

*David Winston* Logos and  
Mystical Theology  
in Philo  
of Alexandria

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*The Gustave A. and Mamie W. Efroymsen Memorial Lectures  
Delivered at the  
Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion  
in the Spring of 1984*

## *Preface*

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Having been engaged for some time in an effort to unravel the complexities and seeming inconsistencies which characterize the writings of Philo of Alexandria, I was delighted when the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion graciously invited me to spend the spring semester of 1984 at its Cincinnati campus and to deliver the Efroymsen lectures for that year on the mystical aspect of Philo's thought. I have sought in these lectures (which appear in the form in which they were delivered) to trace the line of reasoning which inevitably led Philo down the path and byways of an intellectual mysticism (whether it was more than that must remain uncertain) which clearly invested much of his writing with the glow of an extraordinary intensity and with moments of high passion.

I should like to acknowledge with thanks the very warm hospitality extended to me and my wife by colleagues and friends of the Hebrew Union College community. I am especially grateful to Dr. Barry S. Kogan and Dr. Steven Bowman, who, along with my students at HUC, listened patiently to my lectures on Philo and joined me in dialogue. I also wish to thank Dr. Michael A. Meyer, chairman of the Publications Committee, and Rabbi Faedra Lazar Weiss for their skillful preparation of these lectures for publication. Finally, I am beholden to Dr. Jakob J. Petuchowski, chairman of the Efroymsen Lectureship Committee, from whom the invitation to visit at HUC and deliver these lectures came.

## Philo's Logos Doctrine Against Its Platonic Background

Already in 1773 the German Protestant theologian Johann von Mosheim complained about the long and weighty controversies of learned men over the theological opinions of Philo of Alexandria,<sup>1</sup> and even a cursory glance at the history of Philonic scholarship reveals an astonishingly diverse landscape of opinion. Although faint echoes of Philo's teachings may be found in several rabbinic dicta, his name appears nowhere in the vast rabbinic corpus.<sup>2</sup> This is hardly surprising, since the rabbis had evinced little interest in philosophical speculation and did not even refer to the well-known Jewish historian Josephus. Were it not for the extraordinary interest of the Church Fathers in Philo Judaeus, his writings would surely have perished and his richly textured reconstruction of Biblical thought in the Greek philosophical mode would have perished along with them. Aside from some Philonic echoes in medieval Jewish philosophy mediated through a Syriac or Arabic translation of a portion of his works,<sup>3</sup> Philo does not resurface in Jewish literature before the sixteenth century, when Azariah dei Rossi, who read his works in a Latin translation,<sup>4</sup> outlined a number of his characteristic doctrines in the third part of his well-known treatise *Me'or Einayim* (Mantua, 1573-75). Rossi greatly appreciated Philo's philosophical ability but his attitude towards him remained somewhat ambivalent. He refused to decide whether Philo's work is, as he puts it, "pure or impure," and although he would not refer to him as Rabbi or *Hakham*, neither would he condemn him as a heretic,<sup>5</sup> but called him instead Yedidyah the Alexandrian, a felicitous Hebrew equivalent of his Greek name, treating him merely as one of the wise men of the non-Jewish world.<sup>6</sup> It is interesting to note that Spinoza's sole reference to Philo is based on his reading of Rossi and derives from the pseudo-Philonic work *Liber Temporum* cited by the latter.<sup>7</sup> It is unlikely, however, that Spinoza could have obtained much of an appreciation for Philo from Rossi's brief summary of his work. It was otherwise with Joseph Delmedigo

(1591-1655), whose philosophical speculations in *Novlot Hokhmah* may have directly influenced Spinoza. Yashar of Candia, as Delmedigo is usually known, read Philo in the original Greek and even made a Hebrew translation of excerpts from the latter's works, although this was unfortunately stolen from him and never recovered.<sup>8</sup> His own leanings toward Platonism and mysticism must have predisposed him to view Philo's writings with a great deal of sympathy. Finally, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Nachman Krochmal, who composed the first elaborate philosophy of Jewish history, after wryly noting that Alexandrian Jewry disappeared from the memory of the Jewish people because "they forsook the holy tongue of their inheritance," included in his *Guide for the Perplexed of the Time* a Hebrew translation of a number of Philonic passages from the German of August Dähne and a summary translation of the account given of Philo by August Neander, a baptized Jew who was a professor of church history in Berlin and whose original name was David Mendel.<sup>9</sup>

If Philo's impact on Jewish tradition was rather minimal, his writings have been of capital importance in the history of Christian spirituality, constituting as they do a primary source for much of early patristic exegesis of the Hebrew Bible. Indeed, up to the middle of the sixteenth century Philo was regarded as a Church Father who taught the doctrine of the Trinity, and a ninth century manuscript shows him clad in a stole dotted with crosses.<sup>10</sup> An old fresco in the French Romanesque cathedral of Le Puy portrays him around a crucifixion together with Isaiah, Hosea and Jeremiah.<sup>11</sup> The Fathers of the Church uniformly connected him with Plato and Pythagoras, and St. Jerome quotes a proverb current among the Greeks that "either Philo platonizes or Plato philonizes." (*Vir. Ill.* 11). Dionysius Petavius, in his great work on dogma, published in 1644, was the first to assert that the doctrine of the Trinity as taught by Philo is Platonic, not Christian. Early modern scholars, beginning in 1693 with the German classicist at Hamburg, Johann Fabricius, detached Philo from the Christian tradition and clearly demonstrated his Platonic roots, thus allowing him to share in the glory of his master and receive the great respect of the Cambridge Platonists Henry More and Ralph Cudworth.

The protective umbrella of the church once removed, however, Philo soon became vulnerable to very sharp criticism. Mosheim, already mentioned earlier, scored Philo as an unoriginal thinker, though he perceptively discerned in his writings two levels of thought, the one exoteric, directed at the casual reader, the other esoteric, geared for a more sophisticated audience. The chorus of detractors, who saw in Philo a weak-minded eclectic who lacked independent judgment, quickly gathered strength. Thus Heinrich Ritter in his *History of*

*Philosophy* (1836-37) declared that Philo mingles philosophical doctrines promiscuously. Eduard Zeller, in his great work on Greek philosophy, thought that Philo wavers between Stoicism and a Platonism which is fundamentally irreconcilable with it.<sup>12</sup> The great French historian of philosophy, Émile Bréhier, asserted that Philo was greatly influenced by Hellenistic Egyptian mystery religions and a host of conflicting philosophical theories.<sup>13</sup> The denigration of Philo reached its climax in Père Festugière's assessment that one could read the whole of Philo's works without encountering a single original thought and that the refined Platonic imagery which he had inherited had been tastelessly vulgarized by him.<sup>14</sup>

A more sympathetic approach to Philo was that of Erwin Goodenough, who thought that Philo had tried to combine Judaism and Hellenism, not so much in a metaphysical system but existentially, in his aching Jewish heart. He also believed that Philo was a mystic philosopher in the Greek tradition, though heavily influenced by oriental elements, especially Persian and Egyptian. He further insisted that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that a Jewish mystery cult was actually celebrated in Alexandria.<sup>15</sup> Equally sympathetic, yet poles apart, was Harry Wolfson, who claimed that Philo was a philosopher in the grand manner, a profound critic of all the Greek schools of philosophy, and the author of a system of thought which dominated European philosophy for well-nigh seventeen centuries until it was remorselessly torn down by Spinoza.<sup>16</sup>

The main causes for these contradictory portraits are rooted to a large extent in the literary form in which Philo's work was cast, but more especially in the loss of the philosophical literature which formed the context in which he wrote. Philo wrote no systematic works, and his religious world view must be gleaned from the series of biblical commentaries which he composed. Moreover, Philo wrote for an audience well versed in the Platonic thought of his age, which has been labeled for convenience Middle Platonism, to distinguish it from the Old Academy which preceded it and the Neoplatonic tradition which followed it. Philo thus nonchalantly refers to a large number of philosophical terms and concepts without providing precise definitions or explanations. A prime example is the theme of this evening's lecture, the doctrine of the Logos, the linchpin of Philo's religious thought. This notion is everywhere introduced by Philo as something his readers will immediately recognize without any further explanation.

As our understanding of Middle Platonism has steadily advanced, a new and more accurate portrait of Philo has begun to emerge which, while not resolving all the inconsistencies exhibited in his voluminous writings, offers nevertheless

a unified view of his work which preserves its author's integrity and peculiar originality. This is not to deny that there is still considerable room for a large range of nuances in the interpretation of Philo's thought, but the arena has been sufficiently narrowed to exclude the freewheeling assaults of a former age which gratuitously belittled Philo's very important contribution to the development of religious philosophy. There is, however, one remaining gap in current Philonic scholarship which makes it impossible at present to produce a definitive study of his thought, and that is the lack of full-scale commentaries on most of his treatises and new and more accurate translations of the Armenian version of those of Philo's works which have not survived in the original Greek.

Although we know exceedingly little about Philo the man, there are two aspects of his personality which stand clearly revealed in his writings. There is a pervasive use of athletic imagery throughout, with a special emphasis on wrestling. Occasionally Philo even recalls specific athletic or theatrical events which he had seen with his own eyes,<sup>17</sup> and thrice he employs the metaphor of God as the President of the Games, the *agonothete*.<sup>18</sup> We may confidently conclude that Philo must have been a passionate devotee of athletics.<sup>19</sup> If to this devotion to sports we add Philo's speculative philosophical bent, which is transparent in almost all of his writings, we are left with two character traits in which he sharply diverges from his intellectual counterparts in Palestine. However much the Jewish Palestinian scholar had become assimilated to Hellenistic culture, this assimilation hardly included speculative philosophy,<sup>20</sup> and even though there were stadia and hippodromes in Judaea,<sup>21</sup> Herod apparently did not dare build gymnasia in Judaea proper. Moreover, Josephus points out that when Herod built a spectacularly lavish theatre and amphitheatre in Jerusalem, he was departing from native Jewish custom (*Ant.* 15.267-79). The rabbis undoubtedly had little use for theatres, circuses, and stadia.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, although, as Lieberman has pointed out, "they condemned sport as an occupation and even cursed the man who behaved during the ritual immersion as if he was indulging in water-sports, [they] nevertheless did not forbid sports outright." Lieberman has shown that, like their Gentile neighbors, the Jews of Palestine used to perform all kinds of body exercises and that the rabbis tolerated this, prohibiting certain exercises on the Sabbath but allowing them on ordinary days.<sup>23</sup> In any case, there is a great cultural divide between the rabbinic attitude which barely tolerated sports and Philo's deep and completely uninhibited passion for them. There can be little doubt that a Jewish intellectual of the Philonic stamp would have been a great embarrassment to the Palestinian religious leadership, nor is it likely that a Palestinian Jewish community would

foster the growth of such a personality type in the first place.

Philo was thus the ideal Jew to undertake the reconciliation of Judaism and Hellenism, since he was himself a living embodiment of these two cultural spheres dwelling securely together. Without the slightest trace of an apology or hint of any possible dissonance, he praises parents for providing their children with gymnastic training and instruction in the secular school studies (*Spec.* 2.229-30). Similarly, he sees the Jewish Sabbath as devoted to the pursuit of the ancestral philosophy, a time for the theoretical study of the truths of nature (*Mos.* 2.215-16). With natural ease he reads his love of philosophy into Scripture. In the garment taken from one's neighbor as a pledge, which Scripture says must be returned to him before the sun sets, Philo sees a symbol of human reason. Commenting on Exod. 22:26, "This garment is the only cover of his unseemliness," Philo asks: "Who is there that in so fair a fashion removes from sight what might cause shame or entail reproach in man's life as does reason?...For reason is our friend, familiar, intimate, companion, bound to us by an invisible and indissoluble glue" (*Som.* 1.109-11). Elsewhere, philosophy is for Philo God's word; it constitutes the royal road to the Divine (*Post.* 101-02).

If the main intent of the Philonic enterprise is a Greco-Jewish reconciliation, its main instrument is a vast and detailed allegorical interpretation of Scripture, partly through a line-by-line exegesis, known as the Allegory of the Law, and partly through a more thematic treatment designated as the Exposition of the Law. The nature of these two bodies of writings has been hotly debated and students of Philo have provided us with sharply antithetical views as to their intent. My own view is that they undoubtedly express the thinking of an Alexandrian Jew whose formal education was clearly primarily Hellenic, and who appears to have been a convinced Platonist with mystical tendencies who had somewhat belatedly found a renewed interest in his Jewish heritage and had decided to effect a grand synthesis between his ancestral faith and the philosophical-mystical tradition which constituted his first intellectual love.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that Philo's knowledge of Palestinian Jewish tradition is essentially that of an outsider who is utterly dependent on Greek translations and oral instruction. Contrary to the view that Philo is first and foremost a commentator on Scripture who elected to use Platonic thought as the main vehicle of his exegesis because he considered it to be the philosophy most pliable and adaptable to the biblical worldview, I find the deepest roots of his soul taking their nourishment at the fount of philosophy and his Platonist cast of mind a matter of the deepest intellectual conviction. This is certainly not to deny, however, that in the course of his strenuous attempt to reconcile his

Platonism with his equally passionate loyalty and devotion to Judaism, he was not compelled to make a series of compromises, some minor, some more serious.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, I am equally convinced that his mode of exposition is characterized by a deliberate ambiguity, which allowed him to cover his tracks when the philosophical views he had adopted would have struck the wider Jewish audience he was addressing as essentially alien to their native ways of thinking. I find nothing dishonest nor any lack of integrity in this studied use of ambiguity, but only Philo's assured conviction that simple faith is for the simple and philosophical faith for the philosophical.<sup>25</sup> Philo had a genuine and deep affection for the simple Jewish literalists who did not oppose allegorical interpretation on principle, and if he sometimes gently chided them, he never poked fun at them.<sup>26</sup> Toward those of his fellow Jews, however, who had erected a self-satisfied structure of religious superstition, he could be extremely harsh: "Let the superstitious stop up their ears or depart," he writes, "for we teach mysteries divine to the initiates worthy of the holiest mysteries, they who practice the true and veritably unadorned piety without affectation. But we do not reveal the mysteries to those who, held fast by the incurable evil of vanity, measure what is pure and holy by no other standard than the 'birdlime' of verbiage and pretentious claptrap of ceremonial" (*Cher.* 42).

A few words need to be added at this point with regard to Philo's audience. Although the evidence is very inadequate, it seems to me that he is addressing his allegorical interpretations in the main to a sophisticated circle of Jewish intellectuals who would readily understand the Platonic conceptions which he employed without further explication, some of whom were his peers and had themselves made important contributions toward the allegorical exegesis of Scripture.<sup>27</sup> In addition, he may also have entertained the hope that some pagan intellectuals would be attracted by what he had to say and would find themselves among the admirers of Jewish culture. Finally, he also wrote some clearly apologetic works aimed directly at the pagan world or at apostate Jews like his own nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander.

Having provided a brief survey of Philonic scholarship in an attempt to explain the reasons for the confusing array of contradictory interpretations, and having sketched Philo's personality and the nature of his enterprise, we are now prepared to approach the central themes of his religious thought. I shall attempt to cut a broad path through the tangled underbrush of his complex biblical exegesis from the perspective of his most characteristic doctrine. We are told that before beginning his lectures in the Academy, Plato would often say "Not until the *Nous* (or 'Mind') is here," and when Aristotle arrived he would

observe: "Start reciting, the *Nous* is present."<sup>28</sup> If, in the same spirit, I were to select a fitting tag for Philo, I should call him 'Logos,' a term which appears with almost monotonous frequency throughout all his writings. Since Philo's mystical theology bars a direct approach to God's essence, we must seek it out through the oblique traces disclosed by its noetic aspect, the Divine Mind or Logos. That the Logos is not identical with the divine essence as it is in itself was probably deduced from the fact that the process of self-intellection necessarily involves the duality of subject and object, and even though in this instance subject and object are identical, the absolute unity and simplicity of God, which cannot brook even the slightest trace of otherness, would thereby be compromised.<sup>29</sup>

Philo's choice of the term Logos was not dictated by his use of Plato's *Timaeus*, the model which he closely followed in giving his own account of creation. Indeed, it seems to have been deliberately adopted in order to replace the concept of a world soul so central to that dialogue. The reason for this change was twofold. Under the influence of the 'scientific' teachings of the Stoa, the Middle Platonists (such as Atticus and Albinus)<sup>30</sup> merged Plato's Demiurge with his World Soul into the single concept of a *Nous*/Logos to designate the world-immanent activity of the divine. Following in the footsteps of the Middle Platonists, Philo too adopted the Stoic Logos, though like Plutarch and Atticus he drew a clear distinction between it and God.<sup>31</sup> But the special suitability of the Logos for Philo's exposition of God's creative aspect lies in the fact that it could readily be assimilated to the "word of God" in Scripture, which had been rendered in the Septuagint by the term *logos*. When the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, for example, states that God made all things by his word (*logōi*), and through his wisdom (*sophiai*) framed man" (9:1-2), it is by no means clear that "word" and "wisdom" there refer to Logos/Sophia, and further analysis of the text is required to justify such an inference. Logos was thus a term eminently suited to a system of philosophical exegesis which sought to read this concept into the biblical creation narrative. Moreover, since the Jewish Hellenistic wisdom literature employed the term "Wisdom" synonymously with the "word of God", it was only natural for Philo to use that term too as the equivalent of Logos. The personified Wisdom already makes her appearance in Proverbs and Job in the guise of a charming female figure playing always before Yahweh, having been created by him at the beginning of his work (Prov. 8:30). It is above all in the Wisdom of Solomon, however, that this figure comes into her own and offers the closest parallel to the centrality she possesses in Philo's writings. Sophia is described in this work as an effluence or effulgence of God's glory and his agent in creation (7:25-26; 8:4; 9:1-2), and it is implied that she contains the paradigm-

matic patterns of all things (9:8-9). Like Philo, the author refers to her as his bride and boasts of living with her and enjoying kinship with her. Sophia anticipates those who desire her and those who seek her will not weary. She spans the entire range of scientific knowledge and is the source of both morality and prophecy. She is thus a direct bearer of revelation, functioning through the workings of the human mind, and the supreme arbiter of all values. The author's highly charged language with reference to Wisdom seems to allude to a mystical encounter, and although the more precise delineation of the nature of such an encounter afforded by Philo is missing in the Wisdom of Solomon, the latter's description seems more intensely personal and therefore less likely to be a purely intellectual exercise.<sup>32</sup>

An echo of this hypostatization of Wisdom which we have found both in Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon may also be perceived in the rabbinic notion of the divine "Word." In *Song R.* 1.13 it is conceived as a concrete, independent entity, encompassing all of the ten commandments (cf. *Mek. Bahodesh* 4, H-R:218, Lauterbach 2.228). Citing the verse, "Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth," (*Song* 1:2) the Rabbis comment: "The *dibbur* [i.e., commandment or utterance] itself went in turn to each of the Israelites and said to him, 'Do you undertake to keep me'?...He would reply, 'Yes, yes,' and straightway the commandment kissed him on the mouth and taught him Torah." It is but a short step from this to the conversion of the 'Word' into a personal entity, a step which is taken in *Song R.* 6.3 (cf. *Num. R.* 10.3), where the *dibbur* speaks to God person to person. Citing the verse "His mouth is most sweet" (*Song* 5:16), R. Azariah and R. Aha in the name of R. Yoḥanan said: "When the Israelites heard at Sinai the word 'I', their souls left them, as it says, 'If we hear the voice...any more, then we shall die' (*Deut.* 5:22)...The Word (*dibbur*) then returned to the Blessed Holy One and said: 'Sovereign of the Universe, Thou art full of life, and Thy law is full of life, but Thou has sent me to the dead for they are all dead.' Thereupon the Blessed Holy One sweetened the Word for them."<sup>33</sup>

Philo takes great delight in depicting the polymorphic activities of the many-named Logos. It is the image of God, the first-begotten son of the Uncreated Father, the chief of the angels, the High Priest of the cosmos, the man or shadow of God or even the second God, the idea of ideas, the paradigmatic archetype of the macrocosm and of the human mind, the microcosm. As the cupbearer of God and toastmaster of the feast, who differs not from the draught he pours, the Logos fills the soul of rational man with gaiety and gladness. He is a lover of the alone and the solitary, never mixing with the crowd of things created and destined to perish. Yet, extending himself from the center of the universe to its fur-

thest bounds and from its extremities to the center again, he runs nature's unvanquished course, joining and binding fast all its parts. Constituting the unbreakable bond of the universe, he mediates and moderates the threatenings of the opposing elements, so that the universe may produce a complete harmony.<sup>34</sup> Imitating a Stoic usage which has enjoyed a vigorous afterlife, Philo often distinguishes between two aspects of the human logos, "one resembling a spring, the other its outflow; logos in the understanding resembles a spring and is called reason, while utterance by mouth and tongue is like its outflow and is called speech" (*Mig.* 71). Philo then draws an analogy between the twofold logos in man and the twofold Logos in the universe, which he sees symbolized in the doubling of the reason-seat (*Exod.* 36:16, LXX = *MT* 39:9). In the universe it represents the "archetypal ideas from which the intelligible world was framed, and the visible objects which are the copies and likenesses of those ideas. With man in one form it resides within, in the other it passes out from him in utterance" (*Mos.* 2.127; cf. *QE* 2.57). Moreover, "the Logos in nature is true and revelatory, and similarly the reason in man, which is its copy, must unerringly honor truth and not through envy obscure anything whose disclosure would benefit those better instructed. At the same time, as in each of us reason has two forms, the outward of utterance and the inward of thought, he gave them each one of the two virtues as its special property: to utterance clear showing, to the thinking mind truth." Furthermore, "since reason, however admirable are its lofty pronouncements, is of no value unless followed by action, he fastened the reason-seat to the ephod or shoulder-piece so that it should not come loose, inasmuch as the shoulder symbolizes deeds and activity" (*Mos.* 2.128-30).

The manner in which Philo has formulated his analogy is of considerable interest since it highlights a decisive difference between divine and human thought. On the divine level, the archetypal intelligible world and its imaged copy, the sense-perceptible world, do not represent two distinct phases of the divine noetic activity but are instantaneous manifestations of it, whereas on the human level the inward thought of the sovereign mind and its linguistic expression, which is its sensible copy or shadow, involve two successive phases. Indeed, since according to Philo thought and speech should never be detached from action, the second phase, speech, includes the action that follows it. Now, in his exegesis of *Gen.* 6:6 ("God had it in his mind that he had made men upon the earth and he bethought him"), a verse which even in the softened version of the LXX could be taken to imply that God had repented of his creation of man, Philo makes a distinction between *ennoia*, 'having in mind', and *dianoia*, 'be-thinking', the former being the thought quiescent in the mind, the latter

thought brought to an issue, that is to say, *ennoia* becomes *dianoia* when the stored-up thought becomes the subject of active deliberation and subsequent action.<sup>35</sup> But although these phases are distinct in man, each requiring a separate initiative, in God they are identical. In Philo's view God's thinking is simultaneous with his acting, for his word is his deed (*Sac.* 65-68; *Mos.* 1.283). In short, the analogy between the twofold divine Logos and the twofold human logos is valid only insofar as both involve an original and its copy, but the analogy breaks down as soon as we consider the temporal sequence which applies to the two phases of the human logos but is inapplicable to those of the divine Logos. Philo does indeed distinguish between God's *ennoia* and *dianoia* due to the demands of his exegesis of Gen. 6:6, but at the same time he is careful to avoid speaking of God's *Logos Endiathetos* and *Logos Prophorikos*, since no biblical text dictates this terminology and such terms could convey the false impression either that God literally has a voice<sup>36</sup> or that there could be a distinction in the Logos itself between thought and expression. Nevertheless, Philo could not resist indicating the analogy and attaching it to the symbolism of the High Priest's reason-seat.<sup>37</sup> It is interesting to note that the implication of Philo's analogy — that the Logos represents the archetypal speech of God which is copied and embodied in the physical universe — anticipates the Kabbalistic notion that the world of the Sephiroth is the hidden world of language, the world of the divine names. "The process of life in God," writes Scholem, "can be construed as the unfolding of the elements of speech. This is indeed one of the Zohar's favorite symbols. The world of divine emanation is one in which the faculty of speech is anticipated in God."<sup>38</sup>

In his endeavor to explain the functioning of the Logos, Philo seems to have adapted to his own needs what may well have been a Neopythagorean elaboration of a conception which appears in Plato's *Philebus*. In that dialogue (13-31), in an attempt to resolve the One-Many problem, Plato suggests that unity and multiplicity are due to a conjunction of two constituents, the *apeiron* or the Unlimited, a principle of indeterminate potentiality or indefinite quantification, and *peras* or Limit, which stands for precise numbers and proportions. On the cosmic level, all things may be seen to be the result of a Cosmic Intelligence imposing Limit on the Unlimited, or in Aristotelian terms, Form on Matter. Using this Platonic model as a guide, Neopythagoreans like Eudorus of Alexandria and Pseudo-Archytus could thus have discerned below a supranoteic One a duality of causal principles: the Monad, or principle of form, and the Indefinite Dyad, or principle of Matter. In terms of the later philosophy of Plotinus, this can be seen as analogous to the two moments in the emergence of *Nous*,

where we find undefined or unlimited Intelligible Matter proceeding from the One and then turning back to its source for definition.<sup>39</sup> Philo is not so much interested, however, in employing this cosmological theory for the explanation of the emergence of the Logos from God<sup>40</sup> as he is in applying it to the double relationship of God to the world and man, manifested in his two attributes of grace and justice. The former, God's 'Goodness', he designates as the Creative, Beneficent, or Gracious Power, the latter, God's 'Sovereignty', as the Regent, Punitive, or Legislative Power.<sup>41</sup> It is through these Powers that God acts upon the world, and the various positive properties which Philo attributes to God throughout his writings can all be subsumed under either of these two polar principles, which may thus be seen as expressions of the one Logos that constitutes the manifestation of God as thinking-acting.

If the question now be asked why Philo chose to call these two polar aspects of the Logos 'Powers', and why he described them by the adjectives just cited, the answer is not far to seek. It appears that the Stoics had spoken of that part of the Supreme God or Primordial Fire which is all-pervading, namely, the cosmic *pneuma*, as being many-named in accordance with its various powers (*dynameis*), and had correlated the etymologies of the names of the Olympian Gods with these dynamic functions (D.L. 7.147; cf. *LA* 2.22). Moreover, Plato had already conceived of the Forms not only as patterns but also as causes (*Phaedo* 95E), in which sense he described them as possessing power (*Sophist* 247DE), a usage copied by Philo (*Mut.* 122; *Spec.* 1.45-48). But the special aptness which the term 'Powers' possessed for Philo may be found in the fact that it could readily be connected with the Scriptural designation of God as *YHWH Tzeva'ot*, rendered in the LXX as "the Lord of the Powers".<sup>42</sup> As for Philo's choice of adjectives for the Powers, we find once again that the terms he employed may be traced back both to Stoic and Jewish tradition. The author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian work *On the World* asserted after the Stoic fashion that though God is one, he has many names according to the many effects he himself produces. Among many other names, he is also called God of Vengeance (*palamnaios*) and of Supplication and Grace (401a23).<sup>43</sup> Moreover, Bréhier has pointed out that the Stoic mythographer Cornutus (chapters 9 and 15) had allegorized the two mythological figures Justice (*Dike*) and the Graces (*Charites*), interpreting the former as that power of God which introduces fellowship into the affairs of men and exhorts them not to wrong one another, while the latter were the sources of grace and beneficence to men.<sup>44</sup> Philo's frequent references to *Dike* as assessor (*paredros*), attendant (*opados*), and guardian (*ephoros*), and to the Graces as the virgin daughters of God,<sup>45</sup> reveal literary reminiscences of Cornutus' inter-

pretations, and it is clear from Seneca (*Ben.* 1.3) that the allegorization of the Graces, at least, goes back to Chrysippus. In short, Philo found the Stoics referring to the various powers of the Logos and offering an elaborate allegorization of the mythological figures which represented the divine attributes of justice and grace. At the same time he found in Jewish tradition the frequent coupling of God's attributes of justice and mercy, and even their transformation into self-subsistent powers or hypostases.<sup>46</sup>

Scholars have been baffled by the fact that Philo describes Wisdom, a term generally used by him in a sense synonymous with that of the Logos, as "the mother and nurse of all" (*Ebr.* 31), since these are the words used by Plato in the *Timaeus* (49A, 51A) to describe the Receptacle, and Philo himself elsewhere similarly adopts them as a description of matter (*Ebr.* 61; *QG* 4.160). Thus, in addition to the schema which he often uses, according to which the Logos is the eldest son of God and the sensible world is his younger son, no mention being made of a mother,<sup>47</sup> Philo sometimes employs an alternate pattern in which God is said to have intercourse with his knowledge or Wisdom and thus produces his only beloved son, the sense-perceptible world (*Ebr.* 30).<sup>48</sup> This schema is structurally closer to Plato's father-mother-child image in the *Timaeus* (50CD), in which he compares the Recipient to a mother, the model to a father, and the world of Becoming to their offspring. It would appear, however, that even the former schema already represents an attempt on the part of Philo to adhere as closely as he can to his Platonic model, for in Philo's thought, if the Logos, as God's image, was designated son, then the sensible world, as an image of that image, should have been identified as God's grandson. The question remains, nonetheless, how Philo found it possible to adapt his imagery to the father-mother-child pattern of Plato by describing Sophia in the same terms that were applied to matter. There is little likelihood that Wolfson's desperate solution can serve as an adequate motivation for Philo's surprising description of Wisdom. He suggested that Philo, after the manner of the Midrash (*Gen. R.* 1.1) was playfully reading the Hebrew word *'amon* in Prov. 8:30, which according to his conjecture underlies the Septuagint's *harmozousa*, both as *'omen*, nurse, and *'imman*, their mother.<sup>49</sup> In my opinion, however, the difficulty is considerably diminished when we recall that Philo was very likely aware of a Neopythagorean formulation which had distinguished an aspect of the *Nous/Logos* which could be described as the Unlimited Dyad or Intelligible Matter (*noētē hylē*). Indeed, traces of this concept and even the very terminology can be found in Philo's writings.<sup>50</sup> It is therefore not all that strange that he would employ the figure of Sophia for that phase of the Logos which is characterized by indefinite

potentiality.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, since Plutarch, like Philo, in his analogous attempt to adapt Egyptian theology to Platonic philosophy through a process of allegorization, equated the goddess Isis with the Receptacle of the *Timaeus* (*Is. et Os.* 371E, 374A) as well as with Wisdom (351E), it is not unlikely that he too was familiar with a Neopythagorean interpretation of Plato's theory of the *peras* and *apeiron* in which Sophia or a similar mythological figure was perhaps identified with the *apeiron* aspect.<sup>52</sup>

Following his usual exegetical mode of finding biblical support for his philosophical conceptions, Philo identified the Creative or Beneficent Power with 'God' or *theos*, the LXX rendering of *Elohim*, "since it made (*ethēke*) and ordered the All," and the Regent or Punitive Power with 'Lord' or *kyrios*, the LXX rendering of the Tetragrammaton, "since it is the fundamental right of the maker to rule and control what he has brought into being" (*Abr.* 121).<sup>53</sup> The rabbis, on the other hand, had connected the Tetragrammaton with God's mercy and *Elohim* with his judgment.<sup>54</sup> Zacharias Frankel had long ago suggested that the reason for Philo's reversal was his inadequate knowledge of Hebrew, and this has remained the consensus despite Arthur Marmorstein's hypothesis, which was accepted by several scholars, that the surviving rabbinic doctrine had been deliberately altered from an earlier one for polemical reasons.<sup>55</sup> Recently, however, Nils Dahl and Alan Segal have attempted to reinstate Marmorstein's position, though in my opinion unsuccessfully.<sup>56</sup> They cite the following passage from *Mek. Bahodesh* 5, H-R:219, Lauterbach 2.231 (cf. *Shirta* 4, H-R:129, Lauterbach 2:31): "'I am the Lord thy god.' Why is this said? For this reason: At the sea He appeared to them as a mighty hero doing battle, as it is said: 'The Lord is a man of war' (Exod. 15:3). At Sinai He appeared to them as an old man full of mercy, as it is said: 'And they saw the God of Israel [; under His feet there was the likeness of a pavement of sapphire]' (Exod. 24:10). And of the time after they had been redeemed what does it say? 'Like the very sky for purity' (*ibid.*). Again it says: 'As I looked on, thrones were set in place, [And the Ancient of Days took His seat]' (Dan. 7:9). And it also says: 'A river of fire streamed forth before Him; [Thousands upon thousands served Him]' (Dan. 7:10). Scripture, therefore, would not let the nations of the world have an excuse for saying that there are two Powers, but declares: 'I am the Lord thy God.' I am He who was in Egypt and I am He who was at the sea. I am He who was at Sinai. I am He who was in the past and I am He who will be in the future. I am He who is in this world and I am He who will be in the world to come, as it is said: 'See, then, that I, I am He; There is no God beside Me' (Deut. 32:39). And it says: 'To your old age I am still the same' (Isa. 46:4). And it says: 'Thus said the Lord, the King of

Israel, Its Redeemer, the Lord of Hosts: "I am the first and I am the last[, And there is no God but Me" (Isa. 44:6). And it says: 'Who has wrought and achieved this? He who announced the generations from the start—I, the Lord, who was first and will be with the last as well' (Isa. 41:4)".

Dahl and Segal conclude that "since the *Mekhilta* deliberately identifies *Elohim* with the merciful aspect of God, YHWH with the strictly just aspect of God, the contradiction with the received rabbinic tradition cannot be missed. This *Mekhilta* passage is therefore an independent witness demonstrating that the Philonic correlation of God's names with the divine qualities of mercy and justice was known in Palestine as well as in Alexandria." In my opinion, however, an analysis of the *Mekhilta* passage cited reveals that the rabbis are not basing their comment on a correlation of the Tetragrammaton with justice and *Elohim* with mercy, but rather on the contents of the verses quoted. Thus the verse in Exod. 15:3 refers explicitly to the punishing aspect of God at the sea, and the verse in Exod. 24:10 is interpreted by the rabbis to refer to God's compassion. This can readily be seen from *Mek. Pisha* 14, H-R:51, Lauterbach 1.113: "And so you find that whenever Israel is enslaved the Shekhinah, as it were, is enslaved with them, as it is said: 'And they saw the God of Israel, under His feet there was the likeness of a pavement of sapphire' (Exod. 24:10)...And it also says: 'In all their troubles He was troubled' (Isa. 63:9)." The Hebrew expression *kema 'aseh libnat* is taken to refer to brick-work and the verse is interpreted to mean that a brick was placed under God's feet, in remembrance of the harsh labor in mortar and brick with which the lives of the Israelites were embittered in Egypt.<sup>57</sup> As for Dan. 7:10, 'thousands upon thousands served Him,' its rabbinic interpretation can be gleaned from *Lev. R.* 31.6, where the rabbis cite Job 25:3, 'Can His troops be numbered?', as contradicting it. The incongruity is then resolved by referring the verse in Job to the period preceding the destruction of the Temple, when God's praises ascended in a complete or unlimited form, whereas the verse in Daniel is referred to the period after the destruction, when God reduced his household (*familia*). It is thus abundantly clear that the crucial element determining the statement of the *Mekhilta* was not the correlation of the divine names with specific attributes but the peculiar homiletical interpretation of the verses cited. We may therefore conclude that it was indeed Philo's utter dependence on the LXX which had caused him to reverse the Palestinian tradition.

Having isolated and analyzed the dynamic principles which explain the functioning of the Logos, we may now turn our attention to Philo's description of it as the instrument of God in the creation of the world. Following Plato's lead,

Philo argues that "God judged in advance that a beautiful copy would never be produced except from a beautiful pattern and that no sense object would be irreproachable that was not modeled after an archetypal and intelligible idea (*Op.* 16; cf. *Tim.* 28)." Plato had argued that the visible world is a living creature made after the likeness of an eternal original, the so-called 'intelligible Living Creature',<sup>58</sup> a generic Form containing four main families: the heavenly gods (stars and planets), the birds of the air, the fishes of the sea, and the land animals (*Tim.* 30CD, 39E). If Philo was faithfully to follow his master, he had to find a clear reference to this theory in the Genesis creation narrative. Undaunted by a seemingly impossible task and armed with the exceedingly rich and complex exegetical tradition of the Jewish-Alexandrian school to which he was heir, he deftly deduced the creation of the intelligible model from the LXX version of Gen. 2:4-5, a translation which he happily considered inspired. But while the basic notion of the creation of an ideal pattern was thus readily inferred by Philo from the words of Scripture, the precise sequence of creation which he sought to project into the biblical text proved to be a much more recalcitrant task. It is therefore no wonder that scholars trying to unravel Philo's account of the order of creation have found this problem virtually insoluble. The most recent study of this issue, published in 1983, reviewing the failed attempts of its predecessors, resorts to the drastic measure of claiming that Philo was well aware that the various interpretations of Genesis which he had adduced were not of a piece. "Yet his belief in the inspired character of all of these interpretations," writes Thomas H. Tobin, "led him to place them side by side without any real revision."<sup>59</sup> Tobin does concede that Philo finds some interpretations more congenial than others, namely, the Platonic interpretations of the creation of man as opposed to those of the Stoics, and especially the allegory of the soul, and he points out that the contrast of style illustrates Philo's own preference for such interpretations. Yet the theory which Tobin applies not only to Philo's account of the creation of man but also to that of the world as a whole allows for contradictory interpretations to appear side by side, and he therefore sees no need for any effort at their reconciliation. A solution of this kind is clearly attractive, and is certainly not to be ruled out. But before acquiescing in a procedure that benignly accepts incongruities and allows them to stand side by side, the safest course by far is to continue to exert every effort to remove them by analytical interpretation. The subtleties of Philo's exegesis demand a subtle analysis in return, though the flexibility of his approach is such that it requires only that major contradictions be resolved, while at the same time allowing for minor inconsistencies and gaucheries.

The major cause of confusion, in my opinion, has been the imprecision of most of the scholarly accounts of the intelligible model whose formation, according to Philo, took place on day one of creation. It is Philo's philosophical conviction that in reality the creation of all things took place simultaneously, and that the piecemeal sequential account of Genesis is meant only to indicate the logical order in God's design of the universe. Thus, when the Bible speaks of "day one" rather than "first day", this is an expression of the uniqueness of the intelligible world, which is qualitatively different from the sensible world created on days two through six, and when it extends the creation over a period of six days, this is only to indicate the world's perfection, symbolized by the perfect number six. Still, the structure of this numerical schema appears to be clearly violated by the biblical text as interpreted by Philo, for Gen. 1:27a is taken by him to refer to the creation of the incorporeal Form of man, which took place on the sixth day rather than day one, and Gen. 2:4-5 is taken by him as a summary of the creation narrative of Gen. 1 and seems to be interpreted to mean that everything created during the six days was part of the intelligible world.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, even if we were to follow the alternate interpretation proposed by Valentin Nikiprowetzky, according to which days two through six witness the creation of the sensible world with the exception of the plants, fish, birds, animals and man, whose paradigmatic Forms alone were framed at that time, their sensible copies emerging only on the seventh day, contradictions still remain, since according to *Op.* 36, the intelligible world was already complete on day one.<sup>61</sup>

The nub of the contradiction, however, can be removed if the character of the intelligible model created on day one is examined more closely. According to Philo, God created on day one the Forms of heaven, earth, air (= darkness), void (= abyss), water, pneuma, and "topping them all in the seventh place," light (*Op.* 29).<sup>62</sup> This list clearly constitutes the seven primordial or all-inclusive Forms which comprise all the subordinate Forms that can be subsumed under each of them.<sup>63</sup> We have here the Forms of the four basic elements; the void;<sup>64</sup> the *pneuma*, which undoubtedly is meant to embrace not only all the life-forms, which include animals both irrational and rational, but also plants;<sup>65</sup> and light or all-brightness, the pattern of the sun and moon as well as of the stars and fixed planets. Then on days two through six, the various corporeal entities of the sensible world are created, each in accordance with the various generic Forms which are now derived from the seven primary, all-inclusive, patterns under which they were already subsumed. Thus in Gen. 2:4-7, Philo finds a summary of the six days of creation, in which there is a reference to the forma-

tion of heaven and earth and all that they contain, and also a clear indication that the intelligible Forms of all sensible things that had come into being had already subsisted before them. In Scripture's description of the creation of the plants and animals *kata genē* (1:11-12, 21, 24-25), Philo undoubtedly saw included both the creation of their generic Forms and their sensible counterparts (*LA* 2.12). As for man, the crown of all things created on earth, Gen. 1:27a speaks of the creation of his Form after the image of the Logos, while verses 26, 27b, and 28-30 refer to the creation of sensible man, which is described a second time in Gen. 2:7. Philo is happy to exploit this second and more explicit description of sensible man's creation in order to contrast the earthly man who is sense-perceptible, partaking already of such and such quality, consisting of body and soul, man or woman, by nature mortal, with the heavenly man, who is a Form (*idea*) or Type (*genos*) or Seal (*sphragis*),<sup>66</sup> intelligible, incorporeal, neither male nor female, by nature incorruptible.<sup>67</sup> The heavenly man is thus the generic Form of man, which resembles the Logos only in respect of its rational aspect, and which as the generic Form of man contains both male and female, though *qua* Form it is itself neither male nor female (*Op.* 76; *LA* 2.13).<sup>68</sup>

We may conclude by noting that Philo's conception of the Logos as the instrument of God in creation is undoubtedly reflected in the well-known statement by R. Hoshaya of Caesarea, a Palestinian Amora of the third century, to the effect that the Torah served as God's working-tool and paradigm in his creation of the world. Jacob Freudenthal pointed out long ago the similarity between R. Hoshaya's statement and the view of Philo without explicitly designating the latter as the rabbi's source.<sup>69</sup> Wilhelm Bacher, on the other hand, following a lead provided by Grätz, plausibly suggested that very likely it was the church father Origen, who had settled in Caesarea in 231 after being expelled from the church of Alexandria and who was profoundly influenced by Philo (whom he mentions several times by name) who was R. Hoshaya's intermediate source.

The logocentric character of Philo's thought has by now, I hope, become clearly manifest. For Philo, it is through the Logos and the Logos alone that man is capable of participating in the Divine. In my next lecture I shall proceed to examine the workings of the Logos in the human soul.

## The Psyche and Its Extra-Terrestrial Life in Philo's Anthropology

Nothing is more illustrative of the antithetical world views of the Stoics and Platonists than their attitudes towards the question of human self-identity. For the Platonist, the incarnate soul, which associated itself in the main with its bodily abode, lived in a constantly shifting kaleidoscope of being which escaped its grasp as water spurts through the fingers of the hand seeking violently to take hold of it. "We have a ridiculous fear of death," writes Plutarch, "we who have already died so many deaths, and still are dying! Dead is the man of yesterday, for he is passed into the man of today, and the man of today is dying as he passes into the man of tomorrow" (*Mor.* 392AE).<sup>1</sup> The Stoic philosopher Seneca, on the other hand, countered this Platonic notion by insisting that although "the periods of infancy, boyhood, youth and old age are different, I who have been infant, boy and youth am still the same. Thus, although each has a different constitution, the adaptation of each to its constitution is the same. For nature does not consign boyhood or youth, or old age, to me; it consigns me to them" (*Ep.* 121.16). In this characteristic debate between the schools, Philo clearly sides with the Platonists. He likens human life to a dream, "for, just as in the visions of sleep, seeing we see not, hearing we hear not, tasting and touching we neither taste nor touch...but they are empty creations of the mind which without any basis of reality produces pictures and images of things which are not, as though they were, so, too, the visions and imaginations of our waking hours resemble dreams. They come; they go; they appear; they speed away; they fly off before we can securely grasp them....Has not the baby vanished in the boy, the boy in the lad, the lad in the stripling, the stripling in the youth, the youth in the man, the man in the old man, while on old age follows death? Perhaps, indeed, each of the stages, as it resigns its rule to its successor, dies an anticipatory death, nature thus silently teaching us not to fear the death which ends all, since we have borne so easily the earlier deaths" (*Jos.* 126-29; cf. *Cher.* 113-15).

It is the function of the true statesman or philosopher, Philo tells us, "to come forward and, like some wise expounder of dreams, interpret the daytime visions and phantoms of those who think themselves awake." All must be evaluated in accordance with the standards of eternal truth, but it is God alone who has eternal being and it is the heavenly realm which mirrors the unchanging intelligible realities which constitute his Eternal Logos. As Plutarch put it, "God, being One, has with only one 'Now' completely filled 'Forever', and only when Being is after His pattern is it in reality Being, not having been nor about to be, nor has it had a beginning nor is it destined to come to an end" (Mor. 393A). Philo was fully in accord with this view. "If one should be willing," he wrote, "to peer into the interior of things, he will find heaven to be an eternal day, without night or any shadow, because it is unceasingly illumined by inextinguishable and pure beams of light. As much as among us those who are awake are superior to those asleep, so in the entire cosmos are the heavenly things superior to the earthly, for the former enjoy unsleeping wakefulness in virtue of operations unerring, infallible, and always steering a correct course, whereas the latter are mastered by sleep, and even if they momentarily awaken are dragged down again and fall asleep... For they are blinded by false opinions that compel them to dream, and lagging behind realities are incapable of apprehending anything firmly and securely" (Jos. 146-47).

It is man's intuitive intellect alone which, in Philo's view, escapes the flux and uncertainty of transient being, for it is his unshakable conviction that our knowledge of the modal or finite aspect of reality belongs to the contingent and unabiding, whereas our unmediated intuition of infinite divinity, limited though it be by the inherent finitude of the human mind, is vastly more effective than discursive reason in affording us a glimpse of the eternally and truly real (Praem. 28-30; Her. 98). Philo's confidence in the higher reaches of the human mind rests on the self-assurance of the Platonist in him that the human intellect is intimately related to the divine Logos, being an imprint (ekmageion), or fragment (apospasma)<sup>2</sup> or effulgence (apaugasma) of that blessed nature (Op. 146; cf. Praem. 163), or as he occasionally puts it, being a portion of the divine ether.<sup>3</sup> In a number of passages Philo tends to contrast the Stoic notion of the mind as a portion of ether with the more reverent characterization of it by Moses as a faithful cast (ekmageion empheres) of the divine image (Mut. 223) or "an impression and stamp (typon tina kai charaktēra) of the divine power, to which Moses gives the appropriate title of 'image', thus indicating that God is the Archetype of rational existence, while man is a copy and representation" (Det. 83). Similarly, at Plant. 18, Philo says that "our great

Moses likened the form of the reasonable soul to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that divine and invisible breath, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the Eternal Logos" (cf. Spec. 3.207; Her. 57). This should not be taken to mean, however, as Tobin has suggested, that Philo wishes to guard against turning the human mind into a part of God. At most, Philo appears to be indicating that the description of the human mind as ethereal pneuma is to be understood only metaphorically and is not meant to imply that it is a corporeal substance in the Stoic manner.<sup>4</sup> Middle Platonists, on the other hand, readily juxtaposed the terms 'portion' and 'copy' in their descriptions of the human mind in its relation to the world soul or God, and there is no reason to assume that Philo was unhappy with this juxtaposition. He, too, places these terms side by side, and although he sometimes indicates that "an effulgence of the blessed nature of the Godhead" is a better description of the mind than ethereal pneuma (Spec. 4.123; Plant. 18), he shows no particular preference for 'image' or 'copy' over 'portion' or 'fragment'. Especially instructive is Det. 83-90, where he begins by defining the human mind as an impression stamped by the divine power, an image or likeness of God,<sup>5</sup> but then ends his discussion by designating it "an inseparable portion of the divine and blessed soul, for nothing is severed or detached from the divine but only extended."<sup>6</sup> (cf. Gig. 27)

That the Platonists could simultaneously refer to the human soul as a portion and a copy of the divine Mind can be seen from Plutarch's paraphrase of Plato's account in the *Timaeus* (69C), in the course of which he says that the soul of man "is a portion or a copy (*meros ti ē mimēma*) of the soul of the universe and is joined together on principles and in proportions corresponding to those which govern the universe" (Mor. 441F). Elsewhere he speaks of the soul as not merely a work but also a part of God and as having come to be not by his agency (*hyp' autou*) but both from him as source and out of his substance.<sup>7</sup> Plotinus similarly conceives of the hierarchy of emanations from the One as images of their archetypes. Influenced by Plato's comparison of the Good to the sun and his image of the Good as the light of the Intelligible World, he uses the parallel of the sun and its light to describe the procession of *Nous* from the One. The Intellectual Principle is described as a radiation (*perilampsis*) produced from the Supreme and is compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generated from that unchanging substance: "All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced: fire produces the heat

which comes from it; snow does not only keep its cold inside itself" (5.1.6.31; cf. 5.1.7.1). Moreover, Plotinus describes the inseparability of the emanation from its archetype in virtually the same terms as Philo: "The One irradiates forever, abiding unchanged over the intelligible. For what comes from him has not been cut off from him (*oude gar apotetmētai*), nor is it the same as him" (5.3.12.45).<sup>8</sup> It is therefore clear that Philo's Platonic perspective allowed him to see the human mind as an outreach of the divine Logos which although in some measure distinct from it is at the same time a part of it.

Referring to Gen. 1:27, where it is said that man was created after the image of God, Philo points out that the mind in each of us, which is 'man' in the true sense of the word, is an expression at third hand from the Maker, while between them is the Logos, the paradigm of our reason, though itself a representation or image of God (*Her.* 231; cf. *LA* 3.96). Now at *Op.* 69, Philo emphasizes that Scripture's assertion that man was created after the image (*kat' eikona*) of God refers not to man's body but to his mind, "for neither is God in human form, nor is the human body Godlike." We may therefore conclude that when he argues that if the part, namely man, is an image of an image, it is manifest that the entire sensible world is also a copy of the Divine image or Logos (*Op.* 25), he must be referring not to the body of the universe but to its mind. It is clear, however, that on the whole, Philo is extremely reluctant to speak of the mind of the universe,<sup>9</sup> since there was the grave danger that it could lead to the deification of the world, a form of cosmic religion very popular in that period and very much a live option for radically Hellenized Alexandrian Jews.<sup>10</sup> Thus Philo is careful to point out that although Moses confirmed the Chaldeans' doctrine of cosmic sympathy, i.e., the sympathetic communion between all the parts of the universe, he firmly rejected their divinization of the world: "These men surmised that this visible universe was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole. Deifying Fate and Necessity, they filled human life with impiety by teaching that aside from phenomena there is no other cause of anything at all, but that the circuits of sun and moon and other stars assign to each being both good things and their opposites" (*Mig.* 178).<sup>11</sup>

There are, however, several passages in Philo that imply the concept of the world as a living being endowed with body and mind and others which explicitly assert this view. Thus in his allegory of the Tabernacle, when the High Priest "enters to offer the ancestral prayers and sacrifices, the whole universe enters with him, thanks to the representations of it that he brings with him: the full-length robe a copy of the air, the pomegranate of water, the flower-work of

earth, the scarlet of fire, the ephod of heaven, the rounded emeralds on the shoulder-tops in the form of two hemispheres with the six engravings on each of them, the twelve stones in four rows of threes on the breast an image of the zodiac, the oracular breast-piece an image of that Reason which holds together and administers all things. For it was essential for the man who was consecrated to the Father of the world to employ his Son<sup>12</sup> whose excellence is consummate as his intercessor, that sins may be forgotten and good things profusely abound" (*Mos.* 2.133-34; cf. *Spec.* 1.96). Clearly the World cannot act as man's intercessor unless it be conceived as a living being endowed with mind, and the designation of man in the same passage and elsewhere as a microcosm again implies the same.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, at *Spec.* 1.210, Philo speaks of the universe as a living creature of the utmost perfection,<sup>14</sup> and in *QG* 4.188 he writes that "the universal and whole heaven and world is both a rational animal and a virtuous animal and philosophical by nature and is therefore without sorrow or fear and is full of joy."<sup>15</sup> Even more explicit is the passage in *Her.* 155, where he says that "some have made bold to assert that the tiny animal man is equal to the whole world, in view of the fact that each consists of body and rational soul, and thus they declared that man is a small world and alternatively the world a great man." Although this is presented as the view of certain bold thinkers, Philo indicates his virtual approval by adding that "this pronouncement of theirs is not wide of the mark." In short, although Philo almost never makes any direct reference to Plato's description of the creation and composition of the cosmic soul<sup>16</sup> and allows his Logos in its immanent aspect to take over many of its functions, traces of the conception of the world as a rational living being of the highest perfection remain scattered in various passages, even if generally he prefers to allow it to be inferred rather than speak of it directly.

It is essential at this point to locate man's position in the hierarchy of living beings as Philo had conceived it. An early scale of living beings can already be detected in the concluding section of Plato's *Timaeus*, where he accounts for the formation of the lower animals by regarding them as degraded types of humans who have failed to make proper use of their reason and are condemned to undergo transmigration. The three classes of animals, those that inhabit the air, the land, and the water, correspond to the three parts of the soul, which the men condemned to such degradation have respectively misused. After accounting for the appearance of women as transformations at their second birth of cowardly men who spent their life in wrongdoing, Plato explains the emergence of birds as deriving from harmless but light-witted men, who studied the heavens but imagined in their simplicity that the surest evidence in these matters comes

through sense-perception. Land animals came from men who had no use for philosophy and paid no heed to the heavens because they followed the guidance of the lower parts of the soul. "By reason of these practices they let their forelimbs and heads be drawn down to earth by natural affinity. On this account their kind was born with four feet or with many, heaven giving to the more witless the greater number of points of support, that they might be all the more drawn earthwards."<sup>17</sup> The most senseless, whose whole bodies were stretched at length upon the earth, since they had no further need of feet, the gods made footless, crawling over the ground. The water animals came from the most foolish and stupid of all. The gods who remolded their form thought these unworthy any more to breathe the pure air, and in place of breathing the fine and clean air, thrust them down to inhale the muddy water of the depths. These are the principles on which all living creatures change one into another, shifting their place with the loss or gain of understanding or of folly" (91-92).<sup>18</sup> It was the author of the Pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis*, however, who probably for the first time in Greek thought put forward the notion of a scale of living beings which dwell in different regions of the universe in ascending order of perfection.<sup>19</sup> The highest are the fiery creatures, the absolutely perfect astral gods, who are endowed with the happiest and best souls, whereas the lowest are the terrestrial, in which single category he groups the three lower grades of visible animals. The three intermediate kinds are the ethereal and aerial daemons,<sup>20</sup> entirely invisible, possessing intelligence but also subject to passions, since they are kind to the good but hate evil, and the aqueous, a partially visible semidivine species of beings, probably to be identified with the nymphs.

In his commentary on *Timaeus* 39E-40A, Proclus points out that one school of commentators took the four categories referred to in that text as being the heavenly gods and the various classes of mortal beings, while another, "with a more thorough grasp of the truth," referred them to the various classes of beings superior to us, daemons in the air and demigods in the water, adducing the evidence of the *Epinomis* to confirm their interpretation (*In Tim.* 1.107, 26ff). The Middle Platonist Albinus (second century CE) did indeed embrace the latter position, but Philo's own view in this matter straddles both schools. He assigns the land animals to the earth, the aquatic to the sea and the fire-engendered to the fire, but while not disqualifying birds as the proper inhabitants of the air (*Plant.* 12), in *Gig.* 6-11, following a line represented later by Apuleius (*De Deo Soc.*, chap. 8), who appears to be drawing on Posidonius, he identifies the proper inhabitants of the air as the invisible race of aerial daemons.<sup>21</sup> It is from this reservoir of aerial souls, according to Philo, that

human souls derive. Some of these daemons, however, never deign to associate with any of the parts of earth and are consecrated to the service of the Father as ministers in his care for mortal man (cf. Plato, *Symp.* 202E; *Polit.* 271DE). Of those that do descend into the body, some, such as the souls of the genuine philosophers, who from first to last practice dying to the life in the body, soar upward again. But those which have plunged into the surf below are the souls of the others who have had no regard for wisdom (*Gig.* 12-15).

Before turning to the causes of the souls' fall, we must determine the precise nature of the stars. Scholars have been baffled by Philo's description of the stars as pure souls or intellects free of any admixture, which implies that they are wholly immaterial and invisible. Yet the stars are plainly visible as concentrations of fire. H. A. Wolfson (1.364) has suggested that since, aside from the passage in *Gig.* 8, where Philo speaks in his own name, we find that in all the other passages this characterization of the stars as pure intellects is attributed to others,<sup>22</sup> we may conclude that the formulation in *Gig.* 8 is due to carelessness on Philo's part and therefore represents not his own view, but that of the Stoics who readily identified mind with pure ethereal fire. Thus Cleanthes had identified the sovereign mind of the universe with the sun, Chrysippus and Posidonius with the sky, and Antipater of Tyre with the ether.<sup>23</sup> It is difficult, however, to imagine that Philo would have been careless about a substantive issue such as the corporeality or incorporeality of mind, and another solution, in my opinion, suggests itself. Students of Philo have invariably understood his characterization of the star souls as "through and through immaculate and divine," "each an intellect of the purest type" (*Gig.* 8), "each of them a mind in itself, excellent through and through and insusceptible of evil" (*Op.* 73), "rational throughout" (*Plant.* 12), "mind of the purest kind through and through" (*Som.* 1.135), as indicating that they are pure minds lacking bodies. It is much more likely, however, that what these locutions indicate is not that the star souls are disembodied but that they are completely rational, free from any irrational component. This needed special emphasis since the ethereal and aerial daemons were usually conceived of as subject to passions. Xenocrates, for example, had compared the isosceles triangle to the nature of the daemons, since it is partly equal and partly unequal in its lines, like the nature of the daemons which possesses human emotion and divine power.<sup>24</sup> That the contrast is between the purely rational and a mixture of the rational and the irrational can readily be seen from a passage in *Spec.* 1.66, where Philo describes the angels as "unbodied souls, not compounds of rational and irrational nature, as ours are, but with the irrational eliminated, all mind through and through, pure intelligences, in the

likeness of the monad." Our interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Philo invariably calls both the stars and the angels/souls/daemons *zōia*, a term which in Platonic usage always designates a union of soul and body.<sup>25</sup> It is thus clear that the star souls were envisioned as souls that were embodied in the pure fire of the heavenly spheres, whereas the aerial daemons were souls embodied in the purer upper air. Since the air is invisible, the latter are also invisible. But if they are thus not without bodies, why does Philo sometimes refer to them as unbodied (*asōmatōi*)?<sup>26</sup> The answer lies in the ambiguity of the term 'unbodied', which in some contexts may mean 'entirely without body', but in others 'lacking an earthly body,' in contrast to those souls that are embodied in flesh rather than pure fire or air.<sup>27</sup> This is especially clear in a passage such as *Conf.* 177, where it is said of the "unbodied souls which range through air and sky" that they are "immune from wickedness because their lot from the first has been one of unmixed happiness, and they have not been imprisoned in that dwelling-place of endless calamities, the body."<sup>28</sup> A further indication of the Platonic tendency to distinguish between souls embodied in earthly envelopes and those embodied in fiery or aerial ones can be seen in Plotinus' statement that when souls migrate from an aerial or fiery body into an earthly one this is not known as *metensōmatōsis* or reincarnation, since the source of its entry is not evident to the sense (*adēlon*), i.e., *metensōmatōsis* refers strictly to transmigration from one earthly body to another (4.3.9.3-7).<sup>29</sup>

Philo's scale of living beings can now be described in its proper hierarchical order: 1) the physical universe, composed of body and purely rational mind, an image of the divine Logos or Intelligible Cosmos; 2) the fiery stars, also composed of body and purely rational mind; 3) the aerial souls/angels/daemons, again composed of body and purely rational mind (unlike the view of most Middle Platonists, who assign them an irrational mental component); 4) man, composed of body and a soul both rational and irrational, a being who is at home in all the four elements; 5) air, land, and last of all, sea creatures, the latter situated on the very frontier between life and non-life (*Op.* 65-66, 68; cf. *Tim.* 92B).<sup>30</sup>

We turn now to the question of the soul's fall. Plato himself had offered divergent explanations for the soul's entry into the cycle of reincarnation. In the *Phaedrus* it was seen to be the result of an intellectual 'fall', whereas in the *Timaeus* the soul is characterized as destined from the beginning to give life to a body. According to the latter view, mortal creatures come into being in order that the universe not be imperfect, and this requires that it contain every kind of living being (*Tim.* 41BC; cf. *Plot.* 4.8.1). Middle Platonists had already noted this inconsistency in Plato's writings and attempted to resolve it by emphasizing

one or the other of these positions, the majority apparently opting for the pessimistic rather than the optimistic view. Calvenus Taurus was one of the few who adopted the optimistic attitude. The souls are sent by the gods to earth, he said, either for the completion of the universe, in order that there may be as many living things in the cosmos as there are in the Intelligible Realm, or in order to afford a manifestation of the divine life, for it is the will of the gods to reveal themselves through the pure and unsullied life of souls.<sup>31</sup> In his discussion of this issue, Albinus enumerated four reasons, two of which appear to be similar to those given by Taurus. Souls migrate from one animal or human body to another either "awaiting their numbers, or by the will of the gods" (*Did.* 25.6, Louis). The remaining two reasons are the soul's wantonness (*akolasia*), which implies wilfulness on its part, and its love of the body (*philosōmatia*), which indicates a natural affinity for embodiment.<sup>32</sup> Philo appears to allude to all four of Albinus' explanations. He speaks of souls that are "lovers of body" (*philosōmatōi*: *Som.* 1.138), and of souls "unable to bear the satiety (*koron*) of divine goods" (*Her.* 240), a variation of Albinus' reference to the soul's wantonness. Elsewhere<sup>33</sup> he suggests that the reason for the soul's descent "might be in order that even terrestrial things might not be without a share in wisdom to participate in a better life," which is similar to Taurus' second reason ("the will of the gods to reveal themselves"), or else that some souls enter into mortal bodies and quit them again according to certain fixed periods, or that they are selected for return according to the numbers and periods determined by nature.<sup>34</sup> This emphasis on numbers and periods implies that the incarnation of souls is part of the mathematical structure of the universe and is thus similar to Albinus' formulation of "souls awaiting their numbers," and is conceivably allied to Taurus' first reason, "for the completion of the universe".<sup>35</sup> In any case, the latter explanation is explicitly referred to by Philo in *Conf.* 179, where he says that "the work of forming the voluntary element to balance the involuntary had to be accomplished to render the whole complete."<sup>36</sup> At *QG* 4.74, Philo even suggests a fifth reason for the soul's descent, namely, "in order that it might be akin to created beings and not be continuously and completely happy." Undoubtedly regarding this matter as an impenetrable mystery, Philo vacillates and simply offers his readers the various explanations which he found before him in the Middle Platonic tradition. It may well be, however, that Philo, like Plotinus after him, had in his own mind resolved the contradiction between the pessimistic and the optimistic views of the soul's embodiment by maintaining both. As A. H. Armstrong wrote in regard to Plotinus' view, "it is in accordance with the universal order, which requires that everything down to the lowest level should

be ensouled, that souls descend, and appropriate bodies and lower selves are prepared for them. But they want to descend, and are capable of descending, only because they have already a weakness, a tendency to the lower, which seems to be a development of the original *tolma* which carried Soul outside Intellect."<sup>37</sup> As for the possibility of the transmigration of the soul into animal forms, Philo is silent. Although the Middle Platonists generally accepted this concept,<sup>38</sup> and Plotinus had affirmed it as well,<sup>39</sup> it was rejected by Neoplatonists from Porphyry on, and Plato's references to this belief were interpreted by them allegorically (*tropikōs*).<sup>40</sup> But even Plato himself had ignored animal reincarnation in *Laws* 904A-905A, and Aristotle had already criticized the Pythagorean notion that "any soul can find its way into any body" (*De Anima* 407b22). Later objections to this theory are well exemplified by Sallustius' compromise position, which asserted that if a soul passes to an unreasonable creature, "it accompanies it externally as our guardian spirits accompany us, for a reasonable soul can never become the soul of an unreasonable being."<sup>41</sup> It is therefore very likely that Philo's silence in this matter is equivalent to rejection.

The central thrust and fundamental aim of Philo's biblical commentary is to trace the return of the human soul to its native homeland by means of the allegorical method of interpretation, "the method dear to men with their eyes opened" (*Plant.* 36). An unabashed Platonist, Philo considered himself as one of those "who can contemplate the facts unbodied and naked, who live with the soul rather than with the body" (*Abr.* 236), and who "recognize that the letter is to the oracle as the shadow to the substance" (*Conf.* 190). Above all, however, he is concerned with "the hidden meaning which appeals to the few who study soul characteristics, rather than bodily forms" (*Abr.* 147), and the greater part of his allegory is devoted to the psychic ascent to God. Philo envisions the soul as entombed in the body, on whose death it returns to its own proper life. Alternatively, its sojourn in the body may be taken as a period of exile and its return to its homeland is the story of its spiritual regeneration. A close analogy to this central Philonic theme is the Neoplatonic allegorization of Odysseus' return to his "dear fatherland" (*Il.* 2.140) as symbolizing the soul's mystical journey to its true home, overcoming all difficulties and temptations on the way (*Plot.* 1.6.8). Already in Plutarch's *Symposiac Questions* (745DF) we encounter a Pythagorean allegorization of the well-known Sirens in *Od.* 12 as symbolizing the heavenly spheres, whose music creates in the souls departing this world a passionate love for the heavenly and divine and forgetfulness of mortality so that they follow the sirens and join them in their celestial circuits. On earth, while yet in the body, a faint echo of that music reaches the soul and reminds it

of an earlier and better existence, provided its ears are not sealed by carnal passions as wax blocked the ears of Ulysses' companions.<sup>42</sup>

The gradual removal of the psyche from the sensible realm and its ascent to a life of perfection in God is symbolically portrayed for Philo by the scriptural account of Abraham's migration. The late Professor Samuel Sandmel provided a very fine portrait of Philo's Abraham depicted as a mystical philosopher who, after having mastered the general school studies symbolized by Hagar, in which stage all he could produce was Ishmael or sophistry, has abandoned the realm of sense for the brighter regions of intelligible reality and, despite his initial flirtation with Chaldean pantheism, has attained to the highest vision of deity, which involves his transfiguration into a perfect embodiment of natural law. The migration of Abraham to the realm of the intelligible is vividly described by Philo in his allegorical interpretation of Gen. 12:1-3: "'And the Lord said to Abraham, 'Go forth from your native land and from your kindred and from your father's house, to the land that I will show you...' " Intent on purifying man's soul, God initially assigns it as its starting point for full salvation its migration out of three regions: body, sense perception, and speech. 'Land' is a symbol of body, 'kindred' of sense perception, 'father's house' of speech... The words 'Go forth from these' are not equivalent to 'Disengage yourself from them in substance,' since such a command would be a prescription of death. The words are equal instead to 'Make yourself a stranger to them in your mental disposition; cleave to none of them and stand above them all; they are your subjects, never treat them as sovereigns; you are a king; be trained to rule, not to be ruled; throughout your life be getting to know yourself,' as Moses teaches on many occasions, saying 'Give heed to yourself' (Exod. 34:12)... Go forth, then, from the earthly matter that envelops you. Escape, man, from the abominable prison, your body, and from the pleasures and lusts that act as its jailer... Depart also from sense perception, your kin. For the moment, you have made a loan of yourself to each of the senses and have become the alien property of those who have borrowed you, and the good thing that was your own you have lost.... Again, migrate also from speech, which Moses has called 'your father's house', so that you may not be deceived by the beauties of words and experiences and be severed from the authentic beauty that lies in the matter disclosed. For it is absurd that shadow gain the advantage over objects, or a copy over originals" (*Mig.* 1-4, 7-12).

The precise destination of the soul's ascent ultimately depends on the different theories regarding its origin. We have already seen that Philo's thought is framed by the conception of a hierarchy of living beings dwelling in different

regions of the universe in ascending order of perfection. The description of the soul's upward journey thus involves the following realms of being in ordered succession: the upper sublunar atmosphere, the ethereal heaven, the sun, moon and stars, the intelligible World of Ideas or Logos, and the proximity of the Deity itself. We shall consider each level in turn. Philo's general view, as we have already indicated, seems to be that human souls derive from the daemons inhabiting the upper air, so that their ascent must be to the upper atmosphere. At *Her.* 283, however, he is willing to accept the notion that the immortal soul will return to the ether provided the latter is taken to be "the fifth substance moving in a circle, differing by its superior quality from the four elements" and partaking of "a wonderful and divine essence (*QG* 4.8).<sup>43</sup> In that same passage (280) Philo also mentions the view of some who held that the soul returns to the "sun, moon and other stars to which, it is maintained, all things on earth owe their birth."<sup>44</sup> Again in the same passage he makes reference to the view that the mind of the sage finds its new home with the archetypal ideas (cf. *QG* 3.11). Elsewhere he appears to designate the realm of the incorporeal Ideas as the destination of Isaac, who represents the soul-type "which has dispensed with the instruction of men and has become an apt pupil of God, receiving the free unlabored knowledge, and therefore migrates into the genus of the imperishable and fully perfect" (*Sac.* 7). Although his wording is rather vague, the term 'genos' probably refers to the Ideas. Similarly, he says of Enoch, of whom Scripture writes that "he was not found, for God had translated him," that his immortal soul was translated "from a sensible and visible place to an incorporeal and intelligible form" (*QG* 1.86).<sup>45</sup> Finally, says Philo, there are still others "whom God has advanced even higher, and has trained them to soar above species and genus alike and stationed them beside himself. Such is Moses to whom He says, 'Stand here with Me' (*Deut.* 5:31). Therefore we are told that no man knows his grave (*Deut.* 34:6), for who has powers such that he could perceive the passing of a perfect soul to Him that 'is'?" (*Sac.* 8-10; cf. *Ebr.* 94).<sup>46</sup>

The question which now confronts us is whether all souls ultimately soar upward or whether the gift of immortality is only for the select few. Although all are born in the image of God and therefore have a natural claim on joyful immortality, Philo clearly makes that claim conditional on the soul's assimilation to divine wisdom and its pursuit of the life of perfect virtue.<sup>47</sup> Commenting on *Gen.* 15:15, "but you shall depart to your fathers nourished with peace, in a goodly old age," Philo notes that a fine lesson is thus given when Scripture represents the good man not as dying but departing,<sup>48</sup> "in order that the kind of soul that is fully purified be shown to be inextinguishable and immortal, destined to

undergo a journey from hence to heaven, and not dissolution and corruption, which death appears to bring" (*Her.* 276). In *LA* 1.107-08 he writes that "natural death is that in which soul is separated from body, whereas the penalty death comes to be when the soul dies to the life of virtue and is alive only to that of wickedness." Elsewhere he indicates more explicitly that it is virtue that gives immortality and vice that brings on destruction.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, the evil man dies by death even when he breathes, and awaiting those who live with the impious is eternal death.<sup>50</sup> Since Philo further indicates that the earth is the beginning and end of the evil and vile man (*QG* 1.51),<sup>51</sup> we may conclude that in his view the destruction of the wicked very likely consists in an endless series of reincarnations. This would fit precisely his definition of folly as "a deathless evil, never experiencing the end that consists in having died, but subject to all eternity to that which consists in ever dying" (*Det.* 178).<sup>52</sup> It is apparent, however, that such is the fate only of those who have become incurably wicked and thus resemble the class of the incurables which appears in the Platonic myths of the *Phaedo* (113E), *Gorgias* (525-26) and *Republic* (615E), who are doomed never to emerge from Tartarus.<sup>53</sup> But however we understand Plato's references to Tartarus, there is no doubt whatever that Philo interpreted it figuratively. He thus writes in *Cong.* 57: "[God] banishes the unjust and godless souls from himself to the furthest bounds, and disperses them to the place of pleasures and lusts and injustices. That place is most fitly called the place of the impious, but it is not that mythical place of the impious in Hades. For the true Hades is the life of the bad, a life of damnation and blood-guiltiness, the victim of every curse."<sup>54</sup>

Wolfson has argued for a literal understanding of the destruction of the wicked soul and has asserted that this is the new element that Philo has introduced into the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul: "In view of Philo's repetition of the Aristotelian principle that nothing created can be immortal, and in view also of his own explanation of the immortality of the created world as being due to the providence of God, it logically follows that the soul, by virtue of its having been created, must by its own nature be mortal, and that, if the soul of the righteous is immortal at all, it is so only by the providence of God as a reward for righteous conduct. Consequently, since it is only by the providence of God that the soul of the righteous ceases to be mortal, it is quite reasonable to assume that the soul of the wicked never ceases to be mortal and never acquires immortality" (*Philo* 1.410). Wolfson's view, however, is clearly untenable, for it is Philo's explicitly stated position that "nothing comes into being from the non-existent and nothing is destroyed into the non-existent" (*Aet.* 5; cf. *Spec.* 1.266). If the soul were constructed from a compound of air and

pneuma, as the Stoic view had it, it could then be resolved into its component parts and thus suffer destruction. Chrysippus indeed held that the *atonía* or lack of proper tension which characterizes the soul of the wicked, in contrast with the *eutonia* or proper tension of the wise soul, assured its dissolution not long after the body's death (SVF 2.809-22). But for Philo, the soul is an incorporeal image or copy of the immaterial Logos, so that there are no elements into which it can be resolved. It can, of course, be reabsorbed into the Logos, but that could hardly be described as an eternal death, let alone a deathless evil.

We must now examine more closely the category of those considered irremediable. References to incurable conditions of the soul occur in a series of Philonic passages where they clearly refer to the chronic subjection of the soul to irrational passion. At *Post.* 73 Philo speaks of "soul-death, which is the change of soul under the impetus of irrational passion, when...it brings forth...incurable sicknesses and debilities." Of the soul widowed of God "but not yet cast out of the good and beautiful," he says that it may still "find a means of reconciliation and agreement with right reason, her lawful husband. But the soul that has been dismissed from hearth and home as irreconcilable has been expelled for all eternity, and can never return to her ancient abode" (*Det.* 149). Even the merits of the fathers can remain fruitful for their descendants, though they be sinners, only so long as their sins are curable and not completely beyond remedy (*Spec.* 4.181). "The mind which is sick with the incurable sickness of folly is cast forth from the dwelling place of virtue forever and is not permitted to return" (*Cher.* 10).<sup>55</sup>

Although the rabbis also knew of categories of sinners who are beyond pardon,<sup>56</sup> Philo's emphatic repetitions of the notion of a point of no return are philosophically expressed and undoubtedly derive from Stoic ethical theory. Epictetus gives us a vivid description of the deadening of the moral impulse: "There are two kinds of petrification, that of the intellect and that of the sense of shame....Most of us dread the deadening of the body...but about the deadening of the soul we care not at all...Can I argue with this man any longer? He is even worse than a corpse. One man does not notice the contradiction — he is in a bad way; another man notices it indeed, but is not moved and does not improve — he is in a still worse state. His self-respect and sense of shame have been lopped off and his reasoning faculty has been brutalized" (1.5.3).<sup>57</sup> Seneca similarly speaks of chronic trouble which has corrupted or annihilated the natural man, in which case "not even the training that comes from philosophy, striving with all its might, will make restoration" (*Ep.* 94.31).<sup>58</sup>

Thus far we have dealt with those who have forfeited the potential immor-

ality that is within their reach and have condemned themselves to a state of eternal death instead. But what of those who are making gradual progress in virtue but are unable fully to attain it? These clearly belong to the category of those who are curable, but are incapable of consummating their pursuit after wisdom within the limits of the life span allotted to them. Since this class undoubtedly comprises the bulk of humanity, it is somewhat disconcerting to find no explicit statement by Philo regarding their final disposition. In his elaborate allegory, however, of the six cities of refuge, which are made to represent the Logos and its two constitutive principles, the Creative and the Regent Powers, with their various subdivisions, Philo describes the different levels of spiritual attainment, and it is to this passage (*Fug.* 94-105) that we must turn in search of the key to his understanding of the economy of human salvation.

The best and most venerable of the six cities, says Philo, is the divine Logos, and to take refuge first in it is most advantageous. Applying the allegory to the various soul-types which constitute the human condition, Philo tells us that those who reach the supreme, divine Logos "find life eternal in exchange for death," whereas those who attain either the Creative or the Regent Power obtain respectively a knowledge of the Creator, which instills in the creature love for his Begetter, and fear of the Sovereign, which exercises a corrective force (97-98). Below these three superior levels, located "beyond the Jordan, far removed from our race," are three inferior ones "on this side of the Jordan," which respectively refer to those who conceive of the Logos as a Gracious Power who has compassion and pity on his own work, thus inducing a mood of repentance; those who conceive of the Logos as a Legislative Power, enjoining what ought to be done and bringing the one who obeys some measure of happiness; and finally those who conceive of the Logos as a Power forbidding what ought not to be done, thus bestowing on those who follow it the averting of ills, though no share of principal goods (99). According to Philo, the three superior levels are not subject to voluntary error (*tropē*), though they are liable to errors that are involuntary, unlike those who have God himself as their portion (102). These levels must undoubtedly refer to the sage,<sup>59</sup> thus allowing only one lone category to stand above them, that of the super-sage, who is not subject even to involuntary error and is represented for Philo by Moses (cf. *Virt.* 177). The three inferior levels must therefore represent those who are only advancing toward wisdom, the *prokoptontes*, who are subject to voluntary error.

In the light of this allegory, where it is said that those Israelites who conceive of God as Lawgiver and obey all his injunctions will attain happiness (as well as *Mos.* 2.189, where the Israelites who are passing through Edom are all said to be

on the road to happiness), E. P. Sanders has inferred that while salvation is pre-eminently the vision of what is incorporeal, leading to union with God, those Jews are also 'saved' or receive immortal life who obey the commandments and repent of transgression.<sup>60</sup> It seems to me, however, that when Philo says of those who remain on the hither side of the Jordan, who are at best only advancing toward virtue, that they will attain happiness (*Fug.* 99), his meaning must be that they will attain not perfect happiness but only some measure of it. As those who are only progressing toward wisdom they are counted "neither among those dead to the life of virtue...nor among those who live in supreme and perfect happiness" (*Som.* 2.234-35), or, as he says elsewhere, they are fleeing from bad things, but are not yet competent to share the life of perfect goodness" (*Fug.* 213). According to Stoic theory, which Philo is clearly following, such individuals already enjoy some degree of happiness. This is clear from the following passage in Seneca: "You reply: 'What? Are there no degrees of happiness below your 'happy'? Is there a sheer descent immediately below wisdom?' I think not. For though he who makes progress is still numbered with the fools, yet he is separated from them by a long interval" (*Ep.* 75.8).

What, then, will be the final destiny of those progressing toward but never fully attaining perfect wisdom? It is quite likely that Philo thought they needed to undergo further transmigrations to purge them before they could escape the wheel of rebirth and enter the disembodied state of eternal bliss. Philo's sparse references to reincarnation reveal a reluctance on his part to give undue prominence to a Platonic conception which was essentially alien to Jewish tradition. Hence his failure to map out in any detail the projected life histories of the different types of souls and the undoubtedly deliberate vagueness which characterizes his utterances on this matter.

## Philo's Mystical Theology

'What is mysticism?' (*mā al-taṣawwuf?*) is the question the Sufis constantly put to one another. Nakhshabi defined it as "the purity of nearness to God following on the defilement of estrangement," while Junayd, the ninth century Sufi master of Baghdad, asserted that it is "to sit in the presence of God without care."<sup>1</sup> We have already seen that this is precisely the goal of Philo's allegory of psychic ascent: the abandonment of the life of exile, slavery, and estrangement imposed by a misguided and one-sided attachment to the needs of the body and the return to the proximity of God. But how is one to know God so intimately and with such certainty so as to be perfectly content to vest all in his hands? What is it that leads to that ultimate contentment in God indicated in the story of Ḥusri, an early tenth century Sufi mystic, who once asked in prayer: "'Oh God, art Thou content with me, that I am content with Thee?' And the answer came: 'O liar, if you were content with Me, you would not ask whether I am content with you.'"<sup>2</sup> The Sufi answer is that our very knowledge of God is itself the gift of God. Thus prayer can be understood as God's address to man which inspires his answer, or on a deeper level the mystic in the state known as 'sobriety of union' or 'second sobriety' so identifies himself with the Divine Will in all its manifestations that his 'unified personality' finds the subject and object of worship in itself.<sup>3</sup> The Iraqi mystic Niffāri, called the greatest theologian of prayer in the tenth century, is addressed by God as follows: "To me belongs the giving: if I had not answered thy prayer, I should not have made thee seeking it." As Pascal later expressed it: "You would not seek Me if you had not found Me."<sup>4</sup> The notion that in reality it is God himself who performs the prayer is vividly expressed by the thirteenth century mystical poet from Cairo Ibn al-Fārid, who wrote in his so-called *Tā'iyyat u'l-Kubra*, 'The Greater Poem Rhyming in T': "Both of us are a single worshiper who, in respect to the united state, bows himself to his own essence in every act of bowing. None prayed to me but myself, nor did I pray to anyone but myself in the performance of every genuflection" (153-54).<sup>5</sup> In the more radical mysticism of the great Spanish Sufi theosophist Ibn 'Arabī (twelfth-thirteenth century), known in Islam as 'the

greatest master' (*as-shaykh al-akbar*), the individual human mind is nothing but a mode of the Divine Mind so that the esoteric knowledge of the Sufi springs directly from within, and its so-called union with God represents nothing but an awakening to its true condition. The philosophers, on the other hand, had long employed a series of reasoned arguments to demonstrate the existence of God. Our immediate task is thus to determine what it was that had established in Philo's mind that sure knowledge of God which characterizes all his writings.

Although Philo sometimes employs the well-known teleological and cosmological arguments for the existence of God which had already been formulated by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics,<sup>6</sup> he clearly indicates that the demonstration of God's existence from his actions is only for those who have not been initiated into the highest mysteries and are thus constrained to advance from down to up by a sort of heavenly ladder and conjecture the Deity's existence through plausible inference. The genuine worshipers and true friends of God, however, are those who apprehend him through himself without the cooperation of reasoned inference, as light is seen by light.<sup>7</sup> This formula is precisely that which is used later by Plotinus, when he speaks of "touching that light and seeing it by itself, not by another light, but by the light which is also its means of seeing. It must see that light by which it is enlightened: for we do not see the sun by another light than his own" (5.3.17.34-37; 5.5.10).<sup>8</sup>

Philo characteristically does not further explicate his 'light by light/God by God' formula, doubtlessly relying on the fact that his audience would immediately recognize it as part of a well-known Greek philosophical tradition. Its appearance both in Philo and Plotinus clearly indicates that it must have been already well established in Middle Platonism. Plotinus' version is especially close to that of Philo, since both made precisely the same distinction between the existence of God, which is knowable, and his essence, which is unknowable (5.5.6.20-21; *Post.* 169), and both adduced the same reason for man's inability to cognize the divine essence.<sup>9</sup> Since Plotinus asserts that we are taught by the Intellect that the One exists, he undoubtedly deployed some form of the ontological argument, which, unlike the cosmological and teleological arguments that are based on deductive reasoning, constitutes an analytical truth whose function is to clarify what is already implied by our definitions.<sup>10</sup> The Platonists, however, had no monopoly on this form of argument, since the Stoics had also produced a version of it which anticipated St. Anselm's famous formulation 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' (*Proslogion*, chaps. 2 and 3). They pointed out that not only does nothing exist that is superior to the world, but nothing superior can even be conceived (Cicero, *ND* 2.18,

46; Seneca, *NQ* 1. *Praef.* 13). The human mind thus possesses the notion of a being of the highest power or perfection, and may therefore be said to have the existence of God engraved within.<sup>11</sup>

We must now examine the ontological argument at closer range, as it is one of the most troubled in the history of philosophy and has often been misunderstood. It is clearly meant to show that when the human mind reflects upon its primary definitions of the reality that is empirically given, it soon becomes aware of the fact that it possesses the notion of that which is in itself and is conceived through itself,<sup>12</sup> or that which necessarily exists or whose essence involves existence, or which exists through its own power, or a being of the highest power or perfection. It is my view that it is only when the God concept which one seeks to validate is one that is rooted in a notion of relative rather than absolute transcendence that the ontological argument is successful, for the conception of absolute transcendence must be seen as a product of the theological formula of creation *ex nihilo*, which introduces an unbridgeable gap between God and the cosmos deriving from the vacuous character of that formulation.<sup>13</sup> The transition between the utterly transcendent God and his creation is thereby shrouded in total mystery, thus eliminating any possibility of glimpsing his essence through his creative act.

Since ancient Greek philosophy was free of the *ex nihilo* formulation, it could yield only concepts of relative transcendence. Thus the essential difference between the Platonic and Stoic concepts of deity involves two varieties of relative transcendence. The Stoic Logos is corporeal, albeit a corporeality of extraordinary subtlety invisible to the naked eye, whereas the Platonic Intellect is absolutely incorporeal. Within Platonism itself there existed yet a higher level of relative transcendence, the concept of a supranoeitic entity entirely unknowable as it is in itself, but made manifest through a process of self-modification or projection which can only be described in metaphorical terms. Still, inasmuch as there is no absolute discontinuity between the supranoeitic One and its emanations or images, its transcendence remains relative rather than absolute (cf. Plotinus 5.1.7.1)

Philo thus shares with the Stoics the notion of transcendent immanence, except that, unlike the Stoic Logos whose transcendence scarcely conceals its essence, Philo's Logos yields only an image of the divine essence and itself indicates yet a further projection of that image in a cosmos which stands at a third remove from its source. Now, in view of the fact that the ontological argument is analytical rather than deductive, it cannot apply to an entity that is absolutely other than what is empirically observed or experienced. Thus the Stoic use of

this argument is perfectly legitimate inasmuch as its analysis refers to the physical universe. But the Philonic and Neo-Platonic use of it is equally legitimate, since it too refers to the physical universe, which is however, resolved through analysis into the various aspects or levels of being of a single reality, namely, the corporeal images of a noetic archetype or *Nous*/Logos reflected in a qualityless medium, the world soul and also human souls which are seen as inseparable effulgences or images of that *Nous*, and finally the unknowable essence of which the *Nous* is itself an image. We are in no way here concerned with the validity of the Platonist analysis but only with the methodological approach of which it is a part, which does not seek to deduce the existence of an entity that absolutely transcends the physical universe but rather presents a series of aspects belonging to one entity that are all essentially continuous with one another, though logically distinct.<sup>14</sup>

We can now answer the initial question with which we began our lecture, namely, whence comes Philo's overpowering conviction of God's existence and his unshakable confidence that we can bask in its presence. It is evident that Philo had accepted an early form of the ontological argument as it had been formulated by the Stoics and Middle Platonists, an analytical argument that discovered the concept of God imprinted on the human mind, which was held to be an inseparable image or portion of the Divine Mind. Philo could therefore assert that "the invisible Deity stamped on the invisible soul the impression of itself, to the end that not even the terrestrial region should be without a share in an image of God.... Having been struck in accord with the Pattern, it entertained ideas not now mortal but immortal" (*Det.* 86). Elsewhere he writes: "For how could the soul have conceived of God had he not infused it and taken hold of it as far as was possible? For the human mind would never have made bold to soar so high as to apprehend the nature of God had not God himself drawn it up to himself, so far as it was possible for the human mind to be drawn up, and imprinted it in accordance with the [divine] powers accessible to its reasoning" (*LA* 1.38). Similarly, the poet Manilius speaks of "man's wing-swift mind into which alone God comes down and dwells, and seeks himself in man's seeking of Him." (*Astronomica* 2.105-16; cf. Cicero, *Leg.* 1.24-25). Ibn 'Arabī speaks in a similar vein, though with much greater boldness: "When my Beloved appears, with what eyes do I see Him? With His eyes, not with mine, For none see Him except Himself." Elsewhere he writes: "By Himself he sees Himself... None see Him other than He. His Prophet is He, and His sending is He, and His Word is He. He sent Himself with Himself to Himself."<sup>15</sup> Analogously, the thirteenth century Persian mystical poet Jalāluddīn Rūmī "proclaims that the soul's love of

God is God's love of the soul, and that in loving the soul, God loves Himself, for He draws home to Himself that which in essence is divine."<sup>16</sup>

Philo's conception of God and the universe depends to a large extent on his theory of creation, which unfortunately remains one of the most obscure areas of his thought inasmuch as he seems deliberately to have concealed the precise nature of his views on this matter. His description of the primordial matter out of which God created the world is so vague that it is virtually impossible to ascertain his understanding of this concept with any degree of certainty. I have presented a detailed analysis of the Philonic texts dealing with this issue elsewhere,<sup>17</sup> and shall now content myself with a brief summary of my basic conclusions while adding some further justification for my somewhat conjectural reconstruction of Philo's position. In Philo's view, the essential characteristic of God is his continuous and uninterrupted creativity through which he is manifested as a mind eternally thinking itself or a Logos contemplating a determinate series of Ideas or Forms.<sup>18</sup> As we have already noted, Philo finds in the Biblical text of Genesis a reference to seven primary all-inclusive Forms, namely, those of the four elements, the void, the life-breath, and light. There is no mention here of the moral Forms, probably for the same reason that they are not mentioned in Plato's *Timaeus*, which refers only to those Forms that are "relevant to a physical discourse, because they are the patterns of which the things we see and touch are sensible images, coming to be and passing away in time and space."<sup>19</sup> Now, it is the relationship between the intelligible Forms and primordial matter that constitutes the chief difficulty encountered in Philo's exposition. Taking my cue from Plato's *Timaeus*, which served as Philo's prime model for his own treatise on creation, I have surmised that it was Philo's view that in contemplating the Intelligible Cosmos, God is indirectly causing its shadow reflection, a sensible and disordered primordial matter, which he is constantly making to conform as closely as possible to its intelligible Pattern. To explain how this takes place, I shall trace the sequence of cosmogonic events analytically so as to indicate their logical structure, even though Philo makes it clear that all things were created instantaneously. I begin with God's contemplation of the Form of the void, which results in the simultaneous and automatic projection of its shadow image. This in its turn is something qualityless which is relatively non-existent and stands wondrously poised on the very frontier between the intelligible and the corporeal. Indeed, the knife-point that divides these two realms is the most critical and exposed point in the Platonist construction of reality, for it is crucial for the latter to be able to explain the transition from the truly real to the phantasmagoric shadow-world of sensible reality within the framework of a cosmogony attributed to an all-beneficent

Demiurge. This transition was somewhat easier for Plato himself, who seems to have employed a pluralistic schema and was thus able to postulate alongside the Divine Craftsman the eternal existence of an independent Receptacle, a void without quality or shape of any kind, usually designated by scholars as primary matter. Still, even Plato could not readily explain why the eternal Forms should be automatically reflected in the void in disordered array and thus produce through their interaction the disordered traces of the four elemental bodies known as secondary matter. He can do no better than to say that the impressions in the Receptacle "are taken from the Forms in a strange manner that is hard to explain" (*Tim.* 50C).<sup>20</sup> We may therefore surmise that, like Plato, Philo too sought to bridge the gap between the intelligible and the corporeal by projecting some sort of inexplicable automatic reflection from the Form of the void,<sup>21</sup> which constituted a qualityless medium, neither corporeal nor incorporeal, in which the simultaneously projected images of four of the other Forms were reflected, thus forming through their interaction the disordered traces of the four elements. These disordered elements, however, are never actually found in that condition, since they are eternally being given a determinate mathematical structure by the Powers of the Logos. Primordial matter is thus only a logical moment rather than a temporal reality.<sup>22</sup> All this is admittedly conjectural, but Philo's silence in this matter leaves us no other choice. It is not at all surprising, however, that he was not more forthcoming on this difficult but crucial issue, since it was the Achilles' heel of his cosmology and an embarrassment to be glossed over as unobtrusively as possible.

An alternate interpretation of Philo's position asserts that he believed that the primordial matter is an eternal entity by the side of God, whose utter passivity, however, posed no challenge to His all-powerful sovereignty.<sup>23</sup> Although it is not possible to refute this interpretation decisively, a number of considerations make it appear to be very unlikely. First, Philo's description of the Matter subjected to God's creative activity as "in itself perishable" (*Her.* 160) clearly implies that it is indirectly caused by God and is thus ultimately dependent upon Him for its existence.<sup>24</sup> Second, Philo's characterization of Matter as unequal, differentiated, and full of disharmony and discord implies that it already reflects in some way some measure of Form, and short of Plutarch's dualistic solution that it is possessed of irrational soul, such a state must be derived from the divine Logos. Third, if Matter were an autonomous existence by the side of God, its passive resistance or recalcitrance to His formative power would have provided Philo with the ideal explanation for the origin of evil both natural and moral. Yet he never seems to place the main emphasis on this obvious defense, for

when he deals with the question of moral evil, he focuses his attention on the relative freedom of the human will and insists that "the treasures of evil are in ourselves" (*Fug.* 79-81). The voluntary element, he points out, had to be formed in order to balance the involuntary and so render the whole complete (*Conf.* 179).<sup>25</sup> Philo does refer in passing both to Matter and the wickedness of an immoderate nature as the causes of evil, but the former is undoubtedly seen essentially as the source of natural evil, whereas the latter, as we gather from other passages, is regarded as the cause of moral evil, which for Philo constitutes evil in the true sense of that term (*Prov.* 2.82; cf. *Plant.* 53).<sup>26</sup>

If Matter is thus ultimately derived from God, however indirectly, then we inhabit a universe that is in itself a manifestation of Deity, however veiled, and Philo's thought now emerges before our probing analytical eye in the form of a mystical monism. Students of Philo have generally inclined to the view that his Logos doctrine was introduced in order to bridge the gap between the absolutely transcendent and unknowable God and the world,<sup>27</sup> but this, it seems to me, is to put the cart before the horse. The fact is that the notion of a Logos or some rough equivalent of it was already one of the many components which constituted the Platonic account of reality. There were thus the supreme Form of the Good of *Republic* 6 (represented in the Symposium in its aspect of Beauty), the One of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, the *Nous* Demiurge, the young gods, and the World Soul (in addition to the Receptacle) of the *Timaeus*, and the principles of the Unlimited and Limit with a cosmic Reason above them of the *Philebus*. When this pluralistic schema of Plato was further elaborated and systematized by the Middle Platonists through their location of the Forms in the mind of God and their distinction between a first and a second Intellect or God, and was then finally transformed into the monistic system of Plotinus, it became essential to clarify as precisely as possible the relationship between the absolutely simple First Principle and its multiple consequents. Since Philo was committed to the monotheistic doctrine of the Bible, he was compelled to anticipate the central philosophical issue of Neoplatonism. It is therefore somewhat misleading to say that Philo and Plotinus resorted to a doctrine of intermediaries in order to bring the unknowable God into a relationship with the world. It would be more accurate to say that the conversion of the multiple entities, which had been introduced by Plato in order to account for the structure of being, into aspects of a single reality required a shift of emphasis from a detailed description of the independent components of reality to a subtle analysis of the internal relationships of the various manifestations of the One.

The Philonic Logos is thus not literally a second entity by the side of God acting on his behalf, nor is it an empty abstraction, but rather a vivid and living

hypostatization of an essential aspect of Deity, the face of God turned toward creation. Whatever is effected by the Logos is effected by God himself, though its referral to the Logos is a reminder that the effect does not constitute a disclosure of the divine essence as it is in itself. On the other hand, Philo's insistence on the impropriety of God's having any direct contact with the disordered primordial matter and the employment of his Powers instead for that purpose (*Spec.* 1.329; *Fug.* 71) signifies only that we may not impute to Him any interest in the material realm as a part of his primary intentionality. Primordial matter and its ordering, as well as all evil, are indirect consequences of God's primary creative activity and must therefore not be ascribed directly to Him, even though as the only truly Existent, He alone is their ultimate source.<sup>28</sup>

We have already noted that in Philo's view man is a microcosm and his mind an inseparable fragment of the Divine Mind. It may thus be described in two diverse and apparently contradictory ways. Insofar as it is a human intellect, man may well take pride in it as his own personal possession, as an independent capacity which he controls and activates at will. To the extent, however, that it forms but a portion of the Logos from which it ultimately draws all its energy, it can no longer be described accurately as a human capacity at all, but rather as a particular activation of the Divine Mind. The paradoxes which result from this double conception are elegantly exemplified by the ninth century Persian mystic Bāyezīd of Bistām: "I went from God to God, until they cried from me in me, 'O thou I'."<sup>29</sup> Philo's theory of free will can best be understood in the light of this double perspective. It can readily be seen that, from the eternal perspective of his mystical monism, human activity could well be described as totally passive and even as non-action, whereas in the light of his need, in his role as moral instructor, to emphasize human ethical responsibility, man's limited freedom could equally well be magnified and ascribed to his relatively lofty station in the hierarchy of being. We thus find the theme of man's nothingness and utter passivity running through much of Philo's writing. "So long as the mind supposes itself to be the author of anything," he writes, "it is far away from making room for God and from confessing or making acknowledgment to him. For we must take note that the very confession of praise itself is the work not of the soul but of God who gives it thankfulness" (*LA* 1.82)<sup>30</sup> In the following passage Philo's words have an unmistakably Stoic ring to them: "For we are the instruments, now tensed now slackened, through which particular actions take place, and it is the Artificer who effects the percussion of both our bodily and psychic powers, he by whom all things are moved" (*Cher.* 128; cf. *Ebr.* 107). The Stoics similarly say: "The movements of our minds are nothing more than instruments for car-

rying out determined decisions since it is necessary that they be performed through us by the agency of Fate" (*SVF* 2.943). In a fragment from the lost fourth book of the *Legum Allegoriae* Philo reveals the full depth of his conviction that it is God alone who is active within all of creation in the precise sense of that term: "For strictly speaking, the human mind does not choose the good through itself, but in accordance with the thoughtfulness of God, since he bestows the fairest things upon the worthy. For two main principles are with the Lawgiver, namely, that on the one hand God does not govern all things as a man and that on the other hand he trains and educates us as a man. Accordingly, when he maintains the second principle, namely, that God acts as a man, he introduces that which is in our power as the competence to know something, will, choose, and avoid. But when he affirms the first and better principle, namely, that God acts not as man, he ascribes the powers and causes of all things to God, leaving no work for created being but showing it to be inactive and passive... But if selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one cause, why do you advise me, legislator, to choose life or death, as though we were autocrats of our choice?"<sup>31</sup> But he would answer: Of such things hear thou a rather elementary explanation, namely, such things are said to those who have not yet been initiated in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness of the created."<sup>32</sup>

Philo's conception of relative freedom finds many echoes in later mysticism. His assertion that we are instruments in the hand of God and that it is He who effects the percussion of our bodily and psychic powers is mirrored in the statement of Rūmī that man is the instrument on which God plays; he is the harp, touched by God's hands so that it may give forth sound.<sup>33</sup> The illusory character of human action is poignantly expressed by Philo when he writes that "it remains for us to be tossed about on the frontier between beginning and end, both of which belong to God, learning, teaching, tilling, and performing with the sweat of our brow, as it were, every other labor, so that creation too appears to be achieving something" (*Her.* 121). Similarly, in Ibn al-Fārid's *Tā'iyya*, life is seen in terms of the image of the shadow play, a form of entertainment adopted from China and enjoyed in Baghdad as early as the tenth century. Eventually the mystic discovers:

All thou beholdest is the act of One.  
In solitude, but closely veiled is He.  
Let him but lift the screen, no doubt remains:  
The forms are vanished, He alone is all;  
And thou, illumined, knowest by His light  
Thou find'st His actions in the senses' night.<sup>34</sup>

The matter is put more boldly by Ibn 'Arabī, who asserts that God is both the Commander and the commanded and that there is no real servanthip, for the servant is one who carries out the command of his master, but in reality the servant of God is a mere locus through which God's creative power acts. So the servant is the Lord and the Lord is the servant.<sup>35</sup> The same motif is sounded in eighteenth century India by Khwāja Mīr Dard, who composed the first mystical poetry in Urdu. "The intelligent people know," he writes, "that all these puppets of the contingent existences are not more than the manifestation-places of the Active Creator who Does what He Wants, and the whole beauty of the forms of the worldly creatures is nothing but the opening of the screen 'And they want only what He wants'. Praised be God, even though good and evil are both from Him, but yet evil is evil and good is good, and the thief comes to the rewards of the theft and the police master strives to watch, and the string of predestination is hidden from the view of all, and the player [is hidden] in the screen, and the puppets are visible."<sup>36</sup> Closer to home, in the nineteenth century, the Hasidic master Mordechai Yosef Leiner of Izbica wrote that the signal characteristic of the future world is that in it the illusion of free choice will vanish, and that acts will no longer be ascribed to their human agents but to God, their true author.<sup>37</sup> Finally, with Philo's assertion of "the exceeding nothingness of the created," we may compare the emphatic words of the anonymous commentator on Plato's *Parmenides*, fr. 2: "For it is not He who is non-existent and incomprehensible for those wishing to know Him, but it is we and all existing things who are nothing in relation to Him. And this is the reason it has been impossible to know Him, because all other things are nothing in relationship to Him, whereas He alone is the only true Existent in relationship to all things that are posterior to Him."<sup>38</sup>

Now that we have established that the theoretical structure of Philo's thought leads to a mystical view of the nature of reality, we must examine those passages in his writings that refer to mystical experience. Although much of his writing is highly stylized,<sup>39</sup> it occasionally rises to a very high pitch of religious emotion. When he distinguishes, for example, between the heaven-born, who seize only one side of the divine polarity, either love or fear, and therefore worship God only through one of these two modes, thus honoring Him for their own sakes, and the God-born who honor God for his sake alone,<sup>40</sup> since they have grasped the divine polarity entire, so that for them the Deity is both God and Lord, he launches into a strikingly high-spirited description of this double aspect of the Logos. Speaking of Abraham, he writes: "He who says, 'Master, what will you give me?' virtually says the following: 'I am not unaware of your surpassing

power, I know the fearfulness of your lordship; I approach you in fear and trembling, and yet again I am confident. For it was you who made known to me that I should have no fear; you have "given me an instructed tongue that I should know when to speak" (Isa. 50:4), my mouth that was sewed up you have unraveled, and having opened it you rendered it more articulate... Why then shall I not fearlessly speak my mind?... Yet I who assert my confidence concede in turn my feelings of terror and fear, though the fear and confidence do not wage irreconcilable war within me, as one might suppose, but constitute a harmonious blend. I feast insatiably on this blend, which has persuaded me to be neither outspoken without caution nor cautious without speaking freely. For I have learned to measure my own nothingness and to gaze in wonderment at the exceeding perfection of your loving-kindness. And when I perceive that I am "earth and ashes" or whatever is still more worthless, it is then that I have the courage to approach you, when I am humbled, relegated to dust, reduced to the elemental point which seems not even to exist" (Her. 24-29). We may compare this passage with a similar utterance by the ninth century Sufi Yaḥya ar-Rāzī, known as 'the preacher': "O God, I fear Thee because I am a slave, and I hope in Thee because Thou art the Lord!... O God, how should I not hope in Thee, while Thou art merciful, and how should I not fear Thee because Thou art powerful?"<sup>41</sup>

There are a series of passages, however, that go well beyond a merely spirited religiosity, revealing instead what constitutes at the very least an intellectual or theoretical form of mysticism but which may well represent a genuine inner experience that envelops Philo's psyche and fills it with the thrill of God's nearness. Whether we can go further and attribute to him mystical happenings involving union with the Divine Mind must remain uncertain in view of the absence of anything more than vague descriptions of personal psychic states that are at best only incipient forms of mystical experience.<sup>42</sup>

E. R. Dodds has correctly noted that the ecstatic form of prophecy as defined by Philo is not a description of mystical union but a state of temporary possession: "It is the supernatural spirit which descends into a human body, not the man who raises himself above the body." The earliest application of the word *ekstasis* to mystical experience is in Plotinus 6.9.11.22, where mystical union is described as "an *ekstasis*, a simplification, and surrender (*epidosis*, alternatively 'expansion') of the self, an aspiration towards contact which is at once a stillness and a mental effort of adaptation."<sup>43</sup> Philo, however, speaks also of another form of prophecy which may be conveniently designated 'hermeneutical', and is mediated not through ecstatic possession but through the Divine Voice.

Whereas in the state of ecstatic possession the prophet's sovereign mind is entirely preempted by the Divine Spirit, so that he becomes a passive medium, hermeneutical prophecy does not render its recipient passive. It is clear from Philo's description of the giving of the Decalogue, which serves as the paradigm for prophecy through the Divine Voice, that far from being preempted, the inspired mind, in this case, is extraordinarily quickened and sharpened (*Decal.* 35). Since the notion of ecstatic prophecy is employed by Philo only to explain the prophet's ability to predict the future, whereas the core of the Mosaic prophecy, the special laws, are delivered by him in his role of hermeneutical prophet, it is within this form of prophecy that we must seek to locate Philo's conception of mystical union. In his allegorical interpretation of the Divine Voice as the projection of a special "rational soul full of clearness and distinctness" making unmediated contact with the inspired mind that "makes the first advance and goes out to meet the conveyed meanings," it is not difficult to discern a reference to the activation of man's intuitive intellect, by means of which he grasps the fundamental principles of universal being viewed as a unified whole. Philo was here adapting a Middle Platonic tradition which explained Socrates' famous *daimonion* or sign as the special sensitivity of his purified intellect to respond to the unuttered words of a daemon making voiceless contact with it (Plutarch, *Mor.* 588E).<sup>44</sup> In Philo's hermeneutical prophecy, then, we may detect the possibility of a union of the human mind with the Divine Mind, or in Dodds' terms, a psychic ascent rather than a supernatural descent.

We may now summarize the content of Philo's mystical passages. Like most mystics he is convinced that man's goal and ultimate bliss lie in the knowledge or vision of God.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, the mere quest is sufficient of itself to give a foretaste of gladness (*Post.* 21; *QG* 4.4). The soul has a natural longing and love for God and is drawn to him by a surpassing beauty (*Som.* 2.232). The first step leading to God is man's recognition of his own nothingness, which induces him to depart from himself (*Som.* 1.60; *Her.* 69). Having gone out of himself, the devotee is now asked to attach himself completely to God (*Plant.* 64). This attachment to God involves the realization that it is God alone who acts, and as long as "the mind supposes itself to be the author of anything it is far away from making room for God" (*LA* 1.82). Moreover, in abandoning body and sense perception, the mind is now absorbed in a form of intellectual prayer that is wordless and unencumbered by petition (*Fug.* 92; *Her.* 71). The mystic vision itself is a timeless experience that carries the soul to the uttermost bounds of the universe and enables it to gaze on the Divine Logos (*Conf.* 95; *Ebr.* 152). It produces tranquility and stability, and is said to supervene suddenly.<sup>46</sup> It is also fre-

quently described as a condition of sober intoxication, which is invariably depicted in a spirited and enthusiastic manner. The best known passage is the following: "When the mind has transcended all sensible substance, at that point it longs for the intelligible, and on beholding in that realm beauties beyond measure, the patterns and originals of the sensible things in the world below, it is possessed by a sober intoxication like those seized with Corybantic frenzy... Escorted by this to the uppermost vault of things intelligible, it seems to be on its way to the Great King himself; but while it keenly strives to see him, pure and untempered rays of concentrated light stream forth like a flood, so that through its flashing bursts, the eye of the understanding spins with dizziness" (*Op.* 70-71).<sup>47</sup> Finally, like most mystics, Philo is keenly aware of the inability of the human mind to maintain a steady vision of the divine; he speaks of the ebb and flow that characterize this type of experience (*Som.* 2.233).<sup>48</sup>

In a mystical theology such as Philo's, where the emphasis is on the ideal of assimilating one's mind to the Divine Logos, we should expect the process of redemption to shift from the national plane to that of the individual. Scholem had long ago demonstrated that the messianic element in early Hasidism had been neutralized. Mystical Hasidism made *devekut* or attachment to God the center of life, thus shifting Luria's stress on messianic action in the process of *tikkun* to a personal relation of man to God. "*Devekut*," Scholem noted, "a pre-eminently contemplative value which can be realized everywhere and at any time, destroys the exile from within."<sup>49</sup> It will therefore be interesting to observe to what extent Philo's mystical perspective with its individualistic and universalistic emphasis neutralized his traditional acceptance of the messianic doctrine. It is immediately apparent that he could not free himself entirely from the prophetic messianic expectation, yet in the light of his philosophical and mystical universalism and his diluted concept of covenant, it is only natural that his messianism exhibits a persistent tendency to spiritualize the nationalistic component within it whenever possible. Moreover, it is very likely that Goodenough is correct in emphasizing Philo's natural reserve in disclosing his messianic hopes within the context of a political reality in which Rome's military might was irresistible.<sup>50</sup> These two factors, one theoretical, the other practical, are sufficient to explain the paucity of passages in Philo's vast oeuvre which deal explicitly with the messianic ideal.

Philo's intensely nationalistic inclinations are clearly visible. Israel is for him the best of races since it sees the truly Existent (*Cong.* 51). It is a prime example of an entire nation having attained to wisdom and having decisively rejected all earthly goods, preferring to dwell with divine natures instead (*Deus* 148-51).

Though an orphan in comparison with the rest of the nations (*Spec.* 4.179), Israel stands above other nations as the head above the body, and it was she alone that corrected humankind's error of idolatry (*Praem.* 114; *Spec.* 2.166). Unique among all peoples, the contemplative nation shall, as the prophet says (*Hos.* 14:6), blossom like the lily, indicating thereby that when other nations have passed their prime, Israel begins to flower without the things it ought to have as inducements (*QE* 2.76). Nor will God ever let Israel receive the death-blow, for unlike all other nations that are subject to destruction, Israel will always rise again from the depths to recover its pristine vigor (*LA* 2.33-34). Finally, should Israel's national circumstances prosper once again, as Philo clearly hopes they will, the nations will quickly abandon their own ancestral ways and honor Israel's laws alone (*Mos.* 2.43-44). It is nonetheless evident that an undercurrent of ambivalence runs through all these statements, for while most of them represent nationalistic sentiments which have been transposed to the spiritual plane, a few firmly cling to the earthly realm of physical reality. Philo is evidently unable to make a clean sweep of all the terrestrial aspects of Jewish messianism, and in spite of his overall attempt to depoliticize and psychologize the traditional conceptions, we find an unassimilable residue of the latter scattered through his writings.

Aside from the treatise *On Rewards and Punishments*, however, Philo nowhere explicitly refers to a messianic redeemer or a messianic ingathering of Israel's dispersion. Noting that Moses, before his death, prophesies the future for each of the tribes (*Deut.* 33), Philo adds that "some of these things have already taken place, while others are still looked for, since confidence in the future is assured by fulfillment in the past" (*Mos.* 2.288; cf. *Virt.* 77), but these words contain only a vague reference to eschatological hopes for national salvation.<sup>51</sup> In *On Rewards and Punishments*, on the other hand, we have explicit reference to Israel's eschatological hopes and a clear indication of a personal Messiah, though that particular term is not employed. Philo here envisages an interesting progression in the ultimate course of human ethical development (*Praem.* 85-94). First, he looks forward to the day when an elite segment of humankind will tame the wild beasts (i.e., the irrational emotions) within their souls and thus induce God to convert the wild animals into tame and gentle creatures (cf. *Post.* 185). Bears and lions and panthers, elephants and tigers will exchange their solitary life for one of companionship with man, and the poisonous species will find their venom idling. This will in turn shame the rest of humanity into the ways of peace, since they will not wish to prove more savage than the irrational tribes of animals (*Praem.* 92). All this Philo derives from an

expansive exegesis of *Lev.* 26:6 ("I will give the land respite from vicious beasts, and no sword shall cross your land"), read in the light of *Isaiah* 11:1-9.<sup>52</sup> This connection between the pacification of the wild beasts and the end of warfare is repeated in *Hos.* 2:20<sup>53</sup> and *Ezek.* 34:25, which virtually quotes *Lev.* 26:6.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the rabbis, like Philo, specifically connected *Lev.* 26:6 with *Isa.* 11:6 (*Sifra* on *Lev.* 26:6). Philo then concludes his exegesis by asserting that either "the war will not pass through the land of the godly at all," or "if some fanatics whose lust for war defies restraint come careering to attack," they will end up flying headlong in retreat (*Praem.* 93-94).

Philo now proceeds to cite *Num.* 24:7 in the version of the Septuagint, which, in accordance with what appears to have been a widespread tradition, was made to refer to a messianic figure: "For 'a man shall come forth,' says the oracle, who will command an armed host and make war and subdue great and populous nations, because God has sent him the succor befitting the devout, namely, undaunted courage of soul and overpowering bodily strength, either of which is fearsome to the enemy, but joined together are completely irresistible. Some of the enemy, he says, will be unworthy to be defeated by men; against them he will array swarms of wasps to bring upon them shameful destruction, while fighting in the defense of his holy ones. The latter will obtain not only a secure and bloodless victory in war but also incontestable sovereignty for the benefit of their subjects, which will accrue from their good will or fear or respect. For the holy ones practice three supreme virtues that contribute to government safe from subversion, namely, dignity, severity, and benevolence, through which the aforementioned feelings are produced. For dignity fashions respect, severity fear, benevolence goodwill, and these when harmoniously blended in the soul cause subjects to be obedient to their rulers" (*Praem.* 95-97). Numbers 24:7 was, as Vermes has pointed out, "as difficult to understand then as it is now, and for this reason was interpreted symbolically.... All the versions, except the Vulgate, are messianic in interpretation."<sup>55</sup> There can be little doubt, then, that Philo understood "a man shall come forth" as referring to a messianic figure, though his failure to identify the redeemer with a descendant of David was almost certainly deliberate, for the notion of a Davidic covenant is absent from his writings. In deemphasizing the Messiah's military might (he speaks instead of his personal courage and bodily strength) he is following *Isa.* 11:4,<sup>56</sup> and in invoking the aid of swarms of wasps in order to secure a bloodless victory at least over some of the enemies, he is thinking of *Exod.* 23:28 and *Deut.* 7:20. On the other hand, his ascription of three supreme virtues to God's holy ones, namely dignity (*semnotēs*), serenity (*deinotēs*), and benevolence (*euergesia*),

which produce three kinds of affections in their subjects, finds its exact parallel in the Neopythagorean writer Diotogenes, and was undoubtedly derived from Hellenistic kingship tracts.<sup>57</sup>

*Praem.* 163-72 provides us with Philo's enthusiastic account of the ultimate redemption of the Jewish people. In response to the divine chastisements visited upon them, the people will repent and make full confession of their sins (Lev. 26:40). Their conversion in a body to virtue will strike their masters with amazement, who, ashamed to rule over their superiors, will set them free from their captivity. With one impulse they will hasten from their areas of dispersion to the one assigned place,<sup>58</sup> guided by a vision divine and superhuman, though invisible to others. Their ruined cities will be rebuilt, the barren land will be rendered fruitful, and they will have wealth so copious it will make that of their progenitors seem negligible by comparison. There will be a sudden reversal of all things. God will turn the curses against the enemies who had exulted over their failures (Deut. 30:7), not realizing that they were but pawns in the hands of God who had employed them for the admonition of his people. When they begin to receive the wages of their cruelty, they will find that they had wronged not the obscure and inconsequential but men of patrician lineage who had retained the sparks of their noble birth.

Philo's denationalizing and psychologizing tendency in *On Rewards and Punishments* has been underscored by Ulrich Fischer.<sup>59</sup> He points out that Philo allegorizes Deut. 28:13, making it refer to the rule of the wise generally, and that the external well-being of universal peace between man and animal loses its intrinsic value for him and appears only as the consequence of a more important good, man's inner peace of soul (*Praem.* 88). From a future assertion, Philo converts Lev. 26:12 into a present, eternally valid statement concerning God's indwelling in a wisdom-seeking mind. Everything said of the Jewish nation in Lev. 26:12 and Deut. 28:13 is transferred by Philo to the human mind, and in direct contrast to that verse God is designated by Philo not as the God of Israel, but of all people (*Praem.* 158-61). Still, enough of the earthly sphere remains in Philo's messianic vision to reveal the inner tensions in his thought between nationalism and universalism, the mystical and the this-worldly. We may thus conclude that when Philo is justly described as "a man between two worlds", that metaphor needs to be understood in a double sense, for not only does he join Athens with Jerusalem, but also the supernal, celestial Jerusalem with its lower, terrestrial image.

## Notes

All passages from Philo's works are cited according to the numbering in the Loeb Classical Library editions except for those passages from *De Providentia*, cited according to M. Hadas-Lebel (Lyon, 1973) and *De Animalibus*, edited and translated from the Armenian version by Abraham Terian (Chico, 1981). Translations follow the Loeb edition excepting the following quotes in chapters 2 and 3, taken from the author's *Philo of Alexandria* (New York, 1981):

Chapter 2	Jos. 146-47	Her. 155	Her. 276
	Mig. 178	Mig. 1-4, 7-12	La. 1.107
	Mos. 2.133-34	Sac. 8-10	
Chapter 3	Cher. 128	Op. 70-71	Praem. 163-72

### Chapter 1

#### Philo's Logos Doctrine Against its Platonic Background

1. Ralph Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, trans. J. Harrison (London, 1845) 2.320 n. 7.
2. Carl Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria* (repr., Amsterdam, 1970), 283-88; Jakob Freudenthal, *Hellenistische Studien* (Breslau, 1875) 1.73; W. Bacher, "The Church Father, Origen, and Rabbi Hoshaya," *JQR* (1891): 357-60; E. E. Urbach, *The Sages* (Jerusalem, 1979), 73-75, 199-200, 210-11, 225-26. Finkelstein's suggestion that the word *peloni* in *Mid. Tannaim* 6-7 refers to Philo has not found acceptance among rabbinic specialists. See L. Finkelstein, "Is Philo mentioned in Rabbinic Literature?" *JBL* 53 (1934): 142-49.
3. S. A. Poznanski, "Philon dans l'ancienne littérature judéo-arabe," *REJ* 50 (1905): 10-31.
4. Rossi used the Paganus edition (Lyons, 1555) of Gelenius' Latin translation of Philo. See Ralph Marcus, "A Sixteenth Century Hebrew Critique of Philo," *HUCA* 21 (1948): 29-71.
5. Rossi thought that Philo was a Boethusian or Essene.
6. Azariah dei Rossi, *Me'or 'Einayim*, ed. David Cassel (Wilna, 1866; repr., Jerusalem, 1970) 1.97-129. Yedidiah was the additional name of Solomon (2 Sam. 12:25).
7. Manuel Joël, *Spinoza's Theologisch-Politisch Traktat, auf seine Quellen geprüft* (Breslau, 1870), 62ff.
8. Isaac Barzilay, *Yoseph Shlomo Delmedigo* (Leiden, 1974), 32.
9. *Kitvei Nachman Krochmal*, ed. Simon Rawidowicz, 2nd ed. (Waltham, Mass., 1961) section 12, pp. 167, 176-79.
10. T. H. Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus* (Chicago, 1919), 1-6; E. R. Goodenough, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus* (repr., Hildesheim, 1967), v, 124.

11. *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, supplément, vol. 7 (Paris, 1966), s.v. "Philon d'Alexandrie."
12. Eduard Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1923; repr., Hildesheim, 1963), 385-467.
13. See Billings, *Platonism*, 6-8.
14. A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris, 1949) 2:519, 534, 550.
15. E. R. Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus* (Oxford, 1962); *By Light, Light, The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism* (New Haven, 1935; repr., Amsterdam, 1969).
16. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1947).
17. *Prob.* 26, 141; *Prov.* 2.103 (LCLP 2.58). For wrestling imagery, see *Som.* 1.222; 2.129-30, 134, 145-46; *Mig.* 74, 82; *LA* 3.190; *Cong.* 31; *Mut.* 81-82.
18. *Som.* 1.130, 152, 165. This use of athletic imagery is very similar to that found in the writings of the late Stoa. "It is God who summons man into the Agon, it is Zeus who exercises the sage by imposing hardship on him (Epictetus 4.4.29, 3.22.56). The Agon is itself *theios*, God himself being the physical trainer who matches man against difficulties (*idem.* 2.18.27; 1.24.1). The moral athlete is to call on the deity for help and strength in the contest (*idem.* 2.18.27; 3.22.53)." (V. C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif* [Leiden, 1967], 34).
19. See H. A. Harris, *Greek Athletics and the Jews*, ed. I. M. Barton and A. J. Brothers (Cardiff, 1976), 51-95; Pfitzner, *Agon Motif*, 28-48. Harris correctly points out that "as a theologian and moralist, Philo is of course compelled, like all Greek moralists before him, to deprecate the value of the physical compared with things of the mind and spirit. Even so he cannot conceal that at heart he was a lover of sport; no-one who was not could have had his affectionate acquaintance with the details of the subject" (p. 56). Pfitzner has noted that it is only against the background of the decay of the spirit of the games that the polemic and criticism of the tragedians and philosophers against the games and athletics in general is understandable. "The fame attached to the panhellenic games and the exaggerated desire to have a share in this fame led to a professionalism which destroyed the noble ideals of the games and converted athletics into a trade, in the vulgar sense of the word." (pp. 23, 28-48).
20. At best H. A. Fischel (in his book *Rabbinic Literature and Greco-Roman Philosophy* [Leiden, 1973] has made a case for rabbinic use of Greco-Roman literary forms such as the concise *sententia* or *chria*, "a terse, realistic anecdote, originally and usually on a sage-philosopher, that culminates in meaningful action or a truth in form of a gnome, apothegm or proverb." (See his article "Studies in Cynicism and the Ancient Near East: The Transformation of a Chria," in *Religions in Antiquity*, ed. Jacob Neusner [Leiden, 1968], 372-411.) Moreover, as already noted by some of the reviewers of his book, the specific Epicurean affinities which he seeks to establish with certain rabbinic statements are considerably forced and inconclusive.
21. See Harris, *Greek Athletics*, 29-50, and Jonathan Goldstein, "Jewish Acceptance and Rejection of Hellenism," in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition*, vol. 2, ed. E. P. Sanders, with A. I. Baumgarten and Alan Mendelson (Philadelphia, 1981), 64-87; H. L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch* (Munich, 1956) 4.1, pp. 401-05.
22. *Sifra*, *Aḥarei Mot* 13.8: "What is the meaning of the text (Lev. 18:3), 'Nor shall you follow their customs'? That you should not adopt their established usages, such as theatres, circuses, and stadia." (The *Mekhilta de-'arayoth* is considered to be a later addition to the *Sifra*.) Cf. also *Tosef. Avoda Zara* 2.5-7; *B. Avoda Zara* 18b, *Avot de-R. Nathan* chap. 21, 27a; *Gen. R.* 67.3.
23. Saul Lieberman, *Greek in Jewish Palestine* (New York, 1942), 92-97.
24. See my forthcoming essay, "The Limits of Jewish Piety and Greek Philosophy in Philo's Thought," in *The Spiritual World of Philo Judaeus: Two Essays in Ancient Jewish Self-Definition*, in collaboration with Alan Mendelson.
25. Arthur Green (in *Tormented Master* [University, Alabama, 1979], 297) has argued con-

vincingly that Nahman of Bratslav also had two notions of faith, the simple and the dialectical. His frequent exhortations to the life of simple and unquestioning faith seem to be in direct contrast to the spiral of constant growth through challenge, which I find somewhat reminiscent of Gregory of Nyssa's idea of man's infinite progress in his never-completed journey to God. The latter path was undoubtedly intended for an elite comprised of the tzaddik himself and his immediate disciples.

26. Philo's tone in *Conf.* 190 and *Som.* 1.164-65 is gentle, and in *Spec.* 1.8 even complimentary, describing them as divinely gifted men who made deep research into the writings of Moses (cf. *Op.* 77). On the other hand, when referring to literalists who are opposed to allegorical exegesis on principle, he speaks very disparagingly of them (*Som.* 1.39, 101-102; 2.301; *Conf.* 14; *Deus* 55, 61-64; *Agr.* 3, 28-29; *Mut.* 138-40, 266; *Plant.* 35, 69; *QG* 1.18, 4.52; *Sac.* 60-62).

27. Hay has noted that Philo mentions about sixty-three different interpretations of biblical passages as developed or shared by other allegorists, and he correctly concludes that "Philo was conscious of working alongside fellow allegorists, many of whom could be expected to approve of his efforts." He also correctly notes that Philo regards allegorists as an elite minority within the Jewish community. See David M. Hay, "Philo's References to other Allegorists," *Studia Philonica* 6 (1979-80): 51, 58.

28. al-Mubashir b. Fatik, *Kitab Mukhtar al-Hikam wa-Mahasin al-Kilam* (*The Book of Selections of Wisdom and Beautiful Sayings*), 11-12. See I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 63; Göteborg, 1957), 198.

29. Cf. Plotinus 5.4.2.10-11.

30. "The Stoicizing Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon already seems to have equated the Logos with the World Soul (Cicero, *Acad. Post.* 28)" (John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* [London, 1977], 83).

31. See Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 45-46, 86, 252. For the mythological overtones of Philo's Logos, see Émile Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1950), 107-11.

32. See David Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (Anchor Bible 43; Garden City, 1979), 38-42, 192-93. To the references on p. 193, add Plato, *Rep.* 495C-496A; Aristotle's *Ode to Virtue*, where *areta* is personified and addressed as *parthene* (D. L. Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci* [Oxford, 1962] no. 842); A. Gellius, *NA* 14.4, where Justice is represented as of maidenly form; Pseudo-Plato, *Epinomis* 989A: "for I have sought this wisdom high and low;" Cicero, *Off.* 1.15.

33. See Hans Bietenhard, "Logos Theologie im Rabbinat," *ANRW* II. 19.2, pp. 580-617. For a similar hypostatization of the Holy Spirit, see *Pes. R.* 3.

34. *QE* 2.124; *Mig.* 103; *Conf.* 63, 146; *Deus* 31; *Her.* 205; *Fug.* 112; *Mos.* 2.134; Eusebius *PE* 7.13.1; *LA* 3.96; *Som.* 2.249; *Her.* 234; *Plant.* 9-10. It is interesting to note that the Sufi mystic Ibn 'Arabi employed no less than twenty-two terms to designate the Logos. See A. E. Aiffi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibnul Arabi* (repr., Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore, 1964), 66.

35. See *Deus* 33-34, and my commentary *ad loc.* in David Winston and John Dillon, *Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria* (Chico, 1983), 291-93. It may be noted that according to Democritus, Athena's epithet *Tritogeneia* signified that Athena symbolizes Reason, which consists of thought, word, and action (D.L. 9.46; *DK* 68B 1-2; cf. *Mos.* 2.212). See J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie* (Paris, 1976), 102.

36. Plutarch writes that the crocodile is said to be the only tongueless creature and thus a likeness of God, for the *theios logos* does not need a voice (*Is. et Os.* 381B). Cf. *Decal.* 35, *Deus* 83; *Mig.* 47-52; *Sac.* 78.

37. See Max Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der heidnischen Philosophie* (Oldenburg, 1872), 231-35; James Drummond, *Philo Judaeus* (London, 1888; repr., Amsterdam, 1969) 2.171-77; Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen* 3:2, pp. 422-24; J. Horowitz, *Das platonische Noeton Zoon* (Marburg,

1900), 88-89; Max Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften* (Hildesheim, 1965) 1.79-86; Max Mühl, "Der logos endiathetos und prophorikos von den alteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* (1962): 7-56.

38. Gershom Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York, 1954), 216. See Zohar I.74a, I.15. A. E. Affifi writes: "Like the Stoics and Philo, Ibnul 'Arabi makes a distinction between the potential unmanifested Reason, the *Logos Endiathetos*, and the manifested Reason, *Logos Prophorikos*, which he identifies with the Reality of Realities and the Perfect Man respectively" (Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, 77-78).

39. See Plotinus 2.4.5.24-37; 2.4.15.17-24; 3.8.11.1-8; 5.4.2; 6.7.17. Cf. Proclus, *Elements*, 89-92, 159. For the Aristotelian origin of the term, see J. M. Rist, "The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus," *Class. Quart.* n. s. 12 (1962): 99-107.

40. See, however, Conf. 172, where Philo asserts that the Intelligible World (*noētos kosmos*) was framed through the Powers.

41. *Cher.* 27-28; *Her.* 166; *Abr.* 124-5; *QE* 2.62, 64, 68; *Fug.* 95. See Wolfson, *Philo* 1.224-25.

42. See Wolfson, *Philo* 1.217-19.

43. Cf. Cornutus, *Theologiae Graecae Compendium*, chap. 9, where the various epithets of Zeus are explicated, including the term *palamnaios*.

44. See Bréhier, *Idées Philosophiques*, 144-51.

45. *Decal.* 95, 177; *Spec.* 3.19; 4.201; *Mut.* 53; *QE* 2.61; *Conf.* 118. With *Mos.* 2.7, cf. Seneca, *Ben.* 1.3.4; and with *Her.* 104, cf. Cornutus, ch. 15, p. 19, line 17 (Bréhier, *Idées Philosophiques*, 148, n. 8).

46. *Exod.* 34:6; *Ps.* 103:6-17; *Tosef. Sotah* 4.1; *B. Sanh.* 100; *Mishnat R. Eliezer*, Enelow, p. 54ff; *Mek. Wayassa* 3, H-R: 166, Lauterbach *Wayassa* 4, 2:113; *B. Shabbat* 55a; *B. Megillah* 15b. See Urbach, *The Sages* 1.448-61.

47. *Deus* 31; *Mos.* 2.134; *Spec.* 1.96.

48. Cf. *Det.* 54, 115; *Fug.* 109; *LA* 2.49. For the adjective 'beloved', see Plutarch, *Mor.* 423A: "Plato says that his opinion is that this world is the only-begotten and beloved of God, having been created of the corporeal whole, entire, complete, and sufficient unto itself." Cf. *Tim.* 92C: *heis ouranos hode monogenēs ōn*.

49. Wolfson, *Philo* 1.266-69.

50. See *QE* 2.122, where, commenting on *Exod.* 28:36, Philo writes: "It pleases Him that the incorporeal and intelligible substance (*noētēn ousian*) should be unimpressed by itself and without shape but be formed and shaped like a seal-impression by the Logos of the eternally Existent One." See D. T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Albasserdam, 1983), 133-35. Runia thinks that "the theory of the 'striking out' (*proexetypou*) of the noetic world in *Op.* 16 implies the concept of intelligible matter, since the *typoi* must be struck in something." Philo's reluctance to use the term 'Intelligible Matter' and his substitution of the notion of Creative Power is reminiscent of Proclus' similar refusal to apply that term to the phase of Procession (*Platonic Theology* 31.38), regarding instead the Intelligible world's infinity as consisting in its power. See Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 148-49.

51. Cf. *Fug.* 109, where the Logos is seen as the offspring of God, the father, and Wisdom, the mother. Sophia may here again represent the Indefinite Dyad. (See Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 358).

52. See Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 163-64, 204-06. Cf. Eduard Norden, *Die Geburt des Kindes* (Leipzig, 1924), 98; and J. G. Griffiths, *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride* (Cambridge, 1970), 48-49. The idea of Isis as a "mother of all" is found in Apuleius, *Met.* 11.5. According to Plutarch, there are three primordial principles: God or the One (*De E.* 393BC), conceived as Monadic Intellect; Irrational Soul or the Indefinite Dyad (*An. Proc.* 1014D; but also identified with the 'Necessity' and precosmic *genesis* of the *Timaeus* (47E-48E, 52D), the 'congenital desire' of the *Politicus* (269D, 272E, 273B),

and the so-called 'maleficent soul' of the *Laws* (1014DE); *An. Proc.* 1024C, 1015A); and Matter (*hylē*), although the latter two are often telescoped into one. The Indefinite Dyad is a principle of indeterminate potentiality, which was apparently envisaged by Plutarch as always immanent in matter, thereby endowing it with motion and qualities of a chaotic kind. This chaotic state nevertheless prefigured the lineaments of the subsequent cosmos and constituted a sort of "first creation," a "wraith and phantasm (*eidōlon kai phantasma*) of the world that was to come into being" and was identified with the Elder Horus or Apollo (*Is. et Os.* 373C). If the Indefinite Dyad in its immanent aspect thus creates a ghostlike prefigurement of the cosmos, it must somehow already possess the Forms of the Logos in an inchoate or indeterminate state, and may thus be conceived of as a kind of Intelligible Matter (in its Plotinian sense) which is potentially all things. In Plutarch's Platonic reinterpretation of Egyptian myth, Isis symbolizes the creative principle (*genesis*) which has intercourse with Osiris or Logos, i.e. *hylē* is a living, generative force, incapable itself of achieving order but subject to the influence of an ordering Logos and indeed longing for it to shape its inchoate, trace-like forms into an ordered whole (*Is. et Os.* 368C12; cf. 372E). Against the Stoics, Plutarch asserts that *hylē* is not an inanimate and undifferentiated substrate, but rather, as a good woman yearns for and willingly gives herself to her husband, so is Isis/*Hylē* (i.e., Isis immanent in *hylē*) ever associated in love with the primal god, Osiris/Logos.

It would thus appear that in Plutarch's allegory, Isis bears a double image or aspect. As the immanent principle of disordered motion in precosmic *hylē*, ineffectually prefiguring the cosmos, but then through constant union with Osiris/Logos producing the ordered world, she is Isis/*Hylē*, analogous to the human mind seen as the *hylē* of understanding and a 'place of Forms' or 'a sort of mold of the intelligibles' (*tōn noētōn hoion ekmageion*) adorned and ordered by reason (*Is. et Os.* 374EF), but as the transcendent intelligible principle of indeterminate potentiality, the Indefinite Dyad considered in itself, she is Isis/Wisdom (*ibid.* 351E), and as such not to be envisioned as a positive principle of evil. The active principle of disorder in the universe, Plutarch identifies with Seth/Typhon (393A, 376F) and with Areimanios (369E), which is to be equated with that aspect of the Indefinite Dyad which remains unamenable to the rational direction imposed on it by the Logos (371A; cf. *An. Proc.* 1015A), and which is indicative of the fact that the cosmos is not exempt from either dissolution or generation (368D; cf. *Quaest. Conviv.* 720BC) and is therefore always subject to a residual element of disorder, the ultimate source of evil.

It should also be noted that Nicomachus of Gerasa compared the dyad with Isis (*Theologoumena Arithmeticae*, ed. V. de Falco [Leipzig, 1922], 13, line 12), and that just as Plutarch (*Is. et Os.* 373CD) had identified *hylē* both with Isis and with the *Penia* or 'Poverty' of Plato's *Symposium* myth (203B ff.), so did Plotinus, referring to the same myth, identify his Intelligible Matter with Poverty (3.5.7). For Eudorus' account of the 'Pythagorean' doctrine of the pair of opposites, the Monad and the Dyad, and its roots in Plato's *Philebus*, see Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 126-28, and for Pseudo-Archytus, *idem*, 120-21.

53. Cf. *Mos.* 2.99; *QG* 2.16, 51, 75; *QE* 2.62. For the derivation of *theos* from *tithēmi*, cf. *Conf.* 137 and Herodotus 2.52.

54. See Sifré *Deut.* 2b, ed. Finkelstein, p. 41, line 6; *Gen. R.* 33.3; *Mid. Pss.* 56.3; *B. Ber.* 60b; *Y. Ber.* 9.5, p. 13, column A (Venice edition).

55. Zacharias Frankel, *Über den Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik* (Leipzig, 1851), 26-29; Arthur Marmorstein, *The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God* (repr. New York, 1968), 41-53; *idem*, "Philo and the Names of God," *JQR* 22 (1931): 295-306.

56. N. A. Dahl and Alan F. Segal, "Philo and the Rabbis on the Names of God," *JSJ* 9:1 (1978): 1-28.

57. Cf. *Y. Sukkah* 4.3, p. 54, column C (Venice edition); *Lev. R.* 23.8.

58. Philo prefers the designation *kosmos noētos* to Plato's *noēton zōion*. Cf., however, the

phrase *idanikos kosmos* in Timaeus Locrus 97D, and *kosmos noētos* in Aetius, *Placita*, 1.7.31; 2.6.4 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 305, 334). See Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 132.

59. Thomas H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation*, CBQ Monograph Series 14 (Washington, D.C., 1983), 166.

60. *Op.* 134-35; *LA* 1.31, 53-54; 2.6; *QG* 1.4, 8; *Op.* 129; *QG* 1.1.

61. Valentin Nikiprowetzky, "Problèmes du 'Récit de la Création' chez Philon d'Alexandrie," *REJ* 124 (1965): 271-306; Tobin, *Creation of Man*, 169-71.

62. A similar list of seven creations on day one is given by the author of the Book of Jubilees 2.2. His list includes the following: heavens, earth, water, spirits, abysses, darkness/eventide/night, light/dawn/day. The crucial difference between Jubilees and Philo, however, is that the seven items listed in Jubilees do not constitute archetypal Forms. For a similar list of seven, see *Midrash Tadshe*, chap. 6. See A. Epstein, "Le Livre des Jubilés, Philon, et le Midrasch Tadsché," *REJ* 21 (1890). For another list of seven primordial creations, see *B. Pesahim* 54a.

63. Cf. *Op.* 16, where we are told that the material world embraces in itself as many sensible kinds as there are intelligible ones in the noetic cosmos.

64. For the identification of Platonic matter with the void, see Aristotle, *Phys.* 4.214a11; Theophrastus, *Met.* 3.12; Plotinus 2.4.11.30.

65. When Philo characterizes the *pneuma* as *zōtikōtaton* (*Op.* 30), he is simply thinking of its highest manifestation, but surely the term *pneuma* also includes the *pneuma physikon* which encompasses the plant world. According to Galen, the Stoics held that both *physis* and *psychē* consisted in *pneuma*, but the *pneuma* that is *physis* (i.e., found in plants) is colder and more humid, whereas that which is *psychē* is hotter and drier (*SVF* 2.787). Moreover, the Stoics apparently held that plants were infused with life by the air contained in the earth (Seneca, *N.Q.* 6.16). Cf. chap. 2, note 30.

66. For the image of the imprinting of the Forms as seals in wax, see Plato, *Theaet.* 191C. It is not used in the *Timaeus*, but was generally current in Middle Platonism. See Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 200.

67. See references in n. 60.

68. For hints of the notion of a Form of man in Plato, see *Parm.* 130C; *Phileb.* 15A; *Tim.* 30C. Cf. Arius Didymus, ap. Eusebius *PE* 11.23: "For besides all individual men there is a certain conception of man."

69. Urbach has correctly noted, however, that Philo's emphasis on the location of the Intelligible World in the mind of God is missing in the midrash. For references, see n. 2.

## Chapter 2

### The Psyche and its Extra-Terrestrial Life in Philo's Anthropology

1. Cf. Plato, *Theaet.* 154A; *Symp.* 207DE.

2. Nevertheless, at *Som.* 1.34, he ascribes the notion of the mind as an *apospasma theion* to the "words of Moses" in Gen. 2:7. The Stoics frequently referred to the human soul as an *apospasma*, *meros*, or *morion* of the deity. See *SVF* 2.633 (= Diog. Laert. 7.143); 1.495; Epictetus 2.8.11; 1.14.6; Seneca, *Ep.* 66.12; 92.30; M. Aurelius 5.27. This notion goes back to Plato's *Philebus* 29B6.

3. *LA* 3.161; *QE* 2.46. In speaking of those who claim that the soul is a fragment of the *aithēr*, Philo is probably referring to Posidonius, who affirmed in his treatise *On Heroes and Daemons* that daemons were of "aetherial" substance (F24, Kidd). Moreover, Sextus Empiricus reports as Stoic doctrine that "if it is probable that living beings exist in the air, it is certainly reasonable living beings should also exist in the *aithēr*, from which men too derive their share of intellectual power,

having drawn it from thence (*Math.* 9.87; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 120.14; Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 7.7, 644.25). The old Stoa, on the other hand, seems to have refrained from making the soul a portion of the *aithēr*. (See Émile Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien Stoicisme* [Paris, 1951], 152). For the Stoic denial of the Aristotelian notion of the *aithēr* as a fifth element (*De Caelo* 1.1-2), see Cicero, *Acad. Post.* 39; *Fin.* 4.12. For the Stoics the heavenly *aithēr* is simply a purer form of fire. (In *SVF* 1.101 [= Aet. 1.12.4], however, Zeno is said to maintain that "aetherial light" moves in a circle. See M. Lapidge, "Stoic Cosmology," in *The Stoics*, ed. J. M. Rist [Berkeley, 1978], 178-79.) It may be that the reason the early Stoics refrained from speaking of the human soul as a fragment of *aithēr*, insisting instead that it was made of fire, was their fear that this might lead to the misunderstanding that the soul is constituted of a fifth element. At *Her.* 283, Philo seems to be willing to accept the notion that the immortal soul will return to the *aithēr* if the latter is taken to be "the fifth substance moving in a circle, differing by its superior quality from the four elements" (cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.22). Philo appears to adopt the notion of a fifth substance in the following four texts: *QG* 3.6; 4.8; *QE* 2.73, 85 and perhaps 2.46, although it is missing in the Greek version. In *Som.* 1.21., it is treated as an open question. Tobin writes: "In the first century BCE the notion of *aithēr* as a fifth substance seems to have become an acceptable position in Middle Platonic circles. Varro seems to imply that Antiochus of Ascalon may have accepted *aithēr* as a fifth substance (*Acad. Post.* 26)." (*Creation of Man*: 82-84). Cf. Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 170 ("Antiochus does not condemn it, nor yet does he adopt it"). It may also be that Philo is referring to Heraclides of Pontus, who is said to have held that soul was an ethereal body (fr. 99, Wehrli). See H.B. Gottschalk, *Heraclides of Pontus* (Oxford, 1980), 102-07 and Paul Moraux, *Aristote: Du Ciel* (Paris, 1965), li-lx.

4. This qualification was all the more necessary since Philo also employed materialistic language in describing God's imparting of the divine *pneuma* to man, saying that "God projects (literally, 'stretches', *teinantos*, a distinctively Stoic term in this context; also reminiscent, however, of *Timaeus* 34B4) the power that proceeds from himself through the mediant breath till it reaches the subject" (*LA* 1.37; cf. *Det.* 84; *Op.* 144; *Mig.* 181). See Wolfson, *Philo* 1.394-95; Tobin, *Creation of Man*, 87-93. For the Platonic/Stoic language used by Philo of the Logos, see Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 171-74; Winston, *Wisdom*, 189-90.

5. It should be noted that even as he describes the mind as an impression of the Logos, he speaks of it as 'emanating' (*aporryeisa*) from the fountain of reason.

6. It is Tobin's view that "for the most part, neither the Platonic interpretation of Gen. 1:27 nor the Stoic interpretation of Gen. 2:7 predominates in *Det.* 79-90. The two interpretations are interwoven in such a way that they become two complementary formulations of the same act of creation." At *Det.* 83, however, Tobin sees Philo's editorial hand. When Philo writes that "to the faculty which streams forth from the fountain of Reason breath (*pneuma*) has been assigned, not moving air but, as it were, an impression and stamp of the divine power," he is denying, says Tobin, the Stoic notion of 'spirit', which was defined by a Stoic such as Chrysippus as 'moving air' (*SVF* 2.471). It seems to me, however, that what Stobaeus actually reports is that Chrysippus chose the term 'pneuma' for that vital mixture of fire and air which the Stoics believed animated the universe because, according to his theory, the *pneuma* was constantly moving back and forth, either from the center of the cosmos to its extreme boundaries, or from the center of any given entity to its surface (*SVF* 2.442, 551), and it was common usage among the physicists to employ the term 'pneuma' for moving air (Arist. *Meteor.* 360a29; Hero Alexandrinus, *Pneumatica*, ed. W. Schmidt [Leipzig, 1899] 1.6, line 6: *ouden gar heteron esti to pneuma ē kinoumenos aēr*). As a matter of fact, the Stoics defined *pneuma*, when signifying wind, not as *kinoumenos aēr* but as *rhyxis aeris*, though the meaning of both is essentially the same (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 374, line 23; cf. Seneca, *NQ* 5.1.1: *ventus est fluens aer*; Philo, *Gig.* 22). (See Otto Gilbert, *Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums* [Leipzig, 1907], 511-39). What Philo is saying, then, at *Det.* 83 is that the term 'pneuma'

is being used there not in its ordinary sense of moving air but as referring to the human mind. But though not polemicizing directly against the Stoics, he does prefer in this instance to understand the psychic pneuma in Platonic rather than in Stoic terms.

7. *alla kai ap' autou kai ex autou*. Asking why Plato called the supreme God father and maker of all things, Plutarch distinguishes between father and maker, and between birth and coming to be: "In the case of a maker, such as a builder is or a weaver or one who produces a lyre or a statue, his work when done is separated from him, whereas the principle or force emanating from the parent is blended in the progeny and cohibits [restricts] its nature, which is a fragment or part (*apospasma kai morion*) of the procreator [cf. SVF 1.128]. Since, then, the universe is not like products that have been molded or fitted together but has in it a large portion of vitality and divinity, which God sowed from himself in the matter and mixed with it, it is reasonable that, since the universe has come into being a living thing, God be named at the same time father of it and maker" (*Platonic Questions* 1001AB). Cf. LA 1.31, where it is said that "the heavenly man was not molded but was stamped with the image of God, while the earthly is a molded work of the Artificer, but not his offspring."

8. Cf. 1.1.2.13; 3.5.4.12; 3.2.1.30; 5.2.1.22. More particularly, Plotinus thought that "Soul has not sunk entire and that something of it is continuously in the Intellectual Realm" (4.8.8.1-6). There is no evidence, however, that Philo held a similar view.

9. For Philo's use of the Stoic formulation 'mind (or soul) of the universe' of God *qua* Logos, see Wolfson, *Philo* 1.328.

10. Cf. Wisd. Sol. 13:1-9; See Festugière, *Révélation*, vol. 2: *Le Dieu Cosmique*.

11. Cf. Decal. 52-53; Cont. 3; Conf. 173.

12. The Son here is the World. Cf. Spec. 1.96; Deus 31.

13. Cf. Post. 58; Plant. 28; Prov. 1.40; Op. 82.

14. Cf. Aet. 26, where this is given as Plato's view in the *Timaeus*, and Mig. 220, where the universe is described as "the greatest and most perfect man."

15. Cf. QG 1.57, where the world is described as a lover of wisdom; and QG 4.215, where we are told that "in man the mind is like heaven, for they are both rational parts, the one of the world, the other of the soul."

16. See Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 167-74. Runia notes that Professor Abraham Terian has communicated to him his discovery of an unknown fragment of Philo preserved only in an Armenian translation. It had been published in the 1892 edition of the Armenian translations of Philonic works still preserved in the Greek (pp. 222-23), but was not translated and thus remained wholly unnoticed. Terian's translation runs as follows: "The number generated by the sum of the decad is 55, which of itself is beautiful. First of all, it is constituted of the sum of doubles and triples taken successively, in the following manner: the doubles 1, 2, 4, 8 make 15; the triples, by 3, 1, 3, 9, 27 make 40, and when added these make 55, which Plato mentions in the *Timaeus* with reference to the construction of the soul, beginning thus: 'First he took one portion from the whole,' and what follows this." According to Runia, "we can be absolutely certain that Philo drew this information from a source, for an almost identical version of this arithmological observation is found in Anatolius' account of the decad (39.21-40.3 Heiberg)."

17. Cf. Aristotle, *Part. An.* 4.686a27.

18. See Friedrich Solmsen, *Kleine Schriften* (Hildesheim, 1968) 1.588-604.

19. See Leonardo Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia, 1975), 42-47.

20. Tarán has pointed out that the aerial class are in reality left nameless (*Academica*, 44).

21. In Apuleius' case the ultimate source is probably mediated through Varro. See John Dillon, in Winston and Dillon, *Two Treatises*, 198-99.

22. *Plant.* 12; *Op.* 73; *Som.* 1.135.

23. Chrysippus is reported to have identified it elsewhere with the purer part of the *aithēr* (Diog. Laert. 7.139; Cicero, ND 2.39).

24. Plutarch, *Mor.* 416; cf. Apuleius, *De Deo Soc.*, chap. 13; *Epinomis* 985A.

25. *systasis psychēs kai sōmatos*. See *Epinomis* 981A; *Phaedrus* 246C; *Laws* 899B; *Decal.* 33.

26. *Conf.* 176; *Som.* 1.135; *Sac.* 5; *QE* 2.13.

27. A distinction was made by the Stoics between ordinary or terrestrial fire, which is destructive (*pyr atechnon*) and ethereal or heavenly fire, which is "creative" (*pyr technikon*) (SVF 1.120, 154). Plato had already spoken of the fire in the universe, in contrast to that in humans, as pure and as wonderful in respect of its mass and its beauty (*Philebus* 29B, 30B). According to Plotinus, the sun's body is composed of gently warm light, but the light which in turn shines forth from it "as its flower and splendor" is incorporeal (2.1.7, 25-31). Light for Plotinus is the incorporeal *energeia* of the luminous body (4.5.6-7; cf. 6.1.3; *Corp. Hermet.* 16.6). See A. H. Armstrong, *Plotinian and Christian Studies* (London, 1979), chap. 2, "Emanation in Plotinus", 61-66. Armstrong describes Plotinus 6.1.3 as "on the border line between Neoplatonism and Stoicism." For Philo's figurative characterization of the light of the intellect as incorporeal, see *Som.* 1.113; *Praem.* 37; *Conf.* 61; *QG* 4.1.

28. Similarly, the human soul even while in the body may be designated *asōmatos* when its possessor becomes unconcerned with bodily affairs and concentrates his attention on the heavenly and intelligible realities. See, for example, *Conf.* 105; *Det.* 159; *Som.* 2.72. See also John Dillon's stimulating discussion in Winston and Dillon, *Two Treatises*, 200-203.

29. In his discussion of reincarnation, Iamblichus writes: "Another group of Platonists, including Eratosthenes, Ptolemy and others, believing that the soul is always in a body, make it transfer [at birth] from a lighter, finer body into the hard [*ostreōdē*; cf. *Phaedrus* 250C]. For, they believe, it spends the time [between incarnations] in some part of the sensible universe and comes down [at birth] into the hard body, each time from a different place in the whole." (*De Anima*, ap. Stobaeus 1.49.39; Festugière, *Révélation* 3.217-18; Gottschalk, *Heraklides*, 102-03).

There is one further Philonic passage that requires comment. At *Op.* 144, Philo notes that there are "spiritual and divine natures, some incorporeal and visible to mind (*noēta*, intelligible) only, some not without bodies (*ouk aneu sōmatōn*), such as the stars." The *ouk aneu sōmatōn* is apparently meant to indicate that unlike the aerial souls, which have invisible bodies, the star souls are in a special sense "not without bodies," i.e., are not invisible. Another possible interpretation is that Philo is here contrasting those souls that live in the realm of the Forms (*Her.* 280; *Sac.* 7; *QG* 1.86) and are therefore absolutely without bodies with the star souls, which are not entirely without bodies.

30. Philo, like the Stoics, did not regard plants as living beings. See *Anim.* 94; *Op.* 73; *Deus* 37; *LA* 2.22. It may be noted that in *Corp. Hermet.* 10.7, the lowest level of the scale of living beings is that of the creeping animals (*herpetōdeis*) rather than water creatures.

31. Iamblichus, *De Anima*, ap. Stobaeus 1.378, 25 Wachsmuth. See Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 245; Festugière, *Révélation* 3.219 and 63-96; Heinrich Dörrie, "Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus," *Hermes* 85 (1957): 414-35; Walter Stettner, *Die Seelenwanderung bei Griechen und Römern* (Stuttgart, 1933).

32. To judge from Iamblichus' doxographical list of reasons, it was the theory of wantonness that Albinus favored, which brings him closer to the pessimistic view of embodiment (*De Anima* 375.10-11; Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 246).

33. *QG* 4.74; cf. *Op.* 135; *Som.* 1.147.

34. *Plant.* 14; *Som.* 1.138; cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum* 8.53.

35. It is true, however, that in *Phaedrus* 249 it is said that the soul cannot regrow its wings and return to its heavenly home in less than ten thousand years, though this is shortened for the phi-

philosopher to three thousand, and that every thousand years souls begin a new incarnation, determined partly by lot, partly by their own choice, and it may be to these cosmic calculations that Philo and the Middle Platonists are referring, in which case they would be allied to the notion of a 'fall'. It is nonetheless possible that the Middle Platonists had detached from its original connection with a 'fall' the earlier Orphic doctrine, echoed in Pindar's second Olympian ode and transposed by Plato into his own philosophical account, and had chosen to emphasize instead the notion of the mathematical structure of the universe and its intrinsic requirements.

36. Cf. *Prov.* 2.110.

37. See *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967), 255.

38. E.g., Harpocration and Numenius (Aeneas of Gaza, *Theophrastus*, p. 12, Boissonade); Albinus (*Did.* 25.6, Louis); Cronius (Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, chap. 2, M. 118.7).

39. 4.7.6, 14.

40. See *Phaedo* 82; *Phaedrus* 249B; *Rep.* 620. For Porphyry, see Augustine, *CD* 10.

41. *Concerning the Gods and the Universe*, 20. A similar position was held by Theodorus of Asine, Iamblichus' pupil and rival (Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, chap. 2, M. 118.7), Proclus (*In Tim.* 3.294.21; 295.15, Diehl), and Hermeias of Alexandria, a pupil of Syrianus (*In Phaedr.* 170.16, Couvreur).

42. Cf. *QG* 3.3; *Som.* 1.35-36. See Félix Buffière. *Les Mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1956), 365, 395; Pierre Boyancé, "Sur le discours d'Anchise," *Mélanges Dumézil, Latomus* 45 (1960): 60-76; "Études Philoniennes," *Revue des Études Grecques* 76 (1963): 74-77; Jean Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie* (Paris, 1976), 199-200: "The Platonic and Christian Ulysses," in *Neoplatonism and Christian Tradition*, ed. D. J. O'Meara (Norfolk, Va., 1982), 3-18; Tobin, *Creation of Man*, 150-54; Winston, *Philo*, 313, n. 94.

43. See n. 3 above. In the *Quaestiones*, where Philo appears to adopt the notion of a fifth substance, he speaks of the soul of the wise as coming from the ether, implying that it will ultimately return to its fatherland in the ether (*QG* 3.10, 45).

44. Wolfson (*Philo* 1.398) thinks that this view "evidently reflects that of Chrysippus, according to whom immortality, which to him is confined to the wise, means that the soul, which consists of an element similar to that of the stars, will upon the death of the body mount to heaven and there assume the spherical shape of stars, and it will continue to exist in that condition for as long as the world continues to exist, that is until the general conflagration." The old Stoa, however, apparently held that the souls after death pierce through the murky lower atmosphere and rise to a brighter region just below the moon (*SVF* 2.812, 814). See also Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.42-43: "when the soul has passed this tract [i.e., the lower atmosphere] and reaches to and recognizes a substance resembling its own, it stops amongst the fires which are formed of rarefied air and the modified glow of the sun (*ex ardore solis temperato*) and ceases to make higher ascent." That this refers to the upper atmosphere may be seen from Lucretius 5.605: "It is possible also that, even if the sun's fire be not great, yet the glow (*ardor*) may pervade the air with hot burnings, if by any chance the air is so fit and disposed that it can be kindled when struck by small quantities of heat." On the other hand, according to Iamblichus, Heraclides of Pontus collected all the discarnate souls in the Milky Way, whereas the other followers of Plato held that they were scattered through all the heavenly spheres (*De Anima*, ap. Stobaeus 1., p. 378 Wachsmuth [= fr. 97 Wehrli]). Cf. also Plato, *Tim.* 41D, where it is said that the Demiurge, after creating the immortal parts of men's souls, places each in a star "as in a chariot." See Gottschalk, *Heraclides*, 100-01. Moreover, a Pythagorean *akousma* (in Iamblichus, *VP* 18.82, Diels-Kranz 1.464, 6) seems to testify to a belief in a planetary sojourn after death, designating the sun and moon as Islands of the Blessed.

45. Wolfson (*Philo* 1.400) asserts that Philo could not have accepted any of the three views of the

soul's ultimate destination just mentioned, i.e., the ether, the sun and stars, the Ideas: "He could not accept the view that the souls become stars, for to him the stars are made of the element fire, whereas the immortal souls are immaterial. For the same reason he could not accept the view that the souls are resolved into the primary fire or ether. Nor could he accept the view that the souls go back to heaven to dwell there among the ideas, for to him the ideas are not in heaven, but rather in the intelligible world, which is not the same as heaven." None of these arguments are valid. We have already seen that for Philo the stars are rational minds embodied in celestial fire but that they may be nonetheless characterized as *asōmatoī* or unbodied inasmuch as they are not bound to earthly frames. As for the realm of Ideas, it is very likely that this view of the soul's final abode is based on Plato's *Phaedrus* 247-49, where it is said that the soul which has lived three earthly lives as a philosopher regains her wings and returns to the company of the gods in the heavenly sphere to join them in their supra-celestial processions, during which they enjoy a vision of the incorporeal Forms.

46. For the nature of Moses' superiority over Isaac, see my article "The Philonic Sage," *Da'at* 11 (1983): 9-18.

47. *QG* 1.51; *Op.* 154; *Conf.* 149.

48. Cf. *QG* 186: "The end of worthy and holy men is not death but translation."

49. *Legat.* 91; *QG* 1.51; 3.11.

50. *QG* 1.16; *Post.* 39. Cf. the phrase *empsychos nekros* in Sophocles, *Antigone* 1167.

51. In *QG* 1.93, he speaks of the earth as a "place of wretchedness," and of its "horrid position..., which is the last of things."

52. Alternatively, Philo may simply have meant that the souls of the incurably wicked remain somewhere in the region of earth, engulfed, as Plutarch puts it, "in obscurity, oblivion and utter effacement" (*Mor.* 1130E).

53. In the *Phaedrus* myth (248E) all souls eventually regain their wings, and in the eschatology of the *Laws* there is no mention of eternal punishment.

54. Cf. *Her.* 45, 78; *Som.* 1.151; 2.133. For the rejection of a literal hell in the Hellenistic period, see Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.36: "It is ignorance that has invented the world below and the terrors which not without reason you appeared to despise." It is the kind of thing, he goes on to say, that makes a stir in the theatre with its contingent of silly women and children. Cf. *Tusc.* 1.48-49; Seneca, *De Consolatione ad Marciam* 19.4; Lucretius 3.1023: "Here after all on earth the life of fools becomes a hell."

55. Cf. *Det.* 178; *Som.* 2.196; *Ebr.* 140; *Spec.* 1.58; 3.11; *Mig.* 172; *Praem.* 72; *Cher.* 2.

56. The rabbis say: "No pardon is granted to five persons: to him who repents too much, sins too much, sins in a sinless generation, sins with the idea to repent, and to him who profanes the name of God" (*Avot de-R. Nathan*, chap. 39, page 33a; cf. *Avot de-R. Nathan*, chap. 40, page 33b; *Tosef. Yoma* 4(5).13; *Y. Hag.* 2.1, page 77, column B (Venice edition); *B. Hag.* 15a; *Eccl. R.* 7.8; *M. Avot* 5.18; *Mid. Pss.* 1.22; *Exod. R.* 11.1; *B. Erub.* 19a; *Tanḥ. Buber*, *Naso* 17b; *Num. R.* 11.5; *Fug.* 84; *Mark* 3:29).

57. Cf. Epictetus 2.15.13-14.

58. Cf. *Ep.* 112.1, 3; Stobaeus 2.113; Cicero, *Fin.* 4.56. In *Ep.* 50.5, however, Seneca writes: "But I do not despair even of a hardened sinner."

59. As for those who attain to either one or the other of the two Powers, it would seem that although they enjoy a vision of the Logos as embracing the double aspect of *theos/kyrios*, they direct their lives under the inspiration of only one or the other of these two aspects. They thus differ from the highest class in their inability to mold their lives in accordance with both divine aspects simultaneously, even though they recognize them as the two sides of a unitary Logos. Philo's schema here appears to be irreconcilable with those which he employs at *Mut.* 19-26 and *Som.* 1.160-63, which are in turn mutually inconsistent. According to the former, those who envision God as both *kyrios* and *theos* are the most perfect, those who see him as *theos* are making progress, and those who see

him as *kyrios* are fools. According to the latter, the highest perfection is represented by those who envision God as *theos* or unmixed graciousness, the next level by those who see God as both *theos* and *kyrios*, and the third level by those who see him only as *kyrios*. The contradiction between *Mut.* 19-26 and *Som.* 1.160-63 was already noted by Bréhier, *Idées Philosophiques*, 143.

60. See E. P. Sanders, "The Covenant as a Soteriological Category and the Nature of Salvation in Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism," in *Jews, Greeks and Christians: Essays in Honor of W. D. Davies*, ed. Robert Hamerton-Kelly and Robin Scroggs (Leiden, 1976), 11-44. Sanders kindly sent me an offprint of his article and invited me to critique it.

## Chapter 3

### Philo's Mystical Theology

1. See R. C. Zaehner, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism* (N. Y., 1960), 5-6.
2. Farīduddīn 'Aṭṭār, *Tadhkirat al-auliya'*, ed. R. N. Nicholson (repr., London, 1959) 2.290; cited by Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions in Islam* (Chapel Hill, 1975), 126.
3. See R. A. Nicholson, *The Idea of Personality in Sufism* (Cambridge, 1923), 19. Verses 215-18 of the *Tā'iyya* of Ibn al-Fārīd describe this state very poignantly: "When it (my essence) is not called 'two', my attributes are hers, and since we are one, her outward aspect is mine. If she be called, 'tis I who answer, and if I am summoned she answers him who calls me and cries 'Labbayk!' ('At your service!'). And if she speaks, 'tis I who converse. Likewise, if I tell a story, 'tis she that tells it. The pronoun of the second person has gone out of use between us, and by its removal I am raised above the sect who separate."
4. *Mukhātabāt*, no. 42.10, cited by Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 165, 81.
5. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 154.
6. See Plato, *Laws* 886A; *Philebus* 28E; Aristotle, fr. 12a, Ross; Cicero, *ND* 2.31-39, 15-19; Epictetus 1.6, Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mundo* 6; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.412-19; Albinus, *Did.* ch. 10; Wisdom of Solomon 13:1-9; Rom. 2:20.
7. *LA* 3.97-103; *Post.* 28, 167; *Fug.* 12; *Mut.* 54; *Abr.* 119-23; *Praem.* 40.
8. Both Philo and Plotinus undoubtedly depend on Plato, *Rep.* 507C-509B for the sun image. A similar formula appears later in Spinoza, *Short Treatise* 1.1.10: "God, however, the first cause of all things, manifests himself through himself."
9. See Plotinus 5.5.10.6-7; Philo, fr. from *QE*, LCL, supp. 2, 258, lines 9-10: "in order for one to be able to comprehend God, it is first necessary to become God." Cf. Ibn 'Arabī: "No one knows God as He really is except God." (*Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*: 32; Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, 39.)
10. The origin of Plotinus' argument is undoubtedly to be found in Plato's well-known remarks at the end of *Rep.* 6 to the effect that dialectical reasoning (*noēsis*) can arrive at the intuition of a First Principle by "treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas" (511BC; cf. 532AB).
11. For a more detailed discussion, see Winston, *Philo*, 26-30.
12. Cf. Plotinus 2.9.1: *ouk en allōi*.
13. See David Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory of Cosmogony," *HR* 11.2 (1971): 185-202, especially 199, n. 41.
14. See, for example, Wallis' analysis of Plotinus' philosophical approach: "But what concerns

us here is that in his view it is states of consciousness that constitute the primary realities, of which material objects are a very poor imitation. In consequence his three Hypostases may be treated either statically, as objectively existing realities, or dynamically, from the point of view of the individual's inner life... Viewed as a metaphysical reality each level is real in its own right; viewed as states of consciousness, on the other hand, the lower levels become imperfect ways of viewing the true realities contemplated by the higher ones." (*Neoplatonism*, 5). In my opinion, Plotinus views the three Hypostases as the aspects of a single entity.

15. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 266, 268.
16. R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam* (London, 1963), 118.
17. See Winston, *Philo*, 7-21.
18. For my attempt to demonstrate that Philo holds a doctrine of eternal creation, see Winston, *Philo*, 13-21. The fact that in the same treatise in which he asserts this theory (*Prov.* 1.7) he also threatens humankind with the ultimate destruction of the world in response to its wickedness (*Prov.* 1.89-92) does not constitute a contradiction (as asserted by Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus*, 123-24), for it need not be taken literally. It not only contradicts his explicit statement in *Aet.* 19, but can readily be explained as a pedagogical device, analogous to the similar threat often projected by the rabbis into the mouth of God (e.g., *B. Shab.* 88a; *Deut. R.* 8.6; *Mid. Pss.* 20.3.) There are a few scattered statements in rabbinic midrash based on Isa. 51:6 that heaven and earth will perish, but they do not seem to envision the destruction of humanity. In his commentary on Isa. 51:6, the Karaite Yafeth b. Ali explains that God will destroy heaven and earth by degrees, immediately replacing each destroyed part in turn. (See G. Vajda, "The Opinions of the Karaite Yafeth b. Ali on the Destruction of the World in the End of Days," *AAJR Jubilee Volume*, ed. S. W. Baron and I. E. Barzilai [Jerusalem, 1980], 85-95). What Philo means to say is that inasmuch as the world is continuously dependent on God for its existence, God could theoretically destroy it, but in view of his eternal and unchangeable nature he will not do so. An analogy to this may be found in Philo's statement that the stars, the visible gods in Heaven, are naturally liable to correction, inasmuch as they do not possess absolute power (cf. *Op.* 46) but in virtue of their excellence are never destined to undergo it (*Spec.* 1.19). Cf. *Tim.* 41B.
19. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (N. Y., 1957), 41.
20. Nor could Plato explain how an image cast by an unchanging object on an unchanging mirror could be itself inconstant and fleeting. See Aristotle, *Gen. et Corr.* 335b18 and Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 196.
21. Philo's thought may have been that God's infinite creative power is so vast and unrestrained that its primary manifestation as Logos yields a further, secondary manifestation in the form of a shadowy reflection of the latter.
22. That the Form of the void refers to the Platonic Receptacle is made likely by the fact that Philo rejected an extracosmic void (*Her.* 228; although in *Prov.* 2.56, he does seem to admit its existence; cf. *Plant.* 7; *Aet.* 78). As for an intra-cosmic void, it was denied both by Platonists and Stoics alike (cf. Diels, *Dox.* 338.20, *Prov.* 2.550). Moreover, the manner in which the void is described in Scripture, according to Philo's interpretation, as filling the huge gap between the earth and the moon, makes it very unlikely that he was thinking of the *diakena*, the interspaces or interstices which the shapes of particles, when particles have been formed, do not allow them to fill (*Tim.* 58AB). (For Antiochus' reference to them, see Cicero, *Acad. Post.* 27.) On the other hand, it must be admitted that in his various descriptions of primordial matter, Philo never once uses the expressions *chōra*, *hedra*, *tithēnē*, or *pandechēs*, which describe Plato's Receptacle. Indeed, even if he had used any of these expressions, they need not have necessarily referred to the Receptacle if we had lacked his explicit reference to the void both in *Op.* 29 and *Prov.* 1.22. Thus Plutarch, for example, does use the Platonic expressions cited above, yet to him they are indifferently designations of *hylē*. See Plu-

tarch, *Mor.* 1014CD, with Cherniss' note *ad loc.* in LCL 13, part I, p. 184.

23. See Runia, *Philo and the Timaeus* 1.376-79.

24. Drummond's argument that it is not Matter but 'fabricated Matter' which is said to be corruptible is unacceptable, since Philo's subsequent description of it as inanimate, discordant, insoluble, irregular, and unequal shows conclusively that he is referring to Matter in its primordial state before it is shaped by God's formative power. See James Drummond, *Philo Judaeus* (repr., Amsterdam, 1969), 1.301.

25. Cf. *Prov.* 2.110; *LA* 3.73; *Gig.* 3. It should be noted that Albinus, who nowhere says that Matter is uncreated, indestructible, and unlimited, in contrast to Apuleius and Calcidius, who apply to it all three adjectives, nowhere explicitly identifies Matter with evil. Although Apuleius, too, does not explicitly identify Matter with evil, he does refer to seeds of virtue and vice sown in man at birth, but it is difficult to know how much is to be made of this. As Dillon has correctly noted, we find no explicit dualism in Apuleius' cosmological exposition (*Middle Platonists*, 325). Plotinus' position is very instructive in this connection. He makes Matter and weakness in the soul the joint causes of human evil, and although he admits that Matter is the last emanation from the One (5.8.7.22; 3.9.3.7-16), he does not hesitate to designate it as evil in itself. He insists, however, that although the soul is not evil in itself, its weakness is a sufficient condition of evil in the soul. As O'Brien has remarked, "Plotinus was probably reluctant to make matter sole and sufficient cause of evil in the soul, because this would have subjected soul to matter, the higher to the lower. Equally, he was probably reluctant to make the soul's weakness sole and sufficient cause of sin, because this would have given evil a place among the first realities." See Denis O'Brien, "Plotinus on Evil," in *Le Néoplatonisme*, Colloques internationaux du CNRS (Paris, 1971), 144. Later, Proclus repudiates the notion of Matter as evil, and refers its origin exclusively to the soul. This is in accordance with his view that "every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms" (*Elements*, prop. 57). Thus "the higher the principle, the further does its creative activity extend, and matter therefore is a direct creation of the One, and not, as in Plotinus, a product of the partial soul" (O'Brien, 145). We see, then, that although Plotinus derived Matter ultimately from the One, he was still willing to see in it the basic condition for evil. If, therefore, Philo had regarded Matter as autonomous, he would surely have regarded it as the major source of evil.

26. A number of further observations may be made. If Matter is coeternal with God, how are we to explain the Form of the Void which constitutes one of the seven primary intelligible Forms created on day one? Moreover, Philo's statement at *LA* 2.2 that "neither before creation was there anything with God nor, when the universe came into being, does anything take its place with him," would have to be taken in the very restricted sense of referring only to an entity that could pose a challenge to God (cf. *Sac.* 63; *Gig.* 64, where God is seen as the almighty King). The fact is, however, that the recalcitrance of Matter, which God is unable completely to overcome, would indeed, if autonomous, infringe on his sovereignty to some extent and thus compromise Philo's monistic philosophical frame of thought. Finally, the concept of a Matter coeternal with God would contradict the doctrine of eternal creation, but since the question of Philo's espousal of such a doctrine is still a controversial issue among scholars, we are unable to press this point. Another consideration is the logical difficulty generated by the supposition that Matter is a second substance by the side of God having nothing in common with Him, for if that were the case it would be impossible for God to affect it in any way. Since it is difficult to be certain that Philo would have been alert to this logical point, we shall not press this consideration either.

27. See Eduard Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen* 3:2.407-09; Julius Guttman, *Philosophies of Judaism*, trans. D. W. Silverman (New York, 1964), 25-26; Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften* 1.335.

28. For a radically different interpretation, see Wolfson, *Philo* 1.271-89.

29. Nicholson, *Mystics*, 17.

30. Cf. *Som.* 2.224; *LA* 1.48; 2.32.46; 3.136; *Her.* 120; *Cher.* 40-52, 64, 71, 77; *Praem.* 32-35.

31. Cf. Plato, *Laws* 860E.

32. J. R. Harris, ed., *Fragments of Philo Judaeus* (Cambridge, 1886), 8. Cf. *Her.* 121, 124; *Mut.* 141, 155; *Fug.* 46; *Op.* 177; *QG* 3.48; Plato, *Laws* 44DE. For a fuller analysis of Philo's doctrine of free will, see my discussion in Winston and Dillon, *Two Treatises*, 181-95.

33. See Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 166. Cf. also *QG* 4.196, and *The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth* from Nag Hammadi, where the disciple addresses Hermes Trismegistus as follows: "I am the instrument of thy spirit. Mind is thy plectrum. And thy counsel plucks me." (Robinson, 296).

34. See Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 277.

35. See Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, 155; *idem*, in M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Wiesbaden, 1963) 1.418.

36. See Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 278.

37. See Leiner's *Mei ha-shiloah*, part 1: 14b, 55b; and Joseph Weiss, "Torat ha-Determinism ha-Dati le-R. Yosef Mordechai Lerner [sic] me-Izbica (The Religious Determinism of Yosef Mordechai Lerner of Izbica)," in *Sefer Yovel le-Yitzhak Baer* (Jerusalem, 1960), 447-53.

38. See Pierre Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus* (Paris, 1968) 1.119; 2.76.

39. See T. M. Conley, "Philo's Rhetoric," in *ANRW* II.21.1 (Berlin, 1983), 343-71; and John Leopold, "Philo's Style and Diction," in Winston and Dillon, *Two Treatises*, 129-70.

40. Cf. Bāyezid of Bistam, who wrote: "God spoke, 'Everybody wants something from Me, only Bāyezid wants me Myself.'" (See Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 161, and also Winston, *Wisdom*, 254-55).

41. See Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 52.

42. See *Mig.* 34-35; *Cher.* 27; *LA* 2.32, 85; *Som.* 2.252.

43. E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (Cambridge, 1965), 71-72.

44. For a full discussion, see my forthcoming study "The Limits of Jewish Piety and Greek Philosophy in Philo's Thought," chap. 5: Prophecy and Revelation.

45. *Decal.* 81; *Det.* 86; *Abr.* 58; *Praem.* 14; *QE* 2.51.

46. *Gig.* 49; *Deus* 12; *LA* 1.16; *Abr.* 58; *Post.* 27-28; *Som.* 2.227-28; *Sac.* 68; *Som.* 1.71; *Mig.* 35; cf. Plato, *Rep.* 572E; *Symp.* 210E; *Ep.* 7.341CD.

47. Cf. *Ebr.* 146; *Fug.* 32, 166; *LA* 1.84; 3.82; *Prob.* 13; *Mos.* 1.187; *Cont.* 12, 89.

48. Cf. *Som.* 1.115-16, 150; *QG* 4.29.

49. Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York, 1971), 185.

50. See Goodenough, *Politics of Philo*, 115-19.

51. The rabbis, too, found a messianic reference in Moses' blessings: *Sifre Deut.* 352 on *Deut.* 33:12; *Mid. Tannaim* on *Deut.* 33:3. See Wolfson, *Philo* 2.407-08.

52. Cf. *Sib. Or.* 3.371-80, 757-60, 787-94; 2 Baruch 73.4-6; Targum on *Isa.* 11:6.

53. "The cosmic scope of Hos. 2:16-25 is unmistakable; it includes an eschatological vision not unlike that of *Isa.* 11:6-9; 35:9 (cf. *Job* 5:23)." (F. I. Anderson and D. N. Freedman, *Hosea* [AB 24; Garden City, 1980], 281-82, citing B. Kotting). See also Colson, appendix to *Praem.* 87, LCLP 8, 455-56.

54. Ezekiel 34 generally looks forward to the fulfillment of the blessings of *Lev.* 26:3-13 in the messianic age.

55. Geza Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition in Judaism*, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1973), 159-60. Vermes writes: "It is clear that the versions as a whole interpret *yizal* as 'to come forth', 'to arise'; *mayim* as the Messiah; *midālyōw* (or rather *medāliyôtāyw*) as 'the children of Israel'. This disconcerting exegesis results from the following midrashic associations. *yizal mayim* recalls *yizlu šedeq* (*Isa.* 45:8), where righteousness is symbolically expressed as water (cf. *Amos* 5:24). Also *šedeq* is associ-

ated with the Messiah from Jer. 33:15 and 23:5...In short, water = righteousness = Messiah." For the symbolism of 'man' as referring to the Messiah, see *idem*, 56-63.

56. Cf. Ps. Sol. 17:37-39; 4 Ezra 13:25-28, 32-38.

57. Stobaeus 4.267.5, Delatte, p. 42. Cf. Isocrates, *Nicocles* 32-34. According to Diotogenes, *semnotēs* causes the king to be admired and honored; *chrēstotēs* or *euergesia* causes him to be loved; *deinotēs* causes him to be feared by his enemies. For Jewish rule over the nations, cf. Isa. 2:2; Mic. 4:1, 7:16; Isa. 42:1-6; 49:6, 51:4-5; Dan. 2:44, 7:14; 1 En. 90:30; Parables of En. 48:5; Ps. Sol. 17:32-35; Sib. Or. 3.49; 2 Bar. 72:5; Targum on Zech. 4:7; Jub. 32:18-19.

58. Philo characteristically obscures the Holy Land's territorial identity.

59. Ulrich Fischer, *Eschatologie und Jenseitserwartung im hellenistischen Diasporajudentum* (Berlin, 1978), 184-213. Fischer's interpretation, however, is somewhat exaggerated.

## Philonic Texts Cited

### Op.

#### On the Creation (*De Opificio Mundi*)

16	23, 62 n. 50, 64 n. 63
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29	24, 71 n. 22
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### Sac.

#### On the Sacrifices of Abel and Cain (*De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini*)

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63	72 n. 26
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### Det.

#### The Worse Attacks the Better (*Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Solet*)

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*Post.*On the Posterity and Exile of Cain (*De Posteritate Caini*)

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