One Step Forward, Two Steps Back The Steering Effects of Operational Code Beliefs in the Chilean-Bolivian Rivalry

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Introduction

In 2007, after a year in office the Bolivian president Evo Morales included in his speech delivered at the UN General Assembly some optimistic words directed toward Chile. During this address to the international community, he referred to the building of trust between both countries and expressed his hope for a prompt solution to Bolivia's historical claims (see Morales 2007). In 2011, at the beginning of his second term in office and during the commemoration of the Day of the Sea, Morales had changed his positive tone and announced the filing of a lawsuit against Chile at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to demand sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. On that occasion, he stressed the severe damage that Chile had inflicted on Bolivia by being responsible for Bolivia's landlocked condition. He emphasized how the loss of the sea had limited the country's development and had created a feeling of isolation and disadvantage among Bolivians. In that speech, he addressed the international community and explained that after 132 years of struggle, it was finally time to "close this immense wound" (see Morales 2011).

Morales's approach toward Chile not only changed rhetorically but also shifted in terms of his handling of the bilateral relation. Morales's decision to file a lawsuit against Chile marked a new period of escalation in the rivalry between these states. Why did Evo Morales change his behavior? Drawing on the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature, I shall argue that the change in Evo Morales's foreign policy behavior can be associated with a process of learning that resulted in a change in his beliefs regarding the bilateral relations with Chile. To conduct this analysis, I utilize the operational code analysis (OCA) framework and the concept of learning in foreign policy.

The remainder of this article proceeds in five parts. The first section provides a brief background on the development of the rivalry between Bolivia and Chile, including Evo Morales's approach to the rivalry. The second section reviews the literature on the role of leaders in rivalries. The third section introduces the OCA approach to assessing political leaders as well as learning approaches to understanding foreign policy change. Thereafter, I present the method and data utilized in the analysis, followed by a discussion of the results. The chapter concludes by summarizing the main findings and proposing avenues for future research.

Brief Historical Background

It is not possible to understand the complexity of the bilateral relations between Bolivia and Chile without referring to their belligerent past. In the War of the Pacific (or Saltpeter

War), Chile confronted the alliance between Peru and Bolivia from 1879 to 1883. This War ended with victory for Chile, which resulted in significant territorial expansion. Peru lost land that was rich in natural resources, while Bolivia lost access to the Pacific Ocean and became a landlocked country. The War of the Pacific engendered tensions that persist today, which are reflected in constant diplomatic impasses, hostile rhetoric, threats, and two lawsuits filed before the ICJ. Scholars have identified the War of the Pacific as the event that initiated the Chilean-Bolivian rivalry, shaping these countries' bilateral relations (see Gutierrez 2007; Rodriguez 2014, 2016; Rivera 2016).

Some analyses have stressed the impact that the outcomes of the War had on the identity formation of these states as well as on the creation of negative images of the Other that have hindered their capacity to overcome the conflict (see Wehner 2011; Gonzalez and Ovando 2016). The origin of this War is still a contentious matter between these states as they have different interpretations of the reasons why the armed conflict was initiated. Due to this disagreement, the following is a brief chronology that only indicates some relevant dates and the main contents of treaties and negotiations that are necessary to have a better understanding of the past of the rivalry.

- • Before the War of the Pacific, in *1873,* Peru and Bolivia signed the "Treaty of Defensive Alliance" *(Tratado de Alianza Defensivei, 1873),* a pact that compelled both the states to guarantee each other their independence, sovereignty, and integrity over their respective territories, obliging them to defend themselves against any external aggression.
- • In *1874,* Bolivia and Chile signed a Treaty *(Tratado de Limites, 1874)* that established the boundary between both the states at parallel 24°. It was also agreed that Bolivia would not raise taxes to Chilean enterprises for 25 years. In *1878,* owing to Bolivia's economic hardship, Bolivia established a ten cent tax per quintal.[1] of saltpeter to a Chilean company, which violated the Treaty. As a response, in February *1879,* Chile occupied the Bolivian port of Antofagasta and later in April 1879 declared War on both Peru and Bolivia.
- • In *1884,* Chile and Bolivia signed an indefinite truce that stated that during the term of the truce, Chile would continue to govern the territories from the 23° parallel to the mouth of the Loa River *(Pacto de Tregua Bolivia-Chile 1884).*
- • In *1904,* Chile and Bolivia signed the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" *(Tratado de Paz y Amistad entre Chile y Bolivia, 1904).* The Treaty defined the boundaries between the two states and recognized the absolute and perpetual dominion of Chile over the territories indicated in the Truce Pact of 1884. The parties also agreed to build a railway between Arica and La Paz. Additionally, Bolivia was granted the perpetual right of free transit through Chilean ports. The signing of this Treaty converted Bolivia into a landlocked country.
- • In *1929,* Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Lima *(Tratado de Lima Entre Chile y Peru* 1929), w'hich established the final status of the provinces of Tacna (Peru) and Arica (Chile). Additionally, they signed a supplementary protocol, which stipulated that neither Chile nor Peru could cede to a third party any of the territories over which they were granted sovereignty in the Treaty without the previous agreement of the cosigner. Although this Treaty was signed between Chile and Peru, this last clause severely affected and continues to affect the relationship between Bolivia and Chile. The territory to which the Treaty refers is

precisely the area that could be ceded to Bolivia to access the Pacific Ocean without having to split Chilean territory in two.

The Claim for Sovereign Access to the Pacific Ocean

Over the years, Bolivian decision-makers have sought to recover part of the maritime domain lost as a result of the War and the Treaty of 1904. The demand for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean stems from the negative implications that being a landlocked country has brought to Bolivia. Bolivia justifies its demand based on the claim that the Treaty of 1904 took place in a context where Bolivia was overpowered by Chile, and hence, left with no choice but to sign an unfair and detrimental agreement.

The claim for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean appears as central in the dispute between both countries. From the Chilean perspective, despite the context in which the Treaty was signed, the result is a legally binding agreement that for the most part, Chile does not wash to alter. From the Bolivian perspective, regaining access to the sea is a fair request and a matter of historical justice that Chile needs to acknowledge and collaborate with Bolivia in finding a suitable solution. While the main objective of the Bolivian position has remained mostly unaltered, the strategy and arguments to justify the claim have to some extent varied. Before Bolivia filed a lawsuit against Chile at the ICJ in 2013, Bolivia's stance was mainly concerned with the contestation of the Treaty of 1904 due to the unfairness of the terms and its alleged invalidity as it was supposedly procured by the use of force.[2] The later argument presented in the Bolivian lawsuit was grounded on Chile's alleged obligation to negotiate with Bolivia sovereign access to the sea.

Bolivia's lawsuit invoked different legal bases upon which Chile's obligation to negotiate rested, i.e., bilateral agreements or declarations, unilateral acts, acquiescence, estoppel, and legitimate expectations. In a nutshell, Bolivia's general argument was grounded in the idea that Chile's previous behavior and promises to negotiate with Bolivia constituted a legal obligation at present. In October 2018, the ICJ ruled that Chile did not undertake a legal obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia which put an end to that legal dispute.

Evo Morales and His Struggle for the Sea

The election of Evo Morales in 2005 as president of Bolivia is a milestone in Bolivia's political history as he was the first president who belonged to the Indigenous population of the country. Morales, a descendant of an Aymara family, was born in a small and impoverished community in Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2010). In his early political life, he was an active member of the coca growers' union of which he later became the General Secretary. Morales was the first Indigenous leader to obtain more than the absolute majority of the votes (53.7%) since the transition to democracy in 1982 (Deheza 2007, 43).

This election was relevant not only because a representative of a historically underrepresented group came into power in a country where, according to the last census (2012), 41% of the population is of Indigenous origin, but also because the 2005

presidential election completely changed the correlation of political forces in Bolivia, affecting the three largest parties that dominated the scene since 1982 (Deheza 2007, 44). Evo Morales, as the leader of the "Movement for Socialism-Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples" (MAS-IPSP), was reelected president for three consecutive terms from 2006 to 2019.

Evo Morales's victory coincided with the election of Michelle Bachelet as the president of Chile in 2005. This election is also a milestone in Chile's political history as Bachelet was the first woman to occupy this position. Both leaders not only epitomized two underrepresented groups now in power but also shared a left-leaning political stance. These common features, as well as the alleged good personal relationship between these leaders, were widely recognized by the media and political analysts, who augured an improvement in the bilateral relations. These predictions proved to be rather accurate, as the relationship between these states took a positive turn.

Evo Morales was invited to Bachelet's inauguration ceremony, and both presidents expressed their willingness to cooperate and work toward a common agenda to improve the bilateral relation. During his visit to Santiago, Morales attended a demonstration in his honor where the Chilean audience cheered "sea for Bolivia," which he took as a meaningful sign as well as a source of hope. He continued to refer to this episode in subsequent interviews and speeches portraying it as a confirmation that the Chilean people agreed with Bolivia's claim.

Morales began to speak about "the diplomacy of the people," which mainly referred to direct communication between the people to guarantee a solution to the long-lasting problem between Chile and Bolivia. It also stressed the idea that the issues between both countries in the past were mainly due to individual neoliberal interests that did not relate to the real feeling present in the population.

Gestures and expressions of trust marked the positive turn in the bilateral relations between both countries. In June 2006, Chile and Bolivia agreed on a working plan known as the "13 points agenda," which intended to prompt negotiations on 13 relevant bilateral issues, including controversial matters such as the maritime dispute. Both the states portrayed this milestone as an example of the development of trust. A few years later, it was revealed that during Morales's first term, both administrations were close to reaching an agreement that entailed granting a coastal enclave to Bolivia in the Tiviliche Bay. The details of this negotiation are unknown, but press reports indicate that while negotiations had been an unprecedented improvement, granting sovereignty to Bolivia was otf the table (see Cooperativa.cl 2015; Quiroz 2016).

During Evo Morales's second term from 2010 to 2015, the positive tone of the bilateral relations took a drastic negative turn, which culminated with the filing of a lawsuit against Chile at the ICJ. Evo Morales's rhetoric shifted and became aggressive and confrontational, marking an increase in tensions. This negative turn coincided with a change in the Chilean administration direction of which went from a left-leaning charismatic president (Michelle Bachelet) to a right-wing businessman (Sebastian Pinera). While at the beginning of Sebastian Pinera's term, Morales's rhetoric still showed some elements of hope, by 2011, this changed dramatically.

In 2011, during the commemoration of the Day of the Sea, the change in Morales's tone was quite evident. In this speech, Morales announced the filing of a lawsuit against Chile at the ICJ. Politicians and analysts have acknowledged this transformation in Morales's foreign policy behavior regarding the bilateral relations with Chile. For instance, former president of Bolivia Carlos Mesa indicates in one of his books,

Evo Morales approach to the maritime issue had two distinct stages - his first and second term. In his first administration, he was driven by a positive attitude and overlooked historical prejudices. He believed that the ideological affinities with his Chilean colleague Michelle Bachelet would allow us to find a definitive solution to our forced landlocked condition. In January 2010, Evo Morales began his second term and in March Sebastian Pinera took office in Chile. In December, the presidents of Bolivia and Chile decided to form a committee to put the 13-point agenda into effect. But what actually happened was a turning point in the history of the Bolivian maritime claim. The meetings that the committee held in early 2011 in Santiago and La Paz were not fruitful. That was the breaking point (Mesa 2016,212)4

After the announcement of the lawsuit, a round of antagonizing declarations took place. Morales accused the Chilean authorities of being a danger to the region (Morales 2012) and of preferring to see Bolivia "geographically amputated, economically weak and socially dependent" (Morales 2013a). Morales blamed Chile for preventing integration in Latin American and "denying peace, security, brotherhood and destroying the people's desire to live in peace and harmony" (Morales 2013b). Later, he accused President Pinera of "lying to his country and the world" (Morales 2013c).

Interstate Rivalries and the Roles of Political Leaders

The confrontational feature of the bilateral relations between Bolivia and Chile differs from the usual competition between states. What is particularly puzzling about this rivalry is its longevity and resistance to change. The maintenance of this rivalry over time, the facility with which tensions tend to escalate, and the capacity that the rivalry narratives have to pass down from generation to generation are features that have made this dyadic interaction unique and worth studying from a FPA approach. The particular features that have characterized the bilateral relations between these states can be placed conceptually within the description of interstate rivalries.

Much scholarly work has been done on the study of rivalries in the last 30 years, giving birth to different conceptualizations and definitions. Broadly speaking, the study of rivalries has been approached in two different ways. On the one hand, there is a body of research focused on the quantitative features of these conflicts, and on the other, there is an approach mostly centered on the qualitative analysis of their characteristics. Within quantitative approaches, Diehl and Goertz (2000) propose the concept of enduring rivalries to describe a relationship between two states, in which both use military threats and force regularly as well as one in which both states formulate foreign policy in military terms. They define three main components of enduring rivalries, i.e., competitiveness (tangible and intangible), time (w'hether or not it persists over time), and spatial consistency (a consistent set of dyads) (Goertz and Diehl 1992). In this context, enduring rivalries between two states should involve at least five militarized

disputes in a period lasting at least 10 years, which terminates after 10 years without the occurrence of a militarized interstate dispute (MIDs) (Goertz and Diehl 1992).

This quantitative classification excludes a group of rivalries, such as Chile-Bolivia, that have not engaged in recent militarized disputes but dynamics of which remain conflictual and enduring. This exclusion is acknowledged by qualitative approaches that have relied on nonmilita- rized elements to better understand rival interactions. These qualitative conceptualizations have pinpointed psychological factors that intervene in rivalries between states. For instance, Vasquez (1996) stresses extreme competition and psychological hostilities as main characteristics of rivalries. The particularity of the competitive dynamic between rival states relies on the fact that as the conflict recurs, "contenders become more concerned with hurting or denying their competitor than with their own immediate value satisfaction, and wdth this, hostility deepens and goes beyond that associated with normal conflict" (Vasquez 1996, 532). In this sense, Vasquez (1996) argues that contenders are mainly driven by their attitude tow'ard each other rather than by the stakes at hand.

The relevance attributed to psychological factors in explaining rivalries is also present in the work of Thompson (1995), w'ho introduces the notion of strategic rivalries to differentiate them from other interstate conflicts. He argues that the study of rivalries requires a focus on key decision-makers' perceptions of whom they consider to be their primary opponents and enemies. Rivals need to identify and recognize each other as such (Thompson 1995). In later work, Thompson (2001) differentiates rivalries from conflicts that take place in neutral contexts, stressing that rivals "deal with each other in a psychologically charged context of path-dependent hostility" (Thompson 2001, 558). He claims that to create a rivalry, decision-makers must consider each other as competitors, enemies, and possible sources of actual or latent threats that pose some risk of becoming militarized. This categorization is considered by Thompson (2001) as a social-psychological process, for it requires the interpretation of others' intentions.

The acknowledgement of the role of sociopsychological elements present in rivalries is extensively developed by Bar-Tal (2007, 2013), who focuses specifically on intractable conflicts. These sorts of conflicts are considered more meaningful than tractable ones due to their severity, durability, and the serious implications for the societies involved (Bar-Tal 2013). Bar-Tal (1998, 2013) contends that a central element present in societies implicated in intractable conflicts is the perception of their goals as being indispensable for the group survival and at the same time incompatible with the ones kept by the rival. The centrality attributed to perception has relevant implications for the study of these sorts of conflicts, as it shows that the incompatibility, and the conflict itself, are not necessarily objective in nature.

As Bar-Tal puts it "conflicts always begin in our heads" (Bar-Tal 2013, 7). This observation is central as it reveals that sociopsychological factors play a major role in the inception, escalation, maintenance of the conflict, as well as in peace-making and reconciliation processes (Bar-Tal 2013). Bar-Tal (2013) posits that people act upon their ideas and that both their rational and irrational acts are steered by what they think, believe, and anticipate. While these qualitative approaches have shed light on the psychological factors that can help one to explain the characteristics of rivalries, they

have not delved into the specific role of the psychology of key decision-makers in shaping rival interactions. For instance, although Vasquez (1996) mentions the psychological angle of rivalries and points out the actor dimension in explaining the hostility between the contenders, it is not clear what the specific actors' views that underlie this hostility are.

Thompson's (2001) categorization of 174 strategic rivalries based on actors' identification of which states qualify as enemies is a significant advance in the inclusion of a cognitive dimension to the study of rivalries. However, the focus needs to be expanded beyond the identification of rivalries toward understanding the dynamics involved in the development of these interactions. While I concur with Thompson's (2001) contention about the importance of decision-makers' perceptions of whom they consider to be their main opponents, it is not clear which cognitive elements underlie this perception.

Bar-Tal's (2013) more comprehensive approach recognizes what he defines as a sociopsychological repertoire composed of beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors, among others, present in both leaders and followers that lead to conflicts. However, his work is mostly centered in explaining collective psychological phenomena present in societies involved in intractable conflicts, rather than evaluating individual psychological characteristics of decision-makers. This approach leaves aside the difference that powerful individuals can make in shaping rivalries. While decision-makers as members of a society involved in intractable conflicts may share similar views than the rest of the society, individual differences in the type of beliefs and emotions or even in the intensity of these elements can make a relevant difference in the life cycle of the conflict.

More importantly, one limitation of these approaches to rivalries is the insufficient focus on the variability of these conflicts over time. The hostile interaction between rival states is not static as they undergo periods of cooperation, escalation, and de-escalation of hostilities. This variation plays a relevant role in understanding the life cycle of a rivalry. In fact, one of the main concerns that made researchers pay attention to the study of rivalries in the field of International Relations is their greater propensity to escalate compared to other conflicts between states (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1992; Thompson, 1995, 2001; Maoz and Mor 1996). In this sense, understanding the specific perceptions and beliefs of individuals that have the power to mobilize state resources and, therefore, increase and decrease tensions is particularly relevant.

In the specific case of the rivalry between Bolivia and Chile, scholarly literature that has addressed the development of this rivalry shows general references to the role of political leaders. Milet (2002) and Van Klaveren (2011) describe Chile's foreign policy toward its neighboring states during the transition to democracy stressing the role of Chilean presidents in shaping the bilateral relations. Quiroga and Guerrero (2016) point out the importance of elites' narratives in the maintenance of the rivalry between these states. Ovando and Gonzalez (2012) stress the relevance of beliefs in the dynamic of this rivalry. They emphasize the influential role of key decision-makers of both states in the improvement and deterioration of the bilateral relations.

There is also evidence in the literature of the variation that these rivalries have experienced, which are associated to some extent with the role of presidents. Wehner (2011) refers to the positive shift that bilateral relations between Chile and Bolivia took during Morales's and Bachelet's presidencies, and the role they had in the creation of mutual trust. Gonzalez and Ovando (2016) mention Morales's shift from a pragmatic stance toward Chile during the presidency of Bachelet to an "emotivist" attitude as a result of Pinera's decision to reject Morales's proposal of trading gas for access to the sea. Rodriguez (2014) refers extensively to the history of the relationship between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile after the War of the Pacific, stressing the role of presidents, diplomats, and foreign affairs ministers in the trajectories of these rivalries.

While these studies clearly acknowledge the role of foreign policy elites, especially presidents, in shaping the bilateral relations between these states, the reference to individual characteristics that may help one to explain foreign policy decision-making processes is rather anecdotal. In this sense, political leaders' specific characteristics or beliefs about this rivalry and how they might influence decision-making processes have not been thoroughly explored.

Operational Code Analysis and Learning in Foreign Policy

As mentioned earlier, a more nuanced understanding of the psychological factors that explain rivalries must include the analysis of the variation of the conflict across time considering the periods of cooperation and escalation of tensions in the rivalry. This gap in the study of rivalries has been recognized by Thompson (1995, 220-221), who indicates that "the processes that characterize the emergence, the escalation, and the de-escalation, and the endings of rivalries need theoretical explication and empirical examination. We know very little about the 'life cycles' of rivalries of any kind." Similarly, Thies (2001) criticizes the inductive nature of the different approaches to understanding rivalries. He indicates that they have not explained why the levels of intensity vary during the course of a rivalry's life cycle.

The non-static nature of rivalries raises the question of what can help one to explain the variation they undergo over time. Given the cognitive characteristics of rivalries and how their definition and development rely on people's worldviews, examining leaders' beliefs stands as a suitable approach to analyzing their life cycles. I argue that the variation of these rivalries in terms of cooperation and escalation should be reflected in decision-makers' beliefs regarding the conflict. In this sense, changes in the trajectory of rivalries should also be reflected in a change of beliefs in political leaders in charge of making decisions. This process of changing beliefs falls within the concept of learning in foreign policy.

The analysis of learning in foreign policy, understood by Levy (1994, 283) as "a change of beliefs (or degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experiences" may be a contribution to the study of the dynamics that rivalries undergo over time. The potential that learning approaches have to shed light on rivalries' dynamics is pointed out by Thies (2003), who argues that the few studies that have focused on learning in the context of rivalries have taken an adaptive or structural approach to it, in which states

learn by rationally adapting their policies depending on the rewards or punishments imposed by the international system. He contends that a thorough understanding of learning in rivalries must elucidate how main decision-makers, acting on behalf of the state, learn from their experience with the rival.

The case of the Bolivian-Chilean rivalry during Evo Morales's presidency provides a very good case to test the learning hypothesis. On the one hand, Morales's extended time in office (13 years) not only gave him enough time to acquire specific knowledge about the rivalry and the rival's characteristics but also to learn about the consequences of his own behavior. On the other hand, the noticeable change in his foreign policy behavior regarding Chile allows for comparisons of his beliefs in two distinct periods of the bilateral relations. In order to examine leaders' beliefs and the variation that can be associated to learning processes, I utilize the OCA framework (see Leites 1951; George 1969; Holsti 1970; Walker 1983, 1990).

The operational code is an analytical tool initially developed by Nathan Leites (1951) for evaluating leaders' worldviews concerning international politics. This framework was later developed by George (1969), who identified ten questions about politics that together attempted to assess two groups of beliefs. The first group consisted of philosophical beliefs about the fundamental nature of politics. The second group, i.e., instrumental beliefs, are those concerned with ends-means relationships in the context of political action. George (1969) suggests that the responses that political actors provide to these questions could help one to define their fundamental orientations toward the problem of leadership and action. In a nutshell, the operational code approach to the study of beliefs asks what the individual knows, feels, and wants concerning the exercise of power (Schafer and Walker 2006). This information can be accessed through what leaders say in their public addresses by using content analysis tools.

The use of the OCA framework not only provides tools to assess leaders' behaviors in light of their beliefs but also allows for a comparison of beliefs across time or subjects. Moreover, the use of this framework helps one to distinguish between different types of learning. Levy (1994) differentiates between causal, diagnostic, simple, and complex learning. Causal learning refers to a change of beliefs about the laws of cause and effect, the consequences of actions, and the best strategies under different conditions. Diagnostic learning refers to changes in beliefs about the definition of the situation or the preferences and intentions of others or others' capabilities. In terms of levels of learning Levy (1994) differentiates simple from complex learning; the former corresponds to a type learning that leads to a change in means but not in ends, the latter leads to a modification of goals as well as means.

Malici and Malici (2005) utilize OCA to hypothesize these different types of learning so as to help one to explain Cuban and North Korean foreign policy behavior in the post-Cold War era. In this study, simple learning is defined as changes in instrumental beliefs about the best means to realize goals, and diagnostic learning is defined as changes in philosophical beliefs about the political universe. Complex learning takes place when an actor's key philosophical beliefs about political goals and key instrumental beliefs about the most effective means to achieve them are altered to modify the leader's strategic

preferences. Based on Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003), key beliefs take into consideration both the disposition of the leader (1-1 Approach to Strategy and P-4a Self's Historical Control) and relevant features of the context (P-1 Nature of the Political Universe and P-4b Other's Historical Control) to achieve a definition of the "self-in-situation." If their learning hypotheses hold true in the case of Evo Morales, there should be changes in his operational code beliefs between his first and second term. Depending on the potential changes in his beliefs, it will also be possible to distinguish between different levels of learning and assess what he learned from the rivalry.

Methods and Data

To assess leaders' operational codes, I utilize the Verbs in Context System (VICS) developed by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998). This system builds indicators for the philosophical and instrumental propensities proposed by George (1969). VICS first identifies positive and negative attributions for the beliefs that the leader expresses in the context of self- other relations. Subsequently, the self-other valences are characterized as propensities to diagnose and employ cooperative or conflictive behaviors that represent the exercise of power. These procedures allow one for the construction of VICS indices to answer each question in George's (1969) inventory of philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs.

To conduct the analysis, I considered two recent milestones in the bilateral relations between Bolivia and Chile during Evo Morales's presidency, one of them marking a period of cooperation and the other one a period of escalation in tensions. I considered Morales's first presidential term from 2006 to 2010 as a period of cooperation, which was characterized by the development of trust between both countries and the creation of a new cooperation plan (the 13-points agenda). The period of escalation in tensions corresponds to Morales's second period in office from 2010 to 2014, marked by a negative shift in the bilateral relations and the filing of a lawsuit against Chile at the ICJ.

Considering that the main objective of this analysis pertains to Evo Morales's beliefs regarding the rivalry, the verbal material utilized for the analysis was explicitly targeted at the bilateral relations with Chile. I used speeches and more spontaneous material such as interviews or press conferences responses, where he referred to Chile or its policymakers. In this sense, instead of using one speech act as the unit of analysis, my work required the aggregation of data. This decision was grounded in two considerations, i.e., the specificity of the analysis and data availability. This is in line with Schafer and Walker's (2006) guidelines on research design using the OCA framework; they indicate that sometimes the research design favors a larger unit of analysis.

On the other hand, the decision also considered the availability of verbal material. In many Latin American countries, access to decisionmakers' verbal material presents some difficulties due to the lack of archives or databases that compile this information (Brummer et al. 2020). Source texts are usually disorganized and scattered around different governmental websites, presidential libraries, and ministerial archives (Brummer et al. 2020). Additionally, given the specificity of the verbal material required for this analysis, the data is itself limited. While presidents refer to the rivalry in their interviews and speeches, they do not talk about it extensively or very often. In this sense,

the number of utterances concerning the topic is restricted. The disadvantage of this method is that it is no longer possible to run some statistical analyses (t-tests or ANOVA) as the aggregation results in one score for each period (Schafer and Walker 2006). However, these data can still be interpreted by using a norming group as the basis for temporal comparisons in a quasi- experimental research design (Schafer and Walker 2006; Walker, Malici, and Schafer 2011, 62-66; see also Gerring 2012, 272-275, 285-290).

The verbal material was retrieved from dilferent sources. I mostly used official websites belonging to the Bolivian Presidency and the Ministry of Communication. From 2009 to 2019, Morales's public addresses were easily accessible through the official newspaper *El Cambio.* However, the information from previous years was more difficult to obtain. In the cases where the information was no longer available online, I utilized the WayBack Machine digital archive to access old contents in the official websites. In order to have access to as much of Morales's utterances as possible, I also employed the LexisNexis database, which facilitated the search of newspaper interviews or recorded videos of Morales's interventions.

Evo Morales's utterances were collected and analyzed in their original Spanish language. These statements were aggregated totaling 14,228 words for his first term (2006-2010) and 17,612 words for his second term (2010-2014)[4] (530 and 641 coded verbs, respectively). The verbal material was processed using the Profiler Plus automated content analysis system. This is the first published research that utilizes the Spanish version of the OCA scheme to analyze and compare leaders' beliefs. Until the beginning of 2020, leadership profiling through automated at-a-distance assessment techniques, such as OCA, was limited to the assessment of English verbal statements. The Spanish version of the operational code scheme has been recently developed and made available for the use of scholars and institutions interested in the assessment of political leaders (see Brummer et al. 2020).

Evo Morales's Operational Code: Results and Discussion

Evo Morales First Term (2006-2010)

To put Evo Morales's first term results into perspective, I compared his scores to the average of VICS scores for a norming group of 15 Latin American leaders (see Table 7.1). Compared to other leaders in the region, none of Evo Morales's philosophical beliefs differed significantly from the average of the norming group. However, major differences were found in his instrumental beliefs. His beliefs regarding the best strategic approach to achieve his goals were more cooperative than the average leader (Z = 1.5). Morales's risk orientation was much higher than other leaders in the norming group (Z = 2.4). His flexibility in shifting between cooperation and conflict as well as between words and deeds was lower than other leaders from the region (Z = -1.5 and -1.7, respectively). Regarding the utility of means, his preference for expression of appeal as a way to exercise political power was much higher than the average Latin American leader (Z = 2.0). On the contrary, expressions of punishment and threat were more than two standard deviations below the average regional leader (Z = -2.0 and -2.1, respectively).

Table 7.1 Evo Morales's Operational Code (2006-2010)

	OpCode	Mean Norming Group	Z-score	Comparison to the Norming Group
P-1	0.51	0.46	0.4	Average
P-2	0.32	0.30	0.3	Average
P-3	0.15	0.13	0.8	Lean high
P-4	0.63	0.59	0.3	Average
P-5	0.91	0.92	-0.7	Lean low
1-1	0.77	0.65	1.5	High
1-2	0.39	0.36	0.4	Average
1-3	0.37	0.23	2.4	Very high
I-4a	0.23	0.35	-1.5	Low
I-4b	0.50	0.68	-1.7	Low
1-5 Punish	0.03	0.07	-2.0	Very low
1-5 Threaten	0.00	0.01	-2.1	Very low
1-5 Oppose	0.08	0.09	-0.5	Average
1-5 Appeal	0.65	0.51	2.0	Very high
1-5 Promise	0.02	0.04	-1.5	Low
1-5 Reward	0.22	0.27	-0.8	Lean low

Evo Morales's Second Term (2010-2014)

To put Evo Morales's results during his second term into perspective, I compared his scores to the average of VICS scores for a norming group of 15 Latin American leaders (see Table 7.2). Compared to other Latin American leaders, Evo Morales's philosophical beliefs showed noticeable differences. He perceived the nature of the political universe as less

Table 7.2 Evo Morales's Operational Code (2010-2014)

	OpCode	Mean Norming Group	Z-Score	Comparison to the Norming Group
P-1	0.17	0.46	-2.3	Very low
P-2	0.05	0.30	-2.6	Very low
P-3	0.10	0.13	-1.4	Low
P-4	0.31	0.59	-2.4	Very low
P-5	0.97	0.92	2.4	Very high
1-1	0.53	0.65	-1.6	Low
1-2	0.23	0.36	-2.0	Very low
1-3	0.19	0.23	-0.7	Lean low
I-4a	0.47	0.35	1.6	High
I-4b	0.75	0.68	0.7	Lean high
1-5 Punish	0.15	0.07	3.5	Very high
1-5 Threaten	0.03	0.01	3.2	Very high
1-5 Oppose	0.06	0.09	-1.3	Low
1-5 Appeal	0.50	0.51	-0.2	Average
1-5 Promise	0.05	0.04	0.3	Average
1-5 Reward	0.22	0.27	-0.8	Lean low

friendly and more hostile than the average leader in the region (Z = -2.3). Likewise, the prospect for realizing his fundamental political goals was much more pessimistic than the average leader (Z = -2.6). Morales perceived the political future as less predictable than other leaders in the norming group (Z = -1.4). Moreover, his perception of his capacity to control historical developments was over two standard deviations below other Latin American leaders (Z = -2.4). The role attributed to chance in political outcomes is greater than two standard deviations above the average leader (Z = 2.4).

Concerning Morales's second-terms instrumental beliefs, his strategic approach to achieve his political goals was less cooperative than other leaders in the region (Z=-1.6). The tactics to pursue his goals were also more con- flictual than the average leader (Z = -2.0). His flexibility in shifting between cooperation and conflict was higher than other leaders in the norming group (Z = 1.6). Regarding the utility of means, his preferences for expressions of punishment and threat to exercise political power were greater than three standard deviations above the average Latin American leader (Z = 3.5 and 3.2, respectively). Expressions of opposition were more than one standard deviation lower than the average regional leader (Z = -1.3).

Comparing Evo Morales's First and Second Terms

The results of the OCA of Evo Morales showed some noticeable differences in Morales's beliefs concerning the rivalry with Chile between his first and second term (Table 7.3). His philosophical beliefs shifted to a less friendly perception of the political universe (Z = -2.7) and a less optimistic

Table 7.3 Comparison Morales's Operational Code First and Second Terms

	First term Z-score	Second term Z-score	Z-score difference (degree of learning)	Direction
P-1	0.4	-2.3	-2.7	Weakened
P-2	0.3	-2.6	-2.9	Weakened
P-3	0.8	-1.4	-2.2	Weakened
P-4	0.3	-2.4	-2.7	Weakened
P-5	-0.7	2.4	3.1	Strengthened
1-1	1.5	-1.6	-3.1	Weakened
1-2	0.4	-2.0	-2.4	Weakened
1-3	2.4	-0.7	-3.1	Weakened

I-4a	-1.5	1.6	3.1	Strengthened
I-4b	-1.7	0.7	2.4	Strengthened
1-5 Punish	-2.0	3.5	5.5	Strengthened
1-5 Threaten	-2.1	3.2	5.3	Strengthened
1-5 Oppose	-0.5	-1.3	-0.8	Weakened
1-5 Appeal	2.0	-0.2	-2.2	Weakened
1-5 Promise	-1.5	0.3	1.8	Strengthened
1-5 Reward	-0.8	-0.8	0	Unchanged

prospect of achieving his political values (Z = -2.9). The political future became less predictable (Z = -2.2), and his perception of control over historical events also decreased during his second term (Z = -2.7). The role attributed to chance increased during his second term (Z = 3.1). Morales's instrumental beliefs also showed differences between his two presidential terms. His beliefs about the best strategy and tactics to achieve his goals became less cooperative (Z = -3.1 and -2.4, respectively). He was also less prone to accept risks (Z = -3.1). Overall, he also became more flexible in shifting between cooperation and conflict (Z = 3.1) as well as between words and deeds (Z = 2.4). Concerning the utility of means, his preferences remained similar, except for expressions of punishment, where he shifted from well-below average to way above average (Z = 5.5), and expressions of promise, which shifted from below average to about average (Z = 1.8).

The differences observed in Evo Morales's belief system in Table 7.3 support the learning hypothesis. Morales's noticeable change in the majority of his philosophical and instrumental beliefs pertaining to the rivalry, including those considered as key beliefs, indicate that the learning process occurred in all three levels: simple, diagnostic, and complex. His shift to a more negative stance toward the rivalry can help one to explain the negative turn that the bilateral relations took during his second term, which was marked by the escalation of the conflict. In a nutshell, Morales learned from his first term to his second term to be less optimistic and friendly about the rivalry with Chile. The future of the rivalry became less predictable and his perception of control decreased. Likewise, Morales learned that less cooperative strategies and tactics were a better way to achieve his goals, which can help one to explain his more aggressive approach toward Chile in his second term. Morales's new belief system can contribute to the

explanation of his confrontational stance, his decision to file a lawsuit at the ICJ as well as the series of diplomatic impasses.

Conclusions

Drawing on the FPA literature, this chapter explored the role of political leaders in shaping periods of cooperation and escalation of tensions in interstate rivalries. More specifically, I analyzed the role of the former president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, in two pivotal moments of the bilateral relations with Chile. These milestones correspond to a period of improvement of the bilateral relations during Morales's first administration, and a period of increasing tensions during his second mandate. I argued that the change in Evo Morales's foreign policy behavior was the consequence of a process of learning that can be observed in the change of his belief system regarding the rivalry and the bilateral relations with Chile.

This study used a cognitive approach to understanding decision-making processes in the context of interstate rivalries. Specifically, I utilized the OCA approach as a tool to assess Morales's change in beliefs. The results showed a noticeable difference in Morales's beliefs from his first to his second term, which supports the general learning hypothesis proposed at the beginning of this chapter. This finding fills a gap in the scholarly literature on rivalries, as it helps one to shed light on the reasons for the variation of rivalries between states across time. This finding also supports the idea that the mechanism of cooperation and escalation of hostilities can be located in leaders' beliefs concerning the self and the other in the context of a rivalry.

While the learning hypothesis sheds light on the individual mechanisms that might help one to explain leaders' behavior, it is also relevant to highlight the dyadic nature of rivalries as a source of learning. In this study, the source of learning for Evo Morales appears to be a change in the situation between Bolivia and Chile in the form of a change in Chile's leader from Bachelet to Pinera. This change was the environmental stimulus or treatment that likely evoked a change across presidential terms in the Bolivian leader's instrumental and philosophical beliefs. In future studies, it would be relevant and desirable to consider how leaders' beliefs from both sides interact in periods of cooperation and escalation of the rivalry, in order to gain a deeper understanding of their cognitive and behavioral dynamics. Another aspect that could help one to shed light on the variation of rivalries is concerned with leaders' personality traits. Due to their personal characteristics, some leaders may be more prone to escalate conflicts or engage in cooperation. This aspect is worth further analysis.

This study also showed a methodological advance in the application of the OCA approach, as it is the first time that a Spanish-speaking leader has been assessed using the Spanish-language version of the automated content analysis software. This step stands as a relevant advance in the study of political leaders in the Latin American context where presidents have a strong influence in shaping foreign policy decision-making processes due to the characteristics of presidential regimes in the region. Future work could include the expansion of the norming group and the OCA of other leaders in the context of interstate rivalries to develop a more robust body of research.

Notes

- 1. Quintal is a unit of weight.
- 2. This justification is in line with the Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which states that "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." However, this Treaty does not apply to the case of Chile and Bolivia due to its nonretroactivity.
- 3. Own translation.
- 4. While Morales's second term spanned 5 years, I employed verbal material from 2010 to 2014.1 made this decision to prevent the change in the Chilean administration in 2014 from affecting the results.

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