

Ukraine

External Actors and the Orange Revolution

MICHAEL MCFaul AND RICHARD YOUNGS

The analytical framework for explaining the Orange Revolution in this chapter is derived from a theory of democratization that centers analysis on the conflict and the distribution of power between autocratic elites and democratic challengers. It disaggregates variables to develop a nuanced understanding of the proximate causes of the Orange Revolution. This involves identifying factors that both weakened the *ancien régime* and those that empowered the democratic opposition. We locate as crucial explanants the existence of a competitive authoritarianism, an unpopular leader, division among the armed forces, a successful opposition campaign that exposed fraud and was able to communicate information about the falsified vote, and the capability to mobilize masses to protest the fraudulent election.

Crucially, our assessment of the role played by external factors is then structured around this account of regime change, as we consider international policies toward Ukraine. We examine the interplay between internal and external dimensions. The analysis reveals that external factors played a more than trivial role in shaping the Orange Revolution, both in constraining autocratic power and in strengthening democratic power. But it also suggests that this role was more subtle than might have appeared. Precise causal chains between international initiatives and domestic decisions are hard to pinpoint, even if civic actors themselves referred to the importance of outside assistance at various levels. Structuring analysis around the interplay of domestic and international factors, disaggregated across the different causal factors of democratic breakthrough, helps locate exactly where international factors did but also did not have significant impact.

The fall 2004 presidential election triggered a pivotal moment in Ukrainian history. Initially, the campaign and election results resembled other fraudulent votes in semi-authoritarian regimes.¹ The incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma, and his chosen successor, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, deployed state resources, national media, and private funding from both Ukrainians and Russians to defeat the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. When this effort to win the vote failed, Kuchma's government tried to steal the election by adding more than one million extra votes to Yanukovich's tally in the second round of voting held on November 21, 2004.²

In response to this fraud, Yushchenko called his supporters to come to Independence Square in Kyiv and protest the stolen election. First thousands, then hundreds of thousands answered his call. They remained on the square, with some living in a tent city on Khreshchatyk, Kyiv's main thoroughfare, until the Supreme Court annulled the official results of the second round on December 3, 2004, and set a date for the rerunning of the second round for December 26, 2004. In this round, Yushchenko won 52 percent of the vote, compared to 44 percent for Yanukovich. The victors in this dramatic struggle memorialized this set of events by calling it the Orange Revolution.³

THE DOMESTIC STORY

Ukraine's level of economic development, literacy, and urbanization, as well as its cultural proclivities for democratic rule, geographical proximity to Europe, and dearth of oil may all have been necessary preconditions for the Orange Revolution to occur. But, in the fall of 2004, it was real people, motivated by ideas and empowered by real resources, who struggled with each other to produce the Orange Revolution. A few crucial factors explain the democratic breakthrough.

First, before 2004 the degree of authoritarian control enjoyed by the regime was compromised. President Leonid Kuchma aspired to construct a system of managed democracy⁴—formal democratic practices but informal control of all political institutions—similar to President Putin's model of government in Russia.⁵ But the Ukrainian president never achieved as much success as his Russian counterpart.

Kuchma and his regime did not control or own major segments of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine's business tycoons or oligarchs were not completely united by the *ancien régime*.⁶ And crucially, especially after the electoral success of Our Ukraine in the 2002 parliamentary vote, Ukraine's opposition had a foothold in an

important institution of state power. The regime's popularity had begun to ebb. Its factor undermined Kuchma's standing more than the murder of journalist Giorgi Gongadze, the founder of the Internet publication, *Ukrainska Pravda*.

In contrast to Russia or Armenia, the line between civilian government and the military remained clear in Ukraine. Consequently, when faced with mass social mobilization against the regime during the Orange Revolution, Kuchma could not invoke tradition or call upon a loyal special forces unit to disperse protesters. Kuchma threatened to use force. A week into the protest, troops from the Ministry of the Interior armed and mobilized, with the intention of clearing the square.⁷ But Orange Revolution sympathizers from within the intelligence services warned the opposition of the impending attack, and commanders within the regular army pledged to protect the unarmed citizens if these interior troops tried to march into the center of town.⁸ These defections made clear that the guys with the guns—that is, the military, the intelligence services, and police—could not be trusted to carry out a repressive order.⁹ These splits helped to convince Kuchma to call off the planned police activity, even though Yanukovych was urging the Ukrainian president to take action.

Second, a united opposition—or at least the perception of one—was crucial for the 2004 democratic breakthrough in Ukraine. In the previous decade, division, disorganization, and the absence of a single charismatic leader had crippled Ukraine's democratic forces. Ironically, Kuchma helped opposition unity when he dismissed Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister in 2001. At the time, Yushchenko cut an image of a technocratic economist, not a revolutionary. Those who knew him best worried that he did not have the drive or temperament to become a national political leader.¹⁰ But he was a popular prime minister with a record of achievement, an image of not being corrupt, an appealing biography, and a handsome appearance. Crucially, in 2004 Yulia Tymoshenko—an opposition leader with more charisma than Yushchenko but also more baggage—agreed not to run independently for president but instead backed Yushchenko.¹¹

Third, voter mobilization was crucial and extensive. The Yushchenko campaign believed that a higher voter turnout helped its cause and therefore devoted huge resources to get-out-the-vote efforts. In addition to party efforts, the nongovernmental organization Znayu carried out massive voter education and get-out-the-vote efforts, recognized by friends and foes as a positive contributor to Yushchenko's electoral success. The youth groups Black Pora, Yellow Pora, and its closely affiliated Freedom of Choice Coalition, as well as the Committee of Ukrainian Voters (CVU) also organized extensive get-out-the-vote campaigns, while groups such as Internews-Ukraine placed public service announcements on television educating Ukrainian voters about their electoral rights, which was also an indirect method

for increasing voter turnout. In the second round, voter turnout reached an amazing 80.4 percent; in the rerun of the second round (the third time Ukrainians were asked to go to the polls that fall), turnout was still very high, 77.2 percent.

A fourth component of the opposition's success was the ability to provide quickly an accurate and independent account of the actual vote after polls closed. The CVU played the central role in monitoring all rounds of the 2004 presidential vote. CVU also conducted a parallel vote tabulation during all three rounds. In addition, the Ukrainian nongovernmental organization (NGO) Democratic Initiatives coordinated the National Exit Poll.

The Supreme Court used evidence of fraud collected by the CVU and other NGOs to annul the official results and call for a replay of the second round of the presidential election later that month. It is unlikely that either the defecting Central Election Commission (CEC) members or the justices who made up the Supreme Court majority would have acted the way they did if hundreds of thousands of protestors were not on the streets by the time of their deliberations. At the same time, we do know that a necessary condition for the court's decision was hard evidence that the results had been falsified in a systematic manner. This evidence came from Our Ukraine election monitors and commission members, CVU monitors, and several other NGOs. The effort to document violations and then take legal action to prosecute the offenders was much greater in this vote than in previous elections and proved critical to Our Ukraine's case before the Supreme Court.¹²

Fifth, the existence of a modicum of media independence was another important ingredient that created momentum for the Orange Revolution. *Ukrainska Pravda* and Ukraine's other independent media outlets did not fold or begin to practice self-censorship after Gongadze's death, but continued to investigate and expose Kuchma's alleged crimes, often under very threatening circumstances.¹³ This critical media, while not national in reach, did help to set a polarized stage for the 2004 electoral showdown.

During the 2004 campaign, Kuchma's regime controlled or enjoyed the loyalty of most national media outlets. By 2004, Ukraine boasted several independent television networks, but all the major channels were owned or controlled by oligarchs loyal to Kuchma and Yanukovych.¹⁴ Through a system of *temniki*, or secret commands, Kuchma and his staff directed the news coverage on all of these channels, resulting in a massive asymmetry of television exposure for Yanukovych compared to that for Yushchenko.¹⁵ Russian television stations ORT, RTR, and NTV, which enjoy considerable audiences in Ukraine, also gave favorable coverage to Yanukovych.

But important independent outlets did remain and developed in the run up

to the 2004 presidential campaign. In 2003, a wealthy Yushchenko ally, Petro Poroshenko, acquired the rights to a small television station and then transformed it into Channel Five. Poroshenko then hired a team of professional journalists, whose aim was to provide an outlet for media coverage of the entire campaign and not just Yanukovich. Channel Five did provide positive coverage of the Yushchenko campaign, but Channel Five's audience was much smaller than the major channels', roughly 8 million viewers, and its signal reached only approximately 30 percent of the country.¹⁵ Radio Era provided news that was not shaped by the government. External stations such as Radio Liberty, the BBC, and the Voice of America were also important channels of independent news for those with the ability to receive short-wave broadcasts—a small fraction of the Ukrainian population.

Compared to the previous electoral breakthrough in Georgia 2003, Ukraine's opposition had one major advantage—the Internet. In fact, the Orange Revolution may have been the first in history organized in large measure on the Web. During the critical days after the second round vote, *Ukrainska Pravda* displayed the results of the exit poll most sympathetic to Yushchenko as well as detailed news about other allegations of fraud. The Web site also provided practical information to protestors. During the second round, *Ukrainska Pravda* grew to 350,000 readers and one million hits a day.¹⁶ Other portals also provided critical information that helped to make the Orange Revolution. The Maidan.org site was a clearinghouse of information and coordination for protestors.

Sixth, and most striking, was the extensive popular mobilization to "protect the vote." Months in advance of the presidential election, Our Ukraine campaign leaders made plans to organize street demonstrations in what they believed was the likely event that the election results would be falsified.¹⁷ The appearance of truckloads of tents, mats, and food supplies, which had been secured weeks before clearly demonstrated the opposition's preplanning. Yushchenko appeared on television to call upon his supporters to come to Kyiv and occupy the square immediately after the falsified second round results had been released.

Yushchenko and his team benefited tremendously from the support of the Kyiv city government and the city's mayor, Oleksandr Omelchenko. While at first reluctant to take sides, the Kyiv government eventually allowed the protest and provided logistical support for the provision of food, water, and sanitation. They also opened more than a dozen government buildings for out-of-town protesters to use as warm shelter. Had political leaders loyal to the *ancien régime* been in charge of the capital, they could have severely constrained the opposition's capacity to sustain the Orange Revolution.

Civil society and the "middle class" more broadly helped increase the numbers on Maidan from the several thousand who planned to show up to the million

who spontaneously joined the protest. Our Ukraine and its partners made preparations for tens of thousands to protest a rigged election, but they did not anticipate that their act of civil disobedience would eventually swell to more than a million people. A central feature of the mobilization's success was a commitment to nonviolence.

THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS

A combination of many factors produced a democratic breakthrough. In accordance with this account of Ukraine's 2004 democratic breakthrough, the role of external factors can be disaggregated in finer detail and process-traced in relation to the key causal variables of regime change.

Preventing Full Autocracy

Western linkages, coupled with aid to institutions that checked presidential power, helped keep Ukraine between dictatorship and democracy, a regime type that proved conducive for the Orange Revolution. The causal chains of influence were often indirect, but domestic actors themselves pointed to the impetus given by external assistance at both the macrolevel of their representing normative models and the microlevel of tactical training.

The West—the United States, Canada (a bigger player in Ukraine than in other European countries because of the sizable Ukrainian émigré community there), and Europe—remained a constant pull on Ukrainian government officials. Kuchma was a ruthless leader who erected a corrupt and criminal regime, but he refrained from attempting to construct a truly repressive tyranny because he wanted a cooperative relationship with the United States and Europe. Strikingly, even in the face of harsh criticism, Kuchma sent Ukrainian troops to Iraq, maintained ties to NATO and the European Union, and (unlike Milosevic in Serbia) avoided becoming a pariah in the West. Maintaining links to the West was a policy priority for Kuchma, which in the margins constrained his antidemocratic behavior at home.

Kuchma's desire to be part of the West created opportunities of leverage for American and European diplomats. The lure of partnership with the European Union was a major factor in discouraging any move toward full autocracy. Just how powerful an influence the EU played in this crucial regard is open to question, however. Even if the EU exerted a generally positive magnetic pull, significant limitations persisted in the scale of inducement and partnership offered to Ukraine.

A stress on regular and institutionalized engagement was the guiding philosophy of EU strategy. The EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with

Ukraine in 1994, which included a commitment to support the development of democratic norms. This commitment was reiterated and made more explicit in the EU's Common Strategy on Ukraine, adopted in 1999.¹⁶ Europe sought to influence through positive inducements rather than coercive pressure against Kuchma. Serious sanctions were discussed but never applied.¹⁷

Such caution was encouraged by the fact that Kuchma continued to be seen by several European governments as providing a useful bridge to Moscow.¹⁸ Indeed, Russia-related concerns ensured that this European approach of engagement and inducement was itself limited. A membership prospect was not offered to Ukraine at the crucial meeting of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, when other Central and East European states were formally recognized as candidates. EU documents and statements from the early 1990s routinely suggested that Ukraine was making progress toward democratic consolidation, when events on the ground suggested that Kuchma's commitment to reform was increasingly doubtful.

Some EU member states held back any significant deepening of relations with Ukraine, worried that these could be interpreted as intrusion by Moscow. Before 2004, Kuchma himself was scathing of the limited EU incentives on offer to Ukraine, the president having pushed for a free trade agreement and a "European Agreement" (the more generous, preaccession type agreements the EU operated with other Central and Eastern European states).¹⁹ Ukraine even lagged behind Russia in the depth of its relations with the EU right up to the early 2000s. Across a swathe of policy areas—loans from the European Investment Bank, the granting of market economy status (which conditioned the degree of trade preferences for exports to the EU market), cooperation with Europol, education links, and visa facilitation—Ukraine was accorded less than the EU offered Moscow.²⁰

Conversely, some member states argued that the EU should offer Ukraine a deeper and democracy-conditioned partnership, as a means of bolstering reformists. In 2002 the United Kingdom and Sweden first proposed offering Ukraine a further reaching set of relations, through what became the European Neighborhood Policy. Indeed, the ENP was seen by these states as a way of dealing specifically with "the Ukraine problem."²¹ The ENP offered Ukraine incorporation into a wide range of EU policies and programs, within the framework of a partnership formally committed to the fostering of democratic norms. At the bilateral level, in 2002 Lithuania signed a new Strategic Partnership with Ukraine, also with a focus on political reform. Poland pressed for the EU to change its "Russia first" policy to a "Ukraine first" policy.

The Polish government argued strongly that the EU had been guilty of neglecting Ukraine for fear of incurring Russia's wrath and that European policy risked

leading to halt Ukraine's slide into Belarus-like isolation. Polish diplomats admit that they failed in their attempt to boost EU offers to Ukraine both before Poland's formal accession in May 2004 and after this—and were angrily disappointed with other member states' resistance. This discrepancy was nested within a broader clash between assertive new EU-entrant Poland and some of the existing member states. For these states, the ENP was seen as a means of tying down Kuchma to the reform commitments he had repeatedly made but failed to implement. The EU included negotiations for a Neighborhood Action Plan with the Kuchma government a few months before its fall.

The EU appeared to have done enough over the decade of Kuchma's rule to serve as a reference point for the leader's Western-oriented aspirations and hence encourage at least a formal commitment to basic human rights and democratic procedure—even if the EU was less generous than it might have been in the depth of partnership and cooperation it offered Ukraine. There is only modest evidence that a variation in EU policy offers was linked in any very specific sense to Ukraine's degree of political openness; European influence was imported by the Kuchma regime in the form of a more subjective judgment on the latter's part that long-term partnership with the EU would be more likely if some semicompetitive political processes were retained.

Similarly, the US pursued a policy of constructive if sometimes critical engagement.²² After Gongadze's murder, the Bush administration did deny Kuchma a presidential visit to Washington, which the Ukrainian president had desperately wanted. At the Prague NATO summit attended by Bush and Kuchma, the official language was changed from English to French so that the two presidents, whose countries' names begin with the same letter in English but different letters in French, would not have to sit next to each other. Kuchma understood the subtle And more generally, American ambassadors in Ukraine were extremely active in engaging the Ukrainian democratic forces, especially after the murder of Gongadze, in a manner that Ukrainian government officials called meddling. Yet, direct contact with Kuchma never ended, and active courtship of some of Kuchma's closest confidants, including Kuchma's billionaire son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk, continued during the Orange Revolution. The American strategy was to keep the regime leaders interested in the West, so as to raise the costs of seriously bad behavior during the 2004 presidential vote. US State Department officials stated clearly in 2003 that "the conduct of the presidential campaign and election" was "the primary focus on U.S.-Ukraine relations."²³

Western assistance and moral support also helped sustain pockets of pluralism within the regime and independent, opposition actors outside of the state. Within the state, the independence of the Rada was especially critical in checking

population facilitated the flow of ideas and resources about Russia's regime as an alternative to the Western model of democracy. After the second round, Putin tried to strengthen Ukraine's "managed democracy" by quickly acknowledging Yanukovich as the winner in the presidential vote, even before the official results were released. Throughout the Orange Revolution, Putin stood firmly on the side of Yanukovich and against reconciliation, flatly denouncing the idea of rerunning the elections.²⁷

Fostering the Regime's Unpopularity

Kuchma's own actions, monitored by independent media, drove his government's decline in popularity. Indirectly and marginally, Western reactions to Kuchma's behavior helped magnify Kuchma's image as an illegitimate and criminal leader. Most importantly, American and European leaders strongly denounced the manner in which Kuchma handled the investigation into Gongadze's murder.²⁸ The Bush administration further downgraded contacts with the Kuchma regime after it became known that the Ukrainian government had tried to sell its Kolchuga air defense radar system to Iraq.²⁹ European impatience with Kuchma's stalling of long-promised reforms also increased, and the Gongadze murder did elicit a slightly harsher tone of criticism from European governments. High-level visits were reduced: only German chancellor Gerhard Schröder met with Kuchma in 2003, and by early 2004 contacts at the most senior level had dried up.

The most prominent role was adopted by Poland and Lithuania. These two states pressed for a more positive signal to be given toward Ukraine's potential membership to the EU and for a tougher line toward Russian influence in Ukraine. In the autumn of 2004, Lithuania took the lead in initiating EU Council discussions on offering stronger relations with Ukraine. It was backed by six other new Central and Eastern European member states, the Nordic countries and Austria.³⁰ This group of member states met frequently on an ad hoc basis immediately before the elections. Already in early November, the Polish foreign minister switched a planned visit to Kuchma and prime minister Yanukovich to meet Yushchenko instead.³¹

The extent to which concrete EU positions contributed directly to the unpopularity of the Kuchma government was, however, again tempered by the caution of several governments. Indeed, at this stage most European states actually encouraged Ukrainian reformers still to focus on trying to join the government and gain moderate change from within the parameters of the regime—this even as Kuchma had begun tightening controls on the media and the judiciary and mak-

executive power. Technical assistance provided by a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) grantee, the Indiana University Parliamentary Development Project, helped make this institution more effective. Party development efforts by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) also helped insure that Kuchma's party did not win an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliament as occurred in the Russian Duma during the Putin era. NDI and IRI worked with several parties that won representation in the Rada and, in doing so, helped maintain this institution's independence from the president. State Department officials also went out of their way to court the Rada speaker during the crisis. As Ambassador John Telft testified, "We welcomed Rada Speaker Lytvyn to Washington five days before the run-off to underscore our support for a legislative body committed to ensuring an outcome that reflected the will of the people."³²

European funding was of greater magnitude than US assistance but was focused more on government and state institutions. The EU's Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) aid program prioritized support for "legislative approximation"—a distinctive European approach aimed at harmonizing a swathe of Ukrainian legislation to EU norms and standards. It was here that the EU had its most tangible impact, when in 2002 Ukraine adopted a formal "national program of approximation" with EU legislation. This package included numerous governance-related reforms that further loaded the dice against Ukraine's competitive authoritarianism morphing into full-blown autocracy.

European policy could be seen in this sense to have played a vital role during the Kuchma years in locking Ukraine into a dynamic of "governance convergence" with the EU. This did not seek directly to undermine Kuchma but was a key factor in ensuring that some degree of formal political space and constitutional guarantees remained in Ukraine. Critics accused the EU of sanctioning semi-authoritarianism; more positively it could be seen as contributing eventually to democratic transition, nearly 14 years after Ukrainian independence.

Russian leaders and organizations played the exact opposite role to their US and EU counterparts, encouraging autocratic methods as an effective strategy for holding on to power. Years before the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, Putin embraced Kuchma without criticizing his antidemocratic ways. Through the provision of subsidized gas, Russia provided direct financial support to Ukraine's government. Putin's own system of growing autocratic rule provided a model for Kuchma to emulate. Obviously, Russian ideological and financial assistance was not sufficient to build a stable authoritarian regime in Ukraine, yet it did delay change. Ukraine's geographic proximity and significant Russian-speaking

ing it clearer than ever that he would seek to block such "reform from within." Kuchma was manipulating political conditions early on in the run-up to the elections of autumn 2004—rigging mayoral elections, threatening students that they would lose their accommodation if they voted for Yushchenko³²—but the EU stuck to its line of preferring to encourage reform from within the regime.

Some liberal reformers complained bitterly at Europe's reluctance to intervene as tensions deepened early in the autumn of 2004.³³ Many complained that the ENP Action Plan offered backing and protection to Kuchma, just when the latter's position was under challenge. While Central and Eastern European member states, along with the Nordic states and the United Kingdom, argued for a more assertive and critical EU involvement at this stage, they were reined back by Germany, France, and Spain.³⁴

The perception was that the Kuchma regime had contributed to Ukraine's isolation from the European sphere—even through several EU member states had carefully avoided making any firm promises that if Ukraine did democratize it would be allowed into the EU. In terms of external influences, another lesson is to be found here in the difference between perception and the actual substance of Western policies.

The Kremlin did not invest major resources in trying to improve Kuchma's international image, but Russian officials coordinated and sponsored various activities aimed at helping Yanukovych win the election. At the urging of the Kremlin, Russian businesspeople contributed to Yanukovych's campaign.³⁵ Some reports claimed that Russian sources provided \$300 million to the Yanukovych campaign with the lion's share coming from Gazprom.³⁶ Several Russian public relations consultants, including several closely tied to the Kremlin, worked directly for the Yanukovych campaign, while others participated in projects in Ukraine designed to bolster indirectly the Yanukovych efforts. For instance, in 2004, Russian public relations professionals created the "the Russian House" in Kyiv, which organized public events to emphasize Russia's positive and pivotal role for Ukrainian economy and security. To help Yanukovych, Putin personally traveled twice to Ukraine in the fall of 2004. A Russian-sponsored election-monitoring group observed the Ukrainian vote and declared the first and second rounds free and fair.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC FACTORS

Although international carrots and sticks alone did not bring about the Orange Revolution, there were several areas where the actions of international actors in combination with domestic factors appear crucial in bringing about Ukraine's successful transitional moment in 2004.

Assessing the role of external actors on the formation of a united and effective opposition in Ukraine (or anywhere else) is a difficult task because of the nature and sensitivity of the work. The nature of the work is difficult to evaluate because the process of making an impact occurs indirectly over extended periods of time and in parallel to local inputs. The transfer that took place between groups like the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute on the one hand and Our Ukraine on the other was essentially one of ideas and know-how, the most difficult variables to trace systematically.³⁷ Assessing this work is sensitive, because Ukrainian actors do not want to taint their reputations or legitimacy by reporting that Western actors contributed to their domestic success, while Western actors seek to protect their partners and also maintain a claim of acting as nonpartisans. Recognizing these huge constraints, observations about the role of external actors on the development of Ukraine's opposition coalition can still be made.

There is no evidence that the United States or any European government contributed financial resources directly to the campaign of Viktor Yushchenko and Our Ukraine.³⁸ Our Ukraine did receive financial contributions from citizens living in the United States and Canada. The greatest source of foreign funding for the Yushchenko campaign came from Russia.³⁹ The Yushchenko campaign also hired American and Russian campaign consultants. But foreign governments or foreign NGOs receiving financial support from Western governments did not pay for these professional services. Ukrainians did.

The EU had conspicuously declined to support the popular demonstrations that erupted in 2000. Nor did it offer material support for the democratic opposition that took shape in organized and systematic fashion after 2001. At the 2002 elections, no EU support was forthcoming for reformers, and the latter were outmaneuvered by Kuchma for positions and representation after the poll. By 2004 a small amount of party training was being offered on a bipartisan basis, and some indirect logistical support provided in-kind aid for prodemocracy protestors. Germany, Spain, and France eschewed direct political aid projects in the run-up to or in the wake of the first round of the 2004 elections. The role of quasi-independent party foundations such as the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the German Stiftungen, or the Dutch Alfred Mözer Foundation represented the more notable aspect of European political assistance. In interviews, actors in the Orange Revolution reported favorably on the demonstration effects that Serbia 2000 and Georgia 2003 had on their own mobilization efforts. Contacts between youth activists from Serbia, Slovakia, and Georgia provided inspiration to their counterparts in Ukraine, even if the transfer of technical knowledge about civic resistance is

more difficult to measure. The most tangible backing for democracy activists did not come from Western official initiatives but through links between Pora and its Ukrainian counterpart, OTPOR (Pora was too high profile to receive either European or US funding).⁴⁰

While his role was praised *ex post*, EU foreign policy representative Javier Solana was initially reluctant to get involved in supporting the Orange Revolution. The more activist states complained at Solana's passivity; Solana's team was concerned that it lacked a clear mandate supported by all EU governments. One civil society representative lamented that Solana focused on events in Ukraine only after being pushed hard by Poland and when he belatedly saw "history being written." The triumvirate that was eventually assembled of Solana, Aleksander Kwasniewski, and Valdas Adamkus, the Polish and Lithuanian presidents, respectively, focused on mediating more than bolstering support for the opposition. There was general agreement that it was Kwasniewski who served as the crucial interlocutor based on a long-standing mutual confidence with Kuchma. Solana was generally recognized as having played a valuable mediating role, while maintaining a low profile "we do not meddle, or take sides." This tempered the degree to which EU intervention served as a rallying point for the uniting of an erstwhile fractious opposition.

The Our Ukraine campaign had greater organizational reach than any other party in Ukraine. Our Ukraine leaders accomplished this feat primarily on their own through years of hard work. At the same time, Our Ukraine political leaders reported that the development of their organizational capacity benefited from years of close relationships with the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute.⁴¹ Well before the formation of the Our Ukraine bloc in 2002, IRI and NDI also worked closely with many of the individuals who later assumed senior positions in the Our Ukraine organization and campaign. After the creation of the party, NDI and IRI provided additional training assistance, though using different strategies. IRI conducted multiparty training programs focused almost exclusively on regional party leaders outside of Kyiv, while NDI provided trainers to programs organized by Our Ukraine, a service they provided to other parties as well.⁴² NDI staff members also focused more of their efforts on working with Our Ukraine's senior leadership in Kyiv. Measuring systematically the results of these interactions, be it NDI's engagement with senior party officials or IRI regional training efforts, is beyond the scope of this study. That there were purposeful efforts by both IRI and NDI to strengthen Our Ukraine's campaign abilities is without question.

Indirectly, both NDI and IRI also helped to increase the respectability of Yushchenko in Washington. IRI organized a trip to Washington for Yushchenko and

his senior staff in February 2003, at which time the Ukrainian presidential campaign met with key Bush administration officials and members of Congress. Significantly, he met Senator Richard Lugar, who would eventually play a key role in helping to impede American endorsement of the second round result of the 2004 election. Just prior to her departure as secretary of state Madeleine Albright, chair of NDI's board, traveled to Ukraine in February 2004 to meet with Yushchenko and other Our Ukraine leaders. Upon her return to Washington, she also spoke favorably about Yushchenko's candidacy. These kinds of contacts helped assure the Bush administration that the Ukrainian opposition was viable and worth supporting. Our Ukraine, along with other European parties also bolstered Yushchenko's image in the West. In short, generally, elite networks between Our Ukraine leaders and Western leaders bolstered Our Ukraine allies in the West when debates erupted in Washington and European capitals about how to respond to the Orange protestors.⁴³

Turnout in regions supportive of Yushchenko were much higher in the 2004 election than in previous elections. Several American and European organizations, including IRI, NDI, the International Renaissance Foundation (the Ukrainian affiliate of the Soros Foundation), Freedom House, Internews, and the Eurasia Foundation contributed direct financial assistance to the get-out-the-vote projects organized by their Ukrainian partners.⁴⁵

External Contributions to Exposing Fraud

Many of the Ukrainian activities that contributed to the exposure of fraud had significant assistance from external actors. In fact, the West's central contribution to the Orange Revolution was in the form of long-term support of voters' rights groups, think tanks, youth groups, and other civil activist organizations and media organizations that would be instrumental in monitoring, polling, conducting party vote tabulations and exit polls, disseminating information about voters' rights and violations of those rights.

NDI provided the original idea for a Ukrainian election monitoring organization and also substantial technical and financial assistance to CVU throughout its support for the 2004 election.⁴⁶ In 2004 other Western donors, including most importantly the International Renaissance Foundation, also contributed major financial resources to CVU.⁴⁷ The PVT technology used by CVU was also imported from the United States.⁴⁸

CVU was the largest and most visible NGO effort supported by Western funds dedicated to exposing fraud, but not the only effort. At the end of its voter education and voter mobilization campaigns, the Znaymu campaign, supported finan-

cially by the US-Ukraine Foundation and Freedom House, also turned to exposing fraud, including one leafleting campaign that threatened CEC officials about the legal consequences of committing electoral fraud.⁴⁹ Yellow Pora, Black Pora, Chysta Ukraina, and hundreds of smaller NGOs also used various tactics to expose fraud. Freedom House funded many of the NGO activities at the regional level through its Citizen Participation in Elections in Ukraine program.⁵⁰ Our Ukraine also worked hard to expose fraud, first by training its party representatives serving on CEC commissions on the rules for vote counting and mechanisms for recording irregularities, and second by organizing a parallel network of election monitors. NDI played a major role in training Our Ukraine monitors.⁵¹

Democratic Initiatives Foundation's exit poll, which also played a critical role in undermining the legitimacy of the second round official results, was also an imported technology. Its use in Ukraine was funded almost entirely by Western donors, including the International Renaissance Foundation, Eurasia Foundation, Counterpart, and several Western embassies.⁵² IRF even financed the participation of Russian and Polish polling experts in the exit poll project.⁵³

In addition to Ukrainian poll watchers, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), IRI, NDI, and the US-Ukraine Foundation deployed international election monitoring teams to observe the Ukrainian election. Most innovatively, NDI and Freedom House cooperated to bring to Ukraine the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), which comprised 1,000 observers from 17 electoral monitoring organizations in formerly communist countries. ENEMO brought trained electoral monitors, experienced in exposing postcommunist vote rigging (many observers also spoke Russian) and at a fraction of the cost that it would have taken to bring in Americans or Western Europeans. All of these international teams released critical reports about the election process, which were instrumental in generating a unified American and European condemnation of the voting procedures.

The contribution made by European governments to exposing fraud was slightly more circumspect. Interviews uncovered that the French government was particularly ambivalent and tardy in backing protestors' claims that the second round results were fraudulent.⁵⁴ Conversely, the British, Dutch, and Swedish governments did join the United States in funding exit polls. It was only after the electoral fraud had been exposed by local groups that the EU, according to one account, "changed to a stick approach" and threatened "serious consequences."⁵⁵ France and Germany did send observers to the OSCE mission that monitored the rerun of the election. Yushchenko found strong fraud-reversing assistance from European governments only once momentum toward democratic breakthrough

had already taken hold. Here, international influences were imported as a useful secondary back-up, not a factor that was primary in igniting the initial steps toward regime change.

External Contributions to Independent Media

At various stages in their careers, many of the key independent journalists had contact with Western donor programs, most notably USAID-funded media projects.⁵⁶ When asked *ex post* what type of democracy assistance had proved most useful and pertinent, both EU officials and members of the Orange coalition referred to European media training and support. They suggested that, while such support was low key during the Kuchma years, it had helped change journalists' perspectives and provided professional know-how, factors that acted as background "enablers" of the pro-reform role adopted by some Ukrainian media in late 2004.

External Inputs into Internal Mass Mobilization

Several weeks in advance, Our Ukraine planned the first actions of civic resistance after the second round of voting. There is no evidence that it received any Western intellectual or financial assistance in making these preparations. Nor did US or European government sources support its two-week operation on the Maidan. The assertion that demonstrators were paid a daily wage for their efforts is a myth. In line with their preference for "reform from within," European politicians did not encourage mass mobilization. Solana actually called for demonstrators not to impede the working of government ministries. External actors reacted late rather than interacting proactively with domestic dynamics.

External inputs into facilitating mass mobilization were more indirect. Most importantly, a model for "electoral revolution" existed and had succeeded in two postcommunist countries in the previous three years—Serbia in 2000 and Georgia in 2003. Serbian and Georgian activists from OTPOR and Kmara helped reinforce these demonstration effects through direct interaction with their Ukrainian counterparts.⁵⁷ Civic mobilization training programs received at least partial funding from Western sources, including the International Renaissance Foundation, Freedom House, the US-Ukraine Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, NDI, the Westminster Foundation, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and grants from Western embassies in Kyiv.⁵⁸ Black Pora and Yellow Pora received direct financial assistance from several Western sources, including the Westminster Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and several Western embassies. USAID

and its implementers, however, never provided direct assistance to these youth groups, as they were considered too radical and partisan.³⁹

External Contributions to Crisis Mediation

In parallel to these activities was a mediation effort between Kuchma, Yanukovych, and Yushchenko that was facilitated by Presidents Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland, Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania, and Javier Solana of the European Union. Kwasniewski was especially influential in pressing for a negotiated but "right" solution to the crisis; Solana followed his lead. The Bush administration deliberately did not seek a public role in the negotiations but stayed closely involved behind the scenes through contacts with Kwasniewski, Solana, and Adamkus. This international effort helped diffuse tensions between polarized enemies. Somewhat contrary to subsequent impressions, European efforts were more significant at this level of elite mediation rather than at the level of proactive support for the Orange coalition.

Western mediators also helped persuade Yushchenko to accept constitutional changes that would weaken the power of the president and strengthen the power of the parliament, a compromise that certainly made it easier for Kuchma and Yanukovych to agree to a third round of elections. That is, the EU pushed for a "pacted" solution, based on Yushchenko agreeing to cede some presidential powers to the parliament in order to placate Kuchma's allies, who would thus retain influence. Views on the deal struck with Kuchma and Yanukovych differed. Some saw it as both necessary and a means of guaranteeing against an overbearing presidency in the future. But many civil society activists in Ukraine lamented that the EU "gave too much away" in December 2004 to the Yanukovych camp, with reformists judging that it did so specifically in order to reach a negotiated position between France and Germany, on the one hand, and the new member states, the Nordics, and the UK, on the other hand. European diplomats protested that in practice negotiations were not so clear-cut, with the speed of events representing the overwhelming factor in November and December 2004 and with even the more enthusiastic European backers of the Orange Revolution accepting that some form of deal had to be struck.

Hence, whether the roundtable negotiations were necessary for the breakthrough, however, is disputable. Critics of the negotiations, including Yulia Tymoshenko, have argued that the Western-anchored mediation efforts were not central to the outcome and actually tied the opposition's hands after breakthrough.⁴⁰ Ironically, after the 2006 parliamentary elections, Yanukovych became prime minister again, this time with more enhanced powers as a result of the Orange Revolution.

External Facilitators of Divisions within the Security Services

Identifying a direct Western impact on division within the security forces is difficult. Some have claimed that those soldiers who participated in NATO's Partnership-for-Peace programs were more likely to support the demonstrators than those who did not.⁴¹ To date, however, the evidence marshaled to support this claim is far from convincing. There is certainly no evidence that Western governments undertook purposive action to provoke the kind of divisions within the security services that are identified above as a key variable in the account of Ukraine's democratic transition. EU states actually expressed concern over defections from security service insiders; these were viewed more as a potential source of instability than a positive precursor to democratic transition.

Western actors did contribute indirectly to keeping the peace during the standoff between armed forces and the Orange demonstrators. Nevertheless, the number of protesters on the streets was the decisive deterrent to violence, not a phone call from Washington. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Kremlin supported Yanukovych's desire to use force to clear the streets. Some press accounts even claim that Russia sent its own special forces to Kyiv to assist in the protection of the presidential administration building, which at one point was under threat of forced takeover by Orange leaders.⁴² Press reports also claim that Putin sent his special forces unit, Vypmel, to Kyiv in order to evacuate safely Kuchma and his family along with secret documents, if the moment to flee arose.⁴³ Definitive evidence of Russian military involvement never materialized, and statements made subsequently by Orange Revolution leaders implied that the Russian military threat was greatly exaggerated.⁴⁴ Moscow's ability to influence the internal cohesion and actions of Ukrainian armed forces was just as limited as the West's.

CONCLUSION

The set of conditions needed to produce Ukraine's democratic breakthrough was large and complex. Of this long list of factors, external actors played a role in influencing only a few. Given the extremely precarious distribution of power, however, these imported inputs from the West were consequential in tipping the balance in favor of the democratic challengers.

With regard to policies, actions, and programs aimed at weakening the semi-autocratic regime, the Ukrainian experience suggests that it is hard for outsiders to foster splits within the *ancien régime* and also difficult for them to influence directly the popularity of the regime. The West played no measurable role in fostering splits within the security forces. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Western

criticism of Kuchma contributed to his declining popularity at home, but no hard data exist to isolate the independent causal role of foreign rebuke.

More generally, however, the West did seem to play a role in impeding the full-scale consolidation of autocracy. Western resources helped strengthen institutions such as the Rada, which checked presidential power. Western long-term aid to civil society also helped keep semi-autocracy in Ukraine from becoming a full autocracy. Russia provided technical assistance and resources for constructing a stronger autocracy, but these resources were insufficient. It also remains unclear if Kuchma actually wanted to construct a full-blown autocracy. In the margins, Western engagement of Kuchma, his aides, and his family members raised the costs of completely turning away from democracy.

The EU represented an aspirational reference point for at least some members of the regime, and retaining engagement with the EU constituted one vital pole of Kuchma's multivector foreign policy. The depth of partnership promised to Ukraine by the EU was admonished as insufficient by reformists both within and outside the regime. And the EU did not categorically condition its cooperation on prior democratic transition because it was keen to counterweight Moscow's strategic influence. But the general perception existed within the regime that partnership with the EU—and keeping open the prospect of eventual EU accession—required at least some of the formal aspects of competitive politics to be retained. At the margins, this was one factor that discouraged any slide into full autocracy. The EU's focus on economic governance and technical harmonization was not about preparing overtly and directly for democratic transition—indeed, as argued, in some ways it was designed to head off abrupt and destabilizing regime change. But arguably it did lock Ukraine into an area of Euro-governance that provided some of the legal and procedural mechanisms that enabled the Orange coalition to establish its first foothold.

Regarding policies, actions, and programs aimed at strengthening the opposition, the Ukrainian experience suggests that it is difficult to influence the effectiveness of opposition candidates in elections. In the margins, external actors can encourage unity among the democratic opposition, but the real drivers of unity will always be local actors. Western imports were crucial in exposing electoral fraud. The ideas and technology for exposing fraud—exit polls, a parallel vote tabulation, and poll monitors—were imported from the United States. Funding for these activities came largely from Western sources, and the presence of international monitors provided moral support for local monitors. External actors also contributed to the development of independent media in Ukraine. One of the most effective media outlets, *Ukrainska Pravda*, relied almost exclusively on external financial support. EU officials would later opine that their most positive influence

before 2004 was in supporting the modicum of media independence that oiled the wheels of the Orange Revolution at crucial junctures in late 2004. Finally, imported ideas and resources strengthened electoral mobilization, both before and after the vote. If financial assistance for these mobilization activities came from American and West European sources, intellectual and inspirational input came from Serbs, Georgians, and Slovaks. Tracing the intellectual origins of civic resistance ideas back even further, Indian and American ideational inputs—that is, the ideas and practices of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.—are also present in the making of the Orange Revolution.

In short, it was a general feeling of being "left behind"—as the EU expanded to Ukraine's immediate neighbors—that was one, albeit secondary factor that motivated protestors. Kuchma himself probably did conclude that an attempt to force through a rigging of the elections in 2004 would have consequences for relations with Europe, even though he himself had enjoyed much support from EU governments up until that point. European influence had impact more at this level than in terms of concrete responses to democratic backsliding after 2000. Members of the Orange coalition would commonly refer to the presence of European Union flags on the Maidan during the 2004 protests as evidence of EU influence. Again, this symbolized the influence of aspiration and hope—that, as became painfully evident after 2004, were not founded on any concrete policy promises or inducements that the EU had provided for democratic transition.

Far from orchestrating democratic protest behind the scenes, most international actors were in reactive mode once mass mobilization began to impact events in the autumn of 2004. European democracy assistance proper did not play a prominent role in Ukraine. This was forthcoming at a low level and did not support the political activism that directly undermined Kuchma. US funding was slightly more "forward leaning" but also of facilitative rather than determinant value. The EU arguably set a broad set of incentives that loosely filtered into Ukrainian identity and aspirations and then intervened in a way that had more identifiable impact only when the regime was already on its way out, because of the strength of domestic-led pressure for change. European governments did not purposively encourage democratic protest, certainly until this was already potent.

European influence discouraged any temptation the Kuchma regime might have had to completely close the modicum of political space that existed in Ukraine before 2004. But it did not guarantee against some meaningful reversals in political and civil rights during that period. Nor did it actively seek to hasten the arrival of democracy, at least until the confluence of domestic events presented the de facto moment of late 2004. The EU's focus on legislative harmonization before the Orange Revolution might have helped eventually to load the dice in democracy's

favor, but many civil society actors criticized it for shoring up Kuchma for longer than was necessary and diverting attention from the more serious political abuses that occurred after 2001.

NOTES

1. On this kind of regimes, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2004): 51-65.
2. For details, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), chap. 6.
3. The symbolic codification of the Orange Revolution as a pivotal moment in Ukrainian history is well underway. See Laura Arzhakowska, *Revolyutsiya Duxa* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2005); and the movie, *Ukraina: proročko demokracii* (Kiev: O. Dovzhenko Fund Rozvitku Ukrainy's kogo Kino/Pro TV, 2005).
4. On the Russian model in comparative perspective, see Lucan Way, "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine," *World Politics* 57 (January 2005): 231-61.
5. Anders Aslund, "The Ancient Regime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs," in Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds., *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 9-28.
6. Taras Kuzio, "The Opposition's Road to Success," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 125; and interview with Security Service of Ukraine chief Ihor Smeshko, in *The Orange Revolution*, documentary film written, directed and produced by Steve Yank (Washington, D.C.: York Zimmerman Inc., 2007).
7. Yuri Lutsenko, MP and one of key organizers of the Maidan protests, interview, Kyiv, November 2005.
8. C. J. Chivers, "How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path," *New York Times*, January 17, 2005, 1.
9. Interviews with Roman Bezsmertny, MP, Our Ukraine; and Alexander Moroz, MP, Chairman of the Socialist Party, Kyiv, July 2002.
10. Yulia Timoshenko, interview, Kyiv, February 2006.
11. Interviews with Mikhaila Katarinchuk and Yuri Kluchkovsky, Our Ukraine MPs, Kyiv, November 2005. They argued the Our Ukraine case before the Supreme Court.
12. Olena Prytula, *Ukrainska Pravda* editor, interview, Kyiv, June 2002.
13. Marta Dyczok, "Was Kuchma's Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004," *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 2 (March 2006): 215-38.
14. For the specific percentages, see International Renaissance Foundation, *Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004* (Kyiv: IRF, January 2005), 14-19.
15. Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (March-April 2005).
16. Olena Prytula, "The Ukrainian Media Rebellion," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 110.
17. Interviews with Taras Stetskiy and Vladimir Grynev, Kyiv, January 2006. See also interviews with Maidan organizers in Kyiv, *Orange Revolution*.
18. European Council Common Strategy of December 11, 1999, on Ukraine, 1999/877/CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Communities* L331, no. 1 (December 23, 1999).
19. Richard Youngs, "Ukraine," in Ted Piccone and Richard Youngs, eds., *Strategies for*

10. *Democratic Change: Assessing the Global Response* (Washington, D.C.: Democracy Coalition Project, 2006), 104.
11. P. Kubicek, "The European Union and Ukraine: Real Partners or Relationship of Convenience," in P. Kubicek, ed., *The European Union and Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2003), 155.
12. Iryna Solonenko, "European Neighbourhood Policy—The Perception of Ukraine," *Foreign Policy Dialogue* 7, no. 19 (July 2006): 45, www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de.
13. Marius Vahl, "A Privileged Partnership? EU-Russian Relations in a Comparative Perspective," Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper no. 2006/3.
14. K. Smith, "The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy," *International Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2005): 768.
15. Carlos Pascual, US Ambassador to Ukraine, 2000-3, interview, Kyiv, June 2002.
16. Ambassador John Telfer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, testimony before the House International Relations Committee, December 7, 2004, 6, www.state.gov/p/eur/ils/rm/39542.htm.
17. Ibid.
18. Daniel Williams, "Putin Opposes Return in Ukraine," *Washington Post*, December 3, 2004, A16.
19. Pascual interview. See also Ambassador Stephen Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, testimony before the House International Relations Committee, May 12, 2004, 3 (copy provided to McFaul).
20. Michael Wines, "Report of Arms Sale by Ukraine to Iraq Causes Consternation," *New York Times*, November 7, 2002.
21. M. Emerson et al., "The Reluctant Debutante," in M. Emerson, ed., *Democratization in the European Neighbourhood* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005), 17.
22. O. Sushko and O. Prystayko, "Western Influence," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 131.
23. For an overview, see Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution."
24. K. Barysch and C. Grant, "Ukraine Should Not Be Part of a 'Great Game,'" *Open Democracy*, December 7, 2004.
25. Emerson et al., "The Reluctant Debutante," 18; G. Gromadzki, R. Lopata, and B. Bick, "Friends of Family? Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish Perspectives on the EU's Policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova," *FIIA Report* 12 (2005): 31-32.
26. Sergei Markov, interview, Moscow, September 2005.
27. These numbers are reported in Jackson Diehl, "Putin's Unchallenged Imperialism," *Washington Post*, October 25, 2004, A19.
28. Because tracing causality in this sector is so difficult, few have tried. Serious attempts include Carothers, *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); and Sarah Mendelson, "Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia," *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 68-106.
29. Interviews with Kathryn Stevens, Director, Office of Democracy & Governance, USAID Ukraine; Chris Holzen, Resident Director, Ukraine, International Republican Institute; David Dettman, Resident Director, Ukraine, National Democratic Institute; Taras Butenko MP and Our Ukraine campaign manager, Kyiv, November 2005.
30. Interview with a board member of a major Russian corporation, which gave funds to the Butenko campaign, Moscow, June 2005. The businessman asked not to be identified.

40. T. Kuzio, "The Opposition's Road to Success," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (June 1999): 127.
41. Interviews with Stetsiv and Katarynchuk.
42. Interviews with Dettman and Holzen, and Tetiana Soboleva, NDI trainer, Kyiv, November 2005.
43. Interviews with Lorne Craner, President, International Republican Institute, and Steve Nix, Director of Former Soviet Union Programs, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C., October 2005.
44. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lech Walesa, Ambassador William Miller (former US ambassador to Ukraine), and Adrian Karatynsky are examples of private citizens with close ties to Our Ukraine who played active roles in shaping Western debates about the Orange Revolution.
45. Interviews with Eric Boyle, Regional Director, Kiev Regional Office, The Eurasia Foundation; Yevhen Hystriytsky, Executive Director, International Renaissance Foundation; Juhan Grossman, Senior Program Officer, Civic Participation in Elections in Ukraine, Freedom House; Petro Koshukov, Codirector of Znayu project; Inna Pidlyuska, President, Europa XXI Foundation, Kyiv, November 2005.
46. On this technology, see Eric Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
47. The figures are listed in International Renaissance Foundation, *Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004*.
48. Interview with CPU leaders Oleksandr Popov and Yevgen Poberezhny, Kiev, November 2005. On this method for exposing fraud, see Larry Garber and Glenn Cowan, "The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 2 (April 1993): 95-107.
49. Interviews with Koshukov and Dimitri Potekhin, Kiev, 2005.
50. Interview with Grossman and several Ukrainian recipients who received these funds.
51. Vadim Galaychuk, General Director, Moor & Krosodovich, and Coordinator for Our Ukraine Election Monitoring Program, interview, Kyiv, November 2005.
52. See www.ukna.kiev.ua/pub/DI/partners.html.
53. International Renaissance Foundation, *Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004*, 74.
54. A. Guillemoles, *Même la neige était orange: La révolution ukrainienne* (Paris: les Petits Matins, 2005), 75-77.
55. Sushko and Prystayko, "Western Influence," 132.
56. Interview with Andrei Shevchenko, Channel Five, and Kateryna Myasnykova, Executive Director, Independent Association of Broadcasters, Kyiv, November 2005; and Natalya Ligachova, Project Director and Chairman of the Board, Telekritika, Kyiv, February 2006.
57. Andriy Kohut, Member of Board, (Black) Portal, interview, Kyiv, March 2005.
58. Altogether, in the year before the 2004 vote, the International Renaissance Foundation, the local Ukrainian arm of the Soros foundation, contributed \$1,653,222 to NGOs implementing election related projects. See International Renaissance Foundation, *Promotion of the Fair and Open Election of 2004*, 1. Yellow Pora was a recipient of several IRF grants.
59. Interviews with several USAID officials and Pora members, March and November 2005.
60. Timoshenko interview. See also Youngs, "Ukraine," 100.
61. See, for instance, comments of Major General Nicholas Krawciw, US Army, retired, made at an American Enterprise Institute event in Washington, D.C., "Ukraine's Choice: Europe or Russia?" December 10, 2004, during panel discussion entitled, "Ukraine's Armed Forces: On the Way to Join NATO?"
62. United Press International, "Russian Troops in Ukraine Capital," November 24, 2004.
63. Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, "Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution," in Richard and McPaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 151.
64. Ibid.