

**PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND PARTY  
SYSTEM THEORY AFTER THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION\***

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## **ABSTRACT**

The overarching argument of this paper is that the party systems of less developed countries are less institutionalized than those of the advanced industrial democracies. The paper examines three differences between the party systems of the advanced industrial democracies and party systems of less developed countries. First, we show that most democracies and semi-democracies in less developed countries have much higher electoral volatility than the advanced industrial democracies. Second, much of the literature on parties and party systems assumes the context of institutionalized party systems with strong party roots in society and further presupposes that programmatic or ideological linkages are at the root of the stable linkages between voters and parties. In the party systems of most democracies and semi-democracies in less developed countries, programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties are weaker. Third, linkages between voters and candidates are more personalistic in less developed countries than in the advanced industrial democracies.

## **RESUMEN**

Este artículo examina tres diferencias entre los sistemas de partidos de las democracias industriales avanzadas y los sistemas de partidos en países menos desarrollados, particularmente en términos del nivel de institucionalización. El argumento general es que los sistemas de partidos de los países menos desarrollados están menos institucionalizados. Mostramos que la mayoría de las democracias y semi-democracias en los países menos desarrollados tienen una volatilidad electoral mucho más alta y menor estabilidad electoral que las democracias industriales avanzadas. En segundo lugar, buena parte de la literatura sobre los partidos y sistemas de partidos asume un contexto de sistemas de partidos institucionalizados con partidos con fuerte arraigo social y adicionalmente presupone que los vínculos programáticos o ideológicos sostienen la estabilidad de los vínculos entre los votantes y los partidos. En los sistemas de partidos de la mayoría de las democracias y semi-democracias en los países menos desarrollados, los vínculos programáticos o ideológicos entre los votantes y los partidos son más débiles. En tercer lugar, en las democracias y semi-democracias de los países menos desarrollados los vínculos entre los votantes y los candidatos son más personalistas que en las democracias industriales avanzadas.

Most theoretical works on voters, parties, and party systems implicitly assume the context of the advanced industrial democracies, especially of the United States and Western Europe. The argument in this paper is that the literature on the advanced industrial democracies cannot account for important characteristics of party systems in democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries. Voters, parties, and party systems in less-developed countries are qualitatively different from those of the advanced industrial democracies. These differences demand a reconsideration of theoretical assumptions and lead to the necessity of rethinking theoretical problems. More work must be undertaken to rethink theories about party systems based on the distinctive experiences of democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries.

The overarching argument of this paper is that the party systems of democracies and semi-democracies of the less-developed countries are markedly less institutionalized than those of the advanced industrial democracies. The level of institutionalization is a critical dimension for understanding party systems, a fact neglected by the literature on the advanced industrial democracies. In the advanced industrial democracies, the level of party system institutionalization is relatively uniform and hence has rarely been the subject of scholarly attention.

This paper focuses on three specific differences, all related to party system institutionalization, between the advanced industrial democracies and the democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries. First, most democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries have much higher electoral volatility and less electoral stability than the advanced industrial democracies.

Second, much of the literature on parties and party systems assumes the context of institutionalized party systems with strong party roots in society and further presupposes that programmatic or ideological linkages are at the root of the stable linkages between voters and parties. In these theories, voters choose a party or candidate on the basis of their ideological or programmatic preferences. In the party systems of most democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries, theoretical approaches that presuppose programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties are less satisfactory. In these countries, linkages between parties and voters are usually less

ideological and programmatic. Weaker programmatic/ideological linkages between voters and parties are a key part of weaker party roots in society.

Third, linkages between voters and candidates are more personalistic in democracies and semi-democracies of less-developed countries than in the advanced industrial democracies. Outside of the advanced democracies, more voters choose candidates on the basis of their personal characteristics without regard to party, ideology, or programmatic issues. The salience of personalism runs counter to what one would expect on the basis of most of the theoretical literature on voters and party systems. Personalism taps an important criterion for assessing the institutionalization of political parties: the depersonalization of parties and party competition (Mény, 1990: 67). This is far from an exhaustive list of the differences between party systems of less-developed countries compared to those of the advanced industrial democracies, but these differences are important.

In the conclusions, we argue that weak institutionalization has consequences for representation and electoral accountability. Weakly institutionalized party systems are more vulnerable to allowing anti-party politicians to come to power. Many such anti-party politicians (e.g., President Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 1990–2000; President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, 1998–present) have had adverse effects on democracy. We also argue that weak institutionalization hampers electoral accountability, which is a key underpinning of democracy.

Until the 1980s, the theoretical literature on parties and party systems focused on or implicitly assumed the context of the advanced industrial democracies. There were few democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries. Party competition was either nonexistent or tightly constrained in most of these countries. Since the beginning of the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), party competition has become an important route to power in many less-developed countries. Social scientists need to modify the dominant theoretical literature to understand these party systems. They must develop theoretical tools appropriate for understanding the dynamics of these party systems. The best way to develop these theoretical tools is by acquiring a good command of the rich literature on the advanced industrial democracies and of the theoretical literature that implicitly presupposes that context, but to critically challenge those

literatures when they must be modified to understand parties and party systems in democracies and semi-democracies of less-developed countries.

This paper builds on Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999: 22–39), which spawned most of the contemporary work on party system institutionalization, but adds to these earlier works in four ways. First, we provide more systematic empirical evidence by using cross-national surveys to demonstrate some of the earlier propositions about party system institutionalization. Mainwaring and Scully did not use survey data; their work was written before the advent of major cross-national surveys with a wide sample of less-developed countries that held competitive elections. Second, we analyze a broader range of countries than both of these earlier works and other previous work on this subject. Third, we challenge some new aspects of party system theory that these previous works did not address in detail. Finally, we present more rigorous tests of some empirical propositions while dropping some earlier and harder-to-test claims about consequences of low institutionalization. The second half of the paper, while building conceptually and theoretically on Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999), presents new arguments and evidence.

### **CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS**

In this paper, we undertake what Tilly (1984) called a “huge comparison.” We compare party systems in democratic and semi-democratic less-developed countries with party systems of the advanced industrial democracies. Huge comparisons overlook nuances. There are significant differences among party systems of the advanced industrial democracies and among party systems of less-developed countries. Moreover, there is no precise cut point between developed and less-developed countries. This is a continuum, not a dichotomy, and we treat it as such in the quantitative analyses in this paper.<sup>1</sup> Despite these caveats, huge comparisons can be useful, by providing a valid, big picture contrast.

Our analysis is limited exclusively to democracies and semi-democracies.<sup>2</sup> Parties that function in authoritarian regimes fall outside our purview.

## COMPARING PARTY SYSTEMS: THE LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Sartori's (1976) seminal book identified two dimensions of party systems as particularly important: the number of relevant parties and the degree of ideological polarization. He believed that his typology included the most important properties for comparing and conceptualizing party systems. However, he somewhat neglected and inadequately conceptualized an equally important property of party systems: their level of institutionalization.

A classification of party systems based on the number of parties and the level of polarization overlooks substantial differences in the level of institutionalization and, hence, in how party competition functions in less-institutionalized contexts. In comparing and classifying party systems beyond the advanced industrial democracies, political scientists who work on Latin America (Bendel, 1993; Coppedge, 1998: 559–561; Kitschelt, 2003; Mainwaring, 1999; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Molina and Pérez, 2004; Schedler, 1995; Van Cott, 2000), Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001), Asia, (Johnson, 2002; Stockton, 2001), and the post-communist regions (Bielasiak, 2002; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Mair, 1997: 175–198; Markowski, 2000; Moser, 1999, 2001; Rose and Munro, 2003; Stoner-Weiss, 2001; Toka, 1997) have recognized the need to pay attention to the level of institutionalization in addition to Sartori's two dimensions.<sup>3</sup> Institutionalized party systems structure the political process to a high degree. In fluid systems, parties are important actors in some ways, but they do not have the same structuring effect.

Building on Mainwaring (1999: 22–39) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995), we conceptualize four dimensions of party system institutionalization. First, more institutionalized systems enjoy considerable stability (Przeworski, 1975); patterns of party competition manifest regularity. This is the easiest dimension of institutionalization to measure, and perhaps the most important because institutionalization is closely linked to stability.

Second, in more institutionalized systems, parties have strong roots in society, and most voters, conversely, have strong attachments to parties. Most voters identify with a party and vote for it most of the time, and some interest associations are closely linked to

parties. Strong party roots in society help provide the regularity in electoral competition that institutionalization entails. Party roots in society and electoral volatility, while analytically separable, are intertwined because strong party roots in society limit electoral volatility. If most citizens support the same party from one election to the next, there are fewer floating voters, hence less likelihood of massive electoral shifts that are reflected in high volatility. Conversely, where parties have weak roots in society, more voters are likely to shift electoral allegiances from one election to the next, thus bringing about greater potential for high electoral volatility.

Third, in more institutionalized systems, political actors accord legitimacy to parties. They see parties as a necessary part of democratic politics even if they are critical of specific parties and express skepticism about parties in general (Torcal, Gunther, and Montero, 2002).

Finally, in more institutionalized systems, party organizations are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders; they acquire an independent status and value of their own (Huntington, 1968: 12–24). The institutionalization of political parties is limited as long as a party is the personal instrument of a leader or a small coterie (Janda, 1980). When this phenomenon occurs in the electorally most successful parties, system level institutionalization is low on this fourth dimension.

A party system is the set of parties that interact in patterned ways. This definition implies three boundaries between systems and non-systems. First, as Sartori (1976) pointed out, a system must have at least two constituent elements; therefore a party system must have at least two parties. Second, the notion of patterned interactions suggests that there are some regularities in the distribution of electoral support by parties over time even if some parties rise and others decline. Third, the idea of a system implies some continuity in the components that form the system; therefore, “party system” implies some continuity in the parties that form the system, that is, the institutionalization of political parties.

In his discussion of the difference between consolidated party systems and non-systems, Sartori (1976: 244–248) was prescient in recognizing the importance of party system institutionalization. However, he posited a dichotomy between consolidated systems and non-systems, whereas we find it much more useful to conceive of

institutionalization as a continuum. Nothing in the definition of “system” justifies a rigid dichotomous demarcation between a system and a non-system, provided that there is some pattern in interparty competition and some continuity in the main parties of the system. These two criteria are easy to meet in a minimal way.

Although we diverge from Sartori in thinking of institutionalization as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, we give him great credit for recognizing that there are profound differences in party systems according to the level of institutionalization. After Sartori’s classic work, this issue was neglected until Bendel (1993) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) focused on it.

Party systems characterized by a low degree of institutionalization can be called fluid or weakly institutionalized. Compared to more institutionalized party systems, fluid systems are characterized by less regularity in patterns of party competition, weaker party roots in society, less legitimacy accorded to parties, and weaker party organizations, often dominated by personalistic leaders.

We do not systematically compare party systems on all four dimensions because of the difficulties of obtaining comparable valid empirical information for all four dimensions for a wide range of countries. We focus on three issues (high electoral volatility, weak ideological linkages, and personalism) that suggest the need for new theoretical insights on the basis of democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries. All three issues relate principally to the first two dimensions of party system institutionalization: the stability of interparty competition and party roots in society.

### **ELECTORAL VOLATILITY**

To develop the argument that contemporary competitive party systems differ in important ways that cannot be captured by Sartori's typology, we begin by comparing some cases according to the first dimension of institutionalization: that patterns of party competition manifest regularity. It is the easiest of the four dimensions of institutionalization to measure systematically across cases, specifically by comparing electoral volatility. Electoral volatility refers to the aggregate turnover from one party to others, from one election to the next (Przeworski, 1975; Pedersen, 1983; Roberts and



Wibbel, 1999). It is computed by adding the net change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two.<sup>4</sup>

Table 1 shows electoral volatility for democratic lower chamber elections of the post-1978 period for 39 democracies and semi-democracies. We limited the case selection to countries that, as of 2003, had experienced at least three consecutive lower chamber elections when the country's Freedom House combined score was 10 or less.<sup>5</sup> Countries with a mean combined score of 11 or more had authoritarian regimes and are classified by Freedom House as "not free." Parties have different functions in authoritarian regimes compared to democracies and semi-democracies. Authoritarian regimes usually do not allow free and fair elections. Their control of elections favors the governing party and tends to limit electoral volatility, so it is usually misleading to compare electoral volatility in the two kinds of regimes. Only the most recent democratic period is counted in countries where there was a democratic breakdown. We use only post-1978 elections.<sup>6</sup>

Table 1 includes countries from the 1995–97 wave of World Values Survey (WVS) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.<sup>7</sup> Among the WVS countries that meet the Freedom House criterion for at least three consecutive elections, we included all those with a population of at least ten million. Table 1 also includes seven countries (Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Latvia, and Lithuania) that had under 10 million inhabitants, so as to analyze some smaller countries, and Bolivia and Ecuador, so as to reduce the underrepresentation of poor countries.

TABLE 1

## Electoral Volatility, HDI, Per Capita GDP, and Freedom House Scores, 39 Countries

|                | Mean Electoral Volatility, Lower Chamber | Elections Included for Volatility | Human Development Index (HDI) 2001 | Per Capita GDP (PPP US\$) 2001 | 2001–2002 Combined Freedom House Scores |
|----------------|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| United States  | 3.2                                      | 1978–2002                         | .937                               | 34,320                         | 2,F                                     |
| Australia      | 6.4                                      | 1980–2001                         | .939                               | 25,370                         | 2,F                                     |
| Greece         | 6.9                                      | 1981–2000                         | .892                               | 17,440                         | 4,F                                     |
| United Kingdom | 8.2                                      | 1979–2001                         | .930                               | 24,160                         | 3,F                                     |
| Germany        | 8.7                                      | 1980–2002                         | .921                               | 25,350                         | -----                                   |
| Switzerland    | 9.4                                      | 1979–2003                         | .932                               | 28,100                         | 2,F                                     |
| Belgium        | 11.5                                     | 1978–2003                         | .937                               | 25,520                         | 3,F                                     |
| Denmark        | 12.2                                     | 1979–2001                         | .930                               | 29,000                         | 2,F                                     |
| Sweden         | 13.5                                     | 1979–2002                         | .941                               | 24,180                         | 2,F                                     |
| Norway         | 14.1                                     | 1981–2001                         | .944                               | 29,620                         | 2,F                                     |
| Portugal       | 14.1                                     | 1979–2002                         | .896                               | 18,150                         | 2,F                                     |
| Spain          | 16.5                                     | 1979–2000                         | .918                               | 20,150                         | 3,F                                     |
| Netherlands    | 16.6                                     | 1981–2003                         | .938                               | 27,190                         | 2,F                                     |
| Chile          | 16.7                                     | 1989–2001                         | .831                               | 9,190                          | 4,F                                     |
| France         | 17.5                                     | 1978–2002                         | .925                               | 23,990                         | 3,F                                     |
| Japan          | 18.6                                     | 1979–2000                         | .932                               | 25,130                         | 3,F                                     |
| Taiwan         | 18.7                                     | 1996–2001                         | -----                              | -----                          | 3,F                                     |
| Italy          | 22.1                                     | 1979–2001                         | .916                               | 24,670                         | 3,F                                     |
| Colombia       | 22.1                                     | 1978–2002                         | .779                               | 7,040                          | 8,PF                                    |
| Mexico         | 22.7                                     | 1988–2000                         | .800                               | 8,430                          | 5,F                                     |
| Brazil         | 24.1                                     | 1986–2002                         | .777                               | 7,360                          | 6,PF                                    |
| South Korea    | 24.6                                     | 1988–2000                         | .879                               | 15,090                         | 4,F                                     |
| Argentina      | 24.9                                     | 1983–2001                         | .849                               | 11,320                         | 6,PF                                    |
| India          | 25.0                                     | 1980–1999                         | .590                               | 2,840                          | 5,F                                     |
| Hungary        | 25.1                                     | 1990–2002                         | .837                               | 12,340                         | 3,F                                     |
| Czech Republic | 25.7                                     | 1990–2002                         | .861                               | 14,720                         | 3,F                                     |
| Venezuela      | 31.3                                     | 1978–2001                         | .775                               | 5,670                          | 8,PF                                    |
| Ecuador        | 36.4                                     | 1979–1998                         | .731                               | 3,280                          | 6,PF                                    |
| Bulgaria       | 36.8                                     | 1990–2001                         | .795                               | 6,890                          | 4,F                                     |
| Slovenia       | 38.2                                     | 1992–2000                         | .881                               | 17,130                         | 3,F                                     |
| Bolivia        | 39.8                                     | 1980–2002                         | .672                               | 2,300                          | 4,F                                     |
| Estonia        | 42.4                                     | 1992–2003                         | .833                               | 10,170                         | 3,F                                     |
| Poland         | 46.6                                     | 1991–2001                         | .841                               | 9,450                          | 3,F                                     |
| Lithuania      | 49.2                                     | 1992–2000                         | .824                               | 8,470                          | 3,F                                     |
| Russia         | 50.0                                     | 1993–1999                         | .779                               | 7,100                          | 10,PF                                   |
| Peru           | 51.9                                     | 1980–2001                         | .752                               | 4,570                          | 4,F                                     |
| Romania        | 53.0                                     | 1990–2000                         | .773                               | 5,830                          | 4,F                                     |
| Latvia         | 58.2                                     | 1993–2002                         | .811                               | 7,730                          | 3,F                                     |
| Ukraine        | 59.2                                     | 1994–2002                         | .766                               | 4,350                          | 8,PF                                    |

Sources: 2003 Human Development Report for HDI and GDP value in 2001.

Freedom House scores found at: <http://polisci.la.psu.edu/faculty/Casper/FHratings.pdf>

F=Free; PF=Partly Free

Table 1 also presents the 2001 Human Development Index for these 39 countries (as reported in the Human Development Report, 2003) and their 2003 Freedom House scores. In general, wealthier countries have lower electoral volatility. In an OLS regression with countries' mean volatility as the dependent variable and their Human Development Index (HDI) in 2001 as the only independent variable, the HDI variable was significant at the .000 level and had a strong substantive impact; every increase of .100 in the HDI led to an expected decrease of 12.5% in electoral volatility. The HDI accounted for 46.3% of the variance in volatility scores. In a second OLS regression with only one independent variable, per capita GDP was an even more powerful predictor of volatility, accounting for 60.6% of variance in volatility scores. The per capita GDP variable was significant at .000, and it had a strong substantive impact; a \$1,000 increase in per capita GDP produces an expected decrease of 1.29% in electoral volatility. These results show that the advanced industrial democracies have more stable party systems than the less-developed democracies and semi-democracies. The statistical and substantive impact of the HDI and per capita GDP variables justify the "huge comparison" between party systems of more and less-developed countries, notwithstanding the need for careful distinctions among specific countries. The correlation between countries' per capita income and their mean electoral volatility was an impressive  $-.78$ , significant at .000 (2-tailed). The sixteen countries with the highest HDIs ( $\geq .892$ ) are among the eighteen countries with the lowest electoral volatility.

Party systems range from very stable (the US, Australia, etc.) to extremely volatile (Ukraine, Latvia, Romania, Peru, Russia, Poland, and Estonia). Electoral change is on average far greater in the developing democracies and semi-democracies than in the advanced industrial democracies, even if, as Dalton et al. (2000) argue, volatility has increased in recent decades in the advanced industrial democracies. In the US the results of the previous lower chamber election serve as an excellent predictor of subsequent election results by party, erring on average by only 3.2%. In contrast, in Ukraine the identical procedure offers little predictive capacity with an average error of 59.2% (eighteen times greater than in the US). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) characterized the Western European party systems as "frozen." In contrast, most democracies and semi-democracies of less-developed countries have highly fluid party systems.

The causes of the powerful correlation between a higher level of development and lower electoral volatility require further research. The fact that most Western European party systems stabilized before World War II (Bartolini, Stefano, and Mair, 1990; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), when those countries had much lower standards of living than they currently enjoy, indicates that the main explanation is not a modernization argument by which a higher level of development causes lower electoral volatility. In most of the advanced industrial democracies, parties were vehicles of social and political integration of masses of new citizens (Chalmers, 1964; Pizzorno, 1981). In most late democratizers, parties were less central in the struggle to expand citizenship, and they never had the far-reaching social functions or fostered the strong identities that they did in the early democratizers. These differences in historical patterns probably largely account for the high correlations between a higher level of development and a more stable party system. Poor economic performance in many less-developed countries has also contributed to high electoral volatility (Remmer, 1991; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999). A final contributing factor to high electoral volatility in many less-developed countries has been frequent supply-side changes, as political elites shift from one party to another (Rose and Munro, 2003).

Some analysts (Converse, 1969) argued that party systems would become more stable over time as voters came to identify with certain parties.<sup>8</sup> More recent research, however, has indicated that most voters learn fairly quickly to locate parties' positions (Kitschelt et al., 1999), and that party systems in less-developed countries do not, on average, tend to become more stable over time (Bielasiak, 2002). Our data on electoral volatility support this argument. For the 19 countries in Table 1 with a Human Development Index less than .850, for the first electoral period included in Table 1, electoral volatility averaged 38.2%. In subsequent electoral periods, volatility for these countries averaged 33.1% (n=19), 34.8% (n=16), 35.0% (n=10), and 27.9% (n=7). None of the volatility averages after the first electoral period differs statistically (at  $p < .10$ , 2-tailed) from the 39.6% average for the first period, so there is no statistically significant tendency toward diminishing volatility over time. The data on volatility thus indicate that institutionalization is not linear or teleological. Rose and Munro (2003) refer to this phenomenon of extended time without institutionalization as "competition without

institutionalization.” Weak institutionalization (and high volatility) could go on for an extended period.

During the post-1980 period, most countries have not experienced huge shifts in electoral volatility from one election to the next. The correlation between countries’ scores in the first electoral period used in Table 1 and the second is .68 (n=39) (significant at .000); between the second and third periods it is .83 (n=34) (significant at .000); between the third and fourth periods it is .73 (n=27) (significant at .000); and between the fourth and fifth periods it is .69 (n=23) (significant at .000). Even over an extended period, the correlations hold up at moderately strong levels. For example, the correlation between volatility in the first and the fifth periods is .54, significant at .008, and between the second and fifth it is .69, significant at .000. A few countries exhibit marked declines in volatility over time (e.g., Brazil after 1994), while a few manifest notable increases over time (e.g., Italy in 1993, Venezuela after 1988 compared to earlier decades), but volatility is fairly stable in most countries.

### **IDEOLOGICAL VOTING**

The literature on voting behavior and much of the literature on party competition have been dominated by analyses that assume programmatic or ideological voters. This is true of proximity and directional spatial models of voting, the literature on the left-right schema (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990), social cleavage approaches to party systems (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), and theories on party realignments in the advanced industrial democracies (Inglehart, 1984, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994).

Spatial models of voting are one of the most important approaches to understanding why individuals develop attachments to specific parties and why parties develop deep roots in society. The proximity spatial model of voting is associated with Budge (1994), Cox (1990), Downs (1957), Enelow and Hinich (1984), Hinich and Munger (1994), and Westholm (1997), among others. Hinich and Munger (1994) developed a particularly sophisticated proximity spatial model. They argue that spatial competition does not necessarily occur along a left-right economic dimension,<sup>9</sup> but they still assume that voters choose a party or candidate on the basis of ideology. “Ideology is the basis for choice in large, mass electorates. ... Ideology is a means of creating

coherent and meaningful cues to aid voter choice. ... Ideology provides voters with some means of comparing candidates and parties. ... Ideology is the organizing principle ... in which elections are won or lost” (pp. 95, 100, 101, 102). In this theory, individuals develop attachments to parties because they believe that those parties best advance their interests. Their argument about why large numbers of individuals become attached to parties revolves around the ideological congruence between voters and their preferred parties. Voters choose a candidate or party on the basis of a decision about which one best advances their programmatic interests. Ideology serves as a shortcut for this electoral decision.

Directional spatial models differ from proximity spatial models in one key respect. Directional models agree that voters choose a candidate or party on the basis of which one matches their preferred ideological position. However, in directional theories, citizens vote not according to which party is closest to them on the left-right scale, but rather according to the parties’ ideological orientation, on a few issues about which the voter has an intense preference (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989; Rabinowitz et al., 1991). Despite some differences, the directional approach shares with the proximity models the view that ideological position determines voters’ preferences of candidates or parties.<sup>10</sup>

Other major bodies of literature about parties and voters implicitly assume programmatic or ideological voting.<sup>11</sup> Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) social cleavage theory of party systems assumes that voters identify their interests on the basis of their sociological position in society—class, religion, ethnicity or nationality, and urban/rural residence. Implicitly in their argument, some parties programmatic or ideologically advance the interests of different sectors of society, and individuals form their party preference on the basis of the programmatic/ideological interests that result from their social positions (class, religion, ethnicity or nationality, and urban/rural sector) (see also Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Scully, 1992; Valenzuela, 1997).

Another important scholarly tradition sees the left-right schema, which synthesizes ideological orientations, as a stabilizing psychological anchor that influences the vote. According to this literature, individuals determine their party preferences on the basis of their ideological orientation (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Klingemann,

1979; Inglehart, 1979; Laponce, 1981; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Fleury and Lewis-Beck, 1993; Knutsen, 1997).

All three theories overlook or understate three non-programmatic and non-ideological rationales that might motivate voters (Kitschelt, 2000). First, voters might choose more on the basis of clientelistic goods than ideological position. In this case, a voter might cast a ballot for a politician or party even though a competitor is ideologically closer to her preferred position. By securing clientelistic goods, voters can advance their material interests in a way that would not be possible through public goods. Second, all three theories overlook that voting might be personalistic, without a strong link to ideological preferences or to sociological location (Silveira, 1998). A voter may cast her ballot not on the basis of an ideological preference but rather because of sympathy for the personality traits of a candidate. Under these conditions, the ideological bond between individuals and parties is weak, and there may be no other bond that creates an enduring allegiance to a given party. Third, voters may value government performance more than parties' ideological positions (Ferejohn, 1986; Fiorina, 1981; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2003).

Given these alternative rationales for voting, there might be variance across countries in the extent to which voters cast their ballot on ideological grounds. We explore this possibility in what follows.<sup>12</sup> We show that ideological voting as measured by the traditional left-right schema is far more powerful in the advanced industrial democracies than in democracies and semi-democracies of the less-developed world.<sup>13</sup>

Table 2 shows the results of a logistic regression using the left-right scale as the only predictor in the countries included in several comparative surveys that had a combined Freedom House score of 10 or less in 1996. We show the regressions for the largest three parties (according to the number of respondents who expressed a party preference in the survey) in each country. The countries are arranged from highest to lowest mean Nagelkerke  $R^2$  for the three pairs of parties to provide a rough summary score for each country. Although  $R^2$  statistics cannot be compared across models, Table 2 shows huge and meaningful differences using the same independent variable with matched pairs of parties as the dependent variable.

The strength of the left-right dimension in predicting voters' preferences is considerably higher in the more developed countries. The correlation between a country's HDI and its mean Nagelkerke  $R^2$  in Table 2 is .49, and the correlation between a country's per capita income and its mean Nagelkerke  $R^2$  is .40.<sup>14</sup> The predictability of the vote on the basis of left-right position is lower in most of the less-developed countries. Moreover, because the regressions throw out cases in which respondents did not give their position on the left-right scale, and because such cases were more frequent in the less-developed countries, Table 2 understates the differences in how well the left-right scale predicts the vote between these two sets of countries.

**TABLE 2**

| <b>Left-Right Position and Party Preferences (Logistic Regressions)</b> |   |   |                  |  |
|---|---|---|------------------|--|
| Country   | Pair of parties (Dependent variable)          | Significance of left-right logistic coefficient | Nagelkerke $R^2$ | Average of Nagelkerke $R^2$ for party pairings |
| Czech Rep.  | ODS v. CSSD                                   | 0.000   | 0.62             | 0.68   |
|   | ODS v. KCSM                                   | 0.000   | 0.89             |  |
|   | CSSD v. KCSM                                  | 0.000   | 0.52             |  |
| Sweden  | Moderata Samligspartiet v. Social Democrats   | 0.000   | 0.82             | 0.66   |
|   | Moderata Samligspartiet v. Vansterpartiet     | 0.000   | 0.94             |  |
|   | Social Democrats v. Vansterpartiet            | 0.000   | 0.23             |  |
| Italy   | Forza Italia v. PDS                           | 0.000   | 0.85             | 0.64   |
|   | Forza Italia v. AN                            | 0.000   | 0.13             |  |
|   | PDS v. AN                                     | 0.000   | 0.91             |  |
| France  | Socialist v. RPR                              | 0.000   | 0.76             | 0.44   |
|   | Socialist v. National Front                   | 0.000   | 0.59             |  |
|   | RPR v. National Front                         | Not significant                                 | 0.01             |  |
| Spain   | PP v. PSOE                                    | 0.000   | 0.63             | 0.42   |
|   | PP v. Izquierda Unida                         | 0.000   | 0.62             |  |
|   | PSOE v. IU                                    | Not significant                                 | 0.00             |  |
| Uruguay   | Colorado v. Nacional                          | 0.066   | 0.01             | 0.40   |
|   | Colorado v. Frente Amplio                     | 0.000   | 0.62             |  |
|   | Nacional v. Frente Amplio                     | 0.000   | 0.58             |  |
| Bulgaria  | Union of Democratic Forces v. Socialist Party | 0.000   | 0.63             | 0.38   |
|   | Union of Democratic Forces v. Agrarian Party  | 0.000   | 0.28             |  |
|   | Socialist Party v. Agrarian Party             | 0.000   | 0.22             |  |



|              |  |                 |      |      |
|--------------|--|-----------------|------|------|
| Chile        | Socialists (PS+PPD) v. PDC                     | 0.000           | 0.12 | 0.33 |
|              | Conservatives (UDI+RN) v. PDC                  | 0.000           | 0.33 |      |
|              | Conservatives (UDI+RN) v. Socialists (PS+PPD)  | 0.000           | 0.53 |      |
| Belgium      | CD&V v. PS                                     | 0.000           | 0.49 | 0.32 |
|              | CD&V v. VLD                                    | Not significant | 0.01 |      |
|              | PS v. VLD                                      | 0.000           | 0.48 |      |
| Poland       | Solidarnosc v. PSL                             | 0.000           | 0.18 | 0.31 |
|              | Solidarnosc v. SLD                             | 0.000           | 0.53 |      |
|              | PSL v. SLD                                     | 0.000           | 0.24 |      |
| Netherlands  | PvdA v. CDA                                    | 0.000           | 0.47 | 0.28 |
|              | PvdA v. D'66                                   | 0.000           | 0.11 |      |
|              | CDA v. D'66                                    | 0.000           | 0.28 |      |
| West Germany | SPD v. CDU/CSU                                 | 0.000           | 0.35 | 0.28 |
|              | SPD v. Greens                                  | 0.010           | 0.03 |      |
|              | CDU/CSU v. Greens                              | 0.000           | 0.47 |      |
| UK           | Conservative v. Labour                         | 0.000           | 0.43 | 0.23 |
|              | Conservative v. Liberal Democrats              | 0.000           | 0.21 |      |
|              | Labour v. Liberal Democrats                    | 0.000           | 0.07 |      |
| Norway       | Labour v. Progressive                          | 0.000           | 0.10 | 0.19 |
|              | Labour v. Conservative                         | 0.000           | 0.38 |      |
|              | Progressive v. Conservative                    | 0.000           | 0.10 |      |
| Switzerland  | Radical Démocratique v. Socialist              | 0.000           | 0.40 | 0.17 |
|              | Radical Démocratique v. Christian Democrats    | 0.059           | 0.07 |      |
|              | Socialist v. Christian Democrats               | 0.055           | 0.03 |      |
| Hungary      | MSZP v. FIDESZ                                 | 0.000           | 0.32 | 0.17 |
|              | MSZP v. FKGP                                   | 0.010           | 0.04 |      |
|              | FIDESZ v. FKGP                                 | 0.000           | 0.14 |      |
| Japan        | Liberal Democratic Party v. New Frontier party | 0.000           | 0.11 | 0.16 |
|              | Liberal Democratic Party v. Socialist Party    | 0.000           | 0.30 |      |
|              | New Frontier party v. Socialist Party          | 0.009           | 0.08 |      |
| US           | Republicans v. Democrats                       | 0.000           | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| Venezuela    | AD v. COPEI                                    | Not significant | 0.00 | 0.14 |
|              | AD v. Causa R                                  | 0.000           | 0.22 |      |
|              | COPEI v. Causa R                               | 0.000           | 0.21 |      |
| Australia    | Australian Labor Party v. Liberal Party        | 0.000           | 0.16 | 0.11 |
|              | Australian Labor Party v. Green Party          | 0.006           | 0.01 |      |
|              | Liberal Party v. Green Party                   | 0.000           | 0.17 |      |
| Slovenia     | Liberal Democracy v. People's Party            | 0.002           | 0.06 | 0.10 |
|              | Liberal Democracy v. Christian Democrats       | 0.000           | 0.20 |      |

|           |   |                 |      |      |
|-----------|---|-----------------|------|------|
|           | People's Party v. Christian Democrats                   | 0.032           | 0.04 |      |
| Brazil    | PMDB v. PT  | 0.000           | 0.08 | 0.08 |
|           | PMDB v. PSDB  | 0.064           | 0.02 |      |
|           | PT v. PSDB  | 0.000           | 0.15 |      |
| Argentina | PJ v. UCR   | 0.000           | 0.05 | 0.07 |
|           | PJ v. Frepaso   | 0.000           | 0.13 |      |
|           | UCR v. Frepaso  | 0.034           | 0.03 |      |
| Mexico    | PRI v. PRD  | 0.000           | 0.13 | 0.07 |
|           | PAN v. PRD  | 0.000           | 0.04 |      |
|           | PRI v. PAN  | 0.000           | 0.03 |      |
| Taiwan    | Nationalist Party v. Democratic Progressive Party       | 0.000           | 0.13 | 0.07 |
|           | Nationalist Party v. New Party                          | 0.005           | 0.02 |      |
|           | Democratic Progressive Party v. New Party               | 0.002           | 0.05 |      |
| Ukraine   | Democratic Party Ukr. v. Communist Party Ukr.           | Not significant | 0.02 | 0.07 |
|           | Democratic Party Ukr. v. Popular Movement Ukr.          | 0.000           | 0.13 |      |
|           | Communist Party Ukr. v. Popular Movement Ukr.           | 0.007           | 0.04 |      |
| Russia    | Communist Party v. Our Home Russia                      | 0.000           | 0.10 | 0.05 |
|           | Communist Party v. Lib-Dem. Party                       | 0.040           | 0.03 |      |
|           | Our Home Russia v. Lib-Dem. Party                       | Not significant | 0.01 |      |
| India     | Indian National Congress v. BJP                         | 0.023           | 0.02 | 0.02 |
|           | Indian National Congress v. Janata Dal (People's Party) | Not significant | 0.01 |      |
|           | BJP v. Janata Dal (People's Party)                      | 0.024           | 0.02 |      |
| Romania   | CDR v. PDSR   | 0.001           | 0.03 | 0.02 |
|           | CDR v. PD   | Not significant | 0.01 |      |
|           | PDSR v. PD  | Not significant | 0.01 |      |
| Peru      | Cambio 90 v. UPP  | Not significant | 0.00 | 0.01 |
|           | Cambio 90 v. APRA                                       | Not significant | 0.00 |      |
|           | UPP v. APRA   | 0.015           | 0.03 |      |

Sources: *European Election Study 1994* (Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, UK, West Germany), *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996–2000* (Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania), *World Values Survey 1997* (all the remaining countries).

Where survey respondents' left-right location is a weaker predictor of their vote, party supporters have more scattered distributions along the left-right scale. Table 3 provides a score that measures the extent to which a country's parties were cohesive along the left-right dimension. The country score is constructed by beginning with the

standard deviation of each party's supporters along the left-right dimension, then weighting the parties by their number of supporters. Party sympathizers in the less-developed countries typically have high standard deviations in their left-right self-placement.<sup>15</sup> The correlation between a country's 2001 Human Development Index and its weighted standard deviation in Table 3 is remarkably high at -.71. Even if ideological differences have narrowed in the advanced industrial democracies in recent decades (Fukuyama, 1992), they remain more central in party competition in most of the advanced industrial democracies than in most democracies and semi-democracies of less-developed countries.

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**TABLE 3**

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**Standard Deviations of Party Supporters' Left-Right Positions**

| Country                            | Country Score* | Country   | Country Score* |
|------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|
| Sweden                             | 1.35           | Japan     | 1.83           |
| West Germany                       | 1.46           | US        | 1.83           |
| Spain                              | 1.46           | Argentina | 1.85           |
| Italy                              | 1.49           | Russia    | 1.86           |
| Netherlands                        | 1.49           | Bulgaria  | 1.87           |
| France (94)                        | 1.50           | Uruguay   | 1.88           |
| Norway                             | 1.51           | Hungary   | 1.90           |
| UK (Northern Ireland not included) | 1.64           | Belgium   | 1.93           |
| Slovenia                           | 1.65           | Poland    | 1.98           |
| Switzerland                        | 1.65           | Peru      | 2.10           |
| Czech Republic                     | 1.67           | México    | 2.45           |
| Taiwan                             | 1.67           | India     | 2.52           |
| Australia                          | 1.68           | Romania   | 2.59           |
| Chile                              | 1.68           | Brazil    | 2.84           |
| Ukraine                            | 1.77           | Venezuela | 3.00           |

The weighted country mean is the mean standard deviation for all parties with at least two party supporters, weighted by the number of party supporters. The weighting means that all individuals who expressed a party preference are weighted equally, provided that their party had at least one other supporter among survey respondents. The reason for excluding parties with only one supporter is that the standard deviation must be zero if N=1.

Sources: *European Election Study 1994* for Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, and the UK; *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996–2000* for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania; *World Values Surveys 1997* for all the remaining countries.

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This evidence suggests a need to rethink theories about voters, voting and party competition in democracies and semi-democracies of less-developed countries. The programmatic and ideological linkages between voters and parties are weaker in these

countries than much of the literature assumes. Ideological voting is a powerful aspect of party competition in most of the advanced industrial democracies. In contrast, it is much weaker in most of the democratic and semi-democratic developing world. Spatial models and other theoretical approaches that assume ideological voting are not wrong, but there is considerable variance in how accurately they portray party competition in different countries—a fact that spatial models have not acknowledged.

This discussion about the weakness of ideological voting in most less-developed countries is related to the weak institutionalization of these party systems. The second dimension of party system institutionalization is party anchoring in society. In more institutionalized party systems, parties develop strong and stable roots in society. Where parties have strong roots in society, most voters feel connected to a party and regularly vote for its candidates.

Most theories about why individuals develop strong allegiances to parties or, stated conversely, why parties develop strong roots in society, focus on ideological or programmatic linkages. According to such theories, voters choose a party because it represents their ideological preferences. Because ideological linkages between voters and parties are an important means by which voters become attached to parties and hence an important means by which parties become rooted in society, in general, where ideological linkages to parties are weaker, electoral volatility is higher. Although programmatic or ideological linkages are not the only ways to create party system stability, they are the major way that such stability is achieved. Where there is a weak linkage between voters' ideological and programmatic position and their preferred party, voters are more likely to drift from one party to the next; that is, they are more likely to be floating voters.

### **PERSONALISM, INFORMATION, VOTING, AND PARTY COMPETITION**

The flip side of the much lower predictive capacity of ideological voting in most democracies and semi-democracies of less-developed countries is that personalism plays a much greater role in voting (Silveira, 1998).<sup>16</sup> Personalistic voting is an important and partly measurable political phenomenon, yet it has been neglected in most of the theoretical literature on voting, including spatial models and works based on the left-right

scheme. In most democracies and semi-democracies of less-developed countries, individual personalities, independent of party, have a sizable impact in electoral campaigns. Many citizens vote to a significant degree on the basis of the personal characteristics of candidates. Personalistic voting is important in many less-developed democracies and semi-democracies, and political independents can successfully seek high-level office. Space for populists is greater, especially in presidential systems since candidates appeal directly to voters without needing to be elected head of a party in order to become head of state. Candidates can capture high executive office such as the presidency and governorships without being rooted in an established party.

One way to assess the importance of personalism in electoral campaigns is data on outsider presidential candidates. Electorally competitive independent presidential candidates and candidates from new parties reflect a high degree of personalism and voters' openness to candidates from outside the established parties. For operational purposes, we define a new party as one that won less than 5% of the lower chamber vote in the previous election and did not have presidential candidates in any election prior to the previous one.

Table 4 presents data on the share of the vote won by outsider presidential candidates in six Latin American countries and (for comparative purposes) the US.<sup>17</sup> Outsiders won the presidential election in Peru in 1990, Venezuela in 1993 and 1998, and Colombia and Ecuador in 2002.<sup>18</sup> This extraordinary political occurrence manifests weak institutionalization of the existing party system. Another outsider (Evo Morales) made it to the runoff round in the presidential election in Bolivia in 2002. In Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, outsiders won at least 50% of the valid vote in one of the last two (as of 2004) presidential elections.

TABLE 4

**Average Share of Vote Won by Outsider Presidential Candidates  
in Five Most Recent Presidential Elections, Select Countries**

| Country       | Elections Included | % of Vote Won by Outsider Candidates Most Recent Election | Average % of Vote Won by Outsider Candidates Last Five Elections |
|---------------|--------------------|---|--|
| United States | 1984–2000          | 0.3   | 6.0  |
| Brazil        | 1989–2002          | 0.0   | 13.4   |
| Ecuador       | 1988–2002          | 58.9  | 17.5   |
| Bolivia       | 1985–2002          | 51.3  | 22.1   |
| Venezuela     | 1983–2000          | 40.2  | 26.5   |
| Colombia      | 1986–2002          | 66.5  | 28.5   |
| Peru          | 1985–2001          | 27.9  | 32.7   |

Data for Brazil include four elections only because there have been only four popular presidential elections since the transition to democracy in 1985.

Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92) created a party in order to run for president in 1989, and he defeated the candidates of the established parties. Seven months after his inauguration, his party won only 40 of 503 lower chamber seats in the October 1990 congressional elections. Clearly, his appeal was personalistic and not party based. His party disappeared in the months following his 1992 resignation from office in order to avoid his impeachment. Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) also created a party in order to run for the presidency; he, too, campaigned against parties and subsequently eschewed efforts to build a party. In Peru, political independents dominated the 1995 municipal elections. Having seen from Fujimori that anti-party appeals could win popular support, a new cohort of anti-party politicians emerged. Fujimori used focus groups and surveys to determine who ran on the ballot of his highly personalized party. Fujimori himself, rather than the party, controlled congressional nominations (Conaghan, 2000); this personalistic control of candidate selection is the antithesis of what is found in an institutionalized system. Moreover, as is also true in Russia, candidates could gain ballot access without a party and could win election as independents. Former coup leader Hugo Chávez created a new party in his successful bid for the presidency of Venezuela in 1998. In a similar vein, in Ecuador in 2002, former coup leader Lucio Gutiérrez created a new party in his successful campaign for president.

Personalism and anti-party politicians are also common in some post-communist cases. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not a member of a party and undermined parties. Alexander Lebed, who finished third in the 1996 Russian presidential election, ran as an independent. Nonpartisan candidates have fared well in the plurality races for both chambers of the Russian parliament. In the 1993 elections, well over half of the single-member district candidates for the lower chamber were independents without partisan affiliation, and only 83 of the 218 deputies elected belonged to a party (Moser, 1995: 98). In 1995, more than 1,000 of the 2,700 candidates for the single-member district seats were independents. Independents won 78 of the 225 single-member seats; the largest single party could muster only 58 seats (White, Rose, and McAllister, 1997: 203, 224). Former King Simeon II of Bulgaria also created an electorally successful personalistic political vehicle.

Why is personalistic voting widespread in many less-developed countries even after considerable time under democratic rule? We cannot fully address this question here, but some brief speculations are in order. First, historical sequences in party building are important. In the old, well-established democracies, parties became deeply rooted in society before the emergence of the modern mass media, especially television. In Western Europe, working-class parties integrated workers into the political system and provided fundamental sources of identity (Chalmers, 1964; Pizzorno, 1981). A similar phenomenon occurred with Christian Democratic parties (Kalyvas, 1996). In contrast, in many democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries, television became a mass phenomenon before parties were deeply entrenched in society. Candidates for executive office can get their messages across on television without the need to rely on well-developed party organizations (Sartori, 1989). Second, the poor regime performance of many post-1978 democracies in less-developed countries has discredited governing parties (Remmer, 1991; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999) and, even more broadly, has discredited parties as vehicles of representation. The discrediting of parties has opened the doors to personalistic anti-party crusaders. Third, in many democracies in less-developed countries, parties are programmatically diffuse (Kitschelt et al., 1999: 164–190; Ostiguy, 1998), making it difficult for voters to determine which party is closest to their own positions, or they may be ideologically unreliable, undertaking radical shifts in

positions (Stokes, 2001). In such circumstances, voters are volatile and more likely to flock to personalistic candidates, who often campaign against parties. Fourth, personalistic voting is likely to be stronger in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. Most of the advanced industrial democracies have parliamentary systems, and many democracies and semi-democracies in less-developed countries have presidential systems.

The prevalence of personalism in many democracies in less-developed countries is related to the second and fourth dimensions of party system institutionalization. Personalistic linkages between voters and candidates tend to be stronger where party roots in society are weaker. They also tend to be stronger with weak party organizations and weakly institutionalized parties. In most semi-democracies and democracies in less-developed countries, parties have precarious resources and are weakly professionalized. Many parties are personalistic vehicles (Conaghan, 2000). In more institutionalized systems, voters are more likely to identify with a party, and parties are more likely to dominate patterns of political recruitment and political deliberation. In less-institutionalized party systems, many voters choose according to personality or clientelism more than party; anti-party politicians are more able to win office. Populism and anti-politics are more common. Personalities more than party organizations dominate the political scene.

Voting based on the rational evaluation of leaders might be a sign of political sophistication and greater electoral accountability. In many less-institutionalized party systems, however, the relationship between ideological position and voter evaluation of political leaders is weak. This fact comes through in Table 5, which shows the product moment correlation of leadership evaluation and ideology. The relationship between leadership evaluation and ideology is high for all the advanced industrial democracies whereas it is much lower in some less-developed countries. In some countries (Mexico, Peru, and Taiwan), the relationship between citizen evaluation of leaders and their left-right position is almost zero. The correlation between countries' mean Pearson correlation in Table 5 and their Human Development Index is .56, demonstrating a much stronger linkage between ideological position and leadership evaluation in the advanced industrial democracies than in less-developed countries.<sup>19</sup>



TABLE 5

**Ideological Anchoring of Leaders' Evaluation in 19 Countries included in the CSES study  
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)**

|                          |                    |        |                             |                     |        |
|--------------------------|--------------------|--------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------|
| Czech Republic<br>(1996) | Vaclav Klaus       | .60**  | United Kingdom<br>(1997)    | Tony Blair          | -.30** |
|                          | Ellemann-Jensen    | -.42** |                             | John Major          | .40**  |
|                          | P. Stig Moeller    | -.63** |                             | Paddy Ashdown       | -.16** |
| Average                  |                    | .54    | Average                     |                     | .29    |
| Sweden<br>(1998)         | Goran Persson      | -.39** | United States               | Bill Clinton        | -.27** |
|                          | Carl Bildt         | .58**  |                             | Bob Dole            | .31**  |
|                          | Gudrun Schyman     | -.48** |                             | Average             |        |
| Average                  |                    | .48    | Russia<br>(1999)            | Zyuganov            | -.51** |
| Spain                    | Jose Maria Aznar   | .57**  | Kiriyenko                   | .18**               |        |
|                          | Joaquin Almunia    | -.32** | Luzhkov                     | -.12**              |        |
|                          | F. Frutos          | -.29   | Average                     |                     | .27    |
| Average                  |                    | .39    | Germany<br>(1998)           | Schroeder           | -.21** |
| Australia                | Paul Keating       | -.33** | Kohl                        | .26**               |        |
|                          | John Howard        | .43**  | Waigel                      | .28**               |        |
|                          | Tim Fischer        | .39**  | Average                     |                     | .25    |
| Average                  |                    | .38    | Netherlands<br>(1998)       | Wim Kok             | -.10** |
| Denmark<br>(1998)        | P. Nyrup Rasmussen | -.36** | Frits Bolkesetain           | .34**               |        |
|                          | Ellemann-Jensen    | .52**  | J. De Hoop                  | .21**               |        |
|                          | P. Stig Moeller    | .26**  | Average                     |                     | .22    |
| Average                  |                    | .38    | Slovenia                    | Janez Drnovsek      | -.19** |
| Portugal<br>(1997)       | J. Barroso         | .55**  | Marjan Podobnik             | .12**               |        |
|                          | A. Guterres        | -.24** | Janez Jansa                 | .36**               |        |
|                          | P. Portas          | .35**  | Average                     |                     | .22    |
| Average                  |                    | .38    | Romania                     | Emil Constantinescu | .19**  |
| Hungary<br>(1998)        | Gyula Horn         | -.39** | Ion Iliescu                 | -.17**              |        |
|                          | Viktor Orban       | .34**  | Average                     |                     | .18    |
|                          | Jozsef Torgyan     | .36**  | Taiwan                      | Lee Tung-Hui        | .10*   |
| Average                  |                    | .36    | Peng Ming Min               | -.02                |        |
| Norway<br>(1997)         | Thorbjorn Jagland  | -.17** | Lin Yang-Gang               | .19**               |        |
|                          | Carl Ivar Hagen    | .45**  | Average                     |                     | .10    |
|                          | Jan Petersen       | .40**  | Mexico<br>(2000)            | E. Zedillo          | .12**  |
| Average                  |                    | .34    | D. Fernandez de<br>Cevallos | .11**               |        |
| Switzerland<br>(1999)    | Christoph Blocher  | .50**  | Cardenas Solorzano          | -.05                |        |
|                          | Ruth Dreifuss      | -.34** | Average                     |                     | .08    |
|                          | Franz Steinegger   | .18**  | Peru                        | A. Toledo           | -.05   |
| Average                  |                    | .34    | A. Garcia                   | .03                 |        |
|                          |                    |        | L. Flores                   | .13**               |        |
|                          |                    |        | Average                     |                     | .04    |

Entries are Pearson correlation scores between respondents' left-right ideological self-placement and their evaluation of specified leaders. The country average is an unweighted average of the absolute values of the three individual correlations for the country. Non-significant correlations do not differ statistically from 0 at the 90% confidence level, and hence we treated them as a correlation of 0 in calculating the country average.

\* Significant at .10 level.

\*\*Significant at .05 level.

Leadership evaluation might in principle be a reasonable means to promote representation and electoral accountability, but where leadership evaluation is not well connected to ideological or programmatic issues, it indicates non-programmatic personalism. According to many views (Barnes, 1977; Converse and Pierce, 1986), representation devoid of programmatic content is meaningless; representation exists only because of a programmatic/ideological match between the views of representatives and citizens. Such representation occurs only by accident if at all when there is no relationship between citizens' ideological positions and their assessment of political leaders. In most less-developed countries, the connection between citizens' ideological position and their preferred political leaders is weak.

### CONCLUSION

Analyses of parties and party systems in less-developed countries have proliferated in the past decade or two, but they have not sufficiently challenged the way we theorize about and compare party systems. Such a challenge is in order. It is not that the analyses of the party systems of the advanced industrial democracies are wrong; they are often impressive. Rather, analyzing third-wave party systems enables one to perceive important issues that do not surface in examining the advanced industrial democracies.<sup>20</sup>

The most important differences between party systems in less-developed countries and those of the advanced industrial democracies can be synthetically captured by differences in party system institutionalization. Party systems vary markedly in levels of institutionalization, and institutionalization varies independently from the number of parties and the level of polarization. Whereas analysts who compare party systems on the bases of the number of parties would lump together multiparty cases regardless of the level of institutionalization, the weakly institutionalized cases differ markedly from solidly entrenched ones. Treating all multiparty systems as an undifferentiated category when there are vast differences in institutionalization is misleading. Ecuador, Norway, Peru, Russia, and Sweden have multiparty systems, but the systems in Norway and Sweden are much more institutionalized than those in Ecuador, Peru, and Russia. Lumping together these cases of multipartism conceals profound differences in the nature of the systems.

Institutionalization also varies significantly relative to ideological distance in the party system. Some polarized systems (e.g., France from the 1960s to the 1980s, Italy from the 1940s to the 1980s) were well institutionalized. Other polarized systems (e.g., Brazil in the mid- to late-1980s, Venezuela since 1998) are less institutionalized and function in a different manner. A key feature of party systems in the developing democratic and semi-democratic world, as much as the number of parties and the ideological distance among them, is the low level of institutionalization.

Our focus has been on the crucial differences in party system institutionalization and ways in which these differences dictate a need to rethink party system theory. Spatial constraints prohibit an extended discussion of the consequences of weak party system institutionalization. Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mainwaring (1999: 323–336), Moser (1999, 2001), and Stoner Weiss (2001) have written about some such consequences. Although we cannot delve into this issue in detail, the intuition is that institutionalization has important consequences for democratic politics. Otherwise, it would not be a paramount issue in studying party systems. Therefore, we close with two observations about consequences of weak system institutionalization.

First, weak institutionalization introduces more uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes. The turnover from one party to others is higher, the entry barriers to new parties are lower, and the likelihood that personalistic anti-system politicians can become the head of government is much higher. Such uncertainty proved inimical to democracy until the 1980s, when the end of the Cold War reduced the stakes of political conflict and facilitated the post-1989 expansion of democracy and semi-democracy in the world. Even in the post-Cold War context, the much higher level of personalism in weakly institutionalized party systems can pave the way toward authoritarianism (e.g., President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 1992) or toward the erosion of democratic or semi-democratic regimes (e.g., President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela since 1998) (Mayorga, forthcoming).

Second, weak institutionalization is inimical to electoral accountability. In most democracies, parties are the primary mechanism of electoral accountability. For electoral accountability to work well, voters must be able to identify—in broad terms—what the main parties are and what they stand for (Hinich and Munger, 1994). In contexts where

parties disappear and appear with frequency, where the competition among them is ideologically and programmatically diffuse, and where personalities often overshadow parties as routes to executive power, the prospects for effective electoral accountability suffer.<sup>21</sup>

For electoral accountability to function well, the political environment must provide citizens with effective information cues that enable them to vote in reasoned ways without spending inordinate time to reach these reasoned decisions. In more institutionalized systems, parties provide an ideological reference that gives some anchoring to voters. Voters can reduce information costs using the shortcuts at their disposal, thus increasing the levels of electoral accountability. The limited stability of less-institutionalized party systems and the weak programmatic/ideological content that party labels provide in these contexts reduce the information cues that these systems offer voters. The weaker information cues hamper the bounded rationality of voters, undercutting the potential for electoral accountability based on a rational evaluation of policies, governments, and leaders. Where electoral accountability suffers, the promise that representative democracy holds, that elected politicians will serve as agents of the voters to advance some common good or to advance interests of specific constituencies, may break down.

In one of the most famous quotes in the history of the analysis of political parties, Schattschneider (1942:1) wrote that “political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.” If the history of modern democracy is built on political parties, then we can expect democracy to have some deficiencies where parties are less stable mechanisms of representation, accountability, and structuring than they have been in the advanced industrial democracies.

## **APPENDIX 1**

### **Additional Coding Rules for Outsider Presidential Candidates**

1. Our intention is to count only those parties that are really new. Therefore, if a party changed its name from Election  $t$  to Election  $t+1$ , we did not count it as a new party at  $t+1$ .
2. For the same reason, we did not count an alliance (coalition) of previously existing parties as a new party.
3. We did not count a merger of two previously existing parties as a new party.
4. In cases of a party schism, neither of the resulting parties is counted as new.
5. We count as independents candidates who did not have a party affiliation.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> In our usage, roughly, countries with a value of .900 in the 2003 Human Development Report are developed, and countries with a score below .850 are less developed. Values between .850 and .899 are intermediate cases. By this criterion, in 2001, 22 countries ranked as developed, 11 were in the intermediate category, and the remaining 142 were less developed.

<sup>2</sup> We follow the definitions of democracy and semi-democracy in Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñan (2001).

<sup>3</sup> Our focus is on party *systems*. Other scholars have looked at the institutionalization of *parties* (Dix, 1992; Gunther and Hopkin, 2002; Huntington, 1968:12–28; Janda, 1980; Levitsky, 2003; Mény, 1990; Panebianco, 1988; Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Party institutionalization in democracies is positively and strongly correlated to party system institutionalization, but the relationship is not linear, as Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 20–21), Randall and Svåsand (2002), Stockton (2001), and Wallis (2003) have noted.

<sup>4</sup> When a party split into two or more parties from election T1 to T2, we compared its T2 total with the largest split-off. We then treated the smaller new splinter party as if it had no votes in election T1. When two or more parties merged and created a new organization, we calculated volatility using the original party with the highest percentage. If two or more parties merged for election T2, but competed in election T1 as separate parties, we assumed that the one(s) with fewer votes disappeared in election T2. We gave a zero value to this party in T2 and counted its share of the vote in T1 as its percentage of change. When a party changed its name but had an obvious continuity with a previous party, we counted them as being the same organization. We usually treated independents as a category because we lacked the data needed for comparing individuals' results from one election to the next.

<sup>5</sup> Freedom House publishes an annual report on the state of civil liberties and political rights in most countries. Scores ranges from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). We combined the two scores, creating an index from 2 (most democratic) to 14 (most authoritarian).

<sup>6</sup> We did not include Bangladesh and the Philippines because of incomplete electoral results. For Ecuador, we used results for deputies selected in a country-wide district, not the separate results for federal deputies elected in provincial-wide districts.

<sup>7</sup> For Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and West Germany, we used the European Election Study 1994.

<sup>8</sup> Janda (1980) also argued that party institutionalization is a question of age.

<sup>9</sup> We disagree that the left-right dimension necessarily refers exclusively or even primarily to an economic dimension. Rather, it incorporates historically changing issues, of which economic issues were salient in most advanced industrial democracies. In many advanced industrial democracies, religion has been a better predictor of left-right position than class. Increasingly in the past two decades, post-materialism has become an important predictor of left-right position (Inglehart, 1984, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994).

<sup>10</sup> Iversen (1994b) and Merrill and Grofman (1999) integrate the proximity and directional spatial models. Iversen (1994a) integrates spatial theory with an understanding that parties influence voters. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) criticize spatial theory; they argue that ideological voting is less important than spatial models claim.

<sup>11</sup> One important contrasting approach to ideological voting is voting based on government performance. For example, Fiorina's (1981) seminal work assumes voting on the basis of retrospective assessments about policy benefits. Theories about economic voting (Kiewiet and Kinder, 1979) are also predicated upon the assumption that voters make their electoral choices based on government performance. See Sánchez-Cuenca (2003) for a synthesis of ideological and performance based approaches to voting.

<sup>12</sup> We do not have data that would allow us to compare the extent of clientelistic voting across

different countries. Considerable evidence—although it is not systematic—indicates that clientelism is more widespread in most third and fourth wave democracies than in the advanced industrialized democracies. (See Ames, 2001; Guevara Mann, 2001; Hagopian, 1996; Hartlyn, 1988: 170–183; Legg and Lemarchand, 1972; Mainwaring, 1999:175–218; O’Donnell, 1996; and Scott, 1972.)

<sup>13</sup> The left-right scale is a good summary of ideology in most countries (Alcántara, 1995; Dalton, 1985; Inglehart, 1984; Sani and Sartori, 1983). Hinich and Munger (1994:115–163) are more skeptical of using the left-right scale as an aggregate measure of ideological position. In a personal communication, Kevin Krause noted that in some countries with significant ethnic divides, for example, Slovakia, left-right positions is not a good summary of ideology.

<sup>14</sup> Comparing  $R^2$  across different equations, and therefore creating a summary mean by averaging  $R^2$ , is not statistically correct. This procedure merely provides a rough empirical way to examine the relationship between the importance of ideology in party competition and the level of development.

<sup>15</sup> See Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), Table 13.3, for comparable data on standard deviations of party supporters in Western Europe in 1973. Ireland was an outlier, with a tenuous relationship between left-right self-location and party preference.

<sup>16</sup> Silveira 1998 is an excellent study of personalistic voting in Brazil. He emphasizes the non-programmatic, non-ideological aspects of poor Brazilian voters. This theme has echoes in some literature on the US (Converse, 1964; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002), but it cuts against most of the recent work on the advanced industrial democracies. The literature on populism is relevant to the analysis of personalistic voting. Populist leaders establish a direct, personalistic relationship to the masses. (See Roberts, 1995; Weffort, 1978; Weyland, 1999.)

<sup>17</sup> Appendix 1 gives additional details on how we coded whether candidates were outsiders or not.

<sup>18</sup> There are two types of outsiders: those who had never been national politicians and ran against the establishment—such as Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez, and Lucio Gutiérrez—and those outside the party system—such as Rafael Caldera and Álvaro Uribe Vélez. The former have no prior national political experience, and the latter are dissidents from traditional parties. Here we focus on politicians who are outside the established party system.

<sup>19</sup> This correlation is for the 17 countries included in both Table 1 and Table 5.

<sup>20</sup> Along similar lines, Mainwaring (2003) argues that parties in less-institutionalized democracies (most post-1978 cases) have different objectives than parties in the advanced industrial democracies. Parties in less-institutionalized democracies are concerned about objectives involving the political regime (preserving or undermining it) in addition to electoral and policy objectives.

<sup>21</sup> Electoral accountability also suffers where parties undertake radical policy shifts, as occurred in many Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Stokes, 2001).

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