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by Eric Selbin and Vicki Golich

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
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ory and case studies, this cogent text explores the processes and factors that shape foreign policy. In her thoroughly revised and updated edition, Laura Neack provides a rich array of real foreign policy examples. In new cases, Neack explores decision-making in the Eurozone and nationalism in Germany and Japan and what seems to be growing between Canada and Obama's grand strategy and the responses of rising powers in Asia, and the Egyptian youth revolution. Following a levels-of-analysis approach, Neack considers all elements that influence foreign policy, including the international system, domestic politics, public opinion, the media, and the foreign policy process. This is a great text for students of international relations, foreign policy, and political science.

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Neack

The New Foreign Policy

THIRD EDITION

The New Foreign Policy

COMPLEX INTERACTIONS,
COMPETING INTERESTS

THIRD EDITION



Laura Neack

NEW MILLENNIUM BOOKS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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The New Foreign Policy Complex Interactions, Competing Interests

Third Edition

Laura Neack

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- A grand strategy is a policy employed by a great power in which military power is used to promote national interests and global goals.
- A hegemon is a preponderant power defined in terms of military and economic power.
- Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the world's hegemon. As hegemon, the United States built an international order based on the rule of law and multilateralism.
- International distributions of power can be described in terms of the number of power centers in a system: multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international distribution of power is unipolar, and the United States is the unipole.

Chapter Nine

Competitors, Rising Powers, and Allies

IN THIS CHAPTER

- Gauging the Options in Unipolarity
- Potential Balancers and Competitors
- Major Allies
- Rising Powers
- Middle Powers
- Weak Powers and Client States
- Chapter Review

CASES FEATURED IN THIS CHAPTER

- The 2010 British-French defense treaty as a way to remain important to the United States in a time of unipolarity.
- The Shanghai Cooperation Organization seen as either a potential Russian-Chinese counterbalance to the United States or a nonthreatening regional forum.
- The division over military intervention among the major European allies.
- Brazil's global ambitions and ambivalent relations with the United States.
- India's ambivalence about global ambitions.
- Australia's efforts to rethink its middle power role to be a deputy to the United States.
- Canada's efforts to rethink its middle power role as a reaction to the United States.
- The patron-client relationship of the United States and Saudi Arabia and why the Obama administration fired Hosni Mubarak of Egypt as a client.

every purpose. For our purposes here, we can use military spending and size of economy to sort out powerful states and then apply other factors to categorize these states in the international system. As will be shown, being a top military spender or having a large economy does not necessarily mean that a state is considered a great power.

In 2011, the United States accounted for 42 percent of the world's military spending (and 22 percent of the world's gross domestic product, but only 4 percent of the world's population).¹¹ The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is arguably the best source for military spending data. In 2011, SIPRI ranks these states as the top ten military spenders measured in billions of dollars:

1. United States \$711 billion
2. China \$143 billion
3. Russia \$71.9 billion
4. United Kingdom \$62.7 billion
5. France \$62.5 billion
6. Japan \$59.3 billion
7. India \$48.9 billion
8. Saudi Arabia \$48.5 billion
9. Germany \$46.7 billion
10. Brazil \$35.4 billion¹²

The United States outspends all of the other states on this list combined by \$132.1 billion. Even if US military spending should decrease significantly with the removal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014, the United States would maintain its outsized military spending compared to the other top-spender states on this list.

The top-ten list shifts slightly when we consider size of economy as measured in trillions of US dollars for 2011 (to use comparable years). The source for these data is CNNMoney using figures from the International Monetary Fund.

1. United States \$15.1 trillion
2. China \$7.3 trillion
3. Japan \$5.9 trillion
4. Germany \$3.6 trillion
5. France \$2.8 trillion
6. Brazil \$2.5 trillion
7. United Kingdom \$2.4 trillion
8. Italy \$2.4 trillion
9. Russia \$1.9 trillion
10. India \$1.8 trillion¹³

The most obvious differences between the lists are Saudi Arabia's absence from the list of largest economies and Italy's appearance on that list. The United States and China stay first and second on both lists. Indeed, the forward projections to 2015 show this same ranking, with not much change in the relative size of each economy compared to the other. In 2011, the US economy was 2.1 times larger than the Chinese economy, and in 2015, the US economy will be 1.6 times larger than the Chinese economy. From 2011 to 2015, the ranking of the top four economies stays the same as above. France is displaced from fifth on the list in 2014 by Brazil. Russia maintains the ninth spot from 2011 through 2015.

Viewing these lists through the prism of foreign policies and ambitions, and through relations with the United States, five categories can be discerned: potential balancers and competitors (China and Russia); major allies (Great Britain, France, Japan, and Germany); rising powers (India and Brazil); and clients (Saudi Arabia). We'll use these categories—and add middle powers to the list—to discuss the expected behaviors of states in the unipolar system.

POTENTIAL BALANCERS AND COMPETITORS

Great powers are divided here into two groups: those who aren't allies of the United States and those who are. Potential balancers and competitors China and Russia are not allies of the United States, although Russia is a NATO Partnership for Peace affiliate. China is commonly named as the primary future competitor of the United States while Russia is a competitor of diminishing importance.¹⁴

Since 2001, China and Russia have been members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As of the start of 2013, the other full members of the SCO are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Official observer states to the SCO are Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan. Dialogue partners include Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.

In 2005, the United States asked for observer status and was turned down. Also in 2005, the SCO was blamed for the closing of an American air base in Uzbekistan involved in supporting American military operations in Afghanistan.¹⁵ These actions and joint military exercises run by China and Russia led to some speculation that the SCO was designed as a counterbalance to the United States.

In 2008, the National Intelligence Council's *Global Trends 2025* looked at joint SCO military exercises led by China and Russia, burden fatigue in the United States and some NATO countries over Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing antipathy and economic nationalism shown by America toward China and proposed a possible future called "A World without the West."¹⁶ In

this scenario, the United States and its European allies pull out of Afghanistan leaving a power vacuum that is filled by the SCO. Once the SCO moves into the role of stabilizing Afghanistan, its members—not natural allies by most accounts—get pulled together into a power bloc. An important question for the National Intelligence Council was whether the SCO would persist as a bloc and clear counterweight to a diminishing NATO.

But is the SCO really a counterbalancing alliance of China and Russia against the United States? One answer might come again from the National Intelligence Council. In the NIC's *Global Trends 2030* released late in 2012, the SCO doesn't even get mentioned. Indeed, in that report, Russia is largely dismissed (along with Europe and Japan) as a greatly diminished power.¹⁷

Not only is the SCO dismissed by the NIC as a potential competitor worth mentioning, but most of the members of the SCO are NATO affiliates. "All of the SCO countries, except China, have signed Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework documents with NATO and the Central Asian SCO members are past participants in PfP defense training and exercises."¹⁸ This suggests that the SCO members aren't balancing against the United States and NATO as much as they are bandwagoning.

Walt suggests that if the SCO is an attempt at hard balancing—that is, forming a military counterweight—against the United States, it is a "tentative and half-hearted" effort at most.¹⁹ For Walt, hard balancing against the United States in this international system is a formidable task because "when one state is far stronger than the others, it takes a larger coalition to balance it, and assembling such a coalition entails larger transaction costs and more daunting dilemmas of collective action."²⁰ Further, China and Russia face each other and other great power competitors on the same landmass with more immediate potential security concerns. Fundamentally for Walt, the United States doesn't pose a significant enough threat to potential balancers to make the effort worthwhile:

The relative dearth of hard balancing is consistent with the view that alliances form not in response to power alone but in response to the level of threat. States will not want to incur the various costs of balancing (increased military spending, loss of autonomy, punishment by the unipole, and so on) unless they believe doing so is truly necessary. In particular, states will not engage in hard balancing against the unipole if its power is not perceived as posing an imminent threat to their security.²¹

Walt concludes that even the George W. Bush administration was not perceived as aggressive enough to cause hard balancing.

To judge whether a group like the SCO constitutes a balance of any sort, we should ask "what security problem the alliance was intended to address and why particular leaders opted for a specific policy choice."²² The SCO is designed to address three security problems: terrorism, extremism, and sepa-

ratism. Each of the SCO countries has internal terrorist, extremist, and/or separatist threats, and these are linked to similar threats in the broader region. None of this is linked to the United States or its predominant power. India, no fan of large military alliances, wants to join the SCO because of its focus on common regional security issues generally and worries about Afghanistan specifically. If the SCO were a counterbalance to the United States, we wouldn't expect to see India joining it.²³

MAJOR ALLIES

In the list above of the top ten military spenders, the United Kingdom is fourth, France fifth, Japan sixth, and Germany ninth. All of these are major allies of the United States. We would not expect to see hard balancing at all by these countries, but we might see efforts to demonstrate the continued importance of these countries to the United States. Japan's foreign policy orientation was discussed in chapter 5, so here we'll focus on the three EU countries.

During the George W. Bush administration, the secretary of defense was notorious for making a distinction between the old Europe and new Europe. A split among the European allies was apparent at that time—if not exactly as the observer suggested—in the British full-on support for the Iraq war, while the French and Germans (and Russians) attempted **soft balancing**. Walt explains that "soft balancing accepts the current balance of power but seeks to obtain better outcomes within it, by assembling countervailing coalitions designed to thwart or impede specific policies."²⁴ The soft balancing of the French, Germans, and Russians in the Security Council stopped the Bush administration from getting approval for the Iraq war, but the Americans and British and their new Eastern European allies went to war anyway.²⁵

The Obama administration has not attempted to split the Europeans, which is just as well since by the start of 2013 they were busy splitting themselves into camps (but different camps than during the Bush years). The Eurozone crisis was one reason for this split. While Sarkozy was still the president of France, the French and Germans enjoyed unusually warm relations based on shared leadership views on fiscal policy and the need for greater austerity among the countries facing debt crises. In 2011, Sarkozy and German chancellor Angela Merkel proposed that greater political integration of the Eurozone would provide stronger tools for imposing fiscal discipline among member states in order to avoid the many crises that had developed since 2009. Before this could occur, the French people rejected austerity and voted in pro-growth socialist François Hollande. With this major change in the French perspective, the Eurozone countries agreed to a banking union in December 2012 and a common insurance fund for inves-

tors. This, in turn, caused British PM Cameron to declare that he would seek a British referendum on whether to continue in the European Union—even though Britain was not a member of the Eurozone (the Conservative Party has always been the party of Euroskeptics). Anger toward the Germans, and resentment over German control of the debt crisis debate within many Euro-zone countries, and French and German disagreement over the proper role of government in the economy had put continued European integration into question by the start of 2013.

Another factor driving a split among the European allies was a difference of opinion regarding the use of military intervention. This dispute put the French and British on one side and the Germans on the other. Recall that the French and Germans had opposed the war in Iraq. As discussed in chapter 5, German opposition to the war in Iraq marked an evolution in Germany's post-World War II self-image, an evolution that involved the Germans standing with NATO to stop genocide in Kosovo and then sending military personnel to Afghanistan to stand with America in collective defense and unity after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But German opposition to the Iraq war signaled a maturing of German foreign policy such that it could say no to its ally America when America engaged in wars of choice. Thomas Forsberg explains Germany's policy on Iraq as one grounded in "emancipation." Germany demonstrated "a new sense of self-esteem and independence" in its Iraq stance. This independence was still within the Western alliance framework, Forsberg contends, as "German assertiveness is better understood as a desire to not only be part of the West but also to define what 'the West' is."²⁶ For France, the Iraq war demonstrated how the uncontrolled "hyperpower" of the United States needed to be countered in some way.

In early 2011, a strong fissure appeared between Germany on one side and France and Britain on the other regarding the use of military intervention to stop imminent mass killings in Libya. France and Britain were important early supporters of military action to protect the people of Libya from Qaddafi. When the Security Council voted to approve military intervention for the purposes of civilian protection (discussed in chapter 8), Germany (as a nonpermanent member) abstained from voting, along with Russia, China, Brazil, and India. Germany wasn't the only NATO country that refused to participate in the intervention, but its opposition to the action was public and brought it significant criticism.²⁷ France, conversely, launched a second intervention in support of a civilian protection mandate in Côte d'Ivoire within a month of starting the Libyan intervention.

When the French decided to intervene to compel various armed groups to leave northern cities in Mali in January 2013, Germany expressed strong public disapproval again. This put Germany in opposition—again—to the United States. The Americans offered air and logistical support to the French in Mali, calling it their responsibility to assist France and indicating that this

could be a model for the future. The British followed the Americans and assisted the French.

After the divisions of the Bush era, France and the United States seemed to be enjoying a renaissance in their relations. The readers of this book will be able to judge whether the ideological affinities between French president Hollande and US president Obama draw the two countries even closer, and whether the division between the major European allies gets greater. The French seem to have embraced the idea of demonstrating France's importance as a willing, able, and useful partner to the American unipole. This seems to fit well with the French national self-image as described by one French official in January 2013: "We still have a foreign policy, a capacity to act beyond our borders, a capacity to make a difference." After all, the official said, "if you don't have the military means to act, you don't have a foreign policy."²⁸

RISING POWERS

An analyst at Goldman Sachs is credited with coining the term "BRIC" when looking at the fastest-emerging economies at the start of the millennium. The countries included in the term are Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Later, an "S" was added to include South Africa. Other groupings and acronyms have also been developed, but none have stuck quite like BRICS. Leaving the major powers China and Russia out, India, Brazil, and South Africa established the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003. The dialogue was based on these three countries' positions as democratic countries from the developing world that were capable of global action. And, before we leave acronyms behind, in 2009 before the Copenhagen climate talks, China organized a draft proposal on behalf of the BASIC group—Brazil, South Africa, India, and China. The BASIC group agreed to stage a walkout at Copenhagen if there was any discussion of their nonnegotiables.²⁹

The framework being used in this chapter is that unipolarity sets the conditions in which other actors operate, and relations with the United States are the baseline for foreign policy choices among the more powerful states. As if to make this point, the BASIC group had its private meeting at Copenhagen crashed by an unhappy President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who then co-opted BASIC's efforts in a quick news conference just before the Americans headed for the airport.³⁰ Let's consider the foreign policies of rising powers Brazil and India, particularly vis-à-vis the United States.

Brazil is a country that does not have a strong or even a good relationship with the United States, and it is a country with global aspirations. According to Peter Hakim, these two things work together. On the first issue, Hakim

says, "it would certainly be hard to say the U.S. and Brazil are adversaries or in conflict, but the fact is, they disagree more than they agree." And on the second point,

Brazil is in many respects still learning what it means to be a global power. And the way it's been successful, ironically, is not by joining with the United States, which would have been one route, but rather in opposition to the United States, that it sort of has gained its international prestige precisely by showing its independence of the United States.³¹

Hakim also believes that a major problem is that the "U.S. rarely consults with Brazil on the important global issues." Which leads to the obvious question: would Brazil try to partner more with the United States if the United States gave Brazil more respect? But, sticking with our unipole framework, what incentive does the United States have to partner with Brazil?

Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his successor President Dilma Rousseff both engaged in high-profile foreign policy bids demonstrating Brazil's global ambitions and difficult relations with the United States. The first at Copenhagen in 2009 has been mentioned. The second came just months after Copenhagen. In May 2010, da Silva and Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan engaged in dramatic negotiations with Iranian authorities over a nuclear fuel swap. They tried to revive a deal that had been proposed the year before and supported by the United States and the major powers in the UN Security Council. The Iranians had changed their position on the deal several times even as they continued to enrich uranium.³² Because of this, the United States was collecting votes in the Security Council in favor of more stringent sanctions. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton announced the agreement on the sanctions even as the Brazilian-Turkish deal was being announced. Clinton criticized the Brazil-Turkey plan as one that would make the world "more dangerous," singling out Brazil for special criticism.³³ In response, Brazilian authorities released a letter reported to be from US president Obama laying out the very plan that Brazil had brokered; Turkey refused to release a similar letter.³⁴

The January 2011 election of Brazil's first female president, Dilma Rousseff, did not change Brazil's global ambitions and antipathy toward the United States. For Rousseff, a defining moment was when the UN Security Council approved the civilian protection mandate for Libya in March 2011. Brazil joined Russia, China, India, and Germany in abstaining from the vote, and Rousseff and the other leaders expressed alarm over what they considered a distortion of the mandate to justify regime change.

Rousseff used her address to the UN General Assembly that September to claim that the Libyan intervention allowed terrorism to flourish "where it

previously did not exist, gave rise to new cycles of violence and multiplied the number of civilian victims." Then she indicated the direction Brazil was about to take in international discussions: "Much is said about the responsibility *to* protect; yet we hear little about responsibility *in* protecting."³⁵ In November, the Brazilian permanent representative to the United Nations presented a letter/concept paper to the secretary general on "Responsibility While Protecting." In it, Brazil stated its position that the responsibility-to-protect (RTP) idea (the idea behind civilian protection) was being used for political purposes to enact regime change.³⁶ The concept paper then set out a series of problems Brazil saw in the responsibility-to-protect idea, a list that suggested an incomplete appreciation of the RTP.

Brazil went on to host international discussions of the "responsibility while protecting" (RWP) at the United Nations and in Rio de Janeiro. At the Rio discussions, Brazilian authorities threatened soft balancing when they said they would work with India and South Africa through the IBSA framework to oppose any future UN civilian protection actions. One participant at the discussions noted that the IBSA countries complained repeatedly that "their diplomats were treated dismissively throughout the [Libyan] operation and were left uninformed. This sense of personal humiliation at the hands of the P3 (the U.S., France, and the U.K.) appears to be the most significant proximate cause of RWP."³⁷ The RTP was the outgrowth of significant middle power diplomacy; thus, by attacking the RTP, Brazil seemed to be positioning itself against the middle powers as much as against the United States and major allies France and Great Britain.

At the same time that Rousseff was striking a blow against civilian protection, she was riding to the rescue of the Eurozone. After consulting with Russia, China, and India, Brazil backed away from a plan to buy European debt directly. Instead, the Brazilian president donated \$10 million to the International Monetary Fund to assist Eurozone countries.³⁸ Brazil threatened to withhold future funds from the IMF if the IMF imposed austerity measures on Greece in exchange for assistance. The IMF and the European Union ignored Brazil's threats and imposed strict austerity conditions anyway. Every time Brazil tried to assert itself in global affairs, it never seemed to receive the respect it wanted.

Brazil's partner in the BRICS, BASIC, and IBSA, India, has not appeared as bold or as decisive in establishing its own credentials as a rising power. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report on India explains in a nutshell, "Some observers argue that the New Delhi Government acts too timidly on the global stage, and that the country's regional and domestic difficulties continue to hinder its ability to exert influence in geopolitics."³⁹ India's political and economic systems have long been seen as the potential bases for great power status as well as debilitating obstacles to a great power claim.

Additionally, continued border disagreements with China keep India distracted from a global power status enhancement project.

The United States has urged India to take a more prominent role in the world, especially as an “indispensable partner” of the United States and a “potential counterweight to China’s growing clout.”⁴⁰ (The other “indispensable partner” of the United States is Great Britain.) Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama exhorted India to act like a great power. In 2005, the Bush administration initiated and signed the US-India nuclear deal as discussed in chapter 6. The treaty, which came into force in 2008, essentially acknowledged that India was a nuclear weapons power and allowed India in effect to build more nuclear weapons if it so chooses, despite the fact that its whole nuclear weapons development program has been outside international agreements and norms. One benefit that was to accrue to the United States from the treaty was the opening of the Indian civilian nuclear energy market to American manufacturers of nuclear equipment. However, India’s parliament passed a law that imposed liability on nuclear equipment manufacturers in the event of an operating accident. Because of this obstacle, American private-sector manufacturers remained outside the Indian market while Russian and French state-owned companies were happy to comply with the Indian requirements.⁴¹ American efforts to exhort India to bring its liability laws into accord with international standards had no effect.

Complying with international norms on nuclear issues has never been India’s strong suit, yet the United States continued to insist that such compliance would facilitate greater cooperation between the two countries toward the goal of transforming their relationship. The United States wanted India to act as an “anchor of regional stability” and a partner in the US strategic pivot to Asia.⁴² Toward that end, American and Indian military forces have conducted more than fifty military exercises since the nuclear treaty was signed in 2005.⁴³ On the other hand, in 2011, India announced it would choose between two European vendors to supply combat aircraft, a decision that came against US hopes and expectations.⁴⁴ India did not appear to be acting like an indispensable partner to the United States and was not likely to become a counterweight to China in the near future.

India’s relationship with China, like its relationship with the United States, defies easy description. India manifests both cooperative and adversarial attitudes toward China. India’s largest trading partner by 2011 was China. India joined with China on the BASIC plan for Copenhagen, yet the Indian government was reported to be unhappy that the Chinese were credited with putting together the BASIC plan.⁴⁵ Additionally, at the end of 2012 India indicated that it wanted to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—which the Chinese cofounded—while at the same time India and China remained in a significant arms race around an unresolved border dispute.

The border dispute between India and China can be traced back to 1904 and is enshrined in the Tangled Tale of Tibet discussed in chapter 1. In 1904, Britain was unable to convince Tibetan authorities to sign a border agreement between British colonial India and Tibet. In the next ten years, Britain marched its troops into what is today called Arunachal Pradesh and established the Northeast Frontier Agency, and Chinese forces took control of Tibet. But then the Qing dynasty fell in China, and the Tibetans expelled the Chinese and declared Tibet’s independence.

In 1914, at the Simla Conference attended by British, Chinese, and Tibetan authorities, a British administrator drew and lent his name to the McMahon Line delineating the boundary between British India (including Arunachal Pradesh) and Tibet. Arunachal Pradesh contained within it the city and monastery of Tawang, honored as the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. The agreement said that China had “suzerainty” over Tibet, but that China would refrain from interference in the administration of Tibet, including the selection of the Dalai Lama. Further, China would agree not to make Tibet a province, and the British promised not to annex Tibet. The British would retain control of Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese did not like the agreement and so quit the conference. Nevertheless, Great Britain and Tibet signed the Simla Accord agreeing to borders between a country that had left the conference (China) and another one that was not yet independent (India).

Upon its independence, India accepted the McMahon Line; China never accepted it. Over the years there were times when the disputed territory was ignored in relations between China and India. However, in 1962 Chinese troops marched into Arunachal Pradesh starting a war that resolved nothing but which is still remembered with bitterness in India today. Various bilateral commissions on the border were formed, but none resolved the dispute. India’s basic position is that China should accept the fait accompli that Arunachal Pradesh is part of India (much like Tibet is part of China).

Complicating the border dispute is the position of the fourteenth Dalai Lama regarding the ownership of Arunachal Pradesh. The Dalai Lama’s old position was that Arunachal Pradesh was part of Tibet. But in 2008 the Dalai Lama changed his position and declared Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh to be Indian according to the Simla Accord of 1914.⁴⁶ Before 2008, the Dalai Lama had the same kind of territorial claim on Arunachal Pradesh (on behalf of an autonomous Tibet) that the Chinese had. After 2008, the Dalai Lama had a greater political interest in India maintaining control of Tawang—the monastery to which the Dalai Lama had fled in 1959 and one possible spot where the Dalai Lama might be born should he choose to reincarnate.

In chapter 1, we discussed the competition between India and China over the claim of being the seat of world Buddhism. Tawang is the largest Buddhist monastery in India, and thus control of Tawang is critical to India’s claim. This area is also the site of massive militarization. Because of an

Indian ten-year plan for Arunachal Pradesh, India soon will be able to match China's troop deployment on the contested border so that "half a million men are eyeball to eyeball."⁴⁷ India had two fighter squadrons in the area to counter China's fighters based in a string of modern air bases in Tibet.⁴⁸

And this is a juncture at which we can see the enormous differences between the two countries most frequently mentioned as the rising powers of the twenty-first century. Reuters describes the scene and the problem for India:

The road to Tawang, a center of Tibetan Buddhism by the border, is one of India's most strategic military supply routes. Growing convoys of army trucks bring troops, food and fuel through three Himalayan passes on the 320-kilometer (199 mile) muddy coil to camps dotted along the disputed border.

On a road trip in late May and early June [2012], Reuters found much of the 14,000-foot-high road to be a treacherous rutted trail, often blocked by landslides or snow, despite years of promises to widen and resurface it.⁴⁹

On the other side, China had built a series of airstrips and wide, paved roads. The Chinese military practiced military attacks using laser-guided bombs. On the Indian side, "work gangs of local women chip boulders into gravel with hammers to repair the road, many with babies strapped to their backs."⁵⁰

In this disparity between India and China in the area of India's humiliating military defeat of 1962 and where India's largest Buddhist monastery sits, we see the sharp differences between these two rising powers. Steven Ratner concludes that "China has lunged into the twenty-first century, while India is still lurching toward it."⁵¹ Corruption, government red-tape and famous inefficiency, a mind-set that is ambivalent about whether India should play a bigger global role, and a reckless military buildup against China in an area that lacks paved roads all make America's decision to prop India up as its indispensable partner in Asia look like an exercise in fantasy. The United States sees potential where many have long seen potential, but India is not poised—and possibly not inclined—to be a great power or any kind of counterweight to China.

How might we characterize India if not as a rising power? Charalampos Efsthathopoulos suggests that India's foreign policy should not be seen through a great power prism, but through a middle power prism focusing on ideational and behavioral characteristics. India is either unable or unwilling to "match the transformative agency of major powers" despite its potential. Instead, India's global orientation and multilateral preferences make it a better candidate for middle power.⁵² This takes us to the next topic.

MIDDLE POWERS

Of all the categories we discuss in this chapter, "middle power" is the best defined. Middle power diplomacy involves international mediation, peacekeeping, consensus building within international organizations, and other similarly cooperative, multilateralist, and go-between behaviors. According to some analysts, middle power diplomacy (i.e., the foreign policy behaviors of the middle powers) derives from a moral imperative found in the political cultures of the middle powers (Canada, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and so forth). This moral imperative is to serve as international "helpful fixers," extending their own social policies on the redistribution of wealth, peaceful conflict resolution, and so on outward. To other observers, middle powers play their roles because of their position in the international distribution of power, especially vis-à-vis the great powers. Middle powers are not capable of directing the system—as are the great powers—but neither are they the weakest members of the international system. Thus their foreign policy derives from their in-between status.

"Middle power" is a self-identification taken up sometimes by Canadians, Australians, Swedes, Norwegians, Dutch, and Danes—and as of the 1990s, (South) Koreans—to explain their own countries' roles and positions in the world. The self-identification goes back to the interwar period; "middle power" was a designated category within the League of Nations system (1920–1946), but not a particularly popular one. Brazilian delegates threatened to end their participation in league activities if Brazil were designated as being in the middle of anything. Indeed, Brazil quit the league in 1926, only a few years into its existence.

At the half-century mark, Canadian diplomats set their sights on carving out a role for Canada in the architecture of the post-World War II era. "Middle power" would designate both what certain states had contributed to the Allied war effort—important, albeit secondary, resources and energies—and what these states would contribute to maintaining the postwar international system. As the United Nations took shape, Canadians and Australians began promoting the codification of middle power status into the UN Charter based on functional criteria. The great powers, the permanent five, had no particular interest in delineating categories for non-great powers. And countries relegated by the self-described middle powers to small power status had no interest in seeing another layer constructed atop them. This functionally based, status-seeking claim by the Canadians, Australians, and others was rejected, but the notion of the middle power held fast for them.

The self-identified middle powers did not go back to stand among the ranks of the non-great powers. Instead, they internalized the idea of the middle power and began conforming their external behaviors to role expectations. In time, middle power diplomacy became defined as the "tendency to

pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship.'"⁵³ In line with this, middle powers were self-defined as states that committed their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of international peace and order. Middle powers were the coalition builders, the mediators and go-betweens, and the peacekeepers of the world. Middle powers, according to the diplomats and scholars of these states, performed internationalist activities because of a moral imperative associated with being a middle power—middle powers were the only states that were able and willing to be collectively responsible for protecting the international order, especially when smaller states could not and greater powers would not.⁵⁴

How did this moral imperative get imported into what, in the first instance, was a status-seeking project? One quick answer is that the imperative was already present. The self-declared middle powers already possessed a sense of moral superiority and certitude that required a unique foreign policy stance. Going hand in hand with this do-gooder impulse was the equally strong impulse to demonstrate to the world that middle powers were *like* great powers, but were *not* great powers. As J. L. Granatstein explains, in regard to Canada,

Canadian policy in the postwar world would try to maintain a careful balance between cooperation with the United States and independent action. This was especially true at the United Nations. And peacekeeping, while it often served U.S. interests, to be sure, nonetheless had about it a powerful aura of independence and the implicit sense that it served higher interests than simply those of the United States, or even the West.⁵⁵

The packaging of middle power diplomacy in a moral wrapping was not intended to obfuscate the essentially interest-based, status-seeking nature of the middle power project. Middle power scholars, particularly, never shied from this element of middle power diplomacy. Middle powers were devoted to the preservation of international norms and principles because they clearly benefited from a routinized international system. Further, middle power internationalism earned these states much deserved prestige. Even as middle powers proclaimed that their internationalism made them different from the great powers, middle powers also acknowledged that they generally were *active followers* of the great powers. Middle power scholars Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgett, and Kim Richard Nossal have coined a term to describe this behavior: "followership." This phrase is chosen to be both similar and dissimilar to the term "leadership."⁵⁶

Middle power, then, is a self-declared role that contains both status-seeking, self-interested behavior (securing a coveted international position) and moralistic/idealistic elements (being a good international citizen). Thus mid-

dle power contains realist and liberal characteristics. Post-World War II efforts to attain international recognition for the "middle power" label failed, yet the middle powers maintained the identity and elaborated on the role expectations attendant to it. It is not difficult to find statements from the prime ministers or foreign ministries of middle powers saying, "Middle powers act in certain ways, and therefore we must act in certain ways." Yet the middle power imperative did not blind these states to real-world constraints and dangers, and so it also is not difficult to find statements that take the following form: "Middle powers act like this; we are a middle power so we naturally want to act like this, but unfortunately this is not a prudent time for such actions." Imperative—a sense of duty coming from within the country's national culture to do some good in the world—and position—where one is positioned or where one desires to be positioned in the international hierarchy of states—have long been two sides of the middle power coin, equally at play in explaining middle power diplomacy.

Middle power studies all have emphasized middle power vulnerability to changes in the central great power relationship.⁵⁷ Such changes produce uncertainty about the role middle powers should play in the world since "middle power" is a role that is both reactive against the whims of the great powers *and* dependent on partnership with a relevant great power. For example, at the conclusion of the Cold War, Australian officials began to refocus Australia's middle power orientation toward the rising Asian powers of Indonesia and China. This Asian focus was in response to the consensus that American power had waned considerably in the 1980s and Asian powers were on the rise. But American power (particularly the American economy) was resurgent in the 1990s—unparalleled in fact—so Australia began to cast itself as a deputy to the United States for managing Asian affairs. Rather than hitch itself to Indonesia's rising star, Australia led a multinational enforcement operation into the soon-to-be-former Indonesian territory of East Timor in 1999. This enforcement operation was in response to an American call for someone to do something to stop ethnic cleansing in Timor, although later Bill Clinton said he had in mind that Indonesia had a special responsibility to stop the violence there.

Australian prime minister John Howard enthusiastically announced that with the "Howard Doctrine" Australia would fulfill its special responsibility for maintaining order in Asia. The Clinton administration showed little interest in having an Australian deputy since the Clinton strategy was to be best friends with all major actors in the world including those in Asia (as discussed in chapter 8). Clinton had no desire to put Australia in between America and key Asian countries. But within another two years, another US president, George W. Bush, was happy to deputize Australia in the global war on terror. This critical role continues in a slightly different cast for the

Obama administration: Australia plays a central role in the American pivot to Asia.

The most senior of the middle powers is Canada. It holds this seniority precisely because the middle power role is one defined in terms of a special relationship with and service to the relevant great power. Canada's critical secondary role to Great Britain and America in the world wars and its critical participation in the 1991 Gulf War as a chief follower to the United States mark its place in the world.

Further, Canada's place as the premier peacekeeping country during the Cold War demonstrated its commitment to the US-led rule-based international order. When the Clinton administration announced in 1994 that America would start saying no to United Nations peace operations, Canada's own retrenchment from UN peacekeeping followed soon after.

After the Bush administration started the global war on terror, Canada played the expected role of middle power follower and NATO ally in Afghanistan. Like most coalition partners there, the Canadian presence and role was not especially large. Canada did not follow the United States into Iraq in 2003, a move that made sense given the nearly global consensus that the Bush administration was contravening international law and order.

Like its middle power counterpart Australia, Canada had been thinking about its role in the world. In 2005 in a foreign policy white paper, the liberal government of Paul Martin said this: "Our old middle identity imposes an unnecessary ceiling on what we can do and be in the world. Canada *can* make a difference, if it continues to invest in its international role and pulls its weight."⁵⁸ The new role that Canada might play was not so clear. It still had a special relationship with the United States, but Bush administration policies made it difficult to follow America. Canada's economy was fairly robust, but in 2005 it was still smaller than that of Brazil, Korea, India, and Italy; its defense spending had dropped below that of fellow middle powers Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Australia; and its development assistance was at an all-time low. "In this context, the traditional notion of Canada as a middle power is outdated and no longer captures the reality of how power is distributed in the 21st century."⁵⁹

Canada's role in the world might not be characterized as a middle power, but Martin proposed that Canada would continue to fulfill its "responsibilities as a global citizen." Toward this,

[Canada's] current economic and political standing provides the freedom to make choices about how we will contribute. By investing strategically today, we will maintain our capacity to act in the future. Our unique relationship with the United States does not alone assure Canada's influence in the world. We will set our own course, and pull our own weight.⁶⁰

The word used most frequently in the 2005 white paper to describe Canada's foreign policy was "responsibility." And the "responsibility to protect" was noted to be Canada's primary global initiative.⁶¹ Middle power Australia sought to hitch itself in good follower form to the United States. Middle power Canada was thinking about its responsibility for protecting the international order when the great power was predisposed not to do so. Both reactions fit the idea of the middle power.

More recently, both Canada and the United States experienced significant leadership changes. As discussed in chapter 7, conservative Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper took a belligerent tone regarding Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. In 2007, Harper said, "Canada has a choice when it comes to our sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it and make no mistake this government intends to use it because Canada's Arctic is central to our national identity and our future."⁶² The defense minister bragged that Canada would develop a three-ocean navy to defend its claims—particularly against the Russians.

The United States, under the leadership of Barack Obama, did not seem to take Canadian Arctic bellicosity and military competition with Russia seriously. In 2011, a US diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks commented that Canadian Arctic sovereignty claims were little more than campaign rhetoric.⁶³ Indeed, in an internal government memo acquired by the Canadian media, Harper worried that Canadian participation in *NATO-sponsored* Arctic military exercises would offend Russia.⁶⁴ While Harper was talking tough, the Canadian government sought the help of the United States to map the continental shelf in order to make a sovereignty claim before the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in the true form of a good international citizen and friend of America.

There are some countries from the **global south** that have adopted the title of middle power. Efsthopoulos distinguishes between traditional Western middle powers like Canada and Australia and southern middle powers like India, South Africa, and Indonesia. Southern middle powers are similar to traditional middle powers in their use of multilateralism and their commitment to post–World War II global institutions. But where traditional middle powers tend to be more status-quo oriented, southern middle powers seek fundamental revisions of these institutions in order to address the problems of the majority of the world's states.⁶⁵

For instance, South Africa's 2011 foreign policy white paper notes South Africa's commitment to multilateralism, especially through the United Nations, which "occupies the central and indispensable role within the global system of governance." Yet South Africa sees the United Nations as deeply flawed by "a continued over-emphasis by the developed world on issues of peace and security [which] undermine efforts to deal with the root causes of poverty and underdevelopment."⁶⁶ One way to transform the United Nations

would be to democratize the Security Council by making South Africa a permanent member.

Similarly, Efsthopoulos notes that "India's world-view perceives the institutions of the current world order as representative of an outdated configuration of power constructed in the post-war period that does not reflect the new dynamics of global governance and the heightening impact of leading developing countries."⁶⁷ India, too, proposes that the United Nations be transformed by giving it a permanent Security Council seat—an idea supported by the Obama administration. Since the start of the new millennium, India has become the world's premier peacekeeper.

Beyond the desire to transform global institutions, southern middle powers play important regional roles, which serve as power multipliers to move these countries onto the global stage. Regionalism is a requirement for managing immediate foreign policy and security issues that the Western middle powers never confronted:

Whereas traditional middle powers like Australia and Canada have been relatively more detached from their regional environment, Southern middle powers are more entangled in dynamics of regional hegemony and antagonism, and are inclined to provide leadership in projects of regional integration to manage these tensions.⁶⁸

Southern middle power Indonesia promotes itself—and is promoted by the United States—as a country well suited to taking on a global middle power role because of its long commitment to regional multilateralism in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The United States has been assisting Indonesia as it develops its military capacity to become one of the top ten contributors to UN peacekeeping. Additionally, Indonesia seeks to make itself the "hub" of a network of peacekeeping training centers in Southeast Asia.⁶⁹

The middle power role, whether for Western middle powers or those from the global south, is embedded with moral imperative. Western middle powers are called to be good international citizens, while southern middle powers seek to do the same while promoting the interests of countries often left behind by globalization and international politics.

WEAK POWERS AND CLIENT STATES

The final country to be discussed from the list of biggest military spenders is Saudi Arabia. In earlier versions of *The New Foreign Policy*, Saudi Arabia was characterized as a **client state** under the heading "small powers." The starting point for any observer of small power foreign policy is the acknowledgment that the range of opportunities for independent, self-interested be-

havior is more limited than that for more powerful states. Small powers are boxed in by virtue of their relative weakness, but they are not powerless. Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr contend that small states have some power over their foreign policy choices and ultimate fates, but this power is contingent on the opportunities present in the international system and the willingness of the leaders of small states to take advantage of those opportunities.⁷⁰ In this way, small states are like most states; international conditions must be ripe for action, and leaders must be inclined to act.

Davis Bobrow and Steve Chan contend that some small states are more powerful than others because they "have been able to carve out for themselves a special niche in the strategic conceptions, political doctrines, and domestic opinions of their chief ally."⁷¹ These states derive power from manipulating the very relationship in which they are the dependent partner. Israel and South Korea are former small powers that were successful in defining their importance to the United States and taking great advantage from this.

Some small powers or weak states (weak relative to other state actors) are able to establish special relationships with larger powers called **clieny**. Mary Ann Tétrault defines clieney as a "strategic relationship between a strong state and a weak one."⁷² The use of the word "strategic" is important here as it indicates agency on the part of both actors; although the power relationship is asymmetrical, clieney is reciprocal. The patron gains access to something valued such as a strategic route or critical resource while the client gains protection. Often the protection is for the purpose of facing an internal threat. The client plays on the fear of the patron that the client regime may be overthrown if not given sufficient resources and backing. **Patron-client relationships** seem to experience serious diminishing gains over time. And in a system characterized by unipolarity, the client may have difficulty convincing the patron to stay involved.

The patron-client relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia serves as an example of the diminishing returns that seem to characterize this kind of relationship. The clieney relationship between these two states goes back to World War II when the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration sought to secure access to Saudi oil reserves. In return for access to Saudi oil, the United States extended a security guarantee to the House of Saud, promising protection from external and internal challengers. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of neighboring Kuwait posed a serious external military threat, which the United States answered with a massive military response known as the Gulf War of 1991. This special relationship was cited by many different observers as a key reason for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States: unable to dislodge the illegitimate House of Saud, Osama bin Laden determined to poison and kill the relations between patron and client by attacking the patron.

In the unipolar international system, the possibility of the United States disengaging from many parts of the world—because it can—has implications for small or weak powers who previously were able to exploit US fears. Under unipolarity, Walt explains,

weaker states are less able to influence the dominant power's conduct by threatening to realign or by warning that they may be defeated or overthrown if not given sufficient support by their patron. Not only do weaker states lack an attractive alternative partner, but the unipole needs them less and thus will worry less about possible defection or defeat.⁷³

The American relationship with the Hosni Mubarak regime of Egypt is an interesting case in point. When Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the United States rewarded Egypt with substantial foreign assistance (mostly military) and the implicit promise of support against enemies external and internal. Egypt was an important client to win in the Cold War. After the Cold War, the Mubarak regime's importance to the United States was measured in its ability to suppress Islamic fundamentalism, which was seen as a threat to Israel. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and despite neoconservative desires to force democracy on the broader Middle East, Mubarak's value as a counterweight to militant Islam remained high. This was especially true for the Bush administration with its intense concerns about maintaining unipolarity against a variety of threats.

As discussed in the last chapter and the start of the present one, unipolarity as an enduring characteristic of the international system is more or less established, and the Obama administration is more comfortable with the idea of other powers rising. Had the Bush administration been in charge when the Arab Awakening hit Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011, Mubarak would have been guaranteed American support as a counterweight to militant Islam in the global war on terror. But for the Barack Obama administration, the threat that Mubarak might be overthrown by persons aligned with a counterweight to the United States was insufficiently balanced against other concerns. The possible threat of a Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Egyptian government could not overcome the intriguing value of nudging Mubarak out of power in order to come out on the right side of history by supporting the people of Egypt. This, of course, takes us out of a realist interpretive mode in preparation for the next and last chapter.

CHAPTER REVIEW

- The condition of unipolarity has an effect on the foreign policy choices of many different kinds of states from potential competitors to major allies, rising powers, middle powers, and client states.

- Major allies to the United States may be enhancing their military capabilities and demonstrating their willingness to lead military interventions in order to remind the United States of their importance. This can be called bandwagoning behavior.
- Balancing behavior—the effort to create a counterbalance to the predominant power—does not appear to be happening in the present unipolar system.
- Soft balancing is the attempt to create a countervailing coalition to thwart a policy choice of the dominant power without challenging the international position of that dominant power.
- Although analysts think they know “rising powers” when they see them, some so-called rising powers have mixed global ambitions and do not always live up to international expectations.
- Middle power diplomacy involves international mediation, peacekeeping, and consensus building within multilateral organizations.
- Patron-client relations involve a reciprocal albeit asymmetrical exchange that may not be durable or maintain value over time.