Foreign Relations of the Third World

Latin American Nations in World Politics

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1. The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives

The last years have witnessed an increased scholarly interest in the field of Latin American foreign policies. This development is hardly surprising. For one thing, the region includes several important international actors. Cuba, one of those actors, was the main protagonist in one of the most dramatic international crises since World War II and at present is playing a crucial role in the Caribbean, Central America, and Africa. Brazil—which has been variously characterized as an NIC (New Industrializing Country), an upper-middle-class country, a regional power, or an emerging new world power—has a gross national product (GNP) that currently ranks among the ten highest of the world and already possesses a large industrial sector, comparable to that of several advanced European countries. In a less dramatic way than Cuba, Brazil has expanded its foreign relations significantly, establishing cultural and commercial links with Black Africa, selling military equipment to Middle East countries, and signing far-reaching agreements with West Germany for the transfer of full-cycle nuclear technology, in spite of strong U.S. opposition. Mexico's strategic importance as an oil producer need not be highlighted, and its increasingly crucial role in Central America and the Caribbean has been recognized not only by Washington but by Western Europe as well. And—to take the most dramatic example—another Latin American country, Argentina, launched an outright war against Great Britain, thus challenging one of the main European powers.

From a theoretical perspective, the analysis of Latin American foreign policies also seems especially promising. Whereas the region is one of the most homogeneous in the world,[1] its component countries still exhibit marked differences in terms of national capabilities, foreign-policy traditions and styles, political regimes, and external linkages, differences that make them most suited for comparative analysis. Finally, a long if not necessarily successful experience in foreign affairs and the existence of increasingly sophisticated foreign-policy establishments and decision-making processes in Latin America provide the researcher with a relative

abundance of data on the external behavior of a group of developing countries. Indeed, in light of these favorable conditions, what seems surprising is that only now is interest in Latin America becoming evident among students of international relations.

Although studies in the field of Latin American international relations have appeared steadily during the last two decades, the same cannot be said in the specific case of foreign-policy analysis.[2] In fact, in this latter field it is appropriate to speak of a "first wave" of studies that emerged in the 1970s. This initial wave undoubtedly represented a significant and much-needed contribution to the field, but, as often happens, it was of uneven coverage and quality. As expected, some countries have received more attention than others—Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile. Although several case studies have been included in collective and purportedly comparative volumes, real cross-national studies are still conspicuously absent. Moreover, the differences between traditional diplomatic history and foreign-policy analysis have not always been evident in these works. With some exceptions, studies on Latin American foreign policies seem to fluctuate between the descriptive and prescriptive levels, typically including a historical overview, present trends, and a proposal for a better policy.[3] The prescriptive orientation is especially evident in those authors who argue that, with the exception of two or three cases (usually Brazil, Cuba, and sometimes Mexico or Venezuela), Latin American countries have no foreign policy at all, since their external behavior does not respond to a grand strategy or to a preconceived, articulate, and long-range plan for the attainment of certain national objectives.

Considering the previous dearth of sound foreign-policy descriptions and the distressing historical experience of Latin America in its dealings with the rest of the world (especially with its northern neighbor), descriptive and prescriptive studies are to be welcomed. However, there is still a need to elaborate explanatory and explicitly comparative studies in this field. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that there are many disparate elements available for such an effort, but that they have yet to be systematized and integrated into a coherent and comprehensive approach.

Where can we search for these theoretical perspectives that will allow us to explain at least part of Latin American foreign-policy behavior? In some academic circles both in Latin America and the United States, this question has been answered by postulating the need to look for a new, unique, and special approach that focuses exclusively on the reality of developing or Third World countries. In this chapter, it is assumed that this argument must be treated with caution. First, a minimum requirement for any general approach in the social sciences is a reasonable degree of universality, in the sense that the approach is applicable to more than a few cases. Second, the foreign-policy-making process of several Latin American countries is fairly complex and sophisticated,

and there is no practical reason to give it a unique status. Third, it could well be argued that just as Latin American processes are very different from, say, North American ones, they are also far apart from those prevailing in other Third World regions, if only because the internal political and economic environments in which they function are also radically different.

On the other hand, this is not to deny that Latin American foreign policies operate within specific contexts and that certain variables could be more or less relevant to explain them. However, these differences, important as they are, do not allow us to exclude theoretical approaches from the outset for the simple reason that they were elaborated in, and for, the developed countries. Theoretical ethnocentrism is no less to be avoided in the Third World than in the United States. Furthermore, most conventional theoretical perspectives have something to offer to foreign-policy analysis in Latin America. Similarly, many of the reservations that some conventional perspectives deserve are equally as valid for Latin American countries as for the Western European ones.

In the field of comparative foreign policy, a theoretical perspective is described as a general orientation that "posits the importance of some specified and interrelated set of variables for explaining foreign policy behavior and that provides an explanatory logic relating the set of variables to foreign policy behavior."[4] It is the purpose of this chapter to sketch those theoretical perspectives that are most frequently employed in the analysis of Latin American foreign policies or, alternatively, those that seem more promising for this purpose.

Perhaps the best-known and most widely used classification of the variables considered to affect foreign-policy behavior is the one that distinguishes between external and internal factors. Even though most authors agree that both kinds of variables are relevant, they do not ascribe equal weight to them. In the case of Latin America, it is often assumed that the external behavior of the countries of the region is mainly a reflection and reaction to events located abroad. Be this as it may, the distinction between external and internal variables that influence foreign policy is still widely accepted, although the new forces of transnationalism tend to make them less clear-cut than they were in the past. In this chapter this basic distinction is maintained as an organizing device, without implying that the theoretical perspectives that will be grouped under each heading necessarily adopt a monocausal approach or are always mutually exclusive.

PERSPECTIVES ON EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Several well-known approaches in the fields of Latin American international relations and foreign policy coincide in highlighting those external variables that seem to place constraints on—yet might also

offer new opportunities for—the region's role in the world. This tendency to emphasize external factors is especially evident in the case of Latin American scholars, but it is also gaining acceptance among U.S. and European analysts. The perspectives that stress external variables belong to very different intellectual traditions, ranging from traditional power-politics studies to systems analysis and from *dependencia* theory (to be defined later) to foreign-policy compliance testing. What these highly different approaches have in common is that they tend to concentrate on variables originating outside the nation-states of Latin America.

International System

Few Latin Americanists would disagree with the assertion that the international system shapes to a great extent the region's foreign behavior. In fact, it is almost commonplace to initiate any study on this topic with reference to the basic changes that have taken place within the global system and the ways in which these changes have affected individual or regional policies. This interest in systemic variables explains the relative abundance of works dealing with the historical evolution of the international system, its component units (states, regional and global international organizations, transnational corporations, other transnational entities, and so on), and the distribution of economic and political resources at this global systemic level.[5] Obviously, the underlying assumption in all of these studies is that Latin America is extremely sensitive to its external environment and that its behavior toward other nations tends to be a reaction to stimuli originating at this level.

International system variables often are assumed to have a particularly negative effect in Latin America. In the economic sphere these adverse conditions were analyzed in the 1950s by the structuralist approach, developed mainly by scholars associated with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or, in Spanish, Comisión Económica para América Latina—CEPAL). Initially, this approach placed special emphasis on the deteriorating prices of those primary export products on which Latin America was heavily dependent, in relation to rising prices of manufactured goods that had to be imported mainly from the developed countries. This long-term trend caused chronic balance-of-payments difficulties in the region and also contributed to the relatively slow growth rates of most countries. Subsequently, this analysis was extended to the impact on the late-developing periphery of other external variables, such as foreign direct investment, foreign financial reliance, and the scientific-technological gap.[6]

According to CEPAL, the negative effects caused by these systemic trends could be overcome through a strategy of industrialization based on import substitution, through the implementation of economic integration and of other regional cooperation agreements, through the promotion of manufactured and other nontraditional exports, and, of course, through the reform of the international economic order. It should

be noted that almost all of these strategies impinge directly on the field of foreign policy.

At the political level, most specialists in the field of Latin American foreign policy focus on such international system variables as evolution from bipolarity to multipolarity, détente, recent changes in the distribution of resources in the global system, the energy crisis, and the declining role of the United States in the world. Helio Jaguaribe, a leading Latin American specialist in the field, has in several of his works concentrated on the changes experienced by the international economic, political, and military systems and their impact on the region. In particular, he has attempted to assess the degree of "permissibility" resulting from these changes, concluding that only the more viable countries of the region can attain a relatively high degree of autonomy.[7]

A somewhat different approach within this general perspective tends to view Latin America as a regional subsystem within the global system, characterized by the existence of a set of geographically proximate and frequently interacting states that share a sense of regional identity and are so perceived by external actors.[8] Various inferences are drawn from this very general proposition. Some are inclined to view Latin American foreign policies as basically identical, in the sense that their objectives and concrete policies show striking similarities. Others, while not denying that the countries of the region form a subsystem, also pay special attention to internal differences, stressing the varying roles played by powers such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, and Cuba within the regional and global spheres. Finally, there are scholars who have addressed themselves to the prospect of a common foreign policy on the part of all the countries of the region, assessing the favorable and adverse conditions for the achievement of this objective.[9]

In general, systemic approaches have offered valuable insights into the study of Latin American international relations, especially by demonstrating the region's sensitivity and vulnerability to external variables. However, by its very nature this approach can lead to a certain neglect of the widely different functions that individual countries perform within the system and of the diverging ways in which they react to the same external stimuli. Furthermore, international system analysis, if not combined with perspectives that also take into account internal variables, only gives a partial picture of Latin American foreign policies.

Power Politics

In an excellent review of the recent literature on inter-American relations, Jorge Domínguez identifies what he calls a "strategic" perspective in Latin America, which is characterized by its strategic, rational, and calculating orientation, by its rational and unified state actor assumption, and by its stress on international conflict.[10] First developed in the United States and Western Europe, this power-politics approach still enjoys enormous popularity in Latin America,[11] not only among more tradi-

tionalist scholars but also among some young, recently trained social scientists who typically combine it with other approaches, such as imperialism, dependency, and international system theory. Applications of the power-politics approach, in its "pure" form or in combination with the other perspectives, are especially evident in such Latin American journals as *Estrategia* (Argentina), *Foro Internacional* (Mexico), *Estudios Internacionales* (Chile), *Mundo Nuevo* (Venezuela), *Revista Argentina de Relaciones Internacionales,* and *Relaciones Internacionales* (Mexico).

In the power-politics approach the actions of other countries are often considered as the primary conditioning factors affecting foreign-policy decisions, and the capabilities or national attributes of the state—especially its military, material, and intellectual resources—are the predominant internal factors that impinge on concrete policies. Along these lines, nations can, and indeed must, act independently of internal social and political forces in the pursuit of their national interests, which are almost self-evident: physical protection of their territories and citizens, economic development and the general well-being of the population, regional balance of power, and so on. Even though foreign-policy options are influenced by distinct national capabilities, the skillful employ of these objective factors is equally important in the shaping of outcomes; accordingly, a country's position of lesser capability can be partially offset if its leaders utilize national resources efficiently. How and when this can be achieved is not very clear, but usually the approach stresses the need of an enlightened leadership and a unified and supportive national population.

Traditional balance-of-power analysis falls within this general description. It views Latin America as a typical scenario of regional competition, where countries like Brazil and Argentina attempt to maintain a fragile equilibrium in the Atlantic area, whereas Venezuela and Mexico are beginning to compete for the control of Central America and the Caribbean.[12] Similarly, competition between the greater powers of the region is said to affect the weaker and smaller countries such as Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Central American ones, whose economic and political systems are prone to penetration by their powerful neighbors.

Traditional power-politics perspectives have led to capability analysis, characterized by the comparison of such national attributes as size, geographic location, population, natural-resource endowments, industrial capacity, educational levels, scientific-technological development, and political stability. Even if all these variables are typically internal, capability analysis must be listed under the external-variable perspectives because what matters in this approach is its relative value vis-à-vis other countries, and not its intrinsic value. However, capability analysis, in Latin America as elsewhere, is often undertaken without a theoretical framework that specifies the conditions under which the available resources will be employed, or the relative weights assigned to each.[13]

Another current within the general power-politics perspective goes a step further: It views conflict in the region not only as an objective reality but also as a necessary and natural product of the coexistence of several states in Latin America. An extreme version of this perspective can be found in Latin America's geopolitical approaches, which tend to view states as organisms that develop, live, decay, and die according to rather precise life cycles and that struggle constantly in a wild scramble for survival.[14]

Dependency Perspectives

In comparative foreign-policy literature the concept "dependency" has had widely divergent meanings and implications, which at times have provoked rather confusing debates. In Latin America, and later also in other regions, this theoretical perspective has been utilized as a broad and general framework of analysis that attempts to describe and explain the region's economic underdevelopment and also its multiple repercussions in the sociopolitical sphere.[15] By means of an eminently totalizing, historical, and dialectical approach, *dependencia* (dependency theory) explains the failure of national development in Latin America in the light of the historical insertion of the region into the capitalist world system. Development and underdevelopment are seen not as different stages within a unilinear process through which all nations pass, but as partial and highly interrelated aspects of one global and simultaneous process, as two faces of the same phenomenon. According to this approach, the region's position in the international economic system and the ties that were historically established between the external and internal structures condition to a great extent the economic and political processes that take place in Latin American societies.

The mechanisms of dependency are multiple and tend to vary over time and from case to case; however there is consensus in stressing the crucial role played by internationalized elites or bridgeheads in the dependent societies that are closely associated with the core groups within the world economic system and that exert a dominant role both in the economic and political spheres of their own societies. Foreign penetration in dependent countries usually materializes through concrete linkages such as direct investments in the most strategic and dynamic sectors of the economy, asymmetrical trade relations, heavy financial reliance on sources based at—or controlled by—the developed countries, military cooperation and training programs, and specific cultural and educational mechanisms. These linkages, though, are not based merely on external forms of exploitation and coercion, "but are rooted in coincidences of interests between local dominant classes and international ones, and, on the other side, are challenged by local dominated groups or classes."[16] In consequence, underdevelopment is not simply the result of the impact of external variables on dependent societies, but of a complex set of interrelations that involve both external and internal

factors. This is why the approach is usually described as holistic by its proponents.

This brief and certainly not original description of the *dependencia* approach does not give full justice to its level of theoretical refinement and obviously does not reflect the fundamental divergences that separate many of its practitioners, but perhaps it is sufficient to show that it is an approach to development theory (economic as well as political) and to international political economy. It is definitively not a theory of foreign policy. In fact, there are relatively few references to this subject in Latin American dependency writings, and the few that can be found are almost never expressed in terms of general relational propositions. To be sure, most authors who utilize this approach would be willing to recognize that economic class structures—which, as we have seen, are closely related to international structures—affect in the last analysis all political processes, including foreign policy, but this causal chain is too undetermined, mediated, and abstract to allow for precise relational hypotheses.

This last remark explains why several *dependencia* authors, when dealing with a subject like inter-American relations,[17] are willing to recognize that Latin American countries are now adopting foreign policies that are increasingly autonomous from the hegemonic power in the region. These societies continue to be characterized by a general situation of structural dependency, but the new realities of the international system and the relative autonomy of the state and its bureaucracy vis-à-vis the dominant classes allow for considerable independence in the field of foreign policy.[18] Accordingly, the foreign policy of a hegemonic power cannot be viewed as a mere instrument of the main transnational corporations seated in that country, nor can the foreign policy of a dependent state be automatically identified with the interests of the ruling social sectors. The relationships in this field are much more complex and include also important strategic, historical, and political elements.

In sum, authors who write within the Latin American *dependencia* tradition offer only the most general guidance to the specific study of foreign policy in the dependent countries. Theoretical and methodological reasons explain this omission. First, as Fagen puts it, "it is almost painfully obvious that simply analoging over into the study of international politics some of the main elements of the dependency perspective (developed primarily to represent economic relations and their consequences) was and is doomed to failure. . . . Politics are not 'dependent' on each other in the same sense as economics."[19] Second, the units of analysis employed by the *dependencia* approach do not lend themselves easily to comparative foreign-policy studies. Thus, *dependencia* theory usually focuses on the relationship between, on the one hand, a highly aggregate external unit, the global capitalist system, and, on the other, a highly disaggregate and fluid dependent society, composed of distinct

class arrangements, alliances between local and external groups, and so forth. By contrast, foreign-policy analysis maintains a state-as-actor perspective. Third, *dependencia* theory does not consider foreign-policy behavior as a very significant indicator of dependency; thus, the fact that several Latin American countries exhibit an independent behavior at the United Nations (UN) and even dare to resist U.S. pressure in bilateral and multilateral negotiations does not say much about the structural economic dependency of these countries vis-à-vis the world economy or even the North American one. Finally, it should be emphasized that, in general, *dependencia* theory is not easily amenable to the "if and when" propositions that traditionally have been employed in comparative foreign-policy analysis. Rather, the approach has concentrated on specific and concrete situations of dependency, utilizing contextually bound hypotheses and data in the case of both internal and external variables.

External Reliance

Studies in this relatively new field of foreign-policy research have occasionally been associated with Latin American *dependencia* writings, especially in the United States. Although there are some links between both intellectual traditions, in the sense that they focus on international inequalities and the consequences that flow from them, they are in essence very different. To avoid confusing them, James Caporaso proposed, in a special issue of *International Organization* on the subject of dependent international relations, a distinction between "dependency" and "dependence." According to this distinction, "dependency" refers to the process of insertion of the lesser developed countries into the global capitalist system, while "dependence" refers to the external reliance of one nation-state on another.[20] I follow this distinction, although the concept "dependence" has been replaced by "foreign reliance," for the sake of clarity.

The external-reliance perspective seeks to explore and probe the consequences of asymmetrical economic relations between nation-states. Specifically, in the field of foreign policy, this perspective attempts to determine the relationship between economic external reliance and foreign behavior. This association has been suggested by the common belief that, within an asymmetrical relationship, the economically dominant country can exact favorable foreign-policy decisions from its dependent economic partner, by virtue of the power levers it has at its disposal. Accordingly, one could expect a high degree of compliance between the dominant and the dependent countries in their foreign behavior, provided that this compliance is highly valued by the dominant country.

Considering the region's high degree of economic reliance on the United States, as expressed in foreign-trade concentration, financial flows, direct investments, and aid programs, it is not surprising that the general foreign-reliance proposition has been tested in the specific case of Latin

America. The results of these empirical testings, though, have tended to indicate that there is no clear relation between economic external reliance and foreign-policy behavior. According to one study, for instance, "agreement with the U.S. position is not a positive function of the extent of a country's dependence."[21] Another work concluded that "the analyses here clearly support an argument that compliance by Latin American states in the form of voting agreement with the United States in the UN is unlikely to be associated consistently with trade dependence, power disparities, or distance from the United States."[22]

It is evident that countries that are economically very reliant on the United States have shown for a long time a noncompliant foreign behavior in relation to their main partner. Mexico is a good case in point. Argentina, for instance, was able to resist U.S. pressure during World War II and to continue its friendly relations with the Axis powers.[23] Mexico and Argentina are regional powers in Latin America and it may seem unlikely that the smaller and even more reliant countries of the region can follow a similar path. However, Panama, one of the most dependent countries in the region, has nevertheless adopted an independent foreign policy with regard to Central America and, at the same time, has been able to exact new and more favorable canal treaties from the United States.

PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Traditionally, internal variables that affect foreign-policy behavior in Latin America have received less attention than the external ones. In part, this may be the result of a relative underestimation of the importance of domestic factors in the foreign-policy decision-making process; but, for the most part, this omission stems from the scarcity of detailed case studies.

Obviously, it is problematic to identify purely domestic sources in a region where transnational actors of very different kinds have developed close ties with local groups. However, because these transnational forces act through local agents and their influence consequently is mediated, it is still possible to speak of internal variables. It is difficult to classify internal-variable perspectives for the simple reason that they tend to overlap to a great extent. However, varying degrees in emphasis allow us to distinguish four broad categories: regime orientation, decision making and domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, and leadership perspectives. Obviously, this classification is only tentative.

Regime Orientation

This perspective focuses on the structural characteristics and basic orientations of a society in the realms of both politics and economics, in order to assess their relevance to foreign-policy decision making. Three general variables that can be listed under this heading have received special attention in the case of Latin American foreign-policy studies.

The first one concentrates on the relationship between the form of political organization and the foreign policy of a given country. As could be expected, the primary distinction that is made in this area is between democratic and authoritarian regimes and points to the question of whether internal differences in regimes affect the type of foreign policy that is pursued.

In Latin America the relationship between political regime and foreign policy has been explored in a diachronic way, comparing the same country under different regimes. For instance, several authors have traced the main changes experienced by Brazilian foreign policy after the breakdown of the democratic regime in 1964, concluding that during the first years the new authoritarian regime completely reversed the policies of its predecessors and adopted a rather passive foreign policy, characterized by a narrow and highly ideological stance with respect to the rest of the world.[24] Contrast with prior policies was particularly evident because the last two democratic governments had attempted to pursue an activist and reformist foreign policy, oriented toward the establishment of new links with other countries and regions, especially in the Third World, and toward the adoption of a more independent policy vis-à-vis the United States. However, and this is particularly interesting, this reversal from an independent pro–Third World policy proved to be short-lived. Although the authoritarian regime remained essentially the same, in the early 1970s Brazil shifted again to an active foreign policy, characterized by pragmatism and adaptability to external changes.

The case of Chile, a country that experienced a particularly violent change of regime in 1973, has been studied from a similar perspective.[25] However, the Chilean case points to still another dimension of this relationship between political regime and foreign policy that merits attention. During a long period before the 1973 coup, the democratic nature of Chile's political regime not only influenced its foreign-policy processes and outcomes but also became in itself a national capability. Thus, the fact that prior to 1973 Chile was one of the few stable and relatively participatory democracies in a region plagued by chronic instability and dictatorial regimes gave it special prestige both in Latin America and the rest of the world and explains to a great extent why it was able to pursue a foreign policy somewhat disproportionate to its size and physical capabilities. This case of an international presence based more on prestige than on "objective" power assets can also be observed, to a lesser extent, in other smaller Latin American democracies, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay until the 1960s. It would be interesting to compare these cases with those countries of Europe, Africa, and Asia that have also included regime prestige as an important foreign-policy capability.

The second regime-orientation variable refers to the development strategy adopted by a country. Traditionally, in Latin America this variable has had a direct incidence in foreign-policy behavior, which seems understandable given the priority assigned to developmental goals in the region. As Coleman and Quirós Varela suggest, "For Latin America, where political leaders are judged by their ability to articulate goals for national economic transformation as well as for their ability to produce such changes, foreign policy-making is unavoidably very much a function of the requirements of development statecraft."[26] Thus, foreign policy is viewed not only in terms of its contribution to traditional economic objectives such as promotion of trade and procurement of financial assistance in favorable conditions but also as a means of manipulating international variables in a way favorable to developmental goals. This emphasis explains the important role played by foreign policy in Latin America in the nationalization of foreign-owned corporations that extract the countries' natural resources.

The close relationship between economic development strategy and foreign policy has been highlighted in case studies dealing with diverse Latin American countries. Mario Ojeda has shown that during a very long period Mexico's foreign policy assumed the role of "external promoter of the country's economic growth," projecting abroad an image of stability and progress for Mexico and acting in a way to obtain better treatment for its exports and new markets for its products.[27] Although Brazil has adopted a different development strategy than Mexico, its foreign policy is also generally viewed in terms of its possible contribution to the internal development strategy.[28] And, in the case of Chile, the adoption of an orthodox and extreme monetarist and outward-oriented economic model has also placed new requirements on its foreign policy.

The third regime-orientation variable focuses on the existence of a distinct national approach in a given country, which stems from a certain historical tradition that has permeated the state's external behavior. In some cases, this tradition contributes to the emergence of a conscious attitude of the foreign-policy establishment in order to perpetuate this legacy. Thus, although in general it could be argued that because of its immutability a foreign-policy tradition must be considered as a capability rather than as a regime-orientation variable, in the Latin American case this is not so evident. Historically, most countries of the region have experienced important alterations in their foreign behavior. Mexico, in spite of its remarkable political stability, shifted in the early 1970s from a passive, isolationist, and conventional foreign policy to an activist and expansive one. The fact that a recent book on Argentine foreign policy was entitled *Argentina's Foreign Policies*[29] illustrates the absence of a consistent and permanent foreign-policy tradition in its case. Even Brazil, the only Latin American country in which it is possible to speak of a certain foreign-policy tradition, has not been immune to important innovations in both style and substance.

Decision Making and Domestic Politics

This perspective is similar to the previous one in that it focuses on domestic sources of foreign policy. However, it differs from it in the sense that it tends more to disaggregate the internal setting, concentrating on participants, types of decision-making processes, and domestic influences that intervene in the foreign-policy area.

Considering the enormous power wielded by the presidency in almost all Latin American countries, many analysts are inclined to view foreign policy in the region as an essentially presidential and one-person decision process. Some authors even speak in this case of idiosyncratic politics. Although there have been some cases of one-man foreign-policy processes, for instance during the Duvalier ("Papa Doc") and Trujillo regimes in Haiti and the Dominican Republic,[30] in general it is erroneous to view the foreign-policy-making process in Latin America as a very simple and restricted process in which only two or three persons participate. For one thing, political systems in the region, democratic as well as authoritarian, include highly institutionalized bureaucracies and complex networks of interest groups that participate in the foreign-policy area. For another, relatively high levels of development according to Third World standards have imposed new demands upon what used to be traditional foreign-policy establishments.

The number of actors that participate in foreign-policy decisions varies from country to country and over time. In general governmental actors tend to be more numerous in the more developed countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela. Parliaments and political parties, where they exist, have a variable role in the foreign-policy decision-making process.[31] On several occasions, the pressure exerted by political parties on the executive has been sufficient to force it to adopt or reject a given course of action.[32] On the other hand, most Latin American parties have developed links with ideologically similar parties of other countries in Latin America and Europe. This is especially true in the case of the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Communists, but it also holds for more indigenous parties such as the Peruvian Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) or the Argentine Justicialistas.

Specific interest groups also have played an important role in foreign-policy making in Latin America. For instance, the powerful coffee growers association of Colombia, the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, officially takes part in the administration of coffee policy both at the national and international levels.[33] In Venezuela, the Federación de Cámaras de Comercio (Fedecámaras), the national association of entrepreneurs, for several years blocked the country's participation in regional and subregional integration schemes because it perceived this participation as detrimental to the interests of local industry.[34]

Case studies on concrete foreign-policy decisions in Latin America have been rare. However, some scholars have done interesting studies

in this field, concentrating especially on highly salient issues in the region that have involved the U.S. government and/or U.S. business interests. Several historical studies, for instance, have traced Latin American decisions and policies toward the United States and some other world powers.[35] More recent research has dealt with nationalization processes of U.S.-based multinational corporations and the conflicts or tensions that arose with Washington.[36]

Relationships between domestic politics and foreign policy in Latin America have been explored in several cases. Mexico has probably received most attention in this regard. In fact, there seems to be a consensus that interrelations between internal and external politics are particularly close in the Mexican case.[37] Against this general background it is hardly surprising that when President Luis Echeverría in the early 1970s initiated his "New Foreign Policy," many observers interpreted this change as a response to Mexico's internal economic and political crisis.

Mexico is certainly not a unique case in Latin America regarding the interplay between internal and external policies. Indeed, at times this relationship also has been particularly evident in very dissimilar countries of the region, such as Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Bolivia, Panama, and Argentina. It would be interesting to analyze these cases from a comparative perspective, in order to assess the importance of this variable for the whole region.

Bureaucratic Politics

This perspective tends to view foreign policy as the outcome of interactive bargaining processes among diverse governmental agencies with different values, perceptions, and styles. Accordingly, foreign policy is seen not as the result of a rational, coherent, and purposeful process, but as the result of the pulling and hauling of rival agencies.[38] Obviously, this competition takes place within certain limits because there are external constraints and also common values shared by all participants.

This perspective has never been very popular among Latin Americanists, which seems understandable given the high levels of centralization and power concentration that characterize political systems in the region. It certainly would be a misrepresentation to view the region's external policies as the result of bureaucratic infighting.

However, the approach is still valuable. In the first place, some Latin American foreign bureaucracies are relatively complex. They include highly differentiated and specialized groups, each endowed with its own perceptions and interests. In the second place, even in those cases where only one sector of the bureaucracy seems to hold sway in important issues, this group need not necessarily be monolithic. Finally, there have been clear indications of bureaucratic fighting in some crucial foreign-policy decisions in Latin America. Mexico's recent decision not to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a good example.

In sum, even though the bureaucratic-politics perspective may not provide a complete explanation of Latin American foreign policies, it still can offer useful theoretical insights at more restricted levels.

Leadership

In a region that has been characterized by its personalist politics and charismatic leadership, one might expect a high number of foreign-policy studies concentrating on the personal traits of prominent leaders and their effects on foreign policy. Paradoxically, this has not been the case. And, for better or worse, psychohistory has no known followers among specialists in Latin American international relations.

However, leaving aside psychological explanations, several analysts are willing to stress the importance of leadership in the molding of Latin American foreign policy. Thus, the role of President Juan D. Perón in the shaping of Argentina's "Third Position" during the early 1950s has been sufficiently highlighted.[39] And, more recently, several observers of Mexican foreign policy have pointed to the influence of President Echeverría's personality in the formulation and conduct of Mexico's "New Foreign Policy."[40]

Another study combined bureaucratic politics and leadership perspectives to explain recent Cuban foreign policy. According to this approach, Cuba's external contradictions in the mid-1970s derived from the existence of three distinct foreign-policy tendencies: the pragmatic economic tendency, headed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez; the revolutionary political tendency, headed by Fidel Castro; and the military mission tendency, headed by Raúl Castro and other officers of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.[41] The implication is that complex interactions between these tendencies explained important decisions and shifts in foreign policy.

Although outstanding leaders have played an important role in Latin American foreign policies, research relating the personal characteristics of those leaders to their external policies seems most unlikely for the near future. Structural forces, both at the international and domestic levels, are considered to have more explanatory potential in this area.

CONCLUSIONS

Even though the state of the literature on Latin American foreign policies is clearly not satisfactory, it would be unfair to describe it as hopeless. Whatever the validity of some individual perspectives, research on the subject is rising both quantitatively and qualitatively. And, encouragingly, the whole subject seems to be entering a more theoretical phase. The theoretical perspectives that have been described in this paper do not constitute mutually exclusive approaches. Rather, they tend to complement and enrich each other, casting light upon new dimensions and allowing

for the reformulation of old ones. The picture that emerges is one of potential convergence between different emphases and concerns.

However, the road is not as easy as it might appear at first glance. Most of the perspectives are still incipient and, in some cases, they do not amount to more than two or three often implicit propositions based upon a case study or the experience of a single country during a specific time period. Moreover, not even the most conciliatory review could deny that there are incompatibilities between some perspectives. A purely systemic approach, for instance, inevitably leads to the neglect of domestic variables and gives only a partial picture of the foreign policy of a particular country. Conversely, a perspective that focuses exclusively on the interactions that take place within the bureaucracy is very likely to lose sight of important trends within the international system that restrict or expand options available to decision makers. Other perspectives are so confusing and inarticulate that one may question whether they are indeed perspectives. Many geopolitical writings belong to this category.

The preceding review suggests some future directions for research in the area of Latin American foreign policy. First, it is necessary to build conceptual schemes that may facilitate more theoretically oriented analyses. These schemes should be sufficiently broad to allow for multicausal explanations, but at the same time they should not be converted into mere listings of variables, without any suggestion of their relevance and mutual interaction patterns.

Second, a more explicit comparative methodology is needed in the area. This can be achieved through the application of a common theoretical framework to several Latin American countries, through collective projects involving several institutions, or, at least, through the presence of a comparative awareness in individual case studies. Quantitative cross-national comparisons also could be a useful complement in this regard, provided that they do not consist of the accumulation of endless lists of variables and indicators, without any reference to historical contexts and to internal qualitative differences.

Third, as several authors have suggested, issue-area analysis seems especially useful to advance our understanding in the field of foreign policy. As in other cases, Latin American countries tend to respond differently to various types of external stimuli. Thus, Ferris's classification of three relevant issue-areas in the region—military/strategic, economic development, and status/diplomatic—appears as a very appropriate point of departure for this mode of anlaysis.[42]

Finally, before we pretend to explain, we must determine exactly *what* we want to explain. If, as Kalleberg states, "comparison can only be made after classification has been completed,"[43] then we must certainly move in that direction. What differences in Latin American foreign behavior do we want to explain? Is it possible to speak of innovative and traditional foreign policies in the region? How do we differentiate an assertive from a passive external policy? Are there acquiescent,

reformist, and radical countries in the region? Answers to these questions are not only theoretically relevant, but may help Latin American countries design new strategies to improve their participation in the international system.

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NOTES

1. Most authors dealing with the international relations of Latin America view the region as a unified entity and as a specific "system of actions." See, for instance, Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel (eds.), *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970) in which Latin America is considered to be a single subsystem, whereas Africa is divided into five such units and Asia into four.

2. Granting that the distinction between international relations and foreign-policy studies is not always clear, it is assumed that this difference is necessary and useful. Whereas international-relations studies focus on global interactive processes involving at least two different units within the international system, foreign-policy studies refer to those actions and objectives within a given country that are directed to its foreign environment. See Fred A. Sondermann, "The Linkage Between Foreign Policy and International Politics," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 8–17.

3. Harold E. Davis, Larman C. Wilson, et al., *Latin American Foreign Policies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International System* (New York: The Free Press, 1977); and Elizabeth G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln (eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981). A previous and more geographically restricted volume is Carlos A. Astiz (ed.), *Latin American International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities, and the National Interests of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

4. Charles F. Hermann and Maurice A. East, "Introduction," in Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann (eds.), *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), p. 22.

5. A pioneering effort in that direction was Gustavo Lagos, *International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963). Although from a different perspective, José A. Silva Michelena, *Política y Bloques de Poder*, 2d ed. (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1979), also focused on the recent evolution of the international system and its impact on the Latin American countries.

6. For a good summary of CEPAL's approach see *El Pensamiento de la CEPAL* (Santiago: Ed. Universitaria, 1969). For a revised and up-to-date version of this

line of thought by its most outstanding representative, see Raúl Prebisch, "Notas sobre el desarrollo del capitalismo periférico," *Estudios Internacionales* 11 (43), July–September 1978, pp. 3–25; and "La periferia latinoamericana en el sistema global del capitalismo," *Revista de la CEPAL* (13), April 1981, pp. 163–171.

7. Helio Jaguaribe, *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 371–382; and Helio Jaguaribe, "Autonomía periférica y hegemonía céntrica," *Estudios Internacionales* 12 (46), April–June 1979, pp. 91–130.

8. Atkins, *Latin America*, pp. 10ff.

9. Luciano Tomassini, "Tendencias favorables o adversas a la formación de un sistema regional latinoamericano," *Estudios Internacionales* 8 (29), January–March 1975, pp. 3–46.

10. Jorge I. Domínguez, "Consensus and Divergence: the State of the Literature on Inter-American Relations in the 1970s," *Latin American Research Review* 13 (1), 1978, pp. 104–106. The next paragraphs owe much to Domínguez's description.

11. Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1978) is probably the most popular international-relations textbook in Latin American diplomatic and military academies and also in most of the region's universities. Two other widely used books are Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1973); and Georg Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics: A Study of International Relations* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1951). All of these works have been translated into Spanish.

12. Balance-of-power approaches to Latin American international relations can be found in Norman A. Bailey, *Latin America in World Politics* (New York: Walker, 1967), chap. 3; Robert N. Burr, *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Atkins, *Latin America*, chap. 8; and Alberto Sepúlveda, "La dinámica de equilibrio de poder en Sudamérica y sus proyecciones en las políticas exteriores de la región," in Walter Sánchez (ed.), *Las relaciones entre los paises de América Latina* (Santiago: Ed. Universitaria, 1980), pp. 69–101.

13. James N. Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods* (New York: Sage, 1974), p. 13.

14. For a brief but very useful summary of these approaches, see John Child, "Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 14 (2), 1979, pp. 89–111, which includes an annotated bibliography.

15. It would be impossible to include here a bibliography of the *dependencia* literature. For the sake of brevity we refer to the writings of the most representative Latin American authors of the approach: Fernando H. Cardoso, Theotonio Dos Santos, Andre Gunder Frank, Sergio Bagú, Osvaldo Sunkel, Enzo Faletto, Helio Jaguaribe, and Aníbal Quijano. The list is not exhaustive and does not imply that all of these authors agree on most of the points with which they are concerned. Good reviews, introductions, or summaries of the approach can be found in Philip J. O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency," in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth (eds.), *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 7–27; Ronald M. Chilcote and Joel Edelstein (eds.), *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), especially the introduction; James A. Caporaso (ed.), "Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," *International Organization* 32 (1), Winter 1978; and Heraldo Muñoz, "Cambio y continuidad en el Debate

sobre la Dependencia y el Imperialismo," *Estudios Internacionales* 11 (44), October–December 1978, pp. 88–138, and his edited volume, *From Dependency to Development* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).

16. Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. xvi.

17. For a useful summary of the *dependencia* approaches to inter-American relations, see Domínguez, "Consensus and Divergence," pp. 100–108. It should be emphasized, however, that Domínguez refers mainly to international-relations approaches, whereas this chapter deals with the more specific field of foreign policy, in which *dependencia* writings have been scarce.

18. See, for example, Marcos Kaplan, "Commentary on Ianni," in Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen (eds.), *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 52–66. See also the articles by Aníbal Quijano and Guillermo O'Donnell in the same volume.

19. Richard R. Fagen, "Studying Latin America Politics: Some Implications of a *Dependencia* Approach," *Latin American Research Review* 12 (2), 1977, p. 17.

20. James A. Caporaso, "Introduction to the Special Issue of *International Organization* on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," *International Organization* 32 (1), Winter 1978, pp. 1–3.

21. Neil R. Richardson, *Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 163. The study included a sample of twenty-three countries, of which only four were non–Latin American.

22. James Lee Ray, "Dependence, Political Compliance, and Economic Performance: Latin America and Eastern Europe," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Pat McGowan (eds.), *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior*, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981), p. 123.

23. See Michael J. Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile During World War II* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). On the persistence of Argentine resistance to the United States, see Joseph S. Tulchin, "Two to Tango: From Independence to the Falklands Crisis, Argentine and U.S. Foreign Policies Have Been out of Step," *Foreign Service Journal* 59 (9), October 1982, pp. 18–23.

24. See Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil in the World: Multipolarity as Seen by a Peripheral ADC Middle Power," in Ferris and Lincoln, *Latin American Foreign Policies*, p. 98; and Brady B. Tyson, "Brazil," in Davis, Wilson, et al., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 221–236.

25. Heraldo Muñoz, "Las relaciones exteriores del gobierno militar chileno: Una interpretación económica-política" (Mimeographed, May 1981, Instituto de Estudios Internacionales); Manfred Wilhelmy, "Hacia un análisis de la Política Exterior chilena contemporánea," *Estudios Internacionales* 12 (48), October–December 1979, pp. 440–471.

26. Kenneth M. Coleman and Luis Quirós Varela, "Determinants of Latin American Foreign Policies: Bureaucratic Organizations and Development Strategies," in Ferris and Lincoln, *Latin American Foreign Policies*, p. 40.

27. Mario Ojeda, *Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México* (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1976), p. 104.

28. Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), p. 40. See also Celso Lafer, *Comercio e Relaçoes Internacionais* (São Paulo: Ed. Perspectiva, 1977); and Celso Lafer, "La

política exterior brasileña: Balance y perspectivas," *Estudios Internacionales* 13 (51), July–September 1980, pp. 309–327.

29. Edward S. Milenky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978). See also Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari, *Argentina's Foreign Policy 1930–1962* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966).

30. Larman C. Wilson, "The Dominican Republic and Haiti," in Davis, Wilson, et al., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, p. 215.

31. Edy Kaufman, "Latin America," in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 152; and Harold Eugene Davis,"The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies," in Davis, Wilson, et al., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, p. 12.

32. F. Parkinson, *Latin America, the Cold War, and the World Powers, 1945–1973* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1974).

33. David Bushnell, "Colombia," in Davis, Wilson, et al., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, p. 410.

34. See Nelson Rodríguez, "Venezuela: Actores y agentes políticos internos del proceso de integración andina," in Raúl Atria and Iván Lavados (eds.), *Variables políticas de la integración andina* (Santiago: Ed. Nueva Universidad, 1974), pp. 154–187; and Carlos Portales, "Democracia y políticas de integración: El caso de Venezuela," in Manfred Wilhemy (ed.), *Sociedad, política, e integración en América Latina* (Santiago: Ed. Corporación de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, 1982), pp. 149–168.

35. See Parkinson, *Latin America, the Cold War, and the World Powers;* Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony;* Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Great Powers 1930–1939* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); and Joseph S. Tulchin, "The Argentine Proposal for Non-Belligerency, April 1940," *The Journal of Inter-American Studies* 11 (4), November 1969, pp. 571–604.

36. See, for instance, Theodore H. Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Charles T. Goodsell, *American Corporations and Peruvian Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); and Franklin Tugwell, *The Politics of Oil in Venezuela* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975). For a less recent case, see Lorenzo Meyer, *México y Estados Unidos en el Conflicto Petrolero* (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1968).

37. Olga Pellicer de Brody, "Mexico in the 1970s and Its Relations with the United States," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America and the United States*, pp. 316–317. See also her *México y la Revolución Cubana* (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1972), which she describes as a study of the utilization of Mexico's foreign policy for purposes of domestic policy. Wolf Grabendorff, "Mexico's Foreign Policy—Indeed a Foreign Policy?" Review essay, *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 20 (1), February 1978, pp. 85–92.

38. See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Morton M. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974). For a discussion of the bureaucratic politics approach in the context of U.S.–Latin American relations, see Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America and the United States*, especially the articles by Ernest May, Christopher Mitchell, Abraham Lowenthal, and their discussants.

39. On Argentina's foreign policy during the Peronist era, see Conil Paz and Ferrari, *Argentina's Foreign Policy;* Sergio Bagú, *Argentina en el mundo* (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961); Harold F. Peterson, *Argentina and the United States 1810–1960* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1964); and Joseph S. Tulchin, "Foreign Policy," in M. Falcoff and R. H. Dolkart (eds.), *Prologue to Perón: Argentina in Depression and War, 1930–1943* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), chap. 4.

40. Referring to Echeverría's foreign-policy initiatives and actions, one author asserted that at a certain point "it became difficult to discern to what extent many of his initiatives and acts responded to a State policy, and to what extent they responded rather to a personal prestige policy." Mario Ojeda, "El régimen de Echeverría y la nueva política exterior," *Trimestre Político* 2 (5), July–September 1976, p. 31. A similar point is stressed in Yoram Shapira, "La política exterior de México bajo el régimen de Echeverría: Retrospectiva," *Foro Internacional* 19 (1), July–September 1978, pp. 67ff. Robert D. Bond has offered a similar interpretation of Venezuela's foreign policy under Carlos Andrés Pérez: "Championing Third World demands clearly accords with President Pérez's desire to be viewed as a leader of international stature." Robert D. Bond, "Venezuela's Role in International Affairs," in Robert D. Bond (ed.), *Contemporary Venezuela and Its Role in International Affairs* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), p. 247. See also the article by John D. Martz in the same volume.

41. Edward González, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies," in Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (eds.), *Cuba in the World* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), pp. 3–36.

42. Elizabeth G. Ferris, "Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy," in Ferris and Lincoln, *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 242–245. Another author who stresses the utility of the issue-area approach is Yale H. Ferguson, "Through Glasses Darkly: An Assessment of Various Theoretical Approaches to Inter-American Relations," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 19 (1), February 1977, pp. 3–34.

43. Arthur L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," *World Politics* 19 (1), October 1966, p. 75.