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Cover illustration and design by Ben Summers

palgrave
macmillan

ISBN 978-0-230-11095-3

9 780230 110953

www.palgrave.com

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

palgrave
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EDITED BY GIAN LUCA GARDINI AND PETER LAMBERT



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Between Ideology and Pragmatism

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

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First published in 2011 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States – a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN: 978–0–230–11095–3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Latin American foreign policies : between ideology and pragmatism / edited by Gian Luca Gardini & Peter Lambert.
p. cm.
ISBN 978–0–230–11095–3
1. Latin America—Foreign relations—1980– I. Gardini, Gian Luca. II. Lambert, Peter, 1948–
JZ1519.L385 2011
327.8—dc22

2010035729

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by MPS Limited, A Macmillan Company

First edition: March 2011

D 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Printed in the United States of America.

CHAPTER 2

PRAGMATISM, IDEOLOGY, AND TRADITION IN CHILEAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1990*

JOAQUÍN FERMANDOIS

INTRODUCTION: MAIN HISTORICAL TRAITS

Chile has been widely recognized as having adopted a pragmatist approach to foreign relations since the return of democracy in March 1990. This appreciation is based on the "economization" of its foreign policy, since one of the main traits of the international orientation of the country has been the acceptation of "globalization," understood as economic dynamism beyond borders. In the atmosphere of the 1990s, this orientation converged with the policies and ideology of the United States and other industrialized economies, in terms of further opening its economy, pursuing free-trade agreements, and in participating in international accords on a "post-international system." This policy reached one of its goals in the first decade of the twenty-first century, with the signing of multiple free-trade treaties, although by then, the regional economic consensus was already waning.

Throughout the history of Chilean foreign policy two traits are clear. One of them is the legacy of nineteenth century territorial conflicts with neighboring countries, with which Chile is still dealing. As essentially interstate disputes, they have demanded a "realist" approach, couched in legal discourse. The second trait, especially visible from the 1920s

onward, consists of the development of a foreign policy within the framework of the Inter-American system, including Latin American cooperation and integration. However, this approach has always been based on the understanding that the fundamental interests of the country are at least convergent with those of the international and regional systems.

Identification with the West was a dominant feature of the Cold War years, at least until 1970, but what the "West" meant was interpreted in different ways, depending on the focus of different political discourses. The Chilean left, a key actor in the political system, identified the West with "capitalism" and "imperialism," and thus the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973) set out a foreign policy that was strategically directed against the "imperialism" of the United States, and sought improved relations with other anti-imperialist allies, such as Cuba. This was clearly an ideological approach, yet tactically the foreign policy of Popular Unity was highly pragmatic in its relations with the rest of Latin America, including with right-wing military regimes in Argentina and Brazil and, especially, with Western Europe.[1]

The military regime of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990) was characterized by a fervent anti-Communist sentiment, which provided the setting for its foreign policy. Yet this was not a decision taken solely by Pinochet. The Popular Unity government had been viewed with tolerance if not outright sympathy in many Latin American and Western European countries (as well as by the liberal academic public in the United States), and its violent overthrow and the subsequent establishment of an indefinite military dictatorship, received worldwide condemnation. Anti-Communism provided a sustaining ideology for the regime, as well as an ideological platform for regional and U.S. support. Despite this, by the mid-1980s, the military regime was suffering a degree of international isolation unprecedented in the history of twentieth century Latin American states.[2]

Pinochet's foreign policy was ideological in its anti-Communism, reflecting the ideological nature of the regime itself. The regime, however, was not simply anti-Communist, and indeed oversaw a period of economic modernization and insertion into the world market economy, which in itself offered an ideological (as well as pragmatic) position in terms of economic development. Despite uneven growth, by the end of the 1980s, the "Chilean model" was considered an economic success and became a forerunner of the neoliberal economic reforms of the so-called Washington consensus in the 1990s.

This combination of pragmatism and ideology was not only maintained but was reinforced by the center-left Concertación governments in its two decades of power. While there was a degree of change in foreign policy reflecting domestic pressures, Chile remains dedicated to a highly pragmatic foreign policy that reflects an ideological framework of adherence to liberal democracy, the international framework of law and free-market economics.

SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY

What can we consider were the "sources" of the new Chilean foreign relations since 1990?[3] First, the transition to democracy led to a critique of the Pinochet regime, and especially the role of human rights violations against its opponents. This was related to the second source, the consensus around a definition of democracy. The end of the Cold War had been preceded in Chile by a consensus between Right and Left on issues of both human rights and democracy, as the Left dropped more radical or revolutionary interpretations of both in the 1980s and instead adopted a more social democratic position, with which the Right felt it could coexist.

A third source is directly intertwined with the latter. Accompanying the convergence between Right and Left on the political system, and the legitimacy of liberal democracy, was a rejection of the polarized politics of the Cold War (even before the collapse of the Soviet Union). Following the 1988 plebiscite in which Pinochet was defeated, and the ensuing negotiations between government and opposition, the electoral victory of the Concertación led to a broad consensus on common principles in politics and the economy.

A fourth source of the foreign policy of the Concertación years was of course the end of the Cold War and the new international pressure for the coupling of electoral democracy with market economics. As a result, there was both an internal and external consensus, or at least common ground, in terms of the rules of the game. In this context, the reversal of previous diplomatic isolation was a relatively easy objective to achieve.

A fifth source, a consequence of the end of the Cold War, was the changing political scenario in Latin America related to "re-democratization" (of which Chile was the last case). In this environment, Chile was keen to become a model of transition (as well as end its historical isolation), and hence pursued centrist, "normal" policies that combined (almost interchangeably) ideology and pragmatism.

Finally, a sixth and final source of the new foreign policy was the experience of its political class, which sought a strong influence in terms of agency. The period of the dictatorship was not static or inactive in terms of political debate and analysis. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s there had been a rich exchange of ideas with new international

intellectual currents, resulting in an "internationalized" political class, especially in terms of the Centre and Left, many of whom had experience of exile and very different worldviews. Concertación saw in European social democracy a path away from the polarized ideological confrontation that had characterized domestic Chilean politics in the 1960s and 1970s, and a model around which to construct a broad consensus on a "Western model" for Chilean politics and society.

CONCERTACIÓN'S GOALS AND PRACTICE IN THE 1990S

The foreign policy program of the Concertación, written in 1988–1989, showed a clear language of "democratic internationalism," as well as underlining the interests of the country and the goal of reducing foreign "dependence."[4] This produced a situation wherein a very pragmatic policy could be envisioned, without formally negating a principled or ideological orientation. Breaking the international isolation that the country suffered under the Pinochet regime, and promoting democracy and human rights protection, within a Latin America orientation, were indeed the main electoral promises of Patricio Aylwin.

The inauguration of the democratically elected President Aylwin on March 11, 1990, dissolved in one stroke the international isolation that Chile had suffered under Pinochet. In the following two decades, two phases—each roughly a decade long—are visible in terms of foreign policy. The first phase, from 1990 to 1999, included the first two governments of the Concertación (Patricio Aylwin [1990–1994] and Eduardo Frei [1994–2000]). In this phase there appeared to be no contradiction between a pragmatic and an ideological approach to foreign relations. The second phase from 2000 to 2010 (comprising the governments of Ricardo Lagos [2000–2006] and Michelle Bachelet [2006–2010]) was characterized by a more problematic relationship between pragmatic and ideological approaches, especially in terms of relations with the United States. However, despite some conflict of interests, there has been a remarkable continuity in terms of the continuing convergence of ideology and pragmatism.

The government of Eduardo Frei emphasized a pragmatic approach. His first foreign minister, Carlos Figueroa, talked of the importance of "diplomacy for development,"[5] and that Chile had ceased to be a "beggar Nation,"[6] while in his first message, President Frei placed Chile's foreign policy priority as "the deepening of international relations."[7] Of course, there was also an accompanying ideological element to foreign policy; the Frei government emphasized the importance of developing democratic

stability in Latin America,[8] stating in the Río de Janeiro Summit of 1996, that "democracy and human rights are now indivisible in the world of today, and that they are set above national self-determination."[9]

This dual approach was relatively easy to sustain during most of the 1990s, but with the detention of General Pinochet in London in October 1998, Chilean foreign relations were placed in an awkward, unexpected, and ironic situation. Faced with almost universal international criticism, Foreign Minister Insulza expressed the government's dilemma as follows:

> Whether we like it or not, this is a matter of national sovereignty. It is especially painful when the individual concerned is Pinochet, but if we surrender the legislative, governmental and judicial powers of the democratic State of Chile, we are abdicating our duties as a sovereignty State.[10]

This essentially pragmatic approach was very efficient in many fields of foreign relations. At the beginning of the 1990s, most if not all Latin American countries attempted, in one way or another, to implement neoliberal economic reforms, thus dispelling the image of Chilean economic policy as exceptional and even eccentric. Indeed, in 1990 Chile received an early invitation from the administration of George Bush Sr. to be the first Latin American nation to join the planned "free trade zone from Alaska to the Patagonia" in the framework of the Initiative of the Americas. As this developed into the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Chile maintained its support for a general free-trade agreement despite regional criticism (especially from Brazil). On the other hand, however, Chile showed markedly less enthusiasm for the newly created MERCOSUR economic alliance, led by Brazil and Argentina, a decision widely interpreted as a rejection of a "Latin American approach" to economic integration. In June 1996 Chile joined MERCOSUR as an "associate" partner, allowing Chile to enjoy certain rights in the union including participation in the political structure. This was essentially a pragmatic move, which allowed Chile to participate in an important regional organization, but without compromising its trade policies or its economic independence.[11]

NEITHER PRAGMATIC NOR IDEOLOGICAL: HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

In this first phase of Concertación, and for the first time in the twentieth century, Chilean investment began to flow into the region, beginning, notably (given historical tensions) with Argentina and Peru. Given the particular complexity of Chile's relations with its neighbors, "pragmatic"

or "modern" solutions to outstanding problems were promoted as the solution to "out of date conflicts." Such a pragmatic approach depended on consensual support within Chile, which was to a large extent achieved. Indeed, from a neoliberal persuasion, many Chilean investors believed (and still believe) that investment and business opportunities will create enough bridges with Peru and Bolivia so as to overcome seemingly insurmountable political differences (although as yet this has not occurred).

Nonetheless, Chilean investment in neighboring countries has been a significant new development, given historical tensions. Of course, this was facilitated by the rapid development and growth of the Chilean economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s as well as by the free-market economic reforms undertaken in neighboring countries in the 1990s and a more favorable (democratic) political climate. In the case of Peru, the advent of the Fujimori administration facilitated negotiations that (despite obstacles) led to an agreement in December 1999 on the implementation of the Treaty of Peace signed in 1929, after the war of 1879.

However, there was one exception to the successes of this pragmatic foreign policy, which was seemingly devoid of the traditional political competition and mistrust. Fujimori's *autogolpe* in 1992 led to strong and principled condemnation by Chile, probably led by Aylwin himself, resulting in almost frozen relations between the two countries. Of course, the 1991 Democratic Clause of the Organization of American States (OAS) should have led to the suspension of Peru on the grounds of an unconstitutional change of government, but the authoritarian traits of the regime had not yet become evident and there was a degree of support for Fujimori's war with Sendero Luminoso, which led to a gradual resumption of relations.

Relations with Argentina under Carlos Menem (1989–1999) were clearer in terms of pragmatism and benefits. Indeed, the decade was one characterized by probably the closest relationship between the two countries since the "May Pacts" of 1902, which had laid to rest fears of war between them. Even the arbitration of a border dispute, Laguna del Desierto, in 1994, which many felt was unfair toward Chile, was calmly received, while even the armed forces undertook an unprecedented steps toward collaboration. The "special relationship," in part based on Menem's shared preference for "open door" trade policies, reached a peak in 1996, with the agreement of Argentina to supply gas to Chile (although ironically later this became a source of tension) and led to a significant increase in Chilean investment in the Argentinian economy that continues today.

Relations with its other neighbor, Bolivia, improved in the 1990s following the OAS decision that Bolivian claims should be settled bilaterally, as argued by Chile. Progress was made possible by a Chilean

position that discarded ideology in favor of a pragmatic solution between the two countries. Finally, relations with Cuba offer a further insight into the balance of ideology and pragmatism in foreign policy in the 1990s. Under Pinochet, of course, there had been no diplomatic relations for ideological reasons. Despite the fact that other Latin American states had restored relations with Cuba, Aylwin opted for a gradualist policy that led to the postponement of the reopening of full diplomatic relations until 1995. The slow progress was above all a pragmatic consideration of the power relations of domestic forces and the strength of anti-Cuban feeling among the Chilean Right.

OPEN REGIONALISM

From the outset of the transition, Chile sought to follow a dynamic policy of "open regionalism.[12] In a sense the expression was an oxymoron. On the one hand, Chile expressed interest in MERCOSUR, as part of a policy of greater integration into world markets. On the other, however, Chilean officials were keen to underline that integration was a long process (pointing to the example of European integration, which began with six members in 1957)[13] and that Chile would follow a similarly gradualist policy toward integration in Latin America. Thus, Chile showed interest in integration, while simultaneously actively seeking to sign a free-trade agreement with the United States. Although Chilean efforts to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were eventually unsuccessful, it did manage to sign a free-trade agreement with Canada in 1996, perhaps as a first step toward future integration.

On a global level, Chile successfully joined APEC in 1994, although this had been initiated by the military government in an attempt to find trade partners who were interested in trade, but not especially concerned about the regime's human rights record. This relationship developed over the following years, as Japan, China, Korea, and even Indonesia, acquired a new importance for Chilean trade and political relations.[14] President Frei visited Indonesia before the fall of Suharto, without any official of the Chilean government offering any criticism on the subject of human rights violations; and the same silence was evident in relations with China, reflecting that the "ideological" politics of human rights was clearly restricted to Latin America.

This was an essentially pragmatic policy, devoid of any strong ideological component, in line with the concept of the promotion of democracy and the market economy. In another sense, the two first Concertación administrations were acutely aware of their potential vulnerability in two aspects. First, the Government still felt itself vulnerable to the power of

the armed forces, especially in terms of the figure of General Pinochet, Commander in Chief of the Army until 1998. Any disruption, it was feared, could lead to unrest. Second, the free-market political economy inherited by Concertación was working well in terms of its highest recorded economic growth and was almost universally acclaimed. As Chile sought to become a developed nation, foreign policy was guided by a strong sense of pragmatism, which conveniently converged within the broad ideological guidelines of the Washington Consensus.

THE TURN OF THE CENTURY AND THE "LATIN AMERICAN CRISIS"

By 2000 political change within Chile was accelerating. The process began with the arrest of General Pinochet in London in 1998. The two year process led to the political defeat of Pinochet inside Chile, the defeat of *pinochetismo* in the public political arena, the judgment and jailing of hundreds of former officers accused of human rights violations, and the disappearance of what had previously been labeled (and eulogized) as the "Pinochet model."[15] The clear message was that Chile wished to adopt a common Latin American post-dictatorship policy, no longer encumbered by the dictator's legacy.

On a regional level, 1999 witnessed the beginning of dramatic political change in the form of an institutional crisis and the rejection of neoliberalism. First, the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela inaugurated a form of "neopopulism" in Latin America as a political persuasion and, later, as a more aggressive foreign policy. Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras (until 2009), and more recently, El Salvador, followed the path either of institutional crisis, or of democratically elected center-left governments that rejected the Washington Consensus and sought to deepen their model of democracy. In Peru, a moderate, market friendly social democracy emerged as the main political force, while in Argentina, the 2001 crisis was followed by the Kirchner years with a strong rhetoric of "continental nationalism" (with overtones of anti-imperialism). Ecuador's rapprochement with Peru denied Chile a tactical ally in its border conflicts with the latter, while in Bolivia, the rise of Evo Morales threatened to reignite tensions over Bolivian nationalist claims for access to the sea (although relations until the present have proven to be surprisingly good).

The main challenge to Chile, in both a pragmatic and ideological sense came from Hugo Chávez's "Bolivarian Revolution." In terms of ideology, Chávez offered a serious challenge to the established left in

Chile, which had accepted a more centrist position of adherence to the institutions and procedures of liberal democracy as well as, to an extent, the value of the market economy as a regulatory force.[16] There is no doubt that the political orientation of Concertación would be considered reformist or at worst neoliberal by those supporting Chávez, while the politics of free markets and free-trade agreements is in complete opposition to the vision proposed by the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). In the pragmatic sense, the challenge of neopopulism has undermined Chilean aims of promoting regional free-trade agreements, and certainly undermined the concept of Chile as the model of political and economic development.

The administration of Ricardo Lagos was inaugurated in March 2000, in the midst of the political changes sweeping across the continent. His response, as evident in his inaugural speech, represented the reverse of the new trends in Latin American and a continuation of moderate social democracy in an international context:

> The beginning of my administration coincides with the beginning of a new century, and a new millennium. We are the first administration of this twenty first century, a century that heralds many changes and adjustments to the new reality of globalization [. . .] A century in which the countries of the world will have to try to find a new international order, one which is more just, more egalitarian, more sustainable. A century, in which the classical concept of sovereignty at home will give way to new ways of shared sovereignty on a whole range of global issues of the universal domain.[17]

These words sum up the ideological interpretation of socialism held by Ricardo Lagos in the international field. A believer in the concept of the so-called Third Way of Tony Blair, of moderate Western socialism, Lagos sought a foreign policy that combined a "Latin American policy" with a more Western-orientated policy. Within this, there was of course an inevitable reference to a "Latin Americanism," which in some ways was not insincere, and promised to give "priority to our relations with Latin America, especially with the MERCOSUR countries."[18] However, this was far from the Latin Americanism proposed by Chávez.

In the first years, there was some hope of maintaining regional trends. The fall of Fujimori in Peru brought the likeminded President Alejandro Toledo to power. In Argentina, Fernando de la Rúa, and, in Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso promised to follow a path generally akin to the Third Way, a modern market-oriented social democracy, with social and environmental content. Lagos even got on well with President

Luiz Inacio da Silva (Lula) who likewise appeared to be sympathetic to a pragmatic Third Way policy.

There was also a high degree of consistency in other areas of foreign policy. In terms of free trade, Chile successfully sought free-trade agreements with the United States and the European Union, both signed in 2003, and in November 2004, Chile hosted the APEC forum. Foreign policy success helped increase Lagos' domestic popularity, which increased in the last three years of his administration. Indeed, even if the presidential elections of 2005 were close, the opposition were severely weakened by both the economic recovery and the positive international image of the president himself.

To what extent, then, should this policy of this center-left coalition be seen as pure "pragmatism?" It was certainly a term in fashion at the time. Nevertheless, it was highly consistent with the ideological convergence that took place in Chile—and beyond—in the late 1980s, between the intellectual left and the forces of market economics. In the APEC summit in 2004, held in Chile, Ricardo Lagos asked, "Who would have imagined 15 years ago, that the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and China would meet in Chile?"[19] His son and close adviser, Ricardo Lagos-Weber, answered, "The only asset that Chile enjoys is credibility and intelligence."[20]

FREE TRADE AND IRAQ

The free-trade agreement signed with the United States in 2003 came close to failure in an episode that is highly illustrative of the conflict between idealism and pragmatism. Criticized for its neglect of Latin America, the Bush administration supported the free-trade agreement with Chile in order to show its interest in the region and, importantly, to identify itself with a relatively progressive, social democratic government in the Southern Cone during the post–September 11 crisis.[21] Chile would be a perfect favored ally for the Bush administration. For the Chilean government under Ricardo Lagos, the idea of a successful "international strategy" was fundamental in breaking the paralysis on the domestic political front.

This dramatically changed with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Chile was a nonpermanent member of the Security Council when the United States demanded Chilean support for its intervention. It was an unpleasant moment for the Chilean government, faced with implicit threats, not least to the coveted free-trade agreement, which, as Condoleezza Rice clearly stated to a Chilean official, would be in danger if Chile did not support the U.S. position.[22] While wishing to remain an ally of the United States, the Lagos administration strongly believed that

to support the United States would undermine a longstanding tradition of legality in Chilean foreign policy, as well as going against the wishes of the majority of Chilean citizens.

Chile had supported the United States in the UN over its intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, but this case was clearly different.[23] In accordance with a traditional belief in the legal foundations of the international system, reflected in the Chilean attitude to both World Wars, Chile did not see the legal motives for authorizing the war. At the last moment, Lagos tried to postpone the decision, with a counterproposal to the Security Council, for a new inspection by a new UN team. Although this may just have been a smokescreen in order not to appear too hostile to the United States, the White House disdainfully rebuffed the idea. Buoyed by the public moral indignation in the United States toward countries that did not support U.S. policy toward Iraq, the White House played with the idea of dropping the free-trade agreement, a measure that would have been harsh and counterproductive against an erstwhile ally. After some weeks of silence, Chilean fears were laid to rest when the White House gave the green light to the agreement, even if the ceremony itself was very low key.

Did the Chilean government follow an ideological script in the case of the Iraq war? This would have implied that La Moneda was prepared to sacrifice the free-trade agreement in favor of an ethical principle—and this may well have been the case. On the pragmatic side, however, even if Lagos had wished to support the U.S. intervention, it would have been almost highly damaging and political risky to do so, given the strength of opposition of the vast majority of the Chilean public, not to mention that of Concertación itself. In ideological terms then, the political culture of Chile—strong political beliefs and a traditional adherence to international law—led to a rejection of any unconditional support for the U.S. invasion. In pragmatic terms, support for the U.S. could well have alienated domestic as well as regional support for the Lagos administration.

CHILE'S RESPONSE UNDER LAGOS AND BACHELET

The challenge posed by neopopulism has been especially difficult for Chilean foreign policy. Given that a main goal of foreign policy since 1990 has been to privilege relations with the region and build a genuine Latin American foreign policy, this may seem perplexing, but is due to a number of reasons.[24] First, the underlying ideology of Bolivarianism lies in direct conflict with the ideology of the Chilean model. Chile's economy, political system, and indeed, political culture has taken a very different path from that proposed by Bolivarianism, and there is little

common ground. Opposition to Bolivarianism is thus both pragmatic—it would be impossible, and indeed undesirable given the level of economic success since the mid-1980s for the Chilean model to consider embracing Bolivarianism—and ideological, in that Bolivarianism challenges the very tenets of the Chilean free-market model.[25]

Second, Chile has encountered difficult relations with several governments of the so-called Pink Wave. Relations with the Kirchners have been strained at times, due in part to the neopopulist rhetoric emerging from the Casa Rosada, while in the case of Bolivia, the rhetorical nationalism of Evo Morales has threatened to reignite tensions over Bolivia's lack of access to the sea. Failures in negotiations since 2000 have been directly related to the popular mobilizations led by, among others, Evo Morales, which led to the fall of two elected presidents with whom Chile felt it could negotiate. Indeed, one of the causes of these mobilizations was the perception in Bolivia that too many concessions were being made to Chile. With Evo Morales in power, it is possible that this issue, which has deep nationalist roots in Bolivia,[26] could lead to renewed tensions, especially should Morales' domestic support begin to fall.

The traditional Chilean reaction to any dispute has been based on concepts of legality and respect for international law and international treaties, a stance that is perceived as a matter of national interest and hence above party politics. This is an eminently pragmatic policy in some senses, based on a perceived historical legacy, but it is also related to deeply ideological concepts with roots in national identity and an adherence to a certain political culture. While opposition politicians and parties may promise to implement different policies to deal with outstanding issues in a different way, once in power, they find little space or support for a viable alternative.

Thus relations with Peru follow similar lines. The legacy of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) is still very much alive in both countries, but to a far greater degree in Peru. With the fall of Fujimori in 2000, a new government led by Alejandro Toledo, a presumed political ally of Ricardo Lagos, promised better relations with Santiago, but made little concrete progress. This indicates the extent to which relations are still influenced by a longstanding distrust based on the legacy of the nineteenth century conflict. Indeed, Peru has revived the issue of maritime borders with Chile since 2000, with the result that a border dispute that Santiago had long believed settled, has now been taken to the International Court in Hague. As in the case of Bolivia (and the two questions are related), Chilean foreign policy is based on respect for past treaties, past practice, and international law.

Such is the adherence to this stance that not even the government of Michelle Bachelet was able to improve relations with the region or with neighbors.[27] Despite the fact that Argentina and Peru are the major recipients of Chilean external direct investment, valued in total at about US$20 billion, relations are far from pragmatic and still find themselves trapped in the very particular culture of historically strained bilateral relations.

There are shades of difference between the diplomatic efforts of Lagos and Bachelet. Lagos was well known on the international stage and followed an international career after being president. Michelle Bachelet had a more symbolic international presence, and was known more for her story and her personal struggle than for her impact on international relations.[28] Domestically, while Lagos fully embraced the social democratic model and the Third Way, Bachelet was forced to attenuate her more radical views in order to accommodate the "Chilean consensus" on the value of market economics.

Nor was there a great difference between the two in terms of foreign policy. The main political model for Bachelet was the European Union, but she has maintained close links with the United States, both with the Bush administration and especially with Barack Obama who praised her handling of the economy in 2009.[29] She stressed the importance of the social content of democracy, and was not afraid to speak out on human rights issues, especially regarding violations committed by authoritarian, anti-Communist dictatorships and military regimes, in direct reference to General Pinochet in Chile. On the question of Cuba, she downplayed earlier criticism of a lack of democracy, instead focusing on the injustice of the U.S. embargo, while on her much-publicized visit to the island in February 2009, she did not mention the issue of Cuban dissidents, but did hold an interview with an ailing Fidel Castro.

Latin American integration remains an issue on the Chilean agenda, but differs greatly from the regional integration proposed by Chávez. The fact that Chile's free-market orientation has been the target of a new anti-neoliberal discourse among center-left governments throughout the region provides an obstacle to greater integration. Yet the alternative of following the center-left reforms introduced elsewhere in Latin America is unthinkable in Chile; the consensus over the Chilean model of social democracy combined with market economics and social policies designed to help the most vulnerable, on the one hand, and a foreign policy with its emphasis on protecting the national interest, on the other, remains stronger than ever. Thus, while the Chilean Left, including Bachelet, may push for a more Latin American-centered foreign policy, this should be seen through Chilean eyes as part of a broad Chilean

consensus that sees political and economic integration as firmly in the Chilean national interest.[30] This consensus is summed up in the words of President Bachelet:

> We cannot permit that the international crisis destroys the gains of democracy in Latin America. The only way to ensure this is to strengthen [economic] growth, and to guarantee that the gains of growth reach the people, a challenge that can only be met with stronger social policies, and with a powerful and efficient State [. . .] As I have said, this vision supposes a break not only with individualism, but also with populism.[31]

Chilean foreign policy thus still corresponds with the basic tenets of the Third Way. It displays an orientation that differs from both neoliberalism and from populism and is coherent (in ideological terms) with the social democratic worldview of Concertación. It is also coherent with the concept of a historical political consensus on the promotion of the national interest within a legal and democratic framework.

THE CENTRE-RIGHT GOVERNMENT OF PIÑERA

The presidential election of December 2009 and the run-off vote of January 17, 2010, brought to an end the dominance of the Concertación, and gave rise to the government of the center-right coalition, headed by President Sebastián Piñera. While in some ways this represented the end of an era, in terms of foreign policy it is more probable that it will lead to the continuation of the general trend set by the Concertación governments, yet with a greater ideological element. At the head of the Foreign Ministry was appointed the CEO of a large company, in the hope that his negotiating skills would be advantageous in increasing Chilean trade and investment in neighboring countries and Latin America as a whole. Whether this is a pragmatic, ideological, or a technocratic approach is open to question.

After Iraq and the main free-trade agreement signed with the United States and with the European Union, relations with the wider world really are less problematic for Chile. The key issue remains relations with its neighbors. The Piñera government improved relations with Peru, in spite of the case taken to the International Court of Justice over the maritime border, and used this as proof of a new more professional approach to foreign policy. In the same vein, Chile supported the candidacy of former Argentina President Néstor Kirchner, as Secretary General of UNASUR, in spite of muted criticism of some politicians in the center-right coalition. This was a pragmatic decision for a country that has always feared the possibility of isolation.

There has been a notable (ideological) difference in the approach of the new government to the two "hot" issues in Latin American international relations, Cuba and Venezuela. In the first months, the Piñera Government was vocal in its support for political dissent in Cuba, but did not want it leading to open confrontation with Havana. Even if direct confrontation with Hugo Chávez was avoided, center-right members of Congress have been very vocal in their support for the Venezuelan opposition, supported by some members of the Concertación revealing divisions inside the center-left coalition over the issues of Cuba and Venezuela. The government also insisted that the OAS should enhance the definition of "defense of democracy" to include governments that assume excessive executive powers. Behind the scenes, Chilean diplomats continue to promote the recognition of the new Honduran Government by the UNASUR countries. These are political maneuvers with a notable ideological component.

However, the president and the foreign minister have been very careful to avoid any direct confrontation with Venezuela or ALBA countries. In any case, because of the maritime dispute with Peru, Chile must seek some level of cooperation with Rafael Correa of Ecuador. In reference to the intractable issue of a "gateway to the sea" for Bolivia, Piñera had even played football with Evo Morales. All of this is of course highly pragmatic and is almost a mandatory course given the uncertainties in the region.

CONCLUSION

Historically, Chilean foreign policy has been defined by the combination of an adherence to international law, agreements, and treaties; a pragmatic, "realist" approach to relations with other Latin American nations; and a close affinity with Western models of democracy and economic development. This has continued since the beginning of the transition, as Chilean foreign policy has reflected domestic concerns to ensure a stable, progressive, and nonviolent transition to democracy and continued economic growth and development. Both of these highly pragmatic policy objectives took place, of course, within the framework of a hemispheric ideological convergence in the 1990s over the merits of the combination of liberal democracy and free-market economies, encapsulated in the Washington Consensus.

In this sense, Chile's post-dictatorship foreign policy has been highly pragmatic in terms of pursuing national economic interests, through free-trade agreements and increased foreign direct investment in neighboring countries as well as, in terms of politics, through efforts to ensure democratic stability throughout the region. Pragmatism converged

perfectly with the dominant ideology of the 1990s; neoliberal reforms may have been initially associated with Pinochet, but the continuation of free-market economics throughout the transition (albeit with social welfare policies) was clearly seen to be in the national interest first and foremost, and conveniently in line also with the dominant ideology of the time (thus aiding Chilean efforts to increase overseas trade and investment). Indeed, both ideologues and pragmatists have viewed Chile as a model of transition and economic development for others in Latin America to attempt to follow.

The rise of the Pink Tide in Latin America, and its opposition to the dominant ideology of the 1990s, in terms of the perceived limits of both market economics and electoral democracy, represented a challenge for Chile's center-left ruling Concertación and will continue to do so for the new center-right administration. This has provoked a degree of change in foreign policy, with greater emphasis on the defense of human rights and improved relations within the region. Yet Chile ultimately remains dedicated to a pragmatic foreign policy that best reflects its own economic and political interests, and which has, with only a few exceptions, remained within the ideological framework of adherence to liberal democracy, the international framework of law and, more recently, free-market economics. Despite changing times, Chile has remained surprisingly faithful to a long-term commitment to an ideology of legality, development, and pragmatism.

NOTES

1. Joaquín Fermandois, *Chile y el mundo 1970–1973. La política exterior del gobierno de la Unidad Popular y el sistema internacional* (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985). For a different view, see Jorge Vera Castillo, ed., *La política exterior chilena durante el gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende 1970–1973* (Santiago: IERIC, 1987). For a general assessment of the concept of "ideology," see Alan Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World* (New York, London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1–8.
2. For the most complete interpretation, see Heraldo Muñoz, *Las relaciones exteriores del gobierno militar chileno* (Santiago: Ornitorrinco, 1986).
3. For a general view, see Manfred Wilhelmy and Roberto Durán, "Los principales rasgos de la política exterior chilena entre 1973 y el 2000," *Revista de Ciencia Política* 23, 2 (2003); and Joaquín Fermandois, *Mundo y fin de mundo. Chile en la política mundial 1900–2004* (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2005), Chapter 16.
4. Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, *Programa de Gobierno* (Santiago, 1989). For an analysis of the program, see Renán Fuentealba, "Un nuevo estilo diplomático para el nuevo Gobierno Democrático," *Diplomacia*, No. 54–55 (October 1990–March 1991), p. 28.

5. *El Mercurio*, March 15, 1994.
6. *El Mercurio*, June 25, 1994.
7. *El Mercurio*, May 22, 1994.
8. *El Mercurio*, April 6, 1994.
9. *La Epoca*, September 9, 1996.
10. *La Segunda*, November 10, 1998.
11. Joaquín Fermandois and María José Henríquez, "¿Contradicción o díada? Política exterior chilena ante MERCOSUR," *Estudios Internacionales* XXXVIII, 148 (January–March 2005).
12. Alberto van Klaveren, "América Latina: hacia un regionalismo abierto," in Alberto van Klaveren, ed., *América Latina en el mundo* (Santiago: Los Andes, Pehuén, 1997).
13. José Miguel Insulza, *Ensayos sobre política exterior de Chile* (Santiago: Los Andes, 1998), pp. 69–74.
14. Pilar Armanet, Pilar Alamos, and Luz O'Shea, *Las relaciones de Chile con los organismos multilaterales de la Cuenca del Pacífico* (Santiago: Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, 1996). Manfred Wilhelmy, "Los empresarios chilenos frente a la región Asia-Pacífico," *Estudios Internacionales* XXXVI, 144, enero-marzo de 2004.
15. As a reference, see Angelo Codevilla, "Is Pinochet the Model?" *Foreign Affaire* 72, 5 (November/December 1993).
16. The initial reaction of the government of Lagos to the failed coup against Chávez in 2002 was ambiguous. The ambassador was later dismissed. See *La Nación*, April 13, 2002.
17. March 29, 2000, www.presidencia.cl.
18. Ricardo Lagos, Mensaje a la Nación, 21 de mayo de 2001, www.presidencia.cl. (accessed in 2004).
19. *El Mercurio*, November 22, 2004.
20. *El Mercurio*, November 21, 2004.
21. Joaquín Fermandois, "Peace at Home, Turbulences Abroad: The Foreign Policy of the Lagos Administration," Silvia Borzutzky and Lois Hecht Oppenheim, eds., *After Pinochet. The Chilean Road to Democracy and the Market* (Gainesville: The University of Florida Press, 2006).
22. Heraldo Muñoz, *Una guerra solitaria. La historia secreta de EE.UU. en Irak, la polémica en la ONU y el papel de Chile* (Santiago: Mondadori, 2005), p. 19.
23. Joaquín Fermandois, "Chile y la guerra de Irak del 2003," *Bicentenario* 7, 1 (2008).
24. José Rodríguez Elizondo, *Las crisis vecinales del gobierno de Lagos* (Santiago: Debate, 2006).
25. *Encuesta Nacional Bicentenario*, 2006 and 2008. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; y diario *El Mercurio*. This poll generally reflects a self-assured position of Chile in the region.
26. José Rodríguez Elizondo, *De Charaña a La Haya. Chile, entre la aspiración marítima de Bolivia y la demanda marítima de Perú* (Santiago: La Tercera, Mondadori, 2009).

27. For an analysis of the situation at the beginning of her administration, see César Ross, "Chile: los desafíos de la política exterior de Michelle Bachelet," *Foreign Affairs*, en español, abril–junio 2006.
28. Bachelet was the daughter of a general who was an ally of Allende, and who died while imprisoned in 1974; a victim of torture under Pinochet and a former exile in the DDR, she became the first female president of Chile.
29. *El Mercurio*, June 24, and June 25, 2009. Interestingly, there was no report of her visit on *NYT* online.
30. Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de Chile; Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, *Chile, las Américas y el mundo. Opinión pública y política exterior* (Santiago, 2008). This study stresses that the Chilean public considers current relations with other Latin American countries in a positive light.
31. http://expreso.co.cr/noticias/?p=1744. Visited, June 2009.