Shifting Relationships Between Social Movements and Institutional Politics

2 authors:

Nicolás Somma
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
67 PUBLICATIONS **524** CITATIONS

Rodrigo Medel Sierralta
Alberto Hurtado University
24 PUBLICATIONS **99** CITATIONS

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Shifting Relationships Between Social Movements and Institutional Politics

Nicolás M. Somma and Rodrigo Medel

INTRODUCTION

Why has collective protest boomed in Chile in the last decade? In this chapter, we argue that this happens due, among other factors, to the progressive detachment between social movements and political institutional actors—a process beginning just after democratic restoration two and a half decades ago. Such detachment is puzzling: Chile has historically shown a pattern of consistent alignment between social and political forces.[1] Even the long and harsh dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990) could not wash away this tradition. Thus, when

N.M. Somma (✉) • R. Medel
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
e-mail: nsomma@uc.cl; rmmedel@uc.cl

Chile transitioned to democracy in 1990, there were strong ties between political parties and organized civil society actors in terms of goals, organizational resources, and membership.

During the transition, the social and political forces supporting Pinochet coalesced around a new political party—the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), founded in 1983. UDI was supported by the Movimiento Gremial—originally a university movement born in the law and economics departments at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. It was also supported by business organizations and the upper classes in general. Those who opposed the dictatorship, in turn, forged a powerful coalition composed of popular movements—especially squatters, student and labor organizations—and by political parties from the center (Christian Democrats) and the left (Socialist Party, Party for Democracy, Radical Party, and Humanist Party, among others). Brought together by their common opposition to the dictatorship, this heterogeneous coalition generated the demonstrations in the streets and the ballots that forced the transition.[2] The political party side of the coalition—the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia—achieved power in 1990 and governed until 2010. In 2014, it won the national elections again in alliance with the Communist Party and other leftist forces under the Nueva Mayoría label.

Yet the "social" and the "political" sides of this broad center-left alliance shattered as democracy consolidated.[3] Early in the 1990s, the Concertación political elites severed their ties with social activists under the belief that too much mobilization could endanger the newly restored democracy and motivate a military coup.[4] And, with the passage of time, it became evident that the Concertación governments could not or did not want to engage in the structural reforms that post-transition movements demanded in areas such as labor markets, education, indigenous rights, the electoral system, and the environment, among others. As the case studies of this edited book show, social movement activists thus became increasingly disenchanted with and disaffected from institutional actors. We focus on the progressive distancing between social movements on the one hand, and center and leftist political parties and political elites on the other—those parties and elites that controlled the national government for most of the period since 1990.

Combined with the atomizing effect of a market society imposed during the dictatorship,[5] this "demobilization from above" led to the fragmentation of collective action. During the first decade and a half after the transition, protest remained relatively low in Chile. But, as we show

in this chapter, by the mid-2000s, collective protest had boomed. While Mapuche protest had a peak as early as the late 1990s, it was the 2006 Pingüino movement, composed of secondary school students, which pioneered large public demonstrations. In the years that followed, protest continued and expanded to other, hitherto passive social groups and constituencies. The period of demobilization seemed to be over. Why?

This chapter argues that protest boomed, in part, due to the increasing detachment between social movements and "polity members" such as parties, governments, and political elites.[6] This detachment involved both the fact that political parties gradually lost their capacity to incorporate social demands into their agendas and the fact that they no longer could contain resulting discontent. Against this background, and once the shock of disappointment with political elites waned, movements rearticulated and shifted their goals, frames, and tactics away from institutional politics. They secured their own strategies for mobilizing resources, relying little on the largesse of parties, governments, and politicians. Increasingly detached from institutional actors, social movements saw collective protest as the most important way to press for change. However, not all movements were capable of translating growing mobilization into political influence. A comparison of the student movement and the Mapuche movement suggests that, in the Chilean context, movements are influential as long as they can launch massive protest campaigns in visible locations with a predominance of disruptive yet peaceful tactics.

Our chapter attempts to contribute to the lasting and ongoing international debate—reviewed below—about the relationship between social movements and institutional politics. The Chilean case is interesting in that respect because it shows that movement activity can boom and noticeably influence the political process even under conditions of severely strained relationships between political parties and movements. This challenges a widely accepted notion in the literature—that movements are more likely to flourish when they establish meaningful ties and alliances with parties. Additionally, our analysis suggests that the limitations that sometimes accompany newly restored democracies (i.e. scarcely proportional electoral systems, encapsulated political parties, and authoritarian enclaves) can drive a wedge between institutional politics and organized social actors. This raises a question about whether this is an inexorable outcome of newly restored democracies or rather depends on specific conditions such as those in Chile, thus inviting comparative inquiries.

We focus on the student, Mapuche, and—in the first part of the chapter—environmental movements. We select these cases because they have staged some of the most massive and/or notorious protest campaigns and because, despite their differences in goals, tactics, and social composition, they all illustrate how detachment from institutional actors shapes collective protest. We also present analyses of protest patterns with general population surveys that are consistent with our argument. This does not mean that the argument applies to every movement. Rather, we seek to foster the development of a future research agenda. Our timeframe starts with the transition to democracy in 1990, but we pay more attention to the last decade. We combine secondary research produced by social scientists, general population survey data, and a unique dataset which covers thousands of protest events across the country between 2000 and 2012. We also take advantage of 36 semi-structured interviews with leaders of student, environmental, and Mapuche organizations. The interviews—12 for each of the three groups—were carried out in 2014 in the cities of Santiago and Temuco.

Examining the relationship between social movements and "polity members," we follow Tilly, who coined that concept for referring to contenders for political power that have low-cost access to governmental resources on a routine basis.[7] We consider the main polity members in contemporary Chile—political parties, the congress, and the national government. Of course, not all polity members are equal. For instance, during the period under study, the Communist Party may be considered a polity member, but it certainly had less access to governmental resources than the Christian Democratic Party under President Eduardo Frei or than the Socialist Party under Ricardo Lagos or Michelle Bachelet. Additionally, other polity members—such as the judicial system or the police—may be consequential for protest but they are not part of our story. Also, we focus on center and leftist parties because their changing relationships with social movements are more relevant for understanding protest than those between movements and rightist parties—whose relationships were always very weak during this period. By "institutional politics," we refer to the structures, rules, and interactions in which polity members are embedded.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section presents two theoretical views about how relations between movements and polity members shape collective protest—namely, the closeness thesis and the detachment thesis. After this, we document the growth of collective protest

in Chile during the last decade. Then we present our assessment of the increasing detachment of social movements from institutional actors. But protest and impact are different things. Based on a comparison between the student and the Mapuche movement, we argue that in order to shape political outcomes, movements need to be able to utilize massive, visible, and disruptive tactics—small and isolated protests, even if frequent and violent, are less impactful. The last section summarizes and concludes.

Two Theses on the Relations Between Social Movements and Polity Members: Closeness and Detachment

How does the interaction between polity members and social movements affect the emergence and intensity of collective protest? The literature on this subject is vast and complex and it has not reached a consensus. However, even at the cost of some simplification, we derive two theses that are useful for addressing our research question: the closeness and the detachment theses.

The closeness thesis can be derived from a considerable part of the literature on the political process approach.[8] In democratic settings, relations between social movements and polity members are not static. When movements and polity members get close to each other, social movement activity increases—with collective protest being one form such activity may take.[9] Closeness means, for instance, that movements and polity members build alliances and share goals, tactics, and organizational structures. It may also mean that polity members support (or at least are sympathetic to) policies that favor movement demands, that they "certify" the moral stature or intentions of movements,[10] or that movements explicitly adhere to the agendas of polity members and endorse certain candidates during electoral times. All these aspects may change across time.

When movements get close to polity members, they may be aware that they have powerful allies they can rely on. They become less vulnerable to stigmatization by the media and to harsh and arbitrary repression by police forces. Movement leaders and constituencies feel more optimistic and empowered. Hence, they mobilize more—one way of doing so is through collective protest. Examples of this thesis abound. Part of the increased collective mobilization and activity of the American Civil Rights Movement during the 1960s has been attributed to the sympathetic Democrat authorities

of the time.[11] And the increase of protest demonstrations in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s was clearly linked to Gorbachev's openness to reform and citizen participation.[12]

Of course, the political process theory is very broad, and it encompasses important dimensions that go beyond the distance between movements and polity members. Some of these dimensions refer to electoral systems, state strength, forms of government, and prevailing strategies toward challengers.[13] But these dimensions tend to vary little across time—in general, and in particular in Chile during our timeframe. Thus, they are less useful for making sense of the sudden increase of collective protest in Chile than the shifting relationships between movements and polity members.

The detachment thesis makes a different prediction: protest booms when movements and polity members are detached from each other. Detachment often goes hand in hand with disillusionment toward polity members. After considerable spans of time, polity members may eventually fail to channel long-standing social demands and redress collective grievances. Aggrieved groups thus support less and less the policies and platforms of political elites and their electoral candidacies. Citizen confidence in political institutions declines and representation weakens.[14] In this context, protest is seen as the most effective way to press for change. We built the detachment thesis inductively from the Chilean case, but it might also be useful for understanding protests in Bolivia in the early 2000s.[15] It is also consistent with Arce's Latin American cross-national analysis, which shows that protest increases as the quality of democratic representation—embodied in political parties—decreases.[16]

Below we explore the usefulness of both theses for understanding the recent increase of collective protest in Chile. As said before, these two theses do not capture—nor aim to do so—the complexity of the literature on the subject (which often considers nonlinear hypotheses, see e.g. Eisinger 1973). However, they provide a straightforward way of addressing our empirical puzzle of booming protest in Chile—a puzzle we describe in the next section.

Growing Collective Protest in Chile

Researchers generally agree that protest has boomed in Chile in the last few years, but they rarely provide systematic evidence to support this claim.[17] We contribute to filling this gap by presenting our dataset of 2342 protest events taking place throughout Chile between January 1, 2000, and August 31, 2012.[18]

Graph 2.1 plots the evolution of the number of protest events in Chile, both for all the claims raised by protestors and for five main claims that account for most protest activity—educational, environmental, labor, indigenous, and regionalist claims.[19] The main finding is that protest has been growing steadily from 2003 to 2004 onwards. This remains true when considering all types of claims as well as when considering each of the main issue claims—although the increase is more moderate for labor claims.

But does this increase also mean that more people became involved in collective protest? Graph 2.2, which plots the estimated number of participants in protest events,[20] shows that the answer is positive. Since 2003, not only have more protest events taken place but more people have also become involved in protests related to each of the claims considered as well as in general. It is outside the scope of this chapter to explain variations across the slopes of the different claims.

Graph 2.1 Evolution of the number of protest events in Chile by demand type. Source: Protest events dataset based on Chronologies of Protest produced by the Latin American Center of Social Sciences (CLACSO)'s chronologies of protest. Figures for 2012 were estimated extrapolating data available from January to August

Graph 2.2 Evolution of the estimated number of *participants* in protest events in Chile by demand type. Source: Protest events dataset based on CLACSO's chronologies of protest. Figures for 2012 were estimated extrapolating data available from January to August

DETACHED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The flourishing of protest in the last decade raises the question about the role polity members may have played in this change. The closeness thesis would expect this increase to result from the strengthening of the ties between movements and polity members. The detachment thesis, in turn, suggests that the change should result from a growing distance between them. Below we show that the gulf between movements and institutional actors has grown since redemocratization in 1990.

Protestors Are Increasingly Disengaged from Institutional Politics[21]

To explore the relationships between movements and polity members, and the ways they changed across time, we start by considering what happened at the mass level—then we look at organizations and their interactions. To

what extent are those who participate in collective protest in Chile engaged with institutional politics? How has this changed across time? We follow Verba et al.'s notion of political engagement, which refers to psychological predispositions toward political objects as reflected in measures of interest in politics, political efficacy, and trust in political institutions among others.[22]

The closeness thesis would imply not only that those who protest are more engaged with institutional politics than the rest but also that these associations increased across time. This would indicate comparatively stronger ties between movements and polity members, which should explain the increase in protest. The detachment thesis would imply that such associations, even if positive, decrease across time, reflecting the growing distance between movements and polity members. Jumping ahead, that is what we find.

To address these questions, we use the World Values Survey (WVS), which was applied to representative samples of the Chilean adult population in 1990, 1996, 2000, 2006, and 2012. The WVS of 1990, which captures the democratic transition period, reports relatively strong and positive associations between several pairs of variables—pairs in which one variable relates to protest and the other refers to political institutional engagement. Protest measures include participation in demonstrations, boycotts and strikes, occupying buildings, and signing petitions. Institutional political engagement measures include political interest, political discussions, importance of politics, trust in political parties, and vote propensity.[23] Average polychoric correlations are 0.37 and in many cases well above 0.50.[24] That is, those who by 1990 used to engage in a wide array of protest tactics also used to trust more in parties, be more interested in politics, discuss politics more, and so on than those who did not protest.

But these statistical associations decrease systematically across time. From the average of 0.37 in 1990, the average association between protest and political engagement (considering all possible pairs of indicators) drops to 0.25 in 2000, and to 0.18 in 2012. Moreover, many of these associations lose statistical significance across time. At least at the mass level, protest and institutional politics took increasingly divergent paths.

Political Parties Barely Participate in Collective Protests

Another way of exploring the relations between movements and polity members consists of examining with our dataset of protest events (which covers the period 2000–2012) how common it is that political parties—a key polity member—partake in collective protests—the traditional activity

of social movements. "Party protest," as we label this phenomenon, happens when leaders, activists, and/or sympathizers of political parties participate in protest events and identify themselves as such—typically through public statements and chants or by carrying flags, banners, posters, or other visible signs related to their party.

Although the subject of party protest can be pursued more extensively,[25] in this chapter it suffices to note three findings. First, party protest is rare in Chile: we found evidence of party presence in only about 6 % of protest events between 2000 and 2012. This is consistent with the detachment thesis. Second, not all parties are equally prone to participate in protests. The Communist Party (including its youth wing) remains very relevant, accounting for about 60 % of all party protest, and is followed from a considerable distance by the Socialist Party (9.2 %), the Humanist Party (6.9 %), and the Party for Democracy (4.6 %). The Christian Democrats protest very little, and the rightist parties (UDI and National Renewal) do not protest at all. The Communist Party is a less powerful polity member than any of the others mentioned above (except the Humanist Party). It lacked congressional representation from 1990 until 2009, its vote share has been consistently low—typically between 4 % and 6 %—and only in 2013 became a member of the Concertación (or Nueva Mayoría, the governing coalition's more recent name). Finally, consistent with the detachment thesis, there is a marked decrease in party protest since 2006. While in the 2000–2006 period there was party presence in about 10 % of all protest events, this drops to about 4 % for the 2007–2012 period.

Movements Rely Little in Polity Members for Mobilizing Resources

Based on resource mobilization theory,[26] we could argue that an important dimension of the relations between movements and polity members relates to the extent to which the latter channel resources to the former. How do Chilean movements obtain much-needed financial and social resources[27] for sustaining growing protest? If protest results from the strong ties uniting movements and polity members (as the closeness thesis implies), we should find that resources come from state and governmental funds, programs and policies, as well as donations from political parties or individual political leaders. But if protest results from the detachment of movements from institutional politics, we should find that resources come from other venues—yet definitely not from polity members. For assessing this point, we interviewed 36 movement leaders of environmental, student, and

Mapuche organizations.[28] In a nutshell, interviews suggest that Chilean organizations rely very marginally on institutional actors when it comes to mobilizing resources—they rely on a wide array of other sources. What follows is a first approximation of this topic, which in future research could be complemented with quantitative data on funding sources and strategies.

Chilean environmental organizations linked to global environmental networks obtain much of their resources from international foundations and foreign governments, especially European ones—such as the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation, the Packard Foundation, Oxfam, and the Finnish Embassy. Organizations also occasionally benefit from rich individual donors—as was the case of the Patagonia Without Dams campaign, whose stability and material existence heavily depended on the support of Douglas Tompkins's Pumalín Foundation.[29] Some organizations benefit from small funds provided by the Chilean state, but these are tiny. One interviewed put it this way: "in Chile there are no state funds for sustaining oneself. Well, the Environment Protection Fund, it is 2 million pesos, but with 2 million pesos you cannot pay even four salaries, nor a single month." Environmental leaders emphasized, however, that they only apply for funding to those sources that do not curtail their autonomy or that at least have a political or ideological orientation that is consistent with theirs. As the leader of an organization with important international links put it, "We … have decided institutionally not to accept funds that condition our decisions—that is, we protect as much as possible our autonomy. Especially since the context applies so much economic and political pressure, we try to fund ourselves with resources that do not imply any form of external conditioning."

Smaller organizations that face environmental hazards in specific localities—with a not-in-my-backyard style—have different funding strategies. These organizations are more spontaneous, less professionalized, and often disappear once the conflict that motivated them recedes. As they do not have the expertise or infrastructure to apply for international funds, they mobilize local resources from the affected communities, with neighbors providing small monetary donations or voluntary work—in ways that resemble Morris' description of the American Civil Rights movement.[30] Occasionally, they receive support from the mayor, which may side with the community in opposition to a common threat. According to the leader of a neighborhood association: "We reach an agreement with the mayor … In a board meeting, we define the date of the protest, and manage to convoke the people, and also we get the mayor on board. Because, if we

go to Santiago [Chile's capital] the mayor lends us the buses." Yet these approaches remain within the boundaries of local politics. They rarely escalate into contacts with the party the mayor belongs.

The university student movement mobilizes material resources in ways clearly different from those employed by the environmental movement, but both movements have in common their low reliance on polity members. Student federations—the highest representative body of students at the university level—receive many of their financial resources from their respective universities. And student centers, which represent the students of specific colleges within universities, are also supported by the dean's office. As these resources come from the universities students belong to, they cannot be used with complete autonomy, but the range of activities they support is considerable. These go beyond academic or recreational activities and may involve public awareness campaigns on certain topics as well as protest logistics (such as making or purchasing protest flyers, banners, and kits for alleviating the effects of teargases in marches). Some student leaders also noted that parties and the government have no say regarding how to spend these resources.

Student organizations obtain the remaining resources from a wide array of activities such as parties, music shows, raffles, and academic activities with renowned intellectuals. Resources occasionally come from donations from better-off adults such as parents and faculty members, who feed students during occupations and strikes. A student leader relates that "any time there is action, or at the beginning of the year, we organize a fundraising campaign with friends, parents and professors. Professors tend to be an important source of funding … because we are close to them." Some student organizations require regular money contributions from their members. As most students—especially those from the so-called traditional universities—come from the middle or upper classes, they are successful at extracting resources from their social networks.

Finally, student organizations engaged in protest activities often benefit from the human capital of students or recent graduates. Medicine and nursing students take care of wounded students in demonstrations, law students work on the legal dimensions of reform proposals presented by the movement, and music and theater students stage cultural performances. As an interviewee put it, "our advantage is our cultural capital, the university keeps growing, and everybody donates their professional and technical skills."

What role do political parties play in this story? Some interviewees suggest that the Communist Party and the Socialist Party channel resources to leftist student organizations, while the conservative right UDI benefits student groups aligned with their ideology—particularly the Movimiento Gremial at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. We do not have estimates about the quantitative relevance of such resources, but according to the interviewees they seem to be just one among many sources.

Out of the three movements considered here in some detail, the Mapuche movement perhaps relies least on institutional politics in terms of resources (although some organizations partially do so, as noted below). There are two broad types of Mapuche organizations and they differ in that respect.[31] Some are oriented toward cultural goals such as promoting and preserving Mapuche identity and language, developing intercultural educational programs, or improving the socioeconomic situation of the Mapuche people through educational fellowships and access to health services. Mostly based in urban areas, they feel comfortable within the institutional framework of the Chilean state and often receive resources from it through the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI), the Funds for Art (FONDART) program, and the Indigenous Development Area (ADI) program. Although they may also rely on "self-produced resources,"[32] these organizations depend to a considerable extent on institutional politics.

The situation is different for organizations with a more radical stance such as the All Lands Council or the Coordinadora Arauco–Malleco (CAM). They do not identify with Chile as a nation and aim at political autonomy. They heavily engage in disruptive and violent protest tactics. Clandestine or semi-clandestine as they are, they do not receive funds from polity members whatsoever—they find it contradictory to be supported by an institutional order they do not want to be part of. Also, many polity members from across the political spectrum are unwilling to support organizations which they believe commit terrorist acts. These organizations rather depend on resources from the aggrieved communities. They organize cultural festivals and receive donations from other sympathetic groups from civil society. They also collect food and clothes for the families of jailed Mapuche commoners or for those besieged by police forces. These funding sources are not constant but sporadic and linked to particular situations. As one Mapuche interviewed put it, "there is no funding that endures across time … there are donations at particular junctures."

Movements Build Their Collective Action Frames as a Reaction to the Deficiencies of Institutional Politics

The detachment of Chilean social movements from institutional politics goes beyond the mobilization of tangible resources. It also affects the crafting of movements' collective action frames. As noted by framing theorists, movements use collective action frames for identifying problems, attributing blame, proposing solutions, and creating beliefs about the urgency and efficacy of collective action. All these converge in an enlarged and more powerful mass of activists.[33]

A "closeness" explanation of the rise of protest in Chile suggests the existence of strong links between movements and polity members. This implies, empirically, a substantial overlap in the contents of the frames espoused by movements and the discourses and actions of polity members. The detachment thesis, however, claims that protest booms as movements and polity members detach from each other, and this in turn implies that movement frames have little resemblance with policy members' discourses and actions. We hold this last view, but we do not claim that movement frames develop independently from polity members' actions. Rather, we see movement frames as a *reaction* to the inability of polity members to address the problems detected by movements—we call this "reactive framing." While a systematic analysis of this topic would require an entire chapter, here we offer some evidence for our argument.

Consider for instance the environment. While post-transition governments certainly modified in several ways environmental institutions, they rarely challenged the economic orientation inherited from dictatorship, which creates enormous incentives for companies to extract natural resources with negative consequences for the environment and human health. Environmental concerns were never a top priority among Chilean parties, and Chilean leftist parties did never turn green—an intermittent "green caucus" (*bancada verde*), mostly but not exclusively composed of Concertación congressmen, could not boost significant reforms. In fact, environmental priorities *decreased* among the Chilean congressmen.[34] Environmental political parties have been traditionally weak and partisan think tanks do not have environmental issues among their main priorities. Under such conditions, polity members could never be a hub of ideological inspiration for environmental movements.

In this context, the collective action frames of Chilean environmental organizations are largely a reaction to the existing model of exploitation of natural resources and to the inability of polity members to address

environmental problems.[35] These frames emphasize how, in a neoliberal context that imposes little state regulation and in which common goods such as water are privatized, companies profit from overexploiting natural resources. This has a host of negative consequences, from the halving of the native forest and the extinction of many animal species, to the erosion of lands, the contamination of rivers, and severe health problems for human communities located nearby the sites of exploitation. Especially after the Ralco conflict in the 1990s, environmental organizations started blaming post-transition governments for not having implemented significant reforms in that respect, and private entrepreneurs for just being interested in making money disregarding its consequences.[36] Thus, sources other than the Chilean polity nurture these frames. These include international models about environmental activism—as in the case of GreenPeace Chile and research centers such as the Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts (OLCA)—or the domestic elaborations of reactive organizations emerging in local communities affected by environmental hazards.

The collective action frames of the university student movement also stand in sharp contrast with the contents of the educational policies carried out by post-transition governments. There is no such thing as a single movement frame—different student organizations across universities have their own views. However, some notions are widespread across movement organizations—for instance, that the Chilean education system is in crisis, that it is absurdly expensive, and that this forces most would-be students to take burdensome loans from the state and private banks, which is seen as unfair. Also widespread are the beliefs that there are considerable differences in the quality of the education provided by different institutions and that the state is not preventing "educational entrepreneurs" from making illegal profits. Students blame several actors for this situation, from the military government—which stimulated the privatization of the system—to the post-transition polity members—which did not reform it structurally. In terms of prognosis, the mainstream discourse within the movement aims at guaranteeing state funding for all university students—so that the education becomes a universal right rather than a consumption good.

These frames are to a considerable extent a reaction to the moderation (in view of the movements' goals) of the reforms carried out by post-transition governments. While they dramatically increased public expenditure in education and boosted secondary and tertiary coverage, they did not de-commodify the system.[37]

Finally, the trajectory of part of the Mapuche movement provides the starkest example of reactive distancing from institutional politics in terms of frames and goals. During the early 1990s, many Mapuche organizations believed that the new democratic era would come with definitive answers to their long-lasting demands—including the preservation of their traditional ways of life, the protection of their natural environments, and the devolution of usurped ancestral lands. The creation of the CONADI in 1993 fed some of these expectations.

Yet the CONADI was less consequential than many expected. It did not stop the continuous exploitation of lands and forests and the buildings of energy projects that altered the Mapuche environment and communities. Meanwhile, the repression of resisting Mapuche communities increased, and in 1997, President Eduardo Frei removed some CONADI members who opposed his views. As Bidegain shows in his chapter in this volume, all this converged, by the late 1990s, in the tactical radicalization of protests and the emergence of new organizations that sought political autonomy and the emancipation of the *Mapuche* people (though it is important to recall that many organizations did not follow this path). Thus, according to the *Coordinadora Arauco Malleco* (CAM), the Chilean state imposes a Western, foreign culture on the Mapuche people, which includes an alien state, judicial system, and economic system.[38] Organizations like the CAM see Chilean polity members as merely protecting and reproducing this system. From this perspective, resistance and violent protest remained as the only plausible path. It is difficult to imagine a case of detachment from polity members as severe as that of autonomist Mapuche organizations.

Movement Links with Polity Members Are Mostly Instrumental

Detachment does not mean that the relationships between Chilean social movements and polity members are inexistent. Because many of the changes that movements demand require legislative decisions and actions taken by political authorities, they must try to influence them, and this often requires engaging in negotiations.

We asked the social movement leaders we interviewed how they and their organizations relate with polity members. Many recognize that they have ties to some politicians, authorities, and political parties, but these ties are mostly characterized as instrumental, sporadic, and shaped by mistrust. According to the interviewees, movement leaders tend to contact politicians only when needing their help with specific problems or issues,

and politicians are receptive to movements only when the latter manage to stage large and visible protests. As an environmental leader put it, "when our organizations manage to lead a social movement, then political actors immediately start flattering us—so to speak. When mobilization recedes and they control the situation from the political structures, well, they become less interested in dialoguing with us." Encounters between politicians and activists may take place in private settings—like the homes of politicians—or in public ones. They are often tense and sometimes they end up in altercations. According to some activists, this stems from their dissatisfaction with politicians, who continuously make promises they rarely honor.

Thus, many student organizations are flatly detached from the political status quo. As one student leader put it: "When you say 'party', they [the students] tell you 'no, I have nothing to do with parties.' Parties are like AIDS, in the past everybody wanted them, now nobody wants parties. And almost the same happens with authorities." Since most students are indifferent to or have negative views on political parties, leaders who appear to follow the dictates of a given party rather than that of the student body can lose their positions. Leaders tied to parties thus usually downplay such attachments. They rather emphasize that they only follow the will of students as reflected in assemblies—to the point they call themselves "spokesmen" rather than (center or federation) "presidents." This is consistent, since the mid-1990s, with the emergence of an "autonomist" wing within the student movement that emphasizes horizontal organizational structures.[39] Though self-identified with the political left, this wing rejected the moderation of Concertación governments. Its most visible organizations were the SurDA initially, the Front of Libertarian Students, and the Autonomous Left led by Gabriel Boric.

In the case of the Mapuche movement, there has never been in Chile a strong indigenous party. During the last decade, the Wallmapuwen party has attempted to become one, but it faced insurmountable obstacles to even acquire legal existence. This stands in sharp contrast with regional experiences of powerful indigenous parties like the Bolivian MAS and the Ecuadorian Pachakutik.[40]

This is not the whole picture, though. Going back to the interviews, some environmental leaders seem to have relatively harmonious relations with specific politicians of different parties, some of which become allies. For instance, a local environmental leader explains that "we have the support of a senator that has accompanied us to present the protection

resource [a legal figure] and is always asking what we are working on, and he is the only one that stands with the people." Likewise, seven out of the nine presidential candidates in the 2013 elections signed a declaration drafted by environmental activists in which they pledged to protect the Patagonia area from large-scale projects if elected.[41] This affinity between political leaders and activists partially results from the fact that, as one interviewee noted, many environmental leaders and most members of the political class share a common upper-class background. They may even have overlapping friendship and family networks. This creates trust and eases relations despite ideological differences.

Additionally, as suggested above, some student organizations are organically tied to the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, while others are tied to UDI. Likewise, Mapuche organizations that value governmental programs targeted at indigenous communities also establish good working relationships with *wingka* (non-Mapuche) politicians that secure the provision of state resources. These organizations are also tied to a large number of Mapuche mayors—currently gathered in the "Association of Municipalities with Mapuche Mayors".

In sum, while the interviews reveal that there is variation in the strength of the links between movement organizations and polity members, these links are generally ephemeral, instrumental, and shaped by suspicion, all of which is consistent with our identification of the detachment of social movements. Organic, collaborative ties do exist but seem to be an exception.

Can Movements Be Influential Even If Detached? The Role of Protest Tactics

The previous section argued that in the present Chilean social movements are considerably detached from institutional politics. Is lack of influence the price movements have to pay for such detachment? This is not necessarily the case. Movements can be detached *and* influential as long as they manage to display protest tactics powerful enough to press governments to act in ways that address movement demands. We illustrate this claim by comparing the very influential student movement and the less influential Mapuche movement. We select them because they are two important movements that vary markedly in their degree of influence. This allows us to better explore why such variation takes place (we will not consider the environmental movement in the following analysis since it stands in

an intermediate position in that respect). We emphasize tactics but do not deny the role of other factors in shaping movements' influence. For space reasons, we cannot address them here.

The student movement is possibly the one that elicited the most favorable responses from the Chilean governments of the last decade (which includes both Alianza and Concertación administrations). The 2006 protest campaign of secondary students—the so-called *pingüinos* (penguins)—was arguably the decisive factor that moved the Bachelet government to craft a broad political coalition that replaced the Organic Law of Education (LOCE, inherited from the Pinochet era) by a new law, the General Law of Education (LGE). While not all student demands were addressed, the new law reduced the capacity of schools to discriminate against students for economic reasons and tightened the requirements schools had to meet for gaining official recognition.[42] The 2011–2012 massive protest campaign—this time led by university students—was also very consequential. It moved Sebastián Piñera's government to substantially increase public funding for education, reduce the interest rates of educational loans provided by the state from 6 % to 2 %, and establish top loan payments after graduation. Reforms also included the creation of a public agency in charge of supervising the system, and prohibited commercial banks from providing educational loans. Universities suspected of malpractice were prosecuted and closed.[43] Finally, the flagship policy of the current center-left government presided by Michelle Bachelet—the educational reform—is closely related to the demands of the student movement, which also has translated into an increased influence of former student leaders through their hiring at the Ministry of Education.

If the student movement was highly influential, the Mapuche movement can be placed on the opposite side of the spectrum. The current institutional framework regarding indigenous issues was set up in 1993 by Law 19.253, which implemented a fund for transferring ancestral lands to the Mapuche people and improving their socioeconomic situation. Slow advances and government mismanagement led to a radicalization of Mapuche protest in the late 1990s and deepened the conflict between them and the Chilean state. The Bachelet and Piñera governments implemented new programs—such as the Origins Program and the Araucanía Plan—which were less effective than expected. Also, they did not prevent the expansion of energy projects that ended up harming Mapuche communities and lifestyles as well as their access to natural resources. The most important innovation was the ratification in 2008 of Convention No. 169

of the International Labor Organization, which nonetheless did not have a major impact.[44]

Additionally, the Mapuche activists were more systematically and heavily repressed than students. For instance, according to our protest events dataset, only 19 % of those educational protests which had some type of police repression can be characterized as experiencing "violent repression" (by which we mean that there were injuries or deaths during the protest or that the police used firearms). Yet violent repression took place in 47 % of the corresponding Mapuche protests. Going beyond protest events themselves, repression also involved violent police encroachments into Mapuche communities (a phenomenon without counterpart for student organizations) and the application to Mapuche activists of the antiterrorist law, which increased punishments compared to regular laws. This led to many Mapuche casualties over the years, creating deep grievances which fueled more protest.

How can we make sense of differences in movement influence? We first develop an argument based on the literature about tactics and movement impacts.[45] We then use it for understanding our cases.

One of the most important drives of governmental officials is to increase their chances of staying in office in future administrations. In democracies, this ultimately depends on winning more votes than competitors, and this in turn depends on their popularity and public approval. When facing demands by social movements, governmental leaders will try to act in ways that increase, maintain, or at least do not hurt their public approval. Movements can thus be influential if authorities perceive them as capable of affecting such approval.[46] This, in turn, will depend on, among other things, the features of their collective protests. Specifically, four features of protests will provide relevant information to governments about the capacity of movements to shape their public approval: protests' massiveness, public visibility, disruptiveness, and violence.

First, the *massiveness* of protests is likely to be read by politicians as an indicator of the level of popular discontent. Because massive discontent risks reducing governmental approval and damaging future electoral performances, governments have more incentives to make more concessions to larger protest groups.[47] Massive protests are also threatening to governments because they open opportunities for smaller movements and may create protest cascades.[48]

The *public visibility* of protests also matters. Protests taking place in large cities are more likely to be extensively covered by the mass media,

and more residents and bystanders can have a first-hand experience of it. Visibility multiplies the impact of massiveness—more people who are protesting are seen by more people who are watching—and therefore increases its influence on public opinion. Also, when visibility is high, more bystanders are exposed to police repression to protesters, and the media are more likely to spread images of repression that may end up hurting governmental approval.[49] Conversely, protests taking place in smaller communities have fewer bystanders and lower media coverage. Also, repression toward activists will be less likely to damage governmental public approval. The testimonies of repressed activists can be more easily camouflaged, delayed, or distorted by police agents. Low protest visibility makes movements less influential.

Third, scholars have also studied the consequences of *disruptive versus nondisruptive* protest.[50] Disruptive protest (like blocking roads or occupying buildings) creates obstacles for the routine activities of the population and the authorities.[51] This decreases governmental popularity because the affected groups feel that the government is not protecting them. Thus, governments have strong incentives for suppressing disruptive tactics. However, if disruptive protest takes place in visible places, governments will favor deactivation through concessions rather than repression, therefore increasing movement influence.

Finally, we consider the role of violent protest.[52] The same as most people do not like governmental repression, they do not like activist violence, which is usually considered illegitimate.[53] Some groups may ask the government to use an iron hand to show protestors "who rules here," motivating government repression—which more people will consider appropriate given the violent nature of protestors. Violent groups will also elicit fewer concessions from governments: governments do not want the public to see them as weak enough to give up to violent groups. For the opposite reasons, less violent movements may elicit less repression and more concessions, ultimately becoming more influential.

Consequential Differences in Collective Protest: The Student and Mapuche Movements

Guided by the previous discussion, next we explore the tactical differences between the student and the Mapuche movements using our protest events dataset. While many other factors are at play for explaining their differential outcomes, we believe that protest tactics is an important one.

Student protests are by all measures more massive than Mapuche protests. This is evident, first, in Graph 2.2 above. Not only do more people participate in student protests each year but also the gap increases across time. Also, student protest events are much larger than Mapuche events (respectively, an average of 10,187 vs. 698 participants). Excluding events with more than 15,000 participants (which may disproportionately affect averages) also yields average student protests about five times larger than Mapuche protests (2507 vs. 542 participants, respectively). This is consistent with common wisdom. Both in 2006, but especially in 2011, student marches gathered dozens of thousands of protestors. During some days in the winter of 2011, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people took the streets across the country. These were the most massive marches in Chile since those that, in the late 1980s, contributed to the transition to democracy.

Why were student protests so massive? In part, as noted below, because the number of youngsters with access to higher education is also massive. Also, as most students require a loan for studying, the collective action frames spread by movement leaders regarding free education resonate among a wider group of people. Why were Mapuche protests smaller? The Mapuche people represent a small proportion of the population (about 4 % according to the 2002 census).[54] They are geographically segregated—about half of them are concentrated in Regions IX and X—and have lower levels of education, employment, and income than the non-Mapuche population, as well as higher poverty rates.[55] All these factors tend to depress protest participation.[56]

Student protests are not only more massive but also more visible than Mapuche protests. An indicator of visibility is the population size of the province where the protest takes place—larger provinces have more bystanders and typically more media coverage. Table 2.1 shows the six provinces with the largest proportion of protest events for educational and Mapuche demands and the respective province population. A total of 71 % of all student protests took place in the highly populated province of Santiago, the central province in the country's capital, which comprises the downtown and *La Moneda* (the Presidential Palace). By contrast, only 19 % of Mapuche protests took place in Santiago. Beyond Santiago, about 15 % of student protests took place in Valparaíso and Concepción, two other central and populous localities. Yet most of the Mapuche protests outside Santiago are scattered across less populated provinces (particularly Cautín, Malleco, and Arauco, in the center-south of the country). Thus, it

Table 2.1 Provinces where student and Mapuche protests took place (Chile, 2000–2012)

Student protests			Mapuche protests		
Province	% of protests	Province population	Province	% of protests	Province population
Santiago	70.8	4,668,473	Cautín	28.4	667,920
Valparaíso	11.1	876,022	Malleco	24.4	201,615
Concepción	4.8	912,889	Santiago	19.1	4,668,473
Cautín	3.1	667,920	Arauco	7.3	157,255
Iquique	1.7	238,950	Valdivia	4.7	356,396
Copiapó	1.2	155,713	Concepción	3.2	912,889
Others	7.4		Others	13.0	
Total	100		Total	100	

Source: Protest events dataset based on CLACSO's chronologies of protest. Population figures come from http://www.ine.cl/cd2002/

is harder for Mapuche protests to capture the attention of the public, the media, and ultimately political authorities.

The high visibility of student protests did not prevent police repression, which was hard at times and about which there were innumerable complaints by human rights organizations. Yet high visibility forced undercover police operations and possibly limited the brutality of repression, at least compared to Mapuche repression in the countryside. Bystanders and the media could easily notice and register police excesses against students. Moreover, nowadays most students have cell phones that allow them to take pictures and record video. Yet many Mapuche protests took place in rural areas (landed estates or *fundos*), where police repression is less likely to trigger the mass media and public opinion dynamics that end up harming governmental approval.

Finally, student and Mapuche protest also differ in their tactical repertoires. Table 2.2 shows the percentage distribution of tactics employed in student and Mapuche protests. We identify five types of tactics: pacific (e.g. marches or demonstrations), artistic (e.g. music or theatrical performances), disruptive non-violent (e.g. strikes, blockings roads, or occupying buildings), self-destructive (e.g. hunger strikes), and violent (e.g. damaging public or private property, setting things on fire, engaging in lootings, or attacking police forces). Both movements essentially rely on pacific and non-violent disruptive tactics, but the latter are proportionally more prominent among students (40.1 % vs. 31.7 %). Also, students rely slightly more

on artistic tactics (4.8 % vs. 3.1 %), while Mapuche protest depends more on self-destructive (7.5 % vs 2.5 %) and violent (18.3 % vs 11.5 %) tactics.

Why do these tactical differences matter for understanding movement influence? Student protests were very disruptive, actually more than suggested by Table 2.2. Student marches in the main city avenues impeded the routine activities of many citizens and institutions. The seizing of educational buildings halted the normal teaching of classes. This was amplified by the large numbers of participants, as seen above. Moreover, students often resorted to strongly ludic and carnivalesque tactics—from parades in underwear to collective dances and kiss-ins—which increased the sympathy from the general population to the movement. In fact, opinion polls during the 2006 and 2011 campaigns showed that a large majority of the population approved of student demands.[57] Also, because student actions were not overly violent, governments could not react to the disruption with indiscriminate repression. And violence during student protests was often displayed by very small groups of hooded individuals (*encapuchados*), which destroyed public and private property and confronted the police. Yet student leaders emphasized repeatedly in their media appearances that *encapuchados* were not part of the movement but just opportunists, therefore reducing the stigma attached to the movement, which presented itself as peaceful.

Compared to students, however, the tactical repertoire of Mapuche resistance emphasized violent tactics (such as the seizing of land estates or setting trucks and ranches on fire) or self-destructive ones (typically hunger strikes). In fact, more than one quarter of all Mapuche tactics belong to these groups combined. Although Chileans support many demands of Mapuche organizations,[58] violent tactics do not elicit the kind of massive public sympathy that force governments to take movements seriously into

Table 2.2 Distribution of tactics by social movement (%) (Chile, 2000–2012)

	Student	Mapuche
Pacific tactic	41.2	39.5
Artistic tactic	4.8	3.1
Non-violent disruptive tactic	40.1	31.7
Self-destructive tactic	2.5	7.5
Violent tactic	11.5	18.3
Total	100	100

Source: Protest events dataset based on CLACSO's chronologies of protest

account. When in 2007 the Survey of Social Cohesion in Latin America (ECOSOCIAL) asked Chileans to what extent they considered the use of violence by indigenous peoples reclaiming their ancestral lands justified, 65 % said it could never be justified, while 25 % said it could be justified only at times.[59] Additionally, although 32 % of all Mapuche tactics are "non-violent disruptive," their disruptive potential was undermined because these protests tend to be smaller (as noted above) and because many of them took place in remote rural areas, away from large urban centers. All this made it easier for governments to face Mapuche demands with repression rather than concessions.

Conclusions

This chapter aimed at offering an overview of the relations between social movements and institutional politics in contemporary Chile. We presented four main claims. First, collective protest has been growing in Chile during the last decade. Second, when it comes to mobilizing resources and crafting collective action frames, social movements are considerably (and possibly increasingly) detached from polity members such as parties, governments, and political elites. Third, such detachment partially explains the increase in protest. As institutional politics do not deliver the changes that movements demand, collective protest becomes a more attractive and plausible political strategy. Fourth, the rise of protest does not ensure social movement impact. In order to be influential, movements need to stage massive protests in visible places using predominantly disruptive and artistic tactics. We believe our analysis provides insights that go beyond the Chilean case. Specifically, that protest booms in a context of deteriorated (and deteriorating) party-movement linkages defies some well-established predictions.

This chapter has limitations that must be addressed in the future in order to deepen our knowledge on the topic. First, although we emphasized the changing relations between social movements and polity members for understanding protest increases, other factors also matter. Some of them are the expansion of tertiary education, the consolidation of a new middle class with some degree of material well-being, and the sudden eruption of digital networks, which dramatically reduced the costs of transmitting information and coordinating collective actions. Second, important social movements that we ignored in this chapter need to be considered. They include the labor, squatter, sexual diversity, feminist, and

pro-life and pro-choice movements, as well as more short-lived regionalist campaigns in the extreme north and south of the country. The main tenets of this chapter may not apply to all of these movements. Third, we need to consider political parties more in detail, for instance, by asking whether different parties have different strategies and incentives for establishing connections to social movements, or whether party calculations about social movements shape electoral campaigns. Fourth, we need a more detailed analysis of the collective action frames of major movements, as well as a study of their overlap with the contents of the frames of polity members. Fifth, we could gain much from a study of the overlap of the social networks of movement leaders and members of the political elites. Sixth, we need more specific and systematic information about the types and amounts of resources mobilized by each movement. Finally, our protest events dataset, while unique of its kind, could be complemented in the future with other sources in order to reduce selection bias and description bias.[60]

Notes

1. Scully, *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century Chile*.
2. Roberts, *Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru*.
3. Baño, *Lo Social y lo Político, un Dilema Clave del Movimiento Popular*.
4. Hipsher, "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile and Spain"; Oxhorn, *Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile*; De la Maza, "Los Movimientos Sociales en la Democratización de Chile" and "Sociedad Civil y Democracia en Chile"; Garretón, "La Redemocratización Política en Chile. Transición, Inauguración y Evolución."
5. Silva, *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*.
6. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*.
7. Ibid.
8. For a review, see Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities."
9. In this chapter, we are puzzled by changes in collective protest—and in that respect we follow major works in this theoretical tradition such as Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American cities," Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, and Kriesi et al., *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. However, it is important to keep

in mind that the political process theory has been used for understanding other kinds of social movement activity such as court actions, voter registration initiatives, economic boycotts, organizational founding, number of movement organizations, and even policy outcomes (Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities": 133).

10. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 121.
11. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970.*
12. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 74–75.
13. Ibid.
14. Arce, "Parties and Social Protest in Latin America's Neoliberal Era."
15. Arce and Rice, "Societal Protest in Post-stabilization Bolivia," 90–94.
16. Arce, "Parties and Social Protest in Latin America's Neoliberal Era."
17. Tricot, "Movimiento de Estudiantes en Chile: Repertorios de Acción Colectiva ¿Algo Nuevo?"; Somma, "The Chilean Student Movement of 2011–2012: Challenging the Marketization of Education"; Gómez Leyton, "La Rebelión de las y los Estudiantes Secundarios en Chile. Protesta Social y Política en una Sociedad Neoliberal Triunfante."
18. The dataset was collected as part of FONDECYT grant 11121147 "The Diffusion of Collective Protest in Chile, 2000–2012" (Principal Researcher: Nicolás Somma). A team of four social sciences students coded the descriptions of all protest events appearing in the Chronologies of Protest produced by the Latin American Center of Social Sciences (CLACSO), which in turn are based on a wide array of information sources—from mainstream newspapers and radios to websites of social movement organizations. Inter-rater agreement levels were around 90 %. Our study followed—and adapted to Chile—the "Dynamics of Collective Action" project, carried out for the United States by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak and Sarah Soule. Unfortunately, as of October 2015, the Chronologies of Protest are not available anymore via CLACSO's internet website (http://www.clacso.org.ar).
19. The "all" category includes the five claims shown in the figure plus several others like transport, health, housing, human rights, women's rights, and sexual diversity.
20. We logged this variable for reducing the impact of very massive events.
21. This section is based in Somma and Bargsted, "La Autonomización de la Protesta en Chile."
22. Verba et al., *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*, 272.
23. See Somma and Bargsted, "La Autonomización de la Protesta en Chile," for details.

24. Polychoric correlations estimate the association between ordinal and/or dichotomous variables like those used in our analysis. Like the more commonly used Pearson correlation coefficients, they range from −1 (perfect negative correlation) to 1 (perfect positive correlation).

25. Somma, "When do Political Parties Move to the Streets? Understanding Party Protest in Chile (2000–2012)."

26. See Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," for a review.

27. "Social resources" refer to voluntary work, organizations, and social networks See Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization".

28. These interviews were also carried out as part of FONDECYT grant 11121147 "The Diffusion of Collective Protest in Chile, 2000–2012."

29. Schaeffer in this volume.

30. Morris, "Black Southern Student Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization."

31. Lavenchy, *El Pueblo Mapuche y la Globalización. Apuntes para una Propuesta de Comprensión de la Cuestión Mapuche en una Era Global*; Bidegain in this volume.

32. Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization."

33. See Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," for a review.

34. See Universidad de Salamanca *Estudios.*

35. See also Schaeffer in this volume.

36. Schaeffer in this volume; Azkarraga, "Movimientos Anti-mineros: El caso de Pascua-Lama en Chile"; Altieri and Rojas, "La Tragedia Ecológica del Milagro Neoliberal chileno"; Carruthers, "Environmental Politics in Chile: Legacies of Dictatorship and Democracy."

37. See Donoso in this volume.

38. Ruiz, "Autonomismo Mapuche (1907–1992). Renuevos de un Tronco Antiguo"; Tricot, "Lumako: Punto de Inflexión en el Desarrollo del Nuevo Movimiento Mapuche"; Klein, "Los Movimientos de Resistencia Indígena. El caso Mapuche."

39. Donoso, "Dynamics of Change in Chile: Explaining the Emergence of the 2006 Pingüino Movement."

40. Madrid, *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America.*

41. Schaeffer in this volume.

42. Donoso, "Dynamics of Change in Chile: Explaining the Emergence of the 2006 Pingüino Movement."

43. von Bülow and Bidegain, "It Takes Two to Tango: Students, Political Parties and Protest in Chile (2005–2013)"; Somma, "The Chilean Student Movement of 2011–2012: Challenging the Marketization of Education."

44. Donoso, "Chile y el Convenio 169 de la OIT: Reflexiones sobre un Desencuentro"; Báez, *Chile, Entrada en Vigencia del Convenio 169 OIT y el Conflicto en la Región de La Araucanía*; Fuentes, "Derechos Humanos de los Pueblos Indígenas: Chile tras la Ratificación del Convenio 169 de la OIT."
45. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*; Amenta et al., "The Political Consequences of Social Movements"; Giugni, "Was it Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements."
46. Amenta et al., "The Political Consequences of Social Movements," 298–299; Giugni, "Was it Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements," 379.
47. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*.
48. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*.
49. Weitzer, "Incidents of Police Misconduct and Public Opinion."
50. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*; Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why they Succeed, How they Fail*.
51. Taylor and Van Dyke, "'Get up, Stand up': Tactical Repertoires of Social Movements," 281.
52. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*; Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why they Succeed, How they Fail*; Giugni, "Was it Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements."
53. Weitzer, "Incidents of Police Misconduct and Public Opinion"; Crozat, "Are the Times Changin'?" Assessing the Acceptance of Protest in Western Democracies."
54. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, *Estadísticas Sociales de los Pueblos Indígenas en Chile – Censo 2002*.
55. Cerda, "Situación Socioeconómica Reciente de los Mapuches en la Región de La Araucanía"; Lavenchy, *El Pueblo Mapuche y la Globalización. Apuntes para una Propuesta de Comprensión de la Cuestión Mapuche en una Era Global*.
56. Schussman and Soule, "Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation."
57. See http://www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2013/04/16/adhesion-al-movimiento-estudiantil-se-eleva-a-86-segun-encuesta-de-imaginaccion/ and http://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/educacion/movimiento-estudiantil/encuesta-cooperativa-nueve-de-cada-10-familias-apoyan-demandas-estudiantiles/2013-05-27/213251.html
58. Lavenchy, *El Pueblo Mapuche y la Globalización. Apuntes para una Propuesta de Comprensión de la Cuestión Mapuche en una Era Global*, 16.
59. Valenzuela et al., *Vínculos, Creencias e Ilusiones. La Cohesión Social de los Latinoamericanos*.
60. Earl et al., "The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action."

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