Governance of Defense and Policymaking in Chile

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As Latin American countries work toward leaving military regimes well behind, the current governing of defense in the hands of civilians unveils a series of challenges for democratically elected leaders. This article analyzes the case study of Chile's contemporary defense sector and its policymaking after three decades of evolving civil–military relations. The research focuses particularly on the *Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa* (ENSYD), a government-led policy program launched in 2013 that failed to achieve its goals and faced extensive opposition, for example, in its human security approach to understanding security threats. The article explores and builds on civil–military relations literature and suggests the governance of defense as a concept to study further the constant governing processes by which institutions assume different beliefs and interests in relation to how policies are planned and executed.

Mientras que los países latinoamericanos consolidan esfuerzos para dejar a los regímenes militares en el pasado, la gobernanza del sector de la defensa por parte de civiles presenta una serie de retos para las autoridades elegidas de manera democrática. Este artículo analiza el caso de estudio de las políticas públicas de defensa en Chile tras 30 años de evolución de las relaciones cívico–militares. La investigación se enfoca particularmente en la Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa (ENSYD), una política presentada por el gobierno en 2013 cuyo éxito programático fue truncado y objeto de amplia oposición, por ejemplo, en cuanto al uso de un enfoque de seguridad humana para enfrentar las amenazas a la seguridad. El artículo explora y construye sobre la literatura de relaciones cívico–militares y propone a la gobernanza de la defensa como un concepto para estudiar los constantes procesos de gobierno en que varias instituciones expresan motivos e intereses particulares en el planeamiento y ejecución de tales políticas.

Key words: civil–military relations, redemocratization, human security, traditional security, policy failure

Introduction

The morning of June 28, 2012, Chilean President Sebastián Piñera launched the *Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa* (ENSYD), a policy program that proposed novel ways to assess threats and risks to the country's security for the next twelve years. This policy conceptualized security as an encompassing endeavor that required the participation of several security actors and established for the first time a change in perspective from a traditional security approach to

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a human-oriented understanding. Through the ENSYD, President Piñera kept one of his campaign promises for the defense sector and intended for it to be a state policy for the country's security matters thereafter, but its unveiling marked a watershed moment in what was up to then a solemn tradition of consensual defense policymaking in the country (Robledo, 2012). Multiple sectors in government, civil society, and the armed forces severely criticized the policy for its novel framework and viewed it with skepticism and reluctance.

The leader of the Senate, Camilo Escalona, a member of the opposition socialist party and an influential figure of the center-left coalition *Concertación*, disapproved of how the ENSYD proposed a new, wider conceptualization of security. He was especially unconvinced of how "new threats" to security, such as organized crime, energy vulnerability, human trafficking, and other "internal" menaces, were understood in this new approach. To Escalona, this rationale went against Chile's successful experience over the last two decades in keeping the armed forces away from social issues (*La Tercera*, 2012). After the return to democracy, all military missions in Chile were strictly focused on hypothetical scenarios of external conflict. Since then, civil–military relations have followed a mellowing process that has allowed policy in the sector as a result of the gradual maximization of civilian supremacy over military prerogatives inherited from the dictatorship (1973–1990). This move assured democratizers that the military would not interfere in domestic security, as had happened during General Augusto Pinochet's regime with atrocious consequences for human rights and a profound politicization of the military (Fuentes, 2000; Huneeus, 2007). Some argued that the ENSYD was a purposeful demonstration of unilateral policymaking from the Ministry of Defense (MDN), because such an ambitious policy demanded wider bureaucratization among government institutions and political bodies. Defense even lost the executive's goodwill when a redrafted version was presented to Congress two months later. Consequently, Piñera left government in 2014 with the ENSYD wallowing in congressional committees.

What led to the demise of the ENSYD, and what factors can be identified as contending in Chile's defense governance and policymaking? To provide an answer to such query, this article explores how the ENSYD was created and also accounts for its failure.[1] First, it sets a discussion through a review of civil–military relations, governance, and policymaking literature to shed light on different ideas about how defense is governed. The article then briefly analyzes how defense and security policies had been formulated up to Piñera's government and later unveils the elaboration of the ENSYD program in greater depth. This section especially emphasizes how the policy became problematic and controversial. The article concludes with novel reflections on the theoretical and empirical approaches to the governance of defense, taken in light of the Chilean case study.

Civil–Military Relations and Policymaking

Successful policies are often analyzed and considered potential examples to be imitated, but can anything be learned from unsuccessful policies (Freeden, 2009; McConnell, 2010, 2015; Marsh & McConnell, 2011)? The overall study of defense policies in Latin America has attracted less interest now that democracy has taken

root, and consequently scarce accounts have been made regarding country-case policy formulation. With the reduced prospects of military takeovers and the considerably stronger civilian control over the armed forces, social scientists seem to have lost interest in the subject (Agüero, 2012; Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2007). The issue that remains, and that should reenergize scholars, is whether democratic environments enable successful security and defense policy formulation. In theory, in a democratic regime where civilian supremacy over the military has consolidated, civilians dictate efficient and effective national defense policies (Huntington, 1952; Lowenthal & Fitch, 1986; Stepan, 1988). In practice, cases such as the Chilean suggest that civilian-formulated strategic planning can be truncated not because soldiers are still a major contesting force, but rather because civilian actors seem to be incapable of agreeing on the nature and proceedings of such policymaking. The defense sector does not seem to differ from other problematic policy fields, such as health, education, and macroeconomics, where policy disappointments can often lead to unintended outcomes and a blame game of misjudgments (McConnell, 2015). In light of this paradigm, defense policymaking as an outcome of civil–military relations should be understood as a dynamic process of relative success, even in strengthened democracies (Weeks, 2003, p. 162).

Focusing on the Policy

According to Agüero's seminal work *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy* (1995), supremacy over the military "demands that the civilian leadership develops its own conception of national defense" (p. 32). It is assumed that defense policies find greater resonance in democratic environments where a constitutional regime empowers and legitimizes civilian control over the military, where the military has not shown attempts to deliberately take away civilian power for a period of time, and where the military is willing to accept subordination on topics over which it had a contending disagreement with civilians in the past (Agüero, 1995, p. 215), but these variables result depending on the context and are not always a fixed recipe for success. For instance, Chile has experienced promising gradual achievements in terms of building democratically oriented armed forces post-authoritarian regime in some of these areas (see Mani, 2011). Flisfisch and Robledo argue that, by 2010, the country had a high level of performance in defense and civil–military relations governability reaching standards of a "consolidated democracy" (2012, p. 118). Now that the country draws much closer to Agüero's desired management of civil–military relations within the context of democratic rules (Weeks, 2012), policymaking for civilian control seems in need of a rethinking effort. In a nutshell, how do we explain the ENSYD failure when the country's civilian supremacy over the military seems ample or, at least, very advanced (Flisfisch & Robledo, 2012)?

Another helpful road is to revise the classic reading of Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1952).[2] Huntington's concern focuses on how and in what form civilians are to embody the subjective and objective maximization of military control. Put simply, Huntington indicates that civilian control over a professional and neutral military occurs as the result of a struggle between Congress, the executive branch, and other social groups that determine policy

through democratic persuasion and compromise (1952, pp. 80–84). To minimize military influence and maximize civilian power, democratic countries situate policymaking with these actors. If we assume that policies are the result of power relations among different institutional bodies, how is defense policy established in light of this interaction? The literature on Latin America has thoroughly debated the questions of civilian expertise and military policy (Bruneau, 2005; Pion-Berlin, 1997, 2006; Weeks, 2012), defense organizational design issues (Pion-Berlin, 2009), and how civilian policies affect military missions and their role in society (Fuentes, 2000; Weeks, 2003). These studies were conducted by assessing early post-authoritarian transitions when militaries enjoyed numerous legal safeguards inherited from dictatorial eras. The academic workload available since then has partially neglected updated accounts on how members of Congress, public officials, military leaders, and civil society members create policy through interaction. One study that made a difference recently is Flisfisch and Robledo's (2012) use of the term *gobernabilidad* (governability) to assess political control over the military and the quality of its effectiveness and efficiency in the defense sector.[3] The authors' analysis of the Chilean defense sector is overwhelmingly rich in data and explanatory variables regarding how civilian control is exercised. Their *gobernabilidad* approach and use of a principal–agent theoretical approach seems to be a good stepping stone, but it is not the most pertinent analysis for addressing how policy is created (in fairness, because policy formulation was not their core research aim, but rather a secondary aim). The principal–agent theoretical lens enriches our understanding of the relationship between civilian dominance and military subordination, but it does not necessarily expand our understanding of the interaction between institutional actors involved in policy construction, where democratic relations of power seem more horizontal than hierarchical. For that reason, instead of assuming *gobernabilidad*, this article discusses the term governance.

A Helpful Approach: Governance, Civil–Military Relations, and Policy Failure

Observers of public policy and administration have several different interpretations for the term governance.[4] In this article, we understand governance to be those governing practices that combine people and institutions from various societal levels that are "concerned with creating the condition for ordered rule and collective action" (Milward & Provan, 2000, p. 360). If we assume that the governance of defense involves different institutions for policymaking, such as ministries, Congress, the military, and other pertinent groups (Flisfisch & Robledo, 2012, p. 20), then we should agree that civilian-made defense policy is the result of inter-institutional relationships, not the product of an isolated single unit, despite the fact that defense policies tend to have a mastermind and proprietor who typically resides in the defense ministry.[5] Therefore, addressing civilian-led defense policymaking through a governance approach can help discover how sector policies are constructed and managed through the interaction of various institutions.

The lens proposed here builds on two approaches discussed under the umbrella of policy networks literature (Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Smith, 2000;

Rhodes, 2008) and democratic network governance (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007). These approaches overlap with civil–military relations studies, mainly in placing special attention on the parties that influence the policy agenda and the subsequent outcomes of inter-institutional relations. Because the work of Huntington and Agüero, among many others, has greatly recognized the democratic aspects of a civilian-led defense sector, a governance approach looks deeper into these democratic practices by recognizing a multitude of actors that develop relationships based on particular beliefs that make the policymaking process a contested process. In this vein, at least three perspectives of such understanding become relevant. First, a governance approach can help us *identify actors and networks*. Observers argue that governance refers to a group of actors drawn from governmental and nongovernmental sectors that are dependent because of their involvement in a certain collective action (Stoker, 1998). For defense policy purposes, such actors may include, among others, the defense ministry, other ministries, special agencies of the executive branch, Congress, the armed forces, political parties, and civilian expert communities. The military is included as well. Although it is a principle of democratization the military does not interfere with political life, politicians often consult its expertise, turning the armed forces into a valid actor in the policymaking process (Barany, 2012, p. 26). Because actors can develop both formal and informal rules to exert influence in defense policymaking (Pion-Berlin, 2010a; Weeks, 2003), patterns of governance therefore become hybrid and multijurisdictional, as they combine institutions from different areas and levels of government and civil society (Bevir, 2011). A governance approach would suggest that, over time, these actors institutionalize a policy network based on relationships of trust to coordinate policy planning and resource exchange (Marsh & Smith, 2000; Peters, 2007). Some have preferred to keep government as the main planner and deliverer of national security policies in the Weberian sense that states hold the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Peters, 2012), but reality reveals that defense governance involves a flexible and more open process where democratic institutions play an active role in the political decision-making arena.

Second, a governance understanding can *assess meanings*, *beliefs*, and *traditions*. Apart from identifying actors related to the policy process, a governance approach suggests the exploration of the values and ideas that make certain actors be part of the practices of rule (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006). Actors have different intentions regarding addressing policy action and therefore promote particular sets of policies. For instance, whereas the defense ministry could place high priority on certain policies, the president and members of congress might prioritize other policy areas that, according to their beliefs, require more immediate attention (Weeks, 2012). It could also happen that an executive who strongly believes, for instance, in deploying international peacekeeping missions encounters at some point a contending vision from Congress. In short, in regard to creating defense policy, governance actors can and will assign a particular meaning to the role and mission that the armed forces and other institutions will deliver in such policy.

Third, the governance approach *considers struggle and consensus*. As Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2007) argue, the core of defense policy includes not only the effectiveness and control of military resources, but also the rationalization of

many conflictive issues, such as budget and expenditure (p. 78). In Southern Cone countries, the establishment of democratic civil–military relations has revealed the balance of struggle and consensus between civilians, the military, and societal forces on issues such as military justice, human rights abuses, and corporate reorganization (Rojas Aravena, 1998, p. 83). Governance processes suppose that the interaction among decision makers will eventually provide flexible solutions to problems and challenges that involve a high degree of complexity (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007, pp. 95–7). Defense-sector policies do not always deliver consensual decision making, but include policies prone to failure. In that sense, the governance approach does not simply acknowledge that policymaking through interactive governing will lead to effective results, but rather it allows for evaluating the complications and uncertainties that result from interdependent policymaking.

The governance approach therefore overlaps with policy studies literature that blames failure depending, among other factors, on the complexity of involving numerous actors and processes. It is assumed that, when governance includes agencies with various goals and interests, the formulation, implementation, and coordination of policy can become difficult and increase the chances that a policy program will fail (Newman & Head, 2015; Wolman, 1981). Failure is considered to happen when a policy does not achieve the political goals and programs that proponents set out to achieve initially and finds great opposition or loses all intended support (Howlett, 2009; McConnell, 2010, pp. 356–7; Walsh, 2006, pp. 495–6). In a mirror image, a successful policy involves attaining or exceeding its original goals with the same cost, effort, and time that were originally proposed (Howlett, 2009). Although policy success and failure are two contested concepts (see May, 1992; Marsh & McConnell, 2011), for the sake of brevity, this article does not propose a model of failure and certainly avoids a conceptual claim. Instead, it identifies particular components that enlighten the analysis of contending process of conceptualization, theory selection, and specification of policy objectives.[6]

Brief Overview of the Defense Policymaking Scenario in 2010

A governance understanding considers the open and flexible processes of governing and the constantly evolving patterns of policy allocation (both successful and unsuccessful) that result from them. The revision of patterns of policymaking reveals essential issues when researching the governance of defense. It helps to identify the legitimate actors and institutions in the political game, how they have engaged in governance, and how they have played and dictated outputs and outcomes on issues related to defense policymaking. We should assume that some policies would encounter different schemes of actor participation, use either one or a mix of formal and semiformal civilian supremacy channels (Weeks, 2003), and experiment with different levels of consensus or resistance to obtain success or failure eventually. The governance approach suggests that tension exists not only among civilians and the armed forces, but also among all inter- and intra-pertinent institutions. The implication here is a break with the understanding of the "civilian" as a unit. Tension can appear on the civilian side, and the armed forces might remain a passive spectator of debate.

By 2010, when Piñera assumed the presidency, defense policymaking in Chile had drifted toward this latter approach. The ENSYD was framed in a governance scenario where the MDN and other ministries, such as Finance (*Hacienda*), Foreign Relations (*Exterior*), and the Interior (*Interior y Seguridad Pública*), had particular concerns because the strategy meant the allocation of budget, the identification of external threats, and the collaboration of resources and exchange of information between them. Some state organs felt they had a concrete stake in the policy process, although it was assumed that the MDN would be the policy "metagovernor." Metagovernance means the faculty of one body to steer a given governance structure (Sorensen, 2006). Apart from the executive institutions, bodies such as Congress, the armed forces, civilian experts, and savvy technocrats also had a part to play in the creation of the ENSYD.

This multitude of actors highlighted at least two trends of inter-institutional policy elaboration that had matured in Chile throughout the years. During the first decades of redemocratization, human rights affairs regarding military abuses were channeled to other bodies, leaving the MDN as a bystander participant in political and policy issues (Atria, 2009; Huneeus, 2007). Up to 2000, Chile was considered one of the least likely places in the region where civilian-led policy had any influence in the defense area. The military still enjoyed numerous financial, jurisprudential, and professional prerogatives that favored old authoritarian national security doctrines to the detriment of democratic policy formulation (Fuentes, 2000, pp. 113–19; Robledo, 2008).

Although the MDN remained an absent actor in terms of defense policy during the period of early democratization (Atria, 2009), the production of a series of *Libros Blancos de la Defensa* (Defense white papers), with the first launched in 1997, brought political relevance to the ministry. These documents resulted from addressing defense policy as a transparent exercise of collaboration between the armed forces and their civilian counterparts. By 2010, three white papers had been launched, and the MDN had acquired over time formal and semiformal channels to relate to other pertinent actors in the planning of defense. Empowered ministers in office during Ricardo Lagos' administration (2000–2006) and in the first term of Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010), a former Minister of Defense herself, subsequently placed the MDN as the official node between governmental organs, civilians, and the military. The ministry also gained a more relevant status as the place from which policy should derive later after reforms to the defense superior structure and to the MDN, in 2005 and in 2010, respectively, reinforced civilian control. Even though the scenario had radically improved, the challenge with regard to how to establish civilian supremacy in strategic defense planning still remained an issue (Flisfisch & Robledo, 2012, p. 12). Piñera's government decided to emphasize primarily the design of a national strategy (eventually, the ENSYD), in addition to other issues pertaining to financing, investment, military justice, and corporate reorganization (Izurieta, 2012, pp. 145–6).

The engagement of democratic networks of governance brought novel matters concerning the policymaking rationale. Although certain actors, such as Congress, had little to do with defense policy until 2002 (Weeks, 2003, p. 155), the awareness of military issues—either through more expert advice from legislative staffers, or plainly, because members of the defense commissions took matters seriously (Fuchs, 2006)—meant that different understandings and approaches to

conducting policy entered the realm of action in places other than the MDN. Civilians, the military, and societal actors would meet in a variety of venues, such as conferences, workshops, congressional hearings, and other forums, where the differences regarding military policy became a matter of discussion. Pion-Berlin addressed the issue in terms of multi-tiered sets of concentric circles where civilian and military actors interact (Pion-Berlin, 2011, p. 223). Although there was a more pronounced exchange of policy planning when Piñera took office, the armed forces themselves still generated much of the defense policy. The MDN was still not viewed as the absolute space where systematic decision making was conducted, but it was very much expected that, through the 2010 ministerial reform, the MDN would become the official hub for debate and policy planning (Flisfisch & Robledo, 2012, pp. 120–2).

The ENSYD: A Case Study

In light of the public security and other defense policies enforced through Piñera's administration, the ENSYD promised to assess the issues that were the most pertinent to Chile in these two areas. It outlined traditional and nontraditional threats in terms of a *seguridad ampliada* (wider security), a concept used by the authorities to explain a holistic and flexible response to threats and risks. Nontraditional threats ranged from drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and illegal immigration to energy vulnerability, illegal arms markets, fish predation, and cyberattacks (ENSYD, 2012). The adoption of what the scholarly literature would catalog as a human security approach represented the ENSYD's core qualitative transformation in the ways in which it understood and conducted security policy, but this human security approach required a paradigm shift from the traditional national security conceptualization that had dominated Chile's security and defense policymaking for decades (Griffiths, 2011). The human approach seemed more realistic to officials planning the ENSYD because it represented the only possible way to confront what observers had addressed as the "kinds of insecurities that human beings face in a contemporary global era" (Kaldor, Martin, & Selchow, 2007, p. 281). Human security has encouraged policy planners to regard security as "something more than the military defense of states' interests and territory" (Paris, 2001, p. 87). It was difficult for Chilean policymakers to put this in practice, even though in early 2001, Chile had joined an international network of governmental and nongovernmental actors arguing globally for a human approach to security (Fuentes & Aravena, 2005; Paris, 2001).[7]

Whereas in Chile, the predominant national security understanding has been state-centric and has favored the military as a tool for addressing potential acts of foreign aggression against the state as a whole, a human security approach unpacks security in a multiplicity of agencies, including public safety, human rights, and other social and economic approaches that are relevant not only to the state but also to the development of individuals and the community (Liotta, 2002; Staudt, 2011, p. 112). Because the ENSYD was such an important master plan, during its preparation, policymakers in the MDN called on many experts from different policy areas and civil society to create a holistic diagnosis of the security scenario guided by their own understanding of what a human security approach should look like.

One senior official in the MDN recounted how this process occurred.

> The responsibility of making up the ENSYD fell to Defense, but it was aimed to be a holistic security and defense strategy. Obviously, for that purpose, it was not elaborated behind closed doors. We worked with Foreign Relations and the Interior, and over twenty academic panels were conducted. Notwithstanding, at the end of the day, everybody identified it only with Defense." (personal communication, Santiago, December 11, 2013. Author's translation)

The ENSYD aimed to configure multiple solutions to security issues. For instance, policy planners put various topics on the agenda with the aim of developing coordinated responses between the armed forces and other public security actors. These procedures raised initial concerns, for instance, regarding how the armed forces would act in controlling nontraditional threats such as organized crime. For some, the ENSYD suddenly brought back military intromission in internal security. Sources from the MDN responded that nontraditional threats required a coordinated response from all state actors. Minister of Defense Andrés Allamand assumed that this was a sensitive issue, and before the strategy's release, told the defense committee in Congress that the armed forces would not invade the arena of public security under any circumstances.

Despite the wide use of military forces in confronting nontraditional threats throughout Latin America—mostly complex criminality (see Pion-Berlin, 2010b)—Chile is an exceptional case. Its armed forces went back to the barracks after the dictatorship was over and have not addressed criminal matters again at all. From redemocratization onward, all crime and law enforcements actions have rested only in the police bodies, the *Carabineros* and *Investigaciones* (Dammert, 2013). The constitutional framework allows the military to undertake a role in internal security only if a state of exception has previously been mandated. All things considered, the armed forces have taken various security roles after natural disasters, most notably following the 2010 earthquake, which led to chaos and looting in some communities.[8]

For the MDN, the ENSYD did not intend to circumvent legal arrangements but to establish a coordinated mechanism that would set guidelines for security actors in the country. By identifying traditional and nontraditional threats, the national strategy attempted not to eliminate the limits between defense and security, but rather to be flexible enough to allow policy approaches that were outside the parameters of defense and that involved other state offices. In that sense, it attempted to recreate what countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Brazil had recently implemented (see Dockendorff & Duval, 2013).

The ENSYD also aimed to continue fostering international cooperation by acknowledging that Chile's new threats could not be addressed alone. In these terms, the strategy embraced peace operations and joint military exercises, maintaining regional agreements such as those under the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). During a conference in Uruguay, Minister Allamand vowed to keep the spirit of regional cooperation. In a bilateral meeting with his Peruvian counterpart, he emphasized the need to work together to confront "new threats," such as drug trafficking and organized crime, in a parallel track with the established bilateral mechanisms for humanitarian and natural catastrophes (*El Mercurio*, 2012a).

Political figures in the opposition had a receptive first impression of the ENSYD during its planning stage. Members of Congress showed interest in the human security approach proposed, but emphasized early on the importance of placing a limit to separate military and police actions. "It's a strategy of defense and security, clearly dividing these issues. There are topics exclusive to the police forces that do not belong to the military," said Antonio Hales from the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD), in the *Concertación* alliance (Wilson, 2012).

A Rocky Road: Veto Players and Adjustments

President Piñera and Minister Allamand distributed the first copies of the ENSYD to congressional representatives who attended its public launch at La Moneda palace. The President, as a token of good faith, passed it for discussion to the legislative. The move was key to attaching the ENSYD to a new budgetary framework for the armed forces that had already been discussed in Congress (Law N° 13.916, also known as "Ley Reservada del Cobre;" see MDN, 2014, p. 92). Because the latter was already approved in the lower chamber, it was expected that the Senate would discuss it and tie up loose ends before it was formalized through presidential decree. In short, the MDN would elaborate the strategy, Congress would run the needed modifications, and the president would sign it off.

One senior official in the MDN explained how the strategy was elaborated.

> The strategy involved everything that would matter to state security. It was not just a view from Defense. A huge effort was made to make it in terms of security and defense. Maybe it could have been just on security and include an annex on defense. However, it had to be like it was because the new budget legislation was in discussion in Congress, and it cannot operate without a strategy. So, we had to rush it and make it about security and defense in a wider sense." (personal communication, Santiago, December 11, 2013, author's translation)

The leader of the Senate, Camilo Escalona, was the first to sound the alarm as soon as Piñera had delivered the strategy. For him, the ENSYD meant a profound change in the state's defense and security structure, and therefore, various congressional committees in addition to defense needed to review it. Most importantly, he did not share the position that all matters of security and defense were to become a "whole." Politicians were skeptical of the human security approach and favored an approach based on a traditional national security understanding. Through the voice of Escalona, the opposition to government claimed that internal security issues should be left only to the *Carabineros* and *Investigaciones*. Other countries in Latin America that had involved the military in internal security had had negative consequences and social costs, Escalona later added (*La Tercera*, 2012).

Earlier that year, Chilean José Miguel Insulza, the secretary general of the Organization of American States, who lived in exile during the dictatorship (as had Escalona) and later became Minister of Foreign Relations and of the Interior with the *Concertación*, declared that he was reluctant to allow the armed forces to take policing roles, but that he understood the governments that had needed to do it, in consideration to multiple countries in the region under such systems (Palou Egoaguirre, 2012).

Politicians and other observers were critical enough to make the President recoil. It was not until August 2012 that a second text of the ENSYD was finally sent to the Senate. The initial document that had been presented with such pageantry in June was now called a draft. "This sudden passing of official policy to something less than a working paper contrasts with the diffusion that Defense officials put in delivering the document, even to other defense ministers in the continent," said Jorge Burgos, a PPD (*Partido por la Democracia*, in opposition) congressional deputy who was later announced as Minister of Defense in the 2014–2018 second Bachelet government (Burgos, 2012).

The revised version of the June strategy was modified under Piñera's own supervision, leaving Defense out of its redrafting, although no significant changes were made other than restructuring its contents from the 76 original pages to 91. On its initial pages, the following message could now be read, "The current document takes care of some points of view and insights known until this date since its original presentation" (Herrera, Sepúlveda, & Martínez, 2012, August 11).

The final document made explicit the awareness that the concept of *seguridad ampliada* meant the participation of multiple and different public actors but whose responsibilities and designations were clearly established in the constitution and the current legal framework. The role of the defense sector was also refined. Initially, Defense would work with the Ministry of the Interior on issues regarding transnational threats affecting public security. After the revision, it was established that Defense would collaborate in the same scenario only if Interior required it (Herrera et al., 2012, August 11).

Further, the ENSYD originally proposed the creation of a series of new bureaucracies, such as the *Comité Interministerial de Seguridad* (interministerial security committee), *Consejero Nacional de Seguridad* (national security advisor position), *Grupo de Trabajo de Seguridad Público-Privado* (public–private security work group), and the *Comisión de Participación Ciudadana* (commission for citizen participation). Only the first of these was kept. Led by the president, it included the ministers of the Interior, Foreign Relations, Defense, Treasury, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications, and Public Works. Through editorials, the press argued that more bureaucracy hindered the already established channels of inter-ministerial communication (El Mercurio, 2012b). Most notably, the figure of a national security advisor and a permanent executive secretariat were discarded. Criticism of the strategy was mounted in light of an already existing bureaucracy vaguely similar in function, the *Consejo de Seguridad Nacional* (National Security Council), a multi-actor body that includes military and civilian authorities and advises the president (see Huneeus, 2007).

Stagnation and Congressional Concern

In late 2012, Allamand left his government post to pursue a presidential primary bid in the right-wing coalition.[9] To replace him, Piñera installed one of his long-time closest political advisors, Rodrigo Hinzpeter, who had served up to that time as the Minister of the Interior. The ENSYD was subtly removed from the public debate after that.

A former senior Ministry of the Interior official during the *Concertación* era emphasized that:

> The famous strategy presented by Minister Allamand, pulled out of a hat, is archived despite the fact that it was launched by the President and given to the Senate leader. It was rejected by part of the armed forces community, and then with the rotation of ministers, it died completely. They never talked about launching it again." (personal communication, Santiago, November 6, 2013, author's translation)

After a period of floating around in the congressional corridors, the national strategy once again came under debate in late 2013, when Hinzpeter argued that the government was open to the concerns raised by legislators. The ENSYD was given back to Defense for a reconsideration, and authorities proposed January 2014 as the most pertinent date to return it to Congress. This time, Hinzpeter emphasized that its preparation needed a wide-open process to fulfill all requirements made by legislators. He argued that the government was not upset by the fact that the ENSYD had taken so long to be approved. On the contrary, he expressed his gratitude to the Senate for agreeing to revise it (Salinas, 2013, December 26).[10]

Hinzpeter also revealed the novel approach that the ENSYD was about to take. The minister said that the document was not necessarily a fixed path for the proposed horizon of 12 years. Because Piñera's government was about to come to an end, Hinzpeter claimed that the strategy should aim to be revised and updated every year, acknowledging that the next government could change it freely. By then, Michelle Bachelet had won the presidential election.

Furthermore, Hinzpeter emphasized the multisectorial character of the strategy. He explained that the concept of wider security was multidimensional, meaning that it was comprehensive enough to consider aspects regarding human security as well. No matter the reasoning, the *seguridad ampliada* approach had acquired a blurry definition. Hinzpeter also took a more conservative stance toward the new bureaucracy that the ENSYD had initially proposed. Given that it had been criticized earlier, the strategy considered new public bodies that raised questions regarding whether they were actually necessary. The minister emphasized, for instance, that the figure of a National Security Advisor was expendable. He argued that Chile already had a sufficient advisory bureaucracy in the MDN and the *Estado Mayor Conjunto* (Joint Chiefs of Staff). Both of these institutions had earlier been modernized through the legal framework enacted in 2010 and had acquired prominent responsibilities in terms of advising the president, mostly on external security issues (Chile. Law No 20.424, 2012).

A Change in Government

President Piñera's government ended in April 2014 and, as he left office, he did not have the opportunity to send the ENSYD to Congress for a second time. The bulk of the ENSYD was passed on to Michelle Bachelet's newly appointed cabinet officials, and they decided not to make it a priority. During her campaign, Bachelet did not discuss addressing a defense strategy in specific terms, but her written campaign program document criticized how certain policy reforms

regarding the control of the military got "stuck" and others (without mentioning which) simply receded as the result of the political mismanagement of the 2010–2013 period (Bachelet, 2013, p. 150).

Defense Minister Jorge Burgos took office with a different stance. First, he exerted Defense stamina to ensure that the legal framework for the armed forces budget passed in Congress. The issue was considered essential because it would give financial support to defense strategic capabilities through a multiannual budget. Burgos noted two elements influencing his mandate: first, the ability of the former *Concertación*—now known as the *Nueva Mayoría*—to keep the armed forces healthy, democratic, and with numerous resources in the two decades post-dictatorship; and second, adequate participation from Congress to make the defense policy viable through transparency and accountability proceedings. Burgos said he would send a new proposal during the second semester of 2014 (at the time of writing, not yet accomplished), buying time to plan a revised version of the ENSYD. In this instance, he referred to it only as a defense strategy. The ENSYD, he added, would be an "input" to it, given that some elements were worth "rescuing," essentially, those regarding the overall analysis of security threats (Olivares, 2014, May 2).

Analysis of Policy Failure

The Piñera administration branded the national strategy its "policy of policies" (ENSYD, 2012), but despite the administration's grandiosity, a fiasco resulted from the strategy's withdrawal. Its ambition to encompass diverse security affairs—ranging from complex crime to climate change—found scarce support outside the defense community that devised it. Through the accounts of public officials and other interviewees, four components that led to the ENSYD's failure are analyzed next. Although the analysis does not assume any rigid criteria, the purpose is to briefly explain why, in the opinion of the actors involved, these aspects need to be considered as those that partially elucidate the ENSYD's failure.

Contending Conceptualization Issues

The *seguridad ampliada* concept, or the thoroughly theorized (in favor and against) human security approach, became the core of the ENSYD, and its doom. One senior official in charge of its elaboration explained.

> People confused wider security with the military taking over public security issues. And it was not that. The wider security approach does not intend to separate things that are indivisible. If I assume that cybercrime is a threat that affects defense, business, basic services, finance, airports, and so on, is it an issue of internal or external security? How can we classify it? We can't, because it is under the context of a transnational threat, brought from abroad or even from within the country, so the wider security approach did not aim to artificially separate interior from exterior security. Additionally, it does not intend to mix security and defense. On the contrary, starting with the conceptual differences between the two, the state has to use its tools in virtue of a wider security approach, always according to the law and under the responsibility of a pertaining authority." (personal communication, Santiago, December 11, 2013, author's translation).

Defense used the wider security conceptualization as a framework to mobilize from the national security perspective of defense and security. In part, it included controlling security under the shared perspective of many actors. One former official who worked in the MDN during the ENSYD's kick-off noted that:

> The strategy in its first pages establishes that security is a public–private problem, state–society, armed forces–police bodies, public policies and intelligence, and so on. In this sense, it's a wider concept because the players in it have become multiple and because the problems that you identify are not two or three anymore; you see them in a wider context because more problems and issues are being integrated." (personal communication, Santiago, October 30, 2013, author's translation)

A senior Defense official during the *Concertación* era was critical of the approach that the concept took, stating that:

> I was surprised by the use of Buzan and Waever's book (Author's note: The interviewee refers to Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998) and how the understanding of it was totally limited regarding the constructivist approach to securitization. The authors propose that securitization is very contingent and depends on the context. They also warn that this can be a window for securitizing everything, and looking at public policies in this region, this has happened intensively. I was very critical of this. There is a fall back, not in the perspective used, but in allocating to the Defense Ministry a role bigger than defense in a purely random way, without any public debate. In short, it was a securitization process through the administrative way." (personal communication, Santiago, October 24, 2013, author's translation)

Debate Reduction and Nonspecific Policy Objectives

One of the main criticisms of the ENSYD was the lack of public debate on it during its stages of elaboration. Although the document assured that there was an open process in consultation with other counterpart actors outside the MDN, this latter point was refuted. What is recalled is that a group of policymakers performed a diagnosis of the various threats that the strategy included, but that they were not the most pertinent authorities because they did not have adequate expertise on all the issues and were not able to specify the policy objectives. One former official from Defense said,

> How did we do the policy process? We did not come sincerely with it. That is the truth. The defense part of the strategy was put together by us with enough authority. However, the rest, this should have been the object of a larger dialogue and that we did not do well. In my opinion, the ENSYD lacked interagency and interministerial discussion." (personal communication, Santiago, October 30, 2013, author's translation)

One former senior official in the Ministry of the Interior in charge of overseeing organized crime policy shared this point, stating that:

> People from the MDN knew me and we were in contact when they started to make their diagnosis on regional organized crime. I attended some meetings, but they would either cancel them or they would last all day. When I stopped going, nobody called me. A month later, the national strategy came out. Did someone ask me anything or give it a look and share my opinion, an informal validation as is

> sometimes done? Nobody. (personal communication, Santiago, November 6, 2013, author's translation)

One interviewee who worked in the MDN during the *Concertación*'s era noted the lack of policy program specification.

"I saw a discussion in the political and congressional spheres. Also in a couple of think tanks, but everybody said the same thing, 'What is this?' That was the main problem. There was not a public debate large enough during its planning stage, merely a couple of meetings only to justify its 'socialization.' That enriching public debate started in the 1990s to define what is security and what is defense; that was completely lost. That's the main shortcoming of this policy" (personal communication, Santiago, October 24, 2013, author's translation).

Whether there was adequate debate or enough specification of the policy, the pertinent actors felt that the discussion regarding the ENSYD was insufficient, finally undermining its legitimacy. Critics emphasized that Piñera's government was too technocratic and that authorities in Defense did not know how to handle defense policies adequately.

Fostering an Introspective Ministry

The polarization of the result of the policy process was self-defeating. To some in the defense community, the ministry was certainly penalized for forgetting to open the space in the construction of agreements. A culture of separatism from the rest of the public arena was certainly in evidence. When the drafting of the Defense *libros blancos* (white papers) began in the mid-1990s, a large number of people were called for consultation, but over the years, the MDN lost that outward-looking capacity and became more self-reliant.

> The Ministry of Defense is hermetic, opaque, and it should not be that way. In policy construction, we are still using an old hierarchic 'do-as-you're-told' approach. We have not adopted a modern, more contemporary style. We do not discuss relevant topics in society through wide, public scrutiny. Regarding the ENSYD, nobody knew what it was about until the President launched it in 2012, saying it was the draft he was about to send to Congress. The government thought that the deficit in public debate was going to be compensated for in the Senate. However, that is not the current role that the senate has today. (former Ministry of Defense official, personal communication, Santiago, October 30, 2013, author's translation)

Going Solo and Against Historical Legacies

It is said that the national strategy lacked enough political support from other ministries once it left Defense the first time in mid-2012. This failure of political negotiation was not made public at any point during the days that followed its public debut. One former Defense official noted that:

> The national strategy is the agreement that a bunch of policymakers in Defense agreed on. However, do you have the approval of the armed forces or of the *Carabineros*? From what I know, the document did not take into account other ministries' consent, such as Interior, Foreign Relations, and Finance. In short, you got the three heavyweight ministries not agreeing with you. So, your strategy has

> a serious problem. (personal communication, Santiago October 30, 2013, author's translation)

Policymakers in Defense later realized that a text that was perhaps less bold, but that had adequate agreement among cabinet offices could have had better chances of success. "Our very first Defense white paper was rubbish in content, but politically it was privileged. It had every major minister's signature on it. The ENSYD did not have it" (former MDN official, personal communication, Santiago, October 30, 2013, author's translation).

Because the ENSYD proposed a more relevant role for the armed forces in day-to-day security threats, its wording produced aversion among civil and political groups. One top official in Defense commented on the major opponents to the strategy.

> There was a part of the armed forces, and additionally, an important part of the left. Due to historical remembrances, they do not want to know anything about the military but defending the *patria* [homeland]. However, that is retrograde. What would have happened if the military had not provided assistance during the looting after the 2010 earthquake? We know that it cannot occur every day, but again, we did not even propose anything close to that. (personal communication, Santiago, December 11, 2013, author's translation)

Conclusion

Through the case study of Chile's ENSYD, the article explored novel theoretical and empirical concepts regarding why defense policies can fail, regardless of being implemented in an environment where civil–military relations appear as a potential enabler of success rather than a trigger of failure. The governance approach seems to have married and complemented certain aspects of the civil–military relations literature exposed earlier. The challenge now is to put in the hands of policymakers and civil society more theoretical and empirical aspects of the governance of defense. Three relevant remarks are highlighted to advance this endeavor.

1. Theoretically, the governance approach helps identify the actors, beliefs, and struggles in democratic defense policymaking. Defense governance can be framed as a process where a multitude of political actors engage and put in competition different understandings of what policies should be like. In this context, Peters (2014, p. 306) argued that, "having a clear sense of the necessary conditions for governing permits identification of the roles that actors and institutions can play and how they interact." The deliberations surrounding the ENSYD not only revealed a high level of democratic control over the defense sector because of the networked policymaking process, but also captured the essence of governance, given that policy is a result of the relationships among various institutional actors that share stakes in a certain issue. This approach is evident in the discussion concerning what role Defense should take in light of the transnational threats that have come to redefine the traditional and human security approaches for defense and security. The Chilean case suggests that institutional actors engage meaningfully when policies overlap governing areas, especially when these take different approaches for action. The resulting interac-

tion is a dynamic progression in which consensus depends on the institutions that participate in it. Succeeding governments might not advance an entirely new policy, but rather adapt the ENSYD's program and mediate its elaboration, taking into account its previously transited pathways. Further research should help enlighten policy practices and capabilities to better engage and deliver a human security approach.

2. In terms of policy suggestions, this study also shows that democratic authorities cannot take for granted the creation of defense policy, especially in nations that have built more awareness in the supervision of its financial, legal, and political control. In one sense, the Chilean democratic institutions embedded in the defense policy were unable to reach a policy consensus, but in countries where political actors and institutions have closer affinities between them, defense policy might be able to find considerable success, although in light of lesser democratic controls. A case worth noting is Brazil's national defense strategy, which passed swiftly during Lula's second government in 2008, while his coalition, led by the Workers' Party (PT), enjoyed a majority in Congress (see García, 2014).

3. Finally, the highlighted aspects of the ENSYD's failure are a coherent prescription for avoiding possible setbacks in the future. In a scenario of multi-institutional governance, the failure of policy ideas can help us reconsider a design for programs and their intended and unintended effects on the institutions involved. In that sense, the aspects reviewed shed light on the analytical categories that are more meaningful to actors regarding the dimensions of the policy process, its logical program, and its political toleration (see McConnell, 2015). Although the lifespan of the ENSYD permitted us to explore only its agenda-setting stages, leaving out its implementation or evaluation (see Howlett, 2009, pp. 546–7), the empirical story to date allowed us to identify the key process failings, such as its unattainable agenda, the omitted unintended effects in its theoretical formulation, and the failure to obtain support through bargaining among the actors involved.

Studying governance and policy helped identify the contending dimensions pervading the defense sector. This exercise was not merely a study of failure, but of a governing phenomenon and its policymaking, a relevant and timely aspect for in-depth analysis. A call for further comparative cases of governance is extended to better appreciate such processes in the region. New studies should include ways to generate more and better knowledge on the governance of security and defense, put more programs and practices under scrutiny, and build a better grasp of institutional and policy processes. Only through the smooth integration of theory and practice are we better able to explore governance across social, economic, and political areas.

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Notes

[1] The research data for this article were drawn from government documents, media articles, secondary sources, and personal communications with policy officials, civilian experts, and active and retired armed forces officers conducted during a fieldwork visit to Santiago in late 2013.

[2] Recent literature has also addressed the issue. For instance, a model for civil policymaking in defense worth studying is the one developed by Croissant, Kuehn, Lorenz, and Chambers (2013, pp. 21–58).

[3] Flisfisch and Robledo explained the term *gobernabilidad*. "The recent literature reveals that defense's democratic governability develops similarly to a continuum between two poles: between the 'political control over the military' that allows at least a minimum of polyarchic freedom and a high-quality defense governability that includes effective political control but that also requires the exercise of the efficient and effective governing of the defense sector and active steering by the democratic government, above all regarding the range of the security and defense public policy of the country. That is the expected standard in an established democracy" (2012, pp. 10–11, author's translation).

[4] A set of recent compilations to the study of the governance approach suggested in this article can be found in Bevir (2011) and Levi-Faur (2012). Such understanding is more comprehensive in terms of including horizontal relations between public and private actors influencing policy than through the hierarchical and state-oriented "good" or "democratic" governance approach used in other academic studies (see for instance, Domínguez & Shifter, 2013) and also commonly addressed in policy documents from international financial institutions. This article tries to steer away from such latter understanding.

[5] Pion-Berlin noted this point before by saying that, "defense ministries are not the only organizations in the defense sphere, and the role of others and the relations between them must be considered" (2009, p. 564).

[6] For more on the topic, see Wolman (1981, pp. 436–49).

[7] In Chile, the Ministry of Foreign Relations has mostly favored the human security approach. Lately, it has organized international events in Santiago to promote its discussion (see MINREL, 2015), but it has not been an appropriate channel to permeate other public security actors in the country with such understanding.

[8] For an analysis of the legitimacy of the military and of other public institutions in the post-earthquake and tsunami scenario, see Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister (2014).

[9] Interviewees commented that Allamand's early intentions to run for president ended up politicizing the ENSYD. During his tenure as head of Defense, Allamand did not enjoy good relationships with its counterparts in the ministries of the Interior and Foreign Relations. Policymakers in the MDN believed that such opposition within the executive branch put the ENSYD's success at risk, on top of the expected criticism that it encountered outside the sphere of government.

[10] As the policy literature suggests, the interpretation of failure or success greatly depends on the eye of the beholder and the reading given to it (Howlett, 2009; McConnell, 2015; Marsh & McConnell, 2011).

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