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# When Can Idea Entrepreneurs Influence Foreign Policy? Explaining the Rise of the "Turkic World" in Turkish Foreign Policy

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This study aims to shift the focus of scholarship on ideas and foreign policy from its overwhelming concern with domestic structures and institutional setup toward a greater awareness of the importance of changing national identity conceptions. I argue that Turkey's foreign policy toward the post-Soviet Turkic Eurasia has been influenced by an ideational factor—the idea of the "Turkic World." Advocated by nonstate actors, "Turkic World" was rapidly internalized by a wide range of political actors in Turkey in the 1990s. Despite the eventual fading of the geopolitical importance of the region for Turkey and the rise to power of a political party with Islamist roots, the idea has gained a "taken for granted" status in Turkey's foreign policy interests and practices. I argue that idea entrepreneurs can influence foreign policy when two conditions are met: first, when a critical juncture prompts decision makers to search for a new foreign policy framework and second, when the evolving national identity conceptions of the ruling elite overlap with the general premise of the idea entrepreneurs' proposals. In this case, "Turkic World" has not only provided Turkish decision makers with a pragmatic foreign policy course but also spoken to their changing "worldviews."

Under what circumstances are ideas advocated by nonstate actors and transnational networks institutionalized in foreign policy? When do political actors from a wide spectrum of ideologies internalize an idea and pursue its institutionalization in foreign policy? In this article, I focus on how the idea of the "Turkic World" has become institutionalized as a core concept in contemporary Turkish foreign policy despite the waning of Turkic Eurasia's objective geopolitical and economic importance for Turkey. Indeed, despite the difficulty of achieving meaningful Turkish influence in Central Asia given the strong, preexisting Russian and Chinese involvement there, all prominent Turkish political parties regard it as a region in which Turkey should assert its influence, and Turkey continues to intensify its relations with the region through improving intergovernmental ties and offering developmental aid.

Current research emphasizes the role of domestic institutional frameworks in determining the potential for transnational actors or policy entrepreneurs to

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influence the direction of a state's foreign policy (Risse-Kappen 1994, 1995; Evangelista 1995; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012). In this article, I demonstrate that this literature's premises are insufficient to explain a significant development in Turkish foreign policy: the rapid internalization and gradual institutionalization of the idea of the "Turkic World." I argue that idea entrepreneurs can influence foreign policy when two conditions are met: first, when a critical juncture prompts decision makers to search for a new foreign policy framework and second, when the evolving national identity conceptions of the ruling elite overlap with the general premise of the idea entrepreneurs' proposals. I refer to idea entrepreneurs as nonstate actors who advocate the entry into and subsequent institutionalization of an ideational cause in foreign policy. Similar to norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Bratberg 2011; Breuning 2013) and policy entrepreneurs (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012; Macdonald 2015), idea entrepreneurs ultimately aim for policy change. However, they differ from norm and policy entrepreneurs as the ideas that they advocate include a broad set of norms and policies rather than a single norm or policy. Idea entrepreneurs aim to change the conceptual framework within which foreign policy is conducted.[2] As my empirical analysis will demonstrate, entrepreneurs of the idea of "Turkic World" have promoted a comprehensive set of policies, which followed their "worldview" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) or national identity conception. In other words, idea entrepreneurs can influence foreign policy by presenting decision makers in the process of redefining national interests with a ready-made set of policies to follow in order to pursue these new interests. This can render irrelevant any previous barriers presented by the domestic institutional framework. As Turkey's evolving relations with the post-Soviet Turkic states demonstrate, even in nondemocratic settings, critical junctures and changing national identity conceptions can potentially offer "windows of opportunity" (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012; Macdonald 2015) for outside idea entrepreneurs—who were previously regarded as dissidents—to influence foreign policy.

First and foremost, I put forward the argument that the idea of the "Turkic World," a concept initially advocated by idea entrepreneurs—nationalist and pan-Turkist nongovernmental actors—became the key organizing concept in the governmental reconstitution of Turkey's national interests after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The idea of the "Turkic World" corresponds to the belief in cultural, societal, economic, and political unity among the Turkic-speaking peoples of Eurasia. During a period when Turkey's national identity was under fierce contestation, ideologically compatible Turkish decision makers in the 1990s rapidly adopted the idea of the "Turkic World" promoted by nonstate actors so much so that the concept came to acquire a "taken for granted" status among the Turkish political elite (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999). This process of ideational embedding in the 1990s ensured that the current Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, despite its different ideological background, would continue the "Turkic World" policies after coming to power.

I thus take issue with existing studies on Turkey's relations with the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—that have tended to embrace a geopolitical perspective in which Turkey's efforts to acquire greater regional power are evaluated solely in terms of rationality, material capabilities, and political outcomes (Winrow 2003; Aydin 2004; Torbakov 2005). For example, several scholars argue that geopolitical and material constraints have led Turkey to give up on its initial activist outlook in Eurasia and that both regional developments and the ruling JDP's worldview have led Turkey to pursue an activist foreign policy in the Middle

[2]Previously, Sjöstedt (2013) used the term "idea entrepreneurs" in her study of securitizing moves. However, she uses the concepts of idea, norm, and policy entrepreneurs interchangeably.

East and North Africa instead (Aydin, 2004; Murinson 2006; Keyman 2009; Öniş and Yilmaz; 2009; Bilgin and Bilgiç 2011; Erşen 2013). In contrast, I demonstrate that JDP governments have worked steadily to institutionalize cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic states of Eurasia. In particular, I examine the establishment of the Turkic Council and Turkic Parliamentarians Assembly (Turk-Pa), the continuing weight of the Turkic states in the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency's official development aid, and references to the "Turkic World" in the official programs of governments and political parties. This examination shows that Turkish policies in Eurasia have not been primarily influenced by purely material or geopolitical concerns but by ideational ones, which has driven Turkish decision makers consistently toward closer political, economic, and cultural cooperation with the post-Soviet Turkic states.

The first part of the paper places my arguments within the ongoing theoretical debate on how and under what circumstances ideas can constitute national interests and influence foreign policy making. The second part introduces the idea of the "Turkic World" and explains how Turkey's search for a new role in world politics and changing perceptions of Turkish identity after the Cold War created an opening for the idea of the "Turkic World" to enter the Turkish foreign policy debate in the early 1990s. The third part examines the entrepreneurs of the idea of "Turkic World," taking a close look at their platforms and policy proposals. The fourth part explores the institutionalization of the idea of the "Turkic World" in Turkish foreign policy. The conclusion returns to my broader theoretical arguments on idea entrepreneurs and foreign policy making, arguing that in times when political elites redefine national interests and reshape foreign policy orientations, previously disregarded ideas can be internalized by a wide range of political actors and institutionalized in foreign policy if they come to overlap with new national identity conceptions.

## Idea Entrepreneurs and Foreign Policy: National Identity as the Missing Link

This article builds on the theoretical debates that marked the transformation of international relations theory and comparative political institutions in the early and mid-1990s, as the end of the Cold War revealed the need to move beyond materially and structurally oriented explanations of international politics. Scholars such as Goldstein and Keohane (1993), Ikenberry (1993), Risse-Kappen (1994, 1995), Katzenstein (1996), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Checkel (1997), and Evangelista (1995, 1999) laid the groundwork for a debate on ideational and transnational impacts on foreign policy and international political change.

One main line of discussion in the literature was under what circumstances ideas advocated by nonstate actors and transnational networks could change states' policies. In a leading article on the ideational roots of Gorbachev's foreign and security policies, Risse-Kappen (1994) argues that ideas lead to political change, but their impact is mediated by the domestic structures of states. In other words, transnational actors need channels through which they can try to convince decision makers to change and be a part of the "winning coalition" whose interests prevail in policymaking (Risse-Kappen 1994, 1995). In "centralized and state-dominated societal structures," such as the Soviet Union, it was only thanks to a reform-oriented leadership under Gorbachev that transnational networks promoting the liberal internationalist ideas of "common security" and "nonoffensive defense" could influence Soviet foreign and security policy. Similarly, in a seminal piece on the causes of the end of the Cold War, Evangelista (1995, 1) echoes Risse-Kappen in arguing that

> a country's domestic structure influences its degree of openness to ideas promoted by transnational actors as well as the extent to which those ideas are implemented as

> policy. A highly centralized, secretive, state-dominated polity will provide relatively little access to transnational actors, but if their policy proposals do get a favorable hearing from the top leadership, they can be implemented effectively.

In the case of Soviet strategic defense and nuclear arms proliferation policies, the transnational disarmament community—Evangelista's (1999) "unarmed forces"—was influential. This was because they could get their policies implemented in a centralized and hierarchical polity controlled by Gorbachev and his politburo, who favored the ideas advocated by the transnational disarmament community. Counterintuitively, Evangelista shows that the impact of transnational actors on Soviet security policy became more ambiguous after 1989 when the system started to democratize. This was primarily because in a decentralized political system, nongovernmental activism could flourish easily, but it was much harder to influence the top echelons of decision making. In his study on the Soviet and Russian foreign policy behavior before and after the immediate end of the Cold War, Checkel (1997) comes to a similar conclusion. Policy entrepreneurs constituted the key causal link between ideas and policy change in the Gorbachev era simply because many other ways of influencing foreign policy were blocked in the Soviet case. More recently, Hook (2008, 147) has demonstrated that domestic structure mediated the influence of principled and causal beliefs on "the most significant change in US aid strategy"—that of the establishment of the Millenium Challenge Corporation as an independent agency. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, "an enabling political environment and the lack of mobilized parochial self-interests" on American foreign aid gave the Bush administration the freedom to establish a new agency to implement its changed foreign policy program (Hook 2008, 162).

This literature brings us to a second critical debate on ideas and foreign policy: Whose ideas matter? To be more specific, under what circumstances do dissident nongovernmental actors such as pan-Turkists gain legitimate status in the eyes of decision makers? In a recent study on the formation of international institutions in the post-Soviet space, Darden (2009, 45–46) outlines the factors that determine whose ideas matter in policymaking: accountability, accessibility, and control. Accordingly, high governmental accountability, societal accessibility, and low state control over the society were three fundamental variables that make a political system more open to ideational impact. Darden (2009, 146) states that "where the policymaking process is more accessible to domestic or transnational societal actors, state preferences are more likely to reflect the ideas of some subset of those actors involved in the process." Moreover, windows of opportunity, such as international developments and security crises, can help to justify policy entrepreneurs' push for a new foreign policy course (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012). Similarly, Breuning (2013), in her study on the failure of the internalization of international ideas in Belgian development policy, argues that norm entrepreneurs must build coalitions to make sure that the message is conveyed to the domestic audience and the idea/norm is adopted. The ability to build winning coalitions depends to a large extent, again, on the political institutions within which idea entrepreneurs operate. Most recently, through an analysis of the geographic shift in Turkey's official development assistance programs, Ipek (2015) has argued that domestic structure mattered in translating the ideas and material interests of a small group of foreign policy elites into concrete policy outcomes. According to Ipek (2015, 16–18), the principled and causal beliefs held by Davutoglu—Turkey's current prime minister and former minister of foreign affairs—and his colleagues became prevalent thanks to this group's close connections with the current president Erdogan and the ruling JDP's majority control in the parliament.

Turkey was neither fully democratic nor liberal in the early 1990s when the idea of the "Turkic World" made its initial impact on foreign policy making.

During Turkey's post-miltary coup era (after 1980), foreign policy had traditionally been in the realm of "high politics," determined mainly by the priorities of the Turkish military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No single government was able to implement its foreign policy goals fully because leading parties could not control the majority of the parliament between the general elections of 1991 and 2002.[3] That being said, the idea of the "Turkic World" was rapidly internalized by a wide range of foreign policy elites. The idea finally became institutionalized in foreign policy practices under the rule of the JDP, which has systematically held the majority of the seats in the Turkish parliament since the general elections of 2002. The literature leads us to expect that in a centralized political system like Turkey's, with few checks and balances on the executive as well as low societal accessibility, Turkey's domestic institutional set up and/or its elites' material means/ends calculations should be the key causal mechanisms connecting the idea of the "Turkic World" and its entrepreneurs to its foreign policy institutionalization.[4] However, as I will demonstrate, ideational adoption and institutionalization depends as much or more on domestic national identity contestation and the prevailing self-conceptions of the ruling elite in terms of how they define their nation's identity and place in world politics.[5] These self-conceptions facilitate the institutionalization of ideas, especially when governments are in search of new foreign policy orientations. Nationalist and pan-Turkist activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) offered Turkish decision makers, who at the time had little knowledge about the post-Soviet Turkic states, a roadmap (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) to follow. Acting as bridges between Turkey and Turkey's ethnic cousins in the East, entrepreneurs of the "Turkic World" also had sufficient discursive power to get the attention of Turkish policymakers: reputation, credibility, and perceived knowledge on the topic (Sjöstedt 2013). Similar to the influence of Keynesian economic thinking on postwar economic settlement (Ikenberry 1993), the idea of the "Turkic World" provided an opportunity for Turkish decision makers to become a regional power in the Caucasus and Central Asia during a critical juncture. In such periods of uncertainty, decision makers are more open to ideational inputs from nonstate actors as the former engage in a search for information (Checkel 1997).

As we will see, Turkish foreign policy toward the Turkic states of Eurasia shows that former dissidents could initiate foreign policy change and pursue institutionalization because their policy proposals appealed to a wide range of political actors who were in the process of redefining national interests as well as national identity. In Turkey's internalization of the idea of the "Turkic World," changing national identity conceptions served as a "catalyst" for governments in need of redefining foreign policy goals, thereby speeding up the acceptance of the idea by a wide range of political groups (Sjöstedt 2013, 149). As Risse and Sikkink (1999) argue, the socialization of an idea or norm in state policies is finalized through the process of institutionalization in which the norm becomes a habit in the policies of a country. In a time of controversial domestic debate about Turkey's various identities, a wide range of political actors in Turkey, including the left wing and the political Islamists, internalized the Turkic identity. Once such ideas/norms are institutionalized, "changes in government and in individual leaders matter less and less," and they are simply "taken for granted" (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 17). As ideas become taken for granted, conformance with them

[3]For a discussion on coalition foreign policy making, see Ozkececi-Taner (2005).

[4]For a discussion of under what circumstances norm/policy entrepreneurs can change foreign policy behaviour, see Bratberg's (2011) analysis of French and British leaders' view on the Iraq War.

[5]For a discussion on how national identity contestation influences the formation of national interests, see Abdelal (2001). For a social constructivist account of national identity and foreign policy, see Hopf (2002). On contested social contexts and state action, see Tsygankov (2014). In this study, I do not engage with these strands of literature because I am closely focused on how ideas influence foreign policy.

becomes "almost automatic" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904). Moreover, if ideas are embedded in domestic institutions or through the establishment of intergovernmental organizations, policymakers continue to implement them regardless of their worldviews and although geopolitical circumstances change (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995; Kitchen 2010).

## The Idea of the "Turkic World": Emergence and Evolution

The idea of the "Turkic World" emerged in the late nineteenth century in the Russian Empire's Turkic-populated cities, such as Kazan, Bakhchisaray, and Baku. It then spread to Istanbul thanks to both publications in a kind of High Turkic language that were read by Turkic intellectuals all over the Russian and Turkish Empires (Eissenstat 2001–2002) and the political activism of Kazan Tatar and Azerbaijani intellectuals in Istanbul, especially within the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Entrepreneurs of the idea were initially Turkic intellectuals and activists in search of greater cultural and political rights for the Turkic-Muslim peoples of Tsarist Russia.[6]

Only during World War I did the idea of the "Turkic World" start to make a political impact, when leaders of the CUP tried to use Turkism as a means of resurrecting the collapsing Empire. Although Turkish nationalism was the dominant ideology of the commanders of the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), it was much more narrowly defined as pan-Turkism and lost its appeal almost entirely as the new Republic of Turkey was founded in October 1923. Although the new regime was based on a nationalist understanding, it defined Turkish identity within constitutional boundaries eliminating references to ethnicity (Yeğen 2004, 51–66; Aktürk 2011). According to Heper (2007, 85), there was a strong tendency to define a "Turk" based on the history and traditions of Anatolia only. Aktürk (2011, 150) recently argued that Turkey approximated an "anti-ethnic" regime in which reference to ethnicity was invisible. Arguing that pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism have never been policies that could be implemented, Mustafa Kemal said in his Great Speech that "national policy" meant depending on one's own power and resources inside national borders and hence protecting the nation from impossible dreams (Atatürk 2005, 311). Hence, even the Turkmens in today's Northern Iraq, or the Mosul district in Ottoman terms, remained outside the definition of Turkishness although the *Misak-I Milli*—the National Oath of the War of Independence—encompassed the region as a legitimate land of Turkey and Turks.[7] The conceptualization of nationhood in Turkey as confined to the borders of the new Turkish state and the foreign policy framework developed accordingly limited the transnational capacity of the idea of the "Turkic World" and distanced it from Turkish political life. Bolshevik repression of national intelligentsias also limited the transnational capacity of Turkic activism and decreased cross-border contacts to low levels. Friendly relations between the new Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union further contributed to the disappearance of transnational networks among Turkic-speaking peoples.[8]

[6]See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay (1967), Khalid (1998), and Eissenstat (2001–2002) for further information on Turkic intellectuals and their activism in the late Tsarist period.

[7]In his Great Speech he made in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Atatürk dismissed pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism as two irredentist and imperialistic political moves; see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (2005, 310). For Atatürk's speeches on the "Outside Turks," see Utkan Kocatürk (1999, 219). It can be seen in Atatürk's speeches that he makes reference to Turkish history, including Asiatic and Turkic rulers such as Attila and Timur alongside Ottoman emperors such as Suleiman I. He refers to the "greatness" of Turkish history and the Turkish nation as a symbol of civilization since they first appeared on the scene of humanity in Central Asia. Despite his romantic views on Turkish history, Atatürk followed constitutionalist nationalism.

[8]For a detailed analysis of Turkey's foreign policy options and debates in the early Republican era as well as why pan-Turkism was dismissed, see Zarakol (2011, 111–59).

Although Prime Minister Saraçoğlu would argue in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1942 that the ruling Republican People's Party were "Turkists and shall remain Turkists forever" (quoted in Heper 2007, 104), the emerging fear of Soviet aggression on Turkish territory at the end of World War II would color official attitudes toward the idea of the "Turkic World" throughout the Cold War. Starting from 1944 with the famous trials of "Turkism-Turanism," the Turkish state officially distanced itself from the entrepreneurs of the idea, including Turkic émigré intellectuals residing in Turkey (Landau 1995). İnönü's efforts to curb pan-Turkish nationalism and the trials of 1944 pushed the idea of the "Turkic World" into a marginal and romantic line associated with irredentism (Andican 2009).

During the Cold War, only the "idealists" connected to the far right Nationalist Action Party (NAP) promoted the idea of the "Turkic World" with a pan-Turkist ideology. These "idealists" had no contacts with the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union; the idea had lost its transnational nature and was only being used in a domestic political context. Throughout the Cold War, any dealing with the Turkic peoples (or the "Outside Turks") was understood as imperialistic and irredentist, which contradicted the peaceful principles of the republican regime (Aydin 1999, 171–74). As the bloody struggle between left-wing groups and the right-wing nationalists continued, Turkism and the idea of the "Turkic World" became associated with racism, and nationalists were accused of pursuing a fascistic strand of imperialist nationalism.

Consequently, entrepreneurs of the transnational idea of the "Turkic World" were unable to influence the new ideology and nationhood defined in Turkey, which resulted in the initial non-emergence of a Turkic conception in Turkish foreign policy. Pan-Turkist intellectuals and activists were regarded as dissidents and problematic figures for the Turkish state. It would not be until the late 1980s, when Turkey rediscovered its ethno-linguistic ties with the Balkans, Crimea, Volga-Ural region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia that the idea of the "Turkic World" would start to make an impact on Turkish foreign policy.

## The Resurgence of the "Turkic World" in the Post-Cold War Era

Within the post-Cold War international environment, Turkey "found itself at the center of a Eurasian region that has become the focal point of global geopolitics" (Aydin 2003, 139). Although the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus were all in Turkey's neighborhood, Turkey redefined its national interest to include Central Asia within its geopolitical formulation. Soon Turkish Prime Minister Demirel would define the "Turkic World" as "a geographic area extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall," which had "contributed to the development of humanity and civilization" with its distinct identity (Turkish Daily News 1998). This rediscovery owed very much to the efforts of NGOs and former nationalist activists. The efforts of nationalist NGOs and both official and nonofficial individuals—microactors—who lobbied for Turkic rapprochement resulted in the "Turkic World" becoming a key concept in Turkish foreign policy.[9]

This perceptional change related to Turkish history and identity led Turkish decision makers to open up a new agenda for Turkish foreign policy (Bal 2000, 43; Fidan 2010, 120). Turkish identity was on the edge of "fragmegration" (Rosenau 2003, 11) because it showed simultaneous patterns of fragmentation and integration when the Cold War was coming to an end. With the Özal period, ethnic identities other than the upper Turkish constitutional identity were publicized, and intellectuals and activists with various political backgrounds started to debate the content of

[9]Interview with Namik Kemal Zeybek, former Minister of Culture, Minister of State, Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister, and Chief Advisor to the President. January 8, 2009. Ankara.

Turkish national identity (Ataman 2002). As Aktürk (2011, 150) demonstrates, debates about Kurdish and other minority identities in Turkey intensified in the 1990s with the Social Democratic Populist Party and the Islamist Welfare Party challenging official republican policies on homogenous ethnicity and nationality. Turkish armed forces were also in a bitter conflict with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) since 1984, which sought the recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity through armed struggle. But countering this fragmentation of Turkish identity was an opposite trend, an integrating one, which enlarged the definition of "Turkishness" to "the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall" in President Demirel's words.

The rediscovery of transnational Turkic identity was indeed a turning point for the formation of Turkish foreign policy toward the post-Soviet space with a strong emphasis on the five Turkic states. According to Fidan (2010, 110), Turkey's current chief intelligence officer, one reason why Turkey's foreign policy elite would attribute special significance to the region was that "the region is perceived as the original land of ethnic Turkic populations" as well as that of the Turks of modern Turkey. The roots of this perception go back to the 1930s as the "Turkish Historical Thesis" suggested by the Turkish Historical Society argues that Central Asia is the fatherland of the Turkish nation and civilization. Although pan-Turkism was thought to be an adventuristic and dangerous policy that could annoy the Soviet Union and its entrepreneurs were deemed dissidents, the idea remained the logical outcome of the deliberate process of nation building through the glorification of Turkish history and culture, including the pre-Islamic times (Kushner 1997). Zhivkov's policy of ethnic assimilation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in the 1980s and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh between 1988 and 1994 contributed to the development of a societal and political atmosphere welcoming to the idea of the "Turkic World" in Turkish politics (Cornell 1998).[10] NGOs as entrepreneurs could then promote the idea of the "Turkic World" by pressuring governments and key decision makers to seize upon the opportunity offered by geopolitical change in Eurasia. Prominent nationalist NGOs, such as *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) and *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı* (Turkic World Research Foundation), rapidly established personal and organizational ties with the intellectuals and NGOs of the newly independent Turkic republics. Nationalist NGOs in Turkey established the first ties between Turkey and the post-Soviet Turkic states by organizing visits and transnational meetings almost immediately after the Soviet Union disintegrated.[11] Similarly, the NAP and its leader, Alparslan Türkeş, had a high reputation in the newly independent republics due to the party's traditional anti-communist policy. In his first visit to Azerbaijan and Central Asia in April–May 1992 Prime Minister Demirel included Türkeş alongside a large group of intellectuals, businessmen, and journalists. Robins (2003) argues that the Turkish government consulted Türkeş on its new policy toward the Turkic states.

For many scholars, Turkish politicians and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were indeed "unprepared" for the newly emerging reality (Bal 2000; Aydin 2004; Karasar 2007). Turkish policymakers and bureaucrats tried to consult nationalist NGOs in order to formulate foreign policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia (Karasar 2007, 147). This consultation process was a turning point for Turkey's relations with the Turkic states because it legitimized the role of the "Turkic World" entrepreneurs in Turkish foreign policy. Regardless of their ideological backgrounds, subsequent governments would continue to see the pan-Turkist NGOs as legitimate and knowledgeable promoters of the Turkic World concept.

The idea's rapid emergence in Turkish foreign policy is evident in Turkey's ambitious endeavor to open up to the post-Soviet space as early as 1991. According to the

[10]See the left-wing daily Cumhuriyet, 5 April 1993, as an example.

[11]Interview with Ahat Andican, former Minister of State and Government Spokesperson. May 1, 2010. Interview. Istanbul.

(see Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Turkey was the first country in the international community to recognize the independence of all five Turkic republics in November 1991. Turkish decision makers soon organized official visits to Turkic capitals with large entourages (Robins 2003). The officials' discourse included references to the "responsibilities" of Turkey regarding the newly independent Turkic states (Aydın 2003, 141). According to the foreign policy agenda developed toward the post-Soviet Turkic states, Turkey would help these countries establish their state structures in order to consolidate their independence. To accomplish this aim, Turkey sent military, academic, and administrative personnel to offer bureaucratic and technical help in various fields of governance, such as security affairs, national education, and economic reorganization (Aydin 2004, 4–5).

Since its independence, Turkey has helped the post-Soviet Turkic states to represent themselves in international organizations and hence acquire prestigious positions in the international community. This active "bridge" role of Turkey helped Azerbaijan to become a member of the Council of Europe and all five Turkic states to become members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Moreover, Turkey made serious efforts to integrate these countries into regional cooperation organizations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace program. By acting as a bridge, Turkish leaders expected to receive the support of "the brothers" in international forums. This rather brave behavior was a first-time activity in Turkish foreign policy and an indication that Turkey had shed its traditional "cautious" and "skeptical" foreign policy (Aydin 1999, 162). Turkey also attempted to become a model for the newly independent Turkic states. Secular Turkey with its predominantly Muslim population would supposedly become an attractive regime type for the leaders of the brother states. The "Turkish Model" was also encouraged by the United States and Europe as it would curb the possible influence of Iran in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Though this attempted leadership gave way to a less ambitious approach by the mid-1990s, it was perfectly representative of the transformation in Turkey's foreign policy goals.

During this time, Turkey developed an extensive institutional framework to coordinate its relations with the newly independent Turkic states. In several ministries and undersecretariats, such as the one responsible for Foreign Trade, branches responsible for the Caucasus and Central Asia were established (Robins 2003). As part of a new foreign policy vision and activism, Turkey established the Turkish International Development and Cooperation Agency[12] (TIKA) as a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. TIKA's goal would be to offer development assistance to Turkic states and to intensify Turkey's societal, cultural, and economic ties with these states through joint projects and programs (Özkan and Demirtepe 2012, 649). TIKA supported and coordinated hundreds of development projects through the program coordination offices established in all the capitals during the 1990s. Turkish president Özal also initiated the "Turkic-speaking Countries Heads of States Summits" (Turkic Summits) to establish a platform for increasing cooperation and possible future integration among Turkey and the Turkic states. The first of these summits, held in Ankara in October 1992, yielded the famous "Ankara Declaration" and covered economic cooperation, free trade, free movement of goods, people, and services, developing an integrated transport system, telecommunications, banking, and energy cooperation (Robins 2003). In the summit's opening speech, Özal claimed that the twenty-first century would belong to Turks once members of the Turkic world cooperated with each other (Sarioglu 1992). Turkey also undertook steps to steer cultural and educational cooperation. In 1992, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY) was established as a

[12]TIKA is now officially named the "Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency."

transgovernmental body of ministries of culture. Besides the five newly independent Turkic states and Turkey, TÜRKSOY would accept the autonomous Turkic units[13] of the Russian Federation and Moldova as its associate members. Turkey officially opened up two universities in Central Asia: the Turkish-Kazak International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University in Kazakhstan and the Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University in Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish Ministry of National Education and later on the Directorate of Turks and Relative Communities Living Abroad also coordinated the Great Student Project, one of the biggest projects concerning Turkic states and communities. According to Yanık (2004, 293–307), the Project was similar to the national educational campaign of the first republican years. Just as the young republic had embarked upon consolidating a national identity for the citizens, the project aimed to create a stratum of people in the Turkic states and communities who would be sympathetic toward Turkey and Turkish culture.

### Nongovernmental Activism in the 1990s and 2000s: Turkic Kurultays

How did idea entrepreneurs promote so successfully the idea of the "Turkic World" in the aftermath of the Cold War? Once able to better organize and access policymaking, pan-Turkist and nationalist NGOs advocated the Turkic cause in important transnational meetings and, in doing so, managed to get their voices heard by a wide spectrum of political and societal actors in Turkey. Starting in 1991, various nongovernmental conferences and congresses in Turkey have brought together activists, intellectuals, artists, politicians, and bureaucrats from all over Turkic-speaking Eurasia. From among the various nongovernmental platforms established by these activists, I pay specific attention to the Turkic *kurultays*—Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Congresses. *Kurultays* were held between 1992 and 2007 and functioned as the main policy platform through which entrepreneurs have promoted the Turkic cause in a systematic manner. *Kurultays* were more significant than other channels of communication between idea entrepreneurs and policymakers for several reasons. First, they were comprehensive in terms of the range of issues discussed by their participants. These congresses focused on issues, including cooperation in education, transportation and broadcasting, unity in alphabets, Turkic arts and cultures, writing a common Turkic history, architecture, urban planning, transition to liberal market economies, women's rights, and sports, as means of speeding up integration between Turkey and the Turkic peoples of Eurasia. Moreover, among the many conferences, congresses, and meetings held in order to promote Turkic rapprochement, Turkic *Kurultay*s constituted the broadest platform that incorporated NGOs as well as intellectuals and academics from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Crimea, Russia, and the Balkans. What made these congresses even more important was that the participants called upon Turkish leaders and the leaders of the newly independent Turkic states to have a united voice in international forums. Soon after their initiation, *Kurultays* became a platform that brought together entrepreneurs of the "Turkic World" from all over the world and Turkish officials through which to discuss the significance of Turkey's relations with the Turkic-speaking world. Since 1993, eleven Turkic *Kurultay*s have taken place, ten in Turkey and one in Azerbaijan. Turkish presidents, prime ministers, and ministers of foreign affairs, as well as leaders of opposition parties, have attended most of these transnational meetings.

Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of NAP was the leading figure behind the *Kurultay*s until his death in 1997.[14] The legitimacy of *Kurultay*s in the eyes of organizers and participants was based on their connection with the earliest Turkists. Hence, the

[13]Republic of Tatarstan, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Altai, Republic of Tuva and the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic in the Russian Federation, and the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit in Moldova.

[14]Interview with Abdulhaluk Çay, Organizer of *Kurultays* and former Minister of State. May 28, 2010. Interview. Ankara.

motto of *Kurultay*s has been the Crimean Tatar intellectual Gasprinsky's words "Unity in Language, Thought and Action." Çay, a chief organizer of the congresses, argues that *Kurultay*s took the All-Russia Muslim Congresses of the early twentieth century in Tsarist Russia as an example for the format and spirit of the congresses.[15] From the very start, Turkic congresses have had a wide range of goals, including but not limited to increasing ties among Turkic peoples, sustaining cooperation in international relations, economic and technological development, finding solutions for common problems, speeding up cultural exchange, and finding common grounds for the peaceful resolution of disputes between Turkic states and other states (Çay 1995). As a final goal, *Kurultay*s have aimed to institutionalize relations among Turkic countries in such a way that cooperation among the Turkic states could be sustained (Çay 1995). The establishment of a Council of Turkic States and an Assembly of Turkic Parliamentarians had been advocated by these congresses since 1994 (Çay 1995, 35). Beginning with the first congress in 1993, participants invited Turkey and Turkic republics to search for a common alphabet, develop mechanisms to protect human rights and multiparty democracy, and increase cooperation in science and multilateral technology transfer as well as environmental protection (Çay 2006, 26–27).

The tenth *Kurultay*, in September 2006, took place without active support from the NAP and under the auspices of Prime Minister Erdoğan. In the opening ceremony, Erdoğan argued that Turks, in a unified manner, should be actors rather than subjects of the emerging world order and establish a "Commonwealth of Turkic-Speaking States" (Hürriyet 2006). The eleventh *Kurultay* a year later took place for the first time outside Turkey, in Baku, Azerbaijan. The final Declaration of the Baku *Kurultay* suggested forty policy initiatives, such as the rapid establishment of a Union of Turkic-speaking States and Union of Turkic Parliamentarians, cooperation among Turkic states in Azerbaijan's struggle against Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the establishment of economic, cultural, and political ties with the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, support for Turkic diasporas that are actively organized in Europe, and helping Turks and Turkic peoples who live as minorities to acquire political and cultural rights (Qurbanov and Miralem 2008).

Turkic *Kurultay*s is an example of how idea entrepreneurs can reduce uncertainty for policymakers in need of foreign policy roadmaps. Pan-Turkist activists and intellectuals brought together hundreds of people—politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals, artists, and students—from all around Turkic Eurasia and introduced them to Turkish decision makers, diplomats, media, and public. In response to this effort, Turkish presidents, governments, and diplomats came to regard Turkic activism as a means to carry Turkey into Eurasia and vice versa. The "tipping point" for the adoption of the idea by a "critical mass" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895) of political actors was realized within the first decade of the reemergence of the idea of the "Turkic World" in Turkish politics. Presidents, prime ministers, and political parties, as well as different branches of the Turkish media, including the left-wing *Cumhuriyet* and conservative *Tercüman*, accepted the reemerging reality and took it seriously as a factor that could have a significant place in Turkish foreign policy.[16] The "socialization" (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 11) of the idea by Turkish politicians, public opinion, and bureaucrats led to a common perception that Turkey was part of the entire "Turkic World"

[15]Interview with Çay.

[16]For the attention paid by the left-wing *Cumhuriyet*, see 10 April 1993, "Anadolu Anayurt, Orta Asya Atayurt" (Anatolia is the Homeland, Central Asia is the Fatherland) and 18 October 1994, "21. Yüzyıl Türklerin Olacak" (The 21st Century Will Belong to Turks); for that by the right-wing *Tercüman*, see 15 April 1993, "Türkiye Milleti ve Devleti ile Azerbaycan'ın Dostu" (Turkey is a Friend of Azerbaijan with its Nation and State) and 19 October 1994, "Türk Birliğine İkinci Adım" (The Second Step for Turkic Union).

alongside the European (Western) transatlantic security community and the Islamic world. For instance, İsmail Cem, a well-known social democrat and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 1997 to July 2002, came to perceive Turkey's ties to the Turkic republics as a source of Turkish soft power in Eurasia that could contribute to Turkey's bargaining power in the European Union accession process (Cem 2005, 99–100, 113). Cem (2005, 240) also recognized that Turkey had an "Asian" identity and had brother nations in the East that Turkey had a responsibility to assist in economic transition and state building. Most importantly, as I will show in the next section, the JDP has embraced the policy proposals that were laid down in the *Kurultays* by pan-Turkists. In that sense, the entrepreneurs of the "Turkic World" offered a blueprint to follow for Turkish policymakers.

## The Institutionalization of the "Turkic World" Concept in the 2000s

This section traces how the ruling JDP institutionalized Turkey's Turkic identity and implemented the policy proposals put forward in the *Kurultay*s even after the excitement of Turkey's initial rapprochement with the Turkic world gave way to a more pragmatic understanding by the late 1990s that it was not realistic to establish a "Union of Turkic States" stretching from the "Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall." Several domestic and international factors contributed to the policy change (Winrow 2003; Torbakov 2005; Karasar 2007; Tworkowski 2008; Erşen 2013). First, Turkey's struggle against PKK terrorism and the Kurdish question diverted Turkey's regional focus to a more security-oriented foreign policy approach that privileged territorial integrity (Aras and Karakaya Polat 2008). Second, Turkey's economic crises in the mid-1990s and 2001 made its attempts to create a common Turkic market and Turkish investment plans in the Turkic states impossible to realize. Third, although Turkish politicians and publics were eager to develop ties with Turkic peoples, and Turkish bureaucracy was reorganized to incorporate the Caucasus and Central Asia, there was a lack of knowledge and expertise regarding the post-Soviet Turkic states. As the initial excitement could not be supported by regional expertise, Turkish diplomats, politicians, and publics lost their belief in a common Turkic future (Winrow 2003). Fourth, by the late 1990s, Turkey began to focus more on European Union integration, the Cyprus problem, and disputes with Syria rather than building a Turkic economic and political union. Fifth, Russia's "Near Abroad" doctrine hampered Turkey's search for regional leadership. Sixth, the "Turkish Model" was not attractive for the authoritarian Turkic leaders as they "did not have much interest in fostering broader political participation and pluralism" (Torbakov 2005, 119). Finally, several years after independence, Azerbaijan and Central Asia did not need to rely on Turkish assistance to open their markets and energy resources to foreign powers. Hence, Western as well as Chinese and Indian economic and political activities in the region increased, making Turkish geopolitical influence smaller. Nevertheless, despite these changes, Turkish decision makers continued to pursue multilateral intergovernmental cooperation with the Turkic states, and Turkic cooperation has continued to be an important reference point in official documents.

### *Intergovernmental Cooperation: Turkic Council and Turk-Pa*

Heads of States Summits of Turkic speaking States, or "Turkic Summits" have been an important component of Turkey's relations with the Turkic World. Ten summits were held between 1992 and 2010 with the last two the most important in terms of practical policy outcomes. The ninth summit, held in Nakhchivan in October 2009, was of crucial importance due to the steps taken by Alivev of Azerbaijan, Gül of Turkey, Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, and Bakiev of Kyrgyzstan.

The first result that came out of the Summit was the establishment of a Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States, or Turkic Council, based in Istanbul, that would act as a secretariat of Turkic Summits. The Turkic Council also includes a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a Council of Senior Officials, and a Council of Wise Men. After the tenth summit in Istanbul in September 2010, the Turkic Council started to operate in Istanbul with Halil Akıncı, former Turkish ambassador to Moscow, as its secretary general. Upon its establishment, the Turkic Council took over the task of organizing the Turkic Summits. Since the establishment of the Turkic Council, Turkic Summits have been held on a thematic basis every year in the territory of a different member state. The first summit under the official banner of the Turkic Council took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in October 2011, where Turkic leaders discussed issues related to economic cooperation. The Almaty Summit established the Turkic Business Council to make it easier for businessmen to reach out to decision makers in Turkey and the three other signatory states. The next summit was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in August 2012, where Turkic leaders and bureaucrats discussed educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation. The summit's final declaration announced agreements on the financial rules of the Turkic Council, the formation of a Turkic Academy in Astana, and the establishment of the Foundation of Turkic Culture and Heritage in Baku. In 2013, Turkic leaders gathered in Gabala, Azerbaijan, where the theme was cooperation in tourism and transportation. Turkic leaders emphasized the importance of the construction of the Kars–Tblisi–Erzurum railway for the unity of Turkic peoples and encouraged other projects that would connect Central Asia and the Caucasus through new transportation routes (Today.Az 2013). In 2014, Turkic leaders met in Bodrum, Turkey, with cooperation in tourism as the main theme. This time, however, Turkic leaders also discussed the recent developments in Ukraine.

In addition, another intergovernmental body, the Turk-Pa, was established in Baku in November 2008 with an agreement signed between the Heads of Parliaments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey. Turk-Pa constitutes an international platform periodically bringing together Turkic parliamentarians to foster interparliamentary cooperation and build a common political stance in international platforms. Since its establishment, Turk-Pa has observed parliamentary and presidential elections held in Turkic states and has represented a common Turkic view in international platforms such as the OSCE and BSEC.[17] In October 2013, Kazakhstan took over the general secretariat from Azerbaijan.

### *TIKA: Turkey's Soft Power*

Referring to aid from developed nations to the developing world during the Cold War, Fidan and Nurdun (2008) mention that humanitarian aid might also benefit donor countries politically, economically, and strategically. A similar situation exists for TIKA as it has acted as the primary wielder of Turkish "soft power" in Turkey's neighborhood (Ipek 2015). The emergence of five Turkic newly independent states in the former Soviet space and "cultural ties" with those states motivated Turkey to develop a comprehensive foreign aid policy (Fidan and Nurdun 2008, 102).

In line with the Strategic Depth doctrine of the JDP (Davutoğlu 2001) and the widening of Turkish foreign policy goals, the geographic scope of TIKA has increased over the last decade as it has opened up program coordination offices in the Middle East and Africa (Özkan and Demirtepe 2012; TIKA 2012; Ipek 2015).

[17]For detailed information on Turk-Pa's activities, see the organization's official website: http://www.turk-pa.org.

However, a significant portion of its projects and aid continue to focus on the Turkic-speaking countries and regions of Eurasia. In 2007, the Caucasus and Central Asia—including Afghanistan—received the greatest share of expenditure for projects and programs with 57 percent (TIKA 2007, 13). Similarly, according to TIKA's 2008 Annual Report (TIKA 2008, 10), Afghanistan and Central Asia maintained priority, receiving almost 54 percent of the total amount of Official Development Assistance given through TIKA. The agency also offered humanitarian and technical aid to Crimean Tatars (a Turkic minority of the Crimean peninsula), as well as to the Gagauz of Moldova, in order to trigger their integration into society and maintain their ethnic well-being (TIKA 2008, 79–80; 2012, 111, 132). TIKA's 2012 Annual Report emphasizes that the costs of projects dedicated to the Caucasus and Central Asia between 2002 and 2012 (JDP years) were almost seven times higher than those for the period from 1992 to 2002. In 2012, 632 of TIKA's 1788 projects were devoted to the Caucasus and Central Asia, with Kyrgyzstan attracting 7 percent of Turkish official development aid (TIKA 2012). In short, although the JDP foreign policy elite's "principled beliefs" would trigger a geographic shift in TIKA's official development assistance programs (Ipek 2015), the agency's focus on post-Soviet Turkic states and peoples has endured.

### *Government and Party Programs*

Another indicator of the successful institutionalization of the "Turkic World" concept is the references to relations with Turkic states of Eurasia in government programs. In each program of newly elected Turkish governments, Turkey's relations with the European Union, its crucial role in NATO, Turkish–Greek problems, and the Cyprus issue have always appeared.[18] In addition, with only one exception,[19] every post-Cold War government program has included a reference to relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus. The program of the Erbakan government,[20] in which the Islamist Welfare Party was the leading partner, had three paragraphs on relations with the "Turkic Republics" and ranked relations with those countries as important as relations with Europe, the Balkans, and Muslim countries. The fourth Ecevit government[21] was the first to touch upon "Turkic and relative communities that live in different countries." Erbakan's and Ecevit's government programs were especially important because the leaders came from two different political traditions—political Islam and democratic left—that had both previously dismissed pan-Turkism. The 58th–62nd government programs (in the JDP period) also touch upon Turkey's relations with Turkic states and minority communities. The government program that was adopted after the general elections of 2011 states that "during our (JDP) governments, we have accelerated our relations with the Turkic-speaking States of Central Asia and the wider Turkic geography." The most recent government program—that of Davutoglu's term as Prime Minister—was adopted in September 2014 after Erdogan was elected president. The program states that the government will pursue a "value-focused foreign policy" (Başbakanlık 2014). The program argues that Turkey's relations with Central Asia constituted a "unique dimension" of its foreign policy due to the ethnic and linguistic ties of Turkey with the region. Therefore, the program proposed that Turkey would strengthen the Turkic Council. The program also stated that TIKA's priority areas were Turkic Republics and countries with Turkic populations.

[18]See TGNA website for "Governments of Republic of Turkey" for detailed information.

[19]The program of the 52nd government, the third Çiller government, 30 October 1995–6 March 1996.

[20]28 June 1996–30 June 1997.

[21]11 January 1999–28 May 1999.

Turkey's relations with the Turkic states have also appeared in the programs of major political parties, such as the ruling JDP, the main opposition party RPP, and the nationalist NAP. The ruling JDP argues that it will transform Central Asia into a region of cooperation and will also improve existing ties between Turkey and Turkic republics (Justice and Development Party Official Website). The RPP, despite its more Western-oriented Kemalist foreign policy vision, devotes considerable space to Turkey's relations with "Turkic republics" as well as "consanguine" citizens of different countries, such as Turks of Western Thrace and the Balkans (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2008, 129–31). In addition to an emphasis on Turkic peoples, the RPP (2008, 134) regards Turkey's relations with the "Turkic republics" as a key element of establishing a "distinctive character" in foreign policy. As the first and foremost pan-Turkist political party in Turkey, NAP's program includes the greatest emphasis on relations with Turkic-speaking peoples. Under a subchapter of foreign policy titled the "Turkic World," NAP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 2009, 126–7) offers priority and privilege for Turkey's relations with Turkic states and communities. In addition, NAP's program (2009, 77, 81) proposes priority to Turkic states in fields such as mining, energy security, and technological and scientific cooperation.

## Ideas, National Identity, and Foreign Policy Institutionalization

This study aims to shift the focus of scholarship on ideas and foreign policy from its overwhelming concern with domestic structures and institutional set up toward a greater awareness of the importance of national identity conceptions. I have shown that Turkey's attempts to build cooperation with the post-Soviet Turkic-speaking states has been largely shaped by the policy proposals of idea entrepreneurs who introduced the idea of the "Turkic World" to the Turkish political agenda in the early 1990s. Key policy proposals that the Turkic Congresses (*Kurultays*) put forward, such as the establishment of intergovernmental organizations, offering official development aid to Turkic communities and states, and increasing educational ties between Turkey and the Turkic states have all been institutionalized. Thanks to these entrepreneurs, Turkish decision makers adopted a broader Turkic identity at home and relied on the entrepreneurs' policy proposals while searching for a regional leadership role in the aftermath of the Cold War. Although I leave open the question of whether Turkey has actually been successful in acquiring regional power status in Central Asia, I have demonstrated in detail how the idea of the "Turkic World" has reformed Turkey's national interests and expanded Turkish policymakers' foreign policy horizons. I have further argued that the idea of the "Turkic World" has gained a "taken for granted" status in Turkish foreign policy despite the Islamist roots of the ruling JDP's and Turkey's increasing activism in its southern neighborhood under consecutive JDP governments. Although in Aktürk's (2011) words, the JDP acted as a "counterelite" in terms of ethnicity and nationality policies in Turkey, in foreign policy terms, I have shown that the JDP has quietly and effectively institutionalized the "Turkic World" concept to frame Turkey's relations with the Turkic states of Eurasia.

The evolution of Turkish foreign policy toward the post-Soviet Turkic states speaks to two broad issues in the literature: the circumstances under which ideas influence foreign policy and the actors whose voice and advice are listened to in the formulation of foreign policy goals and practices. Turkey's internalization of the "Turkic World" in its foreign policy framework demonstrates that idea entrepreneurs, in this case former dissidents, can influence policymakers if the search for a "roadmap" (a new foreign policy framework) overlaps with changing "worldviews" (national identity conceptions) (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). A transnational network of pan-Turkist activists could build a "winning coalition" (Risse-Kappen 1994) in Turkey very rapidly, despite Turkey's regime type or the institutional set up of its

parliament. Instead, the entrepreneurs of the "Turkic World" idea appealed to the need to reorient foreign policy during a period in which Turkey's national identity was under contestation. In the 1990s, Turkey was facing fierce debates on its national identity, which included demands for minority rights that challenged the ideational and constitutional foundations of the republic. Under these circumstances, the idea that Turkey belonged to a broader Turkic world facilitated its ideational impact on foreign policy. Turkey's Turkic identity would subsequently be embraced by the Kemalists, social democrats, and former Islamists. In other words, Turkey's domestic national identity debate would offer the "window of opportunity" for the "Turkic World" idea entrepreneurs to influence foreign policy makers.

The most important implication of this study is that during critical junctures, organized idea entrepreneurs with timely national identity conceptions can often gain access to policymakers despite challenging domestic institutional frameworks and regardless of regime type. Furthermore, national identity conceptions can consolidate a foreign policy course and pave the way for an idea's socialization and internalization. Governments with different ideological backgrounds will continue institutionalizing ideas if they perceive them as inevitably linked to the broader national identity. The idea of the "Turkic World" has gained an uncontested place in Turkish foreign policy because Turkey's Turkic identity was successfully reincorporated into its various other identities—Western, Islamic, European, Middle Eastern, Balkan, etc.—in the aftermath of the Cold War. Turkey's relations with the "Turkic World" thus shed light on how ideas can become inseparable parts of foreign policy goals and practices if they fit into the changing national identity conceptions of ruling elites and when they serve the pragmatic goal of reformulating foreign policy frameworks.

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