

Foreign Policy Analysis

Classic and Contemporary Theory

Valerie M. Hudson

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The Individual Decisionmaker: The Political Psychology of World Leaders

Do leaders matter? In International Relations (IR), this question has been answered differently in different time periods. In the 1930s, it was not uncommon to see the use of "the Great Man" approach, where almost naught but leadership mattered in explanations of foreign policy. During the Cold War, Great Man approaches fell into disfavor, and the most important elements in understanding at least superpower behavior seemed to be defined at the level of state or system attributes. After the Cold War, crises such as those involving Iraq and North Korea inclined specialists to look once again at leader characteristics to help understand the foreign policy of these nations.

While the academy has been more tentative about the value of leader analysis, the government is much less tentative. An office of leadership analysis was created in the CIA in the 1970s, and continues to offer analysis and briefings about world leaders to presidents and high-level diplomats to this day. As one commentator put it, "policymakers desperately want to understand just what kinds of adversaries they are facing" (Omestad, 1994). Strategies of deterrence and negotiation depend significantly upon an understanding of the other's worldview. Communication between nations can also be affected in important ways by leadership idiosyncrasies. The desperate desire of policymakers to understand their counterparts in other nations is not without foundation.

However, a better question to ask might be, When do leaders matter? Surely not every foreign policy decision carries the imprint of the leader's distinctive personal characteristics and perceptions. A related question

might be, Which leaders matter? Government personnel other than the top leader may leave more of an impression on a particular foreign policy. It is to these questions that we now turn.

WHEN AND WHICH?

Under what conditions might it be more fruitful to examine leader characteristics? A variety of hypotheses come to mind.

First, regime type may play a role in answering this question. Different regime types offer different levels of constraint on leader control of policy. It might be more imperative to assess leader characteristics in one-man dictatorships, such as Kim Jong Il's North Korea, than it would be to examine them in some long-established parliamentary democracies. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind there is no regime type that precludes a leader's personal influence on policy altogether.

Second, it matters whether a leader is interested in foreign policy. Leaders uninterested in foreign policy may delegate a large measure of authority to subordinates, in which case it would be vital to identify and examine their characteristics as well. For example, after World War II, Francisco Franco openly commented on his disinterest in foreign affairs, delegating most decisionmaking power to his foreign minister. Nevertheless, over the years his foreign minister began to make choices that did not sit well with Franco, and eventually was dismissed. Even a disinterested leader can become interested if the context is right. Leaders who have an emotional response to the issues under discussion because of prior experience or memory are also likely to leave more of a personal imprint on foreign policy.

Part of that context may provide us a third scope condition: crisis situations will invariably be handled at the highest levels of government power, and almost by definition top leaders will be involved regardless of their general level of interest in foreign affairs. However, an important caveat must be mentioned here. If the crisis is so extreme that the country's survival is at stake, a leader may try to keep his or her psychological predispositions in check in order to avoid making any unnecessary mistakes. But for every example of such restraint (John F. Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis), we can find numerous examples of how crisis situations brought a leader's predispositions to the fore in a very strong way (Richard Nixon and Watergate).

A related context that may allow a leader's personal characteristics to play more of a role in decisionmaking is in ambiguous or uncertain situations, our fourth contextual variable. When advisors are unable to "read" a situation because information is sparse or contradictory, a leader may be called upon to exercise his or her judgment so that a basis for foreign policy decisionmaking is laid. One subcategory of these types of situations are those involving long-range planning, where sweeping strategic doctrines or approaches to particular problems are decided for an uncertain and unpredictable future.

Margaret Hermann has proffered a fifth contextual variable, namely, the degree to which a leader has had diplomatic training (1984). Hermann argues that leaders with prior training have learned to subordinate their personal characteristics to the diplomatic requirements of the situation at hand. Untrained leaders, especially those with what she has termed "insensitive" orientations to the international context, are likely to rely more on their personal worldviews in any foreign policy response.

Expertise in a particular issue area or region of the world may also signal that a particular leader, even if he is not the top leader, may leave a personal imprint on the policy eventually chosen. It is not uncommon in the post-Vietnam era for U.S. presidents to defer to military leaders when conflict is being discussed as an option. Indeed, in a number of cases it is the military leadership that makes the strongest case against intervention options being weighed by the president. Patterns of deference to acknowledged experts must be tracked in order to identify which leaders bear further examination in any particular case, and this constitutes a sixth condition to consider.

A seventh variable concerns the style of leadership: does the leader like to delegate information processing and decision tasks? Or does the leader prefer to sort through the intelligence himself or herself, providing a much more hands-on style of leadership? There are pros and cons to each style, but clearly the hands-on style of leadership lends itself to a much more prominent effect on decisionmaking of the leader's personality.

Finally, a fuller exploration of the eighth contextual variable must wait until the next chapter, when we discuss group interactions. Groups, whether small or large, tend to evolve into contexts in which particular individuals play a given role on a fairly consistent basis. For example, one person may play the devil's advocate role, while another views himself as a loyal "mindguard." Still others may view themselves as advocates of particular policies, or as the group's diplomats, frequently brokering agreements. Examination of the top leadership must not overlook the advantage provided by examining it not only in isolation, but also in group settings.

EXPLORING THE COMPONENTS OF THE MIND

Before we can understand FPA scholarship on leaders, we must first adopt a language based in psychology that allows us to name and relate components of an individual's mental framework. It must be acknowledged at the outset that there are many schools within the field of psychology, and many

of the terms we will use here have subtle or not-so-subtle differences in definition and interpretation between these schools. Nevertheless, to effect the kind of analysis desired in FPA, we must start somewhere.

The following diagram outlines the key concepts that we will be exploring in this chapter.



Figure 2.1 Diagram of the Components of the Mind Model

Perception and Cognition

It is through our senses that our minds make contact with the world around it. Some psychologists have posited a mental capacity for the brief storage of sensory information as it is processed, usually a quarter of a second in duration. However, our senses take in vastly more information than the mind is ever capable of processing. If we label those sensory inputs perception, than we perceive more than we notice. The mind apparently builds a "filter" that helps it decide which sensory inputs are worthy of more detailed processing, which processing we would call cognition. These filters might include stereotypes, biases, and heuristics. These are all shortcuts to help the mind decide which sensory inputs should be focused on in a given situation. Each person has an individually tailored set of filters that arise from the person's larger experiences. Young children have fewer filters than

adults, and often "see" more in a situation than their parents. I often ask my students if they can say what color shoes I am wearing without looking. The majority of students cannot. In their assumptions about what to pay attention to in a college classroom, the color of the professor's shoes is considered to be unimportant. Therefore, although their retinas surely did register the color of my shoes as I walked around the classroom, their minds deemed the information irrelevant.

These perceptual filters can trip us up, however. In some cases, our filters don't help us in a particular situation. For example, the serial killer turns out to be the nice, quiet man with the immaculate lawn next door. Our stereotypes about serial killers do not include such innocuous characteristics. In other cases, our filters are so strong that they prevent us from receiving accurate sensory perceptions. As Jervis notes, new information may be assimilated into existing images. For example, in one famous experiment, subjects were tasked with playing cards in multiple rounds. At one point, the researchers substituted cards wherein the hearts and diamonds were black, and the spades and clubs were red. At first, it was hard for the subjects to identify that something was amiss. When alerted to the mismatch between suit and color, it was then very difficult for them to play with the abnormal cards (Brunner and Postman, 1949). We perceive what we expect to perceive.

In a very real way, then, our human capacity to be rational is bounded. Herbert Simon, the Nobel laureate, notes that our bounded rationality stems from our inability to know everything, think everything, and understand everything (including ourselves). We construct a simplified mental model of reality and behave fairly rationally within its confines, but those confines may be quite severe. Mental models are inescapable, but they do have their downsides. They are hard to change, and they are based only upon what we know. Mind-sets and categories based on these mental models are quick to form and resistant to change. Thus, we are attempting to reason through the use of mental hardware that is profoundly constrained. For example, let's look at some common heuristics, or ways of processing information.

Heuristic Fallacies

There are several excellent works on heuristic fallacies, with favorites being Richards Heuer's *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (1999), and *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (1982). Each of these works tackles the human brain as it is, rather than as we would like to believe it is. Our brains evolved over long millennia to use particular mental "machinery." We have an almost limitless storage capacity in our long-term memory, but most of

our day-to-day mental activity involves short-term memory and associative recall. Short-term memory has a limited capacity, usually defined at approximately five to seven items. Once you exceed the limits of your short-term memory, some of the items will be dropped from active consideration in your mind. These will be dropped according to some mental definition of priority. Though for a few days you may have vivid recall of a striking experience, you may be unable to remember what you had for breakfast yesterday. After a week, even a vivid experience may fade, and you may only be able to remember generalities about the event. That is why it is not uncommon for two people who have lived through the same event to disagree over the facts of what happened.

If deemed important enough, items in short-term memory can be stored in long-term memory. The advantage of long-term memory is that it is of almost limitless capacity (although unless the experience was traumatic, you are unlikely to be able to recover raw sensory data about a memory—what you will recover instead is an interpretation of the memory). The disadvantage is that usually the only way to retrieve such information is through associative recall. Have you ever tried to remember where you put your keys, or what you named a computer file you created six months ago? What follows is typically an indirect and laborious process of remembering other things you were doing or thinking while you were holding your keys or working on the file. Oftentimes, we have to "sleep on it," with the mind processing the retrieval request through the night and recalling it upon waking.

One common approach to overcoming this problem is to bunch several items in long-term memory together, into a "schema." For example, you may have a schema about renewing your driver's license, in which memories and knowledge about the process are bundled together and recalled together as a template. As Schrodt puts it, "recall usually substitutes for reasoning" (Hudson, Schrodt, and Whitmer, 2004). This is so because the human brain is hardwired to find patterns in complexity. While logic and deductive reasoning take a lot of mental energy for a human being, recall and pattern recognition are almost effortless.

While effortless, however, we do develop "rules" to govern our mental activity, allowing us to become "cognitive misers" concerning our limited cognitive resources. Often these rules are shortcuts that allow for recall or interpretation with a minimum of inputs, thus minimizing reaction time. These heuristics usually help us; occasionally they can trip us up. Let's look at a few examples.

Some of the most common heuristic fallacies involve the estimation of probabilities. Humans turn out to be pretty bad at this task, which is no doubt why the gambling business is so lucrative. The "availability fallacy" notes that people judge something to be more probable if they can easily

recall instances of it from memory. Thus, if certain types of events have happened more recently, or more frequently, or more vividly, humans will judge these events to be more probable, regardless of the underlying causal factors at work. The "anchoring fallacy" points out that when trying to make an estimation, humans usually begin at a starting point that may be relatively arbitrary. After setting that initial estimate, people use additional information to adjust the probability up or down from that starting point. However, the starting point, or anchor, is a drag on the estimator's ability to make adjustments to their estimate. In one experiment cited by Heuer, students were asked to estimate what percentage of the membership of the United Nations were African countries. Students who started with low anchors, say 10 percent, never guessed higher than 25 percent despite additional information. On the other hand, students who started with high anchors, say 65 percent, could not lower their estimate by very much even with the additional information, settling on approximately 45 percent as their final estimate. Thus, although each was given the same additional information, their anchors limited their final estimates (Heuer, 1999).

Humans are also notoriously bad at the calculation of joint probabilities. Take the scenario where I wish to perform well on a test, and a series of things must occur for this to happen. I have to get up when my alarm clock rings (90 percent probability), my car has to start (90 percent probability), I have to find a parking space in time (80 percent probability), and I have to perform to my capacity on the test (80 percent probability). Most will say that the probability of me doing well on the test is about 80 percent. That is, they take the lowest single probability and extend it to the entire scenario. But this would be incorrect. The probability of this scenario is the joint probability defined as the product of the individual probabilities. The true probability of my doing well on the test is .90 x .90 x .80 x .80, or about 52 percent.

But probabilities are not the only thing that humans are not very good at evaluating. Humans are also fairly bad at evaluating evidence, which no doubt accounts for the persistence of even rudimentary scams and frauds in our societies. Humans are eager, even impelled, to seek causal explanations for what is happening in their environment. When you present a person with a plausible causal stream to explain a certain event, for example, "bad" cholesterol causes heart disease because it promotes inflammation and clogging of arteries, if the person "gets" the explanation—that is, if the person exerts effort to understand the explanation as given—it will be almost impossible to disabuse that person of that causal inference. Even if you told the person a *lie*, they will still cling to that causal understanding even when told it was a lie. Because it made sense to them once, it will not stop making sense to them after such a revelation (for a dramatic example, see Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, 1956). Many conspiracy theories

retain adherents for long periods of time because of this heuristic pitfall. Furthermore, if a person has a prior belief that two things are unrelated, they may not perceive evidence of a relationship; likewise, if a person has a prior belief that two things are related, they may not perceive evidence that there is no relationship (Fiske and Taylor, 1984, 264). Apparently, humans tune in to information that supports their beliefs and tend to ignore information that is discrepant with their beliefs (Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991, 144), and humans interpret mixed evidence as supporting their prior beliefs (163). This speaks volumes about human ability to evaluate the evidence for an explanation.

This conclusion even applies to self-interpretation. Psychologists note that humans are terrible at figuring out why they themselves do what they do (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977, 231–59). Humans appear to have little or no access to their own cognitive processes, and attributions about the self are notoriously inaccurate. We cannot even effectively analyze evidence about ourselves.

The bottom line is that humans are not very picky about evidence, because their first priority is to "get" the explanation, that is, to understand their world. Stopping the explainer every other word to demand empirical evidence for their assertions is not standard human practice. For example, researchers now ask whether the conventional distinction between "bad" and "good" cholesterol even makes sense. Other researchers are not sure that the inflammation in heart disease is caused primarily by the cholesterol ratios; they now wonder whether it isn't low-level infections that are the chief culprit. Generally speaking, only a modicum of evidence is sufficient to "sell" a causal story. The best evidence, research shows, is evidence that is vivid and anecdotal, and resonates with personal experiences the listener has had. Abstract, aggregate data pales in comparison. When selling weight-loss products, a couple of good testimonials accompanied by striking before-and-after photos will outsell large N-trials every time.

A second problem with evidence has to do with its representativeness. When we see those two weight-loss testimonials, our mind assumes that such results (if true) represent what the average person could expect from using the product. This is an erroneous assumption. The two testimonials may be the only two positive testimonials the company received.

Similarly, humans are predisposed to work *within* a given framework of understanding, which also limits their ability to evaluate the evidence for a particular explanation. In the aforementioned example concerning heart disease, if we stick to the framework of "bad" cholesterol and "good" cholesterol and of cholesterol-induced inflammation, the story outcome is predetermined. "Bad" cholesterol is going to be bad for you, and is going to cause inflammation, and by golly we'd better do something about it. But if you start asking questions that upset the framework, the story gets fuzzier—

what if there's no valid reason to call one type of cholesterol "bad"? What if inflammation has many causes, and could these other causes be operating in heart disease? Asking such questions is going to cripple your ability to reach closure on a causal explanation, however. Because humans are hardwired to explain the world around them in order to feel a sense of control, reaching such closure provides mental and emotional satisfaction. Therefore, it is not strange that humans are poor at evidence evaluation; they are more interested in the emotional relief of explanations than in the evidence.

Finally, our use of heuristics, as inevitable and natural as it may be, actually leads to the fallacy of "overconfidence." When we first try to, say, make a prediction with limited information, we may feel unsure about its accuracy. As we obtain more and more information, our confidence in our predictions rises. Interestingly, psychological experiments have shown that this level of confidence is *unrelated* to the actual accuracy of our predictions. Confidence was related solely to how much information the predictor obtained. Perhaps this interesting emotional response is necessary in providing humans with enough confidence to act upon what they believe they know. But the lack of correlation to accuracy means there will also be a steep learning curve from the mistakes invariably made as a result. Or not: Kruger and Dunning (1999) point out that students in the bottom quartile on grammar tests still felt they had scored above average *even when they were allowed to see the test papers of the students in the top quartile.* Apparently, if you are not competent in a particular task, you are not competent to know you are not competent—and hence, no matter the feedback provided, everyone thinks of themselves as above average!

Emotion and Reason

In the same way that cognitive constraints affect reasoning, so do emotions. Though an important topic of research in psychology, the implications for foreign policy decisionmaking are only beginning to be explored. This is because most decisionmaking theories in IR have either ignored emotion or seen it as an impediment to rational choice. However, psychologists are now beginning to assert that decisionmaking depends upon emotional assessment. McDermott notes that "individuals who cannot reference emotional memory because of brain lesions are unable to make rational decisions at all" (2004, 153). McDermott also points out that "emotions can facilitate motivation and arousal. . . . Emotion arouses an individual to take action with regard to an imagined or experienced event. Emotion can also direct and sustain behavior in response to various situations" (167). Emotion is one of the most effective ways by which humans can change goal emphasis: I might be focused on getting to work on time,

but if there is a car accident occurring in front of me, emotional arousal will sweep that goal from my mind that I may concentrate on the more immediately important goal of avoiding the accident. The effects of emotion on decisionmaking are diverse, and not all effects are yet understood. Intangible inputs to rational choice equations, such as level of trust, are clearly emotionally based. Studies have also shown that emotion-based attitudes are held with greater confidence than those that are not connected to emotion.

Future advances in the study of emotion will be facilitated by new methodologies. For example, developing fields of neuroscientific inquiry help us to understand that emotion is as important to decisionmaking as cognition is. "Seeing" the limbic system "light up" on an MRI as a person makes a difficult decision gives us a whole new way of thinking about decisionmaking. McDermott is optimistic that "neuroscientific advances might bridge rationally and psychologically-oriented models" (186).

Behavioral economists such as Robert Shiller argue that emotional factors, such as the fear of being left out, or optimistic gut feelings, or media hype producing a sense of confidence and control, all substitute for reasoned analysis on the part of investors. "I can present my research and findings to a bunch of academics and they seem to agree," Shiller said. "But afterward at dinner, they tell me they are 100 percent in stock. They say: 'What you argue is interesting, but I bet stocks will go up. I have this feeling'" (Uchitelle, 2000, 1).

Psychologist Barry Schwartz and colleagues have described the paradox of choice, wherein proliferation of choices leads to lower satisfaction and greater regrets than fewer choices. This may even lead to a situation where, frustrated by the plethora of choices available, decisionmakers find it impossible to make a choice and so do nothing. For example, Schwartz notes that one of his colleagues discovered that as the number of mutual funds in a 401(k) plan offered to employees goes up, the likelihood they will choose any mutual fund plan actually goes down (2004b, 27).

Other psychologists, such as Daniel Gilbert, suggest that humans really do not understand their own emotions. When asked to estimate how a particular event would affect their lives for better or worse (such as winning $1 million on a game show), respondents overestimated how such an event would affect them and for how long. Each person appears to have a happiness "set point" and, over time, will return to that set point no matter their circumstances. Both bad and good events turn out to have less intense and briefer emotional effects than people generally believe. Studies have shown that over time lottery winners were not happier and persons who became paraplegics not unhappier than control groups (Kahneman, 2000, 673–92). Both Midwesterners and Californians describe themselves as similarly happy, but both groups expect that Californians will report themselves

happier. Gilbert calls this misunderstanding of happiness "miswanting": the inability to really understand what their own feelings would be in a particular situation. For example, Gilbert says, "If you ask, 'What would you rather have, a broken leg or a trick knee?' they'd probably say, 'Trick knee.' And yet, if your goal is to accumulate maximum happiness over your lifetime, you just made the wrong choice. A trick knee is a bad thing to have" (Gertner, 2003, 47).

This misunderstanding of our emotions is especially acute when comparing "hot" emotional states (rage, fear, arousal) to more composed emotional states. In experiments conducted about unprotected sexual behavior, people in composed emotional states would generally state they would never engage in such risky behavior. But when subject to arousal most would, in fact, so engage. In a sense, our decisionmaking has the potential to produce profoundly different outcomes depending upon our emotional state. And it also turns out that we are not good at predicting that such differences would ever occur.

Humans also seem to be hardwired to detect unfairness, and the presence of unfairness makes humans very upset. Reaction to unfairness elicits a strong, persistent negative emotional response. When members of a team are presented with the choice to have one of their members win $50 and the rest win $5 each, or to have none of their team members win anything, most persons chose the latter. They would rather not gain at all then acquiesce to an obviously unfair situation in which they would still gain something.

The Body and Reason

Emotions are not the only thing capable of altering our normal cognitive function. Our cognition operates in the context of a physical body, and what happens to that body can affect our decisionmaking.

Mental illness can strike leaders. Indeed, political psychologist Jerrold Post believes that certain mental illnesses are overrepresented in the population of world leaders (2003), such as narcissism and paranoia. Narcissists, for example, may be more willing than a normal person to pay any price to become a leader. Post also hypothesizes that the stresses and power of national leadership may cause a predisposition to mental illness to bloom into a pathological state, especially in systems where the leader's power is unchecked. This was true, for example, in the case of Saddam Hussein, whom Post diagnoses as a malignant narcissist. As Saddam Hussein's power became ever greater within his society, his mental illness began to overtake his normal powers of judgment. He could not admit ignorance, and so could not learn. He could not brook dissent, and so received no dissonant information from his advisors. His power fantasies, lack of impulse control,

willingness to use force, and absence of conscience warped his decision-making to the point where what was good for Saddam Hussein was defined as the national interest of Iraq. An unhealthy obsession with power and control appears as part of the mental illnesses most often suffered by world leaders, with one estimate that up to 13 percent of world leaders express this trait (Weiner, 2002).

The body's experience of stress may also alter decisionmaking. Stress's effect on the body appears to follow a U-shaped curve: our mental acuity seems best when under a moderate amount of stress. We function at less than our peak capacity when under higher (and, ironically, lower) levels of stress. Chronic, high-level stress not only impairs judgment, but induces fatigue and confusion. The body's hormonal, metabolic, and immune functions are also compromised by chronically high levels of stress. Under chronic high stress, the mental effort required to think something through may seem unattainable. Studies show that a rat exposed to repeated uncontrollable stressors cannot learn to avoid an electric shock: the stress has caused it to become helpless and incapable of becoming motivated enough to expend the mental energy to learn (Sapolsky, 1997, 218). The predisposition may be to decide a matter quickly on gut instinct, or to not make a decision at all. And it is interesting to consider common sources of stress: an overabundance of information is a reliable stressor, one that probably plagues most foreign policy decisionmakers every day. One study asserts that the life spans of American presidents are significantly shorter than controls, and that most have died from stress-related causes (Gilbert, 1993).

Though it is always a matter of speculation whether our leaders have used illicit drugs, there is no shortage of evidence that leaders commonly use licit drugs, such as alcohol, caffeine, and prescription medications. A fairly famous case in point is that of Richard M. Nixon, who, while abusing alcohol, was also self-medicating with relatively high doses of Dilantin in addition to taking prescribed medication for depression and mood swings. Dilantin causes memory loss, irritability, and confusion. President George H. W. Bush's use of Haldol as a sleep aid around the time of Desert Storm was also a focus of speculation concerning its effects on his decisionmaking. President John F. Kennedy's use of steroids and high-dose pain medication for his back problems is not as well known as his suffering from Addison's disease, but may also have affected his cognition.

Physical pain and suffering from disease and its treatment must also be mentioned as a bodily experience that may alter decisionmaking. Living with high levels of chronic pain often induces irritability and frequent changes of opinion. Certain types of pathology, such as cerebral strokes, may in fact change cognitive function permanently, as it did with President Woodrow Wilson in the last part of his presidency. Recent research points to a syndrome of lowered impulse control in patients that have undergone bypass surgery, ostensibly due to the mechanical rerouting of the bloodstream. The devastating side effects of chemotherapy and radiation treatment can cause temporary depression. But we must not forget that even ordinary physical ailments, such as jet lag, the flu, and gastric distress, may be distracting and serve to diminish acuity.

Many world leaders are elderly. Aging may bring wisdom, but research tells us that aging may also bring rigidity and overconfidence, difficulty in dealing with complexity, and a preference for extreme choices. Once again, the hardware we have been given in the form of our embodied mind provides some significant constraints on our reasoning.

The Situational Context

The particulars of the situation in which the person finds themselves are also very pertinent to the final choice of action. One germane characteristic is the presence or absence of others. For example, when a person has been seriously injured, psychologists have shown that the actions of bystanders depend on how many of them there are. Counterintuitively, the greater the number of bystanders, the less likely it is that someone will come forward to help the injured person. Everyone among the bystanders is thinking, "Surely someone in this crowd is more qualified than I to help this person," and so they fail to act. EMT training emphasizes that the person who does step forward to help (finally) should make specific assignments to bystanders: "You there, call the police"; "You there, get a blanket out of your car"; and so on. Pressures to conform are also part of the influence of others' presence. A high school kid may find that everyone in his circle of friends drinks alcohol; the resulting social pressure may be so great that the kid will begin to drink alcohol even if he has no personal desire to do so, or even if he actively does not want to drink.

In a series of famous experiments in the 1950s, Solomon Asch assembled groups of male college students where all but one person in the groups were actually working for Asch. The groups were asked to determine relative length of parallel lines, and the real subject would always answer last. When the others in the group gave clearly erroneous answers, over 70 percent of real subjects would conform at least once to the erroneous answer (Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991, 56–57). The need for social acceptance is very deeply rooted in most human beings, and may cause abnormal or even irrational behavior in many individuals given a relevant social situational context. In Asch's experiments, only 25 percent of the real subjects never conformed.

There is also the issue of time constraints. The reaction to a situation is going to be somewhat different if it is an emergency-type situation in which action must be taken quickly. There may not be time for an extensive infor-

mation search; there may not be time for extended deliberation. In such a situation, the role of emotions, or "gut feelings," may be prominent. In a threatening situation with time constraints, even more basic responses, such as the "fight or flight" (male) or "tend and befriend" (female) reactions, may occur without much conscious reasoning.

The stakes of the situation are also formative. When one is risking nuclear war, a more careful deliberation process may occur than when a situation is routine and of little consequence. Furthermore, gains and losses that arise from a situational context may be processed differently in the human brain. Prospect theory tells us that humans do not like situations where one alternative is a certain loss. If I gave you a choice between losing $5 for sure, or betting $5 in a gamble with 1000 to 1 odds of keeping your $5, you would always choose the gamble over the sure loss, though there is little practical difference in outcome. Humans also prefer sure wins to riskier higher gains. If I offered you a choice of $5 or a 1 in 100 chance of winning $500, you would probably take the $5. Prospect theory also tells us that previous wins and losses affect our subsequent behavior. If I have just experienced a sure loss, I will be more willing to engage in riskier behavior in the next round of play to make up my previous loss (Thaler, 2000). An interesting corollary of prospect theory with relevance for international negotiations is that we process the concessions of others as having less value than any concessions we ourselves make (McDermott, 2004). Psychologists believe the discounting of other's concessions may be as high as 50 percent, meaning that the other person would have to concede twice as much to make the concessions feel as valuable to you as the concession you are making.

Social roles and rules can also affect decisionmaking, especially as they tie in with existing schema. I helped to organize a conference once, and in the middle of one of the presentations, a member of the audience stood up and began to verbally harass the speaker. Now, this was not a large and public group, but a small private group of approximately fifty persons, where such aggressive heckling would typically not take place, according to social rules. Most of the participants simply sat there, wondering what to do. But one member of the audience was a security contractor for the government. He got up, deftly pinned the man's arm behind his back without hurting him, escorted him from the room, and made sure that he left the building. His social role gave him a precise and effective schema for handling this situation that had so perplexed the other members of the audience.

Attitudes and the Mental Model—and What Lies Beneath

Though all of us possess the type of cognitive constraints enumerated above, we are not all the same. Each of us is a unique mix of genetic information, life experience, and deeply held values and beliefs. Political psychologists who study world leaders are interested in these deeper elements of personality, as well. We have spoken of how perception is filtered through to cognition, but a person's reaction to a cognition in a particular situational context—their attitudes (easily accessed mental judgments or evaluations) that will shape their immediate response—are largely shaped by their mental model of the world. That model will contain elements such as beliefs, values, and memories, which are drawn upon to form these attitudes. We have already examined characteristics of memory, short-term, long-term, and memory "schema." However, we need to say a few words about beliefs and values.

Beliefs are often called attributions in the psychological literature. These are beliefs about causality in the world. For example, person A might believe that when his neighbor B mowed down a flower in A's yard that was very near their joint property line, B was acting from malicious intent. "He mowed down the flower because he holds malice toward me and acted on that malicious intent." A different person in A's shoes might believe that B's mind was on other things and the mowing-down of the flower was accidental, not intended, and not even noticed. Still another person might believe that B was impaired by alcohol when mowing his lawn and attribute the flower-mowing to alcohol abuse. Why things happen, or what causes what, are crucial elements in our understanding of the world.

Psychologists often speak of a "fundamental attribution error," fundamental in this case meaning common to virtually all humans. Almost all of us attribute our behavior to situational necessity, but the behavior of others to free choice or disposition. Thus, in the example above, if *we* had mowed our neighbors' flower down, we would tend to think it was because we had no choice—but if *he* mowed our flower down, we would tend to think that he wanted to mow it down. One could see how this fundamental attribution error could play out in international relations: North Korea feels it has no choice but to build nuclear weapons given U.S. policy; the United States, on the other hand, believes that North Korea is building nuclear weapons not because it has to, but because it wants to. The North Koreans believe that the U.S. policy of denuclearization of North Korea is a choice based on antipathy; Americans believe their stance is forced by the situation of having to protect themselves and allies from a madman intent upon obtaining nuclear weapons and long-range delivery capabilities.

Values, our final component of the mental model, may be created fairly early in life. Values refer to the relative ranking individuals use to justify preferring one thing over another. These values cannot exist without attribution, attribution cannot exist without memory of experience, but probably it is values that allow us to make judgments—to hold attitudes in a particular situation that will lead to our speech and behavioral actions. Val-

ues, in a sense, "energize" our mental model. Values are also very much influenced by our motivations and emotions. "Values" are often used when discussing morality: we "value" honesty and prefer it to dishonesty, and so we are not going to lie in situation X. But values may also be about things that may have little reference to moral issues: a president may value the advice of his or her ANSA (special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs) over the advice of the secretary of defense. In situation X, then, the advice of the ANSA may be more influential on the president's decision than the advice of the secretary of defense.

To summarize a bit at this point, perceptions are filtered, and only certain perceptions become cognitions. Cognitions are both new inputs and a function of the existing mental model that makes them possible in the first place. The mental model itself is quite complex, containing previously constructed elements such as attributional beliefs (beliefs about what causes what), values and norms created or assimilated from the larger cultural context, and memories, along with a categorization and relational scheme probably unique to the individual that allows the model to both persist and change over time. Important to this conceptualization is the understanding that change in any part of this system of perception/cognition/mental theory/attitude can lead to change in other elements. Belief change can cause attitude change; attitude change can cause behavioral change; change in cognition can cause attitude change; attitudes and cognitions can even change beliefs (Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991, 34).

While we can conceptualize the mental model's structural components to be beliefs/attributions, values, and memories, the mental model is also shaped by the personality of the leader, with personality being the constellation of traits possessed by the leader. Though personality is undoubtedly shaped by one's experiences and background, it is also true that some elements of personality seem genetically determined. For example, scholars now assert that a predisposition toward social conservatism may be inherited. Specific traits of personality might be the person's overall level of distrust of others, the individual's level of conceptual complexity in understanding the world around them, the individual's level of loyalty to relevant social groups (such as the nation), the individual's degree of focus on task completion. Other traits might include energy level, sociability, emotional stability, or degree to which the individual can control his or her impulses.

Furthermore, we cannot overlook the broad influence of emotions, motivations, and the state of the body on personality, but also on mental constructs formed and even cognitions. We have previously discussed emotions and the state of the body, but we must also mention here that there are several psychological models of human motivation. One conceptual framework that has recently been applied to world leaders is that of David

Winter, based upon previous work of McClelland (McClelland, 1985). Winter postulates three fundamental human motivations, which can exist to greater or lesser degree in any individual. These motivations include need for power, need for affiliation, and need for achievement. For example, according to Winter's scoring system (1990), the strongest motivation for John F. Kennedy was need for achievement. But these motivations are not one-dimensional. Nixon's need for affiliation was almost as great as his need for achievement, and Nixon rates rather average on need for power in Winter's scoring.

The deeper element of character may contain underlying structural parameters of the individual's personality. Character is relatively underconceptualized in psychology, but most psychologists use the term to refer to some deep organizing principles of the human psyche. One example could be the individual's predisposition toward abstractive versus practicalist reasoning. Another example might be integrity, here meaning the degree to which constructs, emotions, beliefs, and attitudes are consistent in the individual. A related concept might be the degree to which the individual is able to tolerate dissonance between beliefs and action. Such dissonance is often termed cognitive dissonance, and this concept can inform our concept of mental models.

To understand the concept of cognitive dissonance, it is useful to discuss an example. Suppose a person is absolutely convinced that smoking harms you. And yet that person smokes. If the person's deep character is not shaken by this inconsistency because his or her character has a high tolerance for it, the person may simply both continue to smoke and continue to think it will harm them. However, if the person's character has a low tolerance for inconsistency, the person may be forced to either change his or her actions and stop smoking, or may be forced to change, add to, or delete certain attributional beliefs about smoking. Interestingly, empirical study seems to demonstrate that the likeliest course of action in a case of cognitive dissonance is a change in belief, as it is less costly than a change in behavior.

APPROACHING LEADERS

Most empirical work in psychology derives from experiments and simulations, some of which are embedded in survey instruments and some of which take place in laboratory settings. Most work examining particular individuals' psychology is performed using standard psychological profile testing and/or in-depth psychoanalytic examination. All of it is fascinating. However, its applicability to the assessment of the personalities and views of world leaders is obviously limited. Most leaders refuse to take personality

tests. Most leaders refuse to participate in psychoanalysis. Some of us are old enough to remember when Thomas Eagleton had to drop out as a vice presidential candidate because years previously he had visited a therapist to help him cope with a family loss (and, worse yet, had undergone electroshock treatments). He also happened to shed a few tears once during an interview that touched upon that loss. There are real costs to a leader of letting someone assess their personalities and views. As a result, there are several FPA scholars that do use experiments and simulations to probe general psychological phenomena in FPDM; for example, the decision board approach of Alex Mintz et al. (1997), or the FPDM simulations of the ICONS Project (ICONS, 2004).

Nevertheless, the assessment of leader personality, with a concomitant understanding of a leader's mental model, is clearly a high priority for political psychologists and foreign policy analysts. The problem is that one does not have the luxury of extended person-to-person contact with world leaders. At-a-distance measures are required for this task. The two primary at-a-distance methodologies in use by those who wish to study the personality and views of world leaders are psychobiography and content analysis.

Psychobiography

There have been many examples of "psychologizing" leaders by examining their lives. Sigmund Freud (1967) himself psychoanalyzed Woodrow Wilson based upon biographical material, and Wilson was reanalyzed in a famous psychobiography by Alexander and Juliette George (1956). Numerous others have attempted to psychoanalyze leaders such as Hitler and Stalin. One of the benefits of psychobiography is the ability to bring to light emotional factors that play a role in motivation and decisionmaking. In this section, we will concentrate on the work of two scholars who have famously employed psychobiography in the study of world leaders: James David Barber and Jerrold Post.

James David Barber, who died in 2004, is most famous for the successive editions of his book, *The Presidential Character*. Barber was of the opinion that we should not elect leaders with dysfunctional personalities. He developed a fourfold categorization scheme for leaders using two axes: active-passive and positive-negative. The active-passive dimension taps into the leader's energy level and sense that personal effort can make a difference in human affairs. The positive-negative dimension addresses the leader's motivation for seeking office and overall outlook on life, probing whether the leader was basically optimistic or pessimistic, trusting or suspicious, motivated by feelings of neediness or shame or obligation or motivated by feelings of confidence and joy in the work to be done. Barber believed that these two traits, or elements of personality, were shaped long before a president is elected to office. In Barber's view, a careful examination of the leader's background, upbringing, early successes and failures, and career could provide insight into what type of leader an individual would be.

Not surprisingly, Barber felt that active-positive leaders, such as FDR, Harry Truman, and JFK, made the best presidents. They are not driven by twisted and dark motives, and are willing to work hard to effect improvements. They are also willing to reverse course when things do not turn out well, for they are not constrained by a rigid ideology, but rather motivated by the sense that they should search for policies that actually produce the results they desire.

On the other hand, Barber fervently wished that Americans would not elect leaders who were active-negative in orientation. Leaders thus categorized include Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. These leaders are compelled to power by deep-seated feelings of inadequacy and fear of humiliation and ostracism. They become rigid in thinking and in action, and cannot relate to others with genuine warmth and empathy. They may be feared, but they are not loved—and they know it. They may be willing to circumvent convention or even rules and laws in order to maintain or increase their power.

Of the remaining two types of leaders, passive-positive and passive-negative, Barber actually prefers the passive-negatives. These are leaders who take the mantle of leadership out of a sense of obligation or duty, not out of a desire for power and control. At the same time, passive-negatives may have a hard time effecting significant change, given their lower level of activity. Barber identifies Calvin Coolidge and Dwight D. Eisenhower as passive-negative presidents. Interestingly, new research seems to indicate that Coolidge only became passive-negative, as versus active-positive, after the death of his son in 1924, which caused Coolidge to become clinically depressed (Gilbert, 2003).

Passive-positive leaders, while not as great a danger as active-negative leaders, present a persistent risk of scandal and corruption. So focused as they are on issues of affiliation and acceptance, while also dependent upon others for reassurance, support, and even direction, passive-positive leaders may find that others are willing to take advantage of their emotional neediness and willingness to turn a blind eye to their own excesses and those of their friends. William Howard Taft, Warren G. Harding, and Ronald Reagan were passive-positive presidents, according to Barber.

Jerrold Post was one of the founders of the CIA's Office of Leadership Analysis in the 1970s. Having spent the better part of his career analyzing foreign leaders, Post has developed a fairly systematic approach to the task. He calls his methodology *anamnesis*, and believes that a good political psychological analysis will contain several parts. The first part is a psychobiog-

raphy that compares the time line of the leader's life to the time line of events taking place in the nation and the world. The family saga must be understood, as well as birth order and relationship among siblings. Has the family emigrated from another land? Is the family wealthy, or have they lost wealth over the generations? Have family patriarchs been war heroes? Have there been traumatic deaths in the family? Early heroes and dreams are important to examine. For example, Post notes that Indira Gandhi's favorite childhood game was to be the commanding general over her forces of toy soldiers. The leader's education, mentors, and adolescent life experiences should be examined for influences that will shape the leader's personality. For example, when FDR's mother or father would forbid him to do something, he would find a way to please them while still doing what he wanted to do. Early successes and failures are often a template for high-stakes decisions later in the leader's career.

The second part of the anamnesis concerns the leader's personality. A recounting of the leader's balance between work and personal life is useful, as well as an investigation of his health and habits, such as drinking and drug use. The leader's intellectual capacity, knowledge, and judgment will be probed. Emotional stability and motivations, conscience and values, and the quality of interpersonal relationships with family, friends, and coworkers will also be noted. The leader's reaction to criticism, attack, or failure will be important to discover.

The third part of the anamnesis inquires about the actual substantive beliefs held by the leader about issues such as the security of the nation, or about the nature of power. But other beliefs, such as political philosophy or ideology, will be examined. The fourth part of the analysis surveys the leader's style, examining factors such as oratorical skill, ability to communicate to the public, aspects of strategy and tactics preferred in particular situations, and negotiating style. As we have noted previously, Post, as a trained psychiatrist, is also alert to the presence of mental illness in world leaders.

Post is then able to use this four-part analysis to project a leader's reaction to various possible situations in international relations. Which issues will be most important to the leader? What is the best way to deter such a leader? To persuade such a leader to change his mind? What type of negotiating stance will this leader prefer? How will this leader cope with high-stress, high-stakes crises? The type of analysis Post was able to offer to the CIA no doubt finds parallel in the intelligence establishments of other nations (Post, 2003).

Content Analysis

Content analysis is another at-a-distance measure for analyzing the traits, motivations, and personal characteristics of world leaders. It can be a complement, or an alternative, to psychobiographical techniques. The artifacts of one's personality must include the things one has said and written. There must be some relationship between these and personality. This is the primary assumption upon which content analysis as a methodology is based.

However, there are important reasons to believe that this assumption is not always valid. Politicians lie, and sometimes for good reasons, such as reasons of national security. Much of what politicians say in public has been ghostwritten. A politician may say different things—and differently—to different audiences. And even in spontaneous interviews, the answers given may be shaped, sometimes unnaturally, by the manner in which the question is posed.

Scholars who use content analysis try to get around these perturbing factors in several ways. First, spontaneous live interviews are the most preferred source of text. Second, diaries, letters to confidantes, and automatic tape recordings (such as existed in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations) are very useful. Last, it is important to obtain a large amount of text, spanning different time periods, audiences, and subjects, in order to get a fairly accurate result from content analysis.

There are two primary forms of content analysis: thematic content analysis and quantitative (or "word-count") content analysis. In the first technique, the scholar develops a categorization of themes he or she wishes to investigate. Sometimes the dependent variable is the appearance or frequency of a theme within the text; at other times, the scholar creates a variable from the theme and records the value of the variable. For example, Ole Holsti, in his content analysis of John Foster Dulles, secretary of state under Eisenhower, was interested in four themes. These were Dulles's views on Soviet policy, Soviet capabilities, and Soviet success, and Dulles's overall evaluation of the Soviet Union. Each of these themes allowed for variation. For example, text commenting on Soviet policy could characterize that policy as friendly or hostile or something in between. Soviet capabilities could be seen along a continuum from strong to weak. Soviet policy might be, overall, successful or unsuccessful in Dulles's eyes. Dulles's evaluation of the Soviet Union could range from good to bad.

Interestingly, what Holsti found was that regardless of how Dulles viewed Soviet policy, capabilities, or success, Dulles's overall evaluation of the Soviet Union remained constant—"bad." Even when directly confronted by an interviewer concerning the Soviet 1956 demobilization of more than a million men, Dulles felt that the move did not lower world tensions because the men might be put to work making, for example, more atomic weapons. Holsti felt his analysis was one methodology whereby the dynamics of a rigid and closed belief system could be identified.

Thematic content analysis is only as meaningful as the analyst's categorization scheme, of course. Word-count content analysis, on the other hand,

rests upon a foundation tied to psychological theory. If words are the artifacts of personality, then particular personality traits can be linked to particular word choices. Theoretical literature in psychology can be plumbed to determine such links. Then, while parsing text, the presence and the absence of particular words may be noted, and the presence or absence of traits inferred. For example, researchers have suggested that use of the words *I, me, my, mine,* and *myself* might indicate the trait of self-confidence.

In order to use this proposition, we must go through several steps. First, in addition to noting the presence of these words, we must also be able to notice their absence. Hermann postulates that these words indicate self-confidence when used in such as way as to demonstrate that the speaker is an instigator of an activity ("This is my plan"), or as an authority figure ("Let me explain"), or as the recipient of something positive ("You flatter me"). In the case that these words are used without any of these three connotations, it would indicate the absence of the trait ("He hit me").

Second, there must be a means of computing a score for the trait. A simple way is to simply sum the total instances where these words were used, and then determine what proportion of uses corresponds to the three expressions of self-confidence. Third, the score by itself means nothing without comparison. We cannot tell if a raw score is high or low or average without a group to which to compare it. A sample population to which the leader can be compared—usually a sample of other regional or world leaders—must be available. Scores are standardized and then compared to see how many standard deviations from the mean they are. For example Hermann uses the comparison table on the following page.

Next, the analyst must think again about the usage of the words in question for contextual validity. For example, while teaching a class on political psychology many years ago, one of my students, performing just such a word-count content analysis, announced that François Mitterand was extremely lacking in self-confidence! Knowing just a little about Mitterand, I pronounced that impossible. Upon looking at the coded text, it became apparent that Mitterand always used the "royal we." That is, he referred to himself in the plural to denote that he was representing the nation, as did the French kings of old. Thus, Mitterand would say, "This is our plan; this is what we believe would work best," even though he was referring to himself. When we adjusted for this cultural tradition, the recoding showed Mitterand to be possessed of abundant self-confidence.

Last, the analyst would be well advised to see if trait scores varied significantly by time period, by audience, or by topic. In her analysis of Saddam Hussein, Margaret G. Hermann found that self-confidence swung widely according to time period—that is, if Hussein was pre-invasion or postinvasion (Hermann in Post, 2003). A more nuanced view of such differences

Table 2.1 Adapted from Hermann, 2003.

Personality Traits	*87 Heads of State*	*122 Political Leaders*
Belief in ability to control events	Mean = .44 Low < .30 High > .58	Mean = .45 Low < .33 High > .57
Need for power and influence	Mean = .50 Low < .37 High > .62	Mean = .50 Low < .38 High > .62
Self-confidence	Mean = .62 Low < .44 High > .81	Mean = .57 Low < .34 High > .80
Conceptual complexity	Mean = .44 Low < .32 High > .56	Mean = .45 Low < .32 High > .58
Task focus orientation	Mean = .59 Low < .46 High > .71	Mean = .62 Low < .48 High > .76
In-group bias (nationalism)	Mean = .42 Low < .32 High > .53	Mean = .43 Low < .34 High > .53
Distrust of others	Mean = .41 Low < .25 High > .56	Mean = .38 Low < .20 High > .56

could avoid the masking effects of using an overall mean score for any particular trait.

Though word-count content analysis has been used by many scholars, one of the best ways of exploring its potential for FPA is to examine the work of Margaret G. Hermann. Trained as a psychologist, Hermann began to work on the CFP CREON Project at its inception. One of her earliest research endeavors was the attempt to determine if personalities mattered in classroom simulations of the outbreak of World War I. She became convinced that they did, and desired to create a means by which the personal characteristics of world leaders could be both assessed and used as the basis for projections of how they would behave and react in particular circumstances. As she developed her framework, which is based on long-standing trait research in psychology (Costa and McCrae, 1992), she was called upon by the leadership analysis office in the CIA to explain her approach. Thus, her work has spanned both the academic and policymaking communities.

As with many researchers who perform content analysis, Hermann pre-

fers spontaneous live interviews across topics, time periods, and audiences. She also states that results should be based on at least fifty interview responses of over one hundred words apiece.

Hermann codes for seven personality traits: (1) belief in one's own ability to control events, (2) need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity, (4) self-confidence, (5) task/affect orientation (problem focus or relationship focus), (6) distrust of others, and (7) in-group bias (formerly called nationalism). These seven traits speak to three more general characteristics of personality: whether an individual leader challenges or respects constraints, is open to new information, and is primarily motivated by internal or external forces.

Hermann goes further. These three general characteristics may then be combined into eight possible personality "orientations." For example, an expansionistic leader challenges constraints, is closed to new information, and holds a problem focus. A consultative leader respects constraints, is closed to new information, and exhibits a relationship focus motivation. The following list illustrates her framework:

- Expansionistic: challenges constraints, closed to information, problem focus: focus is on expanding one's power and influence
- Evangelistic: challenges constraints, closed to information, relationship focus: focus is on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause
- Incremental: challenges constraints, open to information, problem focus: focus is on maintaining one's maneuverability and flexibility while avoiding the obstacles that continually try to limit both
- Charismatic: challenges constraints, open to information, relationship focus: focus is on achieving one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act
- Directive: respects constraints, closed to information, problem focus: focus is on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one's own views while still working within the norms and rules of one's current position
- Consultative: respects constraints, closed to information, relationship focus: focus is on monitoring that important others will support, or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a problem situation
- Reactive: respects constraints, open to information, problem focus: focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow
- Accommodative: respects constraints, open to information, relationship focus: focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus, empowering others, and sharing accountability in the process.

One of the most valuable elements of Hermann's framework is that she is able to draw out from the psychology of the orientations hypotheses concerning such varied behavior as the style of the leader, likely foreign policy, nature of preferred advisory group, nature of information search, ability to tolerate disagreement, and method of dealing with opposition. For example, we have mentioned the expansionist leader, who is concerned with increasing his or her control over territory, resources, or people, and who perceives the world as divided into "us" and "them." According to Hermann, an expansionist leader will prefer a very loyal advisory group where the leader's preferences will always prevail. An expansionist's ability to tolerate disagreement will be quite limited, for this will be interpreted as a challenge to authority. An expansionist's usual approach to opposition is to eliminate it. And the nature of an expansionist's information search will be characterized by the desire to find information that supports and confirms what the leader already believes and desires to have happen.

The expansionist's style is prudent and wary, for this type of leader wants to keep one step ahead of leaders and potential opponents. When he or she enjoys a power advantage in a situation, however, the leader will attempt to exercise his or her will, by force if necessary. As a result, the foreign policy of an expansionist is not likely to be very committed unless the situation is one in which the leader's nation holds an undisputed advantage or in which the nation has no alternative but to fight. However, the foreign policy rhetoric of such a leader is likely to be fairly hostile in tone and focused on threats and enemies. The leader may also advocate immediate change in the international system.

Hermann's framework for analyzing leader orientation, then, allows for several layers of derivative analysis that may be of use in forecasting likely behavior over time.

Other Techniques

There are a few other techniques deserving of mention with regard to leader analysis. The first is that of "think aloud" protocols (Purkitt, 1998). Though difficult to use with real world leaders, it can be used with lower-level officials that may be more accessible. In short, the interviewer presents the official with a specific foreign policy problem, and then asks him or her to think out loud while deciding how to react to that problem. Though such responses are manipulable, of course, the intent is to understand what concepts, in what order, and in what relation, arise in the official's mind while thinking the issue through. These transcripts can then be analyzed.

One such method of analysis is cognitive mapping. In cognitive mapping, a visual diagram of a text is constructed. Concepts and variables are coded thematically from the text, and then linkages and relationships are

mapped using lines connecting concepts. For example, if a Middle East expert believes that Palestinian suicide bombings are one motivation for the building of security walls by the Israelis, then a line from the first to the second, with a symbol denoting that the relationship is positive, will be drawn. A cognitive map, once drawn, may then be further analyzed in several ways. The consistency of the linkages and valences may be noted. The "tightness" of the conceptual clusterings can be investigated. Change over time in cognitive mapping can be discerned (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973).

Another technique is personality assessment of leaders by scholars. For example, Etheredge (1978) combed scholarly works, insiders' accounts, biographies, and autobiographies and coded presidents and secretaries of state for personality variables. He then masked the identities of the leaders and asked several other scholars to also rank these anonymous individuals along the same personality variables. Intercoder reliability was quite high. M. Hermann performed a variant of this technique in her doctoral dissertation. Wanting to investigate the effect of personality of leaders on the outbreak of World War I, Hermann wished to run simulations of that event with students whose personalities were similar to the leaders involved in World War I, and students whose personalities were different from those same leaders. In order to perform such an analysis, Hermann used standard psychological inventories to assess the students' personalities. But to compare them to the leaders' personalities, she had to come up with a creative way to determine the leaders' scores on those same tests. She immersed herself in the biographical material of each leader, and then took the personality test as if she were the leader in question.

Yet another technique is that of the Q-sort, where subjects are asked to report how strongly they agree or disagree with certain statements that relate to psychological characteristics the researcher wishes to study. These self-reports are then subjected to factor analysis. The resulting factors represent the subject's "narration of self," which can then be analyzed (McKeown, 1984). One can also use this technique at-a-distance by asking leadership experts or even public citizens about their perceptions of a leader's beliefs, much like the aforementioned personality assessments.

Finally, this chapter would be remiss without an introduction to ProfilerPlus, a series of computer interfaces and software developed by Michael Young to effect word-count content analysis as well as cognitive mapping. Young has prepared a demonstration for FPA students to examine, and that demo is available at www.socialscienceautomation.com/hudson/hudson.html.

The demo is narrated and revolves around the idea that automated text coding allows for superior analysis of textual data. The student is first introduced to four types of automated coding: tag and retrieve, frequency analysis, concept coding, and information extraction. Each type is demonstrated by conceptual discussion followed by actual coding results for Presidents

Bill Clinton and George W. Bush for their respective State of the Union addresses to Congress. In one case, an Iranian leader's remarks are coded.

Tag and retrieve is simply the built-in ability to "tag" certain words in texts, retrieving the context in which the words were used.

Frequency analysis "counts" how often particular words are used, sometimes in contrast to divergent sets of words. The demo illustrates frequency analysis in two ways: the Leadership Style Analysis of Margaret G. Hermann, and the Verbal Behavior Analysis (VBA) system of Walter Weintraub. For Hermann's scheme, the conceptual complexity and task orientation scores of Clinton and Bush are presented; for VICS (Verbs in Context System), the use of "feeling" words that might indicate either aloofness or insincerity depending on use are examined for Clinton and Bush.

Concept coding refers to the automated search for patterns in the use of word phrases. Such pattern recognition typically involves more advanced algorithms than frequency analysis. For example, the algorithms would have to distinguish between the use of positive or neutral context phrases surrounding the mention of other entities versus the use of negative context, in order to code level of distrust. Two examples are given: first, the variables of "belief in own ability to control events," "distrust of others," and "need for power" from the Hermann framework, as well as the variables "nature of the political universe," and "preferred strategy for achieving goals" from the Operational Code analysis scheme developed by Stephen Walker, Michael Young, and Mark Shafer (VICS). For President Bush, the Operational Code variables are also displayed in a longitudinal graph, showing the effect of 9/11 on Bush's perceptions.

Information extraction, the final type of automated coding, is illustrated by two approaches: Image Theory (Martha Cottam, 1986, 1992, and 1998) and Cognitive Mapping. Image theory examines larger themes constructed from particular words used to describe other nations. These themes correspond to broad images the speaker has of other entities, with the example given in the demo of "degenerate." This "degenerate" image is demonstrated to be present in the speeches of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei in reference to the United States. Cognitive mapping, on the other hand, restructures the text physically in order to display a visual picture of the relationships between concepts in text. Both sentence-level and speech-level mapping is demonstrated. Valences and/or levels of certainty may also be attached to the relationships outlined in the maps, and change in the map over time is often analyzed by comparing successive speeches.

In conclusion, then, FPA asserts that leaders do matter, and that analysis of perception, cognition, and personality of world leaders is well worth undertaking. In addition, FPA draws upon a wide variety of techniques to make such an analysis possible, despite the unavailability of world leaders for direct observation.

3

Group Decisionmaking: Small Group Dynamics, Organizational Process, and Bureaucratic Politics

No matter how influential or mercenary, a single leader cannot make and implement foreign policy by himself or herself. In fact, in most countries, foreign policy decisions are always made in a group setting. And these policies are virtually always carried out by particular organizations or arrays of organizations (bureaucracies).

We might consider using the following flowchart to help us orient ourselves to the role of groups in foreign policy decisionmaking.

Of course, these distinctions cannot be precisely drawn. Small groups may devolve to bureaucratic politics, depending upon the group's membership. Organizations must implement decisions regarding nonroutine prob-



Figure 3.1 Involvement of Groups in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

lems. Nevertheless, the locus of decision in a particular foreign policy situation is likely to follow tendencies as portrayed in the figure. In the remainder of this chapter, we will investigate Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory regarding each of these types of groups.

SMALL GROUP DYNAMICS

Most high-level foreign policy decisions are made in small groups, meaning approximately fifteen persons or less. This is not to say that only less than fifteen persons are involved in any particular issue, but serious discussion of, say, a crisis situation almost demands that a leader be able to sit around a table with a set of peers and engage in candid and far-ranging debate of policy options. As a result, the study of small group dynamics has received considerable attention in FPA.

We have mentioned in chapter 2 that a leader's personality will play a role in his or her choice of close FP advisors. Some personalities prefer groups that defer to the leader's opinions; others want to hear dissenting views. Some personalities desire a more methodical process of decision-making, while others do not want to take the chance that a methodical process might stifle either creativity or second thoughts.

Charles F. Hermann (1978) asserts that elements of the group's structure, such as the distribution of power within the group as well as the type of role played by the group's members, will have important consequences for group process, which in turn may have ramifications for FP choice. Groups wherein the leader holds primary power will behave differently than groups wherein the president may have considerable power, but must share that power with other members at the table, such as the military chief of staff in a nation heavily dependent on the military's sanction for rule. Likewise, members of the group may view themselves as differing somewhat in their role at the table. Some members may view themselves as loyal staff, whose presence must help facilitate promotion of the leaders' preferences. Others may view themselves primarily as delegates of external entities, whose main purpose in the group is to clarify and argue for the perspective of that entity. So, for example, the director of central intelligence (DCI) may feel less like a staff member and more like the representative of his analysts and agents when part of a National Security Council (NSC) meeting. Still others may view themselves as autonomous actors, who are neither completely beholden to the leader nor to an external entity. These are often some of the most powerful players in the small group, because it is assumed that being beholden to none, their analysis is more clear-sighted, less constrained, and thus more valuable. Furthermore, the consent of these powerful players may be necessary to implement any resulting decision. In the United States, the secretaries of defense and state are often relatively autonomous players in FP decisions. For example, the U.S.-led bombing of Belgrade in 1998 over the Kosovo crisis was often called "Madeleine's War" because of Madeleine Albright's strong, almost single-handed insistence on retaliatory action against the Serbs, even in the face of a more cautionary stance taken by the Pentagon and even NATO allies.

Many FP issues are often relegated to interagency committees for initial discussion, and these are then tasked to report to the higher levels of decisionmakers. Though these interagency committees are often technically "small groups," we will not consider them in this section because they are almost always "all-delegate" groups, whose interactions can only be understood by reference to theories concerning bureaucratic politics.

Hermann extended his analysis of groups to talk about a more nuanced view of member role than the simple staff/delegate/autonomous actor categorization. In later work, Hermann began to develop indicators of whether, on a particular issue, a member would be an advocate of a specific policy, a "cue-taker" who would see which way the decision was going and bandwagon, or a "broker" who would use his or her influence to create a consensus position through coalitions and bargaining (Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989). Having identified which members of a small group would play each of these roles, Hermann then created a set of rules that helped him decide which members would take what positions, and which views would prevail as a result. Though the data requirements for such an exercise are quite high, this exercise is no different in kind than that performed by top-notch investigative journalists as they try to piece together, say, how the NSC came to a particular FP decision.

The most seminal work on small groups in foreign policy decisionmaking (FPDM), however, is the work of Irving Janis, which focuses on small group dysfunction in the foreign policy realm. Though not all small groups are dysfunctional, quite a few are, given the particular characteristics of FPDM—high stress, high stakes, ambiguity, uncertainty, secrecy, risk (Janis, 1982). Small group dysfunction, which Janis labels "groupthink," feeds upon just such situations, which elicit a strong emotional response centering around fear. Fear-inducing circumstances prompt us to find the emotional support that will enable us to decrease our fear to manageable levels. That emotional support is first and foremost sought through the small group itself, often because the foreign policy issues involved cannot be revealed outside of the group. Janis feels groupthink is a form of group derangement, a parallel to the derangement we often note in larger groups as "mob psychology." Groupthink is a form of dysfunctional group cohesiveness.

In Janis's original theory, groupthink does not arise from conscious manipulation of group members by the leader for his or her own ends, but

rather from a subtle social dynamic that evolves over time. However, as 't Hart and others have noted (1997), it is quite possible to create groupthink-like processes and outcomes in ways other than those posed by Janis. For example, the context may include a high level of threat from the leader himself or herself. For example, Jerrold Post (1991) relates the anecdote of Saddam Hussein calling together his inner circle for advice at a crucial juncture early in his reign. One minister opined that perhaps Saddam should relinquish leadership for a short while until the crisis at hand passed. Saddam thanked him for his opinion, and later that day the minister's body—chopped into pieces and placed in a plastic bag—was delivered to his wife. Needless to say, such an unusually coercive context will almost certainly promote groupthink as well. Other possibilities that may lead to the development of groupthink-like processes and outcomes would include the presence of a highly charismatic leader who elicits in noncoercive fashion an unusual degree of loyalty; a larger cultural context in which unanimity and consensus are highly valued; or an issue about which the society allows for little deviation in acceptable viewpoint.

Though there are several routes to groupthink, we will examine in greater detail Janis's original conception of the social dynamics of groupthink where the variables noted above are not in play. In the original conceptualization, group dynamics produce subtle constraints, which the leader may inadvertently reinforce, that prevent members of the group from exercising their critical powers and from openly expressing doubts when the majority of the group appears to have reached a consensus. There may certainly be sincere agreement with the emerging consensus, but Janis points out that in a groupthink group, there is a significant degree of insincere agreement as well. We have all participated in group deliberations where we went along with a decision with which we did not feel comfortable and then watched in dismay and sometimes horror when the decision turns out as badly as we thought (to ourselves) that it would. How do rational, educated persons find themselves in such a situation, assuming they are not members of Saddam Hussein's group of advisors?

Janis opens his analysis by means of an illuminating field observation made when he was studying the social dynamics of smokers at a clinic set up to help them stop smoking:

> At the second meeting of one group of smokers, consisting of twelve middle-class American men and women, two of the most dominant members took the position that heavy smoking was an almost incurable addiction. The majority of the others soon agreed that no one could be expected to cut down drastically. One heavy smoker, a middle-aged business executive, took issue with this consensus, arguing that by using willpower he had stopped smoking since joining the group and that everyone else could do the same. His declaration was followed by a heated discussion, which continued in the halls of the building after the formal meeting adjourned. Most of the others ganged up against the man who was deviating from the group consensus. Then, at the beginning of the next meeting, the deviant announced that he had made an important decision. "When I joined," he said, "I agreed to follow the two main rules required by the clinic—to make a conscientious effort to stop smoking and to attend every meeting. But I have learned from experience in this group that you can only follow one of the rules, you can't follow them both. And so, I have decided that I will continue to attend every meeting but I have gone back to smoking two packs a day and I will not make any effort to stop smoking again until after the last meeting." Whereupon, the other members beamed at him and applauded enthusiastically, welcoming him back to the fold. . . . At every [subsequent] meeting, the members were amiable, reasserted their warm feeling of solidarity, and sought complete concurrence on every important topic, with no reappearance of the unpleasant bickering that would spoil the cozy atmosphere (1982, 8).

This case, because of its extremity, reveals some of the dynamics at work. When a group is formed, two separate forces are set in motion. The formation of the group sets in motion a decision process to tackle the issue or problem at hand. But the formation of the group also sets in motion a social institution that is to be maintained over time. Thus the group has, in a sense, two goals: to effectively address the problem that catalyzed its formation, and to continue to function as a group. These two goals are neither intuitively nor inevitably at odds. But in groupthink groups, such as the smoking clinic, they become at odds over time.

Group cohesiveness is a powerful source of emotional support for small group members. We see this dynamic at work in families, in gangs, in sports teams, in military platoons, in groups of friends, on specialized internet listservs, in business departments, and so forth. The rest of the world may not appreciate you or even like you, but as long as the people who interact with you in a salient small group (and thus arguably know you best) appreciate and like you, what the rest of the world thinks may not cause you psychological distress. Conversely, the capacity to produce psychological distress for its members is heightened in small groups that interact over time. The source of that stress is fear—fear of ostracism by the group.

Consider that fear of failure in addressing the problem that catalyzed formation of the group is compensated for by the emotional support provided by the group itself, but then the prospect of potentially losing that support produces a fear of ostracism that may dwarf the original fear of task failure. Thus maintenance of group cohesiveness may evolve into the group's primary purpose, supplanting the original task-oriented purpose for which the group was formed in the first place. When this occurs, groupthink exists. What one begins to fear most is to be labeled as a deviant from the group.

As noted in the smoking clinic example, if a group member expresses deviance, the other members of the group will try to influence him or her to revise or tone down their dissident views. If they are not successful in bringing the deviant back into the fold, he or she will be excluded from the group—at first subtly, and then more overtly. Insincere agreement to avoid ostracism may then arise.

In addition to the group's purpose being supplanted and insincere agreement occurring, Janis notes several other hallmarks of groupthink. First, the group's standards of judgment are changed and lowered. The group's standards for judging a matter may stray from more objective reasoning to reasoning based on the desire to prevent deviance or lack of cohesiveness and preserve amiability above all else. Second, groupthink groups begin to think very well of themselves and their members. A groupthink group will feel that it and its members are wiser, more powerful, more knowledgeable, and more virtuous than those who do not belong to the group. This inflated self-image may have several consequences. For one, nonmembers may be dehumanized, especially those who are seen as competing with the group. Nonmembers may be seen as inferior or evil, and action that might not usually be considered moral might be deemed appropriate to deal with nonmembers. For another, inflated self-image may lead to the "risky shift": the propensity for groupthink groups to collectively decide on more risky behavior than any one member of the group would have chosen individually (this is sometimes called "group polarization"). An easy analogy is to teenage gangs. Often these gangs are capable of risky, violent, criminal behavior on a level that no one teen in the group would dare attempt.

In sum, Janis asserts that groupthink groups are hard-hearted but soft-headed. This soft-headedness can also manifest itself in sloppy decision practices due to lowered standards of judgment and inflated self-image. In his case studies of foreign policy fiascoes, Janis finds that the groups in questions usually examined only two options to deal with the problem they faced, and that the group would quickly seize on one of the two options that would never again be critically examined for weakness. He also found very little effort on the part of these groups to obtain information from knowledgeable nonmembers, but found instead a selection bias in the evaluation of information to favor the preferred option, and an utter failure to establish contingency plans in case the preferred option was unsuccessful. Sloppy decisionmaking did not induce psychological stress because of compensatory inflated self-image: the groupthink groups thought of themselves as not only omniscient, but also as invulnerable. And immoral decisionmaking likewise did not induce stress, because loyalty to the group had become the highest form of morality.

Janis is quick to note that not all foreign policy fiascoes are produced by groupthink groups. And it is possible for a groupthink group to operate without producing a fiasco. However, ceteris paribus, it is much more likely for a groupthink group to create fiascoes than otherwise, given its dysfunctional attributes. A case in point, argues Janis, is the 1961 Bay of Pigs episode.

That the Bay of Pigs invasion was a fiasco by any standard is not in doubt. On April 17, 1961, about fourteen hundred Cuban exiles, trained by the United States for this purpose, invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. By the second day, the brigade of exiles was completely surrounded by over twenty thousand Cuban troops. By the third day, about twelve hundred (all who had not been killed) were captured and sent to prison camps. About twenty months later, the United States ransomed most of these with $53 million in food and medicine. The European allies, the United Nations, and friendly Latin American regimes were outraged, and the invasion may have been the catalyst for new military agreements between Cuba and the USSR, which would eventually culminate in the Cuban missile crisis. Even John F. Kennedy, president at the time, asked rhetorically, "How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?" (Janis, 1982, 16)

Janis points to the underlying dynamics of Kennedy's first foreign policy inner circle, which included Dean Rusk (secretary of state), Robert McNamara (secretary of defense), Robert "Bobby" Kennedy (attorney general and the president's brother), McGeorge Bundy (special assistant for national security affairs [ANSA]), Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (White House historian), Allen Dulles (DCI), and Richard Bissell (deputy director of central intelligence [DDCI]). Kennedy had only been in office a very short time. He was under stress to perform well in foreign policy, since he was the youngest president ever elected, he was a Democrat, and he was a Catholic. Kennedy was not the only "greenhorn" in the group: McNamara, Bobby Kennedy, Bundy, and Schlesinger were all new to government, not to mention high-level government office. In the recent presidential campaign, his opponent Richard Nixon had painted Kennedy as too young and inexperienced to stand up to the Soviet threat. Was Kennedy tough enough?

Dulles and Bissell, both holdovers from the previous Eisenhower administration, briefed Kennedy on the ongoing plan for the exiles' invasion of Cuba. The plan, therefore, was the plan of his predecessor: Dwight Eisenhower, two-term Republican president, hero of World War II, and a man about whom no one had qualms about "toughness." Fear of failure in standing up to the Soviet threat was to be extinguished for Kennedy via the emotional support he would get from his small group of advisors. But most were newcomers themselves, and had as great or greater fear of failure as he did. Emotional support from Dulles and Bissell, then, would be key. Since they had crafted the invasion plan, this needed emotional support would only be forthcoming if the plan were accepted. This social dynamic set the stage for groupthink.

Janis points to additional factors auguring in favor of groupthink. Kennedy's election had ushered in a sense of elation and invulnerability among his inner circle. Schlesinger later put it this way: "Euphoria reigned: we thought for a moment that the world was plastic and the future unlimited" (Janis, 1982, 35). Janis also identifies Bobby Kennedy as a self-appointed "mindguard" who would attempt to corral deviants who expressed second thoughts privately: in one instance, Bobby accosted Schlesinger about the latter's doubts with, "You may be right or you may be wrong, but the President has made his mind up. Don't push it any further" (Janis, 1982, 40). Furthermore, Schlesinger himself noted at the time "a curious atmosphere of assumed consensus" (38). No one spoke up against the plan in the group's meetings, even though numerous members apparently did harbor doubts. Silence was interpreted as consent.

In this context, then, group decision-making processes deteriorated in quality. Though the press had leaked the invasion plan, the plan proceeded. The State Department and British intelligence contradicted the CIA position that Castro's army and air force were weak, but there was no attempt to discover which position was correct: the CIA's position was accepted uncritically. One assumption of the plan was that the invasion would ignite the Cuban underground, which would then revolt in the cities. Janis points out that not only did no one think to let the underground know that an invasion was imminent, but that since Castro was alerted by U.S. press reports to the plan, he took preemptive measures to round up dissidents. An egregious error was the decision to move the landing site from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs—without looking at a topographical map that would show that the Bay of Pigs was a swamp far removed from the Escambray Mountains (which is where the invaders were to flee if they ran into trouble).

Though the Bay of Pigs invasion was a fiasco, Janis argues that Kennedy learned invaluable lessons that prepared him for the higher stakes of the Cuban missile crisis. Among other things, ExCom (the small group formed in response) proceeded quite differently in the second crisis. A wide range of options was considered, and Kennedy refused to allow the group to move swiftly to adoption of a preferred option. Experts, particularly from the military, were grilled instead of being shown deference. Dissension was encouraged, and Bobby Kennedy often assumed the role of devil's advocate. Participants were explicitly asked to be skeptical. There was no formal agenda and no protocol. Subgroups of ExCom met with or without President Kennedy. Often lower-ranking officials were asked to meetings to which their bosses were not invited. Contingency plans were extremely detailed. Kennedy fostered an air of discomfort and reminded all of the grave dangers involved. Issues of morality were openly raised. Reversals of judgment were frequent. Kennedy had members role-play Khrushchev and Castro, pushing for a nonstereotypical view of the enemy alongside themes of non-humiliation and non-underestimation.

Janis argues that if we are pleased with the result in the Cuban missile crisis, part of the credit must go to Kennedy being scrupulous and diligent in avoiding groupthink at all costs. Thus, it is possible to consider measures to head off this pernicious social dynamic. In his research, Janis explores a variety of ways to defuse this all-too-frequent phenomenon. He encourages leaders to avoid homogeneity in the background of group members, to refuse to dissipate stress and discomfort through group amiability. Leaders might do well to appoint a devil's advocate, though that role may have to be rotated over time so that the person's views are not automatically dismissed due to role expectations. Janis urges leaders not to make the group too insular, to invite in outsiders and experts to openly challenge group assumptions. Kennedy's use of subgroup meetings is a good way to make room for dissent, especially if the leader himself is not present. Janis also counsels leaders to hold their opinions to themselves as long as feasible, so as to not inadvertently close off dissent. A checklist of good decision practices might be used to ensure no important steps have been omitted. Role-playing and study of the other nations involved in order to construct realistic alternative scenarios are very useful. And finally, Janis notes that a variety of cultures have norms of the "last chance" meeting, here after a decision is finalized, participants often get drunk (or otherwise lower their social inhibitions) and then meet again to see if they still agree on the decision made.

Though we have spoken very negatively of groupthink, for good reason, it is possible that the attempt to foment group cohesiveness might have its uses. One such documented use was the 1994–1995 talks between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators to work out the details of the Oslo Accord regarding the West Bank. At the Patio Hotel in remote Eilat, the Israelis took the third floor, the Palestinians took the second, and the talks were held on the first—and no one was allowed to leave for months. As an Israeli negotiator put it, "We created a setting in which there was no physical way out without an agreement" (Schmemann, 1995, A1). The article goes on to note:

> "You could watch the peace process develop like one of those American soap operas. You saw who went to whose room, who was negotiating with whom." The delegates ate together, went to the health club together, Israeli generals took saunas with Palestinian guerrillas. "It created a club mentality vis à vis everybody else. We needed a common enemy, and it became the media. We developed a deep understanding of each other's paranoias, we created a certain trust among representatives of total mistrust."

Even here, we see the power of the emotional support that small groups can provide; power enough to overcome historical hatreds (at least temporarily). The influence of small group dynamics on foreign policymaking should never be underestimated, but rather studied, understood, and used to promote functional ends.

There are other scholarly insights on small group dynamics that deserve mention. For example, the psychologist Garold Stasser noted that most small groups tend to rely primarily on information about the problem that is already known to all or nearly all group members before group discussion commences (Carey, 2005, 4:1,3). Important information that only a few members of the group hold will probably not be used, and is likely to be overlooked in the group discussion. Apparently, the easiest psychological route to agreement is not learning new premises for a decision, but discovering common premises that already exist within the group.

Ryan Beasley's work on how small groups come to agree on a problem representation moves the small group dynamics research agenda forward in significant ways (1998). Beasley believes that small groups are not identical: that there is a taxonomy of groups according to characteristics such as the centrality of particular individuals, the complexity of group discussion, the degree of alternation between speakers, the continuity of the discussion, and so forth. Thus, each type of group may be predisposed to a certain style of group decisionmaking. Beasley postulates several varied processes for group aggregation of individual understandings: simplicity ("classic" groupthink), single representation embellishment (leader-drive groupthink), factionalism, common decomposition, common alternatives, and expertise. In a study of meetings of the British Cabinet over the Munich crisis, Beasley found that each of these types of decisionmaking was used over time. Groupthink-style processes occurred in only five of the twelve meetings. Thus there may be more nuance and complexity to small group dynamics than the work of Janis might suggest.

Sylvan and Haddad (1998) suggest also that in cases of group conflict over problem representation, the technique of "story-telling" begins to dominate, in which participants compete with each other to provide the most articulate causal argument concerning a particular problem. The views of those with the most persuasive story will become the basis for decisionmaking by the group.

The fine volume *Beyond Groupthink*, edited by 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius (1997), suggests that the "group-as-decisionmaker" might be too simplistic. The small group in FPDM may play a variety of roles that should be considered, not just "command center," but also sanctuary, smoke screen, and arena. Furthermore, the effects of leader personality, culture, and institutional context on small group structure and function need further attention. For example, Stern and Sundelius believe the Bay of Pigs fiasco is better explained as "newgroup syndrome" than classic groupthink à la Janis (Stern, 1997). Going further, Hoyt and Garrison wonder why strategic manipulation of a small group by political "gamesmen" has not been researched more fully (1997): tactics such as non-invitation to meetings, non-sharing of information, destroying a member's credibility, casting a member as an insubordinate when they refuse to be silenced or excluded, duplicating another member's assignments to provide alternative information, dropping an item from the agenda, and so forth. Furthermore, Vertzberger suggests that scholars look more deeply into the cultural context of small group dynamics, pointing to the *guru-chela* (teacher-disciple) template for political relationships in India as an example (1997; see also 1990). In conclusion, there is much more ground to be plowed in FPA concerning the analysis of small group dynamics.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS

Though small group dynamics are extremely important in understanding foreign policy behavior, it must not be overlooked that most high-level foreign policy decisions are implemented through large executive organizations, such as departments and agencies. Furthermore, the government's "senses" are these same organizations: the gathering of information and the initial processing of information are performed for the most part by organizations. Governments both perceive and act primarily through organizations.

This situation invites us to explore the degree to which the government is not a unitary rational actor. Given the prominence of organizations in the government's ability to conduct foreign policy, it might be more useful at times to view the government as a matrix of organizations, or, in other words, as a national bureaucracy. There are multiple actors in a national bureaucracy, not one unitary actor. And just as we have found that a collection of individuals within a small group might not act in classically rational fashion, so we can also speculate that the actions of the multiple bureaucratic players might also result in behavior that is less than optimally rational and coordinated. Those who have had the opportunity to work within a large organization, whether that be a government agency, a business corporation, a university or school system, or even an organized religion, inevitably discover that sometimes the collective is less intelligent than the sum of its members.

So why have organizations at all? Organizations exist to provide capabilities that otherwise would not exist. Consider the case of space exploration, such as sending probes to Mars or Saturn's moon Titan. When one details all the subtasks involved in accomplishing those larger tasks, it becomes

clear that without large collectives of people pooling resources, knowledge, labor, and leadership, no space exploration would ever have taken place. Tasks such as space exploration, or even the fielding of an army of men, require specialization so that larger tasks may be divided into smaller, more feasible ones. Such endeavors also require a tremendous amount of coordination and communication, with the ability to preserve memory as particular individuals enter and leave the larger organization. Remember that some large organizations relevant to foreign policy, such as the U.S. Department of Defense, may have over one million employees!

A common reaction is to anthropomorphize organizations, and speak in such terms as, "The Defense Department wanted greater authority to collect intelligence, and it got what it wanted." This type of language, again connoting a unitary rational actor but at a lower level of government, conceals a more complex reality. Though large organizations contain many human beings, large organizations are arguably a simpler form of life than a human being. First, they have a constrained functionality related to the purpose of their creation. It is useless to ask NASA to plan the invasion of Afghanistan. It is useless to ask the State Department to send a man to the moon. Of course, some organizations may be interested in expanding their functions, but by and large that cannot happen quickly. Organizations will develop specific skill sets, which will constrain what they are able to do. Second, this will give rise to an organizational culture, which is an understanding by the humans in the organization as to the organization's identity and mission and vision. Morton Halperin calls this an understanding of the organization's "essence," which, once entrenched, is almost impossible to change.

One's essence leads to the staking out of particular "turf," meaning an understanding of which issues the organization can claim a "stake" in, or organizational interest. Concerning some issues the organization may view itself as the primary "stakeholder," and in other issues it may view itself as a lesser stakeholder.

An organization's resources include not only its personnel and their capabilities and talents, but also a standard set of resources such as budget, influence, morale, and autonomy, in addition to turf and essence, all of which we will discuss in due turn.

Essence. An organization's self-understanding of what it is and does is crucial to its ability to function effectively. An organization's sense of identity and mission provides its members with a vision of why what they are doing is important and necessary, and how what they are doing differs from what other organizations are doing. Without this focus and vision, an organization may not develop the special skill set needed to possess influence within the bureaucracy, and it may also lose its ability to instill morale in its members. An organization's essence will lead it over time to develop

a distinctive organizational culture, with norms of dress, behavior, thinking, and value prioritization. A legendary case in point is the differing corporate cultures of Microsoft and Apple. Not only can one tell the employees apart, one can also tell the customers apart!

The development of an identity always carries risks however. The most salient risks are empire-building and intra- and interorganizational xenophobia. Though organizations are designed to be tools of a higher-level elected executive, in many ways they are far more powerful than that executive. They are going to last much longer than he or she will; they directly control large sums of money and personnel; they exercise capabilities on the ground; they are not under electoral accountability. It is not surprising, then, that many governmental organizations begin to act as autonomous entities—empires, almost—that are not in the business of obeying directives so much as in the business as negotiating directives with an eye to their organization's advantage. One president (FDR) put it this way:

> "The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want. . . . But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy. . . . To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching" (Eccles 1951, 336).

Essence can also breed distrust and resentment of those who are different, whether they be in other organizations, or even within one's own organization. The infamous antipathy between the FBI and CIA arguably contributed to some of the intelligence failures that led to 9/11. In the wake of that horrific event, the heads of both agencies publicly accused the other of incompetence and noncooperation. Even the intelligence reform of December 2004, with its creation of a director of national intelligence (DNI) and two new interagency intelligence centers, did not stop the bickering between the two. At the time of this writing, they were feuding over which had the right to recruit foreign nationals in the United States to spy on other nations.

But this xenophobia also extends within the organization. Those who are not "like" those who identify with the essence of the organization may be targeted for harassment and even expulsion. Some scholars have used the term *homosexual reproduction* to refer to an organization's tendency to employ only those who embrace the organization's essence and culture, which may, as a result, become even narrower over time. I once overheard

a conversation between two FBI agents, in which was discussed the dismissal of another colleague. One said, "Yeah, he'd show up to work in sandals and chinos. It's true he was very bright—possibly the brightest in the office—but there was no way the Bureau was going to keep him. He just didn't fit in." But it is not just individuals who are targeted in this fashion: sometimes groups of individuals may find themselves marginalized or even expelled because they do not "belong," given the organization's essence. The position of submariners within the Navy has always been somewhat marginalized, because the essence of the Navy is sailing ships on the water, not under the water. Likewise, the Army was eager to be rid of the Army Air Corps in the wake of World War II, because the pilots were seen as undermining the essence of the Army: boots on the ground.

Turf. Essence will help shape "turf," referring to the substantive and skill domains in which the organization believes it has a primary claim to influence and expertise within the national bureaucracy. As we have just noted, sometimes an organization's essence leads it to shun or treat lightly particular turf that it sees as unimportant or subversive to that essence. But much more often than not, organizations are greedy for additional turf, and jealously guard what turf they already possess. The reason is simple: more turf means a larger sphere of influence, more personnel, a larger budget, perhaps even greater autonomy. Losing turf means a concomitant loss in each of these areas. Thus, though the Navy and the Air Force do not view sealift and airlift in support of the Army as expressing their respective essences, the two services resist efforts by the Army to create its own lift capabilities, such as the TSV (theater support vessel). Turf battles over close air support of troops between the Air Force and the Army and over amphibious operations between the Army and the Marines are long-standing and legendary. Issues of turf can also determine access to information within the bureaucracy. Since access to information is a form of power and control, fights over such access can become especially intense. An organization cannot afford to have its policy stances ignored because it is perceived as not knowing what is really going on.

Budget and Personnel. The size of an organization, operationalized as the amount of funds allocated for its budget and the number of personnel assigned to the organization, is a primary indicator of the strength an organization can bring to bear in bureaucratic battles. The budget of the entire CIA is less than one-tenth that of the Pentagon. Civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DoD) alone number over seven hundred thousand, with military personnel adding almost one million more. Estimates of the number of CIA employees range from twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand. Though popular perception, promulgated through Tom Clancy novels and the like, might lead one to conclude that the CIA is on an organizational par with the DoD, nothing could be further from the truth.

Compared to the CIA, the DoD is an eight hundred-pound gorilla, and the social dynamics of interagency working groups reflect this. With regard to budget, it is also worth remembering that relative budget increase is as important to track as total budget figures. The proportion of the armed services budget that goes to each of the three major services is arguably more an issue of contention between the services than is total level of funding. Often a wary peace develops where entities keep bureaucratic conflict under control by a de facto agreement to keep budget proportionality static. This conflict-avoidance measure can readily undercut the ability of the secretary of defense to make significant alterations in the nation's fighting force.

Influence. One of the objectives of any governmental organization is influence; influence with policymakers and comparative influence on matters affecting one's turf within the bureaucracy. For example, even though the CIA is a considerably smaller organization than the DoD, until the DNI office was established, it was CIA personnel who provided the president with his daily morning security briefing (the PDB). This unparalleled access provided the CIA with influence far in excess of what its size would forecast. Now that it appears the office of the DNI will take over this function, the CIA will probably lose influence as an organization. Sometimes influence is obtained not through access to policymakers, but through acquiring an interagency reputation. The very small INR office of the State Department (the Bureau of Intelligence and Research) maintains influence completely out of proportion to its size because it has developed a reputation for skewering the intelligence estimates of its larger sister organizations, particularly the DoD and CIA. Because they are so small, they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by questioning the estimates of these larger organizations. If the INR is proved right, as they sometimes are, this further establishes their reputation as being hard-nosed objectivists who operate unconstrained by organizational pressures to conform their analyses to the accepted or acceptable wisdom. Nevertheless, it is still true as a generality that the larger and more well-funded an organization, and the larger the scope of its expertise and turf, the more likely that organization will have veto power over other organizations in interagency working groups.

Morale. Morale, though less tangible an asset than funding or personnel, is still vitally important to organizations. Demoralization can lead to an exodus of personnel, or a decrease in productivity among those who remain. A demoralized organization is in a weaker position within the bureaucracy, and may have to fight harder to retain what influence, turf, and budget it once had. Sometimes organizational attention to morale can take unusual, sometimes counterproductive forms. Halperin recounts how it was issues of morale that led the Army to implement shorter tours of duty of officers than enlisted personnel during the Vietnam War (Halperin,

1974). Officers who aspired to a long career in the Army needed combat experience to qualify for field grade rank. The Army felt that providing combat experience for the maximum number of officers possible would thus boost morale. Unfortunately, it led in some cases to resentment by seasoned enlisted personnel of "green" officers looking for glory and willing to engage in risky operations to get it. There were reports that especially gung ho junior officers were as much at risk from their own platoons as they were from the Viet Cong.

Autonomy. It is very difficult for two or more organizations to jointly plan an operation. Each has a different culture, different skills, different procedures, different equipment, and different priorities. Furthermore, each is vying with the others for influence and turf in matters where these overlap between organizations. Thus, one objective of organizations is to operate as autonomously as possible. An excellent example of this was the political jockeying over the creation of the DNI position. The 9/11 Commission, which spurred the creation of this new position, wanted the DNI to have budgetary authority over all intelligence units scattered throughout the federal bureaucracy, as well as the power to set priorities for intelligence gathering by these units. The major opponent to this conceptualization of the DNI's power was the DoD, naturally enough: these proposed DNI powers would severely cut into their autonomy. The DoD fought and won the concession that military requirements could override DNI requirements when the lives of American military personnel were at stake. Given the DoD's preference for autonomy, we would expect that exceptional condition to become a chronic condition.

Combined with this understanding of what drives organizations, it is now important to understand how large organizations operate. At their most fundamental, organizations exist to reduce complexity. There are several aspects to this complexity: complexity of information processing and decisionmaking, complexity of task execution, and the complexity of coordinating the efforts of the organization's numerous human employees.

The attack an organization makes on complexity is a simple one: break up a complex whole into pieces that are easily understandable, easily executable, and easily standardized. In a way, the last thing an organization really wants to do is have to think about something from scratch. More efficient is to view something new as an instance of something already known, or something new to do as an extension of something the organization already does. This approach is not irrational in the least: remember that typical government organizations may have hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of human employees. And these employees are not static over time; on any given day, some employees are leaving, some are staying, and some are entering employment with the organization

for the first time. No one human being within the organization can know all there is to know about it. No one human being possesses complete institutional memory concerning what the organization has done in the past. No one human being has the skills and know-how that the complete organization has. If the organization is to function, such global knowledge must be made as irrelevant as possible.

Though the organizational approach is not irrational, it is decidedly different than what we consider to be normal behavior for a human being, where global knowledge is prized. Let us consider some of the major differences.

Organizations are simply not very responsive to change. Inertia is a strong force within organizations, which may result in a lack of creativity, a lack of flexibility, and a lack of adaptability to new circumstances. The National Security Agency (NSA) admitted it had hundreds of hours of captured pre-9/11 conversations among individuals suspected of having planned or taken part in those attacks that still had not been translated months afterwards because it did not have enough Arabic translators. The FBI spent several years and over $170 million to update its computerized file management systems to allow easier dissemination of information across units, only to scrap the entire project and decide to start all over. Nearly two years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Special Operations forces were finally given permission to pay field informants cash. Armor for humvees and body armor for soldiers were not provided in sufficient quantities for the Iraqi invasion because the working assumption was that most troops would not encounter enemy forces. The notion of a hardcore insurgency that would attack American troops anywhere within Iraq, even within "secured areas," was apparently not a scenario seriously considered during contingency planning.

Responsive learning can be painfully slow, imperiling important priorities. Usually incremental learning is the norm for large organizations, where baby steps toward change are undertaken over a significant time period. The most reliable guide to organizational action at time t is organizational action at time t-1. For example, the journalist Fred Kaplan notes it took twenty-one months after 9/11 for the DoD to come up with a nineteen-page planning document to improve language skills pertinent to the war on terror. This document called for another eleven months to come up with guidance to create new programs, thirteen months to come up with an index to measure readiness in language, sixteen months to establish a database of current language capabilities, nineteen months to enunciate language requirements, twenty-eight months to disseminate a language aptitude test, thirty-seven months to establish crash courses for deploying personnel, and forty-nine months to create a personnel information system containing data on language skill. By forty-nine months after the original

planning document, no actual language training programs outside of the crash course for deploying personnel would actually have been established. Kaplan points out that seventy months after 9/11 we still were not yet offering additional language training to meet national priorities—almost six years! He notes it took far less time than that for the Americans to enter World War II and help defeat the Axis powers, and far less time for America to undertake profound reforms after the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957. When the time period is this extended, incremental learning almost becomes no learning at all (Kaplan, 2005, www.slate.msn.com/id/2116330).

Organizations interpret orders according to their existing understandings and capabilities, which results in an implementation gap between what policymakers believe they have ordered and what organizations actually do to execute such orders. March and Simon have called this the "logic of appropriateness," where actions are chosen on the basis of pattern recognition from knowledge already stored in the system (March and Simon, 1993). For example, when John F. Kennedy ordered the Navy to quarantine Cuba, the Navy heard "blockade," because that was the closest match in their knowledge base. But there were several key differences between what Kennedy wanted the Navy to do and what the Navy thought a blockade entailed. For example, the Navy wanted to force Soviet subs in the area to surface, and determined to sink ships that refused to stop or be boarded. Kennedy did not want either to occur. Fortunately, Kennedy was able to recognize these differences and intervene to clarify in very precise terms what would and would not happen during the quarantine.

Organizations develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) in place of thinking through every new situation from the ground up. However, in addition to simple mismatch of definitions, as noted above, there is also the possibility that the existence of an SOP has short-circuited acknowledgment of obvious extenuating circumstances, resulting in wildly inappropriate behavior on the part of the organization. In his book *Essence of Decision*, Allison recounts such a case concerning the camouflage of Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) during the Cuban missile crisis. The missiles were extremely well camouflaged during transportation and unloading at Cuban ports. However, once dispersed to their construction sites, the missiles were not camouflaged at all. They were constructed in the very same configuration as missile sites in the USSR, allowing for easy identification from U-2 imagery. Some U.S. officials even speculated that the USSR *wanted* the United States to know about the presence of these missiles as they were being emplaced. That was not the case, however. According to Allison, the excellent in-transit camouflage was due to the efforts of Soviet intelligence. But once ashore, the missiles were placed under the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba, whose commander placed them in control of his staff from the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Now, the SRF had never placed missiles outside of the Soviet Union. Here they were, thousands of miles away from the USSR on a small tropical island. What to do? What they knew how to do: SOP for missile placement in the Soviet Union, which SOP did not include camouflage but did include a standard configuration for the silos. After the Americans announced they had discovered the presence of the missiles, camouflage was hastily improvised. The DCI at the time, John McCone, could not help but wonder how much worse the situation would have been if the missiles had not been discovered before the IRBMs could be made operational. Fortunately, we will never know.

SOPs also create an explicit chain of command. The degree to which hierarchy permeates decisionmaking within an organization has been related by scholars to both the organization's culture and the culture of the larger society in which it is embedded. In some cultures, "jumping" the chain of command can be grounds for termination. Even serious questioning of a superior's decisionmaking assumptions or information, let alone the actual decision, may cause career disruption. Though all members of the organization in a sense comprise the brain of the organization, possessing some knowledge that may not be duplicated in the knowledge base of others, some brains may be more valued than others. Unfortunately, it tends to be those most removed from the "ground" whose judgment prevails. This creates the undesirable circumstance in which higher-level decisionmakers within the organization may not even know what they lack in terms of important information about a particular situation. And subordinates may feel discouraged from bringing this lack to their superior's attention, for fear of personal repercussions. This catch-22 is, of course, the basis for federal and state protection of "whistle-blowers."

Organizations are motivated primarily by factors discussed above, such as essence, budget, influence, and autonomy. These will not be sacrificed for the sake of executing orders or requests for information issued by policymakers. For example, there is no doubt that organizational reporting on the situation in Vietnam during the Vietnam War was inhibited by the memory of the "China Hands" in the State Department who had been sacked during the McCarthy era for having written the truth about the relative strength and popularity of the Communist and Nationalist forces. Organizations were very leery about reporting the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese regime or the strengths of the North Vietnamese forces. That such "altered" reporting did nothing for the quality of U.S. decisionmaking during this era was not uppermost in the calculations of these organizations.

In conclusion, then, organizations are necessary to government. Yet, organizations often produce unintended negative consequences on a regular basis and often at the most inopportune moments. How can foreign

policymakers use organizations without being undermined by them? First, it is crucial that leaders and their staff delve into the arcane structure and SOPs of organizations through which they are trying to implement policy. In this way, leaders can work with SOP rather than against it, by finding appropriate units and more closely matched SOPs within the organization and steering executive orders in that direction. Second, leaders can try to force a change on an organization through budgetary "feast or famine." Offering more money to do something new can be attractive to an organization. Taking money away—especially if it upsets budgetary "truces" between organizational units—can also be a catalyst for change. Leaders can also be alert to scandal and egregious failure within an organization, which can be the justification for extreme change. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will probably not survive as an organization, given its abysmal handling of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Third, a leader can use turf wars to his advantage, by putting two or more organizations in competition and tying factors like turf, budget, and personnel to the outcome of that competition. Finally, a leader can give up and create a new organization to do what the old organization cannot or will not. This was a major consideration in the creation of the Directorate for National Intelligence. In the end, leaders cannot do without organizations, and must be prepared to deal with them on their own terms in order to effectively use them—and not be used by them.

An excellent way to see how these principles play out when violated is the extensive report on the *Columbia* shuttle disaster of 2003 (NASA, 2003). The crew of the *Columbia* space shuttle was lost on February 1, 2003, when their reentry vehicle disintegrated because of a breach in the wing caused by a foam strike eighty-one seconds into launch. The foam strike was noticed in the launch footage two days after the launch. NASA ultimately treated the foam strike as an event that would not compromise flight safety. How did they come to this conclusion? The following excerpts from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report provide a tragic summary of that organizational decision, and make plain the problems inherent in organizational decisionmaking. As you read these report excerpts, pay close attention to how the panel, which included scholars of organizational behavior, points to several of the factors that we have discussed in order to explain the tragedy.

> Upon learning of the debris strike on Flight Day Two, the responsible system area manager from United Space Alliance and her NASA counterpart formed a team to analyze the debris strike in accordance with mission rules requiring the careful examination of any "out-of-family" event. Using film from the Intercenter Photo Working Group, Boeing systems integration analysts prepared a preliminary analysis that afternoon. (Initial estimates of debris size and speed, origin of debris, and point of impact would later prove remarkably accurate.) As Flight Day Three and Four unfolded over the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend, engineers began their analysis. One Boeing analyst used Crater, a mathematical prediction tool, to assess possible damage to the Thermal Protection System. Analysis predicted tile damage deeper than the actual tile depth, and penetration of the RCC coating at impact angles above 15 degrees. This suggested the potential for a burn-through during re-entry. Debris Assessment Team members judged that the actual damage would not be as severe as predicted because of the inherent conservatism in the Crater model and because, in the case of tile, Crater does not take into account the tile's stronger and more impact-resistant "densified" layer, and in the case of RCC, the lower density of foam would preclude penetration at impact angles under 21 degrees.
>
> On Flight Day Five, impact assessment results for tile and RCC were presented at an informal meeting of the Debris Assessment Team, which was operating without direct Shuttle Program or Mission Management leadership. Mission Control's engineering support, the Mission Evaluation Room, provided no direction for team activities other than to request the team's results by January 24. As the problem was being worked, Shuttle managers did not formally direct the actions of or consult with Debris Assessment Team leaders about the team's assumptions, uncertainties, progress, or interim results, an unusual circumstance given that NASA managers are normally engaged in analyzing what they view as problems. At this meeting, participants agreed that an image of the area of the wing in question was essential to refine their analysis and reduce the uncertainties in their damage assessment.
>
> Each member supported the idea to seek imagery from an outside source. Due in part to a lack of guidance from the Mission Management Team or Mission Evaluation Room managers, the Debris Assessment Team chose an unconventional route for its request. Rather than working the request up the normal chain of command—through the Mission Evaluation Room to the Mission Management Team for action to Mission Control—team members nominated Rodney Rocha, the team's Co-Chair, to pursue the request through the Engineering Directorate at Johnson Space Center. As a result, even after the accident the Debris Assessment Team's request was viewed by Shuttle Program managers as a non-critical engineering desire rather than a critical operational need [above paragraphs from p. 167]. . . .
>
> At 8:30 a.m., the NASA Department of Defense liaison officer called US STRATCOM and cancelled the request for imagery. The reason given for the cancellation was that NASA had identified its own in-house resources and no longer needed the military's help. The NASA request to the Department of Defense to prepare to image *Columbia* on-orbit was both made and rescinded within 90 minutes.
>
> The Board has determined that the following sequence of events likely occurred within that 90-minute period. Linda Ham [head of the Mission Management Team—author] asked Lambert Austin [NASA's systems integration manager—author] if he knew who was requesting the imagery. After admitting

his participation in helping to make the imagery request outside the official chain of command and without first gaining Ham's permission, Austin referred to his conversation with United Space Alliance Shuttle Integration manager Bob White on Flight Day Six, in which White had asked Austin, in response to White's Debris Assessment Team employee concerns, what it would take to get Orbiter imagery.

Even though Austin had already informed Ham of the request for imagery, Ham later called Mission Management Team members Ralph Roe, Manager of the Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering Office, Loren Shriver, United Space Alliance Deputy Program Manager for Shuttle, and David Moyer, the on-duty Mission Evaluation Room manager, to determine the origin of the request and to confirm that there was a "requirement" for a request. Ham also asked Flight Director Phil Engelauf if he had a "requirement" for imagery of *Columbia's* left wing. These individuals all stated that they had not requested imagery, were not aware of any "official" requests for imagery, and could not identify a "requirement" for imagery. Linda Ham later told several individuals that nobody had a requirement for imagery.

What started as a request by the Intercenter Photo Working Group to seek outside help in obtaining images on Flight Day Two in anticipation of analysts' needs had become by Flight Day Six an actual engineering request by members of the Debris Assessment Team, made informally through Bob White to Lambert Austin, and formally in Rodney Rocha's e-mail to Paul Shack [director of the shuttle integration office and Rocha's superior—author]. These requests had then caused Lambert Austin and Wayne Hale [Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager—author] to contact Department of Defense representatives. When Ham officially terminated the actions that the Department of Defense had begun, she effectively terminated both the Intercenter Photo Working Group request and the Debris Assessment Team request. While Ham has publicly stated she did not know of the Debris Assessment Team members' desire for imagery, she never asked them directly if the request was theirs, even though they were the team analyzing the foam strike.

Also on Flight Day Seven, Ham raised concerns that the extra time spent maneuvering *Columbia* to make the left wing visible for imaging would unduly impact the mission schedule; for example, science experiments would have to stop while the imagery was taken. According to personal notes obtained by the Board: *"Linda Ham said it was no longer being pursued since even if we saw something, we couldn't do anything about it. The Program didn't want to spend the resources."* Shuttle managers, including Ham, also said they were looking for very small areas on the Orbiter and that past imagery resolution was not very good. The Board notes that no individuals in the STS-107 operational chain of command had the security clearance necessary to know about National imaging capabilities. Additionally, no evidence has been uncovered that anyone from NASA, United Space Alliance, or Boeing sought to determine the expected quality of images and the difficulty and costs of obtaining Department of Defense assistance. Therefore, members of the Mission Management Team were making critical decisions about imagery capabilities based on little or no knowledge [above paragraphs from pp. 153–54]. . . .

Debris Assessment Team members speculated as to why their request was rejected and whether their analysis was worth pursuing without new imagery. Discussion then moved on to whether the Debris Assessment Team had a "mandatory need" for Department of Defense imaging, Most team members, when asked by the Board what "mandatory need" meant, replied with a shrug of their shoulders. They believed the need for imagery was obvious: without better pictures, engineers would be unable to make reliable predictions of the depth and area of damage caused by a foam strike that was outside of the experience base.

However, team members concluded that although their need was important, they could not cite a "mandatory" requirement for the request. *Analysts on the Debris Assessment Team were in the unenviable position of wanting images to more accurately assess damage while simultaneously needing to prove to Program managers, as a result of their assessment, that there was a need for images in the first place.*

After the meeting adjourned, Rocha read the 11:45 a.m. e-mail from Paul Shack, which said that the Orbiter Project was not requesting any outside imaging help. Rocha called Shack to ask if Shack's boss, Johnson Space Center engineering director Frank Benz, knew about the request. Rocha then sent several e-mails consisting of questions about the ongoing analyses and details on the Shuttle Program's cancellation of the imaging request. An e-mail that he did not send but instead printed out and shared with a colleague follows.

"In my humble technical opinion, this is the wrong (and bordering on irresponsible) answer from the SSP and Orbiter not to request additional imaging help from any outside source. I must emphasize (again) that severe enough damage (3 or 4 multiple tiles knocked out down to the densification layer) combined with the heating and resulting damage to the underlying structure at the most critical location (viz., MLG door/wheels/tires/hydraulics or the X1191 spar cap) could present potentially grave hazards. The engineering team will admit it might not achieve definitive high confidence answers without additional images, but, without action to request help to clarify the damage visually, we will guarantee it will not. Can we talk to Frank Benz before Friday's MMT? Remember the NASA safety posters everywhere around stating, 'If it's not safe, say so'? Yes, it's that serious." [SSP=Space Shuttle Program, MLG=Main Landing Gear, MMT=Mission Management Team]

When asked why he did not send this e-mail, Rocha replied that he did not want to jump the chain of command. Having already raised the need to have the Orbiter imaged with Shack, he would defer to management's judgment on obtaining imagery [above paragraphs from p. 157]. . . .

Mission Control personnel thought they should tell Commander Rick Husband and Pilot William McCool about the debris strike, not because they thought that it was worthy of the crew's attention but because the crew might be asked about it in an upcoming media interview. Director Steve Stitch sent the following e-mail to Husband and McCool and copied other Flight Directors [p. 158]. . . .

The impact appears to be totally on the lower surface and no particles are seen to traverse over the upper surface of the wing. Experts have reviewed the high speed

photography and there is no concern for RCC or tile damage. We have seen this same phenomenon on several other flights and there is absolutely no concern for entry [p. 159]. . . .

At the Mission Management Team's 8:00 a.m. meeting [on January 24, when a final decision about the return flight was to be made—author], Mission Evaluation Room manager Don McCormack verbally summarized the Debris Assessment Team's 7:00 a.m. brief. It was the third topic discussed. Unlike the earlier briefing, McCormack's presentation did not include the Debris Assessment Team's presentation charts. The Board notes that no supporting analysis or examination of minority engineering views was asked for or offered, that neither Mission Evaluation Room nor Mission Management Team members requested a technical paper of the Debris Assessment Team analysis, and that no technical questions were asked [p. 161]. . . .

According to a Memorandum for the Record written by William Readdy, Associate Administrator for Space Flight, Readdy and Michael Card, from NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Office, discussed an offer of Department of Defense imagery support for *Columbia*. This January 29 conversation ended with Readdy telling Card that NASA would accept the offer but because the Mission Management Team had concluded that this was not a safety-of-flight issue, the imagery should be gathered only on a low priority "not-to-interfere" basis. Ultimately, no imagery was taken [p. 166]. . . .

[S]afety personnel were present but passive and did not serve as a channel for the voicing of concerns or dissenting views. Safety representatives attended meetings of the Debris Assessment Team, Mission Evaluation Room, and Mission Management Team, but were merely party to the analysis process and conclusions instead of an independent source of questions and challenges. Safety contractors in the Mission Evaluation Room were only marginally aware of the debris strike analysis. One contractor did question the Debris Assessment Team safety representative about the analysis and was told that it was adequate. No additional inquiries were made. The highest-ranking safety representative at NASA headquarters deferred to Program managers when asked for an opinion on imaging of *Columbia*. The safety manager he spoke to also failed to follow up [p. 170].

Notice in the account several of the factors we have discussed previously: the inflexibility of SOPs, the chilling effect of hierarchy, the compartmentalization of knowledge, the indifference by more senior personnel to the re-synthesis of that compartmentalized knowledge, the issue of organizational "face" vis à vis the Pentagon, the façade of attention to safety belied by the actual organizational culture of "can do." The full report on the *Columbia* shuttle disaster is over six hundred pages long, and is a testament to the inherent problem of creeping dysfunctionality in large organizations. It is well worth the effort for the foreign policy analyst to peruse this report.

Thus, despite elaborate organizational charts to ensure that all aspects of a problem would be considered, despite overt rhetoric about the importance of safety and speaking up, despite the personnel of NASA being highly accomplished in their respective fields, the same old issues of turf, lack of communication, SOP, and organizational culture directly contributed to the deaths of the *Columbia* crew. Without the benefits provided by large organizations, there would have been no shuttle program. Without the disadvantages of large organizations, the lives of these astronauts might not have been lost.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Bureaucratic politics is a complex intersection of small group dynamics, organizational process, and domestic political forces. Most bureaucratic politics takes place in interagency groups, which are one of the foremost means for important, but noncrisis situations to be addressed within government. Though positions taken by the participants in such interagency groups may be roughly predictable, predicting which position(s) will prevail is sometimes possible, sometimes impossible, but always an extremely complex calculation. Though important matters are generally tasked to an interagency group to develop a series of options or recommendations for higher-level small groups, such as the NSC, to address, it is still likely that the interagency group is not only subject to influence attempts by the participating organizations, but also vulnerable to domestic political pressure and even electoral imperatives. Further complicating matters is the impact of diverse personalities assigned to the interagency group, as well as underlying networks of friendship and conflict that enmesh these personalities. In short, bureaucratic politics produce the most intriguing soap operas to be found in government. Allison and Zelikow put it this way:

> Choices by one player (e.g., to authorize action by his department, to make a speech, or to refrain from acquiring certain information), resultants of minor games (e.g., the wording of a cable or the decision on departmental action worked out among lower-level players), resultants of central games (e.g., decisions, actions, and speeches bargained out among central players), and foul-ups (e.g., choices that are not made because they are not recognized or are raised too late, misunderstandings, etc.)—these pieces, when stuck to the same canvas, constitute government behavior relevant to an issue. To explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion" (1999, 257).

Some key concepts help us frame the dramas, large and small, produced by bureaucratic politics:

Stakeholders. Stakeholders, sometimes called "players," are those whose roles, expertise, or sheer political power coupled with strong interest allow them to affect a bureaucratic outcome. Stakeholdership itself may be the subject of politicking. For example, well-credentialed government nuclear scientists propounding that current nuclear warheads are not reliable and must be replaced have been disinvited from key interagency meetings where the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is discussed. Thus the very composition of interagency groups, and other issues such as chairmanship of such a group, are subject to political forces. In general, sheer political power trumps role stakeholdership, and role trumps expertise stakeholdership. For example, Congressman Dan Burton, the grandfather of a child with autism, was able to force the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to reinvestigate links between thimerosal in childhood vaccines and autism, but the FDA was simultaneously able to effectively marginalize the views of physician-researchers who felt they could show such a link empirically. But there are plenty of exceptions to this generalization, and we will deal with these in the section on "equalizers."

Another generalization about stakeholders is the adage "where you stand depends upon where you sit," implying that at least in the case of role stakeholders, organizational affiliation will largely determine the stance taken in bureaucratic negotiations. In interagency discussion between the FBI and CIA, we are not surprised when the one argues for greater powers vis à vis the other. Furthermore, we are not surprised when outsiders demand greater cooperation between organizations and try to institutionalize that through standing interagency "centers," such as the National Counterterrorism Center. But then we are also not surprised when assignment to such centers is regarded as the kiss of death for one's career within one's home organization.

Action Channels. Those of us who work in large bureaucracies know that the only way to be an effective player is to know the action channels—whom to see and where to go and what to do to make something happen. For example, just to make something trivial happen at my university—getting a new key to a new office—requires that I find the proper form, obtain the signature of my chair and my dean, and walk the form over to a particular obscure building on the margins of campus to pay a fee and get the key. Changing from PC to Mac in my university office? I must give a statement to my chair saying why the change is needed, my chair must write a statement justifying my justification, the result must be forwarded to the college computing committee by a particular date, and the committee must in turn relay its decision to the comptroller who buys the equipment. We are all familiar with the plethora of procedures and committees facing us when attempting to do most anything within the bureaucracies of our universities. So it is within government and the foreign policy establishment.

Though it is always instructive to look at organizational charts, "boxology" does not tell you how to actually get something done. For example, how do you get the official U.S. government opinion to be that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? This is actually quite complicated. The president just can't say, "Saddam Hussein has WMD." No, the president asks the DCI if Saddam Hussein has WMD. The DCI asks the Intelligence Community Executive Committee, which asks the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which asks each of its member intelligence organizations to independently answer the question. After each intelligence organization hashes out its own answer, interagency committees are set up to debate the answer among agencies. The resulting opinions and minority opinions and dissenting opinions will then be sent to the Board, which will discuss them and send them up to the Executive Committee. The Intelligence Community Executive Committee will further discuss the issue and then make a report to the National Intelligence Council. The NIC will make their own investigation of all the facts and analysis put forward by the intelligence community. At some point, the particular member of that office charged with oversight of the broad issue area of proliferation will issue a National Intelligence Estimate. That official NIE is then presented to the president, who can now say, "Saddam Hussein has WMD." If you don't know the action channels, you cannot act.

Resultants. Those who study bureaucracy are often reluctant to call the outcomes of bureaucratic politics "decisions." After every stakeholder has pulled and hauled to the best of their power in a particular direction, what is left over is better seen as something less than a *decision*, which term connotes some processual rationality. *Resultant* connotes that the outcome would probably not coincide with one chosen by any unitary rational actor. It is usually the lowest common denominator outcome; the outcome upon which a majority of the participants in the process can agree. In general, of course, unless there is a threatening emergency, most resultants can be characterized as incremental change based upon a papering over of key differences. The vaguer the proposal, the greater the convergence of agreement around it.

Framing, Rules, Deadlines, and Agendas. Effective political players within large bureaucracies not only know all the action channels—they are also masters at group manipulation. The most important tools of manipulation, especially if one can occupy a position of authority within the group such as a chairmanship, are the use of framing, rules, deadlines, and agendas to obtain one's desired ends.

Framing is a process by which a group comes to understand a situation and define its decision-making task. Framing is not only a psychological process for an individual; when it involves persuasion of group members to adopt one's frame, framing also becomes a very political act. Is a fetus

"uterine material" or a "pre-born person"? Were the contras in Nicaragua during the Reagan administration "freedom fighters" or "terrorist guerrillas"? Is Iran exercising its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with its uranium enrichment program or undermining the NPT? Ryan Beasley (1998) notes that framing may actually be more important to study in bureaucratic politics than the final decision-making process, for choice is constrained by the frame adopted by the group. Beasley finds that a particular frame is more likely to be adopted if it is simple, if it is backed by a strong leader or a member of the group that can claim special expertise in the area, and if it lends itself to a fairly clear-cut course of action. Another aspect is whether the frame of action can be characterized as an incremental outgrowth of what has been done in the past. Frames, once adopted, tend to "set" fairly quickly, and it may take the addition of new personnel to the bureaucratic mix to rethink a long-standing frame.

A famous example of "a frame not taken" occurred near the beginning of ExCom's deliberations during the Cuban missile crisis. When ExCom was presented with the photographic evidence that missile silos were being placed in Cuba, Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense, opined that any such missiles would have little military significance. As such, they would not be worth taking forceful action that would risk a nuclear war. McNamara had the expertise to make such a claim, and yet his frame was swiftly rejected by Kennedy. Kennedy felt that the Soviets' move had great political consequences, ranging from the fate of Berlin to his own electoral prospects. Kennedy's strong opinion that the missiles were a grave threat would frame the rest of ExCom's meetings.

The rules under which the group operates are also an extremely significant factor in understanding group behavior. Consider the differences between a bureaucratic group that operates by majority rule and one that operates on the principle of unanimity. In the former, coalitions will be important; in the latter, every single individual can be a deal breaker. A group under rules of unanimity will probably make fewer and less specific decisions than a group with rules of majority voting. But voting itself can become quite complicated. For example, in the U.S. Congress, parliamentary rules are coupled with rules on filibuster, cloture, committee passage before floor vote, attachment of bills to other bills for vote, necessity of two-thirds majority for particular votes and for overturning vetoes, reconciliation of House and Senate versions of the same bill, and so forth. A legislator who has mastered the rules by which Congress works is at a significant advantage over one who has not. Other types of rules that may play into group deliberations include weighted voting, such as in the International Monetary Fund (IMF); permanent versus nonpermanent status, such as in the UN Security Council; and the power to initiate hearings or investigations.

Deadlines also play a role in group process. The very presence of a deadline can profoundly alter deliberations. Less powerful members of the group can use the deadline as leverage to extract concessions from more powerful members. On the other hand, more powerful members can use the deadline to paint others as obstructionists who are likely to cause the group to miss its deadline. Deadlines can force premature closure of discussion on an issue, but on the other hand, deadlines can also create incentive to compile as much information as quickly as possible in an attempt to carry the discussion and sway undecideds before the deadline occurs.

The manipulation of group agendas is a skill that is highly prized in the political arena. In most groups, the chairman decides the agenda, but in some groups the group may actually vote on the agenda. The reason the agenda may become political is that it determines the course of group discussion. Items may be purposefully not placed on the agenda so that they will not be discussed, for example. But other types of manipulation are possible. The chair may set a time limit on the discussion of each item, which may allow him or her to cut off discussion of a contentious issue before all have had the opportunity to speak. This is a common tactic in public hearings where input from citizens or other interested parties is allowed. Another tactic is to allow lengthy discussion of items placed first on the agenda, and thus limit or even prevent any discussion of issues coming later in the agenda.

Coalitions. Unless there is near unanimity on a particular issue, most group interactions become examples of coalition politics at work. Within the constraints of rules and deadlines, the group is usually tasked with making some type of determination or decision. This requires getting agreement among enough group members so that a particular determination or decision carries the day.

There are generally three ways to assemble a coalition. The first is through compromise, where a minimum winning coalition is built around a position with which coalition members feel comfortable, if not completely satisfied. The second is through quid pro quo arrangements where support on Z's pet issue A by member Y is linked to support on Y's pet issue B by member Z, ensuring a win-win scenario for all. The third is through implicit or explicit coercion, where a particular faction uses intimidation, threats, media attention, manipulation of rules, or other means to wilt any opposition to or possible compromise of their preferred position. Needless to say, the first two types of coalition-building efforts are comparatively more stable than the last because those who voted for the particular position have no vested interest in seeing it fail.

A large part of the complexity of coalition building is that each coalition member has multiple interests, and therefore the membership of a particular voting coalition has the potential to change as new or different interests

are perceived to be at stake. Likewise, particular individuals in the coalition may play multiple roles within the government. For example, does the secretary of state represent the president or the State Department? The answer may depend on the issue at hand, and may also be subject to change as circumstances change.

Subversion and Equalizers. Though the individual cog in the bureaucratic machine may have very little power, there are time-honored tactics that can help level the playing field somewhat. Let us suppose you are a middle-level bureaucrat who strongly disagrees with the direction adopted by those at a higher level. What could you do?

Actually, quite a lot. First, you could simply not implement the directives you have been given, without raising a fuss. Oftentimes, officials in high positions may not have the time to check that each and every one of their directives has been carried out. If queried, one could blame overriding circumstances for an unforeseen delay. You could also do something different from what you have been ordered to do, and if questioned suggest that a misunderstanding occurred. You could implement cosmetic, not substantive change, or obey the letter but not the spirit of the orders. Or you could implement your orders in an overzealous fashion so as to showcase the faults you see in the directive.

There are other approaches that can be taken. You could insist upon a personal hearing before implementing your orders, and suggest reasons for reconsidering. You could make it known that you are keeping a detailed paper trail and journal of what is happening. You could resign, or at least threaten to resign. You could attempt to make your directives public, either by going to the media, to Congress, to another government, or by writing your own book about the situation.

This is not to say that subversion is always the right thing to contemplate. There are certainly times when subordinates taking matters into their own hands is exactly the wrong thing to do: think, for example, of the human rights violations at Abu Ghraib. But there are some times when the actions individuals may take on their own initiative may improve the performance of their government. Halperin offers this example from the memoirs of Henry S. Villard, a foreign service officer (FSO) who was ambassador to Libya back when that nation had a king:

> The Libyan Prime Minister had resigned and flown off to Rome, his nerves frayed by the thankless task of guiding a newborn state. The King was ill, in seclusion; there was a rumor in the bazaars that he might abdicate. The whole government structure seemed about to collapse. I had just reached a vital point in negotiations for an air-base agreement. So when the Libyan cabinet asked me to fly to Italy and persuade the Prime Minister to return, I cabled the Department urgently for permission to make the try.
>
> Time was of the essence, yet the hours ticked by without response. In Washington, the wheels ground methodically. Committee met with committee, weighing the pros and cons of my recommendation. The Pentagon had to be consulted. Policy factors had to be considered; so did tactics, in light of the progress to date on the air-base negotiations. Suggestions at a lower level had to be referred to a higher level for further discussion. I sent a second cable. No reply.
>
> Finally, I decided to act on my own. I boarded the plane of my Air Attache, flew to Rome, and called on the Prime Minister at his hotel. With all the eloquence I could muster, I urged him to come back and steer the ship of state through the storm, pointing out that the fate of his country—and our delicate negotiations—rested in his hands alone. He heard me in silence, still smarting from the political wounds which had caused him to resign. He would think it over; he would give me his answer that evening.
>
> At eight o'clock I was again at the Prime Minister's door. His face was wreathed in smiles. He would do as I asked, and to mark the occasion he invited me to dine with him downstairs. With a load like lead off my mind, I was enjoying the repast when I spied an officer of our Rome Embassy discreetly waving a piece of paper from behind the potted palms. I made my excuses, rose, and went over to receive the message—a priority cable to Tripoli, repeated to Rome for information. At long last, Washington had moved. There were my orders. Under no circumstances was I to follow the Prime Minister to Rome for that, the Department feared, might be interpreted as interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country. (Halperin, 1974, 277–78)

The Games. In seeking to understand bureaucratic politics, it must also be recognized that many games are being played simultaneously, and the set of players in any one game only partially overlaps the set of players in another. At the most micro-level, there may be clashes of personality or will between two or more individuals. There may be conflicts between different offices within one organization. There may be a struggle between two or more organizations within a bureaucracy over turf or budget. There may be a contest for influence among the president's closest advisors. The larger electoral context between political parties is always a backdrop, and in election years may move to the foreground. And then there are the games in the international arena played out between allies, rivals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international financial organizations (IGOs), and so on. In other words, just identifying stakeholders in a particular issue is not enough. One must know how many boards a stakeholder is playing on, and who the other stakeholders on each board are.

Example: Detention of Foreign Terrorists at Guantanamo

In order to see some elements of bureaucratic politics in action, we will examine a particular case study of recent importance. The *New York Times*

published a series of articles in 2004 that detailed how a new system of military justice was created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks (Golden, 2004 a and b). This system was used to detain suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in a military prison setting. One of the chief lightning rods of the system was the assertion that the men detained did not possess rights as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. Over time, this new military system came under attack from many quarters, including the military's own lawyers.

The assertion of the *Times* is that bureaucratic manipulation to achieve long-standing ideological aims on the part of key players was the engine driving the creation of this new system. In this recounting, we will refrain from assessing ideological motives and concentrate on the analysis of elements of groupthink, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics. Pay close attention to who "sat" where, who knew whom, who knew what, who was included, who was excluded, and how perceived domestic political imperatives affected the process.

The cast of players included Timothy Flanigan, deputy White House counsel; John Yoo, in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel; William Barr, the former attorney general when Flanigan served as head of that same office; David Addington, counsel to the vice president; Alberto Gonzales, White House counsel; Pierre-Richard Prosper, the State Department's ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues; Patrick Philbin, a deputy in Justice's Office of Legal Counsel; William J. Haynes II, general counsel to the secretary of defense; and John Bellinger, legal adviser to the National Security Council, along with a bevy of higher-ranking officials and lower-ranking attorneys.

The events of September 11, 2001, set the stage for the U.S.-led war on global terrorism. A key question was how the United States could adopt an aggressive stance toward terrorism and yet negotiate the U.S. legal system, which provides many rights to accused persons, and the international legal system, which also provides significant rights to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. The best legal minds in government would be tasked with reconciling what on first glance appeared to be irreconcilable.

The White House counsel's office became the locus of initiative concerning the development of a new legal paradigm for the war on terror. Flanigan was apparently assigned the lead on this assignment. Flanigan contacted Yoo, a friend, who wrote a twenty-page reply opining that in the context of terrorist attacks, Fourth Amendment rights might not apply.

Flanigan then put in a call to his old boss, William Barr, to ask advice. Barr apparently reminded him that the Justice Department had researched the idea of special military tribunals to oversee trials of suspected terrorists almost ten years previously when Pan Am 103 had been blown up over Scotland. Flanigan felt that military tribunals, later reworded as military

"commissions," would strike precisely the right posture in the new global war on terror. As commander in chief, it would ultimately be the president who would control what these commissions did.

At some point, Flanigan apparently shared his ideas with Addington and Gonzales, who both concurred. Gonzales decided to establish an interagency working group to hammer out options concerning the prosecution of terrorists—already knowing which option he would try to ensure prevailed. Pierre-Richard Prosper from State was assigned to chair the group, and according to the *Times* account, it was made clear to him by Gonzales that military commissions would be one of the options.

The Prosper interagency group saw three alternatives for prosecuting terrorists: federal courts, military tribunals, and Nuremberg-style tribunals with both military and civilian members. The Justice Department's representatives to the group insisted that federal courts were adequate. The various counsels from the White House were united in their disagreement. After the options had been researched and debated for approximately a month, the White House pulled the plug on Prosper's group, and Flanigan was again in charge of developing the new legal framework.

This time, the framework would be worked out among the various White House counsels before it was revealed to any other agencies. This is a very risky bureaucratic maneuver. Leaving out whole hosts of lawyers situated across a dozen relevant agencies and departments would virtually invite attack. As we will see, the most damning attack would come from those lawyers who were asked to actually implement the framework's particulars.

On November 6, 2001, Patrick Philbin in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel sent, by request, a thirty-five-page confidential memorandum to Gonzales. In it, citing a 1942 case where Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered on his own authority a military tribunal to try eight Nazi saboteurs, Philbin argued that the president had the inherent authority to set up the desired military commissions. He further argued that rights of due process would not necessarily apply in the context of war (including the war on terror).

Based on this memorandum, the various counsels at the White House drafted an executive order, which was apparently approved by John Ashcroft, the head of the Justice Department, and also Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense (through his counsel William J. Haynes II). Interestingly, it had been the criminal division of the Justice Department that had argued against military commissions in the Prosper interagency group. How did Ashcroft overcome their opposition? He did not. Ashcroft did not tell Michael Chertoff, the head of Justice's criminal division, about the new order. Chertoff, who later became secretary of homeland security, only saw the orders when they were published. Ditto for the State Department and even the National Security Council.

In the meantime, a group of Army lawyers had tried to meet with Haynes to prevent a fait accompli. Probably sensing that not meeting with them at all would be contrary to public relations interests, Haynes called their leader into his office on Friday, November 9, and allowed him to review the proposed order for exactly thirty minutes. He was not allowed to take notes, according to the *Times* report.

The next day, Saturday, the Army's judge advocate general called together a group of senior military lawyers for an emergency meeting. Their purpose was to draft a response that would result in modifications to the order before it was published. But that very same day, the vice president, the attorney general, Haynes, Gonzales, Flanigan, Addington, and others were finalizing the order. The *Times* reports that Dick Cheney felt the order should not be shown in advance to Colin Powell, secretary of State, or Condoleezza Rice, the ANSA. The vice president and the president discussed the order over a lunch, and the president signed the order on Tuesday, November 13. No press conference was held.

In bureaucracies, however, as we have discussed in this chapter, "faits" are only "accomplis" when play has ceased—or at least become dormant—on the multiple boards of play. The maneuvering of Flanigan and others to make only one board, the White House board, count was doomed to failure.

The Senate Judiciary Committee immediately called for hearings. (Ironically, according to the *Times* account, the administration tasked Prosper and Chertoff to represent the administration's view, even though both men had argued against the policy and eventually were excluded from deliberations.) The Department of Defense parried this new attack in preemptive fashion by leaking the draft concerning implementation of the new system, indicating that critics' concerns had been taken into account. Rumsfeld also assembled a group of external legal experts to offer advice, and some of these held credibility for having worked on the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.

For a moment, it appeared that play had stalled, and the administration's gambit had worked. However, it would turn out that the Pentagon had overlooked a very important game board. It was not the Senate or the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that the Pentagon should have worried about. It was their own lawyers, military lawyers, over whom they should have lost sleep. Unfortunately, the approach that Haynes took toward the military lawyers was exclusionary. In one exchange reported by the *Times*, the Navy judge advocate general, Admiral Guter, confronted Haynes directly, "'We need more information.' Mr. Haynes looked at him coldly. 'No, you don't.'" Guter would retire soon after, and then sign a "friend of the court" brief on behalf of Guantanamo detainees appealing their detention.

In the meantime, a new issue had been put into play. Could detainees appeal their detention in federal court? Numerous critics had argued detainees must have this right, and then of course the federal courts would judge whether the new legal framework of military commissions was constitutional. The White House team of lawyers saw this chain of reasoning for what it was: a bureaucratic Trojan horse designed to derail the entire military commission idea. Philbin and Yoo from Justice were again tasked with providing relevant legal arguments, this time that detainees could not make such an appeal. Their memorandum dated December 28, 2001, suggested an overseas detention site in order to argue that the detentions were not taking place on American territory. Guantanamo was chosen in accordance with this logic. The first detainees would arrive on January 11.

Furthermore, the White House legal team, again turning to Justice's Office of Legal Counsel for support, had argued that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to terrorists. Yoo had argued, and Gonzales and Addington concurred, that even the Taliban could be considered terrorists. In fact, even if interrogators could not identify any link to terrorism per se, detainees would be held as "enemy combatants," with the identity of the enemy force left undefined.

At this point, however, excluded players began to emerge and make their presence felt. Condoleezza Rice wondered why the National Security Council and its legal team had not been involved. Colin Powell complained that given the number of allied nations involved in the situation, State had to be in the loop, too. The FBI and the criminal division of Justice had their own complaints.

In order to reconstruct unity among his bureaucratic players on these important issues, President Bush asked two of the NSC's staff, including legal counsel John Bellinger, to bring the players together and have them work out the kinks in an interagency committee. Apparently, however, the various players began asking some rather difficult questions, such as how Defense knew these people were enemy combatants. Defense's first position against such probing was to stonewall. One former Defense official told the *Times* that "he and others went into interagency meetings on Guantanamo with a standard script, dictated by their superiors: 'Back off—we've got this under control.'" Since Defense was following the November order drafted by the White House legal team and approved not only by the president, but also the powerful vice president, this tactic worked—for a while.

According to the *Times*, in August 2002, the ANSA, through the NSC, made her move. Rice's NSC staff sent its own Arab-speaking representative, reportedly a "senior intelligence analyst," to Guantanamo to assess conditions and speak to detainees. His or her report was given to Rice, and the report was purportedly very damning of what appeared to be a completely ad hoc operation. Rice took it to Powell. She also took it to Tom Ridge, adviser to the president on Homeland Security. And, in the coup de grâce,

she took it to the criminal division of Justice. She began to build a counterforce to Rumsfeld and Cheney on the issues of detainment and military commissions.

On October 18, members of the cabinet involved with national security affairs met in a high-level showdown. Rice and Powell argued that what was going on in Guantanamo was not what the president had had in mind. They called for most of the detainees to be released. Rumsfeld apparently backed down. He was not interested in being a jailer; he was a warrior. Rumsfeld agreed to brief other agencies about the situation at Guantanamo, and agreed that the other cabinet members had the right to approve or disapprove plans for prosecution or release of the remaining detainees.

This last promise was to become the Trojan horse that the White House team had effectively warded off earlier. Now Justice, State, the NSC, the FBI, and other agencies all had to agree to a particular detainee's prosecution before Defense could proceed. As the *Times* puts it, "The internal struggle over the prisoners' fate began to play out in dysfunctional weekly meetings at which officials from across the government assembled by secure video link to consider individual detainees put forward by the Pentagon for outright release or transfer to the custody of their home governments." Readers of this chapter will not be surprised to learn that these dysfunctional weekly meetings produced almost no transfers, releases, or prosecutions.

Months later, in the spring of 2003, the military commissions had still not tried even one case. But after the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case challenging the legality of the detentions, the Pentagon decided to move forward with a few prosecutions. But they had underestimated their own lawyers.

Military lawyers assigned to defend the detainees took an aggressive stance. They filed a "friend of the court" brief with reference to the aforementioned Supreme Court case. They publicly challenged Pentagon rules that they were not to speak with the media. One military defense lawyer filed suit in a federal district court to block the military commissions.

On June 28, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that detainees had the right to petition federal courts for their freedom. Since then, a significant number of detainees have been transferred to the custody of their home governments, where many have simply been released from custody. The military commission framework has never become fully operational. In July 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that military tribunals had to be explicitly authorized by legislation adopted by Congress before they could be formed, and the White House conceded that the detainees would retain their rights under the Geneva Convention. And when William Haynes was nominated to the federal bench, a whole host of military lawyers signed a letter to Congress urging his rejection.

This case study is a fascinating tale of groupthink, organizational behavior, and bureaucratic politics all rolled together into what ended up a policy failure. Consider the personal ties that permitted members of the White House counsel team to work effectively with certain members of the Justice Department, perhaps initiating groupthink. But consider further how intra-organizational cleavages within Justice and Defense undermined the resultant policy. Examine also how tactics to exclude potential naysayers from process, from information, and from access were effectively used in the short-term, but then backfired over time. Keep in mind the roles played by the various branches of government, with moves by the executive branch affected by the opening of Senate hearings and rulings by the Supreme Court. Note also the role of organizational essence, with the Pentagon eventually deciding that it was not in the penitentiary business. Do not overlook the role of public embarrassment as military lawyers and judges voiced their open opposition to the plan. Consider finally the larger context of the game played amongst Rice, Powell, Rumsfeld, and Cheney for influence and access. Finally, reflect upon the fact that the end-stage of interagency meetings, where all naysayers were included, predictably resulted in a de facto gutting of the policy through sheer inability to reach consensus. This episode offers the foreign policy analyst an insightful glimpse into the complex levels of group forces at work in foreign policy decisionmaking.