

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

CHAPTER 3

**BRAZILIAN FOREIGN
POLICY: CAUSAL
BELIEFS IN
FORMULATION AND
PRAGMATISM IN
PRACTICE**

MIRIAM GOMES SARAIVA

INTRODUCTION

In general terms, Brazilian foreign policy has been marked by continuity. Behind this continuity lie a number of long-held beliefs that have influenced its evolution: the importance of autonomy, universalist action, and destiny, the idea that the country will one day come to occupy a place of greater distinction in international politics (“the destiny of grandeur”). These beliefs can be clearly identified as long-term aims and are rooted in a structured diplomatic corporation.¹ The means available to achieve these objectives, as will be seen, are not constant, but rather vary according to the specific historical and political context.

The strong tendency toward centralization in the formulation of Brazilian foreign-policy in Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Office) contributed to more stable policies and behavior based on longer-term principles. Indeed, some authors use the organizational behavior model in order to analyze the history and behavior of Brazilian diplomacy.² This concentration makes foreign policy less vulnerable to the direct interference of domestic policy.

1 These beliefs, however, do not necessarily provide a basis for actions
2 based on ideology. On the contrary, in the Brazilian case in general,
3 they orient the organization of behavior, which is in turn inspired by
4 clearly realistic premises of a pragmatic nature. As Pinheiro highlights,
5 within the framework of realism, Brazilian behavior at times assumes a
6 Hobbesian character as a matter of priority, in which a relative increase
7 in power is sought vis-à-vis others, while at other times preference is
8 given to realism of a Grotian nature, emphasizing initiatives that bring
9 absolute gains but may also bring benefits to other states.³ Brazil has fre-
10 quently adopted multifaceted ways of behavior in terms of international
11 policy, seeking to simultaneously benefit from the possibilities of the
12 international system, and also assume a position of leadership, especially
13 of southern hemisphere countries.

14 Nonetheless, change is found alongside continuity. There are alterna-
15 tives regarding the strategy to be adopted based on the tension between a
16 preference for more autonomous action, on the one hand, and the role of
17 leadership of initiatives concerning Southern hemisphere nations, on the
18 other. Both are defined in terms of the international context, the strategy
19 of national development, and certain calculations of foreign-policy
20 experts that vary according to their political vision and their perception
21 of what constitutes the national interest, the international situation, and
22 other more specific variables. In this case, elements of realist pragmatism
23 are found but are occasionally combined with elements of an ideological
24 nature on the part of those formulating policy.

25 In leadership terms, during the administrations of Fernando Henrique
26 Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), the
27 above-mentioned principles and the weighting given to pragmatism were
28 consistent, but operated in different contexts and scenarios. However, in
29 general terms, the particular worldview of Lula allowed the features of
30 what is here understood by ideology to be more evident.

31 The aim of this chapter is to analyze Brazilian foreign policy under the
32 administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva. Two
33 specific variables are taken into account: on the one hand, the degrees
34 of continuity and change between the two administrations and, on the
35 other, the greater or lesser presence of elements inherent in ideology and
36 pragmatism in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.
37 The first part of the chapter examines traditional beliefs underlying
38 foreign policy (and indeed aspects of domestic policy), which represent
39 what can be termed a “Brazilian ideology.” The second part analyzes
40 different understandings of, and approaches to, foreign policy in Brazil
41 over the past ten years. The third section examines the characteristics of
42 foreign policy implemented under the Cardoso and Lula governments,

1 especially with regard to relations with South America, while the conclu-
2 sion examines trends in continuity and change over this period in terms
3 of ideology and pragmatism.
4

5 6 **UNDERLYING BELIEFS OF** 7 **BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

8 The influence of beliefs in Brazilian foreign policy is highly relevant to the
9 debate on pragmatism and ideology. According to Vigevani, Ramanzini
10 Jr., Favaron, and Correia (2008),⁴ Brazil's position on many issues should
11 be seen in light of constitutive factors of foreign policy, rooted in the very
12 nature of Brazilian society and state: namely, autonomy and universalism.
13 Universalism involves a willingness to maintain relations with all coun-
14 tries, regardless of geographical location, type of regime, or economic con-
15 cerns, as well as an independence of action in relation to global powers.
16 Autonomy is defined as the freedom of manoeuvre that a country has in
17 its relations with other states and in its participation in international poli-
18 tics, and is reflected in the historical tendency of Brazilian foreign policy
19 to avoid agreements that may come to limit future alternatives.

20 Underlying the ideas of universalism and autonomy is a historical
21 belief within Brazilian society and among foreign-policy makers of Brazil's
22 destiny. Indeed, since the beginning of the twentieth century, allusions in
23 speeches and publications to the grandeur of Brazil's future are common,
24 contributing to the belief that Brazil should occupy a "special place" on
25 the international scene in politico-strategic terms. At the beginning of
26 the twentieth century, the foreign minister Barão do Rio Branco high-
27 lighted the "similarities" between Brazil and the United States in terms of
28 territory, ethnicity, cultural diversity, as well as its geopolitical position,
29 all of which made it the natural "counterpart" of the United States in
30 Latin America.⁵ In 1926 and in 1945, Brazilian diplomacy made a bid
31 for a permanent seat on the League of Nations/United Nations Security
32 Council, while in the early 1970s, the ex-foreign minister Araújo Castro
33 stated that "few countries in the world have Brazil's potential for diplo-
34 matic reach" and "no country can escape its destiny and, for good or ill,
35 Brazil is condemned to grandeur."⁶ Indeed, this issue has returned to the
36 foreign-policy agenda in the new millennium.

37 Based on these beliefs in its own role and destiny, Brazilian diplomacy
38 has structured its behavior emphasizing policy initiatives with a view
39 to increasing its power on the international scene. As a result, during
40 the 1970s, Brazilian foreign policy became known as "Responsible and
41 Ecumenical Pragmatism," a policy that condensed the above-mentioned
42 ideas of autonomy, universalism, and a destiny of grandeur.

1 **DIVERGENCE IN POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS**
2 **AND STRATEGIES SINCE THE 1990S**

3 The predominance for many years of a paradigm based on the beliefs of
4 autonomy and universalism in Itamaraty gave rise to a convergence and
5 consistency of thinking in Brazilian diplomacy, as well as the presence of
6 important traits of continuity in foreign policy.

7
8 However, the arrival of Collor de Mello to the presidency in 1990,
9 brought a new liberal-oriented policy, advocated by a minority in
10 Itamaraty, to the forefront of foreign-policy decision making. This pro-
11 posed that Brazilian diplomacy should leave aside the normative prin-
12 ciples outlined above and instead privilege relations with “First World”
13 countries in order to “join the club.” This would involve abandoning
14 the discourse of solidarity with developing countries in favor of stronger
15 economic relations with the developed economies. Nevertheless, even
16 during the Collor government, the translation of these ideas into prac-
17 tice abroad was limited. While the attempt to impose such a change in
18 foreign policy did not translate into practice and did not survive much
19 beyond the impeachment of the president,⁷ it did give rise to a crisis of
20 paradigm within Itamaraty, leading to a division within the Brazilian
21 Foreign Office into two main lines of thinking—the autonomist and
22 the pragmatic institutionalist.⁸ Each influences—and struggles for influ-
23 ence in—foreign-policy making today with different views regarding the
24 beliefs outlined earlier.

25 On the one hand, the pragmatic institutionalist current holds a more
26 favorable view of economic liberalization, although without rejecting the
27 policy of industrialization (import substitution industrialization—ISI)
28 adopted in the developmentalist period. In political terms, pragmatic
29 institutionalists, without renouncing the causal beliefs of Brazilian foreign
30 policy such as autonomy, universalism, and a destiny of grandeur, place
31 greater emphasis on Brazil’s support of international structures and insti-
32 tutions as a pragmatic way to advance the national agenda. They defend
33 the idea of Brazil’s international insertion based on “autonomy through
34 integration,” according to which global values must be defended by all.
35 Leadership in South America is sought and pursued discretely.⁹

36 On the other hand, the autonomist current hold a more tradi-
37 tional, nationalist, and developmentalist view, defending a model of
38 development based on the expansion of the infrastructure sectors and
39 an assertive industrial projection abroad. In terms of foreign policy,
40 autonomists defend a more assertive projection of Brazil abroad in terms
41 of leadership in North/South issues, Brazilian participation in the United
42 Nations Security Council, and Brazilian leadership in South America.

1 Priority is given to cooperation with southern countries, not through
 2 notions of solidarity, but to advance Brazil's regional leadership and
 3 hence global standing.

4 Lastly, a more ideologically oriented group, with roots in academic
 5 and political groups, emerged during the Lula administration, establish-
 6 ing an important dialogue with Itamaraty and exercising some influence
 7 over foreign-policy decisions (above all in relation to South American
 8 issues). This group prioritizes regional integration with South American
 9 countries and, more specifically, within Mercosur, but through the
 10 deepening of the process in political, social, and economic terms.¹⁰ For
 11 integration to be successful, compatibility is needed between values and
 12 real common advantages, as well as a degree of common identity.

13 14 15 **THE MAIN FEATURES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN** 16 **THE CARDOSO AND LULA GOVERNMENTS**

17 The emergence of competing orientations led to the emergence of dif-
 18 ferent characteristics under the Cardoso and Lula da Silva governments,
 19 and hence a break with the consistency of the past. While the most per-
 20 manent principles underlying foreign policy were maintained, policy was
 21 adapted to different contexts and situations.¹¹

22 23 24 (I) 1995–2002: AUTONOMY THROUGH INTEGRATION

25 According to Cardoso's Chancellor, Luiz Felipe Lampreia:

26
27 We are a great country, with traditions of growth and a long history of par-
 28 ticipation, very often as a protagonist, in the construction of international
 29 and regional relations. We are committed to international partnerships
 30 which increase our presence in the world. . . . We are a "global trader"
 31 and a "global player" The pre-eminence on the international scene of
 32 values dear to the Brazilian people, such as democracy, individual liberties
 33 and respect for human rights and the evidence that . . . the world is com-
 34 mitted to a process of growth in civilization . . .¹²

35 The strengthening of the pragmatic institutionalist line during the
 36 first mandate of the Cardoso government resulted in the adoption of
 37 the concept of "shared sovereignty," which differed from the classical
 38 concept of sovereignty. This view perceived the world as marked by a
 39 "concert" of nations with the same discourse defending universal values.
 40 One of the conditions of maintaining this "concert" would be a greater
 41 adaptability of the U.S. global leadership to both the demands of the
 42

1 emerging powers, and the demands of medium-sized and small nations.¹³
2 This scenario would open spaces for Brazil—in search of mechanisms to
3 enlarge its capability for international action—to adopt a position that
4 meant neither alignment with the United States nor a free-rider posture.
5 This position would be oriented, first, by the perception of the existence
6 in the new scenario of variable alignments, and second, by the adhesion
7 to leading international regimes. It also meant a modification of the con-
8 cept of autonomy with the new idea of “autonomy through integration”
9 replacing previously established concepts of sovereignty, understood as
10 distancing or self-sufficiency.¹⁴

11 The pragmatic institutionalists identified the institutionalization of
12 international relations as favorable to Brazilian economic development,
13 since the rules of the international game would be followed by all coun-
14 tries, including the richest. Brazil’s position vis-à-vis the richest countries
15 should be simultaneously one of convergence in terms of values and one
16 of criticism of the distortions and inequalities of the existing international
17 order.¹⁵ Within this context, Brazil sought an active role in multilateral
18 forums, as a global player, bidding within the UN for a permanent seat
19 on the Security Council. In the area of international security, Brazil chose
20 to support those international regimes that were already in place.

21 At the same time, the government sought to play the role of “global
22 trader,” with participation in different arenas of trade negotiations, the
23 World Trade Organization (WTO) being the privileged forum, since it
24 favored Brazilian interests in terms of its dispute settlement mechanism.¹⁶
25 In relation to the European Union (EU), in 1995 Brazil promoted the
26 Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the EU
27 and Mercosur that encompassed free trade, economic cooperation,
28 and political dialogue. However, despite common interests in terms of
29 political dialogue and common positions in international forums, strong
30 disagreements in terms of commerce hindered further progress.

31 With regard to political relations with other southern countries, the
32 rise of pragmatic institutionalists slowed progress as priority was given
33 to trade. In 1996, the Pretoria Agreement was signed and trade negotia-
34 tions were begun between Mercosur and South Africa, culminating in a
35 framework agreement signed in 2000. In addition, at the beginning of
36 the decade, China became the third largest importer of Brazilian exports.
37 Relations with Portugal and with the countries of the Community of
38 Portuguese Language Countries were also stimulated. Within the frame-
39 work of universalism, emphasis on interactions with new partners was
40 important.

41 In the Americas, Brazilian pragmatism was dominant over ideology in
42 policy formulation. Brazil clashed with the United States over issues of the

1 organization of international trade and of protectionism in industrialized
2 countries, as well as on issues relating to hemispheric integration. While
3 the U.S. government was eager to conclude the Free Trade Area of the
4 Americas (FTAA), the Brazilian government preferred to delay the process,
5 emphasizing subregional initiatives such as Mercosur. However, following
6 the low-profile line of the Itamar Franco administration, Brazilian diplo-
7 macy under Cardoso adopted what it labeled a “de-dramatization” of
8 U.S.-Brazilian relations, lowering the Brazilian profile, and seeking to
9 dispel the image of a Third-World opponent of the United States.¹⁷

10 In relation to neighboring countries, Brazilian diplomacy did not alter
11 its traditional and realist view of national sovereignty. On the contrary,
12 it was careful to avoid the possibility of integration leading to any shared
13 sovereignty in relation to its behavior with other foreign partners. Indeed,
14 the idea of autonomy was in fact reinforced. According to Pinheiro,¹⁸
15 in the case of Brazil’s relations with neighboring countries, this desire
16 for autonomy “uses the [Grotian¹⁹] conception to satisfy its search for
17 power.” Thus, Brazil’s quest for its own sphere of influence regionally and
18 for a protagonistic role on the international stage came to the fore.

19 During Cardoso’s second mandate, South American countries came to
20 be seen more clearly as important partners with a view to strengthening
21 Brazil’s role as a global player, in the belief that the consolidation of the
22 integration process would strengthen Brazil’s bargaining position in mul-
23 tilateral forums as a regional leader. Diplomacy then began a revision of
24 traditional Brazilian behavior in the region based on the principle of non-
25 intervention. It sought to build its leadership in the region on the twin
26 bases of security and democratic stability, establishing strong links with
27 neighboring countries and acting as a mediator in crisis situations when
28 called upon to do so. Acceptance of the idea of democracy as a universal
29 value contributed to the establishment of a consensus around the links
30 between democracy, regional integration, and perspectives of national
31 development.²⁰ In this way, without giving up principles of nonintervention,
32 it sought to include in its agenda the defense of democracy, and to
33 act accordingly in cases of crisis.

34 As a parallel strategy, construction of a South American Community
35 of Nations began, with the first meeting of South American countries
36 taking place in Brasília in 2000, where the main ideas discussed were eco-
37 nomic integration and the infrastructure of the region, and support for
38 democratic consolidation. With access to the energy resources of neigh-
39 boring countries a priority, Brazil sought to promote infrastructural inte-
40 gration projects, which opened the way for the formation of the Initiative
41 for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America
42 (IIRSA). On the domestic political front, however, there was resistance to

1 Brazil's involvement with initiatives that could divert domestic resources
2 to regional integration projects.

3 The pragmatic institutionalists saw Mercosur as a means of increasing
4 the country's economic power, thus prioritizing trade integration. It was
5 seen as important to preserve open regionalism so as not to prejudice
6 possible relations with other partners, and the institutionalization of the
7 block was not seen as necessary or even desirable. Moreover, the most
8 favored vision identified partnerships with industrialized countries as an
9 important element in stimulating Brazilian foreign trade and Mercosur
10 as a space in which to reduce the potentially damaging impact of overseas
11 economic opening. Despite frictions, Mercosur as a bloc conducted the
12 negotiations toward the formation of the FTAA and was able to develop
13 the dialogue previously established with the EU. Politically, Mercosur
14 was seen as a means of reinforcing Brazil's hand, giving it a greater
15 importance on the international stage.

16 The harmonization of relations with Argentina was an important
17 achievement for the universalist current of Brazilian foreign policy. On a
18 regional level, there were efforts to seek common positions with Argentina
19 in relation to issues that, until then, had not been agreed upon, as part of
20 a process of joint initiatives. The main cases involved common positions
21 in the Rio Group and the Organization of American States (OAS). Within
22 Mercosur, Brazilian and Argentine support for democracy was best reflected
23 in response to the political crisis experienced by the Paraguayan government
24 in 1996, which resulted in the democratic clause in Mercosur.

25 By the end of the Cardoso's administration, a number of steps had
26 been taken to increase Brazil's influence and standing on the international
27 scene. Yet autonomists criticized the pragmatic institutionalist preference
28 for moderation and action within the institutional framework of the
29 international order rather than adherence to the beliefs in autonomy,
30 universalism, and destiny of grandeur as the best way to guarantee the
31 success of long-term objectives.

32 33 (II) LULA, REGIONAL LEADERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM

34
35 The arrival of Luiz Ignacio da Silva Lula to the Brazilian Presidency rein-
36 vigorated the autonomist line of thought in international politics. The
37 rise of the autonomists diminished the conviction that Brazil's interests
38 were best guaranteed through international institutions, and instead
39 advocated a more active approach in favor of the interests of both Brazil
40 and other Southern countries.²¹ Lula's administration thus saw a shift
41 toward the primacy of beliefs in autonomy, universalism, and, above
42 all, in the view of increasing Brazil's presence in international politics.

1 Regional leadership and ascension toward a role as a global power was a
2 clear aim of Brazilian diplomacy in this period.

3 As a first step, the priority of Brazil's candidature to permanent
4 membership of the UN Security Council was reinforced. As credentials for its
5 candidature, Brazil chose to defend more distributive aspects of international
6 trade, and campaigned to tackle problems of hunger and poverty that would
7 affect international stability (the fight against terrorism was not assumed to
8 be a priority). However, the obstacles presented by the reform project in the
9 UN General Assembly of 2005 slowed the pace of this campaign.

10 In terms of trade, the government adopted an active policy to deal
11 with politico-strategic issues. It undertook a proactive policy in search of
12 markets, which resulted in an increase of exports and the Brazilian eco-
13 nomic surplus, as well as an active role in defense of Brazilian interests in
14 negotiations held in the WTO through joint action with other developing
15 countries. In his acceptance speech, President Lula stated that:

16
17 In relation to the FTAA, in negotiations between Mercosur, the European
18 Union and the World Trade Organization, Brazil will combat protection-
19 ism, fight for the elimination of subsidies and will undertake to obtain
20 trade rules which are more just and appropriate to our condition as a
21 developing country.²²

22
23 To this end, the G-20, composed of Southern nations including India,
24 China, and South Africa, became an important forum for Brazilian
25 diplomacy, linking progress in WTO negotiations to the inclusion of
26 issues such as agricultural subsidies in the discussion agenda.

27 Cooperation framework agreements were signed between Mercosur
28 and India, and with SACU (South African Customs Union) as well as
29 with the United States in terms of formative negotiations on the FTAA.
30 However, in the case of the FTAA, Itamaraty introduced a series of
31 proposed modifications that aimed to block and delay its implementa-
32 tion, resulting in the failure of talks in 2005. This led to an emphasis on
33 establishing an integrative but dominant stance with South American
34 countries, including a series of talks between Mercosur and the EU.
35 However, when these foundered, the Brazilian government signed a
36 strategic bilateral partnership agreement with the EU in a clear show
37 of autonomy in relation to Mercosur, with the aim of increasing the
38 country's international profile and presence.

39 The rise of the more autonomist line in Itamaraty gave new impetus
40 to South-South cooperation, based on the belief that there were not only
41 shared characteristics but also shared interests in reordering the interna-
42 tional system. Thus, in addition to the agreements signed with the G-20,

1 the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, and South Africa) was set up,
2 with a view to discussing issues relating to the international order, the
3 UN, and technology (and maintaining strongly the idea of nonintervention
4 in partners' domestic issues). While Brazil maintains autonomy in
5 such initiatives in relation to Mercosur, it clearly enjoys the benefits of its
6 regional influence and power to enlarge its international projection.

7 During Lula's second term, Itamaraty sought to take advantage of
8 the opportunities available through its membership of BRIC (Brazil,
9 Russia, India, and China), the G7, and other forums such as the Group
10 of 20. Activism aimed at achieving a greater international presence
11 increased significantly. The increasingly accepted identification of Brazil
12 as a "bridge" between developed and underdeveloped nations, a concept
13 that had been talked about since the 1970s, would give the country a
14 powerful position in international relations.

15 In terms of the United States, Brazil sought to maintain its position
16 of nonalignment and autonomy, maintaining a firm distance from U.S.
17 policy in the region. Although Brazil's more autonomous and reformist
18 participation in international politics has created new areas of friction
19 between the two countries, Brazil has also attempted to maintain a low-
20 profile policy, actively seeking to avoid conflict and confrontation with
21 the United States.

22 However, its policy toward South America is markedly opposite with
23 Itamaraty seeing regional integration under Brazilian leadership as a political
24 priority, as well as the most effective way to promote Brazil's objectives
25 to become a world power. To this end, Lula attempted to improve
26 the strategy of the Cardoso administration, and without renouncing the
27 principles of nonintervention, to develop regional leadership and a role
28 as a broker of regional consensus, linking regional integration processes
29 to national development.

30 According to the Chancellor Celso Amorim:

31
32 Brazil has always based its agenda on non-intervention in other states'
33 domestic affairs. . . . But non-intervention cannot mean lack of interest.

34 In other words, the precept of non-intervention must be seen in the light
35 of another precept, based on solidarity: that of non-indifference.²³

36
37 Such a policy included a more vigorous promotion of the South American
38 Community of Nations (SACN) as a priority in regional policy, leading
39 to its creation in 2004 before evolving into the Union of South American
40 Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. A further example was Brazil's leading
41 role in the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti, which can be seen as an
42 attempt to consolidate Brazilian leadership in the region and increase its

1 importance in the international arena, even though this violates traditional
2 principles of noninterventionism.

3 Brazilian initiatives were, however, not without tensions. With the rise
4 of nationalist sentiments, some neighboring countries sought to challenge
5 Brazil's regional power and position, demanding economic concessions.
6 Lula was forced to adopt a low-profile position (much criticized by the
7 Brazilian press) and accede to the nationalization of hydrocarbons imple-
8 mented by the Bolivian government, with Petrobras, the Brazilian oil com-
9 pany shouldering the expense. Likewise, despite pressures from Itamaraty
10 and the Brazilian right, Lula and Celso Amorim have sought to maintain
11 a dialogue with Paraguay over the latter's demand for renegotiation of
12 the 1973 Itaipú hydroelectric dam Treaty, which strongly favors Brazilian
13 interests. Without acceding to all demands, some significant concessions
14 regarding decision making, transparency, and completion of works on
15 the Paraguayan side were made in 2009, although these were not ratified
16 by the Brazilian Congress. Moreover, the Brazilian government has to an
17 extent assumed the role of providing technical and economic support in
18 the region, despite internal resistance, with, for example, the Brazilian
19 Development Bank (BNDES) offering to finance infrastructure works in
20 other South American countries (albeit only if carried out by Brazilian
21 companies). From this point of view, which is strongly influenced ideologically
22 by the Workers' Party (PT), Brazilian diplomacy supports the
23 initiatives of anti-liberal, left-leaning governments of the region, and pro-
24 poses some kind of diffuse solidarity with countries of the continent, with
25 Brazil willing to bear the majority costs of regional integration.

26 This new, more ideological, posture was supported by autonomists in
27 the belief that integration would offer greater access to foreign markets
28 and hence greater opportunities for the development of Brazilian indus-
29 try with its competitive advantages in terms of internal production sys-
30 tems. It was also supported and influenced by progressives, from within
31 the PT, as expressed by the President's foreign advisor, Marco Aurélio
32 Garcia:

33
34 Brazil has a greater sense of solidarity towards its neighbors. We do not
35 want the country to be an island of prosperity in the midst of a world of
36 poverty. We do have to help them. This is a pragmatic vision. We have
37 trade surpluses with all of them.²⁴

38
39 This does not mean that the progressive view of the PT does not clash
40 with autonomist visions at times. Indeed, foreign policy toward Mercosur
41 during this period was marked by very different visions from the two
42 orientations within the government. The progressives strongly favored

1 the political and social deepening of the integration process and both
2 the Olivos Protocol and the setting up of the Mercosur Parliament as a
3 step toward greater institutionalization were a direct result of progressive
4 thinking. On the other hand, the autonomist view sees the broadening
5 of South American integration under Brazilian leadership as a priority,
6 and hence adopted a greater focus on UNASUR, while Mercosur is seen
7 more as an instrument to strengthen Brazil's regional position, as well as
8 a mechanism to open the way for a regional free-trade area.

9 Despite patterns of continuity, foreign policy under Lula has shown
10 signs of change and flexibility. The objective of regional leadership has
11 been central to policy, and despite the predominance of the autonomist
12 view, policy was influenced favorably by progressives, pushing for a deep-
13 ening of regional relations and international solidarity. The coexistence of
14 autonomist and progressive orientations reflected a difficult but innova-
15 tive balance between ideological beliefs and pragmatism.

17 CONCLUSION

18
19 The comparison of foreign policies adopted by the two administrations
20 confirms a high level of continuity in the general features of Brazilian
21 behavior based on the causal beliefs of universalism, autonomy, and a
22 greater destiny. These beliefs approximate to what can be understood as
23 ideology, creating a backdrop that guides behavioral patterns in foreign
24 policy. However, it also reveals a pragmatic flexibility in the comparative
25 weightage awarded to these beliefs in terms of implementation of foreign
26 policy.

27 Without doubt the autonomist line, stronger during the Lula
28 government, rested greater importance on beliefs, seeking both the
29 reinforcement of autonomy and the search for a stronger projection of
30 the country as a rising power on the international scene. In this way,
31 the combination of strategic pragmatism and ideological considerations
32 favored a discrete, but definite, reinforcement of autonomist orientation,
33 combined at times with a progressive current, over the institutionalist
34 currents favored by Cardoso. Within this combination, in which the
35 beliefs offer an ideological strategy-orienting framework, both adminis-
36 trations ultimately favored a more pragmatic foreign policy.

37 This combination of ideology and pragmatism can be found in
38 foreign policy from the beginning of the twentieth century. Variations
39 over time reflected the domestic political options of the government in
40 question, the correlation of forces within Itamaraty and the international
41 context. Furthermore, the changing international milieu, in the form of
42 a more multipolar, fragmented international scene, and the election of

1 left-leaning governments in South America, strongly influenced Brazilian
 2 foreign policy. Despite the variation experienced and in different mea-
 3 sures, one can say that, both in the Cardoso term and in the Lula govern-
 4 ment, pragmatism prevailed over ideology.

5 This orientation is not just the result of a political choice, but has been
 6 constructed within the autonomist line since the beginning of the 1990s
 7 and represents a specific—and highly pragmatic—form of adapting beliefs
 8 to new configurations and challenges in the international order. Political
 9 change resulting from the presidential elections in 2010 may again favor
 10 a move toward institutionalism as under Cardoso, but the overall orien-
 11 tation toward activism and Brazil's rapid international ascension as an
 12 autonomous global power will almost certainly be retained.
 13
 14

NOTES

- 15
 - 16
 - 17
 - 18
 - 19
 - 20
 - 21
 - 22
 - 23
 - 24
 - 25
 - 26
 - 27
 - 28
 - 29
 - 30
 - 31
 - 32
 - 33
 - 34
 - 35
 - 36
 - 37
 - 38
 - 39
 - 40
 - 41
 - 42
1. In the Brazilian case, it is important to work with the idea of “beliefs” in addition to ideological features of foreign behavior. Ideologies, by definition, take as their starting point the agent's option, while beliefs are rooted in a worldview that appears to the agent not as optional, but as a reality. Here, the definition of beliefs is based on Goldstein and Keohane (1993), which points to three types of beliefs: worldviews (which create identities), principled beliefs (normative ideas), and causal beliefs (capable of generating cause and effect).
 2. This is the model of organizational behavior proposed by Allison, G., and P. Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Longman; and used by Silva, Márcia Maro. 2008. “Itamaraty's Role in the Process of Recognition of the Independence of Angola and of the MPLA Government.” Doctoral thesis. Flacso/Buenos Aires.
 3. See Pinheiro, L. 2000. “Traídos pelo Desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prática da política externa brasileira contemporânea,” *Contexto Internacional* 22(2), pp. 305–36.
 4. Vigevani, T., H. Ramazini Jr., G. Favaron, R. A. Correia. 2008. “O papel da integração regional para o Brasil: universalismo, soberania e percepção das elites,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* Ano 51, n. 1, pp. 5–27.
 5. Cited by Silva, A. de M. 1995. “O Brasil no continente e no mundo: atores e imagens na política externa brasileira contemporânea,” *Estudos Históricos* 15, pp. 95–118.
 6. Castro, J. A. de A. 1972. “O congelamento do Poder Mundial,” *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, n. 33, pp. 7–30, 9, 30. Araújo Castro was foreign secretary in 1963, Brazilian ambassador to the UN at the end of the 1960s, and ambassador to the United States in the 1970s. (Castro 1972, p. 9, 30).
 7. In countries where diplomatic bureaucracy is more fragile, foreign policy is more conditioned by brusque changes in politics, thus taking on a more erratic aspect. In Brazil's case, Itamaraty's power favors continuity.

- 1 8. Pinheiro 2000.
- 2 9. Ibid.
- 3 10. See Deutsch, K. 1982. *Análise das Relações Internacionais*. Brasília: Editora UnB.
- 4
- 5 11. See Vigevani, T; M. F. Oliveira; R. Cintra. 2003. "A política externa do governo Cardoso: um exercício de autonomia pela integração," *Tempo Social*, n. 20, pp. 31–61.
- 6
- 7 12. Lampreia, L. F. 1995. "Discurso de posse," *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, n. 76. Brasília, Ministério de Relações Exteriores, pp. 17–27, 20.
- 8
- 9 13. See Fonseca Jr., G. 1999. "Anotações sobre as condições do sistema internacional no limiar do século XIX: a distribuição dos pólos de poder e a inserção internacional do Brasil," in: Dupas and Vigevani (eds.), *O Brasil e as novas dimensões da segurança internacional*. São Paulo: Alfa-Omega/Fapesp. pp. 17–42. Fonseca was Brazilian ambassador to the UN during part of the Cardoso government.
- 10
- 11 14. Lampreia, L. F. 1998. "A política exterior de Fernando Henrique Cardoso," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 41(2), pp. 5–17.
- 12
- 13 15. See Vigevani, T, M. F Oliveira, R. Cintra. 2003. "A política externa do governo Cardoso: um exercício de autonomia pela integração," *Tempo Social*, n. 20, pp. 31–61.
- 14
- 15 16. See *ibid.*
- 16
- 17 17. See Hirst, M., and Pinheiro, L. 1995. "A política externa do Brasil em dois tempos," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 38(1), pp. 5–23.
- 18
- 19 18. Pinheiro, L. 2000. "Traídos pelo Desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prática da política externa brasileira contemporânea," *Contexto Internacional* 22(2), pp. 305–36, 323.
- 20
- 21 19. "Grotian" is this author's clarification.
- 22
- 23 20. See Villa, R. D. 2004. "Brasil: política externa e a agenda democrática na América do Sul," paper presented in 4to. Encontro Nacional da ABCP, Jul. 21–24, Rio de Janeiro.
- 24
- 25 21. See Lima, M. R. S. de. 1990. "A economia política da política externa brasileira: uma proposta de análise," *Contexto Internacional* 6. n. 12, pp. 17.
- 26
- 27 22. da Silva, Lula. 2003. "Discurso de posse," *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, n. 92. Brasília, Ministério de Relações Exteriores, pp. 13–20, 17.
- 28
- 29 23. Celso Amorim, 2005, quoted by Oliveira, M. F. de. 2005. *Elites econômicas e política externa no Brasil contemporâneo*. São Paulo: IEEI (draft). Author's translation, pp. 21–22.
- 30
- 31 24. Interview with Marco Aurélio Garcia made and quoted by Dieguez, Consuelo. 2009. "O Formulador Emotivo," *Piauí*, n. 30, March, pp. 20–24.
- 32
- 33
- 34
- 35
- 36
- 37
- 38
- 39
- 40
- 41
- 42

QUERY FORM

BOOK TITLE:	GARDINI
CHAPTER NO:	Chapter 03

Queries and / or remarks

Query No.	Query / remark	Response
	No Queries	

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

CHAPTER 5

ARGENTINE FOREIGN
POLICY UNDER
THE KIRCHNERS:
IDEOLOGICAL,
PRAGMATIC, OR
SIMPLY PERONIST?

ANDRES MALAMUD

INTRODUCTION

Argentina under the Kirchners has become a puzzle for foreign observers. Neither as heterodox as Chávez and Morales nor as orthodox as Lula and Bachelet, the presidential couple are nonetheless vocal members of the contemporary shift to the left in Latin America. Are their policies to be understood as informed by an ideological program or rather as a pragmatic approach wrapped in high-toned rhetoric? Foreign policy is an area relatively prone to the divergence of words from deeds, given its aloofness from public scrutiny and the little direct impact it has on citizens' daily lives—especially in countries that are of lesser international importance. Yet, a third interpretation is possible: foreign policy may not be internally coherent, either ideologically or pragmatically, but rather expresses domestic struggles, reflex actions, and even personal moods. Thus, foreign-policy subordination to short-term domestic concerns (*cortoplacismo interno*) could explain a great deal of the Argentine puzzle.

To attempt a periodization of contemporary Argentine foreign policy requires more imagination than method. Indeed, over the last eighty

1 years the policies flowing out of the Casa Rosada have been at least as
2 many as the presidents themselves. Although in most countries foreign
3 policy tends to be less politicized than domestic policies, and thus more
4 durable, this has not been the case in Argentina. Foreign-policy changes
5 have occurred in the wake of both regime change and administration
6 change—even if the incumbent party did not change—but also under
7 the mandate of the same president. The most conspicuous case was
8 the rapprochement of de facto president Leopoldo Galtieri with Fidel
9 Castro and Yasser Arafat in the context of the Falklands/Malvinas War,
10 after six years of courting of the Western powers. However puzzling
11 this may appear, the Peronist pendulum is even more striking. In ten
12 years, a Peronist administration may evolve from autarkic and militant
13 anti-Americanism to actively seeking American investment in strategic
14 national resources such as oil (as Perón's did between 1946 and 1955)
15 or the other way round (as when overtly pro-American, pro-market
16 reformer Carlos Menem, 1989–1999, was succeeded by such staunch
17 critics of neoliberalism as Néstor Kirchner, 2003–2007, and Cristina
18 Fernández de Kirchner since 2007). To pin down what is behind such
19 volatility it is more important to understand Argentine politics than poli-
20 cies. This is tantamount to saying that foreign policy has been mostly
21 determined by domestic rather than international factors.

22 Upon a background of barely professionalized state bureaucracy
23 and leader-centered party politics, Argentine presidents have tradition-
24 ally enjoyed a wide room for maneuver—especially in times of crisis.
25 The Kirchners used this latitude to put foreign policy to the service of
26 two goals: solving fiscal urgencies and gathering electoral support. The
27 former dealt with substance and sought foreign partners, whereas the
28 latter revolved mainly around form and targeted domestic audiences.
29 Remarkably, both were frequently self-defeated by a tactless leadership
30 style, which became the cornerstone of the country's foreign policy under
31 the Kirchners' administrations.

32 This chapter scrutinizes Argentina's foreign policy vis-à-vis four key
33 foreign actors, namely Brazil (and South American regional blocs),
34 Venezuela, the United States, and the International Monetary Fund, in
35 order to gauge the extent to which it can be explained by recourse to
36 ideology, pragmatism, or rather domestic hiccups.

37 This chapter shows that the main objectives of the Kirchners' foreign
38 policy have been to garner electoral support at home and to obtain finan-
39 cial assistance abroad. The former has been pursued through ideological
40 and combative rhetoric, the latter through pragmatic international
41 alliances. In order to make means meet ends, collective agency has been
42 as significant as individual agency: the historical flexibility of the Peronist

1 party, compounded by the leadership skills of Néstor Kirchner, made it
 2 possible to dissociate words from deeds and to play discursive brinkman-
 3 ship, while abiding by all relevant international norms. This move was
 4 helped by the limited professionalization of the foreign service and the
 5 subordinate role played by ministers under the Argentine constitutional
 6 provisions, which leave foreign-policy decisions exclusively in presiden-
 7 tial hands. Finally, the emergency situation created by the economic col-
 8 lapse of 2001 gave legitimacy to the Kirchners' claim to change and to
 9 their appeal of leading Argentina in a new direction.

11 OVERVIEW OF THE KIRCHNER ADMINISTRATIONS

12
 13 Between 1930 and 1983, Argentina experienced half a century of politi-
 14 cal instability and economic decline. Political instability manifested itself
 15 in six overt coups d'état and at least as many *coups de palace*. In that
 16 period, only three out of twenty-three presidents completed their pre-
 17 established mandate: Agustín Justo, Juan Perón, and Jorge Videla. The
 18 fact that all three were military officers—although not all came to power
 19 through a military coup d'état—suggests how difficult it was for civilians
 20 to stay in office. In 1983, however, a new democratic regime was success-
 21 fully inaugurated, which would remain unbroken until the present. Yet,
 22 political instability continued by other means.

23 In the twenty-six years that followed, the Justicialist Party (PJ or
 24 Peronism) governed for nearly eighteen years while the Radical Civic
 25 Union (UCR or Radicals)—alone or in coalition—ruled for about
 26 eight. The performance of both parties differed significantly: while the
 27 PJ was able to complete all of its constitutional mandates (1989–1995,
 28 1995–1999, and 2003–2007), the Radicals failed to complete any of
 29 theirs (1983–1989 and 1999–2003). Because of this, Calvo and Murillo
 30 speak of the “new iron law of Argentine politics,” whereby “non-Peronists
 31 are able to win presidential elections but are unable to govern until the
 32 end of their terms in office.”¹

33 When Néstor Kirchner, the Justicialist governor of the small province
 34 of Santa Cruz, arrived to the presidency in May 2003, he faced two
 35 important issues. First, Argentina was still recovering from the 2001 col-
 36 lapse that had left the country broken and its political system in shambles.
 37 Second, he had won the election with a scant 22 percent of the vote, the
 38 lowest percentage ever, and was unable to legitimize his victory through
 39 a runoff as the front-runner, Carlos Menem, had already stood down
 40 fearing a landslide defeat. Kirchner's mandate seemed to begin under
 41 inauspicious circumstances and in turbulent times. However, soon after
 42 taking office, he surprised everybody by standing up to vested powers,

1 including the military, the Supreme Court, the business associations, and
2 even his own protector, Eduardo Duhalde, who had decisively promoted
3 Kirchner's candidacy while serving as interim president.

4 Following four years of soaring economic growth and strong political
5 dominance, Cristina Fernández was elected to replace his husband in
6 2007. Although there were expectations that she would be more institu-
7 tionally minded, instilling diplomatic softness where rudeness had pre-
8 dominated, it did not happen. Instead, relations with the United States
9 were embittered by an awkward incident involving illicit Venezuelan
10 money, and a harsh domestic conflict arose only three months later
11 when the farming associations took to the streets in protest against a tax
12 reform.

13 Unlike Brazil, whose foreign policy throughout the twentieth century
14 was known for its coherence and remarkable continuity,² Argentina's
15 foreign policy underwent three different periods over the same century.
16 First, from 1880 until the interwar period, it followed three main ori-
17 entations: "Europeanism, opposition to the United States, and isolation
18 from the rest of Latin America."³ Second, following the Second World
19 War, the paradigm entailed nonalignment vis-à-vis the United States,
20 support for Latin American integration without doing much to construct
21 it, opposition to the establishment of supranational organizations that
22 would curtail Argentine autonomy and development, implementation of
23 a development strategy oriented toward import substitution, the intro-
24 duction of reforms to the international financial and economic institu-
25 tions in the interests of developing countries, and diversification in terms
26 of trade links irrespective of ideology.⁴

27 Third, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Peronist president Carlos
28 Menem introduced a radical departure from the existing policy orientation.
29 So-called automatic alignment or pragmatic acquiescence was premised on
30 a number of related factors, including the subordination of foreign policy
31 to the political and strategic interests of the United States, the definition of
32 national interests in economic terms, acceptance and support for the basic
33 rules of the free market (and possibly neoliberal) international economic
34 and financial order, and economic integration.⁵ The arrival of the Kirchners
35 gave a new twist to an already twisted history.

36 As Margheritis explains, "Apparently contradictory and inconsistent
37 foreign policy behavior shaped Argentina's reputation as an erratic and
38 relatively unpredictable international actor—the adjectives going, in fact,
39 from pariah to wayward to unreliable partner."⁶ This foreign behavior
40 has included different kinds and degrees of turns, ranging from small
41 adjustments to dramatic policy shifts. Remarkably, such a pattern has
42 been due to policy inconsistencies not only between political parties but

1 also within them. The most striking volte-faces are exhibited by the PJ,
 2 a political organization rooted in the popular classes and oriented toward
 3 power, but almost completely bereft of a coherent ideology.

4 The PJ is a party created from above. Its founder was Juan Perón,
 5 a military officer who, holding a key executive office, attempted to build
 6 a popular base of support to promote his political goals. Consequently,
 7 the party doctrine, language, and organization were pervaded by a hierar-
 8 chical temperament. Hierarchy meant a predisposition toward command
 9 and obedience, but it did not imply any substantive content. Hence, the
 10 internal fluidity of Peronism facilitated sharp and often contradictory
 11 programmatic shifts such as those undertaken by Menem in the 1990s
 12 and Kirchner in the 2000s. This was due to the tendency of the Peronist
 13 bosses to follow office-holding leaders: as the authority of the party bod-
 14 ies is rarely taken seriously, “control of the state means control of the
 15 party.”⁷ The province and patronage-based nature of Argentine political
 16 careers further potentiates this effect;⁸ as would soon become apparent,
 17 party flexibility would allow for a rapid reversal to a nationalist, populist,
 18 and antineoliberal program.

19 In order to evaluate Argentine foreign relations under the Kirchners
 20 it is reasonable to focus on the key allies and enemies as defined by
 21 the administration. Whereas Brazil/Mercosur and Venezuela stand out
 22 among the former, the United States and international financial institu-
 23 tions, such as the IMF, are prominent among the latter. In all cases, how-
 24 ever, hidden nuances and mixed policies have usually been as significant
 25 as, and sometimes more significant than, official rhetoric.

26
 27
 28 **FOUR KEY FOREIGN-POLICY ISSUES**
 29 **UNDER THE KIRCHNERS**

30 RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL AND MERCOSUR

31
 32 Once a pragmatic approach to regional integration, Mercosur has gradu-
 33 ally become more ideologically loaded as its effectiveness dwindled over
 34 time.⁹ Although the Argentine government has continued to support
 35 the project at the discursive level, its substantive strategies have been
 36 much less constructive and were guided by material interests rather than
 37 ideological motivations. Those material interests are rooted in domestic
 38 considerations and have promoted protectionist policies as a response to
 39 social pressures or fiscal needs; international calculations were less influ-
 40 ential in Argentina than they were in Brazil.¹⁰ Thus, whereas ideology-
 41 based rhetoric called for integration, interest-based policy hindered it.
 42 While it comes as no surprise that concrete policies were oriented toward



1 economic gains, less obvious is that the rhetoric also served a pragmatic
2 purpose, as it was directed toward securing electoral returns. The plea
3 for regionalism is popular in Latin America, explaining the Kirchners'
4 rhetorical support regardless of their lack of effective action.

5 Nowhere is foot-dragging more evident than in the negligence with
6 which Mercosur member states have implemented, or rather fail to
7 implement, the decisions made to upgrade their common institutions.
8 To start with, the organization lacks a budget; with the exception of a
9 small fund established in 2005 to appease Paraguay and Uruguay, all
10 expenses are supported in equal parts by every country. Second, there is
11 no supranational authority, even less a regional executive office such as
12 the European Commission. Third, there is no effective system of dispute
13 settlement: although an ad hoc mechanism was created in 1991 and a
14 permanent tribunal replaced it in 2006, both mechanisms combined
15 have issued only twelve rulings in eighteen years—as a reference, the
16 European Court of Justice issues around 500 rulings a year, and even in
17 the age of Mercosur it used to issue between 30 and 80 per year. And
18 yet, the most blatant case of noncompliance concerns the decision to
19 set up a permanent parliament. According to the foundational protocol
20 signed in 2005, a decision regarding demographic representation had to
21 be taken by the end of 2007, and direct elections were to be held before
22 the end of 2010; as of 2010, the decision had not been taken and direct
23 elections had been held only in Paraguay, with all evidence suggesting
24 that no other country would follow suit in due time. Massive implemen-
25 tation gaps and inoperative institutions reveal the pragmatic nature of
26 Mercosur, as its advocates wave the flag of regional integration—as long
27 as it is popular—while systematically shirking on regional commitments.
28 In this, to be fair, it should be said that Argentina's strategy is no different
29 from that of the other member countries.

30 Brazil is Argentina's main trade partner and key regional ally. Argentine
31 leaders and diplomats alike see this partnership as based on an equal foot-
32 ing. Therefore, any time Brazil hints at affirming itself as either a regional
33 leader or a global power, Argentine foreign-policy moves closer to the
34 United States—or other circumstantial allies such as, more recently,
35 Venezuela—in order to restore the regional balance.¹¹ This ambivalence,
36 or pendular game, recedes in good times and surges during economic
37 hardship, independent of the party in government. In the 1990s, Carlos
38 Menem was one of the Mercosur founders while simultaneously aligning
39 his country with U.S. foreign strategies. Likewise, in the 2000s, Néstor
40 and Cristina Kirchner cultivated an excellent relationship with the Lula
41 administration, while simultaneously striking a close alliance with the
42 Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.



1 Argentina has consistently opposed one of the Brazil's most-cherished
2 foreign-policy goals: to obtain a permanent seat in the United Nations
3 Security Council. In 2004 a high level committee submitted to the UN
4 Secretary-General a proposal that called for the admission of new permanent
5 members, after which four countries jockeyed to obtain the seats:
6 Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (G4). Notably, however, a larger group
7 was formed to oppose the proposal and advanced instead the introduction
8 of semipermanent membership. First called the Coffee Group and
9 later renamed Uniting for Consensus, this group brought together the
10 regional rivals of the G4, including Argentina, Italy, South Korea, and
11 Pakistan and effectively prevented the aspiring Security Council members
12 from selling their bid on behalf of their respective regions.¹² Though
13 not a surprise, the fact that the Brazilian main regional partner was, at the
14 same time, one of its staunchest opponents was a heavy blow to its image
15 as regional leader. Overall, Argentina holds similar political ambitions to
16 Brazil and nurtures recurrent economic grievances toward it, which have
17 given place to protectionist spasms and hindered further integration.

18 The domestic sources of Argentine regional policy are even clearer
19 vis-à-vis Uruguay, as the so-called pulp mill conflict reveals. The conflict,
20 which concerned the construction of a paper-processing plant by
21 a Finnish company near Fray Bentos, a small Uruguayan town, severely
22 strained relations between the two countries. Lying some 30 kilometers
23 from the Argentine city of Gualeguaychú, a popular tourist resort area on
24 the bank of the Uruguay River, the installation is of significant economic
25 importance to Uruguay, representing the largest foreign investment ever.
26 In April 2005, resident and environmental groups blocked one of the
27 three international bridges that connect the two countries, protesting
28 against the installation of the pulp mills. The protest gained political
29 and diplomatic significance as senior Argentine political figures began
30 to support the protest against the presumed environmental damage that
31 would be produced by the mill's operations and the alleged violation of
32 an agreement regulating the use of the river. During the last days of his
33 presidency, Kirchner backed the protests on environmental grounds. The
34 fact that his administration had done nothing to treat the highly polluted
35 river that surrounds Buenos Aires, on whose shores millions of people
36 live, speaks to the authentic reasons behind the official position: not to
37 alienate potential voters or provoke demonstrations. If the causes were
38 domestic, the consequences were international: in October 2008, after
39 Kirchner had been succeeded by his wife, Uruguay announced that it
40 would veto his candidacy to become the first permanent secretary-general
41 of the newly formed Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The
42 new mill, which had begun to operate in November 2007, became the

1 subject of a protracted and increasingly hostile dispute that was arbitrated
2 by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The appeal of both
3 countries to the Court testified to the feebleness of the Mercosur dispute-
4 settlement institutions as much as to the unfulfilled promises of South
5 American integration. In 2010, after the Court had issued a balanced
6 verdict and José Mujica had succeeded Tabaré Vazquez as Uruguayan
7 president, the Uruguayan veto was lifted and Néstor Kirchner was finally
8 elected as the first Secretary-General of UNASUR. A few days later the
9 blockade of the bridge was ended.

11 RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA

13 Foreign relations between Venezuela and Argentina became closer after
14 Néstor Kirchner took office. Lacking much-needed foreign credit, the
15 newly elected President turned to the oil-rich Bolivarian Republic for help,
16 the only country that would buy Argentine state bonds, while the rest of the
17 world still viewed with distrust the ability of the new government to over-
18 come the default on its debt. Taking advantage of oil revenues, President
19 Chávez seized the opportunity to forge a strategic alliance. Venezuela went
20 on to become Argentina's most significant financial supporter. As of early
21 2007, for example, it had purchased US\$4,250 million in Argentine debt
22 bonds. At the behest of the Argentine government, Venezuela provided
23 US\$135 million to leading Argentine dairy producer SanCor to ward
24 off a takeover by the American financier George Soros. The total loan,
25 as in other cases, is being repaid with SanCor exports of milk powder to
26 Venezuela. Chávez's foreign aid has not only helped to bail out Argentina,
27 improving its finances and standing among creditors, but it also helped
28 Kirchner to develop his economic program. However, this seems not
29 to be the only way Chávez provided financial support to his friends. In
30 August 2007, during the Argentine election campaign, Venezuelan busi-
31 nessman Antonini Wilson flew to Buenos Aires on a chartered flight with
32 Venezuelan and Argentine oil officials and attempted to bring in a suitcase
33 with about US\$800,000.¹³ The detection and confiscation of the money
34 at customs control triggered an international scandal.

35 During the Néstor Kirchner administration, Argentina signed more
36 international agreements with Venezuela (62) than with any other country.
37 After Venezuela came Chile (41), Bolivia (39), Brazil (22), Ecuador (19), and
38 Paraguay (17), with just 10 with the United States. What is more, Cristina
39 Kirchner signed roughly the same amount of treaties with Venezuela (61)
40 in the first year and a half of her administration,¹⁴ which eloquently reflects
41 the level of affinity and interaction between the Bolivarian and the Peronist
42 administrations.

1 Relations with Venezuela were characterized by incoming financial
 2 assistance and outgoing political support. Plausibly, family resemblances
 3 between Bolivarianism and Peronism fostered reciprocal understanding,
 4 but they did not determine foreign alignments or policy outcomes. It
 5 was mutual benefit rather than ideological proximity that brought both
 6 countries ever closer, although—unlike other South American countries
 7 such as Bolivia or Ecuador—Argentina never came to be seen as a
 8 follower, even less a client state, of Caracas.

10 RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

11 Acting on moves previously hinted at by his predecessor, Eduardo
 12 Duhalde, President Néstor Kirchner suspended the policy of automatic
 13 alignment with the United States and moved it closer to other Latin
 14 American countries. Argentina withdrew its support for the resolution of
 15 the UN Commission on Human Rights that criticized the human rights
 16 situation in Cuba, and in the 2006 United Nations Security Council
 17 election for a nonpermanent seat, Argentina supported the candidacy of
 18 Venezuela over Guatemala, the candidate favored by the United States.
 19 In November 2005, at the Fourth Summit of the Americas in Mar del
 20 Plata, most of the discussion was focused on the Free Trade Agreement
 21 of the Americas (FTAA), and marked a clear split between the countries
 22 of Mercosur, plus Venezuela, and the supporters of the FTAA, led by
 23 the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Such tensions notwithstanding,
 24 the United States and Argentina got along on the two topics that were
 25 at the top of their respective agendas: international security, especially
 26 regarding Iranian support for terrorist attacks, for the United States and
 27 support in negotiations with international institutions and debtors' clubs
 28 for Argentina.¹⁵

29 The Néstor Kirchner administration led reinvigorated attempts to
 30 prosecute Iranian figures for their alleged role in the July 1994 bomb-
 31 ing of the main Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, issuing arrest
 32 warrants for several Iranian officials. Among them were former president
 33 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, accused of ordering the attack that killed
 34 85 people and injured more than 200. When one of his key domestic
 35 allies—former street activist Luis D'Elia—suggested that U.S. and Israeli
 36 pressure was fueling Argentina's pursuit of Iran, he was promptly forced
 37 to resign from his government post.¹⁶ This was, perhaps, the only issue
 38 in which Buenos Aires was closer to Washington than to Caracas, but it
 39 was a crucial one for the United States. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
 40 continued her husband's policy: during the speech she gave at the United
 41 Nations General Assembly in September 2009, she had harsh words for
 42

1 Iran, accusing it of complicity in the 1994 attack and restating Argentine
2 demands for the extradition of Iranians wanted by Interpol for the
3 bombing.

4 In terms of debt relief, the Kirchner administration sought and found
5 American support from the early months of its mandate. Within a month
6 of his inauguration, President Kirchner had received the secretary of state
7 Colin Powell and the economy minister Roberto Lavagna had met with
8 the U.S. deputy secretary at the Treasury Department, John Taylor.¹⁷
9 Argentina was facing deadlines to pay up millions of dollars with interna-
10 tional lenders in the following months, and the IMF's head, Horst Köhler,
11 was a harsh opponent of any concession on the part of the creditors.
12 U.S. pressure was key in convincing him to offer Argentina more flexible
13 financial requirements. In true Peronist fashion, pragmatism affirmed its
14 primacy over ideology and the administration got its way.

15 If relations with the only world superpower were stormy but functional
16 during Néstor Kirchner's term, they were widely expected to improve as
17 Cristina's inauguration came closer. However, unforeseen events under-
18 mined hopes of an improved relationship; during the first days of her
19 presidency, Argentina's relations with the United States deteriorated as
20 a result of the *maletinazo* (suitcase scandal), which had occurred a few
21 months previously. A Venezuelan-American citizen, Guido Alejandro
22 Antonini Wilson, had tried to enter Argentina in August 2007 carrying
23 US\$800,000 in cash in his suitcase, without declaring it to customs,
24 having traveled on a flight chartered by the Argentine government. In
25 December, a United States assistant attorney made allegations before
26 a Florida court that such money consisted of illegal contributions for
27 Cristina Kirchner's presidential campaign. Some of the allegations were
28 proven and several individuals received a prison sentence after a widely
29 reported trial. The Kirchners, as well as Venezuelan president Chávez,
30 called the allegations "a trashing operation"¹⁸ and accused the United
31 States of a conspiracy orchestrated to divide Latin American nations.
32 On December 19, 2007, the Argentine government restricted the U.S.
33 ambassador's activities and limited his meetings to Foreign Ministry offi-
34 cials, a treatment generally reserved for hostile countries. However, on
35 January 31, in a special meeting with Cristina Kirchner, the U.S. ambas-
36 sador in Argentina declared that the allegations "were never made by the
37 United States government,"¹⁹ thus cooling down the dispute.

38 In sum, the Kirchners' Argentina relations with the United States were
39 mixed and variable but not bad overall. They were marked by a degree
40 of tacit reciprocity, in the form of low-profile Argentine support for the
41 "War on Terror" in exchange for U.S. support in foreign-debt renegotia-
42 tion, but also by the Argentine rejection to the Free Trade Area of the

1 Americas (FTAA) negotiations and the occasional scandals that punctuated this period. With an eye on their domestic audiences, the Kirchners retained their rhetorical gestures. Yet, aware of their country's financial fragility and of the shared interest of the United States in bringing the Iranian-sponsored terrorists to justice, they were able to step back from open hostility and maintain bilateral relations.

8 RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

9
10 Argentina's relation with the International Monetary Fund has been stormy and superficially contradictory under the Kirchners. Both presidents voiced harsh criticisms of the IMF for its responsibility for the 2001 economic collapse, and strove to reduce its influence on the Argentine economy. They did this not by refusing to serve the national debt, but by doing exactly the opposite. In December 2005, Néstor Kirchner ordered the treasury to repay Argentina's nearly US\$10 billion debt to the IMF, a significant gesture in moving Argentina away from external conditionalities. Once again, strong rhetoric against a target portrayed as the Argentine people's greatest enemy was accompanied by concrete actions that were not hostile but of mutual convenience. Commentators related this to the behavior of the Argentine national bird, the *tero*, which sings in one place but keeps its eggs in another, with the aim of diverting the attention of potential predators—or, in this case, electors. Such a pattern is a Peronist trademark.

25 By celebrating its regained freedom from the IMF while fully canceling its debt, the country that had arguably given more grief than anyone else to the world's lender of last resort—and also the one in which the IMF had made its most costly mistakes—gained applause at home and in Washington.²⁰ Argentina's decision was followed by other countries in the region, notably Brazil and Uruguay.

31 When the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, Cristina Kirchner declared that it would have little impact on the Argentine economy. However, Argentina was hit by the crisis, and the cycle of several years of high-rate growth turned slightly negative in 2009, which led in October 2009 to a further volte-face by the administration. During a visit to Istanbul, the economy minister Amado Boudou declared to the Argentine national press agency that the head of the IMF, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was correctly “interpreting the sign of the times,” and further remarked that Argentina was “on its way back into international credit markets.”²¹ The official argument was that the IMF was rectifying previous mistakes and moving back to the position maintained by Argentina; yet, the underlying reason of the policy reversal was that

1 Argentina's economic surplus had been dried out by the crisis at the
2 same time as Venezuela had run out of cash for financing large countries.
3 Consequently, the Kirchners decided that the need for funds justified
4 inviting the IMF back to visit Argentina. Once more, financial pragmatism
5 prevailed over ideological stance; skillful rhetoric accomplished the
6 mission to hide the fact from view.

8 CONCLUSIONS

9
10 As with any public policy, foreign policy is rooted in the broader realm
11 of domestic politics. Hence, its main goal is for the ruling officers to stay
12 in power.²² In times of war or severe international turmoil, continuity in
13 power depends on ostensibly external factors. In times of peace, however,
14 domestic factors are paramount and foreign policy recedes to the back-
15 ground, thus becoming just another means to gather and retain internal
16 support—or to achieve external resources that serve such goals. If this
17 rationale holds true, it does so even more when it involves Peronism,
18 a mass movement whose essential feature is not a substantive agenda but
19 its fondness for power.

20 During the Kirchner administrations, ideological claims have been
21 discursively pushed forward but not implemented at a later stage. The
22 Kirchners had two main goals: abroad, to ensure the continuing access
23 to financial supply for the public sector; and domestically, to broaden
24 their base of political legitimacy and electoral support. In a nutshell, it
25 all comes down to money and votes. Other objectives related to foreign
26 policy, such as securing energy supplies, improving relations with non-
27 financing partners, expanding foreign markets, gaining international
28 repute, or consolidating economic integration, were either downplayed
29 or utterly neglected.²³ The Kirchners developed a pragmatic behavior in
30 order to accomplish the previously mentioned goals: their policies were
31 oriented toward the first one, money; and their rhetoric was aimed at
32 the second, votes. As they eventually ran out of both around Cristina's
33 middle-term, this strategy could be labeled—with the benefit of
34 hindsight—as short-term pragmatism. They made recourse to two means
35 that only apparently contradicted each other: a combative rhetoric and a
36 few crucial alliances with foreign actors.

37 Brazil and Mercosur were top priorities according to the public
38 position of both Kirchner administrations. However, gradually but
39 determinedly, Argentina substituted Venezuela for the United States as
40 a preferred balance vis-à-vis Brazil. Likewise, regional integration gained
41 a great deal of discursive support at the same time as it receded on the
42 ground. By mid-2010, Mercosur had stalled and there was no prospect

1 of any relaunch or for it to be superseded by a successful alternative.
 2 UNASUR, for its part, only functions as a discussion forum. As dip-
 3 lomatic relations are still tense between Bolivia and Chile and between
 4 Colombia and Ecuador, and ties between Colombia and Venezuela
 5 worsen over time, the UNASUR founding treaty has been ratified by
 6 less signatory countries than it requires. The dominance of rhetoric over
 7 action seems to be a regional feature.

8 Venezuela has become Argentina's most publicized foreign partner
 9 under the Kirchners. However, this fact can only partially be explained
 10 by recourse to ideology. Indeed, there were two practical reasons for the
 11 Kirchners to get closer to Chávez: they sought external legitimacy to
 12 garner support from progressive parties and civil society organizations
 13 at home, plus they badly needed financial assistance in the context of
 14 exclusion from world financial markets. If the former presents the slight
 15 possibility of ideological influence, the latter was definitely pragmatic.

16 Regarding Argentina-U.S. relations, they underwent ups and downs at
 17 the rhythm of a handful of scandals and associated rhetorical excesses—
 18 which were mostly dependent on Argentine domestic processes. However,
 19 issues of mutual interests were workable in areas of maximum concern for
 20 each country: security with regard to the United States, and debt relief
 21 with regard to Argentina. The Kirchners never courted Iran—as Lula and
 22 Chávez did—and the United States never withdrew support to Argentina
 23 when it had to negotiate with third countries or international financial
 24 organizations.

25 Finally, the Kirchners never got tired of repeating the classical Latin
 26 American mantra about the IMF being the main actor to blame for the
 27 nation's economic misfortunes. Yet, not only was Argentina one of the
 28 main countries to pay off its debt with the IMF, but it sold a rekindled
 29 relationship in 2009 as a triumph over the “old” IMF and of a “new”
 30 financial architecture of global governance. Seemingly, necessity trumped
 31 ideology but not rhetoric.

32 Néstor Kirchner's foreign policy was marked by his personal imprint.
 33 However, elements of continuity with his predecessor are visible. If the
 34 “substance and style of his foreign policy ought to be seen in light of the
 35 priority he gave to domestic policy matters,”²⁴ his predecessor Duhalde
 36 also made crucial decisions “thinking more of the internal electoral pro-
 37 cess than of his country's relations with the United States.”²⁵ In contrast,
 38 it can be argued that the administration of Cristina Kirchner has allowed
 39 a slightly greater space for ideological concerns. The fact that her perfor-
 40 mance has declined, as economic indicators, image polls, and electoral
 41 results unequivocally show, might suggest that pragmatism pays better
 42 than ideology.

1 The Kirchners' foreign policy can be uncontroversially depicted as
 2 personalist, based on short-term planning, and principally pragmatic
 3 rather than ideological. Shortsightedness was due to a focus on domestic
 4 objectives, to which foreign policy was all but an instrument.

5 Unlike Brazil, whose self-perception as a predestined great power and
 6 whose professionalized diplomatic bureaucracy has conferred its foreign
 7 policy with a long-term coherence, Argentina's ruling class has never
 8 reached a consensus or instilled a significant level of professionalism in
 9 handling its relations with the outer world. If Brazilian foreign principles
 10 have been universalism, autonomy, and grandeur,²⁶ Argentina's have
 11 often been particularism, oscillation between isolation and subservience,
 12 and self-importance rooted in a glorious past rather than any promising
 13 future. Notably, such volatility has not only taken place across different
 14 party administrations but especially across (and within) Peronist admin-
 15 istrations, reflecting Perón's own dramatic policy changes. In sixty years
 16 of Peronist foreign policies, the only element of continuity has been its
 17 subordination to internal goals, whether financial or electoral, and rejec-
 18 tion of an ideological program or a permanent definition of the national
 19 interest. For the Peronist leadership, foreign policy has been just domestic
 20 politics by other means.

NOTES

- 21 1. Calvo, E., and Murillo, M. V. (2005) "A New Iron Law of Argentine
 22 Politics? Partisanship, Clientelism and Governability in Contemporary
 23 Argentina," in Levitsky, S., and Murillo, M. V. (eds.) *Argentine Democracy:
 24 The Politics of Institutional Weakness*, University Park: Penn State Press,
 25 p. 226.
- 26 2. Lampreia, L. P. (1998) "A política externa do governo FHC: continui-
 27 dade e renovação," in *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 41(2):
 28 5–17.
- 29 3. Russell, R., and Tokatlian, J. G. (2006) "Will Foreign Allies Help?
 30 Argentina's Relations with Brazil and the United States," in Epstein,
 31 E., and Pion-Berlin, D. (eds.) *Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis and
 32 Argentine Democracy*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 247.
- 33 4. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
- 34 5. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
- 35 6. Margheritis, A. (2010) *Argentina's Foreign Policy: Domestic Politics and
 36 Democracy Promotion in the Americas*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
 37 p. 1.
- 38 7. Levitsky, S. (2003) *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America.
 39 Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge
 40 University Press, p. 161.
- 41
- 42

- 1 8. Jones, M. P., Saiegh, S., Spiller, P. T., and Tommasi, M. (2002) "Amateur
2 Legislators, Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party Centered
3 Electoral Rules in Federal Systems," in *American Journal of Political
4 Science*, 46(3): 656–69.
- 5 9. Malamud, A. (2005) "Mercosur Turns 15: Between Rising Talk and
6 Declining Achievement," in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*,
7 18(3): 421–36.
- 8 10. Gómez-Mera, L. (2005) "Explaining Mercosur's Survival: Strategic
9 Sources of Argentine-Brazilian Convergence," in *Journal of Latin
10 American Studies* 37: 109–40.
- 11 11. Russell, R., and Tokatlian, J. G. (2003) *El Lugar de Brasil en la
12 Política Exterior Argentina*, Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica;
13 Malamud, A. (2009) "Leadership without Followers: The Contested
14 Case for Brazilian Power Status," in de Rezende Martins, E. C., and
15 Gomes Saraiva, M. (eds.): *Brasil, União Europeia, América do Sul: Anos
16 2010–2020*. Brasília: Fundação Konrad Adenauer, pp. 126–48.
- 17 12. Arraes, V. (2007) "O Brasil e a ONU, de 1990 a nossos dias: das grandes
18 conferências às grandes pretensões," in Altemani, Henrique, and Carlos
19 Lessa, Antônio (eds.): *Relações internacionais do Brasil Temas e agendas*,
20 volume 2. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva, pp. 27–40
- 21 13. Yanuzzi, M. (2008) "Venezuela: The Chávez Effect. Between Ideological
22 Affinity and Economic Convenience," *ReVista. Harvard Review of Latin
23 America*, Fall. <http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/revista/articles/view/1126>.
24 Retrieved June 19, 2009.
- 25 14. CENM (2009) "La relación especial argentino-venezolana," May 26,
26 [http://www.nuevamayoria.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
27 view&id=1459&Itemid=39](http://www.nuevamayoria.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1459&Itemid=39). Retrieved June 19, 2009.
- 28 15. Sullivan, M. P. (2006) "Argentina: Political and Economic Conditions
29 and U.S. Relations," *Report for Congress*, October 12, [http://www.fas.
30 org/sgp/crs/row/RS21113.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21113.pdf). Retrieved April 13, 2010.
- 31 16. "Argentina Pursues Iran in '94 Blast As Neighbors Court Ahmadinejad,"
32 Monte Reel, *Washington Post Foreign Service*, Sunday, January 14, 2007,
33 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/13/
34 AR2007011301253.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/13/AR2007011301253.html).
- 35 17. Rodríguez Yebra, M., "Kirchner Reorients Foreign Policy," *La Nación*,
36 Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 15, 2003 (reprinted in *World Press
37 Review* 50(9), September. [http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/1416.
38 cfm#down](http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/1416.cfm#down). Retrieved November 24, 2009.
- 39 18. "Slush and Garbage. Argentina, Venezuela and America," *The Economist*
40 (2008). [http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_
41 id=10438525](http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10438525). Retrieved January 5, 2008.
- 42 19. "Declaración del Embajador de EE.UU., Earl Anthony Wayne, luego de
reunirse con la Presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner," U.S. Embassy
in Buenos Aires' press release, [http://spanish.argentina.usembassy.gov/
rel244.html](http://spanish.argentina.usembassy.gov/rel244.html). Retrieved November 24, 2009.



- 1 20. "Nestor unbound; The IMF and Argentina," *The Economist* (2005).
2 <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-139962114.html>. Retrieved June
3 19, 2009.
- 4 21. "Boudou in Istanbul: 'Argentina is on its way back into the credit
5 markets'," *Telam*, October 5, 2009. [http://english.telam.com.ar/index.
6 php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5562:boudou-in-istanbul-
7 argentina-is-on-its-way-back-into-the-credit-markets&catid=37:
8 economy](http://english.telam.com.ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5562:boudou-in-istanbul-argentina-is-on-its-way-back-into-the-credit-markets&catid=37:economy). Retrieved December 7, 2009.
- 9 22. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (2003) *Principles of International Politics:
10 People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions*. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.:
11 CQ Press.
- 12 23. Margheritis (2010), p. 26.
- 13 24. Russell and Tokatlian (2006), p. 259.
- 14 25. *Ibid*, p. 257.
- 15 26. Vigevani, T., Favaron, G., Ramanzini Júnior, H., and Alves Correia, R.
16 (2008) "O papel da integração regional para o Brasil: universal-
17 ismo, soberania e percepção das elites," *Revista Brasileira de Política
18 Internacional* 51 (1): 5–27.
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28
- 29
- 30
- 31
- 32
- 33
- 34
- 35
- 36
- 37
- 38
- 39
- 40
- 41
- 42



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

CHAPTER 12

MEXICO'S FOREIGN
POLICY UNDER
THE *PARTIDO*
ACCIÓN NACIONAL:
PROMOTING
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND
INTERESTS

ANA COVARRUBIAS

INTRODUCTION

The dilemma as to whether foreign policy is—or should be—determined by ideology or pragmatic interests is particularly interesting in the Mexican case, since for decades, Mexico's authorities—and academics—argued that Mexican foreign policy was essentially guided by “principles.”¹ One might discuss whether in defending principles, Mexico was pursuing its national interests or not, but the idea of the righteousness of a policy of principles was broadly accepted and rarely contested.² Implicit in this position was Mexico's view of how the international system ought to be, however pragmatic its policy actually was. Pragmatism only became a more frequent—and rather pejorative—label applied to foreign policy during the presidential period of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988), as the Mexican economy underwent liberalization, and later when Mexico negotiated

1 and signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) under
2 president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994). However, it was dur-
3 ing Vicente Fox’s presidential term (2000–2006) that the debate about
4 the nature and goals of Mexican foreign policy took precedence. Various
5 reasons explain this shift: the post–Cold War international agenda, the
6 ascent to power of the right wing Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and
7 the personalities of Vicente Fox and his two foreign-policy secretaries, Jorge
8 G. Castañeda and Luis Ernesto Derbez. Having defeated a party (Partido
9 Revolucionario Institucional—PRI) that had been in power for over
10 70 years, President Fox had to be seen to break with the past, to clearly
11 mark democratic “regime change,” and to govern in accordance with the
12 PAN’S principles of human rights and social justice. In a world free from
13 the ideological tensions of the Cold War, Mexico finally found the legiti-
14 macy and the willingness to openly join the main currents in international
15 politics: free trade, democracy, and human rights. Jorge Castañeda and Luis
16 Ernesto Derbez understood the importance of so doing, not only because
17 that was an agenda consistent with PAN’S positions, but also because it
18 contributed to Mexico’s own democratic transition and consolidation.

19 This chapter identifies changes and continuities in Mexico’s foreign
20 policy since Vicente Fox assumed power in 2000, with reference to the
21 complex relationship between ideology, principles, and pragmatism. I will
22 argue that the inclusion of values such as the active *promotion* of democ-
23 racy and human rights abroad was new in foreign policy and rather than
24 answer to Mexican interests in the international arena, it responded to
25 domestic policy considerations and the beliefs of Mexican leaders during
26 the first PAN government. President Felipe Calderón (2006–present) has
27 taken a more cautious and moderate approach as far as the promotion of
28 democracy and human rights is concerned, despite rhetorical continuity.
29 On the other hand, very pragmatically, Fox’s government recognized the
30 need for closer relations with the United States, an approach also taken
31 by President Calderón, despite continuing tensions over some areas,
32 especially immigration.

33 In retrospect, the PAN’S foreign policy attempted to place Mexico
34 as an advocate of democratic and human rights. This was clearly one of
35 the priorities of the Fox administration, intended not only for external
36 actors but, equally, for domestic audiences. In response to immediate—
37 and to a certain extent, unexpected—events Fox’s and Calderón’s policies
38 also attempted to project the image of a responsible nation: by cooperat-
39 ing with the United States in security matters in the case of the former,
40 and by attacking organized crime, domestically and internationally,
41 in the case of the latter, between 2007 and 2010. In pursuing their
42 interests, both administrations resorted to the so-called democratic

1 bonus, capitalizing on the 2000 elections as democratic, legitimate, and
2 transparent. Furthermore, the Calderón administration has opted for
3 formal and direct collaboration with the United States to fight organized
4 crime.

5 As far as agency and process is concerned, Vicente Fox, Jorge G.
6 Castañeda, and Luis Ernesto Derbez were key actors in the design and
7 implementation of foreign policy, and their perception of what Mexico
8 was and should be after the elections of 2000 defined their foreign-policy
9 objectives. However Mexico's political opening resulted as well in a wider
10 range of actors, including Congress, political parties, and civil society
11 organizations, discussing foreign-policy issues. Thus, despite the persis-
12 tent role of the president in Mexico's political system, different voices
13 influenced foreign policy during the Fox administration. Calderón, how-
14 ever, appears to have reinforced the role of the president, and to a lesser
15 extent that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in foreign-policy making.

16 The context surrounding the PAN'S foreign policy has clearly been
17 crucial, especially in terms of the deep economic, political, and social
18 transformations that have occurred in Mexico since at least the 1980s.
19 Equally important, however, is the fact that foreign policy has been imple-
20 mented in a post-Cold War world, in the era of the "war on terror" and
21 of a profound economic and financial international crisis. The first PAN
22 government tried to join a liberal, post-Cold War order that abruptly
23 changed with the events of September 11, 2001. The "war on terror"
24 and the economic and financial crisis placed important constraints on
25 foreign policy, limiting room for maneuver and moving Mexico toward
26 an inevitable pragmatism in terms of foreign relations.

27 This chapter illustrates how Fox's government initially attempted
28 to favor ideology over pragmatism by designing a foreign policy based
29 on the promotion of democracy and human rights foreign policy, but
30 eventually consolidated a pragmatic view—not value free—toward the
31 United States. After September 11, foreign policy seemed to be guided in
32 reaction to external events, and to a lesser extent by domestic pressures.
33 In the final analysis, ideology generally seems to have accompanied prag-
34 matism in Fox's *sexenio*. Not being a priority, Calderón's foreign policy so
35 far seems to be mostly reactive to external and domestic events, and the
36 field in which pragmatism has clearly prevailed over ideology.

37 The chapter is divided into four sections: the first will briefly describe
38 Fox's foreign-policy project; the second part will analyze the two key
39 issues of immigration and security in Mexican-U.S. relations; in the
40 third, the more "ideological" aspect of Mexico's foreign policy, that of
41 democracy and human rights promotion, will be examined; and, last,
42 Calderón's first three years will be analyzed.

**SETTING THE AGENDA: THE FIRST PAN
GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN-POLICY PROJECT**

President Vicente Fox and his first secretary of foreign relations, Jorge G. Castañeda, pursued an unambiguous foreign-policy project that underlined the idea of change: According to Castañeda,

Our purpose is to respond, congruently and with vision, to the national, regional and world transformations as well as to the mandate of change implicit in the electoral victory of Vicente Fox. We wish to ensure the protection and promotion of the country's interests in the contemporary world.³

In concrete terms, Castañeda sought to implement a strategic relationship with the United States, as well as actively participate in the construction of a new normative international system. Only by attending to these objectives would foreign policy become efficient and relevant to satisfy the real needs of the country.

With respect to relations with the United States, Castañeda rejected the suggestion that Mexico had no option but to acquiesce to the demands of its neighbor, remain inactive or resort to a rhetorical defense. Instead, proximity to the United States also provided Mexico with valuable opportunities to deepen relations in three areas.⁴ First, he sought to establish key areas for relations, with immigration becoming the most important "new" issue in the bilateral relationship. Second, bilateral relations would have to incorporate different actors in addition to the president of each country. Castañeda sought to identify and work with key actors in U.S. public life: Congress, state governments, the media, trade unions, key businessmen, and NGO'S.

Third, Castañeda sought to formulate a conceptual framework for a long term relationship with the United States and Canada to shape a North American economic community. This was not a totally new idea; despite the acknowledgement of significant cultural differences between Mexico and its northern neighbors, some academics such as Robert Pastor had already discussed the advantages of creating a sense of community between Mexico, the United States, and Canada. According to Pastor, the United States and Canada would be able to contribute to Mexico's development by creating some sort of structural funds, and closing the development gap, which in turn would not only strengthen the economic power of the North American bloc, but would also increase security in the area by improving the standards of living of Mexicans.⁵ Considering that Mexico had proven to be democratic, and that social and economic

1 integration with the United States was deepening—regardless of any
2 governmental efforts to encourage it or not—Fox proposed a “Nafta
3 plus,” a project that would require an “open border”: the free movement
4 of citizens across the border, as well as of goods and services.⁶

5 Active participation in the international system was Fox’s second
6 foreign-policy objective, with the specific aim of contributing to the design
7 of new rules to match the rapidly changing international system. With a
8 policy emphasis on issues including human rights, indigenous rights,
9 trade, disarmament, democracy, and the environment, Castañeda noted
10 the change in the post–Cold War environment toward these issues:

11
12 Some would have preferred that the international system of the 21st
13 Century, after the end of the Cold War, had rested on the principles of
14 non-intervention, juridical equality of states or the opposition to the use
15 of force. But in reality the international system does not rely on those
16 principles; for better or worse the fact is that the new rules that are being
17 devised are interventionist, rather than anti-interventionist, particular,
18 rather than general and concrete rather than abstract.⁷

19
20 The process of normative change in the international system would
21 take place with or without Mexico, and Mexico had to chose between par-
22 ticipating or remaining isolated and letting others decide. Furthermore,
23 any new rules devised would be applied to Mexico. Given Mexico’s long
24 tradition in International Law codification,⁸ the former path seemed
25 clearly advantageous. The Mexican government’s main decision in this
26 sense was to compete for a nonpermanent seat in the Security Council.

27 Castañeda’s quote demonstrates a clear desire to break with the PRI-
28 dominated past, and to introduce new guiding values based on free trade,
29 democracy, and human rights, that may be considered “ideological,” at
30 least in terms of how Mexico’s foreign policy had been defined in the
31 past. In his first annual report, President Fox confirmed this more ide-
32 ological characterization of foreign policy, by setting out five “axis” that
33 would guide his administration’s foreign policy: (1) to highlight interna-
34 tionally the advances in terms of democratic institutions and the advance
35 of democratic political culture, reflecting a plural, transparent, safe, and
36 culturally vibrant Mexico; (2) to actively support and promote respect
37 for and defense of human rights throughout the world; (3) to defend
38 democracy; (4) to play a more active role in the construction of the inter-
39 national system of the new millennium; and (5) to promote continuous
40 and sustainable international economic development.⁹

41 The Mexican government, however, did not necessarily perceive such
42 positions as merely ideological but rather viewed them as responding to

1 its need to strengthen the new democratic regime, and join the “international club of democracies.” In Castañeda’s words:

2
3
4 The complex play between foreign policy and domestic change is
5 manifested clearly by President Fox’s commitment to the cause of human
6 rights [. . .] The updating of our international obligations in the matter of
7 human rights has prepared the political field to underpin respect for those
8 rights in Mexico.¹⁰

9
10 According to Fox’s second minister of foreign relations, there was no contradiction between Mexico’s active participation in international politics
11 and Mexico’s traditional foreign-policy guidelines:

12
13 In a world defined by globalization, the technological revolution, conflict
14 and uncertainty, this government recognizes and appreciates the constitutional principles and foreign policy doctrines that have shaped our
15 rich diplomatic tradition. However, the government of President Fox has
16 taken the best of Mexico’s diplomatic tradition and has adjusted it through
17 its strategic “axis” to respond to the demands imposed by a globalized
18 world.¹¹

19
20
21 Coexistence between a “traditional” and a “new” foreign policy, as
22 suggested by Fox’s government, would not be easy. Interests, principles,
23 international events, and domestic politics would contribute to making
24 foreign policy one of Fox’s most criticized areas.

25
26
27 **MEXICAN-U.S. RELATIONS: THE**
28 **SEARCH FOR PROGRESS**

29 The agenda of Mexican-U.S. relations is extensive and complicated. For
30 the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to analyze two events that
31 demonstrate the intricate links between pragmatism and ideology in
32 Mexican foreign policy: Mexican illegal immigration and the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq.

33
34 A bilateral agreement on immigration was Fox’s main initiative in
35 Mexico’s relations with the United States. Mexico’s proposal consisted
36 of five points: (1) to regulate the situation of undocumented Mexicans
37 in the United States; (2) to increase the number of permanent visas for
38 Mexicans; (3) to implement a program for temporary workers; (4) to
39 increase border security; and, (5) to institute regional compensation
40 funds that included U.S. resources (public, private, or social) in order to
41 promote economic development in those regions from which Mexicans
42 emigrated most. According to Secretary Castañeda, the Mexican proposal

1 had to be taken as a whole and no partial agreement was to be accepted.
2 A “single undertaking” was the natural consequence of President Fox’s
3 idea of “shared responsibility” to solve the immigration problem between
4 Mexico and the United States.¹²

5 Mexico’s project seemed to make initial progress. During President
6 Bush’s visit to San Cristóbal (Fox’s ranch) in February 2001, both gov-
7 ernments approved the beginning of high-level conversations, and the
8 Mexican government was highly optimistic about the feasibility of reach-
9 ing an agreement and thus began active lobbying. In the United States,
10 however, various actors were opposed to the initiative, and even before
11 September 11, it was clear that the project was in trouble.¹³ While some
12 considered that the agreement would not have been reached even had
13 September 11 not happened, most analysts on both sides of the border
14 agreed that the terrorist attacks marked the end of any possible progress
15 on the subject.¹⁴ Indeed, after September 11 the initiative simply disap-
16 peared from the U.S. and Mexican agendas.

17 Despite its failure, it is worth briefly analyzing the initiative due to
18 its implications for Mexican foreign policy. First, it must be understood
19 in terms of President Fox’s purpose of designing a “new” foreign policy
20 that contrasted with that of the PRI. Mexico was attempting to change
21 its passive and reactive position to an active one that took the initia-
22 tive, while vicinity to the United States was to be an opportunity, rather
23 than a problem.¹⁵ Second, for the first time in many years, the Mexican
24 government recognized illegal emigration to the United States as a con-
25 crete problem to be addressed by both countries, indeed as a priority in
26 foreign policy. The Mexican government took the initiative to engage
27 the United States in the search for a practical solution that would benefit
28 Mexico as much as—or maybe more than—the United States. In this
29 sense, it is worth mentioning that the issue of the Mexican proposal
30 being interventionist in U.S. domestic politics was not raised; the key
31 phrase of “principle of mutual responsibility” replaced nonintervention,
32 as pragmatism prevailed over principles.

33 The War on Terror and, later, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 posed seri-
34 ous problems to a Mexican government whose foreign-policy priorities
35 were to establish a “strategic relationship” with the United States, to par-
36 ticipate actively in the construction of a rule-based international system,
37 and to promote democracy and human rights throughout the world.
38 The terrorist attacks of September 11 took place only a few days after
39 President Fox visited Washington D.C., when President Bush declared
40 that the United States “has no more important relationship in the world
41 that the one we have with Mexico.”¹⁶ However, there was a widespread
42 perception that Mexico’s reaction to the attacks was “late, distant and

1 ambivalent,¹⁷ even though the evidence to endorse this view is mixed.
2 After September 11, Secretary Castañeda declared that Mexico should
3 not deny any support for the United States, and that the U.S. govern-
4 ment was right in taking reprisals against the perpetrators of the attacks.¹⁸
5 President Fox sent Bush a letter expressing Mexico's solidarity, sorrow,
6 condolences, and consternation for the loss of life and the destruction
7 caused, as well as his government's disposition to help the people of the
8 United States.¹⁹ On September 13, Castañeda appeared before the Senate
9 where he was accused by senators of the PRI, PRD and the Partido Verde
10 Ecologista for surrendering sovereignty to the United States "in an absurd
11 way," and thus endangering Mexico's security.²⁰ PRI senators questioned
12 the government's commitments regarding the U.S. idea of creating a
13 continental military force, and suggested that Castañeda's declaration
14 regarding "not denying any support" for the United States demonstrated
15 how far he was willing to go just to ingratiate himself with the United
16 States, "even at the cost of generating total confusion in Mexico."²¹
17 Castañeda simply stated that he intended to adhere to the declarations of
18 the Security Council and the General Assembly and indeed, Mexico had
19 already voted in favor of a Security Council resolution to collaborate in
20 bringing to justice the perpetrators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks,
21 as well as those responsible for granting them asylum.²²

22 Fox visited Ground Zero in New York on October 4, 2001, but
23 according to certain groups of U.S. public opinion, this was "too late"
24 for a country that was also a "partner."²³ On that occasion, Fox reiter-
25 ated Mexico's commitment to fight terrorism.²⁴ By December 2001,
26 Castañeda had confirmed the government's stance:

28 President Fox's position has been clear; we should support the United States
29 because it has the right to self-defense, because the international commu-
30 nity has joined the struggle against international terrorism prompted by
31 such attacks, and because it is in our interest to construct a strategic rela-
32 tionship that necessarily implies a greater degree of solidarity.²⁵

34 However, the criticism of some Mexican deputies and other sectors of
35 Castañeda's "alignment" with the United States contributed to projecting
36 the image that Mexico was not unconditionally aligned with the United
37 States. Moreover, compared with the attitude of the United Kingdom,
38 or even Cuba—which immediately offered the U.S. government medi-
39 cal assistance and the use of Cuban airports—Mexico's reaction was less
40 supportive of the United States. In any case, it was clear that Mexico was
41 no longer at the top of the U.S. agenda, and even less "the United States'
42 most important relationship."

1 However, this did not mean that Mexico's reaction seriously damaged
2 U.S.-Mexican relations. According to the former U.S. ambassador to
3 Mexico, Jeffrey Davidow, the U.S. government sent Mexico a message
4 stating that both countries had to find a way to guarantee maximum
5 security without strangling the flow of people and goods across the bor-
6 der. September 11 increased problems in border crossing but the attitude
7 of high-level officials in the United States toward Mexico was "friendly
8 and helpful."²⁶ There was significant communication and the United
9 States considered Mexico a "cooperative ally," even though this was not
10 well communicated to the Mexican public.²⁷ President Fox's declarations
11 during his visit to Ground Zero seem to confirm Davidow's position:

12
13 Ever since September 11, we [the United States and Mexico] are in touch,
14 minute by minute, day by day, in all that concerns security, not only with
15 intelligence and information, but with investigation [. . .] And just today
16 we agreed with President Bush to continue working in this way, with pro-
17 viding security and fighting terrorism as top priorities. At the same time,
18 we will return to our normal bilateral agenda . . .²⁸

19
20 Further agreements followed. In 2002, Mexico and the United States
21 signed the "smart border" agreements to improve security along the
22 border in the areas of infrastructure, and the flow of people and goods.²⁹
23 In July 2004, Mexican authorities announced that a new integral system
24 of migratory operation would be implemented to track all legal visitors
25 entering the country.³⁰ And in 2005, Mexico, Canada, and the United
26 States signed the agreement for a Security and Prosperity Partnership
27 (SPP). As its name indicates, the purpose of the SPP was to improve
28 security and the standard of living of the peoples of Canada, Mexico, and
29 the United States on the grounds that "our security and our prosperity
30 are mutually dependent and complementary, and [this undertaking] will
31 reflect our belief in freedom, economic opportunities, and democratic
32 values and institutions."³¹ The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs
33 declared that the partnership's goal was to "strengthen cooperation in
34 the fight against criminal and terrorist activities across borders, and to
35 guarantee safe, secure, humane and dignified repatriation of workers
36 without legal documents in high risk areas."³² The document underlined
37 the Mexican government's expected benefits and strategic considerations:
38 "Since security issues are intrinsically related to economic and trade flows
39 these days, the SPP will assure that the new security measures imple-
40 mented in the region will not become unnecessary obstacles to trade."³³

41 Cooperation with the United States in the security sphere was not
42 one of President Fox's initial foreign-policy interests, but it became

1 unavoidable. One might argue that Mexico had no option given the
2 predominant U.S. interest in security, but it coincided with Mexico's
3 own interests as well; to improve national security, avoid any movement
4 of terrorists across the U.S.-Mexican border, and as indicated above,
5 protect bilateral trade. Pragmatism, therefore, was in the best interest
6 of Mexico's security and trade, and of U.S.-Mexican relations, despite
7 certain domestic resistance to "side" with the United States, based on
8 concepts of defense of national sovereignty.

9 Despite bilateral cooperation in the security sphere, Mexico's partici-
10 pation as a nonpermanent member in the UN Security Council (2002–
11 2003) complicated relations with the United States. As tensions between
12 the United States and Iraq increased in early 2003, and as a U.S. inva-
13 sion became likely, the Mexican government had to define its position
14 regarding Resolution 1441 and the U.S. claim that Iraq had violated it.³⁴
15 In March, the U.S. government tried to obtain authorization from the
16 Security Council to invade Iraq, counting on Mexico's vote. According
17 to Jorge Chabat, President Bush and Ambassador Tony Garza "sent
18 messages" to the Mexican government stating that Mexico's support was
19 expected, and that it should face the consequences if not granted.³⁵ Fox
20 recognized that defying the United States would be difficult, but Mexico's
21 stance regarding the invasion of Iraq had to be a "state decision," involv-
22 ing the consensus of the country's main political forces. Furthermore,
23 public opinion polls showed around 80 percent Mexicans to be opposed
24 to military intervention in Iraq, and congressional elections were to be
25 held in July of that year. Thus, the Mexican government declared that it
26 would not endorse a UN Security Council resolution that authorized a
27 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Moreover, an hour after President Bush announced
28 that he would order the invasion of Iraq if Saddam Hussein did not leave
29 the country in 48 hours, President Fox gave a speech transmitted by all
30 radio stations and TV channels in Mexico, in which he reiterated that
31 Mexico prioritized multilateral diplomacy to solve disputes and that the
32 use of force should be, as stated in the UN Charter, a last resort to be
33 taken only when other means had failed:

34
35 We are a pacifist nation; we are a pacifist government, we have a clear
36 vocation for peace and [endorse] the validity of the institutional mecha-
37 nisms accepted by the international community [. . .] We share values,
38 goals and purposes with the United States, the United Kingdom and
39 Spain, but on this occasion we diverge on the timing and procedures. We
40 maintain our belief that the diplomatic means to achieve it [disarmament]
41 have not been used yet [. . .] In stating our position at the Council, we
42 have clearly distinguished between bilateral issues on our agenda and our

1 multilateral commitments. Our relationship with the United States . . .
 2 should not change; we coincide with the fight against terrorism . . . as in
 3 many other issues, our shared objectives exceed our differences [. . .] when
 4 the countdown towards war has begun, it is time to strengthen our values
 5 of peace, plurality and tolerance.³⁶

6
 7 As a result, tensions between Mexico and the United States increased;
 8 as argued by Chabat, the Mexican insistence that if a vote had taken
 9 place at the Security Council, Mexico would have voted against it,
 10 was unnecessary “and only succeeded in chilling relations with the
 11 U.S. government.”³⁷

12 These two examples of Mexican-U.S. relations under Fox demonstrate
 13 various aspects of Mexican foreign policy. First, the Mexican govern-
 14 ment identified a concrete problem that needed to be addressed without
 15 relying on traditional principles: immigration. Second, external factors
 16 changed the course of Mexico's foreign policy and Mexico's response
 17 was mixed; on the one hand, the pragmatic view taken by Castañeda
 18 suggested that in order to maintain the government's agenda, and con-
 19 sidering the consequences of any different path, it was in the country's
 20 best interests to support the United States after September 11. On the
 21 other hand, a significant section of public opinion resorted to more
 22 traditional positions—nonintervention, pacifism, multilateralism—thus
 23 reducing the government's margin of action. Third, as always, Mexico's
 24 policies were heavily influenced by U.S. interests and Mexico fully coop-
 25 erated with the United States in bilateral security matters. Whatever
 26 the Mexican government's ideology or objectives—the PRI or PAN in
 27 power—Mexico's powerful neighbor remains a constraint and a great
 28 influence on Mexico's policies.

29
 30 **THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN**
 31 **RIGHTS: THE CONFUSION BETWEEN IDEOLOGY**
 32 **AND TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES**

33 The promotion of democracy and human rights is perhaps the most
 34 interesting area in which to examine the interaction between ideology
 35 and pragmatism in the PAN'S foreign policy. For the first time in the his-
 36 tory of contemporary Mexico, the government identified value-oriented
 37 issues, such as democracy and human rights, as foreign-policy *priorities*.

38 As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, both Fox and Castañeda,
 39 and later Derbez, agreed that the promotion of democracy and human
 40 rights were legitimate foreign-policy goals. Indeed, Castañeda declared
 41 that Mexico recognized human rights as universal and indivisible,³⁸
 42

1 a statement that clearly contradicted Mexico's previous understanding
2 that democracy and human rights were "strictly domestic issues."³⁹
3 Reflecting this, activity in the fields of democracy and human rights
4 increased: Mexico signed a technical assistance agreement with the U.N.
5 Human Rights High Commissioner's Office, who helped to draft an
6 assessment of the situation of human rights in Mexico; Mariclaire Acosta,
7 a well-known human rights activist, was named undersecretary for human
8 rights at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the government issued an open
9 invitation to any appropriate U.N. body wishing to observe Mexico's
10 human rights situation in situ; and Mexico endorsed the Declaration
11 of Quebec City—which established that a democratic regime was an
12 essential condition to join the hemispheric free trade area—as well as
13 the Democratic Inter-American Charter, which provided the members
14 of the Organization of American States with a specific procedure to deal
15 with those countries where democracy was suspended. By the end of
16 Fox's administration, Mexico had ratified three conventions, accepted the
17 competence of six protocols and declarations, and partially withdrawn a
18 reservation on article 25b of the International Covenant on Civil and
19 Political Rights, concerning the vote of religious ministers. Regionally,
20 Mexico had ratified one convention, accepted the competence of two
21 protection mechanisms, and partially withdrawn a reservation of two
22 instruments, also regarding the vote of religious ministers and the celebra-
23 tion of religious acts in public. Fox's government was also participating in
24 the negotiation of five more human rights instruments.⁴⁰

25 Mexico's human rights policy, however, did not necessarily strengthen
26 Mexico's foreign relations, as reflected by the case of Cuba. As Mexico
27 "became democratic" and used foreign policy to prove it, Cuba became
28 the "test case." In the past, Mexican-Cuban relations had been conducted,
29 at least officially, by complying with the key principle of noninterven-
30 tion. By 2001–2002, however, relations had begun to radically change.
31 In 2001 Castañeda announced the possibility that Mexico might vote
32 in favor of the resolution calling on the Cuban government to improve
33 human rights on the island at the U.N. Human Rights Commission,
34 while in 2002 it actually voted for the measure.

35 Both votes in 2001 and 2002 produced an interesting discussion
36 over the validity of human rights promotion. In 2001 the Congress, on
37 the one hand, defended Mexico's foreign-policy principles of noninter-
38 vention and self-determination, and asked the government to abstain
39 from voting, which the government finally did. By 2002, however,
40 Mexico's position had altered and it voted in favor of the Human Rights
41 Commission Resolution. The Mexican government justified such a
42 drastic change in its position by arguing that "[Mexico's] concern about

1 human rights in Cuba is legitimate because Cuba is a close and important
2 country to Mexico.”⁴¹

3 In February 2002 Fox visited Cuba and met well-known Cuban
4 dissidents, among them Oswaldo Payá and Martha Beatriz Roque, at
5 the Mexican embassy. According to Fox, he had notified Castro of this
6 meeting, which was consistent with Mexico's general policy of defending
7 human rights internationally.⁴² From that year on, relations with Cuba
8 became increasingly complicated. Mexico continued to vote in favor
9 of resolutions requesting Cuba to take steps to improve the situation
10 of human rights at the UN Human Rights Commission and, together
11 with other incidents—such as a request by Fox that Castro leave the UN
12 conference on “Financing for Development in Mexico” before President
13 Bush arrived, and Cuba's deportation to Mexico of businessman Carlos
14 Ahumada without following the appropriate procedure⁴³—diplomatic
15 relations became very strained. In May 2004, Mexican authorities
16 declared a Cuban embassy official *persona non grata*, and requested that
17 the Cuban ambassador leave the country, and that the Mexican ambas-
18 sador to Cuba return to Mexico.

19 Relations with Cuba therefore are a very good illustration of the ten-
20 sion that existed between change and continuity, and of the influence of
21 ideology in Fox's foreign policy. Cuba was an opportunity for Mexico
22 to take a stance on democracy and human rights over the traditional
23 principles of nonintervention and self-determination. It was clearly a
24 governmental rather than state policy that almost led to a complete diplo-
25 matic rupture with Cuba, and it carried with it costs for Mexico's foreign
26 and domestic politics. Cuba openly criticized the Mexican government
27 and its foreign policy, and implemented an active diplomacy toward
28 the opposition in Mexico, something that had not been the case when
29 nonintervention was mutually respected.⁴⁴ Internal actors also criticized
30 Mexico's policy toward Cuba, strongly questioning the validity of Fox's
31 “new” foreign policy. The pragmatic position, of course, would have been
32 to maintain relations with Cuba along traditional lines.

33 Another foreign-policy area where ideology and national interests did
34 not coincide was that of the UN peacekeeping operations. Consistent
35 with the government's ideas of implementing an active foreign policy
36 in multilateral fora, supporting the construction of a new normative
37 international system, and promoting democracy and human rights, the
38 discussion was raised as to whether Mexican troops should participate
39 in such operations, especially given the situation in Haiti in 2004. With
40 one exception, Mexico had not participated in peacekeeping operations
41 before,⁴⁵ but according to Secretary Derbez, Mexico, as the ninth larg-
42 est contributor to peacekeeping operations was already supporting these

1 operations: “If we are already funding them, the question that Mexican
 2 society should ask itself is whether we are not hypocritical by not pro-
 3 viding personnel.”⁴⁶ Despite the support of the Ministry for sending
 4 troops on peacekeeping missions, based on the fact that Mexico might
 5 gain international prestige, military training, influence at the Security
 6 Council, and reimbursement of its financial contributions to the UN,
 7 Fox finally rejected the proposal. To the Ministry, Mexico’s participation
 8 in peacekeeping operations was a means to reiterate its commitment to
 9 democracy and human rights, and to strengthen the country’s active role
 10 in international politics. But other actors in Fox’s government, including
 11 the military, argued against this view on the grounds of Mexico’s pacifist
 12 vocation and that, in sending troops abroad, Mexico would be violating
 13 the principle of nonintervention.⁴⁷ In this case, traditional principles
 14 were a very useful resource for those actors who opposed Mexico’s par-
 15 ticipation in peacekeeping operations, and continuity in foreign policy
 16 prevailed.

17
 18 **FELIPE CALDERÓN’S FOREIGN POLICY: CONTINUITY**
 19 **OR CHANGE? PRAGMATIC OR IDEOLOGICAL?**
 20

21 Felipe Calderón’s electoral platform promised that Mexico would con-
 22 tribute to reform multilateral institutions in order to construct “a world
 23 architecture with a human face,” that Mexico would run for a seat at the
 24 UN Security Council, and that it would back all reforms of the Charter
 25 of the Organization of American States to reinforce the mechanisms to
 26 promote and defend the democratic institutions of the region.⁴⁸ The
 27 document also stated that Mexico would press for “special relationships”
 28 with Latin America, for a safer and more prosperous region in North
 29 America, and for a program of temporary workers with the United
 30 States.⁴⁹ The second annual report issued by the Ministry of Foreign
 31 Affairs begins by stating that foreign policy would promote Mexico’s
 32 interests beyond its borders and identifies Mexico’s active participation
 33 in the construction of a world order guided by the values and principles
 34 of democracy as a foreign policy “national objective” [*sic*].⁵⁰

35 The foreign policy of President Calderón has been active although
 36 rather quiet, and to a certain extent successful in terms of both diplomacy
 37 and domestic politics (so far, foreign policy has not become the subject of
 38 domestic disagreement). The language of democracy promotion has not
 39 dominated the agenda, relations with Cuba have improved, and left-wing
 40 presidents such as Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Michelle Bachelet, Daniel
 41 Ortega, Rafael Correa, and Néstor Kirchner, among others, have visited
 42 Mexico. As during Fox’s government, Mexico won a nonpermanent seat

1 at the Security Council, and the president has made it clear that Mexican
2 troops will not participate in peacekeeping operations.⁵¹

3 After two years in power, two of Calderón's foreign-policy initiatives are
4 worth examining: relations with Cuba and the Mérida Initiative. The first
5 case demonstrates a significant and pragmatic shift in Mexican foreign
6 policy. With President Fox's foreign policy widely seen as an utter failure,
7 Calderón sought to take a first step in rebuilding Mexico's so-called inter-
8 national prestige by improving relations with Cuba—a country that was
9 clearly a special case given the significance of the Revolution for many
10 in Mexico and the "special relationship" that the Mexican and Cuban
11 governments had enjoyed until the end of the PRI regime. Once again,
12 Cuba became the "test case" for a new foreign policy. Human rights and
13 the promotion of human rights were quietly dropped from the agenda and
14 communication between the governments renewed. New ambassadors
15 were sent to each capital, the foreign ministers of each country visited
16 each other, an invitation was issued to President Calderón to visit the
17 island, and, according to the Cuban foreign minister Felipe Pérez Roque,
18 relations were normalized.⁵² The new bilateral agenda includes Cuba's
19 debt with Mexico, human trafficking, and trade and investment, but not
20 condemnation of human rights in Cuba, or democracy.

21 After the death of the prisoner Orlando Zapata in Cuba, in February
22 2010, the Mexican government issued a communiqué successfully bal-
23 ancing its concern for human rights, its respect for Cuba's sovereignty,
24 and the principle of nonintervention. Mexico exhorted the Cuban gov-
25 ernment to take all necessary measures to protect the dignity and health
26 of all prisoners, but recognized that no country had the right to judge
27 how other countries protected and promoted human rights. Interestingly,
28 the communiqué stated that Mexico's position was taken from a state
29 rather than ideological perspective.⁵³

30 Before turning to the Mérida Initiative, it is worth mentioning
31 Mexico's policy toward Honduras after the coup in June 2009, since
32 events challenged Mexico's policy of support for democracy and human
33 rights. The Mexican government not only condemned the overthrow of
34 president Manuel Zelaya and agreed with the OAS decision to suspend
35 the Honduran government from participating in the organization, but
36 invited Zelaya as head of state to visit the country in August, while not
37 inviting Honduras to participate in the Latin American and Caribbean
38 Summit that took place in Cancún, in February 2010. The Mexican
39 government did not recognize the Honduran elections, or Porfirio Lobo
40 as the new president.

41 Mexico's policy toward Honduras questioned the government's capacity
42 to defend democracy abroad: Zelaya's visit to Mexico and the government's

1 attempts to grant him asylum were unsuccessful, thus reanimating the dis-
2 cussion as to whether Mexico had the legitimacy, interests, and capabilities
3 to promote democracy abroad.

4 The second case, the Mérida Initiative, reflects continuity with Fox's
5 attempts to increase cooperation with the United States in order to solve
6 shared problems. In an attempt to reduce violence, fueled by organized
7 crime (especially drug-trafficking), Mexico and the United States agreed
8 to strengthen cooperation. Formally, the initiative rests on three pil-
9 lars: (1) the idea that each country will act in its own territory; (2) the
10 implementation of bilateral cooperation; and, (3) the transfer of U.S.
11 equipment and technology to Mexico, and the training of Mexican
12 personnel.⁵⁴ The United States government agreed to grant Mexico
13 US\$400 million to fight drug-trafficking, and gave the first payment
14 of US\$197 million for training and technical equipment on December
15 3, 2008. The Mexican government has reiterated that the initiative will
16 not allow the presence of U.S. troops, or any kind of police, on Mexican
17 soil. Once again Mexico has recognized the need to cooperate with the
18 United States, to ask for U.S. assistance but has been careful not to ignore
19 principles, such as nonintervention and self-determination, and avoided
20 "aligning" with the United States or surrendering sovereignty. Continuity
21 and change, traditional principles, and new attitudes, therefore mix in
22 Calderon's foreign policy.

23 24 **CONCLUSIONS: THE DIFFICULT COEXISTENCE** 25 **OF INTERESTS, VALUES AND IDEOLOGY** 26

27 There is no doubt that the first PAN government introduced changes
28 in Mexico's foreign policy, for better or worse. The projects of Fox and
29 Castañeda were not free from contradictions, but they were clear and well
30 designed. More importantly, Castañeda openly rejected Mexico's "old
31 diplomacy" in favor of both a pragmatic and ideological foreign policy.
32 Such an explicit opposition between an "old" and a "new" diplomacy
33 (however accurate), and the differentiation between interests, values,
34 and principles is what distinguished Fox's pragmatism-ideology formula
35 from that of the past. The formula and the debate about it were openly
36 recognized by the government.

37 In terms of the balance between pragmatism and ideology in Mexican-
38 U.S. relations, Fox's initial approach was very pragmatic, as is Calderón's.
39 The view first expressed by Carlos Salinas in the sense that vicinity with
40 the United States was an opportunity, was reinforced during the first two
41 PAN governments. In the case of Fox, however, September 11 presented
42 significant obstacles to Mexico's approach, not only in terms of the

1 immigration agreement—which may not have been signed anyway—but
2 also in terms of Mexico's position regarding the U.S. security agenda and
3 a foreign policy defined by unilateralism and preemptive war. Domestic
4 politics and the legacy of a foreign policy of principles forced the govern-
5 ment to take its distance from the United States. Pragmatism, as men-
6 tioned above, took precedence as a result of domestic concerns. Calderón
7 has been more successful in reaching agreements with the United States
8 because of the kind of issues on the table, especially organized crime. The
9 Mérida Initiative reveals a highly pragmatic approach to a very serious
10 problem without portraying the image of surrendering sovereignty to the
11 United States. In sum, while pragmatism was the starting point for both
12 administrations, in the case of Fox, it was overshadowed by domestic
13 reactions to U.S. foreign policy, while in the case of Calderón, it has to a
14 large extent prevailed over principles.

15 Both the issues of democracy and human rights and Mexico's partici-
16 pation in peacekeeping operations involved a conflict between ideology,
17 principles, and pragmatism, as well as reflecting conflicting interpretations
18 of the national interest. Secretaries Castañeda and Derbez argued that
19 ideology and principles were in the end a manifestation of pragmatism,
20 since in their view, to defend democracy and human rights abroad was
21 to defend Mexico's domestic and international interests. However, many
22 other actors, domestic and foreign (especially Cuba) strongly disagreed
23 with this position, not only in terms of ideology, but also definitions of
24 the national interest. Certainly regarding peacekeeping operations, the
25 military and other domestic actors argued that in defending principles and
26 not joining such operations, Mexico was protecting its national interests.

27 Given Fox's poor results in terms of foreign policy, Calderón has adopted
28 a "state" view rather than a governmental one (as opposed to Fox, who
29 wanted to mark a clear break with the PRI). Mexico's relations with Latin
30 American countries governed by center-left and left-wing administrations
31 have improved, and relations with the United States have responded to a
32 common concern in the form of organized crime and security. Whether
33 this is the result of a clear project, or of Mexico's very narrow margin for
34 action is open to debate. Foreign policy clearly is not the priority it was
35 under Fox, but this may be advantageous to Mexico's external relations.

NOTES

- 36
37
38
39 1. Such principles are nonintervention, self-determination, peaceful resolu-
40 tion of disputes, international cooperation for development, juridical
41 equality of states, proscription of the use or the threat of the use of
42 force, and the struggle for international peace and security. The Mexican

- 1 Congress approved the inclusion of these principles into article 89 (X)
 2 of the Constitution in 1988.
- 3 2. Ana Covarrubias, "Los principios y la política exterior de México," in
 4 Jorge A. Schiavon, Daniela Spenser, and Mario Vázquez Olivera (eds.),
 5 *En busca de una nación soberana. Relaciones internacionales de México,*
 6 *siglos XIX y XX*, Mexico, CIDE-SRE, 2006, pp. 387–422.
- 7 3. Jorge G. Castañeda, "Los ejes de la política exterior de México," in
 8 *Nexos*, vol. 23, no. 288, December 2001, p. 67.
- 9 4. *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 69.
- 10 5. Pastor's final proposal was published as *Toward a North American*
 11 *Community. Lessons from the Old World for the New*, United States,
 12 Peterson Institute, 2001. He recognized that the European experience
 13 has been unique and is not possible to emulate in North America, but
 14 he suggests a community of a different kind was possible after all.
- 15 6. Fox suggested the "open border" idea even before he was elected
 16 president in July 2000. Jorge Chabat, "The Bush Revolution in Foreign
 17 Policy and Mexico: The Limits to Unilateralism," in Daniel Drache
 18 (ed.), *Big Picture Realities. Canada and Mexico at the Crossroads*, Ontario,
 19 Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008.
- 20 7. Castañeda, "Los ejes de la política exterior de México," p. 73.
- 21 8. *Ibid.*
- 22 9. Mexico, President Vicente Fox, *Primer Informe de Gobierno*, 2001,
 23 <http://primer.informe.fox.presidencia.gob.mx>. My emphasis.
- 24 10. Jorge G. Castañeda, "Política exterior y cambio democrático," in
 25 *Reforma.com*, June 12, 2002.
- 26 11. *La política exterior mexicana en la transición*, Mexico, Secretaría de
 27 Relaciones Exteriores-Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005, p. 11.
- 28 12. Carlos Tello Díaz, "Jorge G. Castañeda. Todo lo que cambió," in *Arcana*,
 29 no. 8, December 2001, p. 21.
- 30 13. President Bush knew that granting amnesty to illegal immigrants would
 31 not be easily accepted. Jesús Velasco, "Acuerdo migratorio: la debilidad
 32 de la esperanza," in *Foro Internacional*, vol. 48, no. 1–2 (191–92),
 33 January–June 2008, pp. 160–61.
- 34 14. *Ibid.* pp. 151–52.
- 35 15. Velasco, "Acuerdo migratorio," *op. cit.*, p. 155. Castañeda, "Los ejes de
 36 la política exterior de México," pp. 87, 89.
- 37 16. "Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for President Vicente Fox of
 38 Mexico," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, September
 39 10, 2001, [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_36_37/](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_36_37/ai_79210653)
 40 [ai_79210653](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_36_37/ai_79210653), quoted by Chabat, "The Bush Revolution," p. 129.
- 41 17. Mónica Serrano, "Bordering on the Impossible: US-Mexico Security
 42 Relations Alter 9–11," in Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Niersteker (eds.),
The Rebordering of North Americas: Integration and Exclusion in a New
Security Context, New York, Routledge, 2003 pp. 46–47, quoted by
 Robert Pastor, "Después del libre comercio en América del Norte: cómo
 cerrar la brecha del desarrollo," in Ana Covarrubias (coord.), *México en*

- 1 *un mundo unipolar . . . y diverso*, Mexico, El Colegio de México, 2007,
2 p. 133.
- 3 18. In Spanish: *no regatear apoyo*. "Apoyan represalias; hay razón y derecho,"
4 reforma.com, September 13, 2001, [http://busquedas.gruporeforma/](http://busquedas.gruporeforma/reforma/Documentos/printImpresa.aspx?DocId=1850)
5 reforma/Documentos/printImpresa.aspx?DocId=1850.
- 6 19. Juan Manuel Venegas, "EU, bajo el fuego," in *La Jornada*, September 12,
7 2001, <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/09/12/023n1mun.html>.
- 8 20. Andrea Becerril, "Acusan senadores a Castañeda de ceder soberanía a
9 EU," in *La Jornada*, September 14, 2001, [http://www.jornada.unam.](http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/09/14/023n2pol.html)
10 mx/2001/09/14/023n2pol.html.
- 11 21. Ibid., and Jenaro Villamil Rodríguez, "Evasiva comparecencia de
12 Castañeda en el Senado," in *La Jornada*, September 14, 2001, [http://](http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/09/14/024n1pol.html)
13 www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/09/14/024n1pol.html.
- 14 22. Andrea Becerril, "Acusan senadores a Castañeda."
15 23. Chabat, "The Bush Revolution," p. 29.
- 16 24. "Versión estenográfica de la entrevista de prensa concedida por el
17 Presidente Vicente Fox Quesada, esta noche en la 'Zona Cero' de esta
18 ciudad," Mexico, Presidencia de la República, October 4, 2001, [http://](http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/actividades/?contenido=1935&imprimir=tue)
19 fox.presidencia.gob.mx/actividades/?contenido=1935&imprimir=tue.
- 20 25. Castañeda, "Los ejes de la política," p. 73.
- 21 26. Davidow, *El oso y el puercoespín*, 356.
- 22 27. Ibid., p. 358.
- 23 28. "Versión estenográfica de la entrevista de prensa concedida por el
24 Presidente Vicente Fox Quesada, esta noche en la 'Zona Cero'."
- 25 29. All 22 commitments may be found in Raúl Benítez Manaut, "La seguri-
26 dad nacional en la indefinida transición: mitos y realidades del sexenio de
27 Vicente Fox," in *Foro Internacional*, vol. 48, no. 1–2 (191–92), January–
28 June 2008, pp. 191–92. Peter Andreas, "US-Mexico border control in
29 a changing economic and security context," quoted in Mónica Serrano,
30 "Integration and security in North America. Do good neighbors need good
31 fences?" in *International Journal*, vol. 61, no. 3, Summer 2006, p. 618.
- 32 30. Chabat, "The Bush Revolution," p. 130.
- 33 31. Joint statement by President Bush, President Fox, and Prime Minister
34 Martin, March 23, 2005, www.spp.gov.
- 35 32. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, "Alianza para la seguridad y la pro-
36 peridad de América del Norte," www.sre.gob.mx.
- 37 33. Ibid.
- 38 34. As argued by Reynaldo Ortega, it is difficult to know whether the
39 Mexican government acted in response to public opinion or whether
40 public opinion encouraged the government to distance itself from
41 Washington. In January 2003, a public opinion poll indicated that
42 82 percent of the people surveyed sustained that in case of a war
between Iraq and the United States, Mexico should remain neutral;
14 percent thought that Mexico should support the United States, and
less than 1 percent answered that Mexico should support Iraq. Reynaldo
Yunuen Ortega Ortiz, "The United States-Iraq war and Mexican

- 1 public opinion,” in *International Journal*, vol. 61, no. 3, summer 2006,
 2 p. 654; 657.
- 3 35. Chabat, “The Bush Revolution,” p. 131.
- 4 36. Juan Manuel Venegas, “Vientos de Guerra. La fuerza sólo se justifica
 5 cuando las otras vías fracasan, dice Fox,” in *La Jornada Virtul*/www.jornada.unam.mx/2003/03/18/014n1pol.php?origen=index.html.
- 6 37. Chabat, “The Bush Revolution,” p. 132.
- 7 38. Tello Díaz, “Jorge G. Castañeda. Todo lo que cambió,” pp. 22–24;
 8 Castañeda, “Los ejes de la política exterior de México,” pp. 72–73.
- 9 39. Ana Covarrubias, “Los derechos humanos en la política exterior de
 10 México: ¿en defensa propia o de valores liberales?” in Covarrubias
 11 (coord.), *Temas de política exterior*, pp. 303–32.
- 12 40. *La política exterior mexicana en la transición*, pp. 142–44.
- 13 41. *La Jornada*, July 1, 2001, p. 8. In 2002, Fox’s government argued that
 14 Mexico had not voted against any country, but had defended causes.
 15 Mexico, Gobierno de la República, “México vota a favor de causas y no en
 16 contra de países,” comunicado, April 15, 2002, <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx>.
- 17 42. *Reforma*, February 5, 2002, www.reforma.com.
- 18 43. See Ana Covarrubias Velasco, “La política mexicana hacia Cuba a prin-
 19 cipios de siglo: de la no intervención a la protección de los derechos
 20 humanos,” in *Foro Internacional*, vol. 43, no. 3 (173), July–September
 21 2003, pp. 627–44. The most embarrassing incident was undoubtedly
 22 Castro’s release to the press of his conversation with Fox, when the
 23 latter asked him to leave the country after lunch, before President Bush
 24 arrived, and not to attack the United States. A transcript of the conversa-
 25 tion may be found in “Exhibe Fidel Castro charla de ‘amigos’,” *Reforma*,
 26 April 23, 2002, www.reforma.com.
- 27 44. Rafael Rojas, “México y Cuba, amigos desleales,” in *Foreign Affairs en*
 28 *español*, vol. 4, no. 3, July–September, 2004, pp. 72–81.
- 29 45. The Mexican government sent a group of policemen to El Salvador in
 30 cooperation with ONUSAL after the civil war in that country.
- 31 46. “Versión estenográfica de la entrevista del secretario de Relaciones
 32 Exteriores, Luis Ernesto Derbez, a corresponsales mexicanos en el Hotel
 33 Ritz de Madrid,” May 11, 2004, www.sre.gob.mx.
- 34 47. “Comentarios” sobre la minuta que reforma y adiciona la fracción
 35 III de 31 artículo 76 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos
 36 Mexicanos.”
- 37 48. PAN, Plataforma electoral, http://www.presidencia.com.mx/plataformas/pan_plataforma2006.pdf.
- 38 49. *Ibid.*
- 39 50. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, *Segundo Informe de Labores*, 2008,
 40 pp. 9, 11, www.sre.gob.mx.
- 41 51. Presidencia de la República, entrevistas, Leonardo Curzio, Enfoque 1a
 42 emisión, September 3, 2008, <http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/prensa/entrevistas/?contenido=38363&impirmir=true>.

- 1 52. Patricia Muñoz Ríos, "Con México se restableció el diálogo político:
2 Pérez Roque," in *La Jornada*, October 20, 2008, [http://www.jornada.
3 unam.mx/2008/10/20/index.php?section=politica&article=015n1pol](http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/10/20/index.php?section=politica&article=015n1pol).
4 53. "México hace un llamado al Gobierno de Cuba a realizar las acciones
5 necesarias para proteger la salud y la dignidad de todos sus prisioneros,"
6 comunicó no. 074, March 15, 2010, [http://www.sre.gob.mx/csocial/
7 contenido/comunicados/2010/mar/cp_074.html](http://www.sre.gob.mx/csocial/contenido/comunicados/2010/mar/cp_074.html).
8 54. Carlos Rico, "La iniciativa Mérida y el combate nacional al crimen
9 organizado," in *Foreign Affairs en español*, vol. 8, no. 1, January–March,
10 2008, pp. 3–13.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42