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Building Administrative Capacity for the Age of Rapid Globalization: A Modest Prescription for the Twenty-First Century

A Senior–Junior Academic Exchange: Building Administrative Capacity

The twenty-first century is characterized by rapid change, globalization, hyper-competition, and hyper-uncertainty. Traditional models of governance and public administration are no match for the challenges of this chaotic environment. This essay argues for building new administrative capacity in response to these serious governance dilemmas. Offered as a modest prescription, this new administrative capacity is proposed to cope more effectively with an increasingly unknowable world. The article opens with an overview of key issues, then focuses directly on the nature and trends of global public sector changes, and concludes by elaborating on the building of such administrative capacity. The author's proposals are presented from a macro perspective: first, suggestions for revitalizing public service and administration given the current crisis; second, macro strategies for enhancing capacity design; and third, specific reforms for strengthening governance, instrumental and administrative capacities, along with concrete recommendations for public administration.

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The age of rapid change and globalization is here. The world has entered a new millennium with epochal changes that have been transforming societies, economies, governments, and public administration. A new civilization has dawned with many positive and negative consequences, questioning the basic assumptions of governance and public administration. On the positive side, the world seems to have become smaller, with more people able to interact easily across the globe and more governments and economies integrated into a "global community."

On the negative side, the threats of growing poverty, insecurity and terrorism, conflict and war (including nuclear war), and unemployment have increased under the emerging new world order, as the "flattening" pressures (Friedman 2005) for further global integration increase. Contrary to the views of the overly optimistic ideological advocates of post–Cold War globalization of corporate capitalism, who portray a rosy picture of the new world order (Friedman 1999; Fukuyama 1992; Ohmae 1990), these global problems do indeed exist, and they will likely continue to pose a serious challenge to the future of humankind, the global community, and nation-state governance and administration in an age of "coming anarchy" (Kaplan 2000; Korten 2001). A "turning point" in history has been reached (Capra 1982).

A new age of "hyper-uncertainty" and "hyper-competition" (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001), "hyper-turbulence" (D'Aveni 1994), and "chaotic changes" (Lewin 1992) seems to have replaced the ages of both "certainty" (Prigogine 1997) and "uncertainty" (Galbraith 1977). Some scholars also have signaled the emergence of an "age of madness and tyranny" that is intolerant of differences in governance and political ideology—an "age of unreason" (Handy 1990). They warn against a rising "predatory" system of economic and social order (see Galbraith 2006, borrowing the term from Thurstein Veblen 1898). Others have downplayed the extent of these impacts on government and administration. But all seem to warn against hyper-changes that produce hyper-complexities and permeate the future of humanity with hyper-uncertainties (Capra 1982; Prigogine 1997). It is this new world, with its highly uncertain and dangerously constraining global environment, that makes the task of public governance and administration ever more challenging (Priesmeyer 1992).

Traditional administrative capacities, important and valuable as they may be, are not good enough to meet the new challenges ahead. There is a need to retool, in both theory and practice, public governance and administration to develop new sets of knowledge, skills, cultures, and designs that are nonlinear and

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surprise-management-oriented in organization and management and can meet the challenges of the age of "unreason" and its rapid changes (Handy 1990; Morgan 2006) and of "chaos" (Farazmand 2003; Murphy 1996). Until recently, scholars intensely debated how to deal with complex "bureaucracies becoming unmanageable" (Elgin and Bushnell 1977), how to control them for democratic ideals (Niskanen 1971), and how to make them "reconcilable with democracy" (Waldo 1992). Today, perhaps the biggest challenge in public administration and governance is how to manage the obstacles of this hyper-turbulent environment of chaotic changes and uncertainties (D'Aveni, 1994; Galbraith 2006; Gleik 1987; Kiel 1994; Murphy 1996; Nonaka 1988). Building "new administrative capacity" is an imperative of our time.

This article argues that the "administrative capacity to manage" governance and economic systems under the new environment needs to be designed at the macro and micro levels. The first deals with the institutional, organizational, policy, and managerial issues of public governance and administration in national and international or global affairs with a multitude of strategies, policies, and approaches for the twenty-first century. The second concerns the acquisition, refinement, and application of detailed organizational, managerial, administrative, and technical knowledge and tools, to achieve the broader goals and objectives of the macro design; the latter requires a separate presentation.

Building on an earlier publication (Farazmand 2006), this essay advances the argument with a macro perspective for building and developing new administrative capacity in public governance and administration for this age of rapid change, hyper-complexity, and globalization. A "modest prescription for survival" is suggested with strategic policy recommendations to meet the new challenges of the twenty-first century, and to revive public service and administration out of the current crisis that permeates the capacity to govern and manage. This is done in the remainder of the paper: The next section discusses global trends of change and globalization, followed by an extensive presentation on building new administrative capacity at the macro level that covers five detailed areas: (1) an argument for revitalizing public service and administration; (2) an outline of three key strategies for capacity design and enhancement; (3) an analysis of four specific "governance capacities" with concrete recommendations; (4) a detailed presentation of four suggested "functionally instrumental capacities" in governing, institutional, policy, and political areas; and (5) an outline of 11 administrative capacities in need of detailed analysis at the micro level in a separate essay. A conclusion is also provided with several key points to challenge the field, its scholars, and practitioners in the hope of invoking more responses.

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Change, Continuity, and Globalization

As a transformational force, change has always shaped and reshaped history. While big changes produce long-term consequences that are beyond immediate anticipation, small changes are more frequent, with predictable and unpredictable consequences. Small changes may also produce large-scale transformations through what is known in chaos theory as the "butterfly effect" (Lewin 1992; Prigogine 1997), a phenomenon that can cause system breakdown or evolution. Thus, change, time, and civilization are directly related (Waldo 1992). Changes occur by many forces, both external and internal to a system. Theories of change and reform explain that they come from the top down and from the bottom up, through institutional reforms, reorganizations, and reinventions or revolutions (Peters 2001). Natural processes of change also constitute the inner forces of movement, transformation, and evolution in ideas and behavior (Capra 1982), through "mutual causality" (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) and "self-organization" of organic systems (Jantsch 1980).

In the past, many changes took decades, if not centuries, to materialize, but many of today's big changes are epochal, with disproportionate scale and magnitude (Ogilvy 2002). Many of these changes are also sudden, chaotic, and often unexpected and hard to anticipate; they happen almost overnight with unfolding surprises and produce anxiety, uncertainty, and possible system breakdown across cultures and governance and administrative systems. There may be strategies and approaches to deal with and manage such changes, but none is a certain or optimal one. Consequently, in the absence of certain choices, one must consider "fuzzy gambling" (Dror 2001) approaches and designs that provide some means of navigation through turbulent seas in weaving the future. Yet a key characteristic of most of these changes, cascading and hyper-turbulent as they may be, is the "continuity" they often produce in the general patterns of system continuity in a "self-organizing universe" (Jantsch 1980) that conditions the world. Many of the changes of the past quarter century—big and small—have been in the general direction of "system continuity" and have reinforced the market economy and its social relations, governance, and administration—hence a renewed capitalism. Few serious pattern-breaking changes have occurred—and most failed—against this globally dominant phenomenon with far-reaching consequences—negative as well as positive—for humanity, societies, and cultures.

While supporters may find the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996) within this pattern to be a reality on the surface, critics find its ideological underpinnings brewing potential catastrophes for humanity beyond any single government's control—terrorism being one. According to critics, the "clash of civilizations" argument is an intellectual claim to a political hegemonic ideology of building a "global empire" by the United States to dominate the entire world, a superpower that champions democracy and liberalism but overlooks economic and political repression through its globalization ideology (Hoffman 2006; Johnson 2006). Proponents of this global ideology advocate a "flattening world," with political consequences of sanction and destruction if resisted (Ferguson 2004; Friedman 1995, 2005). To critics, however, it is a dangerously destructive policy that is driving most developing countries into a "race to the bottom" (Brecher and Costello 1994; Korten 2001) under a globalizing "American empire" that, according to Alice Amsden, they "can't escape from" (2007, 151), because they are heavily dependent on it through conditional aids (Hoffman 2006, 13). Exaggerated or not, these changes do have serious negative impacts on others in the global community.

Consequently, economic exploitation and increasing poverty for many appear to be inevitable results that may produce further global injustice, insecurity, and even terrorism (Johnson 2006), outcomes that proponents of globalization and global empire building, such as Niall Ferguson (2004), consider "the price of America's empire." To combat terrorism and overcome global insecurity, more militarization and policing policies are opted for by great powers, an option that creates a vicious circle that no one benefits from, except some predatory "hegemonic corporations" (Dugger 1989) that tend "to rule the world" (Galbraith 2006; Korten 2001) and their globalizing states with "hegemony" as a global "geopolitical reasoning" (Agnew 2005, 14).

But does this scenario have to be played out? Is capitalism inherently evil and against the masses of people? And will such "geopolitical reasoning" prevail, and at what cost? Although these are big philosophical and political economy questions that are beyond the scope of this essay, the short answers offered here are *negative,* as not all market systems are "predatory," and there are counterbalancing forces of globalization that can negate such geopolitical logic; predatory states can be countered and stopped at the door. The market plays a key role in economies and societies, but so do government institutions and public administration, which must check market failures, help sustain market dynamics, and control abusive corporate organizational behavior to preserve democratic values (Dugger 1989). And history always offers lessons useful only to those who are willing to learn from it (Agnew 2005; Kennedy 1987), because, as Stanley Hoffman notes, "we [Americans] are not sufficiently marinated in history to know that, through the ages, nobody—or almost nobody—has ever loved a hegemon" (2006, 134). The 2008 Wall Street meltdown, which caused a global financial crisis that led to a near collapse of global capitalism and prompted multitrillion-dollar rescue plans by the world's largest capitalist states—the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s—is another fresh reminder of how mythical free market capitalism is and how badly it needs the interventionist capitalist state to make it possible for it operate freely! Such freedom comes at a heavy cost to citizens of the world.

Trends of Public Sector Change

A major factor explaining change and transformation is time, and history is the best storyteller of the significance of time; this means past, present, and future. The twentieth century experienced changing "times" with trend-setting characteristics, long-term structural consequences, and profound implications. Theories of long-wave capitalist economic change explain how human progress is made, at what cost and to whom and through what cycles (see, e.g., Kondratieff, in Mandel 1999, 108–46), pointing to several such changes in the twentieth century that shaped the dawn of the new millennium. However, two broad and instrumental long-wave changes producing large-scale qualitative transformations may be discerned (Capra 1982; Kaplan 2000). One is the rise of the Soviet Union and the socialist worldview, culminating in the Cold War era of a "two-world system" global order with a "welfare state" (Gilbert 1983); the second is the currently emerging "new world order" under globalization (Kaplan 2000). While the advocates characterize the latter as a global free market neoliberal economic ideology, corporate globalization of the world, and consumerist individualism (Cox 1999; Friedman 1999; Lindblom 2001; Ohmae 1990), critics characterize it as a "predatory corporate capitalism" (Galbraith 2006) promoted by a militaristic global power structure at the cost of the "welfare state," the weaker states, and average people (Graycar 1983; Johnson 2006; Korten 2001).

Along with these two very long-wave periods, there were numerous other short-term—and relatively long-term—changes with major consequences. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Great Depression of the 1930s gave birth to the "welfare administrative state," and worldwide competition between socialism and capitalism accelerated the decolonization and national independence movements, while conflicts and the superpower arms race intensified and drained public treasuries at the expense of development. Other changes included institution building, bureaucratization, expanding public enterprise systems, rapid urbanization, agro-business agrarian reforms, public–private partnerships, and an expanded role of the state and public administration that characterized some of the key structural changes in developed and developing nations for much of the twentieth century (Heady 1996). Intellectually, systems theory helped explain the essential concepts of political stability, social order, and system maintenance and the ideological tenets of the welfare administrative state (Graycar 1983). The political economy of much of twentieth-century capitalism, therefore, was based on the basic assumptions of a welfare state, a mixed economy, and a tacitly understood military-industrial complex that rationalized ideological actions against revolutionary or liberation movements and their key supporter, the Soviet Union (Gilbert 1983).

However, rooted in the late 1970s, the decline of the public sector by design in the 1980s signaled a reverse trend of global political economy with the features of sweeping privatization, marketization, commercialization, and shrinking the public sector in favor of the private corporate sector everywhere. Reinventing government, downsizing, and privatization were considered new "prescriptions" for solving problems and running the business of government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Savas 2000). The official architects of this global change were Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who declared that government was the problem, not the solution; both pursued massive policy decisions to reverse the growth of government. The administrative welfare state was dismantled with a corporatist governance system that was rebuilt brick by brick on the ideological grounds of the neoconservative economic and political theories of "public choice" and supply-side economics (Carroll 1997; Graycar 1983).

Globally, profound changes in government–business–society relations were launched and implemented through such globalizing institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and a host of other international aid organizations from the United States and Western Europe to Japan (Korten 2001). As a result, a great transformation of the world has taken place at the turn of the new millennium, with the following characteristics: (1) the orthodoxy of market supremacy (Lindblom 2001); (2) the "one market under God" ideology (Frank 2000) pressed by the "Washington Consensus" for Americanization of the world through militarization and financial domination of the globe (Johnson 2006; Pieterse 2006); (3) the intellectual ideology of the "New Public Management" (Barzelay 2001) to promote business-like, market-

based governance and public administration (Donohue and Nye 2002); and (4) an accelerated process of greedy corporate "globalization" (Farazmand 1999; Scholte 2005). A proponent of corporate globalization has even called it "The Market as God," with many blessings (Cox 1999).

Globalization: Challenges and Opportunities

These and other global changes of the last quarter century or so have evoked profound debates among social scientists with diverse disciplinary perspectives. For example, Samuel Huntington (1996) spoke of a "clash of civilizations" between the West and the East, Francis Fukuyama (1992) predicted the "end of history and of the last man" as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union, and the celebrated Wall Street journalist Thomas Friedman (1999) argued that the current Westernization and Americanization of the world would sweep the Eastern cultures and their religions away, advising nation-states not to resist the moving "herd" in its stampede. Others argued further that with the spread of global capitalism and market supremacy, the "state" has become "irrelevant" and must turn all of its functions over to the market institutions of transworld corporations (Ohmae 1990). But critics warned against a "false dawn" (Gray 1998), "a return back to medievalism" under feudal lords (Kobrin 1996), and a rise of "hegemonic" and globalizing "corporations that rule the world" (Dugger 1989; Johnson 2006; Korten 2001; Rowland 2005). These are expressions of megachanges that are now affecting lives, economies, and countries with unequal impacts, benefiting some significantly while forcing others in a race to the bottom, thus widening the inequality gap between the haves and have-nots worldwide, and between the nations of the North and the South (Kelly 2007; Stiglitz 2003; UN 2001, 2005). As Stanley Hoffman correctly notes, "the benefits of globalization are undeniable. But . . . it is largely an American creation, rooted in the period after World War II and based on U.S. economic might. Globalization's reach remains limited because it excludes many poor countries, and the states that it does transform react in different ways" (2006, 13).

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Dramatic changes have a tendency to produce at least three types of effects: *good, bad,* and *ugly*—and some neutral ones. Beneficiaries of the "good" praise the changes, while receivers of the "bad" suffer and complain, but the "ugly" effects harm virtually everyone everywhere; it is this "ugly" side of the current global changes that has caused a profound global debate and created serious backlash. Examples include the erosion of national sovereignty and public infrastructure, increasing unemployment and underdevelopment, global warming, expanded global economic crisis, poverty and hunger, ethnic conflict, war, AIDS, insecurity and terrorism, increased corruption and lack of accountability, and corporate-friendly dictators such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and the Shah in Iran, to name a few (Barkawi 2006; Korten 2001; Scholte 2005).

Globalization has been the hallmark of many of these global changes and transformations, a process through which worldwide integration and transcendence take place, with many consequences—*good, bad, and ugly*—and corresponding reactions. Generally speaking, three perspectives shed light on globalization: the proponents, the opponents, and the realists in between. Enthusiast proponents, including those dismissing critics' arguments as "exaggerations" (Hirst and Thompson 1996), embrace globalization as a force that no one can resist in a "global village" full of opportunities (Friedman 1999, 2005; Ohmae 1990), while opponents warn against the erosion of community and the loss of national sovereignty and democracy (Korten 2001), of a deepening crisis of "governance" and "governability" (Kregel 1998), of expanding "corporate colonization of the world" (Deetz 1992), and of the "end of public administration" (Stever 1988). The third perspective, including this author's, argues for the inevitability of globalization as a historical development and suggests adaptability and innovation as a response strategy while warning against its threats to national sovereignty, self-determination, and democratic governance and public administration (Farazmand 1999, 2006; Scholte 2005).

The concept, philosophy, and political economy of *globalization* are still being digested in the public administration literature, and there are many areas to explore, but three major developments have prompted great scholarly debate during the last 20 years or so: (1) the sweeping privatization and outsourcing of public service functions, (2) the New Public Management, (3) and the constant reforms and transformation programs toward marketization, commercialization, and corporatization. Together, they have contributed to the globalization of corporate capitalism worldwide. No doubt these global changes have had profound impacts on governance and public administration and on national capacity to develop and advance. The state and public administration persist, but their character and behavior have been radically changed by globalization, which demands a market-based, corporatist system of governance and administration (Farazmand 1999, 2004; Scholte 2005).

While globalization has been around for a long time, with its early origins traced to the great empires of ancient Persia (Cook 1983), Greece, and Rome, as well as the later empires of Spain, Great Britain, and other European nations, modern globalization began to take shape after World War II. It continued with the rise of transworld corporations, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the powerful states of the North. Technological innovations helped accelerate the globalization process boosted by the fall of the Soviet Union and extended by expansionist global corporations that claim the entire world as a new frontier with no boundaries. Thus, globalization is nothing new. What is new, however, is the character, power, pace, and capacity of certain global institutions and processes that are capable of penetrating and integrating states, markets, and economies worldwide through economic inducements and sanctions, political instruments (inducement and coercion), military intervention, and even war (Barkawi 2006). They have contributed to what critics call "Predatory Globalization . . . a reflection of political preferences widely endorsed by dominant elites" (Falk 1999, 2) and led by the global "imperialism" of the North (Johnson 2006; Kelly 2007), especially by what MIT scholar Alice Amsden calls the "second American Empire" (2007, 151), with institutionalized Americans "among the people most inclined to favor

military force as a way of dealing with global conflicts" (Kohut and Stokes 2006, 196). In the face of the recent global crisis economic meltdown, the big "globalizers" have been "turning their back on the world," reports *The Economist* (2009, 59), prompting the advocates of *deglobalization* (Bello 2004) to call for a return to local economy afresh.

There is no universally agreed-upon concept of globalization. It means new market opportunities to businesspeople, new economic ideology to economists, and a reinforced ideology of Western values of capitalism and liberalism to political scientists (Scholte 2005). It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss these theoretical streams of globalization and its causes, consequences, and challenges. What is important is how public administration is to "manage the challenges" that globalization and global changes produce, challenges that cut across all sectors and areas of governance, management, and culture.

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Globalization has produced many opportunities for business corporations and institutions as well as for the governing and political elites who own or run them; it has also provided global connectedness, communications, and other means of integration and accessibility through the Internet, e-governance, and administration to average people and organizations worldwide. But globalization has also produced many *ugly* side effects, as noted earlier. A cursory review of the United Nations Millennium Summit report (2001) shows staggering figures that point to a widening gap between rich and poor nations, rich and poor in all countries, rising corruption and empowered dictatorial regimes, rising absolute poverty with more than 1 billion people living on less than $1 a day, more than 2.5 billion people without clean drinking water, more than 1 billion people suffering from malnutrition and hunger, and millions dying from the ever-rising epidemic yet preventable diseases of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis (Amsden 2007; Stiglitz 2003; UN 2001).

These are monumental global problems and crises—*ugly ones*—that require "global solutions" (Lomborg 2004; UN 2005). Although globalization has had disproportionate impacts on developing nations, the advanced nations of the North are also receiving its adverse impacts, which affect their environment, governance, administration, and culture; it affects all nation-states as members of the global "body." "Epochal turning points usually bring with them turbulent times" (Kupchan 2002, 306) in cycles that affect many; they require appropriate responses by examining root causes and avoiding past mistakes. With respect to terrorism, a leading American scholar, Chester Newland, advises rather clearly, "For success in this struggle, *conditions that foster terrorism* must be dealt with; an Antiterrorist Garrison State must differ importantly from past experience" (2001, 643; emphasis added).

Building the Administrative Capacity to Manage: A Macro Perspective

The task of managing public governance and administration in this emerging global environment of rapid changes and hyper-complexities is very complex and challenging, but it is also a highly rewarding one. Such "capacity" is badly needed in order to manage quality governance and complex public administration systems worldwide. It is a rare capacity that most governments lack, not because they lack the ingredients but because the challenges are far too many, too complex, and changing too rapidly on nonlinear as well as linear paths (Dror 2001) in a world that, despite getting smaller, is increasingly "unknowable" (Stacey 1992).

Complex problems and dynamic critical situations cannot be managed by routine crisis and emergency management capacities, and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina crisis mismanagement in New Orleans was a clear illustration of such a failure that turned into a management and leadership crisis (Farazmand 2007a; Menzel 2006). Similarly, most of the global problems and crises noted earlier are beyond any single country's capacity to solve or cope with; they require global solutions through collective and collaborative actions, a quality capacity that is lacking under the current process of globalization and of the emerging "world order" (Lomborg 2004).

What … can and should be done to cope with and manage these global challenges, problems, and crises? … this essay focuses on some solutions—suggestions for policy and management in rebuilding and developing the "capacity" to manage "governance" and public administration at the local, national, and global levels.

What, then, can and should be done to cope with and manage these global challenges, problems, and crises? The rest of this essay focuses on some solutions—suggestions for policy and management in rebuilding and developing the "capacity" to manage "governance" and public administration at the local, national, and global levels. Thus, what follows is a "modest prescription" not only for survival, but also for excellence in governance and public administration everywhere, in developing as well as developed nations.

Revitalizing Public Service and Administration

Public service and administration have been suffering from a globally deepening crisis of legitimacy and institutional capacity for the last quarter century. This crisis has been the subject of many studies, ranging from the "legitimacy crisis" (Brown 1998; Habermas 1973) to the "institutional crisis" (Rosen 1986), the "crisis in the U.S. administrative state" (Farazmand 1989), the "quiet crisis in the civil service" (Lewis 1991), the "global crisis in public service" (UN 2001), and the "deinstitutionalization" of the federal civil service in the United States (Thompson 2006). Added to the list are the continuing "fiscal crisis of the state" (O'Connor 1973) and growing problems of ungovernability (Scholte 2005), underdevelopment (Amsden 2007; UN 2001), corruption, and unaccountability that tend to accentuate the challenges to modern governance and administration. The 2008 global financial crisis in corporate capitalism, which has called for the largest state intervention through

multi-trillion-dollar bailout plans, is another example of the continuing global crisis in economy and governance systems.

To solve global crises and problems that affect the ability of nation-states to govern, there must be a serious effort to revitalize public service and administration. The capacity to manage basic challenges and to provide public services has been diminished worldwide during the last quarter century. No global crisis or problem can be solved, nor can the challenges of an unknown tomorrow be met, with a broken institutional and legitimacy capacity in public service and administration. Revitalization and reinstitutionalization of public service and administration require, first and foremost, a renewed emphasis on the constructive role of responsible government—however defined—in domestic and global affairs. In the historical role of public administration, three fundamental functions must be recognized and acted on.

First is *service delivery. Service,* provided directly or indirectly, includes the two broad forms of security as well as nonsecurity public goods and services that cover law and order, and a sense of overall security for all sectors and citizens in society; it is a broad-based, nonexclusionary public good. It also includes a number of normative social actions that public administration must engage in, actions that include promoting fairness, equality, economic and social justice, and opportunities for individual growth and development, as well as the elimination or reduction of poverty, discrimination, and disease. These fundamental services provide essential sources for security and good citizenship (UN 2007). Without them, opportunities for insecurity proliferate and grounds for violence and conflict expand—hence a vicious cycle of growing crises and the corresponding need for further policing, social control, and repression (Scholte 2005).

Public service and administration must be revitalized and their institutions, organizations, processes, and values reinstitutionalized (UN 2005). This must be done externally through laws, legislation, and reclamation of the appropriate role for government as the guardian of society in domestic and international affairs. It must also be accomplished internally by engaging citizens, community organizations, and other organizational institutions in governance and administration, along with building trust among a broad-based citizenry and enhancing transparency, accountability, and ethical behavior (Cooper 1998; Denhardt 2004). Ethics, accountability, and transparency are the most important crosscutting principles of democracy and trust in effective governance and administration; they prevent opportunities for corruption and bad administration (UN 2001, 2005, 2007).

Second is *continuous striving for development on all fronts.* Development is a key to socioeconomic and political advancement and opportunities for human prosperity. "Development" is not a term exclusively applied to less developed nations; it also applies to industrialized nations (Waldo 1992). Development means "striving" for better conditions in economic and social environments and standards of living, and creating opportunities for sustainable growth and advancement in science and technology to help lift a society upward. It also means eliminating or reducing poverty, disease, and injustice as sources of crime and insecurity, terrorism, conflict, and war; it means building sound capacity in "administration" (Farazmand 2004) and "development governance" (Huque and Zafarullah 2006).

Because most countries of the developing world lack the needed resources to create such conditions for development, external aid is often needed to help transform these nations toward development. Much of this aid comes from the advanced and rich countries of the world, with conditions attached in the form of "tying aid" (Amsden 2007, 60), or aid given for "political and economic reasons," not development reasons. Consequently, these conditions, coupled with other constraining economic and political obstacles, may actually inhibit rather than empower these dependent nations to develop (Hancock 1989; Lopes 2002; Sallnow 1990), as "tying aid prevents them from shopping worldwide for the best bargain, and from building an experienced local cadre of executives, managers, and engineers" (Amsden 2007, 60). The need to remove these obstacles and to provide new international aid from such global institutions as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other global or regional powers to resource-dependent nations is urgently argued for by globalization scholars and political leaders (e.g., Easterly 2001; Stiglitz 2003). This is clearly outlined in the historic declaration of the UN Millennium Development Goals (UN 2001), a document that should be called a "global manifesto for development in the twenty-first century."

However, with the flow of international resources to less developed nations, there must also be institutional, policy, administrative, and organizational mechanisms to develop a culture of anticorruption, free from external political or ideological manipulations, and a culture of professionalism in public service and administration in building capacity for sustainable development (UNDP 2002) with good global monitoring systems (Dwivedi, Khator, and Nef 2007). Transparency, accountability, and ethical standards must guide policy and administrative actions. They will help restore the building blocks of public service and administration—trust, legitimacy, and institutional capacity.

Designing Strategic Capacity

Designing *macro strategic capacities to manage* in the age of hyperchange and globalization involves at least three key strategies with long-term directions that guide public policy and administrative action: *adaptive strategy, service delivery performance strategy,* and *development and advancement strategy.* They may be modified, redefined, and adjusted to meet the changing needs of time and society, but their overall strategic importance may not be altered.

Adaptive Strategy

Change creates new realities and dynamics that require adaptive skills, knowledge, and attitudes. Just as the age of traditional colonial order ended with the reality of national liberation and independence movements, today's world of global realities is shaped and reshaped by constantly changing global dynamics that are difficult, if not impossible, to predict or control (Handy 1998; Morgan 2006). For example, the computer technologies of the information age, once considered a privileged tool of administrative elites, are now available to most people worldwide today.

The *adaptive strategy* consists of two broad elements: one is a responsive or reactive strategy to adapt to changing conditions so

that the capacity to perform effectively and efficiently in governance and public administration is enhanced. The second element of adaptive strategy goes one or two steps further by thinking and strategizing beyond the maintenance of the status quo; it requires building strategic blocks that are proactive, anticipatory, and future oriented in purpose and design (Argyris 2004; Stacey 2001). It is central to strategic choices of "making things possible and happen" to make changes and alter environmental conditions to suit organizational or national goals rather than reacting to external changes. Multinational corporations and their respective governments of the United States and United Kingdom have practiced this strategic choice across the globe since World War II—e.g., Iran in August 1953 and Chile on September 11, 1973 for "serving national interests" at the expense of democracy (Hamilton 1989). Yet, politically, both produced counterproductive outcomes in the long run, for in both cases, democratically elected governments were removed by military force, causing a legitimacy crisis. Lesson 1: Tampering with legitimacy can produce illegitimacy and backfire. Lesson 2: suppressing democracy and undesired democratic regimes to serve national interests will always be remembered with bitterness and backfire.

Preparing for tomorrow by taking proactive strategies to change or "redesign the future" today may be a necessary choice while adapting to short-term realities, but prudence dictates caution when dealing with "legitimacy" and the democratic rights of others in this volatile global environment. This dual strategic choice to adapt is already reflected in the systems theory of organization since the 1960s, in contingency and institutional theories (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2001), and in the emerging "chaos, complexity, and transformation" theories of organization (Farazmand 2003; Kiel 1994). It must be a prudent strategy for capacity building and development in governance and administration.

Service Delivery Performance Strategy

Governments are judged by their ability to perform well in routine, emergency, and crisis situations. This ability is determined by public organizational and institutional capacities to deliver quality services. The strategic capacity to manage complex organizations must demonstrate effectiveness in service delivery; this is the "bread and butter" of public administration and governance. Performance determines the degree of legitimacy that public organizations enjoy or lose among citizens at home and in the international community. Service delivery effectiveness is determined by the criteria of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, timeliness, meeting of organizational goals and objectives, and citizen satisfaction and trust (Denhardt and Denhardt 2005; UN 2007). The failure of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to perform during the Hurricane Katrina crisis is now an ugly global example.

As noted earlier, public service delivery performance here refers to two broad areas of public goods and services that include the provision of *security* through police protection and national defense systems, and the delivery of nonsecurity or *other public service functions* either directly or indirectly or through outsourcing and contractual arrangements both domestically and internationally. The two constitutive elements of security and nonsecurity services are directly related and reinforce each other. For example, programs of poverty reduction, employment, and public health and infrastructure development contribute to individual security and better government performance (Scholte 2005; UN 2001). In the age of globalization and high interdependence, a multitude of these structural arrangements needs to be considered in providing efficient and effective delivery of services. Effective public service performance is essential to system maintenance and stability (Dror 2001) and must engage people by "unlocking human potential for public sector performance" (UN 2005).

Development and Advancement Strategy

The *strategic capacity* to develop and advance takes one major step beyond adaptive and performance levels or stages. It means a constant striving toward development, growth, and advancement. Advanced countries constantly strive to develop in rural and urban life, in science and technology, and in education and other programs that help upgrade their capacity to manage their governance and administrative systems. In developing countries, similarly, various approaches and strategies must be employed to accelerate the "development" process by upgrading existing capacities and acquiring new ones in science and technology, human resources, and organizational leadership for "managing development" (Dwivedi, Khator, and Nef 2007), as well as enhancing "development governance" (Huque and Zafarullah 2006).

This is a challenging task, as most of these countries are under the external influence of the industrialized nations and transworld corporations of the North (Kelly 2007), which tend to dictate their policy choices through international aid with conditions attached (Amsden 2007; Sallnow 1990). Some may even promote functional corruption that empowers certain local elites for political, security, and economic reasons and actually contributes to more poverty and corruption (Hancock 1989; Tavis 1982), a cycle that calls for more external oversight. Developing nations must learn to break away from this path dependency, promote a culture of self-confidence, and engage in regional and global collaborative governance relationship schemes that enhance their chances of capacity building to develop. Such quality governance demands a "socially learning" (Paquet 1999), "sound public administration system" with institutions, processes, and values that attract rather than deter talented human capital with trust and appreciation. The keys to such quality governance are citizen participation, democratic and free elections, strong and selfless leadership promoting self-confidence, and adherence to the principles of transparency, accountability, and efficiency (UN 2007). History has shown that "the more freedom it has to determine its own policies, the faster a developing country will grow" (Amsden 2007, 153).

While the foregoing strategies are key to capacity building in managing governance and public administration, three other areas of capacity building are also needed to make it happen. These are *governance, instrumental,* and *administrative capacities* discussed next.

Governance Capacities

The ability to recognize changes and uncertainties as they present themselves with chaotic surprises is the first step toward building governance capacity at the macro national and international levels and, by the same token, at the organizational level. A key characteristic of chaotic and nonlinear changes is the high degree of dynamics and complexities they produce, with surprises and unpredictable or uncontrollable outcomes. The ability to recognize and read

accurately such challenging changes is a function of acquired capacities that work institutionally, technologically, and professionally. The task is to design response approaches that will appropriately meet the challenges of the new changes. This is the realm of the *adaptive strategy* outlined earlier. It means constant learning to adapt and relearning to lead, a constant process of "governance" by learning and renewal (Paquet 1999). Such learning is now established in the body of knowledge on organization theory and behavior, as well as in political science and public administration (Argyris 2001; Peters 2001; Senge 2006).

The "capacity to govern" requires several key strategic capabilities. Four such key capacity areas are outlined here, and readers may consider more of their own, but what is important is a broad "governance capacity" that is essential to the capacity to manage in the turbulent environment of rapid globalization.

Crisis and Emergency Governance and Management

The capacity to govern and to manage routine functions of governance and public administration is what most governments do, some better than others. Yet even these tasks are often hampered by a malfunctioning bureaucracy, a failing leadership, a corrupt process, and a host of other problems that afflict sound governance. However, given the constantly changing environment of governance and administration at all levels, a rise in chaotic events, natural disasters, crises, and catastrophes is expected to occur all the time; they demand preparation with a high level of "anticipatory capacity to manage." The challenges become even more formidable in countries facing earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, or conflicts with massive refugee problems. These problems become exacerbated when they occur at the regional or global level, affecting multiple jurisdictions and national boundaries with massive populations, such as the 2004 tsunami that devastated several countries and took more than 200,000 lives in Asia.

While all crises create emergency situations—for example, war, starvation and famine, genocide—not all emergency situations produce crises, but when they do, they often catch governing and administrative capacities by surprise. Routine crises are easier to prepare for, but sudden and chaotic crises with unfolding dynamics are very difficult, if not impossible, to read. Existing capacities may be good for regular tasks, but they are ill suited for managing complex and surprise-producing crises. In an inspiring work, *The Capacity to Govern,* Yehezkel Dror eloquently details the need for "gearing governance for crises" (2001, 201–9). In a nutshell, theories of crisis and emergency management reflect on the possibilities and desirability of "transformation breakdowns" with large-scale social turbulence and collapse; they demand "emergency regimes," not without potential dangers to democratic governance and administration (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000; Leng 1990). But without going as far as John Stuart Mill's justification for "despotism" in *On Liberty,* under extraordinary conditions, the need for a "transient" regime of crisis and emergency management under circumstances of chaos and transformation breakdowns may be conceivable and accepted, and even crucial, without resorting to a risky "plebiscite democracy" with a strong political authority (Dror 2001, 205; McCormick 2000). In fact, some system "breakdowns" may be considered opportunities for change and transformation or projects for a better future, explaining what Schumpeter (1942) called "creative destruction," or what contemporary chaos theorists call "bifurcations" and systems "crisis and renewal" by design (Ogilvy 2002).

The capacity to manage in the age of globalization full of chaotic surprises and crises demands special attention to building capacity for hyper-crisis and chaos management. Specifically, five key requirements or capacities are suggested here: First is preparation through specialized training courses and programs of workshops for *politicians and key political executives* to assume leadership functions in crisis management. This must be accompanied by a *professionally trained and "strategically positioned" cadre of specialized personnel*—administrative, managerial, technical, and scientific staff close to politicians—to assess and deal with the crisis and emergency management systems (Dror 2001). One of the many lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina crisis mismanagement in New Orleans was the lack of such capacity at the heart of FEMA leadership under Michael Brown (see the articles in the special issue of *PAR,* December 2007). Second is a cooperative culture of *learning and relearning organization* and of *organizational learning* that needs to be established to deal with crisis situations. Third is offering *specialized degree programs* of formal study at the master's and doctoral levels within public administration curricula across universities to prepare future crisis managers and leaders. Fourth is offering periodic s*eminars* and *workshops* for administrators and managers as well as politicians and executives year-round to sharpen their skills and knowledge with the cutting-edge information on crisis and "surprise management." Finally, it is important to establish *advanced centers and schools for strategic studies* on *crisis and chaos management* to prepare professional crisis managers with the capacity to assess and manage the unknown possibilities and help govern "surprises" (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001)—hence "managing on the edge of chaos" (Pascale 1990).

Building Collaborative Partnerships with Transparency and Accountability

Partnership building is a key to sound governance and public administration. Partnership systems vary from sector to sector and may include many forms and degrees of control, autonomy, and performance management authority. Contracting out and project management are important features of tomorrow's capacity to manage through network organizations, organizational learning, and multiple partnership schemes at the local, national, and global levels (Wettenhall 2003). But so are government-to-government forms of partnership. Promotion of "collaborative" partnerships with nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations, self-governing community organizations, and intergovernmental organizations at all levels is important to building and developing effective governance capacity (Agranoff 2006; Kettl 2006).

The key to partnership building is transparency along with shared responsibility and authority. Transparency is a central feature of building trust and confidence among partners, and in the case of governance capacity, transparency brings government and citizens closer together (UN 2007); through mutual trust, new capacities can be built to promote creativity, innovation, and confidence toward "sound governance and administration" (Farazmand 2004). Trust is capacity (Denhardt 2004), and accountability is central to building capacity through transparency and confidence building; it promotes credibility and legitimacy. As key elements of democratic sound governance, these principles must be accompanied by responsiveness

and responsibility to broad-based public demands, needs, and expectations, and even the global community (UN 2007).

Strong yet Accountable Government

Authoritarian governments tend to limit free space and shrink the "public sphere" in society, and few people like them. In fact, crisis-driven and powerful governments are dangerous, as they spread fear and anxiety among citizens and neighbors. What is needed is a free, empowered, and engaged civil society that is enabled by the state to promote co-governance and co-administrative behavior with shared responsibility (UN 2001). But governments must also be given a good degree of autonomy in managing under extreme emergency or crisis situations (Leng 1990). Under such situations, total transparency may sometimes be impossible for national security reasons and may undermine the capacity of quality government to perform its extraordinary duties (Dror 2001). Yet mechanisms must be instituted to ensure accountability and to prevent excessive secrecy that can block transparency, blind self-perceived righteous public officials, and destroy public trust in government. Therefore, a strong governance authority must be accompanied by an equally strong system of democratic oversight to prevent the abuse of power and authority. Strong legislative oversight is essential to achieving accountability in governance; there must be a system of checks and balances, including a powerful "counterelite" structure to "guard the guardians" (Farazmand 2004).

Anticipating and "Knowing What We Do Not and Cannot Know"

Anticipating what is possible and impossible requires an exceptionally high-quality capacity that must be developed and institutionalized for "weaving the future" (Dror 2001), making interventions in history, and promoting unknown potentials for better governance at all levels, from the local to the global. Developing strategic human capital and acquisition, as well as effective application of technological innovations, human and artificial intelligence, and creative ideas that lead to breakthroughs while sharpening current skills and knowledge are the keys to building an anticipatory capacity to learn and know what is not known or unknowable (Drucker 2001; Stacey 2001).

Functionally Instrumental Capacities

Conceptually speaking, "instrumental capacity" involves new thinking in history, in managing turbulence and chaotic situations leading to crises, and in administering governance and economy beyond the ordinary management of public and private organizations. Technically speaking, it involves the application of innovative tools, techniques, and designs that help sharpen the capacity to govern and manage and lead to breakthroughs in science and technology and other know-how areas. Diverse in forms and levels of sophistication, instrumental capacity is essential for "redesigning the future" as well as for managing it through "adaptive systems" (De Greene 1982; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Five broad groups of instrumental capacities are offered here to strengthen and enhance the capacity to manage, with technical and political rationalities. These capacities may overlap, but a distinction may help to explain them contextually.

Institutional Capacity

Institutional capacity involves both conceptual and material instrumentalities. *Conceptual instrumentality* is a powerful tool of large-scale strategic thinking legitimized through the institutionalization of innovative "ideas" and "rules of conduct."

Institutional theories, especially neo-institutionalism (Scott 2001), inform us of the significance of legitimating ideas, structures, processes, and cognitive values or culture embedded in "societal systems." Legitimization is a process of social acceptance and approval that develops over time and/or through various means of establishing new ideas, structures, and values. It can occur gradually and slowly or suddenly, as in the case of revolutionary changes sealed by popular consent. An extended feature of conceptual instrumentality is a *cognitive capacity* generated through knowledge creation and information processing that builds into institutional memory and fortifies administrative institutions with *norms and values* and thus enables public managers to read, understand, and manage complex problems and "unknowable" challenges (Stacey 1992, 2001). Instrumental norms and values provide familiarity and comfort to participants in the playing field of organizations (Peters 2001). *Material instrumentality* works only in a conceptually settled environment with established "basic assumptions" (Schein 1992), but its absence can hamper both conceptual and institutional instrumentalities.

This key feature of institutional capacity involves the institutionalization of such structures as government bureaucracies, market corporations, nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations, and other self-organizing entities such as professional associations with flexible and adaptive characteristics (Scott 2001).

Organizational Capacity

Organizational capacity provides "structural instrumentality" as a means to achieve strategic goals for the capacity to manage in administration; it supplies mechanisms through which power is exercised, as well as the ability to get things done (Mintzberg 1983). This is a world of organizational society with increasing complexities. Without organization, chaos may prevail and increase uncertainty, but even chaos or disorder often evolves into forms of "self-organization" and becomes functional. This is a natural dynamic of "living systems" (Jantsch 1980). Organizations are key to order, accomplishing goals, and exercising power and authority (Weber 1947).

Organization here refers to an organizing *activity, a process,* and a *structure* through which collective action takes place—for example, a university, a church, a private firm, or a government department or agency (Waldo 1992). As an organizing activity, organization also means the way in which a society and economy or governance system is "organized," either deliberately by design, as through a constitutional document or a formal institution such as a legislative parliament (Weber 1947), or by cultural and traditional norms and values that supply institutional and organizational forms with "basic assumptions" over time (Schein 1992). As a process, organization transforms materials and ideas and gets things done. Thus, a key to administrative capacity building and enhancement is the capacity to "organize":

- *A society strategically* into manageable sectors such as the public or governmental sector, the private sector, and nonprofit, networked, and cooperative sectors for collective action—either through an "aggregated facilitative governance" system of the

past "big, more or less do-it-all government" via the professional administrative state, or through the newly "disaggregated and offloaded government and aggregated response to onloaded stress" via market-based and self-governing network organizations, to borrow Chester Newland's (2006, 469) eloquent terms.

- *Structures* such as universities or centers of higher learning in knowledge, science, and technology, as well as all of the rules and forms of bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic organizations applied to implement decisions, policies, and preferences in any and each of the foregoing sectors.
- *Processes* through which things get done, procedures and steps followed, and both software and hardware tools and the means utilized to perform tasks.
- *Values or norms* that seal or institutionalize the above three organizational elements in capacity building and development (Schein 1992; Scott 2001).
- *Resources* allocated efficiently and effectively to make organizational capacity work.

Organizational instrumentality may include building capacity through reorganizations, reforms and reinventions, strategic positioning and repositioning of structural and process arrangements, and functional or sectoral reconfigurations into "core and periphery" in the delivery of services—security and nonsecurity services—with the "core" coordinating the "periphery" organizations. Tightly and loosely knit network organizations, hybrid organizational structures, public–private sector partnership organizations, cooperatives, and other forms of self-governing organizations provide different organizational forms for different purposes.

Policy Capacity

Policy capacity "makes things happen"; it provides directional and guidance instrumentality for the capacity to manage under conditions, particularly under the hyper-uncertainties associated with rapid change and globalization. Policy capacity must provide answers to the key questions of *what, where, when, how,* and *who. What?* refers to the short- and long-term strategic directions of governance and management of the economy and society in domestic and international affairs: for example, what are the policy choices in public service delivery, in public–private sector partnership approaches, and in public infrastructure development? Similarly, the questions of *where, when,* and *how* or *how much* should be answered by strategic policy "choices" and directions as well as "guidance" that would steer the other instrumental capacities toward optimal governance and management capacities.

To be effective, policy capacity must be empowered: quantitative and qualitative tools are essential to sound policy analysis, development, and choice adoption. *Establishing centers and institutions of policy analysis, development, and research* is essential to focusing on national and global policy issues with implications for local and national governance and public administration. In addition to public policy degree programs offered at various universities, public administration curricula must also respond to the changing needs of the new governance environment by offering specialized courses and degree programs in policy analysis and studies that can enhance policy capacity.

The answers to the foregoing policy questions must be provided by key governing and strategic policy actors "who" come from the governing elites representing (or claiming to represent) the will of the people and with genuine participation from the civil society actors such as the private sector, the cooperative sector, and broad-based community groups (Dror 2001). Thus, governing elites with broad participation must answer the question *who?* in the policy process as a powerful instrument in the capacity to manage and govern (Jones 1984; Peters 2001). Without a clear and sound policy capacity manifest through sound leadership, other capacities may be wasted, as happened during the 2005 Hurricane Katrina crisis in New Orleans.

Politics as Capacity

Politics is at the heart of policy capacity. Politics is both art and science; it provides a process by which policy is shaped through the changing dynamics of time and conditions. Politics has many faces; it can be "dirty means" of ugly "manipulation and deception" (Jamieson 1992) to achieve desired goals and objectives, with "ugly" results of unfair win–lose outcomes, such as highly contested and controversial elections or conflict resolutions uprooting the losers. It can also be positive and constructive with fair and win–win outcome solutions carrying long-term positive implications. Many areas of politics are, however, so fuzzy and complex that conflicting sources of interest intervene and cause failures or successes. According to political scientist Charles Jones, "the causes of policy failures are, at root, *political*" (1984, 1). In the absence of a broad-based democratic politics, bureaucratic politics—both military and civilian—will likely rise through manipulation or force and dominate by serving particularistic interest groups at the expense of others' broad-based interests (Moe 1989) and "over-tower society" through self-perpetuation and endless bureaucratization (Weber 1947; Wood and Waterman 1991). Admitting the "administratively effective role of an empowered bureaucracy," Fred Riggs nevertheless stresses, "a more powerful bureaucracy could threaten American democracy by seizing power in a coup d'état or even by an invisible revolution during which career officials [both military and civilian] would gradually extend their effective control over elected officials" (1997, 31).

Politics as capacity must be informed by the state-of-the-art information and sound intelligence supplied to governing and managing leadership for policy capacity development that involves a multitude of diverse stakeholders. Broad-based interests and preferences need to be *articulated* with sound participation and democratic processes. In the age of expansive global governance systems, it is absolutely essential to enhance the functioning *national political capacity* with *anticipatory and "future-weaving"* capabilities that can guide the policy capacity and empower the administrative capacity (Dror 2001; Peters 2001).

Administrative Capacities

Nothing gets done without administrative capacity**.** Administrative capacity is a broad concept that entails running the machinery of a political or economic system, a government, and its international or global affairs, executing policy decisions, and translating political and collective will into actions through implementation and management. Administrative capacity also entails the capability to develop and deliver services that include system maintenance and provision of security and social order; it is the "core of government." As such, administration is the most essential component of

the capacity to govern a nation, its economy, and its institutions, both civilian and military. As Matthew Holden, Jr., states, "administration is the lifeblood of power—no administration, no power" (1997, 126), and "administration is power in practice" (Long 1949). The exercise of power in practice also requires "organization"—no organization, no power in practice; hence the *centrality of administrative capacity in quality governance.*

Administrative capacity embodies many dimensions, functions, values, processes, and issues that require close attention. Avoiding the details familiar to students, scholars, and practitioners of public administration, some of the key features of administrative capacity at the macro level are outlined here without discussion. In the age of rapid globalization and hyper-complexity, building a high-level administrative capacity upgraded and geared for anticipatory, future-weaving, and history-making purposes in governance and administration is a modest "prescription for survival," not a luxury anymore.

These key administrative capacities include the following: (1) *structural capacity,* such as centralization, decentralization, and other forms of structural arrangements (Galbraith and Lawler et al. 1993); (2) *process capacity* that includes not only efficiency and effectiveness, but also qualities of "mutual causality" and self-regulative organizational behaviors (Senge 2006); (3) *cultural or normative capacity* (Paquet 1999; Schein 1992); (4) *institutional and organizational capacities* noted earlier (Scott 2001); (5) *learning leadership and managerial capacities* with a "double-loop, perpetual learning" capability (Argyris 2004; Schein 1992); (6) *strategic human resources capacity* (Farazmand 2007b); (7) *financial resources capacity;* (8) *cognitive capacity,* especially through "holistic learning" (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), for knowledge creation and the supply of lifeblood to other capacity areas of governance and administration (Drucker 2001; Kaneko 1995); (9) *technological capacity* of the electronic information age, such as the Internet, information systems; (10) *ethical, accountability, and "legal/constitutional" as well as other capacities of democratic representation, responsiveness, and fairness* (Cooper 1998; Waldo 1992); and (11) *developmental capacity in both development administration and administrative development* (Dwivedi, Khator, and Nef 2007; Haque and Zafarullah 2006; UN 2005, 2007).

Together, these and other related capacities help build the "administrative capacity" to manage public governance and administration in the age of rapid change and globalization.

Conclusion

Building, developing, and enhancing administrative capacity to meet the challenges of this age of rapid globalization characterized by hyper-competition, hyper-complexity, and hyper-uncertainty is an imperative beyond question. Governments and institutions of governance must upgrade their "administrative capacities" to govern and manage in this expansive global governance and economic system. They must build and enhance their "capacity to manage" economy and society with anticipatory, future-weaving, and history-making capabilities. Nothing replaces good knowledge, and "quality knowledge" can only be acquired through constant striving for excellence and advancement with innovations and applications.

The enterprise of public administration must be equipped with … [an] essential "capacity to manage," both intellectually and practically, in the age of chaos and hyper-uncertainties of the twenty-first century. This is a prescription for survival, not a luxury any more.

The enterprise of public administration must be equipped with this most essential "capacity to manage," both intellectually and practically, in the age of chaos and hyper-uncertainties of the twenty-first century. This is a prescription for survival, not a luxury any more. Politicians and political regimes come and go, but the capacity to govern and manage must always rely on an *advanced "facilitative" administrative capacity constantly upgraded to meet the future challenges.* There is no other alternative to "preparedness." All of the lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina crisis in New Orleans signaled the imperative need for such a facilitative administrative capacity—not to be mistaken with a bureaucratic state, but rather a dynamic, professionally trained, anticipatory, and adaptive capacity armed with the brains and bodies of a "surprise management" system.

This essay has challenged the field and scholars as well as practitioners of public administration as a self-conscious enterprise by raising arguments and inviting responses—through further studies—to help advance knowledge and develop public governance and administration in a global context. We need to come out of the "box" defined and constrained by institutional and system maintenance rules and ideologies; public service and administration ought to be rescued from the chronic crisis of legitimacy and of institutional incapacity, and revitalized to its age-old status as a noble profession and a self-conscious enterprise. A new way of thinking is needed that can challenge the dominant schools—both established and emerging—to see things in a new "global context" full of hyper-complexity, hyper-uncertainty, and chaotic inconceivability, a world that is increasingly unknowable with "surprises." Just as conventional armies are ineffective against surprise-oriented networks of partisan fighters, so are both market and bureaucratic models no match for the challenges of public governance and administration in the age of unexpected surprises.

As a modest solution offered here, "building a new administrative capacity" requires elevation of public administration and "administrative capacity" to its rightful place to encompass a broader scope of "administration as power and core or instrument of government," an essence of governance that must lead and empower a multitude of organizational and institutional forms and networks, including networks and a wide range of stakeholders, coproducers, comanagers, and cooperatives, as well as market and public bureaucracies. Politicians come and go, and public sentiments change and swing by forces of power, money, events, and elite manipulation, but it is the age-old administrative capacity that must maintain order with a full "anticipatory" capacity and stand ready to meet the challenges of increasingly unknown tomorrow; there is no better alternative, as the root of most "policy failures" is "politics."

This requires solving the "intellectual poverty" problem of the field as a self-conscious enterprise by (1) advancing a universal "philosophy" of public service and administration; (2) reinstitutionalizing

the theory and practice of the field through broad-based professionalization; (3) legitimizing a revised administrative state as an effective, facilitative, and essential arm of public governance and government empowered and yet tempered or regulated—both internally and externally—by such institutional means and mechanisms as constitutions, common laws, and time-tested administrative, executive, and judicial actions; and (4) positioning such an empowered and *"anticipatory, surprise-oriented public administration" and administrative state*—through a new philosophy and democratic activism, yet guarded in its discretionary authority—with the ability to question and correct political and partisan temptations fueled by reckless and elitist or even populist sentiments, emotions of changing moments, with subsequent regrets down the road.

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