CHAPTER 3

Brazilian Foreign Policy: Causal Beliefs in Formulation and Pragmatism in Practice

Miriam Gomes Saraiva

Introduction

In general terms, Brazilian foreign policy has been marked by continuity. Behind this continuity lie a number of long-held beliefs that have influenced its evolution: the importance of autonomy, universalist action, and destiny, the idea that the country will one day come to occupy a place of greater distinction in international politics ("the destiny of grandeur"). These beliefs can be clearly identified as long-term aims and are rooted in a structured diplomatic corporation.[1] The means available to achieve these objectives, as will be seen, are not constant, but rather vary according to the specific historical and political context.

The strong tendency toward centralization in the formulation of Brazilian foreign-policy in Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Office) contributed to more stable policies and behavior based on longer-term principles. Indeed, some authors use the organizational behavior model in order to analyze the history and behavior of Brazilian diplomacy.[2] This concentration makes foreign policy less vulnerable to the direct interference of domestic policy.

These beliefs, however, do not necessarily provide a basis for actions based on ideology. On the contrary, in the Brazilian case in general, they orient the organization of behavior, which is in turn inspired by clearly realistic premises of a pragmatic nature. As Pinheiro highlights, within the framework of realism, Brazilian behavior at times assumes a Hobbesian character as a matter of priority, in which a relative increase in power is sought vis-à-vis others, while at other times preference is given to realism of a Grotian nature, emphasizing initiatives that bring absolute gains but may also bring benefits to other states.[3] Brazil has frequently adopted multifaceted ways of behavior in terms of international policy, seeking to simultaneously benefit from the possibilities of the international system, and also assume a position of leadership, especially of southern hemisphere countries.

Nonetheless, change is found alongside continuity. There are alternatives regarding the strategy to be adopted based on the tension between a preference for more autonomous action, on the one hand, and the role of leadership of initiatives concerning Southern hemisphere nations, on the other. Both are defined in terms of the international context, the strategy of national development, and certain calculations of foreign-policy experts that vary according to their political vision and their perception of what constitutes the national interest, the international situation, and other more specific variables. In this case, elements of realist pragmatism are found but are occasionally combined with elements of an ideological nature on the part of those formulating policy.

In leadership terms, during the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), the above-mentioned principles and the weighting given to pragmatism were consistent, but operated in different contexts and scenarios. However, in general terms, the particular worldview of Lula allowed the features of what is here understood by ideology to be more evident.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze Brazilian foreign policy under the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva. Two specific variables are taken into account: on the one hand, the degrees of continuity and change between the two administrations and, on the other, the greater or lesser presence of elements inherent in ideology and pragmatism in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The first part of the chapter examines traditional beliefs underlying foreign policy (and indeed aspects of domestic policy), which represent what can be termed a "Brazilian ideology." The second part analyzes different understandings of, and approaches to, foreign policy in Brazil over the past ten years. The third section examines the characteristics of foreign policy implemented under the Cardoso and Lula governments,

especially with regard to relations with South America, while the conclusion examines trends in continuity and change over this period in terms of ideology and pragmatism.

UNDERLYING BELIEFS OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The influence of beliefs in Brazilian foreign policy is highly relevant to the debate on pragmatism and ideology. According to Vigevani, Ramanzini Jr., Favaron, and Correia (2008),[4] Brazil's position on many issues should be seen in light of constitutive factors of foreign policy, rooted in the very nature of Brazilian society and state: namely, autonomy and universalism. Universalism involves a willingness to maintain relations with all countries, regardless of geographical location, type of regime, or economic concerns, as well as an independence of action in relation to global powers. Autonomy is defined as the freedom of manoeuvre that a country has in its relations with other states and in its participation in international politics, and is reflected in the historical tendency of Brazilian foreign policy to avoid agreements that may come to limit future alternatives.

Underlying the ideas of universalism and autonomy is a historical belief within Brazilian society and among foreign-policy makers of Brazil's destiny. Indeed, since the beginning of the twentieth century, allusions in speeches and publications to the grandeur of Brazil's future are common, contributing to the belief that Brazil should occupy a "special place" on the international scene in politico-strategic terms. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the foreign minister Barão do Rio Branco highlighted the "similarities" between Brazil and the United States in terms of territory, ethnicity, cultural diversity, as well as its geopolitical position, all of which made it the natural "counterpart" of the United States in Latin America.[5] In 1926 and in 1945, Brazilian diplomacy made a bid for a permanent seat on the League of Nations/United Nations Security Council, while in the early 1970s, the ex-foreign minister Araújo Castro stated that "few countries in the world have Brazil's potential for diplomatic reach" and "no country can escape its destiny and, for good or ill, Brazil is condemned to grandeur."[6] Indeed, this issue has returned to the foreign-policy agenda in the new millennium.

Based on these beliefs in its own role and destiny, Brazilian diplomacy has structured its behavior emphasizing policy initiatives with a view to increasing its power on the international scene. As a result, during the 1970s, Brazilian foreign policy became known as "Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism," a policy that condensed the above-mentioned ideas of autonomy, universalism, and a destiny of grandeur.

DIVERGENCE IN POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIES SINCE THE 1990S

The predominance for many years of a paradigm based on the beliefs of autonomy and universalism in Itamaraty gave rise to a convergence and consistency of thinking in Brazilian diplomacy, as well as the presence of important traits of continuity in foreign policy.

However, the arrival of Collor de Mello to the presidency in 1990, brought a new liberal-oriented policy, advocated by a minority in Itamaraty, to the forefront of foreign-policy decision making. This proposed that Brazilian diplomacy should leave aside the normative principles outlined above and instead privilege relations with "First World" countries in order to "join the club." This would involve abandoning the discourse of solidarity with developing countries in favor of stronger economic relations with the developed economies. Nevertheless, even during the Collor government, the translation of these ideas into practice abroad was limited. While the attempt to impose such a change in foreign policy did not translate into practice and did not survive much beyond the impeachment of the president,[7] it did give rise to a crisis of paradigm within Itamaraty, leading to a division within the Brazilian Foreign Office into two main lines of thinking—the autonomist and the pragmatic institutionalist.[8] Each influences—and struggles for influence in—foreign-policy making today with different views regarding the beliefs outlined earlier.

On the one hand, the pragmatic institutionalist current holds a more favorable view of economic liberalization, although without rejecting the policy of industrialization (import substitution industrialization—ISI) adopted in the developmentalist period. In political terms, pragmatic institutionalists, without renouncing the causal beliefs of Brazilian foreign policy such as autonomy, universalism, and a destiny of grandeur, place greater emphasis on Brazil's support of international structures and institutions as a pragmatic way to advance the national agenda. They defend the idea of Brazil's international insertion based on "autonomy through integration," according to which global values must be defended by all. Leadership in South America is sought and pursued discretely.[9]

On the other hand, the autonomist current hold a more traditional, nationalist, and developmentalist view, defending a model of development based on the expansion of the infrastructure sectors and an assertive industrial projection abroad. In terms of foreign policy, autonomists defend a more assertive projection of Brazil abroad in terms of leadership in North/South issues, Brazilian participation in the United Nations Security Council, and Brazilian leadership in South America.

Priority is given to cooperation with southern countries, not through notions of solidarity, but to advance Brazil's regional leadership and hence global standing.

Lastly, a more ideologically oriented group, with roots in academic and political groups, emerged during the Lula administration, establishing an important dialogue with Itamaraty and exercising some influence over foreign-policy decisions (above all in relation to South American issues). This group prioritizes regional integration with South American countries and, more specifically, within Mercosur, but through the deepening of the process in political, social, and economic terms.[10] For integration to be successful, compatibility is needed between values and real common advantages, as well as a degree of common identity.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CARDOSO AND LULA GOVERNMENTS

The emergence of competing orientations led to the emergence of different characteristics under the Cardoso and Lula da Silva governments, and hence a break with the consistency of the past. While the most permanent principles underlying foreign policy were maintained, policy was adapted to different contexts and situations.[11]

(I) 1995–2002: AUTONOMY THROUGH INTEGRATION

According to Cardoso's Chancellor, Luiz Felipe Lampreia:

> We are a great country, with traditions of growth and a long history of participation, very often as a protagonist, in the construction of international and regional relations. We are committed to international partnerships which increase our presence in the world. . . . We are a "global trader" and a "global player". . . . The pre-eminence on the international scene of values dear to the Brazilian people, such as democracy, individual liberties and respect for human rights and the evidence that . . . the world is committed to a process of growth in civilization . . .[12]

The strengthening of the pragmatic institutionalist line during the first mandate of the Cardoso government resulted in the adoption of the concept of "shared sovereignty," which differed from the classical concept of sovereignty. This view perceived the world as marked by a "concert" of nations with the same discourse defending universal values. One of the conditions of maintaining this "concert" would be a greater adaptability of the U.S. global leadership to both the demands of the

emerging powers, and the demands of medium-sized and small nations.[13] This scenario would open spaces for Brazil—in search of mechanisms to enlarge its capability for international action—to adopt a position that meant neither alignment with the United States nor a free-rider posture. This position would be oriented, first, by the perception of the existence in the new scenario of variable alignments, and second, by the adhesion to leading international regimes. It also meant a modification of the concept of autonomy with the new idea of "autonomy through integration" replacing previously established concepts of sovereignty, understood as distancing or self-sufficiency.[14]

The pragmatic institutionalists identified the institutionalization of international relations as favorable to Brazilian economic development, since the rules of the international game would be followed by all countries, including the richest. Brazil's position vis-à-vis the richest countries should be simultaneously one of convergence in terms of values and one of criticism of the distortions and inequalities of the existing international order.[15] Within this context, Brazil sought an active role in multilateral forums, as a global player, bidding within the UN for a permanent seat on the Security Council. In the area of international security, Brazil chose to support those international regimes that were already in place.

At the same time, the government sought to play the role of "global trader," with participation in different arenas of trade negotiations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) being the privileged forum, since it favored Brazilian interests in terms of its dispute settlement mechanism.[16] In relation to the European Union (EU), in 1995 Brazil promoted the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Mercosur that encompassed free trade, economic cooperation, and political dialogue. However, despite common interests in terms of political dialogue and common positions in international forums, strong disagreements in terms of commerce hindered further progress.

With regard to political relations with other southern countries, the rise of pragmatic institutionalists slowed progress as priority was given to trade. In 1996, the Pretoria Agreement was signed and trade negotiations were begun between Mercosur and South Africa, culminating in a framework agreement signed in 2000. In addition, at the beginning of the decade, China became the third largest importer of Brazilian exports. Relations with Portugal and with the countries of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries were also stimulated. Within the framework of universalism, emphasis on interactions with new partners was important.

In the Americas, Brazilian pragmatism was dominant over ideology in policy formulation. Brazil clashed with the United States over issues of the

organization of international trade and of protectionism in industrialized countries, as well as on issues relating to hemispheric integration. While the U.S. government was eager to conclude the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Brazilian government preferred to delay the process, emphasizing subregional initiatives such as Mercosur. However, following the low-profile line of the Itamar Franco administration, Brazilian diplomacy under Cardoso adopted what it labeled a "de-dramatization" of U.S.-Brazilian relations, lowering the Brazilian profile, and seeking to dispel the image of a Third-World opponent of the United States.[17]

In relation to neighboring countries, Brazilian diplomacy did not alter its traditional and realist view of national sovereignty. On the contrary, it was careful to avoid the possibility of integration leading to any shared sovereignty in relation to its behavior with other foreign partners. Indeed, the idea of autonomy was in fact reinforced. According to Pinheiro,[18] in the case of Brazil's relations with neighboring countries, this desire for autonomy "uses the [Grotian[19]] conception to satisfy its search for power." Thus, Brazil's quest for its own sphere of influence regionally and for a protagonistic role on the international stage came to the fore.

During Cardoso's second mandate, South American countries came to be seen more clearly as important partners with a view to strengthening Brazil's role as a global player, in the belief that the consolidation of the integration process would strengthen Brazil's bargaining position in multilateral forums as a regional leader. Diplomacy then began a revision of traditional Brazilian behavior in the region based on the principle of nonintervention. It sought to build its leadership in the region on the twin bases of security and democratic stability, establishing strong links with neighboring countries and acting as a mediator in crisis situations when called upon to do so. Acceptance of the idea of democracy as a universal value contributed to the establishment of a consensus around the links between democracy, regional integration, and perspectives of national development.[20] In this way, without giving up principles of nonintervention, it sought to include in its agenda the defense of democracy, and to act accordingly in cases of crisis.

As a parallel strategy, construction of a South American Community of Nations began, with the first meeting of South American countries taking place in Brasília in 2000, where the main ideas discussed were economic integration and the infrastructure of the region, and support for democratic consolidation. With access to the energy resources of neighboring countries a priority, Brazil sought to promote infrastructural integration projects, which opened the way for the formation of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). On the domestic political front, however, there was resistance to

Brazil's involvement with initiatives that could divert domestic resources to regional integration projects.

The pragmatic institutionalists saw Mercosur as a means of increasing the country's economic power, thus prioritizing trade integration. It was seen as important to preserve open regionalism so as not to prejudice possible relations with other partners, and the institutionalization of the block was not seen as necessary or even desirable. Moreover, the most favored vision identified partnerships with industrialized countries as an important element in stimulating Brazilian foreign trade and Mercosur as a space in which to reduce the potentially damaging impact of overseas economic opening. Despite frictions, Mercosur as a bloc conducted the negotiations toward the formation of the FTAA and was able to develop the dialogue previously established with the EU. Politically, Mercosur was seen as a means of reinforcing Brazil's hand, giving it a greater importance on the international stage.

The harmonization of relations with Argentina was an important achievement for the universalist current of Brazilian foreign policy. On a regional level, there were efforts to seek common positions with Argentina in relation to issues that, until then, had not been agreed upon, as part of a process of joint initiatives. The main cases involved common positions in the Rio Group and the Organization of American States (OAS). Within Mercosur, Brazilian and Argentine support for democracy was best reflected in response to the political crisis experienced by the Paraguayan government in 1996, which resulted in the democratic clause in Mercosur.

By the end of the Cardoso's administration, a number of steps had been taken to increase Brazil's influence and standing on the international scene. Yet autonomists criticized the pragmatic institutionalist preference for moderation and action within the institutional framework of the international order rather than adherence to the beliefs in autonomy, universalism, and destiny of grandeur as the best way to guarantee the success of long-term objectives.

(II) LULA, REGIONAL LEADERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM

The arrival of Luiz Ignacio da Silva Lula to the Brazilian Presidency reinvigorated the autonomist line of thought in international politics. The rise of the autonomists diminished the conviction that Brazil's interests were best guaranteed through international institutions, and instead advocated a more active approach in favor of the interests of both Brazil and other Southern countries.[21] Lula's administration thus saw a shift toward the primacy of beliefs in autonomy, universalism, and, above all, in the view of increasing Brazil's presence in international politics.

Regional leadership and ascension toward a role as a global power was a clear aim of Brazilian diplomacy in this period.

As a first step, the priority of Brazil's candidature to permanent membership of the UN Security Council was reinforced. As credentials for its candidature, Brazil chose to defend more distributive aspects of international trade, and campaigned to tackle problems of hunger and poverty that would affect international stability (the fight against terrorism was not assumed to be a priority). However, the obstacles presented by the reform project in the UN General Assembly of 2005 slowed the pace of this campaign.

In terms of trade, the government adopted an active policy to deal with politico-strategic issues. It undertook a proactive policy in search of markets, which resulted in an increase of exports and the Brazilian economic surplus, as well as an active role in defense of Brazilian interests in negotiations held in the WTO through joint action with other developing countries. In his acceptance speech, President Lula stated that:

> In relation to the FTAA, in negotiations between Mercosur, the European Union and the World Trade Organization, Brazil will combat protectionism, fight for the elimination of subsidies and will undertake to obtain trade rules which are more just and appropriate to our condition as a developing country.[22]

To this end, the G-20, composed of Southern nations including India, China, and South Africa, became an important forum for Brazilian diplomacy, linking progress in WTO negotiations to the inclusion of issues such as agricultural subsidies in the discussion agenda.

Cooperation framework agreements were signed between Mercosur and India, and with SACU (South African Customs Union) as well as with the United States in terms of formative negotiations on the FTAA. However, in the case of the FTAA, Itamaraty introduced a series of proposed modifications that aimed to block and delay its implementation, resulting in the failure of talks in 2005. This led to an emphasis on establishing an integrative but dominant stance with South American countries, including a series of talks between Mercosur and the EU. However, when these foundered, the Brazilian government signed a strategic bilateral partnership agreement with the EU in a clear show of autonomy in relation to Mercosur, with the aim of increasing the country's international profile and presence.

The rise of the more autonomist line in Itamaraty gave new impetus to South-South cooperation, based on the belief that there were not only shared characteristics but also shared interests in reordering the international system. Thus, in addition to the agreements signed with the G-20,

the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, and South Africa) was set up, with a view to discussing issues relating to the international order, the UN, and technology (and maintaining strongly the idea of nonintervention in partners' domestic issues). While Brazil maintains autonomy in such initiatives in relation to Mercosur, it clearly enjoys the benefits of its regional influence and power to enlarge its international projection.

During Lula's second term, Itamaraty sought to take advantage of the opportunities available through its membership of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), the G7, and other forums such as the Group of 20. Activism aimed at achieving a greater international presence increased significantly. The increasingly accepted identification of Brazil as a "bridge" between developed and underdeveloped nations, a concept that had been talked about since the 1970s, would give the country a powerful position in international relations.

In terms of the United States, Brazil sought to maintain its position of nonalignment and autonomy, maintaining a firm distance from U.S. policy in the region. Although Brazil's more autonomous and reformist participation in international politics has created new areas of friction between the two countries, Brazil has also attempted to maintain a low-profile policy, actively seeking to avoid conflict and confrontation with the United States.

However, its policy toward South America is markedly opposite with Itamaraty seeing regional integration under Brazilian leadership as a political priority, as well as the most effective way to promote Brazil's objectives to become a world power. To this end, Lula attempted to improve the strategy of the Cardoso administration, and without renouncing the principles of nonintervention, to develop regional leadership and a role as a broker of regional consensus, linking regional integration processes to national development.

According to the Chancellor Celso Amorim:

> Brazil has always based its agenda on non-intervention in other states' domestic affairs. . . . But non-intervention cannot mean lack of interest. In other words, the precept of non-intervention must be seen in the light of another precept, based on solidarity: that of non-indifference.[23]

Such a policy included a more vigorous promotion of the South American Community of Nations (SACN) as a priority in regional policy, leading to its creation in 2004 before evolving into the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. A further example was Brazil's leading role in the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti, which can be seen as an attempt to consolidate Brazilian leadership in the region and increase its

importance in the international arena, even though this violates traditional principles of nonintervention.

Brazilian initiatives were, however, not without tensions. With the rise of nationalist sentiments, some neighboring countries sought to challenge Brazil's regional power and position, demanding economic concessions. Lula was forced to adopt a low-profile position (much criticized by the Brazilian press) and accede to the nationalization of hydrocarbons implemented by the Bolivian government, with Petrobras, the Brazilian oil company shouldering the expense. Likewise, despite pressures from Itamaraty and the Brazilian right, Lula and Celso Amorim have sought to maintain a dialogue with Paraguay over the latter's demand for renegotiation of the 1973 Itaipú hydroelectric dam Treaty, which strongly favors Brazilian interests. Without acceding to all demands, some significant concessions regarding decision making, transparency, and completion of works on the Paraguayan side were made in 2009, although these were not ratified by the Brazilian Congress. Moreover, the Brazilian government has to an extent assumed the role of providing technical and economic support in the region, despite internal resistance, with, for example, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) offering to finance infrastructure works in other South American countries (albeit only if carried out by Brazilian companies). From this point of view, which is strongly influenced ideologically by the Workers' Party (PT), Brazilian diplomacy supports the initiatives of anti-liberal, left-leaning governments of the region, and proposes some kind of diffuse solidarity with countries of the continent, with Brazil willing to bear the majority costs of regional integration.

This new, more ideological, posture was supported by autonomists in the belief that integration would offer greater access to foreign markets and hence greater opportunities for the development of Brazilian industry with its competitive advantages in terms of internal production systems. It was also supported and influenced by progressives, from within the PT, as expressed by the President's foreign advisor, Marco Aurélio García:

> Brazil has a greater sense of solidarity towards its neighbors. We do not want the country to be an island of prosperity in the midst of a world of poverty. We do have to help them. This is a pragmatic vision. We have trade surpluses with all of them.[24]

This does not mean that the progressive view of the PT does not clash with autonomist visions at times. Indeed, foreign policy toward Mercosur during this period was marked by very different visions from the two orientations within the government. The progressives strongly favored

the political and social deepening of the integration process and both the Olivos Protocol and the setting up of the Mercosur Parliament as a step toward greater institutionalization were a direct result of progressive thinking. On the other hand, the autonomist view sees the broadening of South American integration under Brazilian leadership as a priority, and hence adopted a greater focus on UNASUR, while Mercosur is seen more as an instrument to strengthen Brazil's regional position, as well as a mechanism to open the way for a regional free-trade area.

Despite patterns of continuity, foreign policy under Lula has shown signs of change and flexibility. The objective of regional leadership has been central to policy, and despite the predominance of the autonomist view, policy was influenced favorably by progressives, pushing for a deepening of regional relations and international solidarity. The coexistence of autonomist and progressive orientations reflected a difficult but innovative balance between ideological beliefs and pragmatism.

Conclusion

The comparison of foreign policies adopted by the two administrations confirms a high level of continuity in the general features of Brazilian behavior based on the causal beliefs of universalism, autonomy, and a greater destiny. These beliefs approximate to what can be understood as ideology, creating a backdrop that guides behavioral patterns in foreign policy. However, it also reveals a pragmatic flexibility in the comparative weightage awarded to these beliefs in terms of implementation of foreign policy.

Without doubt the autonomist line, stronger during the Lula government, rested greater importance on beliefs, seeking both the reinforcement of autonomy and the search for a stronger projection of the country as a rising power on the international scene. In this way, the combination of strategic pragmatism and ideological considerations favored a discrete, but definite, reinforcement of autonomist orientation, combined at times with a progressive current, over the institutionalist currents favored by Cardoso. Within this combination, in which the beliefs offer an ideological strategy-orienting framework, both administrations ultimately favored a more pragmatic foreign policy.

This combination of ideology and pragmatism can be found in foreign policy from the beginning of the twentieth century. Variations over time reflected the domestic political options of the government in question, the correlation of forces within Itamaraty and the international context. Furthermore, the changing international milieu, in the form of a more multipolar, fragmented international scene, and the election of

left-leaning governments in South America, strongly influenced Brazilian foreign policy. Despite the variation experienced and in different measures, one can say that, both in the Cardoso term and in the Lula government, pragmatism prevailed over ideology.

This orientation is not just the result of a political choice, but has been constructed within the autonomist line since the beginning of the 1990s and represents a specific—and highly pragmatic—form of adapting beliefs to new configurations and challenges in the international order. Political change resulting from the presidential elections in 2010 may again favor a move toward institutionalism as under Cardoso, but the overall orientation toward activism and Brazil's rapid international ascension as an autonomous global power will almost certainly be retained.

NOTES

1. In the Brazilian case, it is important to work with the idea of "beliefs" in addition to ideological features of foreign behavior. Ideologies, by definition, take as their starting point the agent's option, while beliefs are rooted in a worldview that appears to the agent not as optional, but as a reality. Here, the definition of beliefs is based on Goldstein and Keohane (1993), which points to three types of beliefs: worldviews (which create identities), principled beliefs (normative ideas), and causal beliefs (capable of generating cause and effect).
2. This is the model of organizational behavior proposed by Allison, G., and P. Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.* New York: Longman; and used by Silva, Márcia Maro. 2008. "Itamaraty's Role in the Process of Recognition of the Independence of Angola and of the MPLA Government." Doctoral thesis, Flacso/Buenos Aires.
3. See Pinheiro, L. 2000. "Traídos pelo Desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prática da política externa brasileira contemporânea," *Contexto Internacional* 22(2), pp. 305–36.
4. Vigevani, T., H. Ramazini Jr., G. Favaron, R. A. Correia. 2008. "O papel da integração regional para o Brasil: universalismo, soberania e percepção das elites," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* Ano 51, n. 1, pp. 5–27.
5. Cited by Silva, A. de M. 1995. "O Brasil no continente e no mundo: atores e imagens na política externa brasileira contemporânea," *Estudos Históricos* 15, pp. 95–118.
6. Casuro, J. A. de A. 1972. "O congelamento do Poder Mundial," *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, n. 33, pp. 7–30, 9, 30. Araújo Castro was foreign secretary in 1963, Brazilian ambassador to the UN at the end of the 1960s, and ambassador to the United States in the 1970s. (Casuro 1972, p. 9, 30).
7. In countries where diplomatic bureaucracy is more fragile, foreign policy is more conditioned by brusque changes in politics, thus taking on a more erratic aspect. In Brazil's case, Itamaraty's power favors continuity.

8. Pinheiro 2000.
9. Ibid.
10. See Deutsch, K. 1982. Análise das Relações Internacionais. Brasília: Editora UnB.
11. See Vigevani, T; M. F. Oliveira; R. Cintra. 2003. "A política externa do governo Cardoso: um exercício de autonomia pela integração," *Tempo Social*, n. 20, pp. 31–61.
12. Lampreia, L. F. 1995. "Discurso de posse," *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, n. 76. Brasília, Ministério de Relações Exteriores, pp. 17–27, 20.
13. See Fonseca Jr., G. 1999. "Anotações sobre as condições do sistema internacional no limiar do século XIX: a distribuição dos pólos de poder e a inserção internacional do Brasil," in: Dupas and Vigevani (eds.), *O Brasil e as novas dimensões da segurança internacional*. São Paulo: Alfa-Omega/ Fapesp. pp. 17–42. Fonseca was Brazilian ambassador to the UN during part of the Cardoso government.
14. Lampreia, L. F. 1998. "A política exterior de Fernando Henrique Cardoso," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 41(2), pp. 5–17.
15. See Vigevani, T, M. F Oliveira, R. Cintra. 2003. "A política externa do governo Cardoso: um exercício de autonomia pela integração," *Tempo Social*, n. 20, pp. 31–61.
16. See ibid.
17. See Hirst, M., and Pinheiro, L. 1995. "A política externa do Brasil em dois tempos," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 38(1), pp. 5–23.
18. Pinheiro, L. 2000. "Traídos pelo Desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prática da política externa brasileira contemporânea," *Contexto Internacional* 22(2), pp. 305–36, 323.
19. "Grotian" is this author's clarification.
20. See Villa, R. D. 2004. "Brasil: política externa e a agenda democrática na América do Sul," paper presented in 4to. Encontro Nacional da ABCP, Jul. 21–24, Rio de Janeiro.
21. See Lima, M. R. S. de. 1990. "A economía política da política externa brasileira: uma proposta de análise," *Contexto Internacional* 6. n. 12, pp. 17.
22. da Silva, Lula. 2003. "Discurso de posse," *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, n. 92. Brasília, Ministério de Relações Exteriores, pp. 13–20, 17.
23. Celso Amorim, 2005, quoted by Oliveira, M. F. de. 2005. *Elites econômicas e política externa no Brasil contemporâneo*. São Paulo: IEEI (draft). Author's translation, pp. 21–22.
24. Interview with Marco Aurélio Garcia made and quoted by Dieguez, Consuelo. 2009. "O Formulador Emotivo," *Piauí*, n. 30, March, pp. 20–24.