

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies

International Organizations and Preventing War

Martin S. Edwards and Jonathan M. DiCicco

Print Publication Date: Jan 2012 Subject: Conflict Studies, Organization

Online Publication Date: Jan 2018 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.407

Summary and Keywords

International organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations play an important role in war prevention. In theory, IOs reduce the risk of war between belligerents by improving communication, facilitating cooperation, and building confidence and trust. In practice, however, IOs' war-preventing capacities have sparked skepticism and criticism. Recent advances in the scholarly study of the causes of war have given rise to new and promising directions in research on IOs and war prevention. These studies highlight the problems of interstate and intrastate wars, global and regional organizations, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, and the relationship between IOs and domestic institutions. They also offer novel insights that both complement and challenge studies of traditional concepts such as collective security. An interesting work is that of J. D. Fearon, who frames war as a bargaining process between rational states. Fearon articulates a central puzzle of international relations: since war is costly, the question that arises is why rational leaders of competing states choose to fight instead of pursuing less costly, nonviolent dispute settlements. Three general mechanisms account for rational, unitary states' inability to identify an alternative outcome that both would prefer to war: bluffing about private information, commitment problems, and indivisibility of stakes. Despite the obvious progress in research on IOs and war prevention, there remain methodological and theoretical issues that deserve consideration for further investigation, two of which are: the interaction of domestic and international organizations, and the implications of variations in IO design.

Keywords: international organizations, United Nations, war prevention, war, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, domestic institutions, collective security, J. D. Fearon, bargaining

War prevention is a principal motivation of the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations (IOs), and for centuries international relations thinkers have advocated IOs as a means of preventing wars. In theory, IOs improve communication, facilitate cooperation, build confidence and trust, and therefore reduce the risk of war between belligerents, but in practice IOs' preventive capacities have drawn skepticism and critical scrutiny. Perhaps surprisingly, scholarly analysis of how, when, and why IOs

sometimes prevent war remains in its developmental stages; however, recent advances in the scholarly study of war's causes have generated new and promising directions in research on IOs and war prevention. Widespread acceptance of rationalist explanations of war has served as a foundation for novel empirical studies of the types of institutions, institutional design features, and political circumstances that help IOs to stop potential wars before they happen. These studies draw attention to the problems of interstate and intrastate wars, to global and regional organizations, to preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, and to the relationship between IOs and domestic institutions, and provide novel insights that both complement and challenge studies of traditional concepts like collective security. Collectively, they highlight IOs' capacities to not only impose legal constraints on sovereign states, but also to improve the prospects for reaching peaceful bargains between hostile, self-interested parties under conditions of anarchy by providing information, altering bargaining ranges, helping adversaries signal their resolve, and revealing or shaping adversaries' preferences. In so doing, these studies have moved the international relations discipline beyond legalistic arguments and abstract theoretical controversies and toward a more systematic, evidence-based understanding of IOs and war prevention. Future scholarship in this direction – rooted in diverse methodologies and communicated more effectively to policy makers and political leaders – holds significant promise for our understanding of how to prevent war, as well as how best to reform existing IOs or design new IOs to ensure that war prevention becomes a robust, enduring, and effective feature of global governance in the twenty-first century.

International organizations vary widely in form, function, and mandate; even among IOs dedicated to war prevention, substantial variation exists. One important distinction hinges on whether the organization in question is governmental or nongovernmental. Many international and some domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are intended or designed to reduce the incidence of war, including the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), which lobbies governments to use nonviolent methods of dispute resolution, and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which disseminate scientific information about weapons of mass destruction to governments in hopes of preventing the spread and use of such weapons. Yet in general NGOs, private organizations with individuals or other nongovernment associations as members, tend to have less direct influence over governments' decisions for war or peace than do organizations that feature sovereign states as members. These international governmental organizations (IGOs) typically arise from formal agreements among three or more states and institutionalize channels of communication among member-states. Although NGOs vastly outnumber IGOs, many scholars have focused on the latter in part because traditional conceptions of security are inherently tied to state sovereignty and the state's ascribed monopoly over the legitimate control of the means of violence (see Jacobson 1984:4–5, 135–6). Even those IGOs that appear to wield military force – the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and regional organizations like the African Union, for example, all of which deploy peacekeeping troops – do so only by merging military units volunteered by sovereign states into coordinated multinational

forces for temporary missions that preserve rather than challenge states' sovereign control over their own military personnel.

International relations scholars' emphasis on IGOs is evident in the pages that follow but should not be taken to mean that research on the role of NGOs in preventing war is not needed and warranted – indeed, recent works such as Fitzduff and Church's aptly titled collection *NGOs at the Table* (2004) emphasizes the growing number and importance of NGOs as relevant actors integrally involved in peace processes. Certainly NGOs may help to prevent wars by facilitating mediation, highlighting socioeconomic or political grievances, giving early warnings of emerging violence, mitigating the fomentation of violence by acting as media watchdogs, and drawing attention to arms flows (e.g., Rotberg 1996; for a dated but still helpful directory of NGO activities, see the Carter Center's *International Guide*, 1996). Within the web of organizational actors involved in post-conflict contexts, NGOs play vital roles in promoting peacebuilding and other activities intended to prevent war from re-emerging, as they have in Burundi since the mid-1990s (Wohlgemuth 2005). NGOs might even help expand the interdemocratic peace and reduce the risk of war by helping to build democratic institutions and civil society. However, scholars have yet to fully assess their effects.

Intergovernmental organizations need not focus on security concerns to help prevent war. Thinkers in the functionalist school maintained that IOs reduce misperceptions and foster mutual understanding by increasing communications and interactions among states, and that cooperation even in technical or relatively uncontroversial issue-areas would have positive spillover effects in the form of conflict avoidance and nonviolent dispute resolution (Jacobson 1984:190). According to this perspective, simply belonging to IGOs will help member-states avoid war with each other, a proposition that has found only weak support in empirical analyses. Recent scholarship improves on earlier studies by identifying other factors (such as economic interdependence) that work in conjunction with joint IGO membership to preserve peace. Theoretical arguments undergirding these studies date back in part to the late seventeenth-century writings of Immanuel Kant; even earlier, the Duc de Sully and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre proposed organizations designed to control international violence. These and other early sources of thinking about IOs as a means of conflict resolution are covered admirably by the entry “International Organizations and Ending Conflicts.” The present essay focuses more closely on modern developments in theory and research on IOs and preventing war, including concepts of collective security, scientific studies of IOs and war, the debate over the post-Cold War relevance of international institutions, and the recent emergence of a neo-Kantian research program that has renewed scholarly interest in IGOs' war-preventing potential.

Notably, a common thread in the international relations scholarship on IOs and war is the assumption, implicit or explicit, of rationality in government decisions for war or peace. For example, collective security works only when potential aggressors are rationally deterred by overwhelming power, amassed by a number of states via IOs. Defenders of IOs against attacks by realists like John Mearsheimer point to reasons why those organizations create rational incentives for states to elect peaceful dispute settlement

rather than war. Neo-Kantians argue that the synergistic effects of interdependence and institutions make war unprofitable and reinforce a societal interest in nonviolent dispute resolution, thus making war less desirable as a means of solving problems (Russett and Oneal 2001). By contrast, Fearon's (1995) rationalist explanations for war account for why war happens, even when it is undesirable. Because much of the recent literature on IOs and preventing war is framed in terms of Fearon's mechanisms, below they are described for context, and to square the logical circle: if we are to prevent wars, we must first have a sense of why wars occur.

The next section of this essay reviews some of the early empirical scholarship on the link between IOs and war. A survey of studies of IOs' war-preventing activities, especially in terms of collective security and peacekeeping, follows. As background to a discussion of emerging research that moves beyond paradigmatic debates, Fearon's rationalist theory of war is outlined, providing context for an extended discussion of how IOs (or specific institutional design features of IOs) prevent war by revealing information and changing the prospects for successful bargaining between disputants. The final section offers thoughts about future methodological and theoretical directions in the study of IOs and war prevention.

Early Empirical Studies and Neo-Kantian Research

In stark contrast to the early twentieth-century's near-boundless optimism regarding the possibilities of IOs serving as a force for peace, the earliest empirical work on IOs and war (Singer and Wallace 1970; Rittberger 1973) generated little cause for celebration. Although it produced null findings, this early work is notable in retrospect for two reasons. First, it invited a new wave of theorizing as to how IOs matter. Following Merton (1957), Rittberger (1973) distinguished between the open and latent functions of IOs. Early proponents of IOs argued that they would limit war because their charters included provisions for preventing war. At the same time, they argued that IOs would have latent effects on conflict. Because these organizations are created to solve specific forms of cross-border problems (such as trade or financial flows), they would help knit states together so as to make conflicts difficult. Rittberger's brief distinction presages many of the debates that we see in the pages below – whether or not IGOs work by deterring states from aggression and whether or not they serve to socialize states. In this sense, it invited many of the debates addressed in contemporary scholarship.

Second, these pioneering papers were published before the dyad became a common unit of analysis, and left a great deal of room for future research into conflict processes – and the various openings for IOs to preclude or modulate those processes. Early quantitative tests at the monadic level of analysis (so that total nation months and battle deaths in wars were dependent variables) set the stage for later development of investigations at the dyadic level (in which cases are pairs of countries). Those dyadic studies have analyzed conflict processes, especially whether or not disputes emerge and whether they

escalate to war. Part of the reason as to why the early works' findings were so limited was that their research designs could tell us little about what IOs actually do to limit conflicts. More recent follow-up works demonstrate stronger empirical support, but theoretical progress remains elusive.

Russett and Oneal (2001), leaders in the dyadic analysis of IOs and conflict processes, take their inspiration from Kant in extending their work on democratic peace. In Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, the Second Definitive Article calls for a league to enforce peace. The authors test this claim with a dyadic research design, and the independent variable of interest is a count of IGOs in which both countries in the dyad are members. As the authors freely admit (Russett and Oneal 2001:170), this is a rough proxy, since it basically conflates membership in non-security organizations with membership in NATO. Controlling for other factors, the authors find that dyads with high joint IGO memberships are less conflictual than dyads with few shared IGO memberships.

While these findings are significant (both statistically and substantively), it should be noted that conflict and war are not equivalent (not all conflicts escalate to war); and, moreover, the findings invite the theoretical question of just what it is about membership that reduces conflict. For Kant, the federation of free states proposed in the Second Definitive Article is an early form of a collective security organization. The most faithful test of Kant, then, requires addressing how IGO memberships are operationalized – and, perhaps, focused investigations of specific IOs designed for collective security purposes.

International Organizations and Collective Security

The principle underlying collective security is that coordination and organization among states can deter aggression by any one state. Rooted in the simple idea of “all against one,” collective security is achieved when the members of a community commit to countering acts of aggression with overwhelming force. By this logic, potential aggressors convinced of the latent threat's credibility will be deterred – thus, the threat of war by all against one prevents likely belligerents from starting wars in the first place (Thompson 1957:171ff.). Ernst Haas states that “collective security is the technique used by intergovernmental organizations to restrain the use of force among the members” (1968:33) – a helpful definition, but one that misleads when it ascribes agency to IGOs. Composed of sovereign member-states, IGOs like the League of Nations and the UN are incapable of independent action to ensure security. Instead, collective security requires sovereign member-states' voluntary compliance with norms and rules that proscribe acts of international aggression and prescribe collective action as deterrent to (and punishment for) violations of those rules.

In principle a collective security arrangement can exist in the absence of a formal IGO, but in practice experiments with collective security have been inextricably tied to global IGOs like the League of Nations and UN (Claude 1962; Stromberg 1963; Sarooshi 1999;

Thakur 2006) and some regional IGOs (Zacher 1979; Farer 1993). Embedding collective security arrangements in a formal IO may provide benefits, including the delimitation of the community of participating states, the formalization of pertinent rules and international law, and the creation of procedures for recognizing and responding to situations of imminent or ongoing aggression (Haas 1968). Collective security arrangements are thought to be most effective at preventing war when the rules are accepted and upheld by all members of an IGO with universal membership. Potential aggressors are more likely to refrain from proscribed acts if they face a credible threat of overwhelming retaliation by all other states in the system, all of which are legally obligated to confront an aggressor (Claude 1962).

In practice, intergovernmental organizations attempting to provide collective security have, on many occasions, failed to prevent wars of aggression. Prominent examples include the League of Nations' failure to prevent Japanese and Italian invasions of Manchuria and Abyssinia, respectively (see, e.g., Northedge 1986: chs. 7, 10). Analysts have connected these failures to institutional shortcomings of IGOs, including the lack of universal membership, slow response time, insufficient capability or resolve, and the like (Northedge 1986: ch. 12). Collective security's fragility is reflected in A.F.K. Organski's skeptical analysis, which identified five requisites of successful collective security systems:

- (1)** member-states agree in principle that stopping aggression is a priority;
- (2)** when aggression occurs, member-states agree rapidly and universally on the identity of the aggressor;
- (3)** member-states are free and able to take collective action against the aggressor;
- (4)** the collective power of the member-states is enough to overwhelm any aggressor;
- (5)** aggressive states, aware of the overwhelming power of the collective, will stand down (Organski 1958:373; see also Thompson 1953:758-62; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991:124-5; Bennett and Levgold 1993).

Most critiques of collective security as exercised by the League of Nations and the UN address a violation of one or more of Organski's requirements for effective collective security. Institutionalist analyses tend to focus on problems of coordination, procedure, and enforcement rooted in institutional design or structure that prevent IGOs from coordinating a timely, effective response to emergent situations featuring imminent aggression (Downs and Iida 1994; Lipson 1994). Among these problems is aggregating military power sufficient to deter or punish aggressors and developing a speedy, accurate, and universally accepted process for identifying and coercing aggressors (e.g., Finkelstein and Finkelstein 1966:128-40). The League of Nations and the UN have fallen victim to these problems; slow and ineffective opposition to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 exposed crucial flaws in that IGO's collective security mechanism, and the UN has never developed the standing military force described in Article 43 of its Charter. In part, this is because the norm of sovereignty and the body of international law supporting it protects the autonomy of states over and above the collective security interests of the

community of states (Ayoob 1993; Schachter 1993). Constructivist analyses highlight the importance of norms and emphasize the creation of and compliance with norms and rules in international society (e.g., Frederking 2003), as well as the role of elite belief systems in determining their states' foreign policy preferences, preferred methods, and perceptions of the legitimacy of proposed actions (or even of the acts of "aggression" that prompt leaders to invoke the collective security mechanism). Realists typically dismiss or discount the role of IOs, but perhaps would emphasize Organski's fourth and fifth requirements regarding deterrence.

The two most visible twentieth-century collective security actions demonstrate the difficulties of meeting all five conditions for successful deterrence, and raise questions about IGOs' collective security capacity. The UN's "police action" against North Korea is often construed as an attempt to implement collective security. UN-sanctioned military coercion was, however, initiated without the express approval of all members of the UN Security Council (the Soviet Union, which was boycotting UN proceedings, considered the North Korean incursion an act of self-defense against attacks from the South, not aggression), and the UN action resulted in a full-blown war that failed to reverse the initial act of aggression. The UN's Korean action illustrates difficulties in meeting Organski's second and fourth conditions, and came about too slowly to meet the fifth condition. Four decades later, a near-universal coalition of states deployed a massive, US-led multinational force in the Persian Gulf region to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm was successful in forcibly ejecting Iraq's armies from Kuwait, but its predecessor Operation Desert Shield (the mobilization of forces in the Gulf) failed to deter Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the first place. Two observations are crucial here: first, that the United States, not the UN, coordinated a temporary coalition of states to attempt to preserve collective security, and second, that even though the coalition met Organski's first four requirements, the intended target failed to be coerced by the collective without war.

The failings of collective security have had important consequences for the interparadigmatic debate. States have chosen to free ride rather than collaborate against aggression. As a result, realist scholars traditionally make reference to the checkered history of collective security to justify their contention that international organizations are epiphenomenal (Betts 1992; Mearsheimer 1994:33). As Mearsheimer notes (1994:36), "there is little evidence that they can compel" (see also Mearsheimer 1990:44). While collective security organizations have repeatedly failed to prevent war during the twentieth century, the failures have not dissuaded scholars from analyzing the principles behind it, the institutional structures that encourage or discourage its realization, and proposals for how best to implement it in the future (cautiously optimistic analyses include Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Bennett and Lepgold 1993; more pessimistic are Betts 1992; Joffe 1992; Kupchan 1994). Part of the difficulty lies in a problem that affects all empirical analyses of factors hypothesized to prevent war: how do we know a successful case of war prevention when we see one? Collective security attempts that fail to prevent war are easily identified, because war occurs. Identifying cases in which war

was a distinct possibility but never occurred is a crucial (if difficult) task for researchers of collective security, international organizations, and the prevention of war.

International Organizations, Peacekeeping, and Preventing War

The UN system has not proven to be a reliable collective security mechanism for preventing wars through deterrence or punishment of aggressors, but it has contributed to war prevention through the practice of peacekeeping, the deployment of lightly armed, multilateral military forces to inhibit the renewal of armed conflict. Although the UN Charter makes no explicit mention of peacekeeping, Article 43 calls for member-states to supply military forces for multilateral security operations under UN auspices. With the creation of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, and perhaps most notably the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956, UN member-states began to issue mandates for multinational peacekeeping forces for different purposes, including the observation and monitoring of ceasefires, interposition between combatants, and eventually more ambitious and “robust” activities loosely implied by the language in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping is not unique to the UN; regional IOs including the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also have deployed peacekeepers to prevent warring sides from re-engaging in armed conflict, or to create a climate in which conflict resolution might be attempted. Peacekeepers have performed an increasingly wide range of tasks in the post-Cold War era, including election monitoring, maintaining safe havens, and even state-building (see Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998 for a taxonomy; also Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Durch 2006). The specific purpose under consideration here, however, is IOs' use of peacekeeping operations to prevent war – and from a scholarly perspective, how to establish whether peacekeeping has had this effect.

Assessments of peacekeeping's effectiveness in preventing war are wide-ranging in scope and method. Many early studies of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) were single case studies that described and often critically analyzed particular PKOs. Early examples include journalist Conor Cruise O'Brien's account of the fraught UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo, *To Katanga and Back* (1962), and Linda B. Miller's (1968) monograph on UN peacekeeping in Cyprus. More recent cases can be found in edited volumes like Berdal and Economides' (2007) collection of studies of multidimensional or “second-generation” peacekeeping in Cambodia, East Timor, Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, among others. Williams (2000) is a case study of the UN's preventive operations over seven years in Macedonia. The value of these studies and the many dozens like them must not be underestimated. An accumulation of case studies has generated a foundation of knowledge about PKOs, providing policy makers and diplomats with feedback that has helped to reshape and refine peacekeeping in practice. Case

studies have also identified different dimensions of peacekeeping and thus have paved the way for comparative and large-N quantitative investigations of PKOs. Case studies have thus played a pathbreaking role in the scholarly analysis of peacekeeping as a mechanism of war prevention. However, the utility of single case studies for drawing inferences about the effectiveness of PKOs in preventing war is limited (see Diehl in Druckman and Stern 1997:153). Single cases that end with renewed fighting may provide clues about the reasons for the failure of a peacekeeping mission, but not the controls necessary to identify and isolate general causal factors behind peacekeeping's failure to prevent war. A case in which peace is maintained, on the other hand, may be illustrative or instructive – but on the strength of just one case, we cannot know conclusively whether a PKO actually prevented war, or whether some other circumstance or causal factor (superpower intervention, exhaustion, etc.) led to a lasting peace between former combatants. Only through comparison and control of competing factors can we assess the causal impact of peacekeeping operations in war prevention.

Comparative case studies generated a stronger basis for inference by applying a systematic framework to a series of cases (e.g., Diehl 1988; Durch 1993). Comparative case studies have identified common aspects of successful peacekeeping operations (on those aspects, see, e.g., Urquhart 1990) – but scholars have struggled to reach a consensus on the definition and identification of “success” in peacekeeping. Druckman and Stern's (1997) forum captures the debate from the perspectives of several leading scholars and practitioners (see Diehl 1993; Durch 1993; Fetherston 1994; Ratner 1995). Among the debate's parameters are whether PKOs' success should be judged on the basis of the terms of their mandates, rather than on some universal criterion, and whether a universal, “noncontingent” definition of peacekeeping success is even possible. Perhaps most important is the nature of “peace” itself: whether peace requires justice and the minimization of human suffering (“positive peace”) or simply the absence of war (“negative peace”).

Most researchers engaged in large-N empirical studies of peacekeeping have coalesced around a collective understanding of peacekeeping success in the “negative peace” sense: that is, that peace – and peacekeeping success – is evident in cases in which war does not break out. But for how long do the belligerents have to avoid war in order for “peace” or “success” to be attained? The question of time bedevils all empirical studies of war prevention, but may be particularly acute in the case of peacekeeping (Druckman and Stern 1997:156). Recent studies have addressed the problem of time through the use of techniques such as duration analysis, which requires researchers to make no arbitrary decisions about the time period required for success and instead incorporates the duration of (negative) peace into the statistical model as a variable (see, e.g., Fortna 2003, 2004A). Applied to datasets of interstate and civil wars and ceasefires, duration techniques and a heightened sensitivity to selection effects have generated a new wave of quantitative findings on peacekeeping. Earlier quantitative studies (e.g., Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001) either did not incorporate peace duration into their models or did not account for selection effects, statistical bias that arises from the non-random sampling of

a population. Because PKOs are deployed non-randomly (presumably either to “easy” cases in which war renewal is unlikely, or to the hardest cases, in which war is very likely to resume), analysts should attempt to control for the “degree of difficulty” of cases. Drawing on studies of intractable conflict and the stability of peace (e.g., Licklider 1995; Kaufmann 1996), Fortna (2003, 2004A, 2004B) imposes controls for factors that affect the durability of peace in her analysis of a dataset of ceasefires that includes cases with and without the support of peacekeeping missions.

Findings from these studies suggest that peacekeeping helps to prevent war – that is, that even when controlling for selection effects, competing causal factors, and the degree of difficulty of deployment cases, peace is more durable in cases with peacekeeping than in cases without peacekeeping. The general finding, which is robust across several model specifications, flatly contradicts anecdotal arguments that UN peacekeeping prevents peace by artificially prolonging ceasefires and giving belligerents time to regroup, resupply, and later re-engage in hostilities, rather than allowing wars to “burn out” due to mutual exhaustion or decisive victory by one side (Luttwak 1999). However, the decisive victory claim is not entirely without merit, because statistical results suggest that periods of peace after wars ending in decisive victory are, on balance, easier to maintain than informal truces between still-capable belligerents (Fortna 2004A:287). Peacekeeping also appears to have a positive effect in preventing the recurrence of civil as well as interstate war, which corroborates Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) finding that multidimensional PKOs encourage sustainable peace in the wake of civil wars. Doyle and Sambanis' research design, however, has drawn criticism, in part for pooling cases of ongoing conflict with cases of terminated civil wars; when they separate these cases, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) find that UN peacekeeping “causes peace” when the UN intervenes in post-conflict situations, but not when peacekeepers are deployed in ongoing wars. In other words, an old nugget of conventional wisdom applies: peacekeeping operations work when there is a peace to keep.

Recent research, broadly construed, supports the assertion that peacekeeping helps to prevent war – or more accurately, the recurrence of war. Since multinational peacekeeping forces are nearly always deployed under the auspices of an IO (the UN or a regional organization), IOs indirectly prevent war through the mechanism of peacekeeping. Inasmuch as international relations researchers can help IOs identify those cases in which peacekeeping missions are likely to prevent the recurrence of war, as well as those elements of and types of PKOs most closely associated with durable peace, their findings may promote the judicious use of limited peacekeeping resources in reinforcing tentative periods of peace and helping prevent the resumption of war.

Bargaining, War, and the Promise of International Organizations

As noted above, one of the limitations of early empirical scholarship was a lack of theoretical content. The finding that IO membership affects conflict propensity does not tell us just what it is about membership that matters. Recent works have made both theoretical and empirical contributions here, delineating exactly how IOs reduce conflicts between states. One route to greater progress in this field lies in building on an understanding of why wars happen. Pathbreaking work that frames war as a bargaining process between rational states (Fearon 1995) has given scholars a starting point to better articulate how IOs matter. Central insights of that work are described below. Fearon (1995) articulates a central puzzle of international relations: since war is costly, why do rational leaders of competing states choose to fight instead of pursuing less costly, nonviolent dispute settlements? Most wars end with settlements; why do leaders fail to negotiate *ex ante* (prewar) bargains that anticipate *ex post* (postwar) settlement terms without incurring additional costs in blood and treasure? Three general mechanisms account for rational, unitary states' inability to identify an alternative outcome that both would prefer to war: bluffing about private information, commitment problems, and indivisibility of stakes. Several literatures have grown up around these causal logics, but we confine our analysis to the three mechanisms and, later, their application to the question of how IOs prevent war.

First, a leader typically has access to private information (for example, about her state's capabilities and resolve) that she keeps hidden from foreign adversaries, and she has incentives to misrepresent that information – in other words, to bluff. Successful bluffs allow leaders, in principle, to improve their bargaining positions by intimidating an adversary or persuading an adversary to grant additional concessions. A leader therefore has strategic incentives to signal to adversaries that her state is more capable of fighting or more willing to fight than it actually is – and the adversary's interpretation of these signals results in miscalculations of capabilities or resolve that can make war more likely. Communication, or signaling, between adversaries – which, if conducted forthrightly, could facilitate a negotiated settlement – instead increases the risk of war.

Second, leaders of states face commitment problems. No interstate agreement is permanent or binding in the anarchic international system, and a bargain struck today may not be upheld some months or years from now if circumstances have changed. Circumstances change with great frequency; states and their capabilities grow at different rates, and time likely will alter today's balance of power. Consequently, the terms of today's bargain may seem antiquated or unfair later, prompting one or more of the parties to the agreement to renege in hopes of revising the bargain in their favor. In the absence of institutional mechanisms that reassure the parties to an agreement that the agreement's terms will be upheld – or that the terms will be revised peacefully should

International Organizations and Preventing War

circumstances require it – war, particularly preventive war, becomes a rational option as a means of short-circuiting the commitment problem.

Third, issues at stake in a bargaining situation may be difficult to divide equitably among the negotiating parties. Territory, for example, is inherently divisible, but territory with specific symbolic value for two or more competing nations may be difficult to divide between them. War becomes a rational choice in situations where issue indivisibility limits the number of potential bargains so severely that none fall in the range of solutions that both sides prefer to war-fighting. Fearon cautions that most international bargains are not unidimensional, and that linking multiple issues and offering “side-payments” as compensation for not gaining a portion of the indivisible stake theoretically provides solutions to bargaining problems associated with perceived indivisibilities. Still, leaders that view stakes as indivisible may gamble on war rather than accept a bargain that leaves them without the prize.

Pathways to Peace: Preventing War by Reducing Conflict

A central claim of this survey is that IOs play important roles in each of these three areas. Thus, not only do IOs “matter” in more ways than conventionally viewed, but each of Fearon's causal logics suggests a pathway by which IOs can affect conflict outcomes. The section below outlines five ways in which IOs “matter” in the context of rationalist models of war and peace, and in so doing details the roles that IOs play as mechanisms for reducing conflict. In the past, the interparadigm debate has unduly limited our understanding of IOs' effects by focusing on some of these causal mechanisms to the detriment of others. Highlighted below are the roles of IOs as constraints on states and as information providers, as well as IOs' ability to alter the bargaining space, their use as costly signals, and their ability to change preferences or socialize states.

International Organizations as Constraints on States

For institutional scholars, IOs “matter” because they allow states to avoid the one-shot equilibrium outcomes in prisoners' dilemma. They do this, in part, by imposing transaction costs (Keohane 1984), thus making cooperation preferable to defection. By creating a common set of rules, and disseminating who is in compliance with them and who is not, IOs create value for states by helping them to sanction more efficiently.

Much of the realist critique about IOs stems from the experiences of the League of Nations and the UN in collective security. The argument that collective security does not work because IOs cannot compel, and the conclusion that IOs are epiphenomenal that results, misses an important distinction that lies at the heart of Keohane's argument. For institutional scholars, IOs aid states in contracting rather than substitute for it. As a result, the actual test of the realist argument is not that “international organizations by themselves can't impose costs on states” but whether states would sanction more effectively in the absence of IOs rather than with them (see Keohane and Martin 1995:49–50). The “costs” that are imposed by IOs do not have to be significant to be

consequential. After all, in Fearon's model, changes to either the costs of conflict or the probability of victory widen the zone of negotiated settlements that are preferable to war (Fearon 1995). Findings from the role of international institutions in trade support the claim that the influence of IOs can be powerful, in large part because they are subtle (Goldstein 1996; Reinhardt 2001).

Put another way, this suggests that many realists, by focusing solely on the absence of compellent power by IOs, miss other ways in which they might reduce the incidence of armed conflicts. The claim that the interparadigm debate has hindered our understanding of causal processes in IR is not a new one. Moving forward, though, requires a more in-depth appraisal of how IOs matter, and consideration of specific mechanisms.

International Organizations as Information Providers

That IOs help reveal information about the intentions and preferences of other countries is not a new idea. In fact it was a consistent rationale for the economic surveillance activities of international financial institutions (IFIs), and it has been the justification for confidence-building measures, arms control treaties, and aspects of some UN peacekeeping missions. In both the economic and security realms, then, IOs may play vital roles by improving transparency.

In a noteworthy study of the role of transparency in the Concert of Europe, Lindley (2007) draws an important distinction. In his view, the Concert of Europe produced peace by making *realpolitik* work more effectively. As states were able to form alliances against each other and revealed their coalitions, aggressive states were more likely to back down. Greater transparency in international alignment patterns did not lead to the end of bargaining – rather, it helped *facilitate* bargaining, and made the Concert of Europe a barrier against inadvertent war. The broader point raised by Lindley's discussion is a need to move past the normative implications of the interparadigm debate. IOs can promote peace by allowing coercive diplomacy to work more effectively. This is a point we return to in a subsequent section.

While transparency lies at the heart of multilateral arms control agreements (specifically those dealing with weapons of mass destruction), a cursory review of the headlines suggests that relying purely on country's disclosure of its own facilities to organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is far from perfect. As Fearon suggests, leaders have incentives to bluff and keep information private. This helps us to understand why creating strong monitoring systems in IOs is difficult, and also why countries will be loath to reveal information. This observation underscores a broader lesson about the standards by which we judge the performance of these treaty systems. Given that leaders will not reveal their private information bilaterally (as bluffing can help them improve their bargaining positions), they might also be loath to reveal it multilaterally. This suggests that we should be pragmatic about what IOs can legitimately achieve here. It further suggests that we should be careful about the benchmark that we use to assess their performance. Countries would not try to keep monitors such as IAEA

inspectors out if they were not concerned about what those monitors might find and, more importantly, reveal.

International Organizations as Third Parties

That IOs are often brought in by states to help resolve disputes is an important fact. IOs are valued for their role in preventive diplomacy as well as in arbitration. The first of these is more informational, as noted by the “good offices” of the Secretary-General (Ramcharan 2008). The second of these is more demanding of the disputants, since they turn to an independent party to adjudicate their dispute. This, however, raises theoretical questions about what the third party does that allows it to accomplish this task. Scholars have studied the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but this organization can do little to impose costs on states after the fact. Once a decision by the ICJ is handed down, enforcement is tenuous at best. How then can it be consequential? Some scholars rely on “legitimacy” as an explanation for post-arbitration compliance, though this may raise the added question of how legalizing a dispute settlement process induces greater compliance (Finnemore and Toope 2001). Understanding why states seek settlements in the first place might provide a more fulfilling answer. Since both parties have to agree to arbitration for it to take place, the only way this happens is if both parties prefer the “lottery” of the arbitrator to the status quo. This suggests that those states that seek arbitration might be systematically different from disputants more generally.

Determining whether arbitration seekers are systematically different from other disputants requires scholars to answer the question of what affects decisions to arbitrate in the first place. In Simmons (2002) the answer lies in domestic politics, as failed ratifications of bilateral treaties designed to settle territorial disputes give rise to a demand for third-party arbitration. What then makes arbitration work is its value relative to the alternatives. While third parties help the disputants to reach a settlement, whether disputants ultimately comply with the deal also turns on domestic factors. Simmons finds that rule of law states and those with stable executives are more likely to abide by their deals. This suggests that the barrier to third-party dispute settlement is not merely *ex post* commitment – it is also *ex ante* commitment, as disputing states might not desire to reveal their reservation prices to an arbitrator, and this also induces delay in settlements.

Nevertheless, extant empirical papers suggest a strong role for IGOs in third-party dispute settlement – even on traditional “high politics” security issues. Shannon (2009) finds that states that are common members of IGOs are more likely to turn to third parties to settle their territorial disputes, and they are not more likely to resolve their disputes bilaterally. This finding suggests that the addition of the third party changes the negotiation calculus. Similarly, Bearce and Omori (2005) find that shared membership in international commercial organizations (preferential trading arrangements, or PTAs) reduces the probability of countries experiencing disputes. For Bearce and Omori, it is the type of institution that matters – those PTAs that include forums for national leaders to meet and discuss common issues are those that are the most effective in reducing conflict. This suggests a role for dispute linkage and bargaining, and that the presence of

these fora helps to foster trust among leaders. These findings are supported as well in a study with a different research design by Haftel (2007).

The findings of these papers suggest that IGO membership has active effects on dispute settlement. In other words, it is not the mere presence of joint membership that matters, but rather the use of strong institutional fora capable of resolving disputes. Mitchell and Hensel (2007) draw an important distinction between the passive and active roles of IGOs – passive refers to the effects of membership defined in terms of reputational effects. Active involvement refers to binding settlement. Mitchell and Hensel find that states are more likely to comply with agreements in territorial disputes that are brokered by third parties. Fearon's work helps understand why this is the case: binding arbitration is a costly signal, so states unwilling to resolve a dispute will not choose arbitration. The act of choosing a binding arbitrator, then, helps reveal private information. Mitchell and Hensel's claim is not merely that arbitrators are more efficient (as they gather more information), but that the act of submitting a claim to arbitration invokes reputational costs if the resulting settlement is not complied with.

While empirical studies suggest an important role of IGOs as third-party arbitrators, we need to be wary that the use of these third parties might also have unintended consequences for conflict. Some argue that international intervention, especially in civil wars, might create problems of moral hazard (Cetinyan 2002; Crawford and Kuperman 2006). The prospect of external intervention might alter bargaining between rebel groups and the government. The goal here is not to assess the merits of the claim that intervention induces moral hazard, but rather to underscore it as a straightforward implication of strategic behavior. The premise that states are strategic actors that seek to use IGOs to advance their interests makes clear that these fora can be used for good as well as ill. Third parties then might introduce opportunistic behavior or unexpected consequences, possibilities that merit consideration.

In a bilateral interstate competition over a potential prize, the prospect of third-party intervention might alter the competitors' strategies – but it probably depends on the nature of the third party's involvement. If a third party merely helps to facilitate negotiations (think of the Secretary-General's “good offices” here), this is relatively costless for the two states, and entering into a negotiation might well be a means to obtain information about the resolve of the other state. Thus, states might use preventive diplomacy strategically and begin negotiations solely to gain information without being prepared to make a sacrifice for a deal at the bargaining table. In a sense, then, third parties can be exploited to reveal information rather than reach settlements.

Whether such an inefficient outcome would happen in the case of binding arbitration is more difficult to assess. After all, the requirement that both parties submit to binding arbitration is likely to screen out states not serious about the process. The higher entry costs thus reduce the likelihood that negotiations will be used for strategic purposes and thus bear no fruit.

International Organizations and Costly Signaling

Separate and distinct from the role of IGOs as information disseminators is the issue of how states use them to reveal information and signal to adversaries. Just as states used the Concert of Europe to avoid inadvertent war during the nineteenth century, states now use IGOs to convey information and aid in bargaining. Thompson (2006) advances this argument, asserting that major powers use the UN Security Council not as a means to help build a coalition, but rather to signal information. A signal is informative if it is costly to send. For Thompson, the United States' decision to submit the Iraq matter before the Security Council in 2002 was intended to be informative to allies, publics, and to the coercive target itself.

In order for the United States to gain the support of other countries in the Security Council, it had to outline its case for war with Iraq. The United States' justification for war required a discussion of exactly how and in what ways Iraq was in violation of UN resolutions and an appraisal of the United States' intended war aims. This in turn required that the United States reveal information to allies (to ensure that US aims were limited), publics (to justify the case for war), and to Iraq itself (by outlining the evidence). The very act of submitting this dispute to a multilateral organization in which the United States could not guarantee passage of a support resolution served to make this a costly signal. The alternative would have been pure bilateral negotiation, but this might have been less likely to garner more public support or more reassurance for allies. Using the IGO for coercion, then, works because it sends a stronger signal of resolve. Thompson's argument, if extended, would suggest that referral of any matter to an IGO (provided that it is representative and independent of a major power) can be more informative because seeking IGO approval is a costly signal.

A similar line of argument is used in a more traditional approach to IGO membership and peace. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) argue that neo-Kantian approaches to the study of IGO membership and peace are underspecified for two reasons: first, because they fail to take into account institutional differences between disparate organizations, and second, because these empirical studies are not rooted in a theory of why wars happen. Boehmer et al. (2004) build on the literature on costly signaling to suggest that IGOs are a mechanism that allows states to credibly communicate resolve, which addresses the private information problem. Those IGOs able to impose sanctions and embargoes might paradoxically lead to peace because they allow adversaries to learn about resolve, which can lead to settlements short of war.

This paper demonstrates a broader point. Traditional realist scholarship focused solely on IGO ability to prevent war by threatening sanctions so extreme that aggressors would prefer to back down. Because sanctions were not this stringent, the argument went, IGOs cannot be effective in reducing conflict. But for Boehmer et al., IGOs' imposing costs reduces conflict by revealing information – and in the absence of the IGO, there would be no mechanism to reveal this information. Not merely is it the case that realist scholars underestimate the importance of IGOs to security studies, but this also underscores that

the strongest possible route to claim that IGOs matter involves a comparison of their presence with their absence. We return to this theme in the concluding section.

International Organizations and Socialization

In recent years, the arrival of constructivist scholarship has led to the articulation of new causal mechanisms for how IOs matter. International organizations serve to shape state preferences by disseminating norms and socializing states (Finnemore 1993, 2004; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2001). The ability of IGOs to socialize states should be considered as an alternative pathway by which these organizations can reduce the likelihood of conflict. Recent works in this vein have moved beyond the establishment of a rationalist-constructivist dichotomy to develop theoretical arguments suggesting how socialization matters.

Emerging studies of IOs and socialization accept that both interests and identities play key roles. For Checkel (2005), socialization encompasses both the logics of consequence and appropriateness. Eastern European countries had incentives to adapt their institutions to aid accession into the European Union (EU); but also the act of dialogue with the EU caused applicant countries to redefine their roles and rethink their identities. In Gheciu's (2005) study, the act of countries adopting NATO standards regarding civil-military relations served more broadly to socialize newly admitted countries to Western liberal democratic norms.

Though innovative, one limitation of this scholarship lies in its relative newness. Empirical tests of socialization arguments are relatively rare and focused on easy cases such as Europe (Johnston 2005). Bearce and Bondanella (2007) develop a large-N test assessing whether joint IGO membership leads to preference convergence. They find considerable evidence that this process operates with a time lag, which they interpret as evidence in support of the argument that IOs socialize members in addition to informing them. Similar to Boehmer et al.'s (2004) finding that structured IGOs are more likely to reduce conflict by providing costly signals, Bearce and Bondanella find that the socialization effects of IGO membership are stronger in more institutionalized organizations.

Future Directions

The literature has a number of distinct answers to the question of how IOs shape the prospects for war and peace, and these answers transcend the narrow confines of the interparadigm debate. Additional progress in this field is likely to be found by moving past the sterile claims that IGOs do or don't matter and ascertaining how and in what ways they matter (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Milner 1997; Martin and Simmons 1998; Lake and Powell 1999). The final section of this survey outlines some future directions for this scholarship and some potential challenges.

The first challenges that need to be addressed are theoretical ones. Scholars have made important progress in this area by initiating the investigation of how IOs matter for the prevention of war. This theoretical refinement should continue, not only for its own sake but also because this scholarship has the potential to be relevant for policy makers. A consequence of the sterility of the neoliberal/neorealist debate of the 1990s was that the field had little to contribute to policy makers. As a result, while practitioners increasingly turned to IOs, few scholars had much to say about why this was a good idea, or about the potential problems that might result. This growing divergence between theory and policy makers at this time, and the dangerous consequences that result, was already presaged in early scholarship on IOs (Rochester 1986). If anything, the decade following the publication of Rochester's review article written for the fortieth anniversary of the UN represented a continuation of this trend. Thankfully, this divergence appears to be a thing of the past.

To make future theoretical progress in this area, scholars must address two key issues: the interaction of domestic and international organizations, and the implications of variations in IO design. First, the issue of delegation to IOs has drawn increasing attention (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Hawkins et al. 2006), but further study of delegation is needed for two reasons: not only does the role of domestic incentives in delegation shape the demand for IOs, as in Simmons (2002) on territorial dispute settlement, but also because the membership of IOs has consequences for both their workload and their effectiveness, as noted in Pevehouse and Russett (2006).

Second, as Pevehouse and Russett's work suggests, we must remember that not all IOs are the same. International organizations' diversity brings with it different implications for IOs' ability to shape incentives to use force. A mere count of joint IGO memberships conflates those created to solve simple coordination problems and those created to solve more complex prisoners' dilemma-type problems, a problem compounded because it might also conflate two distinct causal mechanisms related to conflict: information revelation and costly signaling. The first of these can reflect more of a constructivist interpretation; the second is purely rationalist. As a result, the field needs a greater emphasis on ascertaining which types of IGOs matter for conflict, and why. Greater attention to variable operationalization brings with it important theoretical consequences.

It is important that empirical findings not outstrip theoretical research. One point where this caveat is most relevant is in findings concerning membership in IOs. Finding links between joint membership and a lower likelihood of conflict (or perhaps in the average duration of disputes; see Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke 2010) once again raises the question of what it is about IO membership that matters. Future progress on these lines of argument requires isolating explicit causal mechanisms to make theoretical innovations. For example, a finding that membership produces peace could be associated with any of the following explanations: membership reflects pre-existing preferences of members, membership leads to dialogue and a willingness to find agreement, membership leads to preference change via socialization, or membership allows for the

revelation of information. It is the last three of these that suggest that IOs matter for conflict reduction, but the first of these has to be ruled out.

Future progress in this area also requires methodological innovation. Realists' central challenge to this literature is that the effect of IOs on the likelihood of conflict and war is epiphenomenal. To make the strongest possible case against epiphenomenality, scholars must demonstrate as clearly as possible that if a state had not been in or used an IO, the outcome would have been different (e.g., war rather than peaceful settlement).

Thankfully, extant research design approaches can be useful here. Models for selection bias and treatment, for example, are increasingly commonplace in quantitative studies of IFIs (Vreeland 2003). In the literature on the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, this is an industry-standard methodology – as scholars use selection bias and treatment models to estimate a counterfactual for level of economic growth in a country based on the presence and absence of an IMF program. The difference between these two values, then, is the effect of the IMF program. Such models allow scholars to generate counterfactuals that capture the IO's effects.

None of this is to imply that quantitative scholars have a better understanding of how to approach this type of problem. A qualitative literature on counterfactuals has existed in political science for years – from Barrington Moore's (1966) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* to the recent use of counterfactual analysis to assess hypothesized necessary conditions for war (Goertz and Levy 2007). Regardless of whether the researcher's approach is qualitative or quantitative, more attention to counterfactuals will be of value not only to guard against epiphenomenality, but also to establish exactly how IOs matter.

References

- Abbott, K., and Snidal, D. (2000) Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization* (54) (3), 421–56.
- Ayoob, M. (1993) Squaring the Circle: Collective Security in a System of States. In T. Weiss (ed.) *Collective Security in a Changing World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 45–62.
- Bearce, D., and Bondanella, S. (2007) Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence. *International Organization* (61) (4), 703–33.
- Bearce, D., and Omori, S. (2005) How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace? *Journal of Peace Research* (42) (6), 659–78.
- Bennett, A., and Lepgold, J. (1993) Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict. *Political Science Quarterly* (108) (2), 213–37.
- Berdal, M., and Economides, S. (eds.) (2007) *United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

International Organizations and Preventing War

Betts, R.K. (1992) Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe. *International Security* (17) (1), 5-43.

Boehmer, C., Gartzke, E., and Nordstrom, T. (2004) Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? *World Politics* (57) (1), 1-38.

Carter Center (1996) *International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution*. At <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1226.pdf>, accessed March 22, 2011.

Cetinyan, R. (2002) Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention. *International Organization* (56) (3), 645-77.

Checkel, J. (2001) Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization* (55) (3), 553-88.

Checkel, J. (2005) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. *International Organization* (59), (4), 801-26.

Claude, I. (1962) *Power and International Relations*. New York: Random House.

Crawford, T., and Kuperman, A.J. (2006) *Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion, and Internal War*. New York: Routledge.

Cusack, T.R., and Stoll, R.J. (1994) Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System. *International Studies Quarterly* (38) (1), 33-59.

Diehl, P.F. (1988) Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace. *Political Science Quarterly* (103) (3), 485-507.

Diehl, P.F. (1993) *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diehl, P.F., Druckman, D., and Wall, J. (1998) International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (42) (1), 33-55.

Diehl, P.F., Reifschneider, J., and Hensel, P.R. (1996) United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict. *International Organization* (50) (4), 683-700.

Downs, G.W., and Iida, K. (1994) Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security. In G.W. Downs (ed.) *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 17-39.

Downs, G., Rocke, D., and Barsoom, P. (1996) Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? *International Organization* (50) (3), 379-406.

Doyle, M.W., and Sambanis, N. (2000) International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. *American Political Science Review* (94) (4), 779-801.

International Organizations and Preventing War

Doyle, M.W., and Sambanis, N. (2006) *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Druckman, D., and Stern, P.C. (1997) Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions. *Mershon International Studies Review* (41) (1), 151–65.

Durch, W. (ed.) (1993) *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Durch, W. (ed.) (2006) *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Farer, T.J. (1993) The Role of Regional Collective Security Arrangements. In T.G. Weiss (ed.) *Collective Security in a Changing World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 153–86.

Fearon, J.D. (1995) Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* (49) (3), 379–414.

Fetherston, A.B. (1994) *Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Finkelstein, M.S., and Finkelstein, L.S. (eds.) (1966) *Collective Security*. San Francisco: Chandler.

Finnemore, M. (1993) International Organizations as Teachers of Norms. *International Organization* (47), 565–97.

Finnemore, M. (2004) *The Purpose of Intervention*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* (52) (4), 887–917.

Finnemore, M., and Toope, S. (2001) Alternatives to Legalization. *International Organization* (55) (3), 743–58.

Fitzduff, M., and Church, C. (eds.) (2004) *NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Fortna, V.P. (2003) Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars. *International Studies Review* (5) (4), 97–114.

Fortna, V.P. (2004a) Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War. *International Studies Quarterly* (48) : 269–92.

Fortna, V.P. (2004b) *Peace Time: Cease Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Frederking, B. (2003) Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security. *American Political Science Review* (97) (3), 363–78.

International Organizations and Preventing War

- Gheciu, A. (2005) Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the "New Europe." *International Organization* (59) (4), 973-1012.
- Gilligan, M.J., and Sergenti, E.J. (2008) Evaluating UN Peacekeeping with Matching to Improve Causal Inference. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* (3) (2), 89-122.
- Goertz, G., and Levy, J.S. (eds.) (2007) *Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals*. New York: Routledge.
- Goldstein, J. (1996) International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American "Unfair" Trade Laws. *International Organization* (50) (4), 541-64.
- Haas, E.B. (1968) *Collective Security and the Future International System*. Denver: University of Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs (5) (1).
- Haftel, Y.Z. (2007) Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes. *International Organization* (61) (4), 217-37.
- Haggard, S., and Simmons, B. (1987) Theories of International Regimes. *International Organization* (41) (3), 491-x517.
- Hartzell, C., Hoddie, M., and Rothchild, D.S. (2001) Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables. *International Organization* (55) (1), 183-208.
- Hawkins, D.G., Lake, D.A., Nielson, D.L., and Tierney, M.J. (eds.) (2006) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jacobson, H.K. (1984) *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*, 2nd edn. New York: Alfred E. Knopf.
- Joffe, J. (1992) Collective Security and the Future of Europe. *Survival* (34) (1), 36-50.
- Johnston, A.I. (2005) Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe. *International Organization* (59) (4), 1013-44.
- Kaufmann, C. (1996) Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. *International Security* (20) (4), 136-75.
- Keohane, R.O. (1984) *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, R.O., and Martin, L. (1995) The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security* (20) (1), 39-51.
- Kupchan, C.A. (1994) The Case for Collective Security. In G.W. Downs (ed.) *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 41-67.
- Kupchan, C.A., and Kupchan, C.A. (1991) Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe. *International Security* (16) (1), 114-61.

International Organizations and Preventing War

Lake, D.A., and Powell, R. (eds.) (1999) *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Licklider, R. (1995) The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars. *American Political Science Review* (89) (3), 681-7.

Lindley, D. (2007) *Promoting Peace with Information*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lipson, C. (1994) Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past? In G.W. Downs (ed.) *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 105-31.

Luttwak, E.N. (1999) Give War a Chance. *Foreign Affairs* (78) (4), 36-44.

Martin, L., and Simmons, B. (1998) Theoretical and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. *International Organization* (52) (4), 729-58.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990) Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. *International Security* (15) (4), 5-56.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994) The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security* (19) (3), 5-49.

Merton, R.K. (1957) *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.

Miller, L.B. (1968) *Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife*. Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 19. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs.

Milner, H.V. (1997) *Interests, Institutions, and Information*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mitchell, S.M., and Hensel, P.R. (2007) International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* (51) (4), 721-37.

Moore, B. (1966) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Northedge, F.S. (1986) *The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946*. New York: Holmes and Meier.

O'Brien, C. (1962) *To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Organski, A.F.K. (1958) *World Politics*. New York: Knopf.

Pevehouse, J., and Russett, B. (2006) Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace. *International Organization* (60) (4), 969-1000.

Ramcharan, B.G. (2008) *Preventive Diplomacy at the UN*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

International Organizations and Preventing War

- Ratner, S.R. (1995) *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Reinhardt, E. (2001) Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (45) (2), 174–95.
- Rittberger, V. (1973) International Organization and Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* (10) (3), 217–26.
- Rochester, J.M. (1986) The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study. *International Organization* (40) (4), 777–813.
- Rotberg, R.I. (ed.) (1996) *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Russett, B., and Oneal, J. (2001) *Triangulating Peace*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Sarooshi, D. (1999) *The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Schacter, O. (1993) Sovereignty and Threats to Peace. In T.G. Weiss (ed.), *Collective Security in a Changing World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 19–44.
- Shannon, M. (2009) Preventing War and Providing the Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (26) (2), 144–63.
- Shannon, M., Morey, D., and Boehmke, F. (2010) The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration. *International Studies Quarterly* (54) (4), 1123–41.
- Simmons, B. (2002) Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Law and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (46) (6), 829–56.
- Singer, J.D., and Wallace, M. (1970) Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816–1964: Some Bivariate Relationships. *International Organization* (24) (3), 520–47.
- Stoll, R.J. (1998) Nice States Finish ... Pretty Well: Collective Security Behavior in Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992. *International Interactions* (24) (2), 287–313.
- Stromberg, R.A. (1963) *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO*. New York: Praeger.
- Thakur, R. (2006) *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, A. (2006) Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *International Organization* (60) (1), 1–34.

International Organizations and Preventing War

Thompson, K.W. (1953) Collective Security Reexamined. *American Political Science Review* (47) (3), 753–72.

Thompson, K.W. (1957) Isolationism and Collective Security: The Uses and Limits of Two Theories of International Relations. In A. DeConde (ed.) *Isolation and Security*. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 159–83.

Urquhart, B. (1990) Beyond the Sheriff's Posse. *Survival* (32) (3), 196–205.

Vreeland, J.R. (2003) *The IMF and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, A. (2000) *Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Wohlgemuth, L. (2005) NGOs and Conflict Prevention in Burundi: A Case Study. *Africa Development/Afrique et développement* (30) (1), 183–209.

Zacher, M. (1979) *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946–77*. New York: Praeger.

Links to Digital Materials

UN Actions in Peace and Security. At <http://www.un.org/en/peace/>, accessed October 15, 2009. This website is a link to UN activities in the area of international security, including disarmament and peacekeeping operations.

Global Policy Forum. At <http://www.globalpolicy.org/index.php>, accessed October 15, 2009. As an NGO, Global Policy Forum provides resources on evaluating a whole range of UN activities.

Security Council Report. At <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org>, accessed October 15, 2009. Security Council Report is an independent nonprofit affiliated with Columbia University. The website provides information and analysis of the issues facing the Security Council.

COW IGO data. At <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/IGOs/IGOV2-1.htm>, accessed October 15, 2009. This website is a link to the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations data, which is used in many quantitative studies of conflict.

Links to IO websites. At <http://www.uia.be/node/163992>, accessed October 15, 2009. This website is provided by the Union of International Associations and is a directory to the individual websites of many international organizations.

UN Treaty Collection. At <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Home.aspx?lang=en>, accessed October 15, 2009. This is a link to the UN treaty collection, which includes treaties

International Organizations and Preventing War

entered into since 1946. The status of treaties by country can be tracked in real time through the use of this system.

USIP Peace Treaty Digital Collection. At <http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html>, accessed October 15, 2009. Provides the full text of peace agreements ending inter- and intrastate conflicts since 1989.

Avalon Project. At <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/default.asp>, accessed October 15, 2009. This link is to a digital library of documents relating to law and diplomacy. It is arranged both thematically and historically.

League of Nations Digital Collection. At <http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govinfo/collections/league/>, accessed October 15, 2009. Provides a number of electronic resources related to the league, including its published statistical abstracts and its activities in the area of disarmament.

United Nations bibliography on peacekeeping operations. At <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/pkeep.htm>, accessed October 15, 2009. The Dag Hammarskjöld Library's bibliography of studies of UN peacekeeping published between 1945 and 2002 as English-language monographs.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Jack S. Levy for being a model mentor. In honor of his lifelong commitment to understanding the causes and prevention of war and his enduring contributions to the field of international relations, we dedicate this essay to him. We also thank Andrew Richardson for research assistance.

Martin S. Edwards

School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University

Jonathan M. DiCicco

Department of Political Science, Canisius College