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OTHER TITLES IN THIS SERIES

The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy

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This volume has its roots in a conversation between the editors at the ECPR general conference in Potsdam. The ECPR has provided many venues for both of us to present our work, and to meet with colleagues, and we appreciate these opportunities.

After agreeing on the need for a comprehensive examination of both the concept and practice of internal party democracy, among the first tasks we set for ourselves was the recruitment of a group of first-rate academics to carry out this examination. If at nothing else, we believe we achieved resounding success at this task. The contributors to this book all have made significant earlier contributions to the study of party politics and this volume benefits greatly from that body of work.

In addition to outstanding scholarship, each of the contributors also brought a professional and collegial approach to the project. This has truly been a team enterprise and the final product is better for it. The group of authors met twice in Ottawa for workshops during which the scope and contours of the study were agreed upon and preliminary drafts of chapters were reviewed and discussed. These gatherings often took on the feel of sophisticated graduate seminars with no shortage of discussion and constructive criticism of each other's work. We are grateful to Thomas Zittel and David Farrell who participated in these meetings and offered much useful advice.

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The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy

William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz

The centrality of political parties to modern democracy was already recognized when Schattschneider (1942: 1) argued 'that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties. . . . The parties are not therefore merely appendages of modern government; they are in the center of it and play a determinative and creative role in it'. Political scientists have continued to identify parties as key institutions for a healthy democracy, highlighting their roles in the recruitment of candidates, the providing of linkages between government and civil society, the organization of legislatures and the structuring of election campaigns. Beyond observations concerning the importance for democracy of the fact *that* parties do these things, there has also been widespread concern with the *ways in which* parties discharge these responsibilities. In particular, if state-level democracy cannot flourish save for parties, the questions inevitably arise of whether the parties themselves must be, should be, and are internally democratic with respect to their own decision-making practices and distributions of authority or influence.

If these are questions for academic political science, for many of those working to establish democracy in the third (or fourth) wave democracies, the answers are obvious: internal party democracy is either a necessity or a panacea. When the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the 'Venice Commission') issued its *Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties,* it identified 'to reinforce political parties' internal democracy' as 'its explicit aim'.[1] Likewise, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has called on member states to 'ensure that the legislative framework promotes the implementation by political parties of internal party democracy principles'.[2] After a workshop on the subject at the Third Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy, 'There was a general consensus at the workshop that the strengthening of internal party democracy is a crucial prerequisite for democratic development in various

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[1] <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL-AD%282009%29021-e.pdf>.
[2] <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12107.htm>.

countries'.[3] International IDEA has a project on internal party democracy that aims 'to provoke party reform by identifying the challenges facing political parties for them to become more democratic, transparent and effective'.[4] According to the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 'internal democracy' is one of the '"institutional guarantees" that... political parties would have to fulfill if they were to effectively meet what is expected of them in a democracy'.[5] Similarly, USAID support for political parties 'emphasizes the need for internal party democracy'.[6]

For many practicing politicians confronting what they see as crises of participation in the longer established democracies, the answers are the same: the way to counter the nearly universal decline of party membership (van Biezen et al. 2012), is for the parties to become more internally democratic. The result has been a wide variety of reforms in party structures and practices—in some cases adopted by internal decisions of individual parties and in others imposed by law (although, of course, in democratic systems the laws are made in elected legislatures, which is to say by representatives of the parties themselves)—to provide for more direct member involvement in the choice of candidates for public office, the selection of the leader(s) of the party, and the formulation or ratification of statements defining the party's policies. Parties often present themselves as being democratically organized both to differentiate themselves from their competitors and as a signal that they are open to participation from all citizens. Rare is the party that admits to being 'undemocratic' in its organization.

While parties and the democracy promotion community may espouse general agreement that internal party democracy (IPD) is a good thing, any survey of parties' internal structures makes it clear that there is no single, agreed upon definition of what it means to be internally democratic. Parties claiming to practice IPD organize and operate in dramatically different ways. Like democracy itself, the definition of IPD is essentially contestable. Is it primarily about participation, inclusiveness, centralization, accountability, or something else altogether? Should the emphasis be on outcomes or on process? For example, if inclusiveness is a key consideration, in terms of candidate selection is the concern about the inclusiveness of the selectorate (those who choose the candidates), or is it about the diversity of the group of candidates ultimately selected? And, who is either group meant to be inclusive of—party members, party supporters in the electorate, the electorate generally?

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[3] <http://www.wmd.org/assemblies/third-assembly/workshops/political-parties-and-finance/how-strengthen-internal-party-demo>.

[4] <http://www.idea.int/parties/internal_democracy07.cfm>.

[5] <http://www.nimd.org/documents/I/internal_party_democracy-_state_of_affairs_and_the_road_ahead.pdf>; report written by Augustine Magolowondo.

[6] <http://serbia-montenegro.usaid.gov/code/navigate.php?Id=23>.

There is no obviously correct answer to these questions. First, even when there is agreement about democratic values, the values themselves may be in conflict. For example, there is a significant body of evidence suggesting that processes that strengthen the value of participation can have an adverse impact on the value of inclusion (at least with regard to the inclusiveness of candidate lists—Hazan and Rahat 2010). Second, IPD as an internal value may impede the achievement of the party's external goals. Aside from the frequently cited possibility that giving more power to the party's activists may result in candidates or policy positions that are less able to attract support in the broader electorate (May 1973), thereby increasing the likelihood of government policies that are less to the liking of those activists,[7] there are the examples of left-libertarian or ecological parties in Europe whose insistence on direct member decision making (aside from giving disproportionate power to those members with the stamina to endure interminable meetings) made it impossible to take binding decisions (because they could always be reversed at the next meeting, with a different set of members present) (Kitschelt 1989), or whose abhorrence of hierarchy and insistence on rotation in office denied them both stable and experienced representation. In other words, if democracy, whether intra-party or systemic, is an end in itself, there is no consensus on exactly what that means or how it would be either institutionalized or measured. And if, on the other hand, 'Democracy is a political *method*, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at... decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions' (Schumpeter 1962 [1942]: 242), then there may be limits to how much IPD is actually a good thing.

Even parties that generally agree that internally democratic structures are desirable are faced with a series of decisions when operationalizing this principle. In some cases, they are constrained by state imposed party laws that regulate parts of their internal activity. These laws generally are predicated on the ideas that, on the one hand, parties are private associations of citizens who should be free to organize their activities as they choose, but that, on the other hand, they are also powerful actors in politics and potentially subject to capture or perversion by their nominal leaders. Hence, when internal party processes are legally prescribed, it is generally to assure, at a minimum, that the 'members' (somehow defined) are represented in party governing bodies, either directly or through the periodic election of representatives. The German party law, for example, specifies that parties must have: regional branches (art. 7); an executive committee of at least three members, elected at least every two years (art. 11); an assembly, at least half the members of which must be allocated on the basis of membership, with the rest allocated in proportion to votes obtained at the last parliamentary election; party

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[7] In other words, the activists might rationally prefer to have less power in a way analogous to the observation of Mancur Olson (1965) that a rational individualist might prefer to be compelled to contribute to the production of public goods which would otherwise be under-provided.

courts of arbitration, whose members must be elected at least every four years, and cannot be 'members of the executive committee of the party or a regional branch, be employed by the party or a regional branch, nor receive regular income from them' (art. 14). In other cases, the law may simply require that the party be internally democratic without specifying what that means, or at the other extreme, it may define the party's internal arrangements in great detail, perhaps going so far as to identify the exact number and functions of its officers and to specify the dates on which they are to be elected. And of course, in still other cases, there may be no legal strictures at all.

Within such legal constraints as are imposed, each political party makes choices regarding how it organizes, reflecting its view of appropriate internal democratic practices, influenced no doubt by its perceived self-interest, and its conception of the political party itself. For example, parties usually decide both the criteria for membership and whether to limit the intra-party franchise in particular areas of decision-making to members, or whether alternatively to permit a broader range of supporters to participate, essentially determining who the party 'demos' is. Some parties restrict formal influence to long-time activists while others invite all partisans to take part in their decision-making. Labour parties may grant formal authority to trade unions while others restrict the internal franchise to party elites. Some parties are heavily reliant upon corporations for their funding while others explicitly reject any corporate contributions. Some may adopt gender and regional quotas for internal decision-making bodies while others choose members of these bodies at-large, and leave the distribution of positions among different categories of individuals entirely to the electors.

Two parties adopting widely different practices may both defend their choices as best reflecting IPD. For example, parties selecting their leader through a one-member-one-vote procedure often argue that this reflects a populist democratic view of equality among members and offers opportunity for expansive participation. Others, deciding to make the choice at a party conference, by delegates chosen to ensure regional and gender balance, argue that this process best respects the democratic values of inclusiveness, representativeness, and collective decision-making. On their face, neither claim is right or wrong; rather each reflects a different understanding of what democracy requires.

Analysis of parties' approaches to IPD is made more complex by their common practice of adopting different practices for different areas of party activity; for example, as parties engage in a variety of activities, the questions of who should be empowered, and in what ways, may have many different answers within a single party. It is not uncommon for a party to decide that one group should have authority over candidate selection, another should choose its leader and a third authority over policy positions. Not only do the bodies with decision-making authority determine policy positions. Not only do the bodies with decision-making authority differ across activities, so too may the ways in which the members of those bodies are chosen and the 'demos' to whom they are ultimately responsible.

If it is important to understand the internal workings of parties because of the importance of parties to the realization of democracy at the system level, it is also impossible to understand or to evaluate those internal workings without considering the fact that parties are parts of, and enmeshed in, a wider political system. On the one hand, the choices parties make will be influenced, if not necessarily determined, by their environment. The constraints imposed by party laws are examples of one such environmental influence. The type of electoral system, the number of competitive parties, the ideological range of the party system, whether a party is in government or opposition, whether it competes in a federal or unitary state, the degree to which (and the conditions under which) state subventions are available, all might encourage a party to adopt particular approaches to IPD, as indeed might the approaches to IPD taken by other parties in the same political system.

On the other hand, because parties are only parts of the wider system, the underlying idea that the internal democracy of parties is a necessary component of system-level democracy is itself not beyond question. While some theorists argue that real democracy requires that all the institutions of society, including but hardly limited to parties, be themselves democratic, others, such as Giovanni Sartori (1965: 124), are quite clear in their claims that 'democracy on a large scale is not the sum of many little democracies'. Here the basic claim is that the essence of democracy is free choice *among* parties, rather than direct participation *within* parties—based on the further premise that parties are properly understood to be teams of politicians rather than associations of citizens.

In less stark terms, some argue that IPD cannot properly be considered on its own but must be viewed as part of the full range of democratic or participatory opportunities offered a citizen. In this view IPD is but one component of democratic life in a state and it is this full democratic experience that must be considered. IPD can add to the overall democratic experience or it may detract from it depending upon how it is structured. This argument is made most clearly by Hazan and Rahat (2010) who suggest that highly participatory candidate nomination processes may lead to less inclusive and representative groups of candidates. General elections have little opportunity to rectify an inclusiveness problem created through the candidate selection process, as parties, in most systems, are gatekeepers to elected office. On the other hand, general elections can at least partially remedy a participatory shortfall created through more exclusive methods of candidate selection, by maximizing participation in general election voting. The point is that democracy is multifaceted, and some components of it are most easily maximized by the internal workings of political parties and others through general elections. In Hazan and Rahat's argument, inclusiveness in candidate pools and legislatures may be maximized through less participatory party nomination processes, which can be remedied through highly participatory general elections.

The challenge is not only in balancing party and state-level democratic practices but also in prioritizing different democratic impulses within the practice of

IPD. Trade-offs and compromise are inevitable. Parties favouring deliberative decision-making may adopt institutions based on geographic, gender, or even factional representation that guarantee the inclusion of what they view as the important interests or opinions that need to be taken into account, with the objectives of compromise and accommodation 'trumping' direct member participation on a one-member-one-vote basis. Others may not face a need to accommodate widely divergent interests and may instead prefer broadly participatory processes even if these provide little opportunity for collective deliberation. The decision may reflect the character of the party (for example, catch-all versus ideological) or may result from the differences inherent between governing and opposition parties or those operating in a heterogenous versus more homogenous society.

In this sense, IPD cannot be measured in a way that permits a 'scientific' conclusion that one party is more democratic than another—in the same way that it is a mug's game to try to definitively determine whether Germany or Australia or the Netherlands is the most democratic. Rankings of how democratic various countries are depend on the definition they ascribe to democracy and the same is true for IPD. It is an interest in the different approaches parties take to IPD, their rationales for doing so, and the implications of these decisions that animate this book. Accordingly, we are interested in the range of questions parties face in considering whether and how to implement IPD.

SOME OF THE KEY QUESTIONS

Some of the important questions on which we hope to shed light are: what aspects of their internal activity do parties conclude should, and should not, be subject to democratic determination, which democratic values are prioritized in implementing IPD, who is empowered in making party decisions, what are the perceived costs and benefits of different approaches to IPD, and how are these decisions influenced by the context in which a party operates? While not questioning the sincerity of the commitment of parties and politicians to democratic values, we also recognize that IPD is both about the distribution of power and influence within a party, and within the broader society. As such, both internal democratization in general, and the choice of a specific variant of IPD in particular, involve winners and losers. Whose interests are served by what version of IPD?

The first big question is how parties fit into the broader scheme of democratic government. Much of the discussion above concerning IPD stems from the party model/democratic theory of the mass party of integration. In this view, parties are the political arms of well-defined social groups, and politicians— including party leaders—are the agents of those groups, with the members of

the groups (archetypically the members of a social class or a particular religion), or at least the members of the group who are sufficiently politically interested to have joined the party, being the principals. Not surprisingly, IPD has a prominent place in the overall understanding of democracy associated with the mass party (Beer 1965; Katz and Mair 1995).

The mass party is not the only party type that has been identified, and indeed most analysts of party organization regard it largely as an historical relic. A variety of types have been suggested to characterize more recent developments in party organizations, including the catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1966), the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995), the party as public utility (van Biezen 2004), the business-firm party (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999), and the franchise party (Carty 2004). Each of these has its own interpretation of democracy, and its own implications for the proper role and implementation of IPD.

One of the consequences of the widespread perception of IPD as a positive democratic force, and in the minds of some a necessary component of statewide democracy, is the increased attempts by the state to mandate it. Once commonly viewed as strictly private organizations based in civil society, the internal organizational procedures and structures of parties have become increasingly subject to external regulation. In crafting these regulations many states have taken their cue from the classic mass party as a prescriptive model of organization. These regulatory efforts may not rest easily in societies in which the socio-economic structures supporting the mass party are no longer found. Questions of democratic legitimacy may also arise when legislatures and courts become the deciders of how parties should internally organize and conduct their affairs. These can raise concerns relating to state centralization and control over political participation and public life. Diversity in party organizational practices, reflecting prioritization of different democratic norms, perhaps in competition with one another and none a priori less valid than another, may be homogenized through these efforts.

As suggested above, one of the central questions a party must consider when implementing IPD is who is the 'demos'—that is, who should have authority in its internal decision making? Although there are exceptions, parties generally attempt to portray themselves as being open and inclusive and thus welcoming of participation from everyone. Most parties are membership organizations and requisites of membership are often minimal—residency, a minimum age, and payment of a small fee. This can vary, however, with some parties requiring a greater commitment to their ideals in return for membership. Significant academic attention has been paid in recent decades to an apparent decline in the number of party members. Some see this as partially reflecting citizen dissatisfaction with parties that they see as being overly hierarchical and not providing sufficient opportunities for their rank-and-file to influence internal decision-making. Accordingly, many of those who view a decline in party membership negatively argue for more robust forms of IPD as a way of providing an increased incentive for party activism. Parties may benefit from a larger membership in a number of ways including:

having a larger base of supporters to draw upon for financial contributions and election campaign volunteers and to legitimize their argument that they have widespread support among the electorate as evidenced by an increasing membership. But this expanded membership may also come with some costs as members can, for example, be a source of policy demands on the party and can constrain the leadership's freedom to manoeuver (Katz 1990).

Regardless of how broadly the demos is defined, one of the fundamental issues parties face in terms of member influence is determining whether their constituency is comprised of individuals or identifiable groups. This question manifests itself in the internal organizational structures of parties through a choice between according all members a free choice and an equal voice in party decision-making, or alternatively guaranteeing particular groups a prescribed level of influence regardless of the immediate preferences of individual members. Group-based representation, whether it is based on trade union membership, age, geography, or gender, challenges notions of popular control based on individual equality. Many parties have struggled with this issue in terms of gender representation, as women continue to be under-represented both in parties' decision-making processes and in the outcomes they produce (in particular, lists of candidates for public office). The question is whether processes and outcomes can in any meaningful way be considered genuinely democratic if they are not fully inclusive of the half of the population comprised of women.

A party's approach towards membership may tell us relatively little about its practice of IPD. While a party that empowers a highly restrictive membership may well not be viewed as practicing robust IPD, the same conclusion may be reached with regard to parties with more expansive memberships that offer them little or no influence in important decision-making. Parties that offer significant influence to supporters who have not chosen to become members may be regarded as even more democratic than those that restrict participation to formal members—or alternatively, they may be seen to be less democratic as organizations themselves precisely because this expansion of the range of participants dilutes the influence of those who are members. The crucial consideration in terms of IPD appears not to be norms of party membership, or even patterns of intra-party participation, but rather who has real authority over what areas of party decision-making.

As suggested above, the answers to this question vary not only among parties but internally for different aspects of party life. We can use the example of leadership selection here. Until well into the second half of the twentieth century, leaders in many parties were said to 'emerge' through processes such as the UK Tories' 'magic circle' in which the outgoing leader, together with a small group of party elites, essentially chose the next leader. This practice has now all but disappeared as most parties agree that some formal 'democratic' process should be followed. There is, however, fundamental disagreement over who should be included. The range is dramatic, with some parties extending the leadership franchise essentially to all of their supporters in the electorate, others to all party

members, some only to long time party members, still others to a select group of members in a party conference, and a sizable number restricting formal influence to members of the parliamentary party. In nearly all cases there has been a democratization of the process as even those limiting the vote to MPs now have formal, secret ballots, but the parties' views of who the appropriate demos is for the leadership choice obviously varies.

The same can be said for candidate selection as parties similarly take very different approaches, sometimes leaving the choice to their rank-and-file membership and in other cases having candidates appointed by a central party elite. In this case, the demos question is not just one of scope but also of centralization versus local authority. Parties also differ with some adopting quotas to ensure equitable gender representation in their candidate pool while others reject this approach as placing an artificial restriction on voter choice and a favouring of one group over another. Nearly all parties justify their choices relating to these personnel recruitment issues in terms of advancing democratic norms. The different conclusions they reach, and different practices they adopt, represent a privileging of different democratic priorities. One may favour inclusiveness in the process manifested through the broadest possible selectorate while another privileges democratic deliberation and accommodation best realized through a smaller, representative selectorate. These differences may reflect the democratic needs of particular political communities and may produce very different outcomes.

Similar diversity can be found in approaches to policy development with some seeing this as solely within the purview of the parliamentary party and others as an important function for the extra-parliamentary membership. Differences here often reflect both the internal democratic ethos of the party and its relative proximity to power. Opposition parties, not burdened with the challenges of actually governing or maintaining good relations with coalition partners, may find it easier to empower their extra-parliamentary members in the policy development exercise as they are not faced with the necessary compromises inherent in policymaking across the many interconnected and complicated spheres of contemporary governance. Governing parties also face the 'democratic' question of whether they are meant to represent the views of their activists (perhaps members), their voters, or all citizens. If the answer is the latter, then questions of IPD become more complex as the views of their members can be expected to differ in significant ways from those of the citizenry at large. Similar to candidate selection, the issue arises of whether IPD in terms of policy development is best measured on its own or as a contributing component of the state's overall democratic quality.

As in much of life, the necessity for, and sources of, financial resources underwriting party activity influence who exercises authority in decision-making. This issue relates both to the internal workings of parties and to their place in the broader state-wide democratic apparatus. For example, when parties adopt internally democratic practices based on expanding the inclusiveness of their leadership selectorate, details relating to political financing influence the relative balance of

authority within the party. How are candidates financed in these contests that require significantly more expansive (and expensive) campaigns? Are corporate, trade union, and large individual contributions permitted? Are candidates limited in the amounts they can spend in these internal party elections and if so do these limits dampen party building opportunities or do they make them more accessible to all segments of the party regardless of their access to large amounts of resources? For internal contests, parties often make these decisions themselves and the different approaches they take reflect both their democratic ethos and their competitive needs. The regulatory scheme imposed by the state regarding levels of public financing and permissible contributions for general elections also has an impact on IPD as it influences the relationship between parties and civil society. One regulatory approach can result in parties becoming largely dependent on state subventions for their financing, another can encourage parties to seek large numbers of small donations from voters while yet another might encourage the solicitation of large corporate contributions. In considering how these scenarios influence IPD, it is worth recalling the often-repeated observation that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune.'

In each of these aspects of party life there is an important, but sometimes overlooked, distinction between participation and control, and we must be alert to the possibility that party leaders may try to encourage the first without ceding the second. In her study of workplace democracy, Pateman (1970: 69, following Verba 1961) points to the possibility of *pseudo participation*—a feeling of involvement without the substance of decision-making influence—as when employees may question the boss or make suggestions, while the authority to decide still rests firmly at the top. The same might be said about highly participatory but also highly centralized political campaigns. Similarly, to the extent that party congresses operate in practice like the Greek assemblies in Homer, limited to approving or rejecting proposals made by the elite after debate in which only the elite could participate and in any case liable to have their decisions overturned or ignored by the elite, it makes little difference if the delegates are numerous and diverse.

At the other extreme, we must be alert to the fact that oligarchy is only one antithesis of democracy. At another extreme is anarchy. While decentralization/defusion of authority is generally considered to promote democracy (consider, for example, Dahl's idea of 'polyarchy'), if decentralization means that each local branch or party candidate is free to ignore the central party, or if participation in decision-making is expanded beyond party leaders and members to include more passive supporters, or in the limiting case, illustrated by the American open-primary, any citizen who cares to participate, the result may be to render the party as a distinct political entity irrelevant rather than to make it more democratic. While there are many ways in which IPD can be institutionalized, the ultimate questions remain to what extent, how, and in which aspects of party life the members are able to control what their party does.

2

Are Political Parties Meant to Be Internally Democratic?

R. Kenneth Carty

In his pioneering study of *Political Parties*, Maurice Duverger (1954: xv) tells us that any political party is simply 'a community with a particular structure' and that 'modern parties are characterized primarily by their anatomy'. This being the case, a party's democratic character would appear to depend on its formal structure and the fashion in which interested individuals and groups can and do manipulate its parts. Inevitably then, scholars and practitioners have sought to understand the critical distinctions between the different and changing organizational models adopted by parties over time, as well as how these forms have really worked in the hard world of competitive electoral politics.

At its simplest, the intra-party democracy (IPD) question is often posed as 'should the party's leadership determine its policies, or should its mass members or supporters?' (Katz 1997: 38). However there is necessarily more to the issue than that. Besides the determination of policy there are intimately related questions of priority setting, implementation and accountability. What role for members or supporters (or even other citizens) in influencing or controlling them? And beyond policy there are questions of personnel for it may often be, as Trollope once suggested, 'men not measures are, no doubt, the very life of politics'.[1] So what role for members or supporters (or others) in making personnel choices, be they for internal party office or for candidates for public office. These questions lead directly to the problem of just who or what is the party. Katz and Mair's (1993) answer is that modern parties have three distinct faces—the party on the ground, in central office, and in public office. The relationships among the faces define any party as a unique organization and shape the democratic tensions that govern its internal party decision-making and political life.

This is not to say that there is necessarily any easy agreement on the essential democratic character of particular parties or the way that power is organized and

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[1] Trollope (in *Phineas Redux*, Ch. XXXI) follows this claim with the observation, equally true of much political science, 'but then it is not the fashion to say so in public places'.

11

Problematizing Intra-Party Democracy

Richard S. Katz and William P. Cross

At the beginning of 1968, it was widely assumed that Lyndon Johnson would have no trouble securing the Democratic nomination for re-election as president of the United States, notwithstanding deep division within the party over the war in Vietnam. On 12 March, however, Senator Eugene McCarthy won 42 per cent of the vote in the New Hampshire primary (to Johnson's 49 per cent), and four days later Robert Kennedy declared his candidacy was well, leading Johnson to announce at the end of the month that he would not be a candidate after all.

Although the pivotal role of the New Hampshire primary in leading to Johnson's withdrawal might look like an example of intra-party democracy, two important qualifications must be borne in mind. First, although Johnson withdrew from the presidential contest, he was actually the winner in New Hampshire. Second, although New Hampshire represented an important opportunity for a limited segment of the Democratic (plus independent) electorate to make their views known, the vast majority of the delegates to the 1968 Democratic Convention were not selected in primary elections, but rather in state conventions and caucuses that were largely under the control of local elites. Despite the fact that he did not enter any of the primaries, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who was the choice of the party leadership, easily won the nomination in a highly divisive convention, and went on to a narrow defeat by Richard Nixon in the general election. The party's response to discord and defeat was to democratize, going from roughly one-third of the states holding primaries to roughly two-thirds. Moreover, more of the primaries selected delegates who were pledged to particular presidential candidates, rather than merely being 'beauty contests' that might inform party leaders of popular sentiment while actually deciding nothing. In the new environment, in 1972 the party's anti-war activists were able to impose their choice of George McGovern on the party leadership, leaving many large donors feeling marginalized and alienated. McGovern then went on to electoral disaster, winning only 37.5 per cent of the popular vote to Richard Nixon's 60.7 per cent.

The American direct primary system is an unusual form of IPD. Nonetheless, the Democrats' experiences in 1968 and 1972 illustrate some of the strengths and weaknesses of IPD. The oligarchic nature of the 1968 decision certainly alienated

many young and committed activists, who in taking to the streets in Chicago both seriously tarnished the party's image and gave the Democratic establishment the opportunity to divide the party even more. The party had the complementary problem in 1972. By allowing the groundswell of anti-war sentiment to prevail in the party's choice of nominee, the newly 'democratized' structure led to the alienation, and in some cases defection to the Republicans, of core supporters without whom the party could not compete effectively in the general election. One explanation is simply that when a party is deeply divided, neither the presence nor the absence of IPD is adequate to prevent defeat.

Even without deep internal division, however, IPD can be a two-edged sword for a political party. On one side, IPD may help to convert passive supporters into actively invested participants in the party's competition with other parties both to hold governmental office and to shape public discourse whether in government or in opposition. It may help to inform political leaders of the desires of their supporters, and of the public more broadly. It may further the image of the party as one committed to democratic principles more generally, and as a firmly rooted movement in society.

On the other side, however, the principle that a ruling party or coalition is supposed to act in the national interest rather than in the sectional interest of its own supporters may be undermined by IPD. Although parties may influence policy from outside of government, there can be little doubt that a party's influence is greater when in government than when outside. In this sense, the common suggestion that parties may have to make a choice between office and policy is misleadingly simple; generally, office is a means to policy influence rather than an alternative. The real choice is between maintaining ideological purity at the possible expense of office, on the one hand, and bowing to electoral expediency or accepting compromise, on the other hand: between standing on principle and accepting half-a-loaf (or even a quarter-of-a-loaf) rather than none. For a variety of reasons, party leaders are likely to give relatively higher priority to winning elections and achieving office, while members are likely to give relatively higher priority to what they think is right, whether or not it will 'sell' at the polls. The price of being responsive to the party's members may be limited capacity to be responsive to the broader electorate.

This, in turn, addresses a contrast between two conceptions of democracy, and of the place of parties, and of IPD, within it. On one side, there is the family of models represented by the mass party conception of democracy (see Carty's chapter, this volume). Democracy involves competition between collectives of citizens who share common interests and ideologies. Parties are the organized political expression of these collectivities, and party leaders are their agents. Hence, members are the real heart and proper voice of the party; the possibility of active participation in politics, which is to say in parties, is an essential element of full democratic citizenship; parties will express real differences of policy; electoral politics is primarily about the mobilization of the party's natural supporters. On the other side, there are models that derive from the rational or social

choice school. Democracy involves competition between teams of politicians seeking public office. To the extent that parties are more than labels for those teams, they are organizations of their supporters. Hence, while members may always exercise the option of exit, the real rulers of the party are and should be its leaders; system-level democracy does not require active popular participation within parties, but only free choice among parties; the policy proposals of parties (or coalitions of parties) should converge toward the median voter; because, electoral competition is primarily about appeal to moderate and unattached voters. IPD is central to the mass party conception of democracy, but potentially inimical to the second.

The chapters in this book have problematized the concept of intra-party democracy. In the book's introductory chapter we noted that many who are concerned with democratic promotion champion IPD as a necessary part of a vibrant democratic state. This perspective is premised on the long established belief that political parties are an essential part of contemporary democracy. This sentiment is captured best in Schattschneider's (1942) often quoted observation that there can be no democracy without parties. In most modern democracies parties organize both the electoral and the legislative spheres, dominating policymaking processes, and occupying the central roles in election campaigns. The conclusion many draw from this is that if parties are so central to democracy then they themselves should be democratically organized. Additionally, reflecting their central role, parties increasingly receive significant resources from the state, which, as van Biezen notes, leads some to view them as public utilities rightfully subject to significant state regulation of their affairs.

However, as Sartori (1965) has warned, state-wide democracy need not be the sum of many smaller democracies. And, as argued at times in this volume, it is possible that internal party democracy may even partially detract from state-wide democracy. For example, as suggested by Rahat, highly participatory party decision-making, in areas such as candidate selection, may lead to less inclusive legislatures. To some extent this may reflect a clash of competing democratic values—not all best manifested through internally democratic parties.

Even when there is agreement that IPD is a good thing, this does not get us particularly far in assessing how parties conduct their internal affairs. As illustrated in the preceding chapters there are many forms of IPD and parties are faced with a multitude of decisions when deciding whether and how to democratize their operations. The decisions parties reach reflect many different factors and these are often not as simple as whether or not a party wishes to be 'democratic'. A party with democratic impulses may find that different relative priorities given to the values of accountability, participation, inclusiveness, or responsiveness lead to different preferred outcomes in terms of IPD.

Scarrow, in this volume, shows how internally democratic practices can be very expensive both for parties and participants. For example, internally organized membership votes for candidate and leadership selection can cost parties many thousands of dollars that often need to be raised from private sources. Similarly

these contests can be very expensive for would-be candidates, both raising the threshold for candidacy and making it impossible for some to compete while forcing those who do enter the contests to raise significant amounts from donors. The question then is whether these costs allow private donors to gain undue influence in party decision-making—as Scarrow asks, does he who pays the piper call the tune? Thus while these contests may be seen to increase participation in terms of a broader selectorate, they may be more exclusive in terms of candidacy and raise other issues concerning to whom a party is responsive.

When considering IPD, one is faced not only with normative questions relating to the definition, or perhaps preferred form, of democracy but also with questions relating to the scope and form of a political party. At their core, questions relating to IPD revolve around consideration of *who* has authority over *what*. In terms of who, most attention in IPD debates revolves around the role of a party's rank-and-file membership. As Young and Katz note in their contributions to this volume, the vast majority of parties are membership organizations and at least give lip service to the desire to have large numbers of members. As party membership numbers in many Western democracies are in decline, parties are increasingly engaged in discussions, and sometimes real efforts, aimed at increasing the size of their membership. A larger membership is seen as increasing a party's legitimacy and as a potentially useful instrument in waging electoral campaigns.

Support for increased IPD is frequently stimulated by this decline in party membership and activism. The argument is often made that few join political parties because voters increasingly do not see party membership as an effective form of political participation. In this view, parties are overly hierarchical and grassroots members have little say in determining their direction. The result is that those interested in politics, and in influencing public policy, increasingly choose alternative methods of participation, such as activism in advocacy groups, over party membership. In turn, some parties have taken steps to become more plebiscitarian in their decision-making, for example adopting membership votes for candidate and leadership selection, as part of an effort to increase the value of party activism and thus attract more members to their organizations. Katz, however, suggests that the decline in party activism may have little to do with the form of party organization and degree of IPD but rather may reflect broader societal changes. In this view, forces largely exogenous to the internal arrangements of the parties have made partisan involvement less attractive to citizens, and so should have been expected to result in declining party membership. This observation raises the question of whether there is anything parties themselves can do to reverse the trends of declining membership numbers.

Among parties desiring to increase the role of their members there are alternative views regarding the definition of membership. Some take a very expansive position resulting from their belief that an empowering of members may lead a desired growth in membership numbers by attracting new supporters. This view is manifested in events such as party leadership contests allowing anyone who

joins up to the day of the vote to participate. These contests often result in the recruitment of many new members and in that narrow sense can be viewed as successful. Research, however, suggests that many of these recruits have little commitment to the party and few remain as party members once the contest is over. Others, for IPD purposes, restrict member involvement to those with a longer commitment to the party. As Cross notes in his discussion of leadership selection, some parties restrict the franchise to those who have belonged to the party for a year or more while others require attendance at party meetings or some other evidence of active membership.

While parties taking either approach can argue they are practicing IPD by means of empowering their members, they are engaged in very different exercises and are granting influence to very different categories of party supporters. The first are more casual partisans who come to party membership for the sole purpose of participating in an important party event, and indeed their commitment may be limited to support of a particular candidate rather than generalized to the party as a whole; the latter are more likely to be committed party activists. The arguments for inclusion of the first group are both to grow the party membership and to benefit from the collective wisdom of a large group of party supporters. The alternative position is that participation in key party events should be limited to those with an ongoing interest in the party as a way of rewarding them for their commitment, and to encourage others who would like a voice in these decisions to first illustrate an ongoing participation in party affairs.

Young also warns that party memberships are typically unrepresentative of the general electorate. Older, from high socio-economic classes and often male-dominated, party memberships are often not able to represent all of a party's voters effectively. This then raises several questions for a party, including whether it is both illegitimate and electorally dangerous to allow such an unrepresentative body to make key decisions that may not reflect the views of supporters generally. As is apparent in Gauja's discussion of party policymaking, the supposedly democratic impulse to empower grassroots members in the setting of policy direction raises concerns relating to other democratic norms given the unrepresentativeness of the party membership.

Often under the cover of IPD, some parties have addressed the under-representation of particular societal groups in their organizations. This has been most common with regard to gender as parties have formalized women's organizations within their decision-making structures, adopted affirmative action programmes (including in some cases quotas) to increase the number of female candidates for public office and mandated gender equity in internal decision-making bodies. Childs' contribution to this volume considers the intersection of IPD and issues of gender and politics. The primacy in much of the IPD debate of concerns with increasing the number of those participating, which results in adoption of procedures such as one-member-one-vote decision-making, may run counter to efforts to ensure equitable representation of groups such as women,

youth, and ethnic minorities who may be under-represented in the general membership. More exclusive decision-making bodies may be more easily engineered to ensure fair group representation.

This example also illustrates another of the classic tensions that arises among different democratic norms that parties struggle with in adopting IPD, a theme that recurs throughout this volume. This is whether IPD concerns should be primarily directed towards decision-making processes or outcomes. In other words is it more important that decisions are made in an inclusive and participatory manner or that the outcomes reflect these democratic norms? This may be most apparent in terms of candidate selection. Is the primary concern with producing candidate pools that are inclusive and generally representative of the electorate or with decentralized and participatory selection processes regardless of the outcomes they produce?

Declining and unrepresentative memberships, coupled with what Katz identifies as a general disinterest among voters in joining parties, has resulted in what seems to be a growing phenomenon among parties to include their 'supporters' rather than solely their members in their internal decision-making. Sometimes this is accomplished through adoption of a very liberal definition of membership, but in some recent cases parties are not even 'pretending' to require membership but rather are explicitly inviting 'supporters' to participate in their internal decision-making. Parties in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, for example, have experimented in recent years with candidate and leadership selection mechanisms that grant a share of the vote to self-proclaimed party supporters who decline to join the party formally. These are similar to the primary processes long used by the US parties. While these are potentially highly participatory and inclusive insofar as they are open to virtually all voters, they largely eliminate the privileged place of party members.

While parties hope these processes will eventually attract supporters to membership, by extending one of the central benefits of membership to non-members, they run the risk of further cheapening the value of party membership and actually making it less attractive. As raised by several authors in this collection, at some point efforts to be inclusive of all voters remove the basic 'partyness' from these supposedly intra-party affairs. When membership is not required, and increasingly when these processes are governed by state regulation, can they continue be viewed as intra-party events?

When we deconstruct and problematize IPD it is obvious that there are no easy answers to the multitude of questions that result. It has not been our objective in this volume to argue that IPD is necessarily a good thing nor that any one form of internal party organization is preferable to all others. If pushed, we suspect that the contributors to this volume, while all committed democrats, would not agree on many of these issues. At their core, these are often highly normative questions that require the balancing, and prioritizing, of many important democratic values. In our view, there is no universally correct answer to many of these questions. Rather, parties, and their voters, need to reflect on the various issues and

compromises at play and make judgments reflecting their values and priorities. Our task has been to set out these challenges and to identify the potential pitfalls and compromises inherent in a comprehensive consideration of intra-party democracy. In doing so, our objective has been to help inform consideration of the possibilities of intra-party democracy and to highlight the implications of decisions parties and their supporters make.

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