

Part I: 2020: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

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Administration without Borders

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To thrive in 2020, we must conceive of the field of public administration in the broadest possible terms. Phenomena that typically have been treated peripherally in our literature are emerging center stage in recent years, confirming that the “old” boundaries of our discipline do not reflect contemporary reality. After reviewing three key developments—the rise of mixed and nongovernmental institutions in public policy, the increasing importance of market mechanisms, and the assertion of meaningful global regulation—an argument is made for a broader reconception of “publicness” that goes hand in hand with the embrace of governance in lieu of administration.

The most formidable enclosures are those that go unrecognized, creating a confinement so profound that those entrapped are unaware of the boundary. In the movie *The Truman Show*, Jim Carrey’s character is the subject of a “reality” television show, living his entire life within an elaborate sound-stage. He exists in this state of ignorance, with his every move providing entertainment for the viewers at home, until a sequence of developments reveals the very real limits of his world. Alerted to his containment, he is driven to break out of this bubble, overcoming obstacles thrown in his path by the show’s producer, who suggests that the neatness of Truman’s artificially circumscribed world is preferable to the chaos beyond its limits.

The adventures of Dwight Waldo and his acolytes are not (yet) the stuff of reality television, but as public administration scholars we now find ourselves similarly confined by boundaries that have arisen around our field over the last hundred years. To remain relevant in 2020, we must step beyond the lines that define our field but do not reflect contemporary realities. The financial

crisis and the remarkable events of the last several years, coming on top of waves of reform and innovation, suggest that remaining within existing disciplinary borders risks marginalization of our field. Only by forcefully resisting the academic tendency to burrow ever deeper within disciplinary confines can we maintain our vitality. The emerging world of public administration without borders requires a significant reorientation.

In this brief essay, I will highlight three ascendant institutional forms and practices that transcend boundaries that traditionally define the study of public administration. This list is not comprehensive, nor should this essay be read as an indictment of our field for “missing” these developments. All of the topics have been looked at by scholars of public administration (and other disciplines), but because they are not easily accommodated within our existing bins, they have not been embraced as core issues in our field.

- First, organizations that mix characteristics of governmental and nongovernmental entities now play a central role in the delivery of public goods and services in almost every policy arena.
- Second, market mechanisms in the regulation and allocation of scarce resources seem to be favored in numerous policy areas.
- Third, cross-border cooperation and, in some cases, reliance on institutions that span nation-states is an increasingly common response to transnational public policy challenges.

Each of these developments is considered before turning to a discussion of the changes required in our collective mindset to push these matters to the forefront. Essentially, I argue that

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in order to maintain and even increase relevance in 2020, we must revise our understanding of both “public” and “administration” to better match emerging practices. This means rejecting the equation of “public” with “governmental” and instead taking in the full panoply of programs and institutions that create and protect public goods, regardless of organizational sector. It also means expanding our understanding of “administration” to include market-based programs that eschew the state production and distribution of public goods and services that once defined government bureaucracy. Indeed, “governance in the public interest” might be a better moniker for our field than “public administration.” Finally, the pressures of academic specialization that keep international organizations off the radar screen of those interested in bureaucracy and administration must be overcome.

In his *Spirit of Public Administration* (1997), H. George Frederickson considered the meaning of “public” and “administration” and expressed reservations about the expansion of these terms. He persuasively argued that the transmutation of public administration into “governance” would move our field away from the very real matters of managing complex organizations and implementing public policy. But even in the 13 years since that book was published, the practice of public administration has spilled over the boundaries of our discipline. “Public policies” are not exclusively implemented by government agencies wielding traditional tools. In shaping the meaning of public administration, we should favor the empirical over the theoretical.

Organizations Mixing Sectors

From its origins in the writings of ancient philosophers and our spiritual godfather Niccolò Machiavelli to our more proximate founder Woodrow Wilson, public administration has been taken to refer to the theory and practice of government. The view is fairly universal; scholars around the world have pursued work that hews to the public administration as government line. This approach was understandable in the past, but it now feels artificial. The last few decades have seen reliance on a wide variety of institutions to deliver public policy (O’Leary, Gerard, and Bingham 2006; Seidman 1988; Seidman and Gilmour 1986). Pushed by changes in budget rules, fiscal constraints, and a belief that market instruments are more effectively wielded by institutions designed to function in the marketplace, there has been a proliferation of public–private hybrids, partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental entities, and other nontraditional approaches to public management (Kettl 2006). In the last two years, we have even witnessed an unanticipated American revival of a different variation on quasi-government, government ownership of for-profit enterprises.

None of this is new—either as a phenomenon or as a subject in public administration discourse. Public authorities predate the United States as mechanisms for the delivery of collective goods that endow entities outside the formal government bureaucracy with pseudo-governmental powers (Doig 2001; Walsh 1978). In the United States, public authorities—and their cousins, special districts and other municipal corporations—are familiar parts of the local governance landscape (Foster 1997; Leigland 1994). The modern era of federal experimentation began during World War I, during which there was a population boom of government corporations to facilitate wartime production. Although these entities were dissolved following the Great War, the government corporations

created as part of the New Deal persisted (Koppell 2003; Stanton 2002). Indeed, the institutional form proved useful, and government corporations proliferated and evolved in response to changing conditions (Moe 1983).

Government corporations introduce a different logic into the administrative equation by virtue of their reliance on fee-based revenue generation to cover costs.¹ Admittedly, most government corporations are not formally limited by their income; their budgets are not literally constrained by revenues, but managers of government corporations must shape activities with the goal of breaking even (Koppell 2003). And so the delegation of public policy responsibilities in a variety of areas—housing, power generation, uranium disposal, agriculture—often operates under a different dynamic than “normal” administration, which requires operation within an appropriation not linked to agency revenue. If recent history is an accurate guide, the linkage between programmatic revenue and budget is likely to be stronger by 2020, a development that shapes the politics of policy in which that connection is drawn (e.g., highway funding, national parks) and those in which it is not.

Mutations of the basic government corporation have spread across the governmental landscape. The federal government now boasts a fairly extensive lineup of venture capital funds, for example. Inspired in part by the Small Business Administration’s Small Business Investment Company program, which offers financial assistance to privately run funds that direct capital to smaller firms, both the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Agency for International Development oversaw portfolios of government venture capital funds (Koppell 1999). The Central Intelligence Agency’s In-Q-Tel, a technology fund named after the gadget wizard from the James Bond films, prompted the U.S. Army to start its own fund, OnPoint Technologies (Rottenberg 2006). Similar programs have proliferated at the state and local level (Lerner 2009).

The quirkiness, obscurity, and peculiar names associated with these and other organizations that break the mold of government bureaucracies have kept the study of quasi-government out of mainstream public administration studies. But the centrality in the financial crisis of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that originated as government corporations, underscores the need to pay more attention to institutions that do not fit into the typical categories of bureaucratic study. For one thing, the effects of the Fannie and Freddie collapse will be far-reaching. As Congress wrestles with the future of these two companies, other quasi-governmental entities such as the Federal Home Loan Bank system (which also plays a central role in the U.S. housing finance system and is even more obscure to students of American government than the GSEs) will be drawn into the discussion (Hoffmann and Cassell 2002).

Moreover, the activities of quasi-governmental organizations cannot be detached from “normal” government. Not only will the financial implications of the GSEs’ collapse still be felt in 2020, their restructuring has put the entire federal approach to housing and financial regulation on the table as well. Most fundamentally, the Fannie and Freddie debacle calls into question the ability of bureaucrats to effectively administer government participation in markets. Policies that harness the creditworthiness of the U.S. government are

immensely appealing on paper, but the administration challenges cannot be overlooked when confronted with events of the last two years. The regulatory administration was clearly overwhelmed, but the problem runs deeper. In the midst of a mortgage credit crisis, members of Congress used Fannie and Freddie to stimulate or sustain markets even as the condition of their balance sheets was going from bad to catastrophic. Senators suggested *lowering* the GSEs' capital requirements even as the federal government put billions on the line to cover company losses to keep propping up house prices (Duhigg 2008). One cannot understand such developments—and the administrative challenge for government officials working in this area—without a strong understanding of the business logic driving the institutions at the heart of this policy arena.

Our collective comfort with the incongruity of government sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now seems fairly quaint. As publicly traded companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the GSEs unambiguously owe a profitable return to their shareholders even as they meet regulatory demands for fiscal safety and attainment of public policy goals (Koppell 2003). The companies are now effectively government agencies, maintaining a shareholder structure mostly as a means of keeping their liabilities off-budget. The spectacle of firms with no implicit government guarantee receiving bailouts in 2008 and 2009 actually eclipsed this development. With the federal government now the dominant shareholder in General Motors, AIG, Chrysler, and Citigroup, the problem of murkiness in corporate objectives is more widespread; claims that maximizing shareholder value is the unchallenged corporate purpose for these American state-owned enterprises are undermined by the thorny reality of government officials seeking to impose policy objectives (e.g., saving dealerships from elimination) (King 2009). Similarly, financial institutions that accepted Troubled Asset Relief Program funds are assailed for their practices—from nonlending to executive compensation—with the linkage between dissatisfaction and their receipt of government largesse quite explicit.

Public administration scholars must confront such developments head on, and they must not be deterred by the “business-y” aspects of quasi-government. Corporations in which the public has a material interest must be an integral part of our disciplinary territory. Leaving such institutions to be studied by scholars from other fields is more than an interdisciplinary turf concession, it is an ideological choice with policy consequences. To leave analysis of the corporations owned wholly or in part by the federal government, or those receiving billions in taxpayer funded bailouts, to economists, finance professors, and scholars from fields other than public administration is to deny the “publicness” of this phenomenon. By examining these newly created creatures as subjects of public administration inquiry, however, we can (and should) make clear that steps taken with respect to these entities must be examined in more than mere economic or financial terms. Indeed, extending the umbrella of public administration to cover such entities—and explicating the administrative complexities of such arrangements—may reduce the likelihood of Uncle Sam holding equity in these firms 10 years from now.

There are both policy and administration dimensions to these developments. The former receives more attention, but the latter is of primary interest here. Government-sponsored enterprises and other mixed institutions introduce distinctive imperatives and constraints

for government officials, inside and around these organizations. Consider another class of sector-spanning institutions that has received attention in recent years: sovereign wealth funds. These are vast accumulations of capital, often accrued from the sale of natural resources, controlled by governments. Most attention has gone to the funds associated with petrostates such as Russia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Norway, but there are others with wealth that is not derived from oil and gas sales (e.g., China, Singapore). And there are massive funds controlled by subnational governments, including American entities such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, and various state pension funds, most notably Calpers.

Each of these entities offers a formidable public *administration* challenge as the leaders and staff of these organizations—some government employees and some retained management firms—seek to balance revenue maximization, risk management, and other policy considerations in portfolio management (Kimmitt 2008). Recently, attention has been focused on the estimates of returns offered by pension fund managers. Slight changes in these estimates have profound budgetary implications for the states and municipalities that rely on these entities to meet their obligations to retired employees (Walsh 2010). So the decision to rely on hybrid organizations raises myriad novel policy questions, but the successful *implementation* of such an approach requires an equally profound reevaluation of administrative assumptions (Justice and Miller 2010). Scholars focused on the administrative issues raised by hybrid government can make a valuable contribution to policy debates by highlighting the implementation pitfalls that are often unconsidered in the policy-making process.

The mixing of sectors is hardly limited to government and for-profit firms; the thickening of ties between government and nonprofit organizations is also undermining the public administration as government syllogism. Nonprofits are now vital instruments of public policy in a host of domains (Clerkin and Grønbjerg 2007). They receive favorable tax treatment and direct grants, of course, and also are engaged as contractors for federal, state, and local agencies (Dionne and Chen 2001). This trend seems to transcend partisan dividing lines (White 2009). President Barack Obama kept in place the Office of Faith-Based Initiatives established in the White House by George W. Bush, a particular species of collaboration that may have been seen as endangered under a Democratic administration (Allard 2009).

Schools of public administration have generally embraced students who aspire to manage nonprofit organizations, reflecting the need to offer an attractive product to potential master's students in an environment that has seen declining interest in government employment. The field of public administration should remain synchronized with this curricular demand, or scholars may find themselves out of place in the very schools that are our home. Again, I am not suggesting that this is not happening. In education, health, housing, and other areas, public administration scholars have looked at nonprofits, but this remains a secondary topic in our field.

Treating boundary-spanning organizations—both familiar and novel—as core subjects of public administration scholarship is important for another reason. One might argue that although these types of organizations are instruments or consequences of government policy, they are at the margins of our discipline's traditional focus. But the effects of introducing these creatures into the

environment are felt in every traditional area of administration research, placing new demands on government bureaucracies and processes.

The regulators and bureaucrats overseeing hybrids and firms with government ownership stakes, for example, are on terrain as unexplored by public administration scholars as those they are supervising. Hybrid organizations are linked less formally to the federal bureaucracy than traditional agencies; they are often not in the budget, they are not staffed by appointees, and they are exempt from management laws (Koppell 2001). Regulatory relationships are de facto substitutes for these severed administrative ties (Koppell 2003). Goals must be translated into specific requirements that can be applied without undermining the hybrid. If the regulation is too onerous, the theoretical benefits promised by the quasi-governmental structures may be lost. On the other hand, failure to adequately regulate hybrid organizations can leave the public policy objectives unreached thus undermining the underlying purpose. The regulator has to balance conflicting goals—financing housing for Americans without threatening the fiscal health of the U.S. government, in this case—with no obvious solution. Adapting regulation to this task has proven a challenge, with the current Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac situation a dramatic illustration. Even with the companies facing fiscal disaster, Congress smacked the regulator (which it had chastised for its weak oversight of the two firms) when it attempted to set limits on size of the portfolio size, and increased the size of the loans Fannie and Freddie could purchase (Shenn and Tyson 2008).

For students of public administration, such oversight follies beg the question of bureaucratic ability to effectively regulate the proliferating public–private hybrid organizations. Similarly, the now common collaboration between government agencies and nonprofits should raise concern regarding bureaucratic capacity to manage such programs (Selden, Sowa, and Sandfort 2006). The emergence of a set of special companies—those financial institutions that, through scale or interconnectedness, are deemed “too big to fail”—raises the stakes considerably. With investors and business partners confident that the government will step in to make them whole no matter what goes wrong, the emerging burden on financial regulators will dwarf those placed on GSE regulators. Government officials have been given unprecedented responsibilities, including setting compensation levels for executives of publicly traded financial institutions. If proposals now before Congress are adopted, government bureaucrats will be put in a position to evaluate massive financial institutions and empowered to preemptively deconstruct them when they pose a dire threat to the economy (Puzzanghera 2009). It is worth noting here that in-depth analysis of the agencies that will be on the spot—the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and even the Federal Reserve—is surprisingly scarce in the archival pages of this journal.

The proliferation of entities that span the public and private sectors thus has first- and second-order effects that ought to influence

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the future of our field. First, we have more and more institutions that do not look like traditional government agencies. We should resist our collective tendency to treat these novel arrangements as sui generis deviations from a norm. The public–private hybrid *is* the contemporary norm, and thus the effective administration of such entities should be a central concern and one that informs, and is informed by, mainstream public administration discourse. Second, increased reliance on organizations that blur the lines between public and private alters the burden on traditional government bureaucracies. Many of the core processes in which public administration is interested—from personnel to procurement to budgeting—are upset by the introduction of these new bureaucratic beasts. And new responsibilities, discussed more in the next

section, increase the emphasis on skills (predicting markets, assessing risks) that have never been bureaucratic strengths.

Using Markets to Deliver Public Goods

Treating “market” as the opposite of “government” is just as limiting as regarding “public” as government’s synonym. Although governments obviously regulate markets and even participate in them as buyers and sellers, historically public administration has treated government as something outside the marketplace. In the canon of public administration, attention typically is focused on government programs and institutions that produce and distribute goods and services through a vertically organized bureaucracy. Similarly, regulatory responsibilities are carried out with a “command and control” approach as government bureaucrats write rules and impose them on private actors. This image is not accurate today—as the examples in the previous section indicate—and it certainly will not be 10 years from now.

Some government participation in markets has received careful attention from public administration scholars. Procurement, for example, is a core subject, and it includes, by extension, some of the most current topics, including the contracting out of government services (e.g., Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). Other subjects inevitably touch on the government as a market participant. As an employer, for example, the government is a major *participant* in labor markets, not just a regulator (e.g., Fernandez, Smith, and Wenger 2007). But the field has not followed as enthusiastically as public administration has entered the market in at least three ways: first, the increased reliance on market-oriented tools of government, like extension of insurance and guarantees; second, the transformation of regulation from a tool to curb negative behavior into a substitute for traditional government service provision; and third, the emphasis on market-based approaches to regulation in particular substantive fields (e.g., climate change). Each should be seen as fertile public administration research topics.

In 2020, public policy strategies incorporating market mechanisms that are less familiar to students of bureaucracy are likely to be most popular. The use of loan guarantees and government insurance, for example, represents an intelligent leveraging of the U.S. government’s creditworthiness that does not strain the budget.

Given the debt being accumulated at present, it seems safe to assume that this will be a significant virtue for the foreseeable future. In a wide range of policy areas, including agriculture, housing, trade, small business, energy, and international development, such approaches are already well integrated into federal policy (Salamon 2002). They effect change not by direct expenditure, but by altering the incentives of private market participants.

This approach to public administration poses many distinctive questions that should be embraced. It reduces outlays but increases risk rather than debt, for instance. But the federal government has not demonstrated its competency as a risk manager, and, with trillions of dollars in outstanding liability, we are already sitting on an explosive financial powder keg. The chain reaction stemming from the collapse of the subprime mortgage market gave vivid evidence of the consequences of leverage gone awry. Yet the policy response—wise or unwise—extended the government's guarantee to some of the most troubled institutions and thus dramatically increased exposure of the public treasury. Congress has not seriously addressed the risk management problem, and it will be hard-pressed to do so in the future, for any comprehensive management of federal risk would likely establish limits on the extension of federal guarantees. Public administration scholars can push this issue to the forefront by making risk management a core topic in our field (Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001; Pollak 1996).

Instead of turning to mixed institutions, collaborative partnerships, or contractual relationships, governments often use creative regulatory strategies to pursue public policy objectives in ways that stretch our conception of regulation. The mandate of regulatory bodies has been expanded to include the shaping of incentives for private market participants to induce creation of public goods. This moves away from a narrower idea of regulation as mechanism to limit negative externalities. Shifting the burden of producing public goods from government to private actors, this regulation might be seen as inducing the creation of positive externalities.

One example that has received attention in recent years is the use of the Community Reinvestment Act to steer capital into poorer communities. The law sets requirements for financial institutions to serve "whole communities" and represents a response to the problem of "redlining," or the systematic avoidance of communities by financial institutions (Barr 2005). By setting a regulatory requirement, this law effectively steers capital into areas where it is chronically undersupplied. Critics have charged that the implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act, with insufficient attention to the reliance on unscrupulous loan originators, added fuel to the subprime crisis (Pressman 2008).

This is precisely the type of challenge introduced by the movement from one type of governance to another, and a reason why it should be treated as a marked shift in public administration. Majone (1997) calls it the substitution of regulatory governance for positive governance. For regulatory bureaucracies, this represents a reordering of the goals and measures of success. In such circumstances, regulatory bureaucracies depend on the regulated entities to thrive in order to achieve policy objectives. Regulators must understand the considerations driving the business calculations of firms in targeted areas. Any rules must be calibrated to alter these calculi in

such a way that behavior is modified without creating unintended consequences. Current experience with incentives created for ethanol production is a cautionary tale. Farmers switching to fuel corn production from the growth of crops for human and feedstock consumption is causing a rise in food prices (Ayre 2007). Did the bureaucracy have the knowledge necessary to predict this outcome and the ability to resist legislative will? This is a vital question for our field. Indeed, the historic health care legislation passed in March 2010 will require government bureaucrats to create insurance exchanges whose smooth-functioning will be key to the success of the new system.

As if these adaptations were not putting enough pressure on regulatory agencies, the place of traditional regulation in the arsenal of the government is under attack. Market-based mechanisms are offered as a more preferable—and more politically feasible—approach to vexing problems than conventional command and control arrangements. The cutting edge of this trend is emissions regulation.

The effort to cap greenhouse gas emissions is now centered on determining the appropriate approach. The command and control approach, after years of being pilloried, is being pushed aside by market-based approaches and enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol (Stavins 2003; Stavins, Keohane, and Revesz 1998; Woerdman 2004). So the answer is not to create requirements for more efficient smokestack scrubbers or lower-sulfur coal. Even a more traditional market approach, a carbon tax, is widely scorned. The popular solution, and the one adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives, is a cap and trade system. Trading in emissions permits places the reduction decisions in the hands of firms, allowing them to determine the most efficient way to satisfy societal targets (Antes, Hansjürgens, and Letmathe 2008). This logic has been extended to land use, where grazing permits and mineral extraction rights have been auctioned (so far on a pilot basis). This approach uses the market to determine the "value" of the privilege to consume a public good and even shifts political activism to the marketplace by giving environmentalists an opportunity to purchase land-use privileges or pollution permits.

These programs represent another type of regulatory governance. The state retains some responsibility for establishing the rules of the market. And the commodity being traded in many cases—permits, credits, licenses—derives value by virtue of government programs (Durant et al. 2004). But unlike programs that keep decisions regarding allocation and preferred method in the hands of regulators, market programs shift as much discretion as possible to the market participants. Again, public administration must embrace such developments and see the decision-making processes of these *regulated* firms as part of our field rather than cede this terrain to other disciplines. Doing so will leave critical elements—issues of equity, process, and governance—out of the equation.

Transnational Governance

In almost every policy arena, the most severe public policy problems are not confined by political boundaries. Each day brings new stories indicating the need for a deeper appreciation of the interaction between phenomena experienced on opposite sides of the globe in the realm of security, environmental protection, and public health. As noted earlier, changes in fuel regulation on one continent are blamed

for the inflation of food prices and even stability-shattering riots on the other side of the globe. Calamity in one financial market spreads almost instantaneously to others. Deadly diseases take advantage of modern transportation to cross oceans in a matter of hours. Criminals prey on victims from remote corners of the Earth using wild schemes or devious software. The demand for raw materials in China's burgeoning economy drives commodity prices higher and renders cost estimates for municipal construction projects hopelessly low.

There is, of course, a substantial collection of international organizations devoted to addressing these problems. People are most familiar with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund, World Bank) but there are many others, some affiliated with the United Nations and others not. There are a host of regional organizations that work with or complement global efforts. And, it is important to remember, there are many nongovernmental bodies that play a vital role in addressing transnational challenges. The development of such organizations and their assumption of meaningful roles are accelerating. The recent meetings of the G-20, for example, included a commitment to better coordinate financial regulation as a response to the lessons learned from the financial crisis (Financial Stability Board 2009).

Public administration as a field has been slower than the bureaucracies we study to appreciate and devote attention to this new reality. The pages of our journals feature limited discussion of the distinctive administrative issues associated with transnational bureaucracies. This is probably attributable to the way in which disciplinary lines are drawn in political science and public administration. For the most part, international organizations are the purview of the "international relations" subfield of political science. Many of the seminal scholars looking at international organizations were interested in organizational design and administration; their work would be comfortable alongside public administration research (Haas 1964; Jacobson 1979). Alas, most contemporary research in this area is not as concerned with administrative issues, and, for the most part, our field remains focused on institutions within a single jurisdiction—or perhaps comparisons across a small number of such entities.

Transnational governance has been with us for longer than many may realize. The Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union (née Telegraph) were created in the 1860s to facilitate smoother cross-border communication (Murphy 1994). In the years since, many other international organizations have been created to deal with issues requiring global coordination and harmonization. Traditionally, these have been intergovernmental organizations with a basis in treaties among states. The World Intellectual Property Organization, for example, has its origins in several nineteenth-century treaties signed to protect copyrights and trademarks across borders. The International Civil Aviation Organization arose to establish safety and communications standards when transoceanic flight became a part of everyday life. Each of these organizations developed a bureaucracy, administrative procedures, and a rulemaking process suitable to a unique set of

demands. Indeed, each organization—even those that are part of the United Nations "system" of organizations—is truly distinctive.

In recent decades, the landscape of international organizations has become more diverse as nongovernmental bodies and quasi-governmental bodies play an increasingly prominent role in global governance. Standard-setting bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization or the International Electrotechnical Commission originated as obscure industrial coordination bodies, intended to ensure the interoperability of devices and mechanical parts. But the substantive footprint of these entities has grown over the years to include management processes and even corporate social responsibility. More specialized bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Board, a nonprofit organization based in London, promulgate standards that are just as crucial in global financial regulation as those produced by the intergovernmental Basel Committee on Capital Standards. From an administrative perspective, these standard-setting bodies represent a significant departure from standard models of governmental rulemaking. In general, the work of these entities is carried out by members—with the staff playing mostly a supporting role—who participate through technical committees and working groups centered around substantive areas of concern. Naturally, this creates a dynamic entirely different from that associated with a typical Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking exercise.

Even more intriguing, there has been a proliferation of nongovernmental standard-setting bodies with a clear social agenda driving their work. The Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Stewardship Council are perhaps the best known to American consumers. These organizations attempt to get market power behind their standards, and, when successful, these can be every bit as compelling as the rules set forth by intergovernmental organizations. Indeed, one key finding of my recently completed study of international rulemaking organizations was that the adherence dynamics—including rule adoption and enforcement—were not terribly different for government and nongovernment rule-makers (Koppell 2010).

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If the mere existence of global rulemaking bodies is not enough to attract the attention of public administration scholars, the increasing centrality of transnational rules in a wide variety of policy arenas—from food safety to money laundering to Internet commerce—ought to be. The emergence of a world government is not at hand, but the increasing importance of global rulemaking bodies suggests a future of meaningful public administration that transcends borders. And like the rise of quasi-governmental bodies domestically, the emergence of global governance has secondary effects at home.

The intertwining of American bureaucracy with global governance organizations is a far less advanced phenomenon than the proliferation of public-private hybrids or the incorporation of market mechanisms, but it is already an important fact of life in many policy areas (O'Toole and Hanf 2002). Bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organization,

the World Intellectual Property Organization, and, most famously, the World Trade Organization make rules with serious ramifications for American actors. In many cases, these rules can conflict with American statutes and regulations, requiring adaptation on the part of government agencies and firms. And contrary to the view that the U.S. government is unbending in the face of international norms, this accommodation of international rules occurs regularly (Chayes and Chayes 1991).

More importantly, the American government is taking its participation in such international organizations more seriously than has been the case historically (DaVaux 2000). For decades, the International Organization for Standardization, which promulgates standards in a host of industrial areas, has been dominated by Europeans, giving businesses from these countries a significant potential advantage. If global standards match European standards (and not American), the size of the potential market accessible to European firms without costly adaptation to local markets is significant (DaVaux 2000). So participation in the deliberations of international bodies is a commonplace responsibility for American bureaucrats.

Agencies now routinely devote staff to international issues and participate in global and regional transnational organizations. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, has an international office. More importantly, the regulations produced by the commission make frequent reference to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations and the requirement that American entities comply with IAEA standards and make themselves open to IAEA inspections (NRC 2004). This type of recognition of the primacy of international regulations is far from universal, but the practices of many government bureaucracies reflect international mandates from entities such as the World Customs Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the Convention on the Trade in International and Endangered Species.

The need for an integrated global financial regulatory architecture was highlighted by the crisis, but active support for transnational rulemaking institutions in this policy area has been growing for some time. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, for example, has gained prominence as shutting off the financial spigot has become a tool to stop terrorists (Ayres 2002). The Securities and Exchange Commission and the nongovernmental Financial Accounting Standards Board consult with the International Accounting Standards Board as it develops the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It was announced recently that companies listing in the United States need only prepare IFRS accounting, thus saving them the expense of reporting their financial data according to GAAP standards (SEC 2007).

By 2020, our field should have embraced the international arena, bringing attention from those serious about organization and administration. At a minimum, educated public administrators must be aware of and well versed in the dynamics of global governance.

More than any single addition to the research agenda, the most profound adaptation required is that we embrace a broader understanding of “public administration” to include all forms of governance intended to serve public interests. This means moving beyond the

equation of “public” with “government” and seeing administration in the broadest possible light to capture all of the varied approaches to governance (Frederickson 1997). Divorcing the idea of “publicness” from government can maintain the field’s vitality without rendering it hopelessly amorphous, as some have feared. In the most straightforward formulation, to be a public organization is to be of the government. Bozeman and Bretschneider (1994) refined this notion to recognize the reality that many organizations that are not literally governmental (such as government contractors or some nonprofits) are funded by governments or derive their authority from governments, making them public as well. Others have looked at the tools employed by an organization, the mechanisms used to control the organization, or the expectations facing an organization as the relevant criteria to determine publicness (Antonsen and Jorgensen 1997; Bozeman 1987, 2007; Pesch 2008). These conceptualizations of “public” would take in many of the developments described in this essay. Still, these approaches do not disentangle publicness from sector because the aspects of organizational design that connote publicness ultimately trace back to government (Lan and Rainey 1992; Perry and Rainey 1988).

To frame publicness as something distinct from governmentality, the quality of an organization’s function, its role in society, and the impact of its activities must be captured (Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994, 219; Haque 2001). Ten years from now, we should see “publicness” as a measure of the extent to which an organization draws on, invokes, or affects the common interests of all members of a society (Haque 2001; Nutt and Backoff 1993; Pesch 2008; Wamsley and Zald 1976). We might capture publicness by looking for the pursuit of collective goods and an effect on individuals’ public or civic interests.

- **Collective goods:** Organizations serving a common interest should be regarded as more public (Haque 2001). Nondivisible public goods are, in this sense, more public than individually consumed goods. Thus, to illustrate with a rather extreme comparison, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees is more public than the Coca-Cola Company, even though the beverage maker serves a larger percentage of the world’s population. Organizations that pursue profits for shareholders are less public than those endeavoring to maintain collective goods such as security. Similarly, control of a common good—by a private or governmental organization—renders an organization more public.
- **Civic interests:** Publicness is about more than collectivity. Some individual considerations are highly public. State coercion is public not only because it reflects government’s monopoly on violence, but also because it deprives individuals of their rights of citizenship. An organization is directly impinging on the “public” side of the individual (Benn and Gaus 1983). Organizations can be differentiated on this basis. Those that affect individuals’ purely private interests—say, their product choices—are less public than those that affect civic interests such as voting ability or the right to purchase property.

Few have trouble seeing the work of governmental bodies as public in character given these criteria. And government contractors would still be seen as part of the public administration firmament with publicness framed in this light. For example, private prison

operators, companies that have assumed increasing responsibility for housing the nation's inmates, are carrying out a collective function and affect the civic interests of inmates (e.g., Morris 1998). Similarly, Halliburton drew questions—and charges of malfeasance—precisely because it was carrying out the administration of public functions in Iraq (e.g., Gibbons 2004).

But there are nongovernmental organizations that might not be seen as falling within the purview of public administration that would seem more public when considered in the proposed approach. The Educational Testing Service, for example, is a New Jersey-based nonprofit organization that creates and administers a range of academic tests that are crucial to thousands of students seeking admission to American universities every year. The exams are offered around the world and constitute a gateway to U.S. higher education. Thus, the role performed by this private entity is public in its effect and broad in scope. Unsurprisingly, this organization has been criticized by teachers, students, parents, and concerned interest groups (Jackson 1986; Nordheimer and Franz 1997). It makes sense for public administration scholars in the education area to view the Educational Testing Service as a legitimate subject of inquiry. There are other examples in different policy arenas—such as credit rating agencies that are crucial element of financial architecture or the standard-setting bodies discussed earlier—that might be more persuasive to some (Sinclair 2005).

This is not offered as a definitive approach, but rather to suggest a sense in which publicness can be separated from governmentality to redefine our disciplinary terrain. Others would undoubtedly improve on this primitive effort. A conceptualization of publicness that moves beyond government is consistent with an understanding of “public administration” that captures varied approaches to governance. Definitions of governance generally touch on the processes, systems, and structures (formal and informal) by which behavior is regulated and constrained (Peters 1995). Our field should be concerned with organizations that are charged with creating order in public spheres. As such, governance does not require government involvement, although it certainly is very common, and any organization engaged in governance would be, by definition, “public” (Peters and Pierre 1998; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Ruggie 2004).

Broadening the view of “public” in such a way that it encompasses varied approaches to governance may seem like a backdoor means of access to the governance trend. Frederickson (2005) offered an insightful critique of the faddish rise of “governance” in place of public administration. While expressing some frustration with the knee-jerk normative desirability of “governance,” which seemed to amorphously encompass anything that was supposedly novel and good (e.g., New Public Management), he emphasized the value of what “governance” *does add* to the agenda of public administration scholars. Governance takes in, according to Frederickson “(1) vertical and horizontal interjurisdictional and interorganizational cooperation; (2) extension of the state or jurisdiction by contracts or grants to third parties, including subgovernments; and (3)

forms of public nonjurisdictional or nongovernmental policymaking and implementation” (2005, 294). Indeed, this covers a substantial portion of the developments described in these pages. Much research that comes under the governance heading, Frederickson notes, complements the bread and butter of public administration, the “day-to-day management of an agency or organization,” and public administration could even be expanded to include “public administration of governance,” the management of nongovernmental institutions and organizations” (Frederickson 2005, 300). This starts to sound a lot like the expanded view of “public” proposed above. From a disciplinary marketing perspective, an imperialistic version of governance that includes both the day-to-day challenges of administration *and* the transformation of states and governments may be most attractive. This is perhaps broader than that which Frederickson contemplates. In short, governance would include the whole of public administration as we know it and then some!

One can easily get caught up debating labels *ad infinitum*. Whether we use “public administration” or “governance” is less important than the boundaries we define for our field and the relationship of those boundaries to the world in which we are interested.

One can easily get caught up debating labels *ad infinitum*. Whether we use “public administration” or “governance” is less important than the boundaries we define for our field and the relationship of those boundaries to the world in which we are interested. In its early days, public administration was the heart of political science. Indeed, the two were essentially indistinguishable. In the years since, however, our field has become increasingly disconnected from many of the big-picture questions and seen as being narrowly concerned

with bureaucratic processes and the implementation of government programs. Indeed, we ought to take umbrage at the fact that many of the giants of our field who pushed beyond this definition—Herbert Simon, Chester Barnard, Mary Parker Follet, and Charles Lindblom, to name few—are now labeled something other than scholars of public administration because they do not meet this overly restrictive expectation. This development may be an unintended consequence of the rise of schools of public policy and public administration, which sapped public administration scholarship out of departments of political science. Or it may lie much more deeply in an overly eager acceptance of Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy. The historical explanation, however, is a topic for a different essay.

The point here is to argue for a reassertion of a more expansive conceptualization of public administration—one that is empirically and historically grounded—that accommodates the varied forms and approaches to the implementation of public policy. The enthusiasm with which many scholars have embraced the governance label speaks to our collective desire to break beyond the boundaries that have hardened around our field. The contemporary developments sketched in this essay are offered to force a confrontation with the artificial limitations that have been placed on public administration. Like Truman Burbank struggling to get beyond the soundstage wall, we should pursue a broader conception of our field (whether it is called governance or something else) and eagerly revel in all the messiness lying beyond the borders.

Note

1. Many so-called government corporations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from agencies. They are on budget, receive appropriated dollars, and are staffed

by presidential appointees and civil servants. Indeed, the definition of what constitutes a government corporation is so ambiguous that a General Accounting Office study of such organizations (1995) relied on entities to determine whether they were, in fact, government corporations.

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