APP
ASIAN POLITICS & POLICY

Bridging the Pacific Ocean? Tactical Maneuvering Instead of Grand Strategy in Chile's Foreign Policy toward Southeast Asia

Nicole Jenne *

Chile often portrays itself as Latin America's bridge to Asia, where the ASEAN countries have been singled out as its new priority. Yet, it is not difficult to see that Chile, a small and peripheral state, does not actually serve as a gateway between Latin America and Southeast Asia. This article argues that Chile has lacked consistency in its approach toward Southeast Asia as well as focus of purpose to become a bridge-builder due to the structural constraints faced by a small state. Based on an analytical framework of small states' foreign policies, I revisit Chile's relations with Southeast Asia, pointing to factors driving and limiting deeper engagement with the distant region. The analysis shows that a risk-adverse, low-profile approach of tactical maneuvering has served Chile's objectives even though it is insufficient to bridge the Pacific Ocean. The article concludes with a reflection on this trans-Pacific relationship.

Key words: Chile, foreign policy, small states, Southeast Asia, trade diplomacy

跨越太平洋？智利对东南亚外交政策中用策略操纵替代大战略
智利经常将自身描述为通往亚洲的拉美桥梁，东盟国家已经将其选择为新的政策重点对象。然而不难看出，智利这一发挥边缘作用的小国并不能真正充当拉美与东南亚之间的桥梁。本文主张，鉴于一个小国所面临的结构限制，智利无法始终践行其对东南亚的外交政策，也无法始终聚焦于成为桥梁搭建者这一目的。基于一项有关小国外交政策的分析框架，我重新审视了智利与东南亚的外交关系，指出了与远距离地区进行更深入接触的驱动和限制因素。分析表明，采用风险厌恶、低调的策略方法一直是智利的目标，尽管其不足以跨越太平洋。本文结论反思了跨太平洋关系。

关键词: 智利, 外交政策, 小国, 东南亚, 贸易外交

¿Construyendo puentes sobre el Océano Pacífico? Maniobras tácticas en lugar de una gran estrategia en la política exterior de Chile hacia el Sudeste Asiático
Chile a menudo se presenta como el puente de América Latina hacia Asia, donde los países de la ASEAN se han convertido en su nueva prioridad. Sin embargo, no es difícil ver que Chile, un pequeño estado periférico, en realidad no sirve como puerta de

*Nicole Jenne is an Assistant Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Institute of Political Science, and an associate researcher at the Centre for International Studies (CEI-UC) of the same university. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the European University Institute (Florence).

DOI: 10.1111/aspp.12519
Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 12, Number 2—Pages 106–126

enlace entre América Latina y el Sudeste Asiático. Este artículo argumenta que Chile ha carecido de consistencia en su enfoque hacia el Sudeste Asiático, así como en su objetivo de convertirse en un constructor de puentes debido a las limitaciones estructurales que enfrenta un estado pequeño. Basado en un marco analítico de las políticas exteriores de estados pequeños, reviso las relaciones de Chile con el Sudeste Asiático, señalando los factores que impulsan y que limitan un compromiso más profundo con la región distante. El análisis muestra que un enfoque de maniobras tácticas de bajo perfil y adverso al riesgo ha servido a los objetivos de Chile a pesar de que es insuficiente para tender un puente sobre el Océano Pacífico. El artículo concluye con una reflexión sobre la relación transpacífica.

Palabras clave: Chile, política exterior, estados pequeños, Sudeste Asiático, diplomacia comercial

Introduction

Chile's foreign policy circles like to portray Chile as a gateway for Latin America's relations with the Asia-Pacific. Former President Michelle Bachelet put it bluntly at the "One Belt, One Road Forum" in Beijing in May 2017 when she declared: "Chile is ready to serve as a bridge between Latin America and Asia" (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2017). Former Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heraldo Muñoz (2017), described it as a "prime objective of our foreign policy […] to become a bridge between Asia and Latin America." More recently, President Sebastián Piñera, too, invoked the image of Chile as a bridge-builder between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Pacific Alliance, a trade bloc between Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, portraying his country as a "development partner" of Southeast Asia (Sputnik, 2018).

It does not take much to see that Chile falls short of performing the functions of a trans-regional bridge-builder. Unlike small states like Singapore, Chile lacks the strategic location to serve as a regional hub. In fact, Latin America, including Chile, lacks important regional infrastructure connecting the countries inside the region collectively with the other side of the Pacific. Apart from an impressive number of trade agreements and a vivid trade policy agenda, Chile has neither established a strong presence within Asia nor has it pursued unconventional policies that would position it as an outstanding actor. Indeed, the scholarly consensus has been that "the idea of Chile being the bridge to Asia has been no more than an illusion" (Frohmann, 2016, p. 208; see also Artaza, 2007, p. 55).

This article revisits Chile's foreign policy toward the Southeast Asian region. Drawing on the literature on small states and secondary powers in international politics, I argue that Chile's approach toward Southeast Asia has been guided by strategic considerations with regard to the country's commercial and trade interests. Facing structural constraints as a small state, however, it failed on instrumental delivery. The result has been an approach of low-risk tactical maneuvering instead of a proactive foreign policy strategy. Nevertheless, keeping a low profile has allowed Chile to consolidate a positive international image as a champion in negotiating trade agreements that could eventually bolster its claim to serve as a trans-Pacific bridge.

Although the idea of a bridge is loosely applied to the broader region of the Asia Pacific, this article focuses on Southeast Asia, the region comprising the ten members of ASEAN. There are two main reasons to do so. First, Southeast Asia has attracted growing attention since it began to enter into the foreign policy considerations of Chile's successive governments after the country's neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. Chilean policy makers from all sides of the political spectrum have insisted the country could serve as an "integration platform" for ASEAN (Frei Ruiz-Tagle in Xinhua, 2016), which is seen as "one of the blocks with the strongest gravitational pull in the world" (Jana, 2014). Made up mostly of small states and one aspiring middle power, Indonesia, the region includes both thriving economies and emerging markets. Moreover, ASEAN has managed to establish itself as a political actor within East Asia (Caballero-Anthony, 2014).

Second, from the Southeast Asian side, too, there has been a growing, mainly commercial interest in Latin America. Although for the purpose of this article the focus is on the Chilean side of the relationship only, Southeast Asian states' interest in and reactions to Chile's engagement with the region play an equally important role in the relation between the two sides. Latin America's natural resources and agricultural production as well as its potential to serve as a market for Southeast Asian goods has raised the profile of a potential bridge-builder and pioneer country in cross-Pacific relations. The current government of Joko "Jokowi" Widodo in Indonesia, one of the fastest growing economies in the G20, has placed emphasis on seeking access to non-traditional markets such as that of Latin America (UGM, 2018). Thus, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed with Chile in 2018 was seen as a facilitator to export Indonesian goods not only to Chile, but to other Latin American markets (Oxford Business Group, 2018). According to policy makers in Hanoi, "Vietnam considers Chile one of its most important partners in the Latin America region" (Vietnam News Agency, 2018) and, echoing the Chilean aspiration, "Chile could become a bridge connecting Vietnam and South American markets" (Vietnam Investment Review, 2018). As a group, ASEAN has signed the ASEAN-Pacific Alliance Framework for Cooperation in 2016 (ASEAN, 2017). Also the now widely debated, US-promoted idea of an Indo-Pacific region opens a potential role for Chile to become part of this imagined regional space spanning both the Indo and South Pacific areas.

In asking which type of foreign policy Chile has pursued toward Southeast Asia, this article makes three contributions. First, it adds to the literature on small states' or small powers' foreign policies (Browning, 2006; Cooper & Shaw, 2009a; Handel, 1990; Ingebritsen, Neumann, & Gstöhl, 2006; Long, 2016; Neumann & de Carvalho, 2015). Chile is an atypical small state in that it neither followed a strategy of employing creative, unconventional strategies to "punch above [its] weight" (Cooper & Shaw, 2009b, p. xxi; Panke, 2012), nor has it pushed the limits of international rules by creating a tax haven or attracting dubious financial resources (see Cooper, 2009; Payne, 2004; Prasad, 2009). Nevertheless, like other small states, Chile has faced resounding structural constraints in foreign policy making that turned its attempt to follow a set strategy into an inconsistent policy characterized by mostly reactive, tactical maneuvering. This article describes such an approach, illustrating both its merits and shortcomings.

Second, although the article centers on Chile, its conclusions will be relevant to the relationship between Southeast Asia and Latin America more generally. Some of the limitations found in Chile's Southeast Asia policy likely apply to other Latin American countries as well, since Chile, as I argue below, is generally well-positioned to serve as a partner and potential bridge-builder for Southeast Asia.

Third, the article addresses a gap in the literature on relations between the two regions. Work on the relations between Chile and the ASEAN states is scant, highly repetitive, and tends to list formal events and the economic factors underpinning the relation (Arnson, Heine, & Zaino, 2014; Oyarzún, 2018; Ross, 2007; Wilhelmy, 2010; Wilhelmy, Lazo Rodríguez, 1997). This article provides new empirical evidence allowing for novel insights into past and future relations across the Pacific.

The remainder is divided into seven parts. After setting the theoretical framework, the second section justifies the case selection. Next, I provide the historical background to Southeast Asia-Chilean relations before I describe the shift in Chile's foreign policy toward a more active approach in the form of economic diplomacy in the 1990s. I sketch the economic relations developed with Southeast Asia since and argue that Chile has successfully promoted an international image of a champion in negotiating commercial agreements. Beyond economic diplomacy, however, Chile has neither developed an outstanding presence in Southeast Asia nor has it acted as a promoter of specific policies. This is shown in the fifth section, which deals with foreign policy activities in areas other than economic. A similar, rather inconsistent low-key approach is also reflected in Chile's recent moves to multilateralize its foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, as subsequently discussed. The concluding section summarizes and reflects on how the capacities of a small state can be used to build trans-regional bridges.

Small States' Foreign Policies

What does it take to become a trans-Pacific bridge-builder? The potential options to establish a set of reasonably substantive and stable relations with the countries of Southeast Asia are many. In order to narrow the focus and define a suitable scope of analysis, it is first necessary to ask what kind of foreign policy Chile can be expected to exercise toward Southeast Asia. Certainly, there is no point in expecting a country of just over 18 million inhabitants that ranks 10th in size among the 35 countries on the American continent to maintain an extensive physical presence throughout the world. What benchmark, then, should be used to evaluate Chile's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia?

Finding a suitable category is not straightforward. Surely, Chile is not a big power, but this is about where scholars' agreement ends. According to Ping (2005), Chile is a middle power, a category Cooper and Shaw (2009c, p. 2) specify further when describing Chile as a "non-traditional middle power" like South Africa but unlike the Nordic countries. However, two decades earlier, Higgott and Cooper (1990) still thought Chile belonged to those countries "*not* generally recognised as middle powers" (1990, p. 601, emphasis added). Recent studies on middle powers effectively do not include Chile among their case studies (Cooper, 2013; Gilley & O'Neil, 2014; Wang & French, 2013).

The classification of who counts as a middle power depends of course on the indicators used. Those commonly applied can be grouped into quantitative indicators such as GDP, population size, and military expenditure, on the one hand, and qualitative indicators that identify traits in states' diplomacy and security policies, on the other (Emmers & Teo, 2015, p. 186). Middle powers, for instance, are thought to be "good international citizens" that support multilateralism, act as conflict mediators, and obey the dominant rules of the international system (Thies & Sari, 2018, p. 400). However, both approaches are problematic. While quantitative indicators often lack a theoretical justification for the thresholds they define (Prasad, 2009, p. 44), the main flaw in the qualitative approach is its tautological reasoning (Black, 1997). If middle powers are grouped together according to their behavior, this group unites middle power-constitutive traits that are then used to explain this very behavior. Yet, the goal of defining the kind of a state should not be studying the category itself—often "used by policy-makers for their own purposes"—but instead, it should serve a better understanding of specific policies and decisions (Keohane, 1969, p. 292). Therefore, and based on the prevailing ambiguities in the existing literature, this article takes a pragmatic approach leaving aside the middle power category and instead studying Chile as a small state as opposed to a big one. Although the resulting small state category is extensive and broader than others, mainly those used by international financial institutions that define small states as those with fewer than 1.5 million inhabitants (Prasad, 2009, p. 44), it is still useful to highlight the systemic and structural constraints Chile has faced in projecting itself across the Pacific.

Small powers, as opposed to big ones, face greater structural limitations in what they are able to achieve in relation with other states. At the most basic level, they may not be able to afford international overseas representation (Baldacchino, 2009, p. 26). In this sense, small states need to cope with vulnerability, "a naturally imposed and predictable condition in which the room for manoeuvre is severely constrained" (Cooper & Shaw, 2009b, p. xviii). However, existing studies have shown that in order to reduce vulnerability and perhaps even achieve an international status where small states can "play above their weight" (Cooper & Shaw, 2009b, p. xxi), non-great powers can use their capacities in creative and unconventional ways. Put differently, for a small state to perform the role of a trans-regional bridge-builder, we would expect it to pursue a foreign policy strategy aimed at doing exactly that.

Strategy, based on its origins in military studies, can usefully be defined as "the art of distributing and applying […] means to fulfill the ends of policy" (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 321). Accordingly, grand strategy describes the use of instruments in different policy areas, including, among others, military, economic, and sociopolitical. There is a well-established body of literature that has described different strategies for non-great powers to get their way in international politics. For instance, bigger small states like Chile can carve out a niche where they concentrate their resources in order to promote specific policies (Emmers & Teo, 2015, p. 187). They can also establish themselves as honest brokers since they are perceived as less threatening than great powers. As long as they are not clearly aligned with a great power, small states have greater capacities to promote certain international norms by providing intellectual leadership (Hey, 2003). The more active small states thus build an image and act upon the "good

international citizen" model described above, whereby they support multilateralism and peaceful coexistence between states (see also Björkdahl, 2008; Evans, 2011). Others have highlighted the "collective power" of small states (Long, 2016) when they cooperate with their kind in order to gain political clout and economic weight (Cooper & Shaw, 2009b, p. xx; Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006). Lastly, since there really is no single, "blanket description for small countries when it comes to something as specific as devising foreign policy" (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009, p. 102), small states have pursued a range of different "non-orthodox approaches" to achieve specific ends (Prasad, 2009, p. 43). Such unconventional, creative approaches can take an infinite number of forms, like the selling of passports as in the case of Malta and others, or the taking of extraordinary risks to promote an active international diplomacy, like Qatar (Cooper & Shaw, 2009b).

However, devising such policy strategies, that is, a goal-oriented higher order policy, requires intellectual and bureaucratic capacities that often exceed those of small states. As scholars have observed, many small state foreign policies do "not emerge out of a set development strategy […, …] a commitment to a proactive state or the overall building of state capacity. Rather, the approach was ad hoc and opportunistic" (Cooper, 2009, p. 207). As I shall show, Chile's Southeast Asia policy is best described as such an approach of tactical maneuvering. The bridge country policy is atypical in that despite setting a strategic goal, the country did not resort to common small state policies such as niche activism, unorthodox approaches or creative and unconventional diplomatic initiatives. However, it still faced structural constraints typical of small states, which rendered its foreign policy inconsistent and often deprived of purposeful action. The result has been a low-key approach toward Southeast Asia lacking instrumental delivery, and although this approach falls short of building the capacity needed to perform the role of a gateway for Latin America-Southeast Asian relations, it nevertheless created the basis for what could be a "thin bridge" across the Pacific.

Chile: An Often-Cited "First" in Trans-Pacific Relations

Chile is not the only Latin American country that aspires to position itself as a relevant partner vis-à-vis Asia. Alongside the BRICS state Brazil, there are also the members of the Pacific Alliance, all of which border the Pacific Ocean: Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. This section explains why Chile merits closer attention and why the conclusions derived from this case will be relevant for Southeast Asia's relations with Latin America more generally.

Historically, the Pacific has been seen as Chile's "manifest destiny" (Porteous, 1981, p. 72). When the country declared independence in 1818, the coastal town of Valparaiso was emerging as a Pacific commercial hub. By the mid-19th century the Chilean *peso* was an accepted currency in Asia's trading capitals (Chou, 2004, pp. 273–274). Even if the vision of an integrated "Pacific" geographical space failed to materialize, it was still an "aspirational identity" that continued to draw Chile's attention seaward (Melillo, 2016). Boosted by its victory in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883)—with a resulting economic bonanza and a powerful navy both politically and militarily—Chile's projection toward the Pacific led to the annexation of Rapa Nui (Easter Island) in 1888. Although no meaningful attempt was made to integrate the island located over 3,500 kilometers off its coast, Chile

was at the time the only Latin American country with a territorial possession in Polynesia.

This was not the only time Chile was cited as "first" and "only" in relation to the Asia-Pacific. Among the Latin American countries that have eyed closer relations with Southeast Asia, Chile has been described as a "pioneer in promoting […] ties with the Pacific Rim" (Oyarzún, 2018, p. 283). It was the first South American country to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1971, the first South American host for the annual APEC summit in 2004, and the first non-Asian country to sign a free trade agreement with China in 2005. Of all Latin American countries, Chile is first in terms of exports destined to Asia and the second country after Brazil to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2016. Together with Mexico and Peru, Chile is a member of the three Pacific economic institutions: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC, created in 1980), the business forum Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC, created in 1967), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, created in 1994).

Taken together, the above shows that Chile has had comparatively strong incentives to project itself toward Southeast Asia. In economic terms, its interlocking trade agreements with other Latin American countries can serve as a bridge for Southeast Asian markets. Politically, Chile's longstanding presence in the Asia Pacific, albeit limited, could turn it into a facilitator of trans-Pacific relations. Therefore, the obstacles Chile has faced in developing an effective foreign policy to bridge the Pacific are likely to be found in other countries as well. From this perspective, Chile's relationship with Southeast Asia will provide insights into Latin America-Southeast Asian relations in a more general sense.

Sporadic Encounters Prior to 1990

Historically, Chile's relations with Southeast Asia were sporadic and highly context-specific. Although trade has played a role, the early encounters were mostly political. This goes back to Chile's independence hero, the *Libertador* Bernardo O'Higgins, who aspired to liberate the Philippines from Spanish rule. However, O'Higgins' noble intentions lacked any means to project power toward Asia. But when the Philippines eventually gained independence from the US in 1946, Chile was quick to open an embassy in Manila. Since, Chile's relation with the Philippines has been less stable than with other Southeast Asian countries even though the Spanish colonial heritage has created symbolic bonds. A Philippines-Chile Cultural Agreement was signed in 1987, but soon it became functionally defunct.

Still during the colonial period, Southeast Asia received a Chilean consul who would become famous later in life: Pablo Neruda. Neruda, who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1971, was first sent to Rangoon, the capital of Burma, which was then part of British India. Later, he was appointed to Singapore and Batavia, present-day Jakarta's former name under the Dutch. During the five years he spent in Asia, Neruda also visited Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia. Although this period is seen as one of the most important ones for his literary creation, comparatively little is known about Neruda's life in Southeast Asia, except that it was marked by isolation and loneliness (Neruda, 2009).

In the early Cold War, Chile aligned itself with the anti-communist, Western bloc led by the United States. Salvador Allende, then as President of the Senate, tried to foster relations with the communist camp and visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (then commonly known as North Vietnam) in May 1969. Allende was elected President the following year, and in 1971 the two countries established diplomatic relations while the communist north of Vietnam was embroiled in a civil war against the US-backed regime in the south. The fate of Allende's government is well-known. The military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, which lasted from 1973 to 1990, was an internationally isolationist regime whose dire human rights record led to strained relations with many countries (but not China), most importantly the Western democracies of North America and Western Europe. Within Latin America, the regional agenda for economic integration was at a low point, given that most countries had implemented protectionist measures and pursued import-substituting policies. Thus, when Chile embarked on a neoliberal reform process that required its economic insertion into global markets, the regime's economists identified the authoritarian, Western-aligned states of Southeast Asia as potential international partners. Chile's reaching out to Southeast Asia was driven more by the particular situation the country found itself in at the time rather than a strategic decision.

Chile's export-oriented model broadly aspired to follow the example of the Asian tigers that had achieved rapid industrialization, technological innovation, and high growth rates in the context of non-democratic political systems: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Moreover, the Pinochet regime saw in Asia a potential diplomatic interlocutor. Although allies of the Western bloc, the Asian tigers, and other Southeast Asian states were staunch supporters of formal non-intervention and strongly opposed what they saw as meddling of the US and Europe in their domestic affairs. Thus, in 1977, Chile opened a permanent representation in Indonesia. From there, it was repeatedly assured that the regime of President Suharto (1967–1998) would support Chile regarding its internal human rights situation (see for instance Embajada de Chile, 1985). A similar, well-disposed position was taken by Filipino strongman Ferdinand Marcos, who invited Pinochet for an official state visit in March 1980. The visit was canceled at the last minute when Pinochet, already in Tahiti on his way to the Philippines, was informed that he could not land in Manila (Muñoz, 1980, p. 24). The *Filipinazo* was seen in Chile as a diplomatic maneuver by the US and showed the limited leverage of its nascent foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Until this began to change in the mid-1990s, this section has shown that the region appeared only rarely on the radar of Chilean foreign policy makers. The country's resources were limited, and at the same time Chile saw few opportunities in Southeast Asia. From the late 1980s on, this perception was gradually being transformed.

Commercial and Trade Diplomacy: The 1990s and Beyond

Rather than a set policy strategy, it was Chile's socioeconomic development reforms of the 1980s and its isolation from Western democracies that provided the initial impetus to find trade partners as far as in Southeast Asia. After 1990, the transition to democracy accelerated its international engagement. One of the main pillars of the country's so-called "international re-insertion," Chile's

foreign policy has since been characterized by an active commercial and trade policy globally and toward the Asia-Pacific in particular (Oyarzún, 2013; Wehner & Thies, 2014). The most tangible expression of its economic strategy has been the signing of commercial and trade agreements, which amount to a total of 27 worldwide, covering over 90% of Chile's commerce.[1] In Southeast Asia, Chile has concluded five commercial agreements with six of the ASEAN states (see Table 1 below). In this context, during the 1990s the "bridge country proposal became state policy" (Frohmann & Wilhelmy, 2016, p. 228).

In this section, I argue that these policies were part of an instrumental approach of limited scope Chile has pursued vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. They fall within the range of policies that might be expected from a small state like Chile and as such they have failed to trigger a set of relations sufficiently widespread and diverse to serve as a trans-Pacific bridge-builder. Yet, Chile used its low-key economic diplomacy to build an international image as a reliable trade partner (see Wehner, 2016), establishing itself as a potential bridge-builder in the future.

Before describing Chile's commercial and trade diplomacy, it is worth clarifying what the terms mean since they are often confounded in the literature or used interchangeably. Following the standard used in diplomacy studies, commercial diplomacy and trade diplomacy are two different activities that both belong to the umbrella term of economic diplomacy, together with development aid (Okano-Heijmans, 2016, p. 525). Trade diplomacy describes the negotiation of economic agreements, while commercial diplomacy is a broader term "defined as 'all public policy measures that actually or potentially enhance exporting activity either from a firm, industry or national perspective'" (Naray, 2008, p. 3). Both commercial and trade diplomacy became crucial instruments in Chile's foreign policy after the country had dropped its import substituting industrialization policies in favor of an export-oriented development model. As one observer notes (Wehner, 2016, p. 425):

> Although Chile is also a promoter of democracy and defender of human rights, both of which represent key aspects of its new post-authoritarian national identity, the model of export promotion has become the most salient characteristic in its foreign policy behaviour since re-democratisation in the 1990s…

Key to this approach was the signing of free trade agreements (Oyarzún, 2013; Wehner, 2011).

Yet, Chile's economic diplomacy has not amounted to a policy strategy aimed at punching above its weight, as an innovative small state foreign policy would suggest. In an increasingly globalized world, the importance of commercial and trade diplomacy has grown to the point that "[s]ome small and middle-sized countries ask the question whether diplomacy at all should exclusively focus on commercial diplomacy in order to survive" (Naray, 2008, p. 2). The fact that an economic rationale prevailed in Chile's Southeast Asia policy from 1990 onward should, therefore, not be mistaken as an unconventional or exceptional approach, even though its trade liberalization policy has certainly been remarkable (Wehner, 2011). Beyond the signing of economic agreements, Chile has failed to promote a significant expansion of its relations with Southeast Asia as its

Table 1. Representation and Trade Agreements of Chile

	Diplomatic relations	Embassy	Commercial office/commercial representative (ProChile)	Trade agreement
Brunei	1984	Concurrent (Malaysia)	–	Pacific-4 (2005), operational since 2006
Cambodia	1973	Concurrent (Thailand)	–	Preferential access under WTO regulation since 2013
Indonesia	1965	Since 1977	Agricultural Attaché	Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2017)
Laos	1991	Concurrent (Vietnam)	–	Preferential access under WTO regulation since 2013
Malaysia	1974	Since 1989	Commercial Attaché	FTA (2010), operational since 2012
Myanmar	1982	Concurrent (Thailand)	–	Preferential access under WTO regulation since 2013
The Philippines	1946	Since 1967	–	Negotiations for FTA underway
Singapore	1979	Since 1979	–	Pacific-4 (2005), operational since 2006
Thailand	1962	Since 1996	Commercial office	FTA (2013), operational since 2015
Vietnam	1971	Since 2004	Commercial Attaché	FTA (2011), operational since 2014

attention was focused on other parts of the world. After Pinochet's dictatorship, the first democratic government of Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994) put emphasis on re-establishing Chile's relations with the countries of Latin America and Europe. Nevertheless, Chile managed to build an image as a strong promoter of agreements to liberalize trade, even if its approach had fallen short of what is needed to serve as a bridge between the two sides of the Pacific.

East Asia attracted Chile's attention mainly because of the recently created APEC, the first intergovernmental organization in the Asia Pacific, which was set up to liberalize and facilitate trade and to foster economic and technical cooperation. Given that APEC's agreements are not legally binding, it was especially appealing to Chile. In 1991, Santiago asked to participate as an observer in APEC's informal dialogue session in Seoul. Its newfound interest in the Asia Pacific was welcomed by Malaysia's Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir, who opened an embassy in Santiago after visiting Chile in 1991. Mahathir was an internationally vocal figure speaking on behalf of developing nations and an outspoken critic of the West and the United States in particular. In a bid to defend Malaysia's interests against those of Washington, which favored the entry of its NAFTA partner Mexico into APEC but was skeptical of Chile's membership, Malaysia worked as a coalition-builder to facilitate Chile's accession in 1994. The demonstration of mutual interest between Aylwin and Mahathir reflected the latter's political motives as a champion of South-South cooperation as well as business interests of the Malaysian elite. However, what could have been a promising start for a more extensive relation with Malaysia, one of the so-called Southeast Asian tiger economies, bore few tangible results. Under the premiership of Najib Razak (2009–2018), Malaysia became increasingly embroiled in domestic issues and lost its vocal international profile. Chile, overstretched with its new neighborhood policy and the simultaneous global reinsertion (see Wilhelmy & Durán, 2003), was unable to capitalize upon the nascent relation.

Chile began gradually building resources to bolster its economic diplomacy activities. Accession to PECC (1991) and subsequently APEC spurred the formation of an informal network among academics, private sector representatives, and government officials across party lines (Wilhelmy & Lazo Rodríguez, 2011, p. 16). President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle assigned trade policy to the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and undertook himself frequent visits to the Asia Pacific while he was still in office. His personal relationships with government officials and business representatives continued when he was appointed as special envoy for the region in 2014, a position that was renewed under the subsequent government.

It was in terms of trade diplomacy that Chile was most actively engaged with Southeast Asia. As of today, the country has bilateral free trade agreements with three Southeast Asian states, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Indonesia, and a comprehensive, multilateral trade agreement that includes Brunei and Singapore, together with New Zealand (see Table 1). Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar all export tariff-free since Chile passed a law in 2013 that gave the three least developed countries preferential access under a World Trade Organization (WTO) regulation. Consultations for a bilateral agreement with the Philippines are underway.

However, Chile's economic relations with Southeast Asia have clearly been of secondary importance relative to other economies in the Asia-Pacific and the

North Atlantic. In 2015, the combined share of the ten ASEAN member states in Chilean imports was 3.68%, while the entire East Asia and Pacific region accounted for over one-third (World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS], 2019). Considering Southeast Asia's combined share of total merchandise exports, its markets have consistently accounted for less than 2% of Chilean imports. Only one country, Vietnam, has significantly grown in relative importance in the past years (WITS, 2019). As for Chile's exports to the ten ASEAN states, Figure 1 shows that these have increased only marginally in absolute value, although relatively steadily, as compared to the two big economies of the Asia Pacific, China and Japan, which have demonstrated greater complementarity with the Chilean markets.

Southeast Asia's comparatively lesser importance in economic terms is likely both a cause and a consequence of Chile's reduced diplomatic and commercial representation in the ASEAN countries (see Table 1). As of today, all ten ASEAN states have diplomatic representations, including six embassies and concurrent ambassadors in the tiny kingdom of Brunei and the three least developed countries: Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. According to a ministerial reform that reduced embassy staff in 2003, all embassies are run by the ambassador plus one civil servant. The only country with an office dedicated to promote commercial ties is Thailand; four other countries have one or more commercial representatives mostly from *ProChile*, the Foreign Ministry's trade and investment promotion agency.

This section has shown considerable advances in Chile's trade diplomacy and, although to a lesser extent, in its commercial diplomacy toward Southeast Asia. Yet, given the globalized nature of the international economic system, these policies on their own fall short of constituting the type of niche diplomacy that allows



Figure 1. Chilean exports (in US$ Thousands).
Source: Data from World Integrated Trade Solutions, Trade Stats (Retrieved from http://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?lang=en).

small states to punch above their weight. Since the existing commercial ties are relatively reduced in number and importance, Chile's flag has not (or perhaps not yet) followed the money, as it would be necessary were the country to become a bridge between Latin America and Southeast Asia. The next section demonstrates that apart from its commercial and trade strategy, Chile has lacked a focus of purpose in its engagement with Southeast Asia. Other priorities, namely, its immediate neighborhood and the strategic partnership with the US and, increasingly, China, have rendered its approach to Southeast Asia inconsistent and lacking in decisive political backing and strategic allocation of resources. Thus, economic diplomacy has failed to spill over into other policy areas.

Limited Engagement in Foreign Policy Areas Other than Economic

Exchanges and common initiatives between Chile and the countries of Southeast Asia have been limited across different policy areas other than commerce and trade. Chile has no bilateral exchanges in the area of defense and security with any Southeast Asian state. On two occasions, the desire to promote Chile's insertion into the global economy brought its military as peacekeepers to Southeast Asia. The governments of the democratic transition identified peacekeeping as an instrument to signal their commitment to multilateralism and establish Chile as a reliable partner. Thus, in 1992–1993 a marine infantry unit participated in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in which the ASEAN countries had taken a lead role. In 2000, Chile contributed an Army helicopter platoon to the UN Mission for the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Yet, with the closing of each mission, Chile's engagement in security matters came to an end. Security was only recently identified as a potential area for cooperation with Southeast Asia (see below), but so far Chile has neither designated defense attachés nor developed any action plans in this area. The armed forces participate in some of East Asia's defense trade fairs and defense diplomacy fora, such as the Shangri-La Dialogue. These are limited points of contact, however, since it is generally the representatives of Asia's bigger countries that receive the greater share of attention in such activities.

Chile has concluded political agreements of mutual support for candidatures in international organizations with Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Among these, the country that has arguably spurred the greatest attention from the Chilean foreign policy elite is Indonesia. Chile's relations with the Philippines have suffered from the latter's repeated internal crises; relations with Thailand are still comparatively new; and relations with Vietnam have mainly centered on the Chilean Communist Party and particularly on one of its leading figures, Senator Isabel Allende, Salvador Allende's daughter. With Singapore, although important in economic terms, Chile has maintained little, if any, political dialogue. Indonesia, on the contrary, has long been ASEAN's *primus inter pares* and more recently it has established itself as one of the emerging economies of the global south.

If there is a special emphasis on Indonesia from the Chilean side, however, the same has not been true *vice versa* due to Chile's position as a secondary state within the region. It is perhaps no coincidence that Chile runs an embassy in Jakarta since 1977, while the Indonesian embassy in Santiago opened its doors

only in 1991. Following Chile's gradual international opening in the late 1970s, several high-level visits were undertaken to Indonesia, but these were not reciprocated in frequency nor in rank (Wilhelmy & Lazo Rodríguez, 1997, p. 43). Within Latin America, the main referents for Indonesian foreign policy makers have been the region's biggest countries, Brazil and Mexico. Although they still concentrate much of Indonesia's diplomatic activity in the region, Chile was the first Latin American country with whom Indonesia signed a free trade agreement in 2017 and was designated as a priority country for Indonesia's diplomatic engagement in 2020.

In the political realm, Indonesia is Chile's most likely partner in democracy promotion and human rights (Fundación Imagen de Chile & BCN, 2014, p. 23), a goal listed in all major foreign policy guidelines of the past two decades. Other than Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines are all formally democratic but have a questionable record in practice. The external dimension of democracy promotion and human rights protection played a crucial role during Chile's democratic transition and worked as a driver for its engagement with the world in general and the Asia-Pacific in particular (Wilhelmy, 2008). However, if Chile used regional cooperation within Latin America to further a "pragmatic" agenda of democracy and human rights (van Klaveren, n.d., p. 10), its resources were too limited to extend to Southeast Asia. The issues have never been formally dealt with, either using bilateral channels or with the ASEAN states collectively.

The venue that is widely seen as the most promising for deepening trans-Pacific relations is the Singapore-initiated Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC). Providing possibilities for both bilateral and multilateral engagement across different policy areas, FEALAC could play an important role in building bridges between the two regions. Established in 1998, FEALAC brings together 36 East Asian and Latin American countries to form an official and regular dialogue channel between public and private individuals. Following the model of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), it consists of regular meetings at the levels of Foreign Ministers (every two years), as well as senior officials and working-level officials (every year).[2]

Contrary to the general appreciation that FEALAC has substantive potential to bolster Latin America-Asia relations, the forum, a stand-alone meeting, has failed to establish a meaningful link with policy making. Chile's role in FEALAC in particular has been negligible due to a lack of continuity and resources necessary to deliver on its promises. FEALAC's relevance is entirely dependent on the initiative of individual states or groups of two and more states to propose, implement, and carry out specific projects. While Chile has not been part of any regional project, between 2000 and 2012 it formally proposed eight individual projects.[3] To date, none of these has been concluded. The one project that has advanced to the extent that it counts with some level of specification, the FEALAC Academic Network (FAN), was put on ice as APEC consumed the human resources available for inter-regional cooperation.

The failure to take advantage of FEALAC is indicative of Chile's shortfall in positioning itself strategically as a relevant actor for trans-Pacific relations. The forum is more inclusive than APEC, which excludes the three ASEAN countries of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, and where Mexico and Peru are the only

Latin American countries besides Chile. Other than APEC, the PBEC and PECC, FEALAC is also the only Pacific institution without the US, thus providing greater freedom in defining a potential Latin America-Southeast Asian inter-regional agenda. However, focused on promoting its immediate economic interests, Chile's (in)activity in FEALAC reflects its Southeast Asia policy of pursuing strategic objectives in terms of commerce and trade without developing complementary, and more ambitious, foreign policy goals.

Although a trans-Pacific approach in the form of FEALAC has so far proven to be irrelevant for Chile's Southeast Asia policy, other multilateralized initiatives have been put forth in recent years. These are discussed in the next section.

Coalition-Building through the Inter-Regionalization of Foreign Policy?

A multilateral approach toward Southeast Asia could serve as a shortcut to playing the central role of a broker in Latin America-Asian relations. Multilateralism is also often highlighted as a typical small state strategy whereby states promote particular policies, norms, and ideas to serve their interest as small actors in the international system (Evans, 2011; Hey, 2003). Nevertheless, this section will demonstrate that Chile opted against a typical small state multilateral approach to trans-Pacific relations in favor of a more limited, bilateral engagement. The initiatives to engage with Southeast Asia collectively are of recent origin and have so far been largely symbolic.

Chile's Southeast Asia diplomats have long insisted that a comprehensive approach to the region should entail relations with ASEAN. In 2015, the country presented its bid to become a signatory to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), more than a decade after the first major non-ASEAN states had signed the TAC (including China, India, Japan, South Korea and Russia). The treaty, which emphasizes the basic principles of international relations as formalized in the UN Charter, is a precondition to become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Thus, once Chile officially acceded to the TAC in 2016, it also applied for membership in the ARF. Other than signing the TAC, ASEAN develops relations with third states under its scheme of Dialogue Partners, a status that has so far been granted only to geographically close states and the US, which has a strong presence in the Western Pacific. The possibility of applying to become a Dialogue Partner was assessed by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but was eventually judged too costly in terms of resources. Chile did, however, become an ASEAN Development Partner in 2019. The development partnership is in line with Chile's focus on economic issues in its relation with Southeast Asia, excluding both political dialogue and sociocultural exchanges.

Considering its timing, it is clear that the new, multilateralized approach was not the result of a proactive national foreign policy strategy. Instead, it was a reaction to what was perceived to be clear signs by Asia's economic power houses, primarily China, that ASEAN will be a key area for their future economic and financial policies, such as China's Belt and Road Initiative. Still more important in forging the move to approach ASEAN as a grouping were the regional dynamics affecting Chile, in particular the Pacific Alliance. Since its inception in 2011, the trade bloc, which comprises Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, has eyed

ASEAN as a partner of growing importance. Chile sees the Alliance as an important instrument in its trade-heavy Southeast Asia policy and echoed the invocation of trans-Pacific bonds at an APEC workshop in 2017 when the government declared that the Pacific Alliance has a "special vocation toward the Asia-Pacific region" (DIRECON, 2017).

Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand are among the 55 countries holding the status of observers of the Alliance. Although the number is impressive, it is still unclear what role the observers will play. Institutional relations between ASEAN and the Pacific Alliance began in 2014 with regular dialogues held on the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly meeting. Two years later, the two organizations agreed on an ASEAN-Pacific Alliance Framework for Cooperation in four key areas: economic, educational, technological, and sustainable development. A sign that the relationship between the Pacific Alliance and ASEAN has not been a priority for either of the two parties is the delay and extension of the first Work Plan to explore and advance concrete possibilities of cooperation for the period 2017-2018 (ASEAN, 2018).

Whether the Pacific Alliance can provide a platform for Chile to serve as a bridge to Asia depends on a number of factors that are beyond its immediate control. So far, the Pacific Alliance's approach has essentially been bilateral and centered on the individual countries' respective trade agreements with the ASEAN states (Rubiolo, 2016, p. 227). Although the existing bilateral treaties could serve as a basis for a multilateral free trade agreement, such a proposal has not been voiced. The potential challenges are numerous (Faure, 2017):

> Inadequate infrastructure and high logistic costs remain a problem, as well as relatively low mutual cultural awareness between these highly diverse groups of countries. Different levels of institutionalization in each bloc, potentially competing national interests, and changes in domestic political landscapes could also hinder the progress of relations.

Among the four key areas of cooperation, the Pacific Alliance has clearly prioritized trade. Even if cooperation in this area proves successful, it is questionable whether other, non-commercial joint policies will follow. For the time being, there is little to be expected from the multilateralization of Chile's Southeast Asia policy unless a more active approach is taken. The activities in FEALAC lay dormant, and the pending membership request in the ARF is unlikely to bring relations to a new level. The eldest of various fora to address security matters in the Asia-Pacific, the ARF has lost relevance in recent years as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting together with its various extensions gained importance.

In sum, this and the preceding sections have shown that Chile's Southeast Asia policy has been limited in scope. Apart from trade diplomacy and commercial activities, there is no identifiable area in which Chile sought to partner with Southeast Asia, and neither has it used unconventional or innovative strategies to make its presence felt across the Pacific. Such an approach is contrary to what appears to be the most logical one for a small state aiming to punch above its weight in order to bridge the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, however, Chile's Southeast Asia policy has suffered from the common, structural limitations of small state foreign policy. Apart from its limited strategic approach focused on

commerce and trade, Chile has failed to maintain consistency and focus of purpose in its dealing with Southeast Asia. The result has been a lack of instrumental delivery on its pledge to become a bridge-builder.

Conclusion

A small state needs to punch above its weight if it wants to serve as a bridge between two regions separated by a large ocean. Although the aspiration to serve as a trans-Pacific gateway was time and again expressed by Chilean policy makers and uncritical observers, the country has not pursued foreign policies that would have allowed it to outgrow the structural limitations of smallness. The existing literature identifies as successful small state activism a range of strategies, such as innovative diplomacy, the concentration of resources on selected niche areas, and going around the rules, among others. Yet, Chile has pursued no such policy strategy toward Southeast Asia ever since the region became an area of interest for the democratic governments of the 1990s. Instead, it engaged in a limited-goals diplomacy, focused on fostering commercial exchange through the negotiation of trade agreements. Other than that, Chile has reactively engaged in some of the opportunities the region provided, foregoing the possibility to build alliances in order to promote its own initiatives. Such an approach of tactical maneuvering rather than pursuing a grand strategy bears marks typical of common small state foreign policies in that it is constrained by resource limitations.

Although Chile's policy toward the ASEAN states has undergone some renovation as the country sought to further its commercial and trade interests in the region, the result has fallen short of delivering the capacity needed to establish itself as a bridge-builder. Chile's regional trade agreements provide advantages for the Asian Pacific countries, but by themselves they are insufficient to promote substantive trans-regional relations. Politically, Chile has abstained from profiling itself as a broker, rather it positioned itself as a reliable trade partner. Given that this implied neither risks nor outright failures, Chile's untainted image may well constitute a political asset to serve as a trans-regional bridge-builder in the future.

To be fair, the hurdle to promoting relations between Latin America and Southeast Asia is high. It takes two to tango, and the foreign relations of both regions have historically gravitated around the economic and political power centers of North America and Europe. Thus, given structural constraints and limited resources, Chile's Southeast Asia policy is caught between a rock and a hard place. So far, the shifting power relations of the 21st century meant a re-orientation away from the West toward China, but the risks posed by geographic distance and cultural differences continue to represent strong forces working against the development of deeper and more comprehensive relations with China's regional environment, including Southeast Asia.

I argued that Chile is well-positioned to become a bridge-builder between Latin America and Southeast Asia. However, to avoid leaving it to circumstance to actually serve as a referent for other countries and to use regional institutions, such as the Pacific Alliance to support its own interests in Southeast Asia, Chile will need a more comprehensive, coherent foreign policy projection. Since the 1980s, the country's interest in Southeast Asia has essentially been economic. As a foreign policy tool,

commercial and trade diplomacy are meant to benefit not only private companies but the economies of the involved countries in general, as well as the government by contributing to its international status and prestige. To achieve these goals and to become a bridge across the Pacific, a set of different political, strategic, and economic considerations need to be developed and aligned with resource provision to bolster the activities of business actors.

Acknowledgments

I thank Andrew Cooper, Collin Koh, Pedro Iacobelli and the participants of the workshop "The Entrepreneurial Power of States" at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, March 8, 2019, for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Financial support to this project was granted by the Chilean National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research (CONICYT), Programa Fondecyt de Iniciación 2017, Project No. 11170387.

Notes

[1] Retrieved from https://www.direcon.gob.cl/modulo-de-acuerdos-comerciales/

[2] Unlike ASEM, FEALAC does not bring together the heads of states of its members.

[3] In 2014, the three original FEALAC Working Groups have been restructured into four. The Chilean projects are prior to this date. Six were proposed in the years 2000-2003, one in 2009 and one in 2012. Information provided by the FEALAC Cyber Secretariat via e-mail, different dates in October 2017, and the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of the Asia-Pacific via e-mail, 28 January 2019.

References

Arnson, Cynthia, Heine, Jorge, & Zaino, Christine. (Eds.). (2014). *Reaching across the Pacific: Latin America and Asia in the new century*. Washington, DC: Wilson Center.

Artaza, Mario. (2007). Chile y Asia: Una mirada crítica. *Estudios Internacionales*, *156*, 55–65.

ASEAN. (2017, May 3). ASEAN, Pacific Alliance to strengthen cooperation. *ASEAN Secretariat News*. Jakarta. Retrieved from https://asean.org/asean-pacific-alliance-to-strengthen-cooperation/

ASEAN. (2018). *ASEAN, Pacific Alliance to explore further cooperation*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Retrieved from https://asean.org/asean-pacific-alliance-explore-cooperation/

Baldacchino, Godfrey. (2009). Thucydides or Kissinger? A critical review of smaller state diplomacy. In Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.), *The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience* (pp. 21–40). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Björkdahl, Annika. (2008). Norm advocacy: A small state strategy to influence the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *15*(1), 135–154.

Black, David. (1997). Addressing Apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian and Swedish Policies in Southern Africa. In Andrew F. Cooper (Ed.), *Niche diplomacy* (pp. 100–128). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne. (2009). The Diplomacies of Caribbean community states: Searching for resilience. In Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.), *The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience* (pp. 96–115). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Browning, Christopher S. (2006). Small, smart and salient? Rethinking identity in the small states literature. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *19*(4), 669–684.

Caballero-Anthony, Mely. (2014). Understanding ASEAN's centrality: Bases and prospects in an evolving regional architecture. *The Pacific Review*, *27*(4), 563–584.

Chou, Daniel Lin. (2004). *Chile y China: Inmigración y relaciones bilaterales, 1845–1970*. Santiago, Chile: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Instituto de Historia.

Cooper, Andrew. (2009). Confronting vulnerability through resilient diplomacy: Antigua and the WTO internet gambling dispute with the United States. In Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.), *The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience* (pp. 207–218). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cooper, Andrew F. (2013). Squeezed or revitalised? Middle powers, the G20 and the evolution of global governance. *Third World Quarterly*, *34*(6), 963–984.

Cooper, Andrew F., & Shaw, Timothy M. (Eds.). (2009a). *The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cooper, Andrew F., & Shaw, Timothy M. (2009b). Preface. In Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.), *The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience* (pp. xvi–xxv). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cooper, Andrew F., & Shaw, Timothy M. (2009c). The diplomacies of small states at the start of the twenty-first century: How vulnerable? How resilient? In Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.), *The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience* (pp. 1–18). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
DIRECON. (2017, August 26). *Pacific Alliance: Special Vocation Towards the Asia-Pacific Region*. Presentation at the APEC Workshop on Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific Building Blocks. Ho Chi Minh City: Viet Nam.
Embajada de Chile. (1985). *Chile-Indonesia relations* (File no. 90/85, dated 12.4.1985). Santiago: Archive of the Foreign Ministry.
Emmers, Ralf, & Teo, Sarah. (2015). Regional security strategies of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, *15*(2), 185–216.
Evans, Gareth. (2011). *Middle power diplomacy*. Santiago de Chile: Inaugural Edgardo Boeninger Memorial Lecture. Retrieved from http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech441.html
Faure, Anaïs. (2017, April 5). The new trans-pacific partnership. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/the-new-trans-pacific-partnership/
Frohmann, Alicia. (2016). Mesa redonda: Chile, trayectoria y proyección en el Asia-Pacífico. *Estudios Internacionales*, *48*(185), 204–208.
Frohmann, Alicia, & Wilhelmy, Manfred. (2016). Chile: A bridge to Asia? In Riordan Roett & Guadalupe Paz (Eds.), *Latin America and the Asian giants: Evolving ties with China and India* (pp. 227–250). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Fundación Imagen de Chile, & BCN. (2014). *Chile y sus posibilidades en el Sudeste Asiático*. Santiago: Fundación Imagen de Chile, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional.
Gilley, Bruce, & O'Neil, Andrew (Eds.). (2014). *Middle powers and the rise of China*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Handel, Michael I. (1990). *Weak States in the International System*. London, UK: Frank Cass.
Hey, Jeanne A. K. (2003). Luxembourg: Where small works (and wealthy doesn't hurt). In Jeanne A. K. Hey (Ed.), *Small states in world politics: Explaining foreign policy behavior* (pp. 75–94). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Higgott, Richard, & Cooper, Andrew F. (1990). Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay round of trade negotiations. *International Organization*, *44*(4), 589–632.
Ingebritsen, Christine, Neumann, Iver, & Gstöhl, Sieglinde (Eds.). (2006). *Small states in international relations*. New directions in Scandinavian studies. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Jana, Álvaro. (2014). *El interés de Chile en el Sudeste Asiático*. DIRECON. Retrieved from https://www.direcon.gob.cl/2014/01/el-interes-de-chile-en-el-sudeste-asiatico/
Keohane, Robert O. (1969). Lilliputians' dilemmas: Small states in international politics. *International Organization*, *23*(2), 291–310.
Liddell Hart, Basil H. (1991). *Strategy* (2nd revised ed.). London, UK: Meridian.
Long, Tom. (2016). Small states, great power? Gaining influence through intrinsic, derivative, and collective power. *International Studies Review*, 10.1093/isr/viw040. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2486
Melillo, Edward D. (2016). *Chile and the Pacific World (Vol. 1)*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-304
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (2017). *Presidenta Bachelet en Foro 'Una franja, una ruta': 'Chile está listo para ser un puente entre Asia y América Latina'*. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Sala de Prensa. Retrieved from https://minrel.gob.cl/presidenta-bachelet-en-foro-una-franja-una-ruta-chile-esta-listo/minrel/2017-05-14/145554.html
Muñoz, Heraldo. (1980). *The international relations of the Chilean military government: Elements for a systematic analysis*. Washington, DC: Wilson Center.
Muñoz, Heraldo. (2017, May 26). Chile, país puente con Asia. *El Mercurio*. Retrieved from http://www.elmercurio.com/blogs/2017/05/26/51320/Chile-pais-puente-con-Asia.aspx
Naray, Olivier. (2008). *Commercial diplomacy: A conceptual overview*. Paper to be presented at the 7th World Conference of TPOs. The Hague, The Netherlands.
Neruda, Pablo. (2009). *Confieso que he vivido*. Barcelona: Debolsillo.
Neumann, Iver, & de Carvalho, Benjamin (Eds.). (2015). *Small states and status seeking: Norway's quest for international standing*. New international relations. London, UK: Routledge.

Neumann, Iver, & Gstöhl, Sieglinde. (2006). Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? InChristine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstohl, & Jessica Beyer (Eds.), *Small states in international relations*, New directions in Scandinavian studies (pp. 3–36). Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. (2016). Economic diplomacy. In Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, & Paul Sharp (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*. (pp. 552–563). London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Oxford Business Group. (2018, February 22). *Indonesia turns to Latin America to diversify trade portfolio*. Retrieved from https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/indonesia-turns-latin-america-diversify-trade-portfolio

Oyarzún, Lorena. (2013). When trade policy is not enough: Opportunities and challenges for Chile's international insertion. *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research*, *19*(2), 268–285.

Oyarzún, Lorena. (2018). The Pacific in Chile's foreign policy: A tool to reinforce open regionalism. *Latin American Policy*, *9*(2), 282–303.

Panke, Diana. (2012). Being small in a big union: Punching above their weights? How small states prevailed in the vodka and the pesticides cases. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *25*(3), 329–344.

Payne, Anthony. (2004). Small states in the global politics of development. *The Round Table*, *93*(376), 623–635.

Ping, Jonathan H. (2005). *Middle power statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Porteous, Douglas. (1981). The Annexation of Eastern Island: Geopolitics and environmental perception. *N/S, North South*, *6*(11), 67–80.

Prasad, Naren. (2009). Small but smart: Small states in the global system. In Andrew F. Cooper & Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.), *The diplomacies of small states between vulnerability and resilience* (pp. 41–64). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10366733

Ross, César. (2007). Chile y el Asia Pacífico: La construcción histórica del futuro. *Si Somos Americanos*, *9*(1), 109–140.

Rubiolo, Florencia. (2016). Interregionalismo Sureste Asiático-América del Sur: Un complemento al bilateralismo. *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, *113*, 211–234.

Sputnik. (2018, November 14). *Chile busca posicionarse como socio de desarrollo de la ASEAN*. Retrieved from https://mundo.sputniknews.com/america-latina/201811141083425162-sera-chile-socio-activo-de-asean/

Thies, Cameron, & Sari, Angguntari. (2018). A role theory approach to middle powers: Making sense of Indonesia's place in the international system. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *40*(3), 397–421.

UGM. (2018, May 15). Latin America is prospective market for Indonesia. *Universitas Gadjah Mada*. Retrieved from https://ugm.ac.id/en/news/16208-latin.america.is.prospective.market.for.indonesia

van Klaveren, Alberto. (n.d.). *La promoción de la democracia como principio de la política exterior de Chile*. Unpublished manuscript.

Vietnam Investment Review. (2018, July 6). *Promoting investment and trade between Vietnam and Chile*. Retrieved from https://www.vir.com.vn/promoting-investment-and-trade-between-vietnam-and-chile-60735.html

Vietnam News Agency. (2018, September 12). Vietnam sees Chile as leading Latin-American partner: Deputy PM. Retrieved from https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-sees-chile-as-leading-latin american-partner-deputy-pm/138186.vnp

Wang, Hongying, & French, Erik. (2013). Middle range powers in global governance. *Third World Quarterly*, *34*(6), 985–999.

Wehner, Leslie. (2011). Chile's rush to free trade agreements. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *31*(2), 207–226.

Wehner, Leslie. (2016). Inter-role conflict, role strain and role play in Chile's relationship with Brazil: Chile's relationship with Brazil. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, *35*(1), 64–77.

Wehner, Leslie, & Thies, Cameron. (2014). Role theory, narratives, and interpretation: The domestic contestation of roles. *International Studies Review*, *16*(3), 411–436.

Wilhelmy, Manfred. (2008, November 17). *Chilean Policy towards the Asia-Pacific Region*. Paper presented at the conference 'Tiger meets Jaguar: Perspectives on Trans-Pacific Relations'. Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Wilhelmy, Manfred. (2010). La trayectoria de Chile frente a la región Asia-Pacífico. *Estudios Internacionales*, *167*, 125–141.

Wilhelmy, Manfred, & Durán, Roberto. (2003). Los principales rasgos de la política exterior chilena entre 1973 y el 2000. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *23*(2), 273–286.

Wilhelmy, Manfred, & Lazo Rodríguez, María Rosa. (1997). La estrategia bilateral de Chile en el Sudeste Asiático. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *XIX*, 37–60.

Wilhelmy, Manfred, & Lazo Rodríguez, María Rosa. (2011). La política multilateral de Chile en Asia-Pacífico. *Estudios Internacionales*, *30*(117), 3–35.
World Integrated Trade Solution. (2019). *Trade stats*. Author. Retrieved from http://wits.worldbank.org
Xinhua. (2016, July 28). Chile tiene 'muchas similitudes' con países del Sudeste Asiático, dice ex presidente. *Xinhua Español*. Retrieved from http://spanish.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/28/c_135546274.htm