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Source: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Oct., 2001), pp. 1-22

Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/422412>

Accessed: 11-03-2020 15:50 UTC

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# Clarifying a Contested Concept

## Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics

*Kurt Weyland*

Social scientists commonly encounter concepts that are unclear and contested. Authors inspired by competing theories emphasize different attributes from a complex set of defining characteristics. These differences in intension produce differences in extension as scholars apply the same term to divergent sets of cases. Therefore, it is unclear how one author's findings apply to the cases delimited by another's different definition. Conceptual disagreements thus hinder the cumulation of knowledge. Indeed, scholars can shield their arguments from criticism by attributing discordant results to definitional differences. Due to the lack of conceptual agreement, authors "talk past each other" and avoid addressing counterarguments. The resulting fragmentation obstructs debate and criticism, the engines of scholarly progress.<sup>1</sup>

A particularly confusing concept is populism. Scholars have diverged not only over its specific attributes, but also over its primary domain. Should populism be defined in political, social, economic, and/or discursive terms? Due to these conceptual disagreements, a wide variety of governments, parties, movements, leaders, and policies has been labeled populist, and scholars have found populism to have radically divergent characteristics.<sup>2</sup>

To flee from this confusion, some authors have advocated abandoning the concept.<sup>3</sup> But the scholarly community has refused to follow these calls. Instead, in the last decade studies of populism have thrived.<sup>4</sup> Evidently, many authors continue to regard populism as a useful, even indispensable, concept in elucidating Latin American politics.

This article therefore applies a different approach, inspired by Sartori's "guidelines for concept analysis."<sup>5</sup> It seeks to clarify the meaning of populism and to propose a new definition. To place the debate in a systematic context, it first distinguishes different types of conceptualization. It then assesses the most useful type in clarifying populism. Finally, populism is systematically redefined by determining its domain and *genus*, clarifying its specific characteristics, and distinguishing two subtypes.

### Strategies of Conceptualization

Conceptual confusion prevails when different scholars emphasize divergent attributes as defining characteristics of a concept. This problem is particularly acute when

authors disagree on a concept's domain, whether it should be defined as political, economic, social, discursive, or multidomain.


There are three strategies for clarifying such unclear concepts: cumulation, addition, and redefinition (see Figure 1). Cumulation elaborates definitions that combine the attributes from different domains stressed by various scholars through a logical "and" ( $\wedge$ ). Accordingly, only cases to which all of the main characteristics from different domains apply qualify as instances of the concept.

By contrast, addition connects the attributes from different domains proposed by various authors with a logical "or" ( $\vee$ ). Any case that displays at least one of the defining characteristics is subsumed under the concept in question. While only cases that share all the attributes from different domains are considered full instances, cases that partake in some of these characteristics are also included in the general category, though as "diminished subtypes" marked by qualifying adjectives.<sup>6</sup> Addition thus creates radial concepts.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, redefinition identifies the primary domain among the different spheres stressed by various scholars and for definitional purposes discards attributes from other domains.<sup>8</sup> Redefinition is based on logical differentiation, the distinction of definitional attributes from logically accidental (though empirically coincident) characteristics. Redefinition thus yields classical concepts. These "minimal" definitions contain only the attributes from one domain that are necessary and jointly sufficient to identify instances of a concept.<sup>9</sup>

What are the advantages and problems of these different strategies of conceptualization? Cumulative concepts set high standards for inclusion and further clarity by minimizing the danger of false positives. Any case that meets these demanding criteria clearly qualifies as an instance of a concept and therefore deserves intensive investigation. Cumulative definitions thus help identify the most promising cases for small-N analy-

**Figure 1** The Extension of Cumulative, Radial, and Classical Concepts



sis. Cumulative concepts are problematic, however, if the logical connections between attributes from different domains are open to question. Economic-structural approaches, such as Marxian theories that derive politics from a socioeconomic base, provide a theoretical justification for tying together characteristics from different domains. But for scholars who reject socioeconomic structuralism cumulative concepts are questionable because they stipulate causal or functional connections among different spheres by definitional fiat, rather than leave them open for empirical research.

Furthermore, cumulative concepts are of limited empirical use if they have an exceedingly narrow extension. This problem appears when the different attributes stipulated in a cumulative definition have little overlap.<sup>10</sup> Under these circumstances, a theoretically rich concept has few, if any, empirical referents.

These problems may be avoided by transforming a cumulative concept into a radial concept by including as diminished subtypes the cases that lack one or more of the defining attributes. By relaxing the demands for definitional inclusion, a radial concept makes multidomain notions more broadly applicable and thus reduces the danger of false negatives. It also offers a conceptual compromise to different theoretical approaches. By encompassing the attributes stressed by different schools and acknowledging the underlying theoretical contributions, radial concepts facilitate minimal conceptual agreement.

But radial concepts may foster a pseudo-consensus. Agreement on a term may disguise disagreement on its meaning. In encompassing conceptual diversity, they may perpetuate rather than reduce confusion.<sup>11</sup> This danger is acute because diminished subtypes coexist with classical subtypes that are full instances of a concept.<sup>12</sup> For instance, electoral democracy does not fulfill all definitional requirements of democracy,<sup>13</sup> but delegative democracy does.<sup>14</sup>

Radial and cumulative concepts also increase the number of border conflicts by encompassing several attributes from different domains. It is therefore necessary to decide on several fronts whether a case really falls under a concept. By contrast, classical concepts minimize border conflicts by relying on minimal definitions that focus on one domain and stipulate as few definitional characteristics as possible. Classical concepts are also likely to have an extension of reasonable size (a number of empirical referents) because they do not demand the simultaneous presence of attributes from different domains, which may have little overlap.

Moreover, classical concepts do not rest on socioeconomic structuralism but allow for the autonomy of different domains. They thus prompt scholars to investigate empirically the connections between definitional characteristics and other hypothesized attributes, rather than decree them by definitional fiat, as cumulative concepts do, or leave them open, as radial concepts do.

Finally, classical concepts are by nature part of a system of concepts. The *per genus et differentiam* procedure situates a concept by reference to related concepts.

Thus, whereas the relationship of cumulative and radial concepts to similar ones often remains unclear, classical concepts require clarification of a whole “semantic field.”<sup>15</sup>

Classical concepts face a crucial challenge, however: how to determine a concept’s domain and definitional attributes. It is often difficult to identify characteristics that are necessary and jointly sufficient in classifying a case as an instance of a phenomenon and to distinguish these definitional attributes from background conditions, causes, functional requirements, and consequences, as Sartori demands.<sup>16</sup> Scholars have therefore questioned the feasibility of classical concepts in the social sciences.<sup>17</sup> The particularly confusing concept of populism provides a best case for this skeptical position. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of different conceptualizations of populism. In particular, how theoretically justifiable and empirically useful are cumulative and radial concepts, and is a redefinition of populism as a classical concept feasible?

### **Conceptualizations of Populism**

What type of concept have scholars used to define Latin American populism? What type of concept is most useful to define it? From the 1960s to the 1980s most authors embraced cumulative concepts. This preference for multidomain notions was inspired by the prevailing theories of development and underdevelopment. Both modernization and dependency theory had clear economic-structuralist tendencies. They assumed that socioeconomic processes shape and drive politics.<sup>18</sup> Cumulative concepts of populism also had an empirical basis because many instances of classical populism from the 1930s to the 1960s displayed this syndrome of definitional attributes. Thus, the different presumed characteristics of populism actually overlapped.

But modernization and dependency theory fell into disrepute in the 1970s. Economic-structuralist approaches in general suffered convincing criticism. Furthermore, populist politics unexpectedly reappeared in the 1980s and 1990s in a very different socioeconomic setting from classical populism. In fact, some presidents who reached and maintained office through populist political tactics enacted neoliberal reforms that diverged radically from economic populism. Thus, the overlap among the presumed attributes of populism diminished drastically.

Scholars have responded to this dissolution of the populist package in different ways. Several authors remain committed to cumulative definitions and therefore refuse to apply the populist label to many of the new movements, especially those that enact neoliberalism.<sup>19</sup> Other authors argue that even neoliberal governments enact some features of economic populism.<sup>20</sup> They therefore retain a multidomain definition of populism, but in the looser version of a radial concept.<sup>21</sup> Finally, several scholars redefine populism as a classical concept; they identify politics as its core domain and declare socioeconomic characteristics as logically accidental.<sup>22</sup> These

authors do not hesitate to call leaders like Peru's Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) and Argentina's Carlos Menem (1989–1999) populists.

**The Long Predominance of Cumulative Definitions** Most traditional definitions of Latin American populism were cumulative concepts that encompassed several attributes from different domains. In particular, they assumed a close connection between populist politics and its social roots, socioeconomic background conditions, and/or substantive policies, especially expansionary economic programs and generous distributive measures.

Most authors noted a personalistic, plebiscitarian style of political leadership as a defining characteristic of populism. A charismatic individual wins and exercises power by maintaining direct, unmediated contact to a largely unorganized mass of followers.<sup>23</sup> But this political attribute was widely seen as part of a package of equally central social and economic characteristics. Accordingly, authors commonly stressed the heterogeneous social base of populism, defined as an amorphous mass,<sup>24</sup> an urban multiclass movement,<sup>25</sup> or a broad alliance of urban classes.<sup>26</sup> They also emphasized the provision of material incentives—the pursuit of expansionary, developmentalist economic policies and the extension of social benefits—as crucial instruments in maintaining mass support.<sup>27</sup> Finally, many authors situated populism historically in certain developmental stages, such as the transition from traditional to modern society,<sup>28</sup> the rise of mass society after the fall of oligarchic rule,<sup>29</sup> or the early, “easy” phase of import-substitution industrialization.<sup>30</sup>

These cumulative definitions reflected the prevailing development theories, which postulated close connections between politics and socioeconomic factors. Both modernization and dependency theory depicted politics as shaped by social and economic processes. They assumed that politics had limited autonomy, at best relative autonomy, from socioeconomic structures and processes.<sup>31</sup> This premise prompted definitions of populism as a package of political and socioeconomic characteristics.

Specifically, modernization theory maintained that the rapid advance of urbanization, industrialization, and education triggered an explosion of mass participation, undermined traditional political authority, hindered the gradual establishment of institutionalized new regimes, and thus produced unstable types of rule, including populism.<sup>32</sup> In a similarly economic-structuralist vein, dependency theory claimed that the incorporation of peripheral countries in the capitalist world system and the resulting economic and social distortions hindered the emergence of a hegemonic class capable of establishing a stable form of rule. Combined with the structural heterogeneity and fragmentation of the popular classes, this “political vacuum” led to the formation of tension-filled, temporary class alliances held together by personalistic leaders, that is, to populism.<sup>33</sup>

Modernization and dependency theory also were historicist. They both assumed


that history had a direction. Modernization theory postulated progress, whereas dependency theory diagnosed stagnation or decline (the development of underdevelopment) but hoped and called for radical change to realize the historical potential for progress. In these grand schemes populism was one phase of historical development. Modernization and dependency theory therefore included definitional attributes that situated populism historically during the early phase of social mobilization and easy import-substitution industrialization, respectively.

The preference for definitions that tied together attributes from different domains thus followed logically from the basic assumptions of the predominant development theories. In fact, cumulative definitions of populism became so consensual that even scholars not explicitly committed to modernization or dependency theory adopted them.<sup>34</sup> In particular, historians, who do not seek broad generalizations and can therefore confine concepts to specific historical settings, embraced multidomain notions.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, cumulative definitions of populism were quite useful in empirical research because they reflected fairly well the syndrome of political and socioeconomic features that characterized classical populism from the 1930s through the 1960s. During these decades a populist political strategy tended to be associated with a multiclass social constituency that had its core in the working class, with developmentalist economic policies and the expansion of social programs, and with the early phases of accelerated industrialization and/or social mobilization. Thus, during these decades the attributes from different spheres stipulated in cumulative definitions of populism often overlapped (see Figure 2, Section A).

Certainly, not all experiences fit perfectly. For instance, Uruguay's José Battle y Ordóñez expanded mass participation and enacted generous welfare programs in a preindustrial setting. Ecuador's José María Velasco Ibarra used populist political tactics in a poor, largely agrarian nation that lacked resources for generous distributive programs.<sup>36</sup> Thus, populist politics was not always accompanied by the presumed socioeconomic characteristics of populism. Furthermore, Mexico's Lázaro Cárdenas targeted not only urban groups, as definitions of Latin American populism commonly stipulated, but extended mass mobilization to the countryside.<sup>37</sup> Thus, several cases did not display all of the characteristics listed in the prevailing cumulative notions. But a large number of instances fulfilled most or all of these definitional standards. Empirically oriented scholars therefore saw no problem in embracing multidomain concepts of populism.

**Challenges to Cumulative Definitions**    This syndrome of populism, depicted tentatively as a combination of political demagoguery, organizational instability, economic irresponsibility, and excessive distributive generosity, was one of the enemies that the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s sought to extirpate. But populist politics survived the assault and experienced a stunning resurgence in the 1980s and

**Figure 2** The Historical Evolution of Latin American Populism<sup>1</sup>

1. Brazilian president José Sarney (1985-1990) is classified as an economic populist by Jeffrey Sachs. *Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989), pp. 20-22, but he was not a personalistic leader who based his government on organized mass support and therefore does not fall under the political definition of populism.

1990s in a different socioeconomic context. Old protagonists of classical populism, such as Leonel Brizola in Brazil, achieved considerable electoral success in the new democracies.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, a new generation of leaders retained many, but not all, elements of the classical populist syndrome; Peru's Alan García was most prominent.<sup>39</sup> Finally, another wave of personalistic leaders used political strategies reminiscent of classical populism to reach and maintain power but enacted neoliberal policies that diverged starkly from the programs of classical populists and sought to eliminate the socioeconomic legacies of classical populism.<sup>40</sup>

This unexpected proliferation of personalistic leaders who commanded largely unorganized mass support but deviated to varying degrees from classical populist policies constituted a conceptual challenge. Most important, the growing divergence of populist political strategies and the socioeconomic characteristics of classical populism called into question the prevailing cumulative definitions. Different attributes that had been depicted as integral parts of a coherent syndrome evidently had surprisingly little overlap (see Figure 2, Section B). In fact, none of the new leaders displayed all of the defining characteristics stipulated by cumulative notions. Was it necessary to untie the package of attributes that spanned different domains? Which new personalistic leaders should be classified as populists?



Advocates of cumulative notions faced the problem of conceptual slippage. It was difficult to deny the populist label to old populists who were making a political comeback, such as Brizola. Yet, if these leaders were classified as populist, it became impossible to tie the concept to a specific socioeconomic setting, such as easy import-substitution industrialization.<sup>41</sup> The resurgence of old populists in the 1980s thus made the concept of populism footloose. Consequently, García should also be called a populist because, besides using personalistic, plebiscitarian political tactics, he advocated similar socioeconomic policies as Brizola. Yet this further extension of the concept eliminated an additional characteristic of classical populism, the special appeal to blue collar workers. García largely bypassed industrial labor and appealed to a different core constituency, the urban informal sector.<sup>42</sup> If populism were extended even further to cover Menem, Fujimori, Brazil's Fernando Collor (1990–92), and Ecuador's Abdalá Bucaram (1996–97), the remaining socioeconomic characteristics would have to be abandoned, and the concept would become a purely political notion.

Thus, the resurgence of old populists and the emergence of new personalistic leaders cast doubt on cumulative definitions by dissolving the close connection between populism's political attributes and its alleged socioeconomic characteristics. Can populist politics thrive outside its postulated socioeconomic context, even divorced from the socioeconomic policies of classical populism? Political developments, which drastically diminished the overlap among different presumed characteristics of populism, thus posed conceptual challenges for cumulative notions.

In addition, the theoretical justifications for cumulative notions faced incisive criticism. Modernization and dependency theory were discredited by the early and late 1970s, respectively. A central assumption of both approaches—that socioeconomic structures and processes were more basic than and shaped politics—drew particularly sharp rejection. Discarding the socioeconomic structuralism that inspired modernization and dependency theory, many authors reasserted the autonomy of politics.<sup>43</sup>

This criticism of socioeconomic structuralism had a profound impact on concept formation far beyond the concept of populism. It stimulated a rethinking of other concepts that had often been defined in cumulative ways. Most important, scholars criticized multidomain notions of democracy and adopted classical definitions centered on political-institutional characteristics. Authors examining transitions from authoritarian rule, in particular, converged on minimal, procedural definitions and eliminated more ambitious input and output characteristics, such as equity-enhancing policies.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the renewed insistence on the autonomy of politics undermined cumulative concepts in general and prompted redefinitions of central social science notions.

As regards populism, the discrediting of modernization and dependency theory corroded the theoretical justification for cumulative definitions. As the historicist assumptions underlying both of these approaches became questionable, populism could no longer be tied to a specific stage of social mobilization or delayed dependent development.<sup>45</sup> As claims about the social bases of politics faced growing criti-

cism, it made little sense to define populism by specific social constituencies, such as organized workers.<sup>46</sup> And the renewed emphasis on the autonomy of politics made scholars doubt that the political strategies and tactics associated with populism necessarily went hand in hand with certain economic and social policies.<sup>47</sup> Thus, the criticism leveled against modernization and dependency theory inspired the unpacking of cumulative notions of populism. This theoretical shift also contributed to new conceptualizations of populism, such as Laclau's focus on populist discourse.<sup>48</sup>

### **The Reemergence of Populism: Cumulative, Radial, or Classical Definitions?**

Cumulative notions of populism that spanned different domains thus faced a double challenge: the resurgence of populist political strategies outside the socioeconomic context of classical populism and the theoretical questioning of socioeconomic structuralism. How have scholars of populism responded to these empirical and theoretical problems? In particular, how have they conceptualized the new experiences of personalistic, plebiscitarian leadership that display some characteristics of the classical populist syndrome but not others? Has a new consensual definition of populism emerged, or have authors embraced different types of concepts? If disagreement prevails, which type of definition is most useful?

Studies of the personalistic politics of the 1980s and 1990s disagree strongly on the use of the populist label. While some authors remain committed to cumulative notions, others seek to adapt such complex concepts to the increased diversity of populist experiences by redefining populism as a radial concept. Going even further, many authors leave multidomain definitions behind, discard socioeconomic characteristics as definitional attributes of populism, conceptualize populism in political terms, and thus adopt a classical concept.

The main controversy centers on how to classify personalistic leaders with ample mass support who enact market reforms. Many, especially Marxist-inspired, scholars assume that neoliberalism violates popular interests and is therefore exclusionary and profoundly unpopular. They refuse to call presidents such as Menem and Fujimori populists, personalistic leaders who sustain their governments through support from the popular masses. Other scholars of different theoretical persuasions stress that Menem and Fujimori achieved widespread popular approval, which was crucial for their governing strategy; therefore, they qualify as populists.

Authors like Lynch, Nun, Quijano, and Vilas remain committed to cumulative definitions of populism. In particular, they retain developmentalist, nationalist economic policies and generous social programs as indispensable definitional attributes of populism.<sup>49</sup> In fact, Lynch, Quijano, and Vilas also cling to socioeconomic structuralism. They therefore accuse scholars who classify Menem, Collor, or Fujimori as populists of "conceptual stretching."

This conceptual conservatism, however, plays down the important similarities in political style and strategy between "true populists" and personalistic leaders with

mass support who enact neoliberalism. It leads to excessive particularism in concept formation, which in the last instance rests on theoretically questionable socioeconomic structuralism. The insistence on socioeconomic attributes also overemphasizes the substantive policy commitments of populist leaders. Rather than embrace specific development programs, even classical populists were flexible and opportunistic.<sup>50</sup> Argentina's Juan Perón, for instance, adopted expansionary economic policies in the late 1940s but imposed fairly orthodox adjustment in the early 1950s. Thus, traditional multidomain definitions do not do justice to the characteristic adaptability and opportunism of populist leaders.

Many authors have therefore advocated conceptual innovation. In a particularly interesting, important contribution, Roberts redefined populism as a radial concept.<sup>51</sup> He listed five characteristics traditionally associated with populism: "personalistic and paternalistic...leadership"; "a heterogeneous, multi-class political coalition"; "a top-down process of political mobilization that...bypasses institutionalized forms of mediation"; "an amorphous or eclectic ideology"; and "an economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods."<sup>52</sup> While the simultaneous presence of all five attributes characterizes full populism, the presence of some but not all of them yields diminished subtypes that fall under the general rubric of populism.

This reconceptualization preserves the concept's multidomain nature but loosens the requirement for different definitional attributes to coexist. Roberts thus proposes a conceptual compromise that can be acceptable to scholars of different persuasions. Socioeconomic structuralists can focus on the central area, where the different attributes overlap; scholars who want to apply the concept more broadly can invoke diminished subtypes that lack some of these attributes.

But the capacity of radial concepts to accommodate different specific notions also creates the risk of perpetuating and legitimating confusion. Authors who use the same term may associate very different meanings with it. For instance, both Knight, who advocates a political definition of populism, and Greskovits, who applies an economic definition, subsume their different notions under Roberts' radial concept.<sup>53</sup> In addition, the pejorative connotation of diminished subtypes may induce scholars to reach for the central area of definitional overlap and thus implicitly transform their radial concept into a cumulative concept. For instance, to show that Fujimori qualifies as a true populist, Roberts classifies as "economic populism" the limited antipoverty programs adopted in Peru within the parameters of structural adjustment.<sup>54</sup> This effort to prove that Fujimori fulfilled all the definitional attributes of populism may amount to conceptual stretching. In sum, radial concepts may create more confusion than clarity.

It is therefore advisable to abandon multidomain concepts, both cumulative and radial, and redefine populism as a classical concept located in a single domain. This reconceptualization enhances clarity by identifying populism's central domain while discarding attributes from other spheres as incidental. Whereas cumulative and radial concepts require scholars to determine a notion's extension in different domains

and thus create multiple border conflicts, classical concepts stress one domain and thus facilitate delimitation of populism's extension. Furthermore, classical concepts fit into a hierarchical system of concepts, whereas the relationship among different cumulative or radial concepts, which create an ample gray zone of imperfect instances or diminished subtypes, is unclear.

To define populism as a classical concept, one first needs to identify its domain. The resurgence of old populists in the 1980s makes it infeasible to use historical location as definitional anchor. And the appeal of leaders who are usefully labeled neopopulists, like García, primarily to the informal sector, not industrial labor, makes it inadvisable to stipulate any specific class base as the foundation of populism. In general, while most populist leaders seek mass support among groups that are less well-off (the popular sectors), other personalistic, plebiscitarian, that is, populist leaders, such as Mario Vargas Llosa in Peru and Joaquín Lavín in Chile, won stronger backing among better-off sectors. Thus, populism should not be defined by the class composition of its main constituency. Socioeconomic policy and political style or strategy therefore remain as the most promising definitions. Recent debates among advocates of classical concepts have in fact centered on economic populism versus political populism.<sup>55</sup>

Which concept is preferable? The economic definition of populism is confusing for political analysis because it subsumes under the same label leaders as diverse as the classical populist Juan Perón, neopopulist Alan García, conservative José Sarney, and Marxist Salvador Allende.<sup>56</sup> It is also logically questionable because it does not clarify whether the economic irresponsibility that it associates with populism is due to design or mere constraint. Expansionary economic policies may result from a deliberate governmental choice, from parliamentary refusal to increase taxes to finance additional spending, or from administrative incapacity to collect increased taxes approved by the legislature. Since the outcome is identical, all three examples qualify as economic populism. It is problematic to subsume such different experiences under the same concept.

A political definition of populism is therefore preferable. It conceptualizes populism as a specific way of competing for and exercising political power. It situates populism in the sphere of domination, not distribution. Populism first and foremost shapes patterns of political rule, not the allocation of socioeconomic benefits or losses. This political redefinition captures best the basic goal of populist leaders, to win and exercise power, while using economic and social policy as an instrument for this purpose. Thus, this reconceptualization is most attuned to the opportunism of populist leaders and their weak commitment to substantive policies, ideas, and ideologies.<sup>57</sup>

In espousing antielite rhetoric and challenging the status quo, populism rests on the distinction of friend versus foe that constitutes politics.<sup>58</sup> Historically, it arises from a leader's promise to protect the people from a pernicious enemy.<sup>59</sup> Originating in real or imagined conflict, populism is thoroughly political. Therefore, populism is best defined in political terms.

## A Political Redefinition of Populism

**The Overarching Dimension of Populism** Classical definitions use a systematic, hierarchical approach that starts by identifying a concept's overarching dimension (*genus*). What is populism's *genus*? Some authors conceptualize populism as a political style.<sup>60</sup> Others see it as a political strategy.<sup>61</sup> Political style denotes the forms of political performance and emphasizes populism's expressive aspects, including its discourse. But political style is a broad, not clearly delimited concept. Many leaders whom most scholars would not classify as populists, such as Brazil's Sarney, occasionally adopt a populist style, especially in election campaigns. Defining populism as a political style therefore casts too wide a net and hinders the clear delimitation of cases.

By contrast, political strategy focuses on the methods and instruments of winning and exercising power. Political strategies are characterized by the principal "power capability" that a prospective or actual ruler deploys.<sup>62</sup> Political strategy is therefore better delimited than political style. It encompasses only leaders who base their rule on a certain power capability, not those who occasionally use this power capability.

Political actors can use different strategies to win and maintain government power. A simple classification distinguishes three types of political actors—individuals, informal groupings, and formal organizations—and two basic power capabilities—numbers (as demonstrated in votes, poll responses, or mass rallies) and special weight (particularly socioeconomic clout or military coercion).<sup>63</sup> The intersection of these two dimensions creates a variety of political strategies and types of government (see Table 1). For instance, under *caudillismo* individuals base their rule on military might. In an oligarchy a ruling group draws on economic weight and social prestige.

**A Systematic Definition of Populism** Under populism an individual leader seeks or exercises government power based on support from large numbers of followers.<sup>64</sup> Thus, elections, plebiscites, mass demonstrations, and most recently opinion polls are the crucial instruments with which populist leaders mobilize and demonstrate their distinctive power capability. Populist aspirants whip up support from largely unorganized masses to win office. Populist chief executives constantly invoke their broad mass support to boost their own influence and overpower their opponents' institutional bastions.

It becomes most evident in crisis situations in which populist leaders face the threat of losing power that backing from large numbers of common citizens constitutes populism. When pushed to the wall, they invoke and thus reveal the *ultima ratio* of populism: broad mass support. Accordingly, the outpouring of support for Juan Perón on October 17, 1945, was the crucial moment of Peronist populism. Alberto Fujimori established his predominance in Peruvian politics and controlled his own allies, especially the military, by garnering strikingly high approval for his *autogolpe* of April 1992 and his performance thereafter. Venezuela's Rafael Caldera

**Table 1** Strategies of Rule (by Type of Ruler, Principal Power Capability, and Ruler's Relationship to Support Base)

TYPE OF RULER	PRINCIPAL POWER CAPABILITY			RULER'S RELATION- SHIP TO
	Numbers	Special Weight		
		Economic Clout	Military	SUPPORT BASE
Individual Person	Populism	Patrimonialism	<i>Caudillismo</i>	Fluid & Unorganized
Informal Grouping	Clientelism	Oligarchy	Government by Military Faction	Firm Informal Ties
Formal Organization	Party Government	Corporatism	Government by Military Institution	Stable Organiza- tional Links

Note: The right and left columns refer to the same dimension, but from different angles.

(1994–99) won a dangerous constitutional conflict by threatening to call a plebiscite, which his high popularity assured him of winning.<sup>65</sup> And Fernando Collor invoked the thirty-five million votes he won in the 1989 election when facing damaging allegations of corruption in 1992.<sup>66</sup> But Collor's mass support had long evaporated, and he suffered an ignominious impeachment. These cases show that populism rests primarily on mass support.

Mass support can have different levels of organization and institutionalization. Since under populism the ruler is an individual, that is, a personalistic leader, the connection between leader and followers is based mostly on direct, quasi-personal contact, not on organizational intermediation. By contrast, where mass support is marshalled through formal institutional structures, the ruler is effectively an organization, usually an organized party. And where a firm, but not formally organized group rules by drawing support from large numbers of people, the followers are linked to the leaders through extensive, lasting patron-client networks.<sup>67</sup> By contrast to the strong organization provided by an institutionalized party and the stable connections established by patron-client ties, the relationship between populist leaders and their mass constituency is uninstitutionalized and fluid. The followers' loyalty can evaporate quickly if the leader fails to fulfill popular expectations. Such a decline in popularity threatens the foundation of populist rule and can trigger its collapse.

To compensate for the fragility of their mass support, populist leaders seek to create a particularly intense connection to their followers. Such intensity requires charisma.<sup>68</sup> In the age of popular sovereignty it means a supernatural capacity to rep-

resent and lead the people, rescue them from adversity, and usher in progress. Therefore, populist leaders constantly demonstrate their closeness to common people and stimulate popular identification with their leadership. They seek frequent face-to-face contacts with the masses, now often through television, act in ways that embody and live out the dreams of the common man, promise to include the long neglected populace in the mainstream of development and protect it from sinister forces, and instill in their followers a sense of mission to transform the status quo and transcend the confines of the established institutional framework in order to find redemption under their savior's guidance.<sup>69</sup> Thus, populist leaders draw on the potency of charisma to maintain their fickle support.

Yet to stabilize their rule many populist leaders eventually seek to "routinize their charisma" and solidify their mass following by introducing elements of party organization or clientelism.<sup>70</sup> The relationship remains populist as long as the party has low levels of institutionalization and leaves the leader wide latitude in shaping and dominating its organization and as long as clientelist patronage serves the leader in demonstrating personal concern for the followers and a supernatural capacity for problem solving.<sup>71</sup> But where party organization congeals and constrains the leader's latitude, turning him into a party functionary, or where proliferating clientelism transforms the relationship of leader and followers into a purely pragmatic exchange, political rule based on command over large numbers of followers eventually loses its populist character.<sup>72</sup> Political success thus transforms populism into a different type of rule that rests on nonpopulist strategies.<sup>73</sup> Populist leadership therefore tends to be transitory. It either fails or, if successful, transcends itself.

This discussion of different types of government suggests that populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers. This direct, quasi-personal relationship bypasses established intermediary organizations or deinstitutionalizes and subordinates them to the leader's personal will. Most followers lack institutionalized ties to the leader and therefore constitute an unorganized mass in the political arena (for example, the nation-state) in which the leader appeals to them (although they may participate in local organizations). A charismatic leader wins broad, diffuse, yet intense support from such a largely unorganized mass by "representing" people who feel excluded or marginalized from national political life and by promising to rescue them from crises, threats, and enemies. The leader appeals to the people for help in his heroic effort to regenerate the nation, combat the privileged groups and their special interests, and transform the "corrupt" established institutions.

**Subtypes of Populism**    Since populist leadership rests on mass support, populism has two versions, depending on whether its constituency has some minimal traces of organization or is completely unorganized. Correspondingly, populism's mass base either has

more of a collective, public character or consists of a dispersed set of private individuals. Populist leaders appeal either to the people, an imagined singular actor, whom they convoke to collective manifestations in public, or to the common man and woman, a plurality of actors, whom they reach in the private sphere through television and opinion polls. The former leaders claim to represent the general will (Rousseau's *volonté générale*), and the latter, the aggregation of individual wills (*volonté des tous*).

These variants correspond largely but not perfectly to the classical populism of the 1930s to 1960s and the neopopulism of the 1980s and 1990s. Which variant emerges depends on two factors, the organizational saturation of the polity and the leader's instruments for mobilizing followers and demonstrating mass backing.

In politics with low levels of institutionalization, for example, in the early phases of mass participation, most prospective followers have never participated in a national organization. Populist leaders can therefore promote the "initial incorporation" of these people.<sup>74</sup> Under these circumstances, populists create organizations, but they keep them under personal control and severely limit their institutionalization. By contrast, in organizationally saturated polities populist leaders rise by adopting more antiorganizational tactics. They appeal to people who distrust established parties and interest groups and offer a different avenue—personalistic leadership—for "representing" those people's interests. Neopopulist leaders who rise in inchoate, fragmented party systems deliberately weaken established intermediary organizations and refuse to transform their own electoral vehicles into organized parties (for example, Collor and Fujimori). In more consolidated party systems, which block the ascent of antiparty candidates, neopopulist leaders emerge by taking over parties of populist origin, undermining the established party apparatus, and subordinating these weakly institutionalized organizations to their personal control (for example, García and Menem).

The available instruments for mobilizing and demonstrating mass support also condition which subtype of populism emerges. Certainly, votes in elections or plebiscites are most important for proving backing from the people. But elections and plebiscites are held infrequently and can not be scheduled at will. Given the precarious nature of their rule, populist leaders need instruments to demonstrate their broad backing at any moment. Traditionally, mass rallies fulfilled this function. To turn out hundreds of thousands of followers, populist leaders needed some nucleus of organized support, especially a cadre of activists. Classical populists therefore built organizations but kept them under tight personal control.

Yet the advance of opinion polling has devalued mass rallies and made them less useful for demonstrating popular backing. Since surveys give voice to a representative cross-section of the population, they are more valid in ascertaining the will of the people than mass rallies, which draw self-selected activists and their followers while leaving the silent majority on the sidelines. Surveys measure the general interest, whereas demonstrations have turned into instruments of special interests. And while populist leaders have less control over poll results than over mass rallies, sur-



veys are less costly and more easily conducted. In particular, they do not require the capacity to marshall public manifestations. In the age of polling populist leaders therefore have much less need for an organizational base.

The tremendous spread of television has also diminished the need for organization. Through television populist leaders reach their followers directly and establish quasi-personal contact with millions of people simultaneously. While radio played a similar role for classical populists, television is more powerful in projecting charismatic leadership.<sup>75</sup> Thus, modern mass media have further diminished populists' interest in organized intermediation.

Thus, neopopulism is even less institutionalized than classical populism. It adopts a more antiorganizational stance, reaches followers in the private sphere, and depends on the confidential responses of individual citizens, not on collective manifestations by the people in the public sphere. The *volonté des tous* has replaced the *volonté générale* as populism's base of plebiscitarian legitimation. Neopopulism is therefore less mobilizational, transformatory, and redemptive than classical populism, and its inclusionary character is more symbolic than effective. But by appealing to the whole citizenry and by ascertaining the will of the people through votes and poll responses, neopopulism is more representative than classical populism and more compatible with liberal democracy.<sup>76</sup> And according to my redefinition, which focuses on personalistic leadership with mostly unorganized mass support, neopopulism is by no means a diminished subtype of populism. Instead, due to its lower level of institutionalization it is more populist than classical populism in terms of political strategy.

### Usefulness of the Redefinition

The redefinition of populism in political-organizational terms is useful in analyzing contemporary Latin American politics. Above all, it elucidates important phenomena that otherwise remain puzzling. For instance, emphasis on uninstitutionalized mass support as the basis of populist rule helps account for the dramatic rise and decline of several political leaders of the 1980s and 1990s, such as Alan García and Fernando Collor. These personalistic politicians enjoyed tremendously high popularity and commanded great political clout at the beginning of their terms but quickly lost support when they encountered serious economic problems. Even more striking, three presidents who fall under the redefinition of populism—Collor, Abdalá Bucaram, and Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela (1989–93)—were removed from office, whereas nonpopulist presidents who had committed similar or worse acts of malfeasance served out their terms.<sup>77</sup> The lack of firm organized support made the former leaders politically vulnerable and prevented them from surviving adversity. By drawing attention to the insecure political base of these presidents, the redefinition of populism helps explain their political fate.

This redefinition also elucidates surprising cases of political success. For instance,

President Menem maintained mass loyalty, including support from many sectors of the Peronist movement, while undoing the socioeconomic project of traditional Peronism. Scholars who define populism by socioeconomic characteristics and therefore contrast the nationalist, expansionary, redistributive policies enacted by Perón with Menem's neoliberal program can not easily account for this political success. The redefinition, by contrast, highlights the flexible, weakly institutionalized nature of the Peronist movement, which provided much latitude for the resurgence of personalistic leadership and predisposed rank-and-file Peronists to follow their new chief.<sup>78</sup> This redefinition also captures the flexibility and adaptability of populism, which Menem invoked to his political benefit by claiming that party founder Perón "would have applied the same policies" if he had faced a similarly deep economic crisis.<sup>79</sup>

Above all, the redefinition of populism helps explain one of the most counterintuitive developments in contemporary Latin America, the frequent convergence of populist politics and neoliberal economics.<sup>80</sup> Specifically, a political-organizational definition sheds light both on the important affinities and the undeniable tensions between personalistic political leaders and their market-oriented economic advisers.

Populist tactics were crucial in guaranteeing the necessary popular support for painful, risky neoliberal reforms. Personalistic leaders garnered this backing by boldly combating severe crises and forestalling a complete collapse. These courageous efforts demonstrated their charisma, intensifying their bond to their mass base. Furthermore, populism's orientation against the status quo, which arises from personalistic leaders' efforts to whip up unorganized mass support by attacking enemies of the people, helped neoliberal experts transform the established development model. To break resistance to costly market reforms, these experts branded their opponents as selfish defenders of privileges, thus invoking a typically populist line of argument. Personalistic leaders' claim to advance the common good also helped legitimate market reforms, which bring short-term pain but promise long-term gain.

The redefinition of populism also sheds light on the tensions between personalistic leaders and neoliberal experts, as evidenced in the rocky relationships of presidents Menem and Fujimori with economy ministers Domingo Cavallo and Carlos Boloña, respectively. Acting with the flexibility and opportunism typical of populist leaders, Menem and Fujimori did not fully commit themselves to neoliberalism. They resented the constraints that such an ideological conversion would imply and sought instead to enhance their own autonomy and power.<sup>81</sup> To do so, they had to maintain mass support, the base of their rule. Therefore, they deviated from neoliberal principles at their political convenience, for instance, by enacting fiscally imprudent spending increases before crucial elections.

In sum, the political redefinition of populism helps explain the surprisingly close, yet tension-filled relationship between neoliberal experts and personalistic, plebiscitarian leaders. It thus furthers the analysis of important new phenomena in Latin American politics that other conceptualizations have difficulty elucidating.

## Conclusion

Minimal agreement on type of conceptualization and definition of terminology is important in facilitating scholarly communication, debate and criticism, and the cumulation of knowledge. In particular, in standing on common conceptual ground authors must take potentially disconfirmatory evidence seriously; they can not explain it away by pointing to definitional differences. The resolution of conceptual debates therefore makes an important contribution to scholarly progress.

Cumulative and radial concepts of populism, which stipulate attributes from different domains, suffer from theoretical and empirical problems, especially tendencies towards socioeconomic structuralism and difficulties in delimiting the extension of populism. Also, the proliferation of new types of personalistic leadership has reduced the overlap among the different attributes stipulated by cumulative and radial definitions and extended the gray zone of diminished subtypes.

The redefinition of populism as a classical concept focused on politics, in contrast, locates populism in a single domain. This reconceptualization leaves the relationship of political and socioeconomic factors open for empirical research, rather than stipulates it *a priori*. The focus on one domain also minimizes border conflicts and facilitates the clear delimitation of populism's extension. Finally, the reconceptualization as a classical concept situates populism in a hierarchical system of concepts, facilitating comparison and contrast.

Populism is best defined as a political strategy. Political strategies are characterized by the power capability that types of rulers use to sustain themselves politically. Under populism the ruler is an individual, a personalistic leader, not a group or organization. Populism rests on the power capability of numbers, not special weight. Populism emerges when personalistic leaders base their rule on massive yet mostly uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of people. This minimal definition encompasses both the classical populists of the 1930s through 1960s and the neopopulists of the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>82</sup> It stresses the central rationale of populism—the quest for political power—but leaves the association of populist politics with specific social constituencies, economic settings, and socioeconomic policies open for empirical research. This political redefinition thus recognizes the flexibility and opportunism of populist leaders.

This redefinition has been inspired especially by the theoretical questioning of socioeconomic structuralism and the reassertion of the potential autonomy of politics. Its other main impetus stems from the emergence of personalistic leaders who share many political characteristics with classical populists but differ in other attributes. Empirical developments have reduced the overlap of attributes in multidomain definitions and thus prompted a reconceptualization of populism. Responding to changes in the real world, this analysis diverges from pure nominalism and embraces conceptual pragmatism. The central question is whether conceptual definitions are

useful for empirical research. The political definition of populism helps elucidate the rich and fascinating universe of populist movements.

Many authors have doubted that the goals of classical concepts, especially clear delimitation of extension, consistency and parsimony of intension, and systematic location in a hierarchical structure of concepts, are feasible or appropriate in the social sciences.<sup>83</sup> The particularly confusing and contested notion of populism constitutes a most likely case for confirming this critical position. The redefinition of populism casts doubt on skepticism and suggests that classical categorization is a feasible and promising avenue for the social sciences.

## NOTES

For helpful comments, I thank David and Ruth Collier, Michael Coppedge, Carlos de la Torre, Sam Fitch, Wendy Hunter, James Mahoney, Richard Mitten, Gerardo Munck, Victoria Murillo, Marcos Novaro, Pierre Ostiguy, Philip Oxhorn, Nancy Powers, Kenneth Roberts, two anonymous reviewers, and the participants in the conference on Regimes and Political Change in Latin America, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, August 6–7, 1999, the work-in-progress series at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and the workshop on Old Populism, New Populism, Yale University, April 6–7, 2000.

1. For instance, the study of democratization made progress only after the long-standing debates over the concept of democracy receded and most authors settled on a minimal, procedural definition.

2. Carlos de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); Aníbal Viguera, "'Populismo' y 'Neopopulismo' en América Latina," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 55 (July 1993), 49–66.

3. Ian Roxborough, "Unity and Diversity in Latin American History," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 16 (May 1984), 14.

4. Victor Armony, "Is There an Ideological Link between Neopopulism and Neoliberalism?," paper presented for twenty-second LASA Congress, Atlanta, March 16–18, 2000; Felipe Burbano de Lara, ed., *El Fantasma del Populismo* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1998); Michael Conniff, ed., *Populism in Latin America* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999); de la Torre; Rüdiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, eds., *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Denise Dresser, *Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1991); Edward Gibson, "The Populist Road to Market Reform," *World Politics*, 49 (April 1997), 339–70; Alan Knight, "Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 30 (May 1998), 223–48; Nicolás Lynch, "Neopopulismo: Un Concepto Vacío," *Socialismo y Participación* (December 1999); René Antonio Mayorga, *Antipolítica y Neopopulismo* (La Paz: CEBEM, 1995); Philip Oxhorn, "The Social Foundations of Latin America's Recurrent Populism," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 11 (June 1998), 212–46; George Philip, "The New Populism, Presidentialism and Market-Oriented Reform in Spanish South America," *Government and Opposition*, 33 (Winter 1998), 81–97; Kenneth Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America," *World Politics*, 48 (October 1995), 82–116; Cynthia Sanborn, "The Democratic Left and the Persistence of Populism in Peru" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991); Viguera; Kurt Weyland, "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 31 (Fall 1996), 3–31.

5. See Giovanni Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984).

6. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives," *World Politics*, 49 (April 1997), 430–51.

7. David Collier and James Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited," *American Political Science Review*, 87 (December 1993), 845–55. I refer to "radial concepts" as presented by Collier and Mahon, not to the interesting but different interpretation by Pierre Ostiguy, "The Concept of Democracy: A Radial Category" (unpublished, 1992).
8. Sartori, pp. 55–56.
9. Ibid., pp. 32–33, 54–57.
10. Ibid., p. 47.
11. Even Collier and Levitsky, p. 450, admit these dangers.
12. Ibid., pp. 435–41, 450–51.
13. Ibid., p. 440.
14. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (January 1994), 55–69.
15. Sartori, pp. 51–54.
16. Ibid., pp. 54–56.
17. Recently, John Gerrig, "What Makes a Concept Good?," *Polity*, 31 (Spring 1999), 363–64.
18. The following discussion of modernization and dependency theory focuses on the similarities within and between these schools, not on the undeniable differences among individual authors, some of whom advanced more qualified, nuanced views.
19. Paul Drake, "Comment," in Dornbusch and Edwards, eds.; Paul Drake, "Chile's Populism Reconsidered, 1920s–1990s," in Conniff, ed., *Populism*; Lynch; José Nun, "Populismo, Representación y Menemismo," *Sociedad*, 5 (October 1994), 93–119; Aníbal Quijano, "Populismo y Fujimorismo," in Burbano, ed.; Carlos Vilas, "Latin American Populism," *Science and Society*, 56 (Winter 1992–1993), 389–420; Carlos Vilas, "Los Caudillos Electorales de la Posmodernidad," *Socialismo y Participación*, 69 (March 1995), 31–43.
20. Roberts, pp. 102–8; Vicente Palermo, "Moderate Populism," *Latin American Perspectives*, 25 (July 1998), 36–62.
21. Roberts, pp. 88–91.
22. Knight; Mayorga, pp. 29–30; Nicos Mouzelis, "On the Concept of Populism," *Politics and Society*, 14 (September 1985), 329–48; Weyland, "Neopopulism."
23. Michael Conniff, "Toward a Comparative Definition of Populism," in Michael Conniff, ed., *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), pp. 21–22; Paul Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), pp. 2–3, 8; Francisco Weffort, *O Populismo na Política Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980), pp. 69, 73–74. An exception is Torcuato di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
24. Di Tella; Gino Germani, *Política y Sociedad en una Época de Transición*, 5th ed. (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1974).
25. Conniff, "Comparative Definition," pp. 13–23; Drake, *Socialism*, pp. 2–13; Drake, "Requiem for Populism?," in Conniff, ed., *Latin American Populism*, p. 218.
26. Octavio Ianni, *La Formación del Estado Populista en América Latina* (Mexico: Era, 1975), pp. 121–22, 137–77; Hélio Jaguaribe, *Sociedade e Política* (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1985), pp. 13–17; Weffort, p. 75.
27. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 138–43; Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979), pp. 53–57; Drake, *Socialism*, pp. 2–4, 8–10.
28. Di Tella; Germani, chs. 5, 8–9.
29. Jaguaribe, pp. 7–17; similarly, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 161–68, 788.
30. Cardoso and Faletto, ch. 5; O'Donnell, *Modernization*, pp. 53–57.

31. See the multidomain definitions of the state in dependency theory.
32. Di Tella; Germani, chs. 5, 8–9; Jaguaribe, pp. 7–17.
33. Weffort, p. 159; Cardoso and Faletto, ch. 5; O'Donnell, *Modernization*, pp. 53–57; Ianni; Weffort, chs. 3, 7.
34. For example, Robert Dix, "Populism: Authoritarian and Democratic," *Latin American Research Review*, 20 (1985), 29–52.
35. Conniff, "Comparative Definition," pp. 13–23; Drake, *Socialism*, pp. 2–13; Drake, "Requiem," p. 218.
36. De la Torre, ch. 2.
37. Dix, pp. 35–39.
38. Gamaliel Perruci and Steven Sanderson, "Presidential Succession, Economic Crisis, and Populist Resurgence in Brazil," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 24 (Fall 1989), 30–50; Julian Castro Rea, Graciela Ducatenzeiler, and Philippe Faucher, "Back to Populism," in Archibald Ritter et al., eds., *Latin America to the Year 2000* (New York: Praeger, 1992).
39. Sanborn.
40. Roberts; Weyland, "Neopopulism"; Armony.
41. Perruci and Sanderson.
42. Sanborn, pp. 293–94, 340–49, 363–64.
43. Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State," *Comparative Politics*, 16 (January 1984), 223–44; Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
44. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 7–14.
45. Perruci and Sanderson, pp. 34–36.
46. Sanborn, pp. 47, 340–49, 382.
47. Knight, pp. 240–44.
48. Ernesto Laclau, *Politik und Ideologie im Marxismus* (Berlin: Argument, 1981); discussion in Roxborough, p. 10; also, Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 288–94; de la Torre; and Pierre Ostiguy, "Peronism and Anti-Peronism," paper prepared for the twentieth LASA Congress, Guadalajara, April 17–19, 1997.
49. Similarly, Drake, "Chile's Populism," p. 63; Philip Mauceri, "Return of the Caudillo," *Third World Quarterly*, 18 (1997), 900, 909; Gibson, p. 340.
50. Jacques Lambert, *Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 204, 208.
51. Roberts, pp. 88–89.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
53. Knight, pp. 224, 226–27, 248; Béla Greskovits, *The Political Economy of Protest and Patience* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), pp. 99–101.
54. Roberts, pp. 102–8.
55. Jeffrey Sachs, *Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989); Dornbusch and Edwards, eds.; Knight; Mouzelis; Weyland, "Neopopulism."
56. Sachs, pp. 17–23; criticism in Knight, pp. 241–43.
57. Knight. Populism's instrumental nature becomes evident in the case of Brazil's Getúlio Vargas, who led a nonpopulist, authoritarian government (1930–45) and adopted populism only when he faced a strong democratizing challenge and sought to regain power in the new democracy.
58. Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987), pp. 26–37; Krasner, pp. 224–25.
59. Marcos Novaro, "Los Populismos Latinoamericanos Transfigurados," *Nueva Sociedad*, 144 (July 1996), 96–97.

60. Knight, pp. 226, 233; Viguera, pp. 53, 62.
61. Graciela Ducatenzeiler, Philippe Faucher, and Julian Castro Rea, "Amérique Latine: Les Échecs du Libéral-Populisme," *Revue Canadienne d'Études du Développement*, 14 (1993), 175; Weyland, "Neopopulism," p. 5.
62. Charles Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1967), pp. 89–101.
63. See Kurt Weyland, "Latin America's Four Political Models," *Journal of Democracy*, 6 (October 1995), 128–29.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 128–30.
65. Philip, p. 84.
66. By contrast, President Clinton did not call for mass demonstrations or a plebiscite when facing impeachment proceedings. Similarly, when Brazil's constituent assembly threatened to abridge presidential powers in 1987–88, incumbent José Sarney appealed, not to the masses, but to clientelist politicians and the military.
67. Mouzelis stresses the contrast between populism and clientelism.
68. Therefore, charisma tends to be an empirical characteristic of populist leaders, but it is not a definitional requirement.
69. De la Torre; Novaro, "Populismos."
70. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 5th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1976), pp. 142–48, 661–87.
71. See Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), ch. 8; de la Torre, pp. 21, 97, 127–28, 136–38.
72. As happened to Chile's Socialist Party and Mexico's PRI. See Drake, *Socialism*.
73. But given the memories of the foundational period, the maintenance of populist discourse and ritual, and the preservation of discretionary leadership, the resulting postpopulist organizations are susceptible to revivals of populism, as spearheaded, for instance, by Mexican President Luis Echeverría (1970–76).
74. Collier and Collier, ch. 5.
75. Michael Conniff, "Introduction," in Conniff, ed., *Populism*, p. 10.
76. Marcos Novaro, "Populismo y Gobierno," in Burbano, ed., pp. 35–43.
77. Kurt Weyland, "The Politics of Corruption in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy*, 9 (April 1998), 117–19.
78. James McGuire, *Peronism without Perón* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
79. In Mario Baizán, *Conversaciones con Carlos Menem* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Fraterna, 1993), p. 21.
80. Weyland, "Neopopulism."
81. Domingo Cavallo, *El Peso de la Verdad* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1997), pp. 273–75; Carlos Boloña, *Cambio de Rumbo* (Lima: Instituto de Economía de Libre Mercado, 1993), pp. vii–ix, 202.
82. But it excludes organized parties with muted personalistic leadership, such as Venezuela's *Acción Democrática* since the 1960s.
83. Recently Gerring, pp. 363–64.