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

Laura Neack

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Chapter Five

National Self-Image, Culture, and Domestic Institutions

IN THIS CHAPTER

- Similar Countries but Different Foreign Policies?
- Rosenau's Ideal Nation-Types
- National Self-Image
- Culture and Institutions of Governance
- Culture, Institutions, and the Democratic Peace
- Chapter Review

CASES FEATURED IN THIS CHAPTER

- The similar characteristics but different foreign policies of Denmark and the Netherlands.
- Serbian and Soviet siege mentality and how this national characteristic leads to expectations about relations with other countries.
- The disagreement in Israel over who should serve in the military and how the most hawkish Israeli Jews have been exempted from defending the country.
- Swiss neutrality policy that is a manifestation of distrust of the outside world and how this contributes to a nonprovocative defense posture.
- Japan's antimilitaristic political culture and Peace Constitution and the nationalist challenges to these.
- Germany's antimilitaristic political culture and how contemporary interpretations of German collective memory have allowed German leaders to make selective use of military force abroad.

SIMILAR COUNTRIES BUT DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICIES?

Denmark and the Netherlands are two small European countries situated on the northwestern coast of the continent. Both have approximately the same amount of territory, although the Netherlands has three times the population of Denmark. Both are founding members of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and both are members of the European Union (EU). Finally, both are parliamentary democracies.

Despite their similarities, there is a difference between the two countries that some scholars have attributed to a difference in **national self-image.** For example, in a cross-national study that included Denmark, Ulf Hedetoft depicts the Danes as being "peaceful nationalists"[1] who are somewhat disdainful of countries whose nationalism is bolstered by war. Instead,

> political defeats in war(like) situations have regularly been used to boost the country's cultural nationalism and the reputed "homogeneity" between state and people. This anomaly is based on three distinctive criteria: Denmark is small; Denmark is not the aggressor; Denmark has survived.[2]

Hedetoft writes that, in sport as in war, the Danes hold a different view of themselves when compared to others: "The UK has its violent, racist 'hooligans'; [Germany] has its often intimidating 'Schlachtenbummler' (soccer rowdies); but Denmark takes pride in its 'roligans,' i.e., 'peaceful supporters,' and laps up the international praise it can collect on that account."[3]

Internationally, the Danes contribute substantially to UN peacekeeping in line with the notion of "peaceful supporters," but as a people they tend to be reluctant to cooperate too quickly with others. The Danes are famous for the "no" vote they cast on the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union in June 1992. The Maastricht Treaty was the plan for the broadening of the European Community into the European Union—a monetary and economic union that gives citizens of each member state European citizenship and ushered in the single European currency, the euro, among other things. In order for the European Union to go forward, voters in each of the member states needed to approve it. When the Danes took a vote on union, they initially voted "no," demonstrating their reluctance to jump onto any bandwagon, no matter how carefully planned. In May 1993, the Danes took another vote and this time agreed to the union on the promise that Denmark would be exempted from certain expectations in the new European Union.

The Dutch could also be considered "peaceful supporters" of the international system, but there is no reluctance on their part to participate. The Netherlands is a country that takes the lead in the writing and promotion of international law. The Hague has been the long-standing home of the International Court of Justice and, since 1993, has been the site of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). What is especially remarkable is that the Dutch people have paid most of the costs of the ICTY since its inception. The Hague is also home to the International Criminal Court (ICC), established formally in July 2002.

Peter Baehr asserts that the Netherlands is a country unusually committed to the rule of law internationally, and to human rights law particularly, because of the combination of system-level factors and national self-image. On the system level, the Netherlands always has been dependent on international trade, and the development of international law was crucial to protecting the interests of a trading state. In terms of national self-image, the Dutch as a people believe they must "do some good" in the world, a belief that derives from their religious heritage.[4] This combination of national interest and national self-image creates an interesting domestic political arena where all the major political parties stand committed to an activist human rights policy. Because of this widespread agreement, the details of such policy are left to the Foreign Ministry. By law and practice, Foreign Ministry officials work side by side with human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to plan and execute Dutch human rights foreign policy.

To understand how the Netherlands came to be called the international legal capital of the world or to understand why Denmark voted "no" initially on Maastricht, we need to go "inside" each country to explore the dynamics at play within each. A more complete understanding of these phenomena would require us also to examine where each country "sits" in the world (in terms of the power hierarchy of states) and its relations with other countries (i.e., system-level factors explored in later chapters), but an examination of the inner workings of each country can yield interesting insights into how and why these countries follow the distinct foreign policies that they do.

Foreign policy study that proceeds from the state level of analysis involves examining different features of a country to see which of those factors shape its foreign policy. At this level of analysis, we include leaders and leadership as important factors, but we add into the mix the country-specific context. This level of analysis is the one that most directly borrows from the insights of comparative politics and regional area specialists. The focus here is that what goes on within states has an impact on what goes on between states.

There are two broad categories of factors that we examine at the state level: governmental and societal. Governmental factors include the type of political system and its constitutional framework, the type of regime that sits atop the government, how decisions are made in different parts of government from the highest levels to the basic bureaucratic level, the division of powers and authority between government institutions, bureaucratic in-fighting among government agencies, and the size and institutionalization of bureaucracies. Societal factors include the type of economic system; the history

of the people(s) in the country; the ethnic, racial, and religious mix of the people; the number and activities of interest groups and political parties; and the role of the media in setting the public agenda. These two categories are not exclusive; for instance, it would prove informative in some cases to study state–society relations, the lobbying of government officeholders by interest groups, and the mobilization of **public opinion** by national leaders.

ROSENAU'S IDEAL NATION-TYPES

There have been some serious efforts to develop midrange theories of foreign policy at the state level of analysis, and some of these go back to the beginning of the field. In his foundational work (the "pre-theories" article discussed in chapter 1), James Rosenau hypothesized that three national attributes taken together influence foreign policy choice and behavior: size (large or small as measured by population), economic system (developed or underdeveloped as measured by gross national product), and political system (open or closed as measured by whether the country is democratic or not). Rosenau proposed that these factors could be grouped into eight configurations or "ideal nation-types."[5]

Rosenau's primary focus was to develop a typology for ranking variables from many levels of analysis according to what he proposed to be the relative importance of each in the foreign-policy-making process of the eight nation-types. Rosenau hypothesized that foreign policy making for each nation-type would be best studied at particular levels of analysis and not at others. For instance, a highly developed, closed society would have very little societal influence on foreign policy decision making because the "closed" nature of the society meant that **civil society** actors were not permitted to operate or be involved in the policy-making process. The following is a list of Rosenau's eight nation-types, his examples of each, and a ranked list of which level of analysis he hypothesized would be most important to study for each nation-type.

1. Large, developed, open; example: United States; key levels of analysis: role, societal, governmental, systemic, individual.
2. Large, developed, closed; example: Soviet Union; key levels of analysis: role, individual, governmental, systemic, societal.
3. Large, underdeveloped, open; example: India; key levels of analysis: individual, role, societal, systemic, governmental.
4. Large, underdeveloped, closed; example: China; key levels of analysis: individual, role, governmental, systemic, societal.
5. Small, developed, open; example: Netherlands; key levels of analysis: role, systemic, societal, governmental, individual.

6. Small, developed, closed; example: Czechoslovakia; key levels of analysis: role, systemic, individual, governmental, societal.
7. Small, underdeveloped, open; example: Kenya; key levels of analysis: individual, systemic, role, societal, governmental.
8. Small, underdeveloped, closed; example: Ghana; key levels of analysis: individual, systemic, role, governmental, societal.

Rosenau wrote his "pre-theories" article in the mid-1960s, and so some of his examples do not make sense in this new millennium. For instance, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia no longer exist, while India and China have large economies in 2013.

The purpose of the "pre-theories" article was to sound a call to action (really, a call to research) for foreign policy scholars. Rosenau didn't know whether these nation-types were accurate, nor did he know whether the ranked levels of analysis he listed for each were accurate. Hypotheses are guesses about reality based on the analyst's existing understanding of that reality. After the hypotheses are constructed, the analyst then explores the evidence to find proof that the hypotheses might be correct or might not be correct. Rosenau hypothesized or guessed that countries could be categorized usefully by size, economic system, and political system, but he didn't know this to be the case. Rosenau hypothesized or guessed that some levels of analysis were more important than others given a country's type, but he didn't know this to be the case either. He was sounding a call to other scholars about where they might begin to engage in a broad and collaborative research effort.

With Rosenau's hypotheses as launching pads, scholars could begin a systematic search for pieces of knowledge that could be used both for grounding future research as well as for building generalized theory around which the scientific study of comparative foreign policy could coalesce.

> The concept of nation-type [made] it unnecessary to examine individual nations in considering the certain types of foreign policy activity. To this extent, [scholars could] move away from analysis of discrete objects and concentrate on classes of objects and the different patterns of foreign policy associated with each.[6]

That is, ideal nation-types were conceived as tools for facilitating the development of general statements linking state type and foreign policy behavior. If we knew that a country was a certain type of state, then we would benefit from previous research that had connected certain kinds of foreign policy behavior with that type of state. The more evidence generated that a country of type A was most likely to engage in behavior B under certain conditions,

the more certain we could be that we had discovered a "law" of foreign policy.

Upon Rosenau's call, other researchers started searching for statistical evidence to support the proposition that physical size, economic development, and political accountability were significant in explaining the variation in states' foreign policy behaviors. Maurice East and Charles Hermann were among a group of scholars directly inspired by Rosenau's "pre-theories." East and Hermann constructed and used the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) data set to test twenty-seven bivariate hypotheses linking size, economic development, and political accountability with nine foreign policy behaviors. Of the single indicators, East and Hermann concluded that physical size best accounted for behavior. The next most important indicator was political accountability, especially when combined with economic development.[7] On the other hand, they were unable to find much support for Rosenau's ideal nation-types. That is, "large, developed, open" states did not engage in foreign policy behaviors that were distinctive from, say, the behaviors of "small, developed, open" or "small, underdeveloped, closed" states. Indeed, researchers found little evidence that Rosenau's ideal nation-types were useful categories.

Although Rosenau's ideal nation-types were not shown by research efforts to be linked to specific foreign policy behaviors, the idea that particular kinds of states engaged in particular foreign policies was not put to rest. Researchers have attempted to rank states on combinations of national indicators that suggest something about the degree to which states are penetrated by and successful at globalization,[8] are failing or have failed as states,[9] or create and sustain peace.[10]

It is worth taking a moment to look at one of these. The Global Peace Index (GPI) is produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, an independent research organization, with the collaboration of the *Economist* Intelligence Unit. The first GPI was released in 2007. The 2012 index was presented as a measure of 158 states' peacefulness based on twenty-three indicators. The indicators were grouped into three categories: those that measured the state's involvement in domestic and international conflict (such as the numbers of deaths from internal and external conflict, and relations with neighboring countries), those that measured the state's societal safety and security (such as the perceived criminality in society, terrorist acts, and homicides), and those that indicated the degree of militarization in the state (such as military spending, number of armed services personnel, and transfer of major conventional weapons).[11] The use of twenty-three indicators makes this index much more sophisticated than Rosenau's nation-types, but Rosenau proposed his typology at a time when there was much less available and reliable data on a large number of states.

According to the GPI, 2012 was more peaceful than the years 2010 and 2011, reflecting some stabilization of states after the global financial crisis that hit in 2008.[12] The ten most peaceful states in 2012 were, from most peaceful to tenth most peaceful: Iceland, Denmark, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Austria, Ireland, Slovenia, Finland, and Switzerland. The ten least peaceful states, listed from number 149 to 158 (least peaceful), were Pakistan, Israel, the Central African Republic, North Korea, Russia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The countries most responsible for international peace and security—the permanent members of the Security Council—were a mixed bunch with Russia ranked 153, China ranked 89, the United States ranked 88, France ranked 40, and the United Kingdom ranked 29.[13]

Among the top twenty countries on the GPI for 2012 were seventeen Western democracies. This finding supports one of the more enduring research hypotheses linking state type and foreign policy behavior: the **democratic peace** theory. The democratic peace theory proposes that a democratic country's culture and the resulting political institutions make the country more likely than not to engage in peaceful foreign policy behaviors, especially toward other democratic countries. To get to this theory (discussed at the end of this chapter and the beginning of chapter 6), we first need to consider the impact of a country's self-image and culture on its foreign policy.

NATIONAL SELF-IMAGE

National self-images "consist, at least in part, of idealized stereotypes of the 'in-nation' which are culturally shared and perpetuated."[14] The Dutch view that their country should "do some good" in the world is a manifestation of aspects of the Dutch self-image that comes out of a common sense of history, religious imperative, and social obligation. As suggested earlier, Baehr attributes the substantial strength and depth of Dutch commitment to an international legal system in part to this Dutch national self-image.

A national self-image is basically the story a people in a country tell about who they are as a people, who their country "is" in the world, and what their country does in the world. The national story—or dominant national narrative—can be found in the official history of the country (as spread by schools and religious institutions and supported by national holidays), is present in the national culture (as seen and reinforced by media of all sorts), and can be discerned in public opinion polling among other methods.

That a national self-image can be called a "dominant" cultural narrative indicates that alternative or subnational narratives may also exist in a country. Subnational narratives tell a different story about the subnational group's struggle against the dominant group and its narrative, just as the dominant

group may "other-ize" subnational groups. Indeed, arguments over what the "nation" is, or who composes the nation, are linked to disagreements about the story of the nation and how other people might or might not fit into that story.

For example, consider what happened after the French national team didn't win a single match in the 2012 World Cup. Some critics of the team concluded that its terrible performance was because the individuals on the team weren't sufficiently nationalistic and so failed to play like a team.[15] The team was multiethnic, and the failure of the team was blamed on the failure of the ethnic minorities on the team—and in the country more generally—to assimilate as Frenchmen. The education minister complained on television about how the captain of the team didn't even sing the national anthem, "The Marseillaise." A French sports historian concluded that "France is confused about its identity and uncomfortable with the growing numbers and sometimes the attitudes of its immigrants and their children."[16]

Whether the in-group is comprised of the people within a country and the out-groups are the people in other countries, or there is an internal divide between the dominant and subordinate groups within a single country, the development of a positive in-group self-image depends upon this in-and-out dichotomy. A group is not a group unless it has boundaries that set it apart from other groups. Whether in domestic politics or in foreign affairs, this means that competition is intentionally built into the promotion of a group identity.[17] In the domestic political realm, my group must compete against yours for limited resources. In the international system, this competition pits my state against your state. Further, the in-group/out-group distinction is embedded with subjective claims about the goodness of the in-group and the bad nature of the out-group to distinguish why the in-group deserves the limited resources more than the out-group does.

A country without subnational competition over who gets to define the "nation" and in which a significant number of people share and support a positive national self-image should be a country with significant societal stability and tranquility. Positive national self-image, thus understood, can contribute to stable governance. As Matthew Hirshberg writes,

> The maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state. . . . This allows government to go about its business, safe from significant internal dissension, and to expect a healthy level of public support in times of crisis.[18]

Positive national self-image also may impair the ability of the people to hold its government accountable. Recall from chapter 3 in the discussion of cognition that a belief set functions as a screen to keep out information that is

incongruent with an individual's established beliefs. National self-image can be understood as a national belief set, and the national belief set also may screen out information that is incompatible with a positive national self-image. This was demonstrated by Matthew Hirshberg when he tested the hypothesis that a positive, patriotic self-image interferes with Americans' ability to keep watch over the government's foreign policy behaviors. Hirshberg's subjects were only able to recall details of fictional news stories that featured the United States doing stereotypically good things, and his subjects re-created the details of news stories that featured the United States doing bad things (such as supporting nondemocratic governments against prodemocracy dissenters) in order to select out the negative information about the United States. Hirshberg claims that his findings show that "Americans rarely interpret or remember things in . . . ways that threaten their patriotic self-image." As a result, he concludes,

> Even if American news consisted equally of information consistent and inconsistent with this [patriotic American] stereotype, Americans would, at least in the short term, tend to find its confirmation in the news. The stereotype interferes with information otherwise capable of cuing alternative perspectives. This increases popular support for military interventions that are or can be viewed as instances of a benevolent America protecting freedom and democracy from a perceived threat, such as communism. It also allows politicians and officials to elicit such support by promoting the application of the stereotype to specific conflicts.[19]

The danger in this, Hirshberg warns, is that "in the end, citizens' abilities to critically monitor and evaluate American foreign policy [are] impaired, and the ability of government to pursue unsavory policies with impunity is enhanced."[20]

National self-image contains a subjective message (implicit or explicit) about those outside the nation—our nation is good, therefore other nations are not (as) good. This mirror image is usually accompanied by what we call an attribution bias (as discussed in chapter 3): our country does good things because we are good people, but if we do bad things it is because we were forced to do so. Conversely, a bad country does bad things because it is in its nature to be bad. Given this understanding of us and them, we need to be constantly vigilant about outsiders and their intentions. Studies of siege mentality, such as Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla Antebi's study of Israeli siege mentality, suggest that governments are given permission to conduct aggressive, preemptive foreign policies in order to protect the good nation from the actions of evil nations. Bar-Tal and Antebi define **siege mentality** as "a mental state in which members of a group hold a central belief that the rest of the world has highly negative *behavioral* intentions toward them." This culturally shared and perpetuated belief is complemented by the belief that the

group is alone in the world, that it cannot expect help in times of crisis from anyone, and that therefore "all means are justified for group defense."[21] Siege mentality is not a group-shared paranoia; paranoia is an unfounded fear of others, whereas a historical, evidentiary basis exists for siege mentality.

Yugoslavia in the postcommunist era is an excellent example of a country manifesting strong elements of siege mentality. The former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic manipulated historical examples of Croatian and Turkish or Muslim attacks on the Serbian nation to foster a strong and particularly aggressive modern Serbian nationalism. Milosevic used this nationalism to wage war on Croatia and then Bosnia in the early 1990s toward the goal of creating a greater Serbia. When Milosevic turned Serbian nationalism on the ethnic Albanian people of the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo in early 1998, his Serbian forces managed to displace or kill a third of the total population in a matter of weeks. This prompted nearly two months of NATO air strikes against Serbia, which only reinforced Serbian siege mentality and nationalism. These air strikes came on the heels of nearly a decade of international economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. Ultimately Milosevic was forced from power through elections and a "people's revolution," but the new Serbian leaders demonstrated the same suspicion of the intentions of the outside world. Countries exhibiting high degrees of siege mentality require careful handling by the outside world in order not to cue automatic distrust and noncooperation. Bringing Yugoslavia back into the community of states will take time and patience given the intensity of Serbian nationalism and siege mentality during the 1990s.

The leaders of the former Soviet Union displayed siege mentality when they viewed their country as a "besieged fortress" in the 1950s. There was clear cause for suspicion about the intentions of other countries. By 1955, the United States had managed to form military alliances with a series of countries that, taken altogether, nearly encircled the Soviet Union and communist China. Present-day, post-Soviet Russia appears to have retained this suspicion about the outside world, even as it struggles with an age-old identity conflict over whether it is essentially a European country or a uniquely Slavic country. A conflicted national self-image results in a conflicted, sometimes contradictory foreign policy as competing tendencies vie for control over who and what defines the nation.

CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

A culturally maintained national self-image sets the stage for the institutions of governance built by the in-group to promote the group's interests. It should be intuitive to say that a people's culture will influence the shape and type of its political structures when that people is self-governing. For example, once we have found that a country exhibits high degrees of siege mentality, it should come as no surprise to find mandatory, universal military conscription. The urgent need to protect the in-group results in the practical need for a strong and ready military. The need for a strong military necessitates conscription.

In Israel, Jews (and Druse) must serve in the military—men for thirty-six months and women for twenty-one months. The state of Israel was founded to protect and promote the Jewish nation, and the "people's army" with mandatory military service was seen as critical to this. However, not all Jews are required to serve in the military. Since its founding, Israel has exempted ultra-Orthodox Jews from the draft. Ultra-Orthodox political parties formed in order to promote and maintain this exemption, although these parties also tend to be hawkish about national security threats. (Bar-Tal and Antebi find that more religious Israeli Jews demonstrate more siege mentality than secular Israeli Jews.[22]) In 2012, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled this exemption illegal, but the negotiations over how to replace the conscription law—and require service of ultra-Orthodox Jews—threatened the continuation of the **coalition government** of Benjamin Netanyahu.[23] Thus, we might conclude that most Israelis share the belief that because of the urgent need to protect Israel, there must be a draft, but those with the strongest attitudes about the need to protect the Jewish nation wish to continue to exempt themselves from the burden of national defense. As many Israelis have noted, the issue of national military service had become a significant problem for Israeli national identity.[24]

Switzerland's well-known image as a neutral country contains similar elements of distrust of out-groups. **Neutrality** is the stance that the country will not take sides in international disputes or form military alliances of any sort. Switzerland's neutrality policy doesn't come out of a peaceful orientation to the world, just a clear preference not to take sides in an often war-torn and divided Europe. Indeed, we might argue that Switzerland is neutral because the Swiss hold a generalized lack of trust in outsiders, and this belief results in a shared and long-standing agreement among the Swiss about the need for maintaining defense preparations even in the absence of external threats. Thus, Swiss men between nineteen and twenty years of age must perform fifteen weeks of active military duty, followed by ten three-week reservist training periods over the subsequent twenty-two years.

Neutral Switzerland is a country with a **nonprovocative defense** posture. Geoffrey Wiseman describes Switzerland's policy as "deterrence by denial" by which Switzerland would "deter attack by setting a high price for invasion."[25] Wiseman explains,

> In the event of an external armed attack, the armed forces would assume the major role in defending the country. . . . Should large parts of Switzerland

become occupied, citizens would carry out activities ranging from guerilla warfare to sabotage and civil disobedience. No form of retaliation or punitive action against the adversary's population is planned. Switzerland would rely heavily on passive defenses, such as obstacles against tanks, anti-aircraft missiles, and early-warning radar systems.

Undoubtedly, these military preparations are manifestly defensive. Switzerland seeks only to defend its territory, it does not threaten others, and will not fight unless attacked.[26]

Japan and Germany are countries whose post–World War II national self-image was intentionally altered in order to create states that would no longer pose a military threat to others. In both cases, the national culture adopted an antimilitaristic orientation reinforced by constitutional arrangements. In both cases recently, elites wanting to expand the range of foreign policy options for their countries had to attempt to navigate both the cultural and constitutional prohibitions against the deployment of military personnel abroad.

As a result of losing World War II, Japan and Germany were forced into nonprovocative defense postures.[27] Military arsenals that are said to be for defense can often be easily transformed into offensive capabilities. Military arsenals and preparations that can only be used to protect national territory, or that can only be converted into offensive capabilities with much difficulty, are considered to be "defensive defense" or nonprovocative defense. The transparency of one's capabilities is critical to this posture for reassuring other countries. The idea is that if others know—can see and verify—that you cannot attack them, they won't attack you.

Japan and Germany assumed antimilitaristic national self-images and nonprovocative defense postures as the price of losing World War II. Of course, each country is different, and neither Japan nor Germany looks like Switzerland or each other on the matter of defensive postures or military capabilities. Indeed, both Japan and Germany have considerable military capabilities, and leaders in both countries have been attempting to move away from strict antimilitarism to more active, "normal" foreign policies that make use of all types of power, including military power.

Japanese defense is built on three pillars: its military alliance with the United States, its membership in the United Nations, and its Peace Constitution. Chapter II, Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution reads,

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Japanese nationalism since 1945 until the present has been channeled into the pursuit of economic security, especially the goal of reducing reliance on imported raw materials through the development of "technological autonomy."[28] Two dominant cultural norms—antimilitarism and economic nationalism—informed and reinforced the institutions of governance as well as defined what the Japanese perceived as appropriate foreign policy behavior. For instance, on the issue of human rights, the Japanese believed that they were in no position to preach to others given their militaristic past, opting instead to pursue straightforward, nonpolitical economic goals in bilateral relations, especially in Asia.[29]

As might be expected, the Japanese government agencies in charge of pursuing economic security were given more real power and authority than those tasked with military defense. What is surprising is the degree to which this was the case. The three most powerful state institutions—and the ones with essential control of national security policy—are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and International Trade and Industry.[30] Conversely, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) did not have cabinet-level status until 2006. The civilian staff of the JDA was "colonized" by civil servants from other ministries, and the JDA lacked a mobilization plan, an emergency civil defense system, and rules for engaging the enemy.[31] Military ambitions were kept in check by cultural norms that structured institutional constraints.

In the new millennium, American pressure on Japan to commit greater resources toward its defense along with international pressure on Japan to play a more significant role in global affairs (especially UN peacekeeping) and certain elite aspirations about restoring Japan's status in the world collided with Japanese cultural and institutional insistence on antimilitarism. Junichiro Koizumi served as Japanese prime minister from 2001 to 2006. Koizumi viewed the Iraq war that started in 2003 as "a major opportunity" to pursue Japanese interests. Specifically, Koizumi thought that Japanese participation in the war would help to reinforce the US-Japanese alliance, help Japan recover a stake in Iraqi oil lost in the 1991 Gulf War, earn Japan greater respect, and "reshape national norms in a way more favorable to Japan's remilitarization and hence mark a major step in redressing its lopsided strategic profile as an economic giant without commensurate military capabilities and hence global political clout."[32] Although Koizumi was able to get the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB)—the government agency that serves as "the guardian of national norms in policy making"[33]—to approve the deployment of Japanese troops (the Self Defense Force or SDF) to Iraq, the CLB limited the troops to noncombat roles. And, although Koizumi enjoyed enormous popularity initially, his efforts to change the antimilitarist norm by extending the activities of the SDF in support of US-led wars led to a precipitous loss of support in public opinion polls.

Koizumi's successor as premier, Shinzo Abe (2006–2007), attempted to continue pushing against the antimilitarist national culture. Abe supported issuing revised history textbooks that would eliminate references to Japanese wartime human rights abuses abroad, such as those committed against so-called "comfort women." And in late 2006 Abe pushed two laws through the Japanese parliament that were intended to be the start of rewriting the Peace Constitution.[34] At the same time, on Abe's urging, the Japanese parliament "broke two postwar taboos" by passing legislation that upgraded the status of the JDF to ministry level and required schools to teach patriotism.[35] Schools are one of the most effective transmitters of patriotic and nationalistic values in any country, as every government knows. The new education requirements were supported by school boards but strongly opposed by Japanese teachers as too reminiscent of Japan's war-era education system that encouraged support for imperialism and the military.

The governing party's nationalist turn and its inability to overcome persistent economic problems led to the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP's) electoral loss of the upper house of parliament in July 2007. The Democratic Party won the upper house by focusing on domestic issues, although its opposition to Abe's nationalist goals and the deployment of troops to Iraq were well known. The Democratic Party flexed its muscle by refusing to reauthorize the refueling of American and allied warships by Japanese tankers, contending that the refueling missions violated the pacifist constitution. With the lower house in the hands of the LDP and the upper house in the hands of the Democratic Party, parliamentary paralysis resulted. This paralysis ultimately contributed to the resignation of Abe, and haunted the new LDP prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, as well. Fukuda met the US president at the White House in November 2007 against the backdrop of Japanese tankers heading toward home. Ultimately, the refueling mission was restarted, but the Democratic Party was able to unseat the LDP in parliamentary elections in 2009, taking over the premiership.

In the new millennium, while Japanese political parties argued over what the constitution and the culture would allow, the SDF increased its regional profile even while overall defense spending continued to fall. Japan participated in naval training drills with Australia in 2009 and then with the countries of Southeast Asia and India in 2012. Japan also extended military aid to Cambodia and East Timor for training in disaster relief and reconstruction. The Japanese cabinet approved a military alliance with South Korea in 2012, but opposition in South Korea put the alliance on hold. And the nationalists of the LDP managed to use anti-Chinese rhetoric in a successful parliamentary bid to return to ruling status. In December 2012, the LDP and the nationalistic Shinzo Abe regained control of the government in late-year elections.

The return of Abe and the LDP did not mean necessarily that the nationalists had won the debate over whether Japan's self-image and constitution should change so that Japan might acquire "normal" great power status. This issue has been argued over in the context of two decades of economic duress and failure of leadership. This leadership failure is reflected in the fact that from 2001 until the end of 2012, Japan had eight different prime ministers and ruling governments. Seven of those governments came in a span of six years.

In Germany, antimilitarism also was embedded in the national self-culture after World War II and was reinforced by the constitution, or Basic Law. Ruth Wittlinger and Martin Larose explain that "German foreign policy behavior as well as political culture traditionally has consisted of a set of policies and norms the roots of which were clearly a result of a particular view of the National Socialist experience and the Second World War."[36] Wittlinger and Larose write about these policies and norms as the "collective memory" of Germany, a notion that works well in our discussion of national self-image. The collective memory of Germany has three strands: a call to remember the lessons of the Holocaust, a reminder of the dangers of aggressive nationalism, and a solidarity with the United States and NATO for their support of Germany through the Cold War. German foreign policy has had to remain true to these strands. "No more war" was understood as the baseline for any foreign policy that lived by the parameters established by the collective memory.

After the end of the Cold War, German political leaders were dismayed by Germany's constitutional prohibitions against contributing to international military operations, particularly broad-based operations such as the 1991 Gulf War and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia. In 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court gave Germany more room to contribute to international peace and security by ruling that German military forces could participate in missions outside of Europe when conducted in a multilateral framework and approved by the legislature.[37] Because of this change, Germany was able to participate in the 1998 NATO air campaign against the Yugoslavian government in response to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Wittlinger and Larose explain that elites successfully justified this use of force by telling the public that "because of its past, Germany has a particular moral responsibility to use military means to avoid dictatorships and/or genocide going on elsewhere."[38] "No more war" was altered to mean no more holocausts, and the use of force was necessary to stop genocide.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the German elite called upon the collective memory to warn against the dangers of "going it alone." Since the United States and NATO had stood with Germany during the Cold War, Germany had an obligation to assist the United States in Afghanistan.[39] But, standing with one's ally was a limited obligation when

the ally sought to go to war for self-interested purposes, and so the German government refused to follow the United States into Iraq in 2003. The lessons of the past warned against "warmongering" such as that evidenced in the US Bush administration by its war in Iraq. The "German Way" was to oppose preemptive wars, which hearkened back to the collective memory of the dangers of aggressive nationalism.[40]

Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq allowed the German elite to offer an expanded use of the German military abroad in a way that fit the collective memory and maintained a national culture committed in general to antimilitarism. Where the Japanese push for **"normal power"** status was driven by the power ambitions of some elites, German elites focused on making the German military a tool for promoting moral internationalism with "the self-confidence of a grown-up nation."[41]

When the Arab Awakening of 2011 came to Libya, armed rebel groups formed to liberate the country from the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. The regime responded with expected ruthlessness and proclaimed that it would eliminate all armed opposition. In March 2011, the United Nations Security Council approved a **civilian protection** mandate for Libya that included establishing a no-fly zone to stop Qaddafi's forces from using air power to engage in the widespread killing of the rebels and their supporters. NATO member states then began the enforcement of the no-fly zone and subsequently started targeting the military assets of the regime in support of the rebels.

In the middle of what seemed to be international agreement on the need for collective action to stop the impending widespread killing of Libyans by their government, Germany surprised many observers by abstaining from the Security Council resolution and refusing to participate in the NATO-led air campaign.[42] A critic concluded that the German government of Chancellor Angela Merkel had "illusions" about the lessons of German collective memory.[43] Within a few weeks of the Security Council vote, Germany announced that it would allow its troops to help with the provision of humanitarian aid in Libya if the United Nations were to request such of the European Union.[44] This announcement came after friends of the chancellor let the media know that the foreign minister—a leader of a junior coalition partner in the government—had been responsible for the German abstention and would have voted against the Security Council resolution but for the intervention of the chancellor herself.[45] That is, friends of the chancellor wanted everyone to know that the episode demonstrated less about a change in German national culture than domestic political competition between members of the coalition government.

CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

The greatest concentration of scholarly activity on the impact of culture and institutions on foreign policy has been on the idea of the democratic peace. This research finds its intellectual roots in philosopher Immanuel Kant's proposition that democracies are peace-loving countries.[46] In the first modern variation on this idea, it was asserted that democracies are less likely to go to war than nondemocratic states. In a later version, the idea was refined to the proposition that democracies do not fight wars with other democracies. If true, a world of democracies would be a world freed from war. When national leaders, such as former US president Bill Clinton, speak about "enlarging the circle of market democracies," they suggest that the idea of the democratic peace is more than an idea; it is an operating reality.

There are two explanations for why democracies are or should be more peaceful than nondemocracies—the first explanation emphasizes the culture of democracies and the second emphasizes domestic institutional structures. The cultural explanation proposes that "liberal democracies are more peace loving than other states because of the norms regarding appropriate methods of conflict resolution that develop within society."[47] Further, "leaders choose to employ the standards and rules of conduct which have been successful and acceptable at home in their international interaction."[48] Leaders of democracies are not constrained by peaceful standards when dealing with nondemocracies, since nondemocracies cannot be expected to be similarly constrained. The second explanation stresses the constraining role of democratic institutions on foreign policy decision makers. The division of and checks on power within democratic governments and the ultimate restraint of officeholders having to face voters in regular elections prohibit violent (and costly) foreign policy behaviors.[49]

The idea of the democratic peace has generated much excitement and much criticism. Critics point out a number of weaknesses in the proposition: that interstate war is rare; that the number of democracies at any given point in history has been small; that, for the bulk of the second half of the twentieth century, most democracies were primarily Western states bound together in military alliances against the Soviet bloc; and that these same democracies were also the world's richest states bound together by class-based interests. The democratic peace idea also has been accused of being another justification for Western imperialism.[50] This criticism is that Western states claim moral cause to impose their political and economic structures on other peoples in the name of creating a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, these same states claimed the need to defend democracy against communism as their justification for **neoimperial** policies in the developing world. Other criticisms of the democratic peace literature focus on the methodology or the manner in which democratic peace research is conducted.

Despite the criticism, proponents declare that the proposition of the democratic peace is so robust that it amounts to the only "law" in the study of international relations.[51] The criticisms have not deterred research programs intent on fleshing out the nuances of the proposition. It may well be, however, that the democratic peace idea has had a setback with the more militaristic foreign policies of the US Bush administration and the British Blair government. For Bush and Blair, and people called "neoconservatives," democracies were duty bound to bring democracy to nondemocratic places like Iraq, and the use of force was a morally correct use of "might for right." In this interpretation, it was appropriate for democracies to use war to promote democracy and the democratic peace. Bruce Russett, one of the leading theorists on the democratic peace, criticized the Bush administration for its gross distortion of the theory in order to justify war against Iraq:

> Many advocates of the democratic peace may now feel rather like many atomic scientists did in 1945. They had created something intended to prevent conquest by Nazi Germany, but only after Germany was defeated was the bomb tested and then used—against Japanese civilians whose government was already near defeat. Our creation too has been perverted.[52]

In the next chapter, we will come back to the notion of the democratic peace with this twist: stable democracies may be less likely than other states to use force, but countries undergoing democratization are *more* likely to use force than other states.

CHAPTER REVIEW

- Efforts to link state type with particular foreign policy behaviors go back to the founding of foreign policy analysis and the "pre-theories" work of James Rosenau.
- Except for the contested theory that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, there is little evidence that state type is linked to particular foreign policy behavior.
- National self-image helps to build a loyal population that will not evaluate leaders' decisions too critically.
- National self-image is like nationalism; both have positive and negative sides.
- The political institutions of a self-governing people should reflect the dominant political culture of that people.