41	2.75	3.02
Electoral volatility	–	60.7	17.6	33.8	30.4	19.5	24.2
Vote share new parties	51.1	0.0	0.7	0.0	7.0	0.0	0.0

Source: IPEADATA and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

makes sense to distinguish between the presidential and the congressional party systems. Alternatively, one could argue that Brazil has had a bifurcated party system: exceptionally fragmented in the national congress yet with low fragmentation in presidential voting (Meneguello 2011). As we explain later in this chapter, the impressive fragmentation of the legislature is not incompatible with our broad argument of uneven institutionalization of the party system.

Presidential Elections

The presidency is by far the most powerful position in Brazil, so we analyze it in greater detail than the congressional party system. Our discussion of presidential elections emphasizes a shift from high volatility (1989–94), high fragmentation (1989), and the electoral victory of an outsider populist in 1989 to the stabilization of electoral tendencies, the concentration of the vote on two leading candidates, and the consistent dominance of the PT and PSDB from 1994 through 2014. The second and third points have been closely linked in Brazil since 1994, but they are discrete in principle and usually in reality; in highly fragmented congressional party systems, voting for the presidency is usually concentrated on two or three leading candidates but these candidates do not always come from the same two or three parties.

From High Volatility (1989–94) to Stabilization (1994–2014). The president and the other most powerful political positions in Brazil – state governors and mayors of cities with at least 200,000 registered voters – are elected in majority runoff systems. For these posts, two candidates get to the second round if nobody wins a majority of the valid vote in the first round.

Table 6.2 shows the results of first-round presidential voting, organized by the party of the candidate who spearheaded different coalitions. The table includes only parties that won at least 5% of the vote on at least one occasion. The second row from the bottom shows the sharp drop in electoral volatility, from 60.7% (extremely high) for the 1989–94 electoral period to an average of 25% in the five elections since then, with a high of 33.8%. The top two contenders have always been from the same parties since 1994.

From Fragmentation to Concentration of the Vote. The third row from the bottom of Table 6.2 shows the effective number of presidential candidates. This number is calculated in the same way as the effective number of parties: by squaring each candidate's percentage of the vote, summing these squares, and dividing one by the sum of the squares. The 1989 presidential election was marked by fragmentation of the first-round vote. The effective number of presidential candidates was 5.45%. Populist Fernando Collor de Mello, who created a party (the PRN, *Partido da Reconstrução Nacional*) to run for office, won 30.5% of the valid vote, and Lula came in second with 17.2%.

The fragmentation of the vote for the presidency declined sharply after 1989. The average has been 2.70% in the five subsequent elections, and the numbers

TABLE 6.3 *Results of Presidential Elections, 2nd Round, 1989–2014*

Party	1989	2002	2006	2010	2014
PRN	Collor 53.0%	-	-	-	-
PT	Lula 47.0%	Lula 61.3%	Lula 60.8%	Dilma 56.0%	Dilma 51.6%
PSDB	-	Serra 38.7%	Alckmin 39.2%	Serra 44.0%	Neves 48.4%

Note: No runoff election was necessary in 1994 or in 1998.

have fluctuated little, from a low of 2.41% in 2006 to a high of 3.17% in 2002 – another component of the stabilization of presidential elections.

From Outsider Victory to PT/PSDB Duopoly. The third important change, also associated with increasing institutionalization, is that the same two parties, the PT and PSDB, have consistently come in first or second in the last six presidential elections. The route to the presidency has been through these same well-established parties, in sharp contrast to what occurred in 1989.

The PSDB candidate won in the first round in 1994 and 1998 and lost in the runoff in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. The PT was the runner-up in 1994 and 1998 (as well as 1989) and won in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. The two parties' candidates won 81% (1994), 85% (1998), 70% (2002), 90% (2006), 80% (2010), and 75% (2014) of the first-round presidential vote in the last six elections. Table 6.3 shows the second-round results of presidential voting.

Except in 2002, the gap between the PT and PSDB, on the one hand, and third place finishers, on the other, has been large: 19.6% in 1994, 20.7% in 1998, 5.3% in 2002, 34.7% in 2006, 13.3% in 2010, and 12.2% in 2014. There has been no major outsider candidate since Collor won in 1989. In 1994, outsider Enéas Carneiro won 7.4% of the valid vote; since then no outsider has come close to Enéas's percentage.

This combination of an exceptionally fragmented party system in congress and the consistent dominance of the same two parties over many (six) presidential elections is rare and perhaps unique in the history of presidential democracies. In other presidential democracies with highly fragmented congressional party systems, no set of two parties has consistently dominated presidential elections.

This duopoly in presidential competition is a contrast to Brazil's democracy of 1946–64. During that earlier period of democracy, the party system was much less fragmented in congress, and four different parties (the PSD, the PTB, the UDN, and the PDC) either won the presidency or came a close second at least one time. Each of the three largest parties had at least one winning presidential

TABLE 6.4 Coalitions Running Presidential Candidates, 1994–2014

1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
	PSDB/PFL/			PSDB/DEM/	PSDB/ PMN/SD/
PSDB/PFL	PPB/PTB/	PSDB/ PMDB	PSDB/PFL	PTB/PPS/PMN/	DEM/PEN/ PTN/PTB/ PTC/PTdoB
	PSD			PTdoB	
PT/PSB/ PCdoB/ PPS/PV/ PSTU	PT/PDT/ PSB/ PCB/ PCdoB	PT/PL/ PCdoB/ PMN/PCB	PT/PRB/ PCdoB	PT/PMDB/PDT /PCdoB/PSB/ PR/PRB/ PTN/ PSC/PTC	PT/PMDB/ PSD/ PP/PR/PROS/ PDT/ PCdoB/PRB
PMDB/PSD	PPL/ PL/PAN	PPS/PDT/ PTB	PSOL/PCB/ PSTU	PV	PSB/PRP/PPS/ PPL/PHS/PSL
Prona	PTdoB	PSB/PGT/ PTC	PSL	PSDC	PSOL
PDT	PMN	PSTU	PDT	PRTB	PSC
PPR	PSDC	PCO	PSDC	PSOL	PV
PRN	PSN			PCO	PRTB
PSC	PTN			PSTU	PSTU
	PSC				PSDC
	PSN				PCB
	Prona				PCO
	PV				

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

candidate (if we count Jânio Quadros’s party in 1960 as the UDN), and each was unable to field its own candidate on at least one occasion.

It is not only the consistent dominance by the PSDB and the PT that stabilized the system. As Limongi and Cortez (2010) noted, party coalitions in presidential elections have also been fairly stable. The PT and other leftist and center-left parties have always anchored one coalition, augmented since the 2002 election with at least one center-right party in every contest. In four of the last five presidential elections, all except for 2002, the PSDB and PFL/Democrats have spearheaded the other coalition. Among the four parties profiled in the first section of this chapter, the PMDB has been the only one outside this generally stable set of coalitions. After dismal showings by its own candidates in 1989 and 1994, the PMDB sat out the 1998 and 2006 presidential contests and joined the PSDB coalition in 2002 and the PT coalition in 2010 and 2014. Table 6.4 shows the coalitions in presidential elections.

LOWER CHAMBER ELECTIONS: STABILIZATION WITH EXTREME FRAGMENTATION

Our discussion of the party system in the lower chamber emphasizes the plunge in electoral volatility starting in 1994 combined with extreme fragmentation. Table 6.5 shows the results in votes for the main parties in lower chamber elections, 1982–2014. In the 1980s, electoral volatility in voting for the Chamber of Deputies was very high: 35.4% for the 1982–86 electoral period and 35.6% for 1986–90. The 1980s were a decade of turmoil in the party system.

Since 1994, mirroring the stabilization of presidential elections, Brazil has had low electoral volatility for the Chamber of Deputies. For these last six elections, Brazil's electoral volatility has been close to the average for the advanced industrial democracies and well below average for Latin America.

The congressional party system is extraordinarily fragmented – the most fragmented in the history of Latin America and perhaps beyond. The effective number of parties in votes for the Chamber of Deputies has increased monotonically since 1982, reaching 14.1 in 2014. Since 1990, the largest vote share that any party has won for the Chamber of Deputies was the PMDB's 20.3% in 1994. In 2014, the largest party was the PT, with only 13.9% of the vote. Brazil's effective number of parties in 2014 was much higher than any election in the 618 electoral periods in sixty-seven countries in the Mainwaring/España/Gervasoni dataset on electoral volatility (Mainwaring *et al.* 2016).

For state assemblies and the Chamber of Deputies, voting at the state level results in a high effective number of parties in all twenty-seven states (Ferreira *et al.* 2008: 443–46). In 2010, the least fragmented state assembly was Santa Catarina with an effective number of parties (ENP) of 7.2, and the unweighted mean for all twenty-seven states was 11.4 (Rebello 2012). At the state level, there has been a huge contrast in party system fragmentation between gubernatorial results and proportional elections (state assembly and the Chamber of Deputies). The combination of low electoral volatility and extremely high fragmentation is unusual; high fragmentation tends to be associated with high electoral volatility (Mainwaring *et al.* 2016; Roberts and Wibbels 1999).

PARTY COMPETITION FOR STATE GOVERNORS: PERSISTENTLY HIGH VOLATILITY

State governors – especially those of large and wealthy states such as São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul – are powerful actors in Brazil. Next to the presidency, these are the most powerful elected positions. Brazil is a federal country, and states have ample resources and legal competencies.

In contrast to what has occurred in presidential and lower chamber elections, gubernatorial contests continue to be marked by persistently high electoral

TABLE 6.5 *Vote Share of Brazilian Main Parties, Lower Chamber Elections since 1982*

Party	Founded	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
PP ¹	1966	43.2	7.8	8.9	9.4	11.3	7.8	7.1	6.5	6.6
PMDB ²	1966	43.0	48.1	19.3	20.3	15.2	13.4	14.5	13.0	11.1
PDT	1979	5.8	6.5	10.0	7.2	5.7	5.1	5.3	5.0	3.6
PTB	1979	4.5	4.5	5.6	5.2	5.7	4.6	4.7	4.2	4.0
PT	1979	3.6	6.9	10.2	12.8	13.2	18.4	14.9	16.9	13.9
DEM ³	1985		17.7	12.4	12.9	17.3	13.4	10.9	7.5	4.2
PR ⁴	1985		2.9	4.3	3.5	2.5	4.3	4.4	7.5	5.8
PSB	1985		0.9	1.9	2.2	3.4	5.3	6.2	7.0	6.4
PSDB	1988			8.7	13.9	17.5	14.3	13.7	11.9	11.4
PSD	2011									6.1
Others		0.0	4.7	18.8	12.6	8.2	13.4	18.3	20.5	26.9
ENPv ⁵		2.6	3.6	9.8	8.5	8.1	9.3	10.6	11.2	14.1
Volatility		–	35.4	35.6	18.0	15.3	14.9	10.4	11.2	17.6
Vote share, new parties		13.8	26.3	11.5	0.3	0.6	0.0	1.4	0.0	11.9

¹*Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA)/Partido Democrático Social (PDS)/Partido Progressista Reformador (PPR)/ Partido Progressista (PP).*

²*Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB)/Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB).*

³*Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL)/Democratas (DEM).*

⁴*Partido Liberal (PL)/Partido da República (PR).* The PR is result of the merger between the PL and PRONA.

⁵Effective number of parties, in votes.

Source: Data from the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*.

volatility. In this respect, the institutionalization of the party system has been uneven. Mean electoral volatility for the twenty-seven states was 67.8% from 1990 to 1994, 56.3% from 1994 to 1998, 48.8% from 1998 to 2002, 52.1% from 2002 to 2006 (Melo 2010: 27), and 48.8% for 2006–10. Party switching by major gubernatorial candidates accounts for an important share of this volatility (Cortez 2009: 130; Melo 2010: 29).

At the aggregate national level, many parties compete for and win state governorships.¹⁰ Table 6.6 shows the number of state governorships won by party since 1982. Since 1990, in every election at least six different parties have captured at least one state. During this time, no party has ever won more than nine of twenty-seven states. Thus, the near duopoly that has existed on the presidency since 1994 does not exist at the country-wide level in the competition for governors. The bottom row shows the “effective number of governors” at the national level; the number is consistently much higher than the effective number of presidential candidates. The PT and PSDB combined have never won more than 37.7% of the vote; this zenith occurred, oddly, in 2002, when the two parties had a lower share of the first-round presidential vote than in any election since 1989. The PSB, PMDB, and PFL/Democrats, the latter two of which have never fielded a major presidential candidate and have not even presented a candidate since 1994 and 1989, respectively, win a meaningful number of states. In 2014, the PMDB won seven states, more than any other party, and the PSB won three.

Coalitions are the rule in gubernatorial elections. Presidential coalitions shape gubernatorial elections; state-level coalitions for gubernatorial elections tend to follow the same lines as the presidential coalitions. The PSDB and PFL frequently join forces, as do the PT, PSB, PDT, and PC do B (Limongi and Cortez 2010: 32–35). This consistency in coalitions between the presidential election and gubernatorial elections stems in part from ideological compatibility and in part from strategic bargaining: Coalition Partner A, realizing it is unlikely to field a competitive presidential candidate, supports Coalition Partner B in the presidential election; B support A’s gubernatorial candidates in some states.

At the state level, consistent with what has occurred in presidential elections since 1994, fragmentation in gubernatorial elections has been modest (Cortez 2009). Melo (2010: 26) reports a mean effective number of gubernatorial candidates of 2.57 from 1990 to 2006. In the 2010 elections, the mean was 2.36, and in 2014, it was 2.55. Thus, the high dispersion of seats and votes for governors at the national level results exclusively from federal aggregation; low fragmentation in each state coexists with high fragmentation when results are aggregated to the national level.

¹⁰ For analyses of party competition for state governorships, see Cortez 2009; Limongi and Cortez (2010); and Melo (2010: 24–35).

TABLE 6.6 *State Governors Elected by Party (N) and Effective Number of Governors, 1982–2014*

Party	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
ARENA/ PDS/ PPR/PPB/PP	12	0	1	3	2	0	1	0	1
PMDB	9	22	7	9	6	5	7	5	7
PT	0	0	0	2	3	3	5	5	5
PSDB	–	–	1	6	7	7	6	8	5
PSB	–	–	0	2	2	4	3	6	3
PFL/DEM	–	1	9	2	6	4	1	2	0
PDT	1	0	3	2	1	1	2	0	2
PTB	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
PTR	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	0
PRS	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	0
PSC	–	–	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
PSL	–	–	–	–	0	1	0	0	0
PPS	–	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
PMN	–	–	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
PSD	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
PCdoB	–	–	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
PROS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
Total	22	23	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
No. of parties that won at least one state	3	2	10	8	7	8	8	6	9
Effective No. of Governors	2.1	1.1	4.8	5.1	5.2	6.0	5.7	4.7	6.1

Source: Nicolau 1996 and *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*.

STABILITY OF IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS

Stable ideological positions of the main parties characterize institutionalized systems. The main Brazilian parties have shown remarkable consistency in terms of their ordinal left–right ideological placement. The left has been anchored by the PT, the center and center-right by the PMDB and PSDB, and the right by the PFL/DEM until 2010. Although the ordinal placement of parties has been stable, the system has seen increasing ideological moderation accompanied by a gradual shift to the right. Table 6.7 shows the reputational left–right placement of each of the main parties as recorded in the Brazilian Legislative Surveys, which have been carried out in each legislature under democracy. The PFL/DEM has held a consistent position on the right, and most other parties have been drawn closer to it (Power and Zucco 2012). Both the PSDB and PT shifted sharply to the right after they won the presidency in 1994 and 2002, respectively. The net result has been a narrowing of the ideological range of the party system and a reduction in the ideological distances between the key power contenders, especially the PSDB and PT. On the 10-point ideological scale, the gap between the furthest left (always the PT) and the furthest right party fell sharply from 6.99 in 1990 to 4.39 in 2013.

TABLE 6.7 *Reputational Ideology: Left–Right Placements of the Major Parties, 1990–2013*

Party	1990 placement (BLS Wave 1)	2001 placement (BLS Wave 4)	2013 placement (BLS Wave 7)	Total movement relative to 1990
PT	1.51	2.27	3.86	2.35 right
PMDB	5.10	6.19	6.19	1.09 right
PSDB	3.98	6.30	6.32	2.34 right
PSB	2.23	2.85	4.12	1.89 right
PDS/PPB/PP	8.50	8.65	7.55	0.95 left
PL/PR	7.20	6.94	6.98	0.22 left
DEM	8.02	8.59	8.25	0.23 right
PDT	3.15	3.46	4.21	1.06 right
PTB	6.88	6.96	6.52	0.36 left
PSD	–	–	6.65	–

Notes: Parties are placed by non-members only on an ideological scale where 1 is left and 10 is right.
Source: Brazilian Legislative Surveys, <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/zucco> (accessed November 2016).

CONNECTIONS BETWEEN VOTERS AND PARTIES

In this volume, we moved away from conceptualizing party roots in society as a dimension of PSI. Nevertheless, as many scholars have argued (Lupu 2016;

Seawright 2012), strong connections between voters and parties generally underpin stable electoral competition. Although “stabilization without roots” (Zucco 2015) is empirically plausible and is a reasonable characterization of the Brazilian case, PSI is likely to be more secure if parties have deep roots in society.

Although there is fairly broad agreement among scholars that the Brazilian party system has institutionalized, there is disagreement about the strength of connections between voters and parties. Most scholars agree that these linkages are weak (Ferreira *et al.* 2008; Limongi and Cortez 2010; Samuels and Zucco 2014; Zucco 2015). Others, however, argue that they are stronger than skeptics have posited (Braga and Pimentel 2011; Braga *et al.* 2016).

We largely agree that Brazilian parties do not have deep roots in society; to put it conversely, most voters do not have strong attachments to parties. Party identification has recently dropped to low levels, and voters evince cynicism about parties (Pavão 2015). However, we qualify this conventional wisdom in two ways. First, at least until 2015, the PT was an exception to the idea that parties have weak roots in society. It developed strong connections to a sizable constituency. From early on, it forged deep roots in society, both among its voters (although they were relatively few in number until 1989) and among labor unions, grassroots Church groups, and organized social movements. Its huge advantage in party identifiers from 2002 until 2015 supported its consistent competitiveness in presidential elections, which, in turn, helped stabilize the party system.

Figure 6.1 shows the PT’s gaping advantage in party identification from 2002 until 2015. In 2012, 27% of survey respondents identified with the PT. During the 2000s, the PT diluted its brand and still boosted the number of party identifiers – perhaps surprisingly in light of Lupu’s (2016) findings about brand differentiation and partisanship. All other parties combined accounted for only 19%, and the PMDB was second with only 5%. In a context of great party system fragmentation and few identifiers beyond the PT, 27% of party identifiers constituted a large advantage.

From 2002 to 2014, the PT’s substantial and fairly stable base of partisans gave it a sizable advantage in presidential elections. Dilma Rousseff’s election in 2010 supports this argument. She had never run for elected office previously, and she had a non-populist profile. She won because of her party and Lula’s support. The PT’s strong roots in society qualify the claim that stabilization at the aggregate level has occurred despite weak party roots in society.

The second qualification to the claim that parties have weak roots in society is that many voters have relatively stable preferences about the parties, leading to an individual-level underpinning of systemic institutionalization that is not captured by party identification.¹¹ Braga and Pimentel (2011) advanced this argument by turning from the traditional question about spontaneous party

¹¹ Valenzuela, Somma, and Scully make a similar argument in Chapter 5 regarding the Chilean case.




FIGURE 6.1 Party ID in Brazil, 1989–2015

Source: Kinzo (2005) with data from *Datafolha*; from 2003 to 2010, annual average of party ID reported in *Datafolha* surveys compiled by Braga, Ribeiro and Amaral (2016). Data for 2011–15 extracted from *Datafolha* website (<http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/>).

identification to a newer question, asked in the 2002, 2006, and 2010 Brazilian post-election surveys, about how much voters “liked” the main parties (*gostar de*). A voter might not state that he or she identifies with a party yet still might be strongly disposed for or against it. Using this question, they showed that how much voters “like” different parties has a powerful association with their vote. We build on this insight by modifying their models to control for party identification. By including partisanship as a control variable, we test their argument that voters might have latent sympathies or antipathies toward parties, and that traditional measures of partisanship often do not capture these affective orientations.¹²

The survey response scale to this question runs from 0 (the respondent does not like the party at all) to 10. Table 6.8 shows the results. The dependent variable is the respondent’s presidential vote in 2002, 2006, and 2010. In Models 1, 3, and 5, we regress vote choice in the first round of the three elections. In Models 2, 4, and 6, we do the same with second-round vote choices. To facilitate comparison,

¹² We did not include the 2014 elections in our analysis because the question about how much citizens like parties was not included in that year’s survey.

TABLE 6.8 *Presidential Vote Choice and How Much Respondents Like Parties (Logistic Regression Models)*

	2002		2006		2010	
	1st round	2nd round	1st round	2nd round	1st round	2nd round
Difference (like PT minus like PSDB)	0.041*** (0.002)	0.045*** (0.002)	0.049*** (0.004)	0.053*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.052*** (0.003)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Some High School	-0.050 (0.026)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.066 (0.039)	-0.036 (0.039)	-0.057 (0.043)	-0.002 (0.042)
Some college	-0.071 (0.042)	0.023 (0.038)	-0.157** (0.057)	-0.152** (0.058)	-0.251*** (0.052)	-0.074 (0.073)
Woman	-0.029 (0.023)	-0.027 (0.022)	-0.085** (0.032)	-0.058 (0.032)	-0.056 (0.038)	0.003 (0.035)
PT Partisan	0.248*** (0.03)	0.134*** (0.025)	0.142*** (0.03)	0.083** (0.032)	0.135* (0.055)	0.120** (0.042)
PSDB Partisan	-0.074 (0.041)	-0.156** (0.053)	-0.050 (0.077)	-0.050 (0.073)	-0.056 (0.052)	-0.149** (0.055)
Intercept	0.481*** (0.041)	0.638*** (0.041)	0.729*** (0.060)	0.698*** (0.060)	0.385*** (0.071)	0.443*** (0.071)
Pseudo R-squared	0.310	0.313	0.318	0.329	0.325	0.386
N	1637	1633	732	714	1411	1398

Notes: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$. Estimator: Logit, using survey weights. Standard errors in parentheses.

vote choice for the PT's candidates is always coded as 1. In models 1, 3, and 5, we assign 0 to all other candidates. In models 2, 4, and 6, only the PSDB candidate is assigned a 0.

The main independent variable for all models is the difference in the levels of how much respondents like the PT and the PSDB. This variable captures both a strong positive identification with a party, and a negative orientation – for example, a voter who does not identify as a PT partisan but consistently votes for it and reports liking it, or a voter who does not identify as a PSDB partisan but maintains a clear anti-PT position. We subtracted the respondents' answer about the PSDB from the same value for the PT. On average, this difference was 1.4 points in favor of the PT in the three surveys. We control the effects of our main independent variable by adding respondents' age, sex, level of education,¹³ and partisanship.¹⁴

The results are substantively and statistically powerful, suggesting that the way citizens view parties is strongly associated with their vote even after controlling for partisanship. The more respondents liked the PT and disliked the PSDB, the more likely they were to vote for Lula in 2002 and 2006 and Dilma in 2010. The key variable of interest (how much the respondent liked the PT minus the PSDB) is far more significant than being a partisan of either the PT or the PSDB. Indeed, surprisingly, the variable for PSDB partisans is not consistently significant. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 present the predicted probabilities for voting for the PT's candidate in the first and second rounds of the three elections, respectively.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

Solid organizations should facilitate PSI. For this reason, we briefly analyze the growing solidity of party organizations.

In the period of great turbulence in Brazil's party system, 1982–94, the major parties except for the PT were comparatively loose federations of free-wheeling politicians. Party switching was rampant among members of the catch-all parties, reflecting low allegiance of politicians to their party.¹⁵ Many politicians of the catch-all parties had a long history of switching from one

¹³ A three-category variable. The reference category is “Less than high school.” The only way to make the measurement of educational level comparable across the three waves of the survey was by using three different categories (no high school, some high school, some college). The reference category is “no high school.”

¹⁴ We thank David Samuels for suggesting this design. We included two dummies to control for partisanship with the PT and the PSDB. Respondents answering PT/PSDB to the question “Would you say that some party represents how you think?” were coded as 1, while all other respondents were coded as 0.

¹⁵ Analyzing data for the state of São Paulo, Meneguello and Bizzarro (2012) found that more than 50% of all candidates in the 1982–86 elections ran again under a different party label in the 1988–96 period.




FIGURE 6.2 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for the PT by Difference in Liking the PT and the PSDB (1st Round)

party to another; some had been members of five or six parties. Party switching remained rampant until 2007 (on average 29.7% of federal deputies changed parties at least once in each legislature). Pervasive party switching indicated that individual politicians, not party organizations, were the key actors.

During the constitutional congress of 1987–88, party discipline was low except on the left (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1997). Again, this indicated considerable autonomy of politicians with respect to their parties. Except during electoral campaigns, local party organizations in most medium and small municipalities were listless. Parties were generally bereft of financial resources and very limited in their activities; campaign donors primarily gave to individual candidates rather than to parties. Elected politicians reigned supreme in the catch-all parties; neither the national leadership of the parties nor local-level members and activists had de facto decision-making authority.

The catch-all organizations have experienced changes over the last two decades, all in the direction of greater cohesion, organizational density, and resources. Because of changes in institutional rules, party discipline became




FIGURE 6.3 Predicted Probabilities of Voting for the PT by Difference in Liking the PT and the PSDB (2nd Round)

tighter after the constitutional congress of 1987–88 (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999: 73–100). The 1995 Organic Law of Political Parties sharply increased public financing of parties, enabling them to carry out more activities. It also provided them with other resources, such as guaranteed free access to television and radio advertising every year.

The 1995 law and the scope and constancy of Brazilian elections in the period have created incentives for the main parties to nationalize their local bases (Speck and Campos 2014). From 1982 to 2016, the main parties listed above became national organizations, with extensive territorial penetration. Figure 6.4 shows information about the territorial penetration of six of Brazil's main parties, two from each side of the ideological spectrum (Right: DEM, PP; Center: PMDB, PSDB; Left: PT, PSB) to demonstrate this point. In 2016, on average they had local organizations in 82.2% of the 5,570 municipalities in the country¹⁶ (an average of 4,579 local organizations). Ribeiro (2014) and Meneguello *et al.* (2014), relying on two different surveys

¹⁶ Measured by the number of cities in which the parties run at least one candidate to the cities' councils. Samuels and Zucco (2015) also use this measure.




FIGURE 6.4 Municipalities with Local Organization (% of Total)

Source: IPEADATA and *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*.

Note: Parties are identified with their current names.

conducted in the state of São Paulo with party rank-and-file members and party middle-level elites, respectively, demonstrated that overwhelming majorities of party activists reported the existence of regular activities at the local level in the main parties, particularly the PT and the PSDB. As Samuels and Zucco (2015) demonstrated, the establishment of local units had positive impacts on parties' electoral results, suggesting that those units are a partisan resource for candidates during electoral races.

The PT has long been an exception to the organizational norms of the other Brazilian parties (Meneguello 1989). The party demanded and received strong allegiance from its politicians. On several occasions, it expelled PT members of congress because they refused to toe the line on important issues. Party switching among elected PT officials was rare. Elected PT officials contributed a substantial part of their salaries to the party to help finance the organization. Party discipline was ironclad. Whereas the catch-all parties were created top-down by politicians, the labor movement, Catholic Church activists, and other local-level activists played a major role in forging the PT. Local organizations were often the site of intense discussions and extensive grassroots involvement.

Despite its programmatic moderation over time, the PT retained considerable organizational distinctiveness. Local PT branches for a long time engaged civil society and were sources of real involvement in the party. A high percentage of PT members also participate in social movements.¹⁷ However, this involvement has

¹⁷ Roma (2009: 163, Table 4) reports that according to one survey, in 1997, 84% of PT members also participated in a social movement.

also changed over the years, becoming less intense and more professionalized, with growing dominance in electoral campaigns of professional surveys and marketing firms as opposed to the activist-led campaigns of the 1980s (Hunter 2010).

EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Our second goal in this chapter is to explain this transformation to a more institutionalized system. Our explanation rests mostly on process tracing, i.e., looking at sequences of change and examining causal connections in these sequences. It rests secondarily on comparing across cases, which by itself constitutes shaky grounds for causal inference but which can be useful for assessing the plausibility of arguments, and on consistency (or lack thereof), with quantitative analysis of PSI based on a larger sample of observations. We argue that economic stabilization helped generate order in the party system and that rules of the game that advantage existing parties have reduced the system's openness to new contenders and conversely enhanced its stability. When things went badly, programmatic differentiation gave voters options within the system; therefore, they did not need to turn to outsiders.

The timing of change provides useful information about the causes of institutionalization. Many indicators of institutionalization registered a clear change in 1994. The vote share of new parties dropped precipitously in 1994 for both the presidency (from 51.1% in 1989 to 0% in 1994) and the lower chamber (from 11.5% in 1990 to 0.3% in 1994). Electoral volatility for the lower chamber dropped sharply in the 1990–94 electoral period (from 35.6% in 1986–90 to 18.0% in 1990–94). The year 1994 also marked the beginning of the PT/PSDB duopoly in presidential competition.

This timing supports the assertion that one key to the shift from an inchoate party system in the 1985–94 period to greater institutionalization since then was economic stabilization. From 1980 until 1994, the Brazilian economy lurched from one crisis to the next, and chronically high inflation plagued the country. Bad economic performance pummeled the approval ratings of presidents João Figueiredo (1979–85), José Sarney (1985–90), and Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92). Brazil experienced fourteen consecutive years (1981–94) of triple and quadruple digit inflation, peaking at 2,948% in 1990.¹⁸ During this long period, in net terms the economy was stagnant (though with sharp year-to-year fluctuations); according to the World Bank estimates, per capita GDP (in 2010 constant US dollars) was essentially unchanged in 1994 (\$8,269) compared to 1980 (\$8,247) (World Bank 2016).

Bad economic performance helps explain the fracturing of the PDS in 1984 and its steep electoral demise in 1986, the dismal electoral results of the PMDB and PFL presidential candidates in 1989, the sharp electoral decline of the

¹⁸ Estimates of the World Bank. Variable: Inflation, consumer prices (annual%) (World Bank 2016).

PMDB/PFL coalition in 1990, and the near disappearance of the PRN after 1992. The sharp decline of these governing parties contributed greatly to party system upheaval. Almost all of the decline side of the high electoral volatility for the Chamber of Deputies in 1986 and 1990 came from the PDS (1986) and the PMDB/PFL coalition (1990), respectively. Figueiredo's government (1979–85) triggered massive defections by politicians from the PDS to the PFL, and Sarney's government catalyzed massive defections away from the PMDB. Pinto (2013) demonstrated that presidential popularity varied to a large degree due to changes in the country's economic performance (rates of inflation, unemployment, and public debt) in the 1995–2010 period.

Given its nodal position in the Brazilian political system, the presidency is always a potential source of systemic instability (Lima 1999), and during the 1986–94 period it increased the fluidity of the party system. A clear contrast between the two periods is seen in Table 6.2 above. Consider the share of votes cast for the parties of the first two presidents of the post-1985 democracy in the next election. Ulysses Guimarães, the PMDB's candidate in 1989 four years into the disastrous Sarney government, and Carlos Antonio Gomes, the 1994 candidate of Fernando Collor's 1989 party, the PRN, two years after Collor's impeachment received only 4.6% and 0.6% of the votes in 1989 and 1994, respectively. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was reelected in 1998 with 53.0% of the vote and José Serra, the PSDB's presidential candidate in 2002, received 23.2% of the vote. Although the decrease in Cardoso's popularity in his second term led voters to punish the PSDB in 2002, this punishment was far more moderate than the one observed before economic stabilization. This PSDB was the first post-1985 party to govern the country reasonably well, making it a stable option for the country's government in the views of a large number of voters.

In contrast to what occurred in many Latin American countries, economic stabilization led to significant short-term increases in real wages in 1994 – a fact that helps explain the vast popular support for the stabilization plan (Mendes and Venturi 1994) and the dramatic turn toward Cardoso in the 1994 electoral campaign. Economic stabilization occurred simultaneously with the beginning of markedly lower electoral volatility. Rather than defecting from the governing parties of the 1994–2014 period, voters stuck with them, fostering the institutionalization of the party system. For the 1994–98 electoral period, presidential electoral volatility plummeted.

Economic stabilization catapulted Cardoso to the presidency in 1994 and 1998, and it put the PSDB on the map as a major player. After fifteen years of chronically high inflation (1979–94) and thirteen years of no net growth (1981–94), stabilization under the PSDB government gave the party a leg up over other contenders in presidential elections. If the stabilization plan had failed, it is highly unlikely that Cardoso would have won a landslide reelection and that the PSDB would have consistently been one of the top two contenders in subsequent presidential elections.

In turn, the consistent domination by the PT and PSDB in presidential elections fostered the institutionalization of other dimensions of the party system. The presidency is the cornerstone of the political system. Because of the dominance of the PT and PSDB in presidential elections, the dynamics of electoral competition since 1994 have focused primarily on their rivalry (Cortez 2009; Limongi and Cortez 2010; Melo 2010). The presidential competition influenced congressional and gubernatorial elections because the PT and PSDB coordinated strategies across different levels of elections in order to maximize their presidential candidates' prospects (Cortez 2009).

In some Latin American countries, including Argentina and Peru, economic stabilization in the wake of hyperinflation did not lead to PSI. In Peru, economic stabilization occurred shortly before party system collapse; President Fujimori (1990–2000) oversaw economic stabilization and purposefully fostered the collapse of the party system (Tanaka 1998). In Argentina, stabilization in the 1990s splintered the Peronist party because President Menem's (1989–99) policies diverged radically from the party's historical programmatic commitments and produced massive unemployment from 1995 onwards. A continuation of Menem's economic policies led to a crushing repudiation of the failed government of 1999–2001. The Brazilian experience diverged from these other cases in two critical respects. First, in the short term, stabilization in Brazil helped boost income, especially of the poor, so it was very popular. As already noted, stabilization was critical in Cardoso's election in 1994 and his reelection in 1998. For this reason, economic stabilization helped solidify the PSDB's position. Second, economic stabilization in Brazil was not accompanied by a muting of programmatic differences in the party system.

In sum, economic stabilization had a profound effect in institutionalizing Brazil's party system. Subsequent economic growth, poverty reduction, and income redistribution under Lula (2003–10) solidified the PT's pivotal role in presidential competition and in the party system. It helped boost PT party identification. The counterfactual is what would have happened if Lula's presidency had been a failure. Given that the 2006 election was competitive even after four years of significant economic growth, income redistribution, and poverty reduction, it is unlikely that an underperforming Lula would have won reelection. Moreover, it is uncertain that the PT would have solidified its position as part of a duopoly that dominated presidential elections, and the doors for other contenders to become competitive in presidential elections would have opened. It is unlikely that the system would have achieved the level of institutionalization that it did without the PT's success under Lula.

Programmatic Differentiation. In combination with reasonably successful PSDB and PT governments, clear programmatic differentiation between the PT and the PSDB-led coalition helped foster PSI (Hagopian *et al.* 2009). In Brazil, voters who became disaffected with the coalition that implemented stabilization had a clear and viable option within the system – the PT. The combination of economic stabilization without economic distress *and* clear programmatic

differentiation distinguished Brazil from all cases of deep party system erosion and collapse.

In countries in which programmatic distinctions among the major parties became blurred, voters were more likely to become disgruntled with the entire system in periods of economic distress (Lupu 2016; Morgan 2011; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012). In Bolivia from 1985 on and Peru after 1990, voters who repudiated the economic policies associated with orthodox stabilization lacked an alternative within the system. In both countries, differences among the main parties were obfuscated by structural adjustment. Voters flocked en masse to new contenders, destabilizing the old party systems. In Colombia, likewise, the programmatic blurring among parties after 1958 ultimately was an important ingredient in discrediting the traditional parties (see the chapter by Albarraín, Gamboa, and Mainwaring).

Programmatic differentiation did not ensure institutionalization, nor does sharp programmatic differentiation by itself explain increasing institutionalization in Brazil after 1994. In Brazil, the party system offered voters very distinctive choices from 1982 on, yet high volatility and considerable turmoil prevailed until 1994. But sharp programmatic divisions in conjunction with the fact that the PT, the most important opposition to the PSDB government, did not govern at the national level until 2003, meant that dissatisfied voters did not turn against the entire system. Consistent programmatic differentiation distinguishes all contemporary Latin American cases of fairly high institutionalization (Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay) from all cases of party system collapse (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and from most cases of deep deinstitutionalization (Colombia and Argentina).

Changes in Formal Institutional Rules. In the 1980s and 1990s, an extensive literature on Latin America emphasized the impact of formal rules of the game on actors' behavior and, as a result, on political outcomes (Linz and Valenzuela 1994). In the last decade, a new literature has questioned this earlier work, emphasizing that formal rules often do not have their anticipated consequences and that informal institutions are often more salient in political life (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Levitsky and Murillo 2014; Weyland 2002b). However, formal rules sometimes have deep consequences, especially when political actors *must* follow the rules of the game, either because otherwise outcomes would be stacked against them or because enforcement mechanisms would punish them.

Several changes in formal rules helped foster PSI in Brazil. The constitutional congress of 1987–88 passed measures that led to higher party discipline on roll-call votes from 1989 on (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999: 73–100). Except for the PT, party discipline on roll-call votes never reached comparatively high levels, but it rose significantly relative to the constitutional congress. These changes made the political system more manageable, and they paved the way for building more solid party identities.

As mentioned above, in 1995, the Law of Political Parties greatly increased public funding for parties and gave them ample free television time during

electoral campaigns. Parties became well funded. In 2015, the value of public funds distributed to the parties was 811 million reais (more than US\$200 million).¹⁹ In addition, parties have access to free television and radio time for political advertising. In values of 2014, the price paid by the government for this time (with tax waivers) was estimated at 850 million reais.²⁰ Combining these two figures with the value of the *Fundo Partidário* for 2014 (310 million reais), in the 2014–15 period, public funding for parties was nearly two billion reais.²¹

With more resources, party organizations became more robust. The distribution of public funding supports the “cartelization” of the party system: 99% of the resources are distributed proportionally, based on a party’s share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the last election, and 1% is distributed evenly to all parties. Moreover, the parties have free office space in the national congress, plus mailing and telephone privileges for these offices. Brazilian parties have changed from being resource poor to resource rich. These changes allowed parties to establish and maintain regular bureaucracies at the national and sub-national levels.

Since 1995, the laws regulating access to campaign time on television and radio have favored the main parties and coalitions at the expense of political outsiders and coalitions or parties with few seats in congress. No candidate may buy time for political ads on television or radio; the only legally permissible TV and radio ads are those allocated for the free campaign time. In 2014, this was substantial: an hour and forty minutes (fifty minutes, twice a day) during the first round on TV and an hour and forty minutes on radio for six weeks (August 19 to October 2). Every TV and radio station in Brazil must broadcast the campaign ads during this period. During the runoff round for the presidential and gubernatorial elections, television and radio stations reserved an hour and twenty minutes (forty minutes twice a day) for campaign ads for three weeks.

TV and radio time is allocated mostly on the basis of the size of a party or coalition’s delegation in the Chamber of Deputies as of the previous election. Without access to television or radio, political outsiders would be very hard pressed to campaign effectively for the presidency or for governorship in a large state. The current rules for access to free TV and radio time are more favorable to established parties than they were in 1989, when the allocation of time was based on the share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies one year before the election. The current rules benefit those parties that existed a full four years earlier. Thus, an outsider cannot gain access to substantial TV and radio time by virtue of members of congress switching to his/her party as the presidential election approaches.

¹⁹ Source: www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/arquivos/tse-distribuicao-do-fundo-partidario-duodecimos-2015-1429900293402 (accessed December 2016).

²⁰ Source: www.contasabertas.com.br/website/arquivos/8075 (accessed December 2016).

²¹ Source: www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/arquivos/tse-distribuicao-do-fundo-partidario-duodecimos-2014 (accessed December 2016).

The 1995 Law of Political Parties also established moderately demanding criteria for creating a new party. The most difficult hurdle is the gathering and authentication of signatures. The threshold, which is 0.5% of the number of valid votes cast in the previous Chamber of Deputies election, with at least 0.1% of the valid vote in at least nine states, changes every four years based on the previous results. After the 2010 elections, 484,169 signatures were needed to form a new party. The authentication requirement stopped Marina Silva from registering a new party in 2013. The local electoral authorities rejected 95,000 of her signatures, denying the registration of her party.

In March 2015, a new law was passed that prohibits any two parties from merging unless they have existed for five years. It also stipulates that any party switching into “merged” parties (*fusão*) cannot be used to determine allocations for public funding or for free TV and radio campaign time. These measures have added disincentives to creating new parties.

In 1997, congress approved a constitutional amendment that allowed for immediate presidential reelection once, shortened the presidential term from five to four years, and made presidential and congressional (and also gubernatorial and state assembly) elections concurrent. The change from non-concurrent to concurrent elections was favorable for PSI. With non-concurrent elections, as occurred in the 1989 presidential contest, governors, gubernatorial candidates, members of congress and candidates for congress, and state legislators and candidates had weaker incentives to invest heavily in the campaign. Their own political positions were not at stake. With concurrent elections, almost everyone in the party machines has a high stake in the presidential outcome. Moreover, with concurrent elections, there are economies of scale in investing time and resources into campaigns across different levels. As Carreras (2012) showed, the meteoric rise of a political outsider such as occurred with Fernando Collor in 1989 is less likely with concurrent elections.

In 2002, the Supreme Court effectively overturned a rule known as the *candidato nato* (birthright candidate). Under this rule, every incumbent politician had the right to run for his or her same position in the next election. Politicians who were not aligned with the party leadership in their states had the right to become candidates, formalizing a situation in which politicians had considerable autonomy and the party leaders (except in the PT) were in a weak position. The abolition of the birthright candidate rule gave party leaders more power over the rank-and-file politicians.

In 2007, the Supreme Electoral Court (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*, the country’s highest electoral court) changed its interpretation of the 1995 parties statute and started stripping the mandate from elected officials who changed parties. With this new legal ruling, politicians had powerful incentives to change their behavior. This change increased the leverage of the party leadership over rank-and-file elected politicians; the latter could no longer flaunt their independence because of their ability to switch parties. Constant party switching reduces the value of party labels, and, thus, it

should make it harder to build party labels in the electorate. A subsequent (2011) Supreme Electoral Court ruling allowed elected politicians to form a new party without losing their mandate, softening the effect of the end of the birthright candidate rule. Still, forming a new party takes collective action, whereas party switching was an individual decision. In this respect, the change in rules made it more costly to leave the label on which a politician was elected. Although it is not a change in the rules, in Brazil candidates for elected offices must run on a party label, making it harder for outsiders to challenge the system.

In and of themselves, these changes in institutional rules might not have produced huge effects on PSI. Most of the changes in rules post-dated the early signs of a shift to a more stable party system, so they cannot fully explain institutionalization. But these reforms reinforced the effects created by economic stabilization and growth and by programmatic differentiation. Their net effect has been to establish fairly high barriers to outsider presidential candidates and to major new parties.

These arguments about institutionalization in Brazil are consistent with our broader explanatory effort in Chapter 4. The growing institutionalization of Brazil's party system shows a process that mirrors the dynamics of party system deinstitutionalization and collapse, providing support for the argument in Chapter 4 that processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization have symmetrical causes. Economic stabilization fostered party system stability – in contrast to the Venezuelan and Peruvian experience where economic failure led to massive support for political outsiders (Lupu this volume; Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012). The relative economic success of the policies implemented both by the PSDB and the PT kept voters “within the system,” avoiding the search for political outsiders. Similarly, the PSDB and PT provided clear alternative programmatic options to voters, again sustaining partisan actors as the main political alternatives in national elections.

THE CRISIS OF THE PT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SYSTEM

In its early years, the PT was a highly idealistic party, willing to shun alliances to preserve ideological principles. However, Lula's victory in the 2002 presidential election sealed a turn toward greater pragmatism (Baker *et al.* 2016). The party agreed to a pre-electoral coalition with the conservative PL in 2002, and, once in government, formed the most ideologically heterogeneous coalition in Brazil's democratic history (Pereira *et al.* 2016), ranging from the Communist Party of Brazil to small clientelist right-wing parties. Managing this coalition was costly, though. One of the biggest corruption scandals in Brazil's history erupted in 2004–05, when the media, based on information from public officials and members of congress, reported that the PT was systematically paying conservative members of congress a sizable bribe to

vote for PT proposals. The scandal led to a jail term for Lula's chief of staff, José Dirceu, among others. However, probably because of economic growth and the government's social policies, Lula and the PT emerged largely unscathed.

The party was less fortunate when arguably the most publicized corruption scandal in world democratic history emerged during Dilma Rousseff's government. Investigators uncovered a massive corruption network involving the country's largest company, the publicly owned Petrobras, several huge construction firms, many PT leaders, and other politicians. The PT siphoned funds from Petrobras to pay for political campaigns, and it took bribes from construction firms for the same purpose and to pay off political allies. Former President Lula faces multiple criminal investigations. Many prominent PT politicians, as well as prominent politicians from other parties and business leaders, have gone to jail or face criminal charges. President Rousseff experienced the fallout from the scandal and from Brazil's worst recession in decades.

Even before this scandal erupted, the PT was hemorrhaging partisans, in part because of the economic downturn. In the 2016 municipal elections, it suffered large reversals. Many politicians exited the party, some to avoid the stigma of its label, others dismayed because of the corruption scandal. The party fielded only 1,004 mayoral candidates compared to 1,779 in 2012 (a decline of 43%), and 22,259 candidates for municipal assemblies compared to 38,784 in 2012 (a decline of 42%). After electing 655 mayors in 2012, the PT elected only 256 in 2016. The party suffered big setbacks in almost all of Brazil's largest cities.

Given that the PT was one of its linchpins, the party system seems less predictable now than it was from 1994 until 2014. The massive corruption scandal on top of a long and bruising economic recession has left few parties unscathed. It has exacerbated voter cynicism and anger, conditions that in the past have been favorable to political outsiders.

Nevertheless, we do not expect radical deinstitutionalization, much less a collapse. Established parties, not new organizations or outsiders, were the winners in 2016. Of the eight parties that won the largest number of mayoral positions in 2012, only the PT and the PSB won fewer *prefeituras* in 2016. The PSDB won 15.6% more mayoral positions than in 2012 (793 versus 686, respectively), including winning Sao Paulo, Brazil's largest city. These results suggest that even if citizens repudiate the existing parties, they have little choice but to vote for existing organizations because the rules of the game create high barriers to new parties and outsiders. These barriers to entry remain salient and meaningful even while fragmentation in the national legislature has soared.

CONCLUSION

From 1994 to 2014, Brazil's party system became more institutionalized even as systems in many other Latin American countries experienced partial

deinstitutionalization (Argentina, Colombia) or collapse (Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru). Electoral competition became much more stable from 1994 on. The system changed from one in which multiple new parties emerged on the scene and became important contenders (1980–89) to one in which new parties have enjoyed scant success (1990–present); from one in which governing parties suffered huge defeats and defections (1984–94) to one in which three consecutive presidents won reelection attempts (Cardoso, Lula, and Dilma); from one in which a populist outsider created a party and captured the presidency (1989) to one in which presidential contests have been dominated by two solid parties (1994–2014). In a historically unprecedented manner, two parties established a regular (though potentially fragile) duopoly in presidential elections. Party organizations are more solid today than they were in the 1980s and early 1990s. Party discipline increased; party switching decreased; parties enjoyed a substantial infusion of public funding, enabling them to undertake far more activities than they could between 1985 and 1994.

But institutionalization occurred somewhat unevenly and with generally thin roots, as Zucco (2015) argued. Stabilization occurred even though only one party, the PT, developed strong roots in society. Institutionalization was also uneven across party organizations; the PT developed a more robust organization than other parties.

Economic stabilization fostered the institutionalization of the Brazilian party system. Unlike in many countries, the initial phase of stabilization was not associated with economic hardship – much to the contrary. In the 2000s, moderate economic growth, steep declines in poverty, and some income redistribution helped further cement the PT and PSDB's positions in the system.

Consistent programmatic differentiation helped preserve the system from the fate suffered in several cases in which there were no meaningful differences among the main contenders: system collapse (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), party collapse, or the sharp demise of one of the traditional major parties (Argentina and Colombia). Voters disappointed with the PMDB and the PFL in the 1980s could turn to the PSDB in 1994. It offered a different programmatic and ideological profile. Voters who subsequently became disenchanted with the PSDB/PFL coalition could move to the PT, whose positions differed significantly from those of the previous governing parties. To get change, voters did not need to turn from the entire system.

Changes in institutional rules also helped foster institutionalization. These changes fostered greater party discipline; increased the barriers for political outsiders; increased the funding and other material advantages and the campaign advantages of existing parties; helped make it easier for parties to build solid organizations; made it costly for politicians to switch parties once they were elected on a given label; and strengthened the hand of party leaders in relation to individual members of congress.

As of this writing (August 2017), Brazil is in turbulent waters, with a deep and long recession, a massive corruption scandal, and an unpopular, unelected president who has also been severely tarnished by accusations of improbity, among other woes. These new challenges raise questions about whether a moderately institutionalized party system can be sustained despite the country's downturn and despite uneven and thin institutionalization. Our cautious answer is that it probably can.

APPENDIX 6.1

Brazilian Political Parties in 2016

Party	Seats (2016)	Orientation and background	Ideology score (2013)
Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), founded 1966	67	Party opposing military regime of 1964–85; currently centrist, decentralized, functions as catchall support party for Lula and Dilma governments; party of President Michel Temer	6.19
Workers' Party (PT), founded 1980	58	Prior to 2002: left-wing; grew out of labor unrest in late 1970s; strong support from intellectuals, workers, state employees; best organized party in Brazilian history. Since 2003: centrist turn, alliances with right parties, pragmatic economic policy, expanding support in Northeast	3.86
Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), founded 1988	50	Progressive faction of PMDB 1988–94 originally Western European-style social democratic; champion of 1990s pro-market reforms; supports parliamentarism; principal force of the modernizing center-right	6.32
Progressive Party (PP), founded 1966, renamed 2003	47	Conservative: formerly ARENA and then PDS, the pro-military party in 1964–85; shrank drastically in 1980s; has changed names four times	7.55
Party of the Republic (PR), founded 2006	42	Center-right, based on merger of former Liberal Party (PL) and PRONA party. Founded as PL in 1985.	6.98
Social Democratic Party (PSD), founded 2011	35	Center-right party created (mostly from DEM, but some from PTB, PP, PSDB) by politicians who wanted to support the then PT government	6.65

(continued)

Party	Seats (2016)	Orientation and background	Ideology score (2013)
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), founded 1985	32	Center-left party, generally supported PT governments until 2013; strong base in Northeast	4.12
Democrats (DEM), founded 1984, renamed 2007	27	Formerly PFL; conservative, pragmatic, clientelistic “party of power”; supported every president from 1964 to 2002, military or civilian; usually allies with PSDB	8.25
Brazilian Republican Party (PRB), founded 2005	22	Christian and conservative; founded by Lula’s vice president José Alencar (1931–2011) with support from pastors linked to Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD)	NA
Democratic Labor Party (PDT), founded 1980	19	Center-left; created by Leonel Brizola (1922–2004); on-again, off-again partner of PT in 1980s and 1990s	4.21
Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), founded 1980	18	Center-right; clientelistic; “party for rent” that supports most presidents; after 2003, grew as repository for opportunistic center-right politicians wishing to support Lula	6.52
Solidarity (SD), founded 2013	14	Pragmatic center-left party, linked to <i>Força Sindical</i> labor central, allied with PSDB against PT government	NA
National Labor Party (PTN), founded 1995	13	Center-Left, claims connection to the homonymous PTN of the previous democratic period (1945–66)	NA
Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), founded 1962	11	Defected from PCB in 1962 during Sino-Soviet split, later pro-Albanian until end of Cold War; after 1989 mostly satellite of PT; dominated national student union. Since 2003: centrist turn and pragmatic ally of PT presidents	2.86

(continued)

Party	Seats (2016)	Orientation and background	Ideology score (2013)
Popular Socialist Party (PPS), founded 1922, renamed 1992	8	Descended from Moscow-line Brazilian Communist Party (PCB); abandoned Leninism and supported Gorbachev in 1980s; later center-left; in Lula years moved rightward to ally with PSDB-led opposition	4.72
Social Christian Party (PSC), founded 1985	7	Center-right “party for rent” loosely linked to Christian doctrine and to Assembly of God churches; identified with socially conservative causes	NA
Republican Party of Social Order (PROS), founded 2013	7	Opportunistic, centrist “party for rent,” supported by Pentecostal pastors	NA
Humanist Party of Solidarity (PHS), founded 1996	7	Center-right, associated with traditional religious movements	NA
Green Party (PV), founded 1986	6	Center-left, pragmatic environmentalists	4.63
Party of Socialism and Liberty (PSOL), founded 2004	4	Former radical left faction of PT, founded by dissidents unhappy with centrist policies; key leaders were expelled from PT in 2003	1.73
Sustainability Network (REDE), founded 2015	4	Center-left party movement created and led by Marina Silva, environmentalist leader and two-time presidential candidate	NA

Note: “Seats” refers to seats in Chamber of Deputies as of October 2016. The 18 parties shown here comprise 498 of 513 chamber seats (97%), with some small parties excluded from the table. Reputational ideology: in surveys of Congress, parties are placed (by non-members only) on an ideological scale where 1 is left and 10 is right. Ideology data from Brazilian Legislative Survey 2013 (7th wave), <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/zucco> [accessed November 2016].