Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought

Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters

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Kent Emery, Jr.

Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought

A Tribute to Kent Emery, Jr.

Edited by

Roberto Hofmeister Pich
Andreas Speer

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Editorial

For the *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* (STGM) it is the most honorable task to publish the Festschrift for Kent Emery, Jr. in this very series. In 1997, Kent Emery accepted the invitation of the, at that time, director of the Thomas-Institut and general editor of the STGM Prof. Dr. Jan A. Aertsen to serve on the editorial board of our series. Since volume 61, Kent Emery generously gave his support, advice and judgement to the STGM for more than twenty years.

Kent Emery's commitment was strongly motivated by the aim to share common intellectual ideas concerning the understanding of—quoting Paul Oskar Kristeller—the "history of philosophy in the widest possible sense", regarding a Millenium which we are accustomed to call the Middle Ages. According to Joseph Koch, the founder of the Thomas-Institut and of the STGM, a better understanding of this era often classified as dark is not only confronted with the unfamiliarity with central medieval assumptions of the world, but also with the preconditions for education and learning at that time. For a proper understanding, we should have to study the *trivium* and the *quadrivium* again, as was common in the Middle Ages, and we should also read the ancient Arabic and Jewish authors in the same way as the philosophers and theologians at the medieval universities. However, the biggest obstacle to the implementation of such a project, despite the hundreds of years of research, is still the lack of adequate textual output. Most philosophical and theological literature of the Middle Ages has either not yet been printed or printing and expenditure are insufficient. But all too often inadequate interpretations are based on inadequate texts. Therefore, the STGM has always strongly fostered critical editions alongside detailed studies. I remember many occasions discussing these questions and the need for critical editions with Kent Emery, who himself worked and is still working on some of the most important editorial projects.

The present Festschrift for Kent Emery, Jr. can be considered a good example of what the *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* stand for: studies and texts. Every new research project, which is concerned with new problems, historical contexts and traditions, raises new questions, opens up new perspectives and makes our picture more complex. It has always been an exciting opportunity to share common ideas with Kent Emery and to be engaged in the liveliest discussions with my distinguished colleague, whom I have the privilege to also call my friend.

Andreas Speer

Preface and Acknowledgements

This *Festschrift* was planned in connection with a conference held at the University of Notre Dame, July 27–29, 2014, in honor of Kent Emery, Jr., on the occasion of his 70th birthday (July 7, 2014), bearing the same title, i.e., "Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought". This volume is thus, to a large extent, a scientific outcome of said academic event. The conference was organized by two former post-doc fellows supervised by Prof. Emery in Notre Dame, namely, Roberto Hofmeister Pich (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre / RS, Brazil) and Alfredo Santiago Culleton (Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, São Leopoldo / RS, Brazil), and by the—then—Director of the Notre Dame Medieval Institute, Olivia Remie Constable. Eighteen scholars read papers at the conference, coming from places as different as Belgium, Brazil, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and others. Each of these lecturers, as well as another group of distinguished scholars, had also been invited prior to the conference to prepare an essay subsequent to it, which would help composing a collective volume in honor of Prof. Emery, as a sign of friendship and, above all, recognition for his enormous and undisputable contributions to the research field of medieval philosophy and theology, not only as a teacher but also as author, advisor, editor of books and of the *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* of the SIEPM, and, last but not least, as a true leader in his area of expertise. As a result, the editors of the present volume can be really proud of having gathered, through this *Festschrift* in honor of Prof. Emery, the publication of essays (and editions!) which are, in many—if not in all—cases, truly new and original.

Roberto Hofmeister Pich and Alfredo Santiago Culleton first conceptualized the conference and the *Festschrift* in April 2013. Remie Constable strongly and enthusiastically supported the idea of the conference and offered us the invaluable support of the Medieval Institute to help realize the project. Unfortunately, Remie Constable could not take part in the academic *convivium* of July 2014, as she got very ill in the second half 2013 and passed away on April 16, 2014. We would thus like to express our most sincere thankfulness to her, *in memoriam*. It also seems appropriate to mention that Prof. Kent Emery, Jr. was the first recipient of the Olivia Remie Constable Prize, which was awarded by the Notre Dame Medieval Institute in summer 2015.

We would further like to thank Maureen B. McCann Boulton, who worked as Acting Director of the Medieval Institute in the months previous to the conference in July 2014, as well as John Van Engen, who was, at that time, Robert M. Conway Director of the Medieval Institute. Both embraced the project and

supported it enormously. Also, we are most grateful to Roberta A. Baranowski, who was, in the months prior to the conference, Associate Director of the Notre Dame Medieval Institute. She has always worked *with* kindness and serenity; and *without* her energy, intelligence, and positive spirit, the conference would not have been possible, especially because the organizers had to coordinate things despite the—quite significant—distance between Brazil and the USA.

Roberto Hofmeister Pich and Andreas Speer took the responsibility of editing this volume. We would especially like to thank Alfredo Santiago Culleton, not only for having co-organized the 2014 conference and contributing an essay to the *Festschrift*, but also for making important suggestions and providing his full support regarding every little step in the course of the editorial work. Also, in a very special way, I would like to thank Prof. Speer, long-lasting friend and academic partner of Prof. Emery, for his support and for having joined me in the task of editing the volume. From the very beginning, he promoted the idea of publishing the *Festschrift* and helped secure a place for it in the prestigious series "Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters" by Brill. This editorial project would not have been possible without his experience and academic expertise, and without the cooperation of his team at the Thomas-Institut at the University of Cologne. Allowing myself a personal note, I must say that the project would not have been possible without Andreas Speer's limitless patience with me.

Roberto Hofmeister Pich

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Publications by Kent Emery, Jr.

Books

Renaissance Dialectic and Renaissance Piety: Benet of Canfield's Rule of Perfection (Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies 50), 323 pp. Binghamton, New York: State University of New York, 1987.

Dionysii Cartusiensis Opera selecta. Tomus I (*Prolegomena*). *Bibliotheca manuscripta* IA–IB: *Studia bibliographica*, two volumes (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis 121–121a), 884 pp. with 16 plates, 4 in color. Turnhout: Brepols, 1991. [These volumes are the first of a multivolume critical edition, directed by Kent Emery, Jr.].

Editor, with Mark D. Jordan, *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers*, 380 pp. including 12 plates. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.

Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages (Variorum Collected Studies), xii + 362 pp. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1996.

Editor, with Joseph P. Wawrykow, *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, 672 pp. including 88 plates with 103 figures. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.

Editor, with Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer, *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte. After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Studies and Texts* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), x + 1033 pp. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000.

Editor, critical edition, with C. Bazán, R. Green, T. Noone, R. Plevano and A. Traver, IOANNES DUNS SCOTI *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima* (Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera philosophica V), vi + 148* + 296 (= 552) pp. Washington, D.C.-St. Bonaventure, NY: Catholic University of America Press-The Franciscan Institute, 2006.

Editor, with Russell L. Friedman and Andreas Speer, *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 105), 1024 pp. Leiden-Boston: E.J. Brill, 2011.

Editor, with William J. Courtenay and Stephen M. Metzger, *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts* (Rencontres de philosophie médiévale 15), xx + 764 pp. Turnhout: Brepols, 2012.

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Editor, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 44 (2002), 339 pp. (Author: Editorial, v–x.)

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Introduction

Kent Emery, Jr. has dedicated much of his scholarly writing to the discussion of the actual historical relations between philosophy *lato sensu*, scholastic theology and mystical theology in the Middle Ages. Even though it is true that Prof. Emery has largely dealt with what, strictly speaking, counts as "theology", his studies testify his conviction concerning an expansive and flexible understanding, on historical and philological grounds, of the term "philosophy" with respect to medieval thought. This understanding also guided, for example, his exceptional work as editor of the *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* and of the series "Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale" of the SIEPM in the period 2002–2017. Further, it highlights his belief in the benefits—in fact, so strongly shared by Scholastic thinkers—of studying medieval theology *also* "from the Arts Faculty". In this sense, the terms "philosophy" and "philosophical thought", including what is materially "theological" in Prof. Emery's own studies, surely give a kind of conceptual identity to his scholarly legacy, as well as to the studies offered in the present *Festschrift* in honor of him.

The last sentences of the above paragraph provide us at once with a broad and precise definition of Prof. Emery's scholarly interests as they are evident in his writings, lectures, reviews, editorial work, and teaching activities. In a completely Augustinian sense, Prof. Emery's interests focused on "God and the soul", or—with a more cautious methodology of philosophical investigation—on "the soul and God". In fact, the following topics belong very much to Kent Emery's emphases of study and scholarly work: (a) the nature of the human soul (in philosophical and theological discourse, comprehending monastic-Scholastic-mystical perspectives); (b) medieval theories of cognition (natural and supernatural), self-knowledge and knowledge of God; (c) the human soul's contemplation of, and union with, God (comprehending philosophical-theological-mystical approaches); (d) the tradition of "the modes of theology" in the Middle Ages; (e) the relation between philosophy and theology, broadly speaking.

In his own research and publications (see also below), Prof. Emery focused on Denys the Carthusian, Henry of Ghent, and more recently, John Duns Scotus. In contextual connection with Denys the Carthusian, Kent Emery, Jr. was always especially interested in the history of philosophy and theology in the 15th century. As it is well known, he studied all of these topics in relation to institutional history (of universities, monasteries, etc.) too, as becomes obvious, for example, in his studies on the religious "studia" and the papal court[1]—

1 Cf., in this regard, Kent Emery, Jr., "Introduction", in: Kent Emery, Jr.—William J. Courtenay—

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these areas of interest could certainly be expanded to current projects on Baroque and colonial Scholasticism. Of course, we should not forget Prof. Emery's interest in the study of manuscripts, textual studies, and critical editions. The several essays contained in this volume pay tribute to Prof. Emery's contributions and consider this articulated constellation of scholarly interests pursued by him.

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The **First Part** of this *Festschrift*, which comprises five studies, begins with "conceptual approaches" to philosophy, broadly speaking, and scholastic theology more narrowly. They have the purpose of showing, from various classic, patristic, and medieval sources—and in various ways—, how contemplation and philosophy closely relate and shape, from the beginning to the end of the Middle Ages, an understanding of philosophical knowledge as "wisdom". Stephen Gersh, in "Les notions de puissance et d'harmonie chez Porphyre", investigates the "hierarchy of principles" in Porphyry's metaphysics and defends the view that such a hierarchy is connected to an account of "power"—to be gradually conceived in terms of a scale determined by the extremes "perfect" and "imperfect". In neo-platonic fashion, and in line with emanation processes, Porphyry applies such a hierarchical distinction in several different ways. Above all, the author explores the relationship of the immaterial soul to "the intellect", which implies an abundance and a plenitude of its powers. By exploring the ascending movement of the soul towards the intellect and the intelligible world, Stephen Gersh emphasizes how much the soul's power in its plenitude depends on its unification with a superior, transcendent principle, whereby "more unification" means "more power" and "more perfection". In "La philosophie comme considération, la contemplation et ses moyens selon Bernard de Clairvaux", Christian Trottmann describes mental attitudes and cognitive processes which should be clarified in order to understand mystical theology and its influence on philosophical undertakings in the Middle Ages. By describing the work *De consideratione* by Bernard of Clairvaux, the author highlights the difference between "consideration" (search of the truth) and "contemplation" (presupposition of the already known truth). Although philosophy and theology are not formally connected by Bernard of Clairvaux, he greatly helped shape philosophical considerations concerning contempla-

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Stephen M. Metzger (eds.), *Philosophy and Theology in the* Studia *of the Religious Orders and at the Papal Court* (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 15), Turnhout 2012, pp. VII–XVI.

tion, according to which contemplation is the clear intuition of the undoubtfully known, through "the eye of the spirit". In "Contemplation and Philosophy: A Historical and Systematic Approach", Andreas Speer investigates, from both the historical and systematic perspective, the relation between contemplation and philosophy. With regard to the historical perspective, the author explores the Middle Ages and the heritage it received from the Hellenistic Late Ancient world, especially from Platonic and neo-Platonic traditions, which so much gave form to "Christian philosophy" until the 12th century. In the 13th century, the "original marriage" between philosophy and contemplation was shaken indeed, but the contemplative approach to philosophy was not lost; it rather became less obvious and "more fragile". It is undeniable that the reception of Aristotle's epistemology and theory of cognition very much challenged the epistemological status of the "contemplative endeavor". On the systematic level, Andreas Speer insists that the marriage between contemplation and philosophy would then demand a more thorough understanding of "wisdom", which turned out to be the criterion, in both Augustinian / neo-Platonic and Aristotelian circles, for any attempt at establishing conceptual links between contemplation and philosophy. William J. Courtenay, in "The Two "Late Middle Ages"", helps understand particular questions regarding the "periodization of medieval history", especially concerning the 14th and 15th centuries and the label "Late Middle Ages". In fact, that same period is divided by historians into "Early" and "High Renaissance" as well. Does it mean that it is a period of "decline", of the "disintegration" of scholastic thinking and synthesis? If most historians think of those two centuries as a unit, and understand it from the perspective of the transformations that occurred in the 15th century—i.e., mainly through "retrospective eyes"—, the author rather stresses the differences between them. After all, if in the 15th century we see, for example, "resurgence of various forms of Platonism", "the growth of Realism", the "reappearance of schools of thought" and their conflicts, etc., all this stands in contrast with the cultural-intellectual tendencies of the 14th century. It thus seems more appropriate to treat the 14th and 15th centuries as quite distinct periods. Two shifts which are important in order to understand this distinction are accurately explored by William J. Courtenay, and they concern (i) the intellectual life of universities, i.e., moving away—especially through Jean Gerson's repudiation of "sophistical argumentation in philosophy"—from a certain "philosophical" and "meta-linguistic approach" to theology, and (ii) the reemergence of "competing schools of thought". Georgi Kapriev, in "Die scotische Essenz-Energie-Distinktion bei Georgios Scholarios und die eigenen Ressourcen der palamitischen Tradition", sheds light on surprising aspects of the philosophical tenets of Georgios Scholarios (ca. 1400–ca. 1473), Patriarch of Constantino-

ple from 1454 onwards. In historiography, he is usually mentioned as one of the greatest Thomists among Byzantine theologians, but he actually always showed a certain eclecticism and interest for other schools of thought as well. Georgi Kapriev agrees with previous researches, which see, particularly in the distinction between "essence" and "energy" (or "energies"), highly important in Byzantine philosophy and systematic Palamism, a reception of Scotus *distinctio formalis a parte rei*. The author describes that current research has a renewed interest in this topic. Can Scholarios's solution be compared to Gregory Palamas's (ca. 1296–1357/1359) *distinctio realis*? On the one hand, for some interpreters, the answer is clearly no, and thus Scholarios departs from Palamas and his followers. On the other hand, there are scholars who try to see a further, third, tradition, including Palamas and Scholarios, which is connected to the views of Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus. Kapriev analyzes Palamas's and Scholarios's positions and tries to check them for continuity and disruptions, as well as evaluates the references of both thinkers to Western Latin (medieval) philosophy. In many regards, such conscious or unconscious theoretical eclecticism, which in the end cannot avoid a certain tension when it comes to contrasting and distinguishing points of view defended by the different "schools", characterizes, also in the Byzantine medieval space, the undertakings of philosophy and theology.

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The **Second Part** of the volume presents studies which deal more directly with the understanding of philosophy and the philosophical theory of the soul in medieval thought, and even more specifically with challenges to our understanding of the human soul when other, heterodox, forms of knowledge such as "divination" and even "magic" receive closer inspection. Moreover, the last two essays of this session are excellent examples of how much, in medieval philosophy, important philosophical theses, theories, and developments are pressed by outmost theological concerns and convictions, such as the extension and characterstics of the soul's knowledge after the resurrection of the body. Carlos Steel, in "What a Philosopher May Learn from Theologians. Albert the Great on the Principles of Movement in Humans (*De anima* III, 9–11)", analyzes Albert the Great's paraphrases of *De anima* III, 9–11, in which—having investigated with Aristotle the "principles of movement" in animals—the Dominican thinker makes a long digression on the subject, discussing not Aristotle's principles, but rather those proposed by "Platonists and theologians". Aristotle defines the souls of animals *lato sensu* by the powers of judgment and the capacity of initiating movement with respect to place. Animals are "self-

movers", and what initiates movement apparently is the desire to obtain what is considered pleasurable or good. The sufficient and complete movement, however, must also include a cognitive principle, which, in humans, is the intellect in its practical function. The interaction between desire (or will as rational desire) and judgment explains how animals start moving. But Albert does not only follow Aristotle in this regard—in the digression just mentioned, he believes that more principles are needed to understand what sets human actions in motion, and the additional principles incorporate Platonist and theological views, such as *synderesis*, *conscientia*, *liberum arbitrium*, Augustine's *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior*, and others. By exploring these concepts, Albert contributes to a new synthesis on animal (human) movement and action theory, which incorporates both Platonist and Christian heritage into an Aristotelian structure. In "Dreams and Divinatory Dreams in Albert the Great's *Liber de somno et vigilia*", Silvia Donati first explains the basic characteristics of Aristotle's three works on sleep in the *Parva naturalia*. Those short treatises deal with life functions common to soul and body, involving both psychic and bodily processes. The investigation of sleep in *De somno et vigilia* is central to Aristotle's inquiry, "since sleep is a basic function of animal life", and sense perception cannot be exercised during sleep. On the other hand, the investigation of dreaming and divination through dreams in *De insomniis* and *De divinatione per somnum* plays an accessory role in Aristotle's inquiry—such phenomena do not relate to animal life. Irrespective of how Aristotle makes use of his mental and cognitive apparatus to explain and to epistemically classify them as well as the cases of perceptual awareness of the external world, which occasionally take place during sleep, scholars have stressed the different character of his *De divinatione*, which is, above all, concerned with natural philosophy. In this work, Aristotle polemizes with current views on divination, and he did not develop a solution regarding the significance of dreams or the rational explanation of them. In particular, Aristotle refutes supernatural explanations for divinatory dreams, and, even if he looked for natural explanations of divinatory dreams, his overall attitude towards them rather is epistemically dismissive. In turn, in his commentary on Aristotle's *De divinatione*—corresponding to Book III of his *Liber de somno et vigilia*—, Albert the Great, who finds Aristotle's account unsatisfactory, offers a truly original treatment of the phenomenon of divination. He follows Aristotle's naturalistic approach, but his explanation to divinatory dreams has a cosmological model—Ptolemy's scientific project—as its background. Steven P. Marrone, in "Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon and the Magicians on the Power of Words", explores Roger Bacon's *Opus maius* (1266–1267), with his "path-breaking investigations into the sciences". Bacon, in fact, had plans of inaugurating a reform of "all fields of higher learning".

In Book 4, Bacon advances ideas that constitute something like a treatise on astrology and presents considerations on the "power of the spoken word". In a nutshell, Bacon includes himself in the 13th century "debate over the reality and power of magic", or over the "arts of learned magic", when plenty of related literature from Greek and Arabic traditions came to Europe. Steven P. Marrone first describes the work known as "Picatrix", the Latin version of a mid-11th century work, originally composed in Spain by an anonymous Arabic author. Although it did not circulate outside Spain before the 15th century, the *Picatrix* represents a "type of work" familiar in Western Europe in Bacon's time—and similar indeed to Bacon's undertaking in Book 4 of his *Opus maius*. The *Picatrix* explicitly contained "detailed instructions for producing a magical operation", and it reserved a special place for the treatment of "words" (*verba*), whose power can be verified when they are spoken (as incantations) or inscribed (on image objects). Steven P. Marrone also brings in a further work, the *Speculum astronomiae* (mid-1260s), probably authored by Campanus de Novara, whose aim essentially was to distinguish illicit from licit parts and uses of practical astronomy or astrology. Both works seem to be important in order to understand Bacon's claims in favor of a science regarding the power of words and a science of images. In turn, almost at the same time, Aquinas, in his *Summa contra gentiles*, raised a strong and well-sustained criticism to all the works of the "magicians". In an essay on the doctrine of the soul (its nature and ontological status), Bernardo Carlos Bazán, "Can It Be Proved, Following Thomas's Philosophical Principles, That the Human Soul is Naturally Incorruptible?", presents some of the questions to be asked before deciding whether Aquinas's arguments for the natural incorruptibility of the soul are consistent with his philosophical principles. This set of questions is, of course, to be found in Aquinas's natural philosophy and metaphysics—i.e., in principles pertaining to what we might call his "philosophical system". In fact, Aquinas holds the thesis of the *immunitas a materia* regarding thinking in general, i.e., regarding an act of the soul, in which such an immunity is a condition for "being intelligent and being understood by an intellect". In this sense, Bazán's paper is the outline of *an internal critique* to the philosophical consistency of Aquinas's "doctrine of the incorruptibility of the soul"—something that would allegedly be philosophically proved to follow from our knowledge of the soul's nature. In a further study on Aquinas's legacy concerning the doctrine of the soul, Bernd Goehring, in "Henry of Ghent on Knowledge, Remembrance, and the Order of Cognitive Acts: The Problematic Legacy of Thomas Aquinas", analyzes the opening articles of the *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*) of Henry of Ghent. The central topic is the limits of human knowledge. Henry of Ghent applied his remarkable philosophical apparatus to understand human cogni-

tion throughout all stages of human life—a topic that was also explored by Prof. Emery in lectures and essays on Henry of Ghent.[2] With this, Henry showed a particular interest in analyzing how cognition would appear in the state of contemplation, and this question was also philosophically charged by the Aristotelian thesis that contemplation is the culmination of *the human function*, which requires, accordingly, an account of the right performance of this function. This reflection would bring us to the conclusion that knowing is intimately tied to happiness. Taking into consideration that human knowledge, now, is tied to the sensible world, how would it be in the state of glory? Bernd Goehring focuses on one aspect of human knowledge which is of special significance in this debate, namely the connection between knowledge and remembrance. Since the soul is the animating principle of a human being, and it depends on a body for actualizing cognitive functions, can a *separate* soul have the same kind of cognitive performances as an *embodied* soul and, in particular, remember the things previously known? Bernd Goehring's study shows, once again, how important philosophical problems—such as the nature of cognitive acts and the nature of intellectual cognition—were triggered by theological motivations, in this case the theological (scriptural) premise that there is memory after death. In fact, such a tension of convictions turns out to be even stronger when we try to understand Henry's reasons for rejecting the very idea that the soul, separated from the body, can remember things it knew in an embodied state or as the animating principle of the human body as a whole.

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In a **Third Part** of studies, two fundamental lessons—highly accentuated by Kent Emery, Jr.'s role as a teacher, advisor, editor, and member of the SIEPM—, namely (i) that medieval philosophy can *never* be properly understood and studied *only* from the perspective of the Faculty of Arts and (ii) that the fundamental step for any research and academic results in this field, also for "analytic" studies, is the combination of inventorizing / cataloguing and critical editing sources and texts,[3] are excellently observed by the authors. The essays

2 Cf., for example, Kent Emery, Jr., "The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Human Cognition according to Henry of Ghent", in: Jan A. Aertsen—Andreas Speer—Kent Emery, Jr. (Hrsg.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin—New York 2000, pp. 59–124.

3 Which certainly belongs, according to Prof. Emery, to the "historical" or rather "humanistic / philological" approach to the study of medieval philosophy and theology. Prof. Emery's

of this session present contributions to basic research on Iacobus Metensis and Henricus de Gandavo, to the ongoing research on Henry of Ghent's creative synthesis of Augustine's and Aristotle's approaches to metaphysics, the theory of cognition, and philosophy of mind, as well as to the first reception(s) and criticism(s) of Thomas Aquinas, and further to the classical topic of the epistemological status of theology as a habit. Gordon A. Wilson, in "The Parts of Henry of Ghent's *Quaestiones ordinariae* (*Summa*)", emphasizes the significance of Henry of Ghent's *Summa* in order to understand theology at the Parisian University in the second half of the 13th century, a text whose edition is a priority for researchers in the field and, at the same time, an enourmous challenge. In this sense, the author explains both the "physical" and the "conceptual parts" of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*, and he makes his point by analyzing the extant manuscripts and Renaissance editions of the work. Gordon A. Wilson also conceptually divides the parts of the *Quaestiones ordinariae* and tries to answer the question whether the physical divisions were made according to the conceptual ones. In "A Thomist Facing the Challenge of Henry of Ghent. An Edition and Study of Distinction 2 from James of Metz's *Commentary on Book 1 of the Sentences*", Mikolaj Olszewski deals with a topic of speculative theology, namely "unity *versus* plurality", which is not the patristic problem of "unity *versus* multiplicity" or how to reconcile divine essence with the Trinity, but rather questions whether there are several divine attributes in God which are really distinct from the essence and from each other exist. This debate has a permanent repercussion on scholastic ways of doing speculative theology, and many authors in the late 13th century and in the 14th century reacted to Aquinas's attempted solution regarding this problem. The author explores criticisms and reactions to Aquinas from within the Dominican Order itself, in this case those of James of Metz, and he also offers a first edition of James of Metz's "Quaestiones in 1 Librum Sententiarum—Distinctio 2". A further study on James of Metz is provided by Chris Schabel, in his "James of Metz's *Lec-*

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view of medieval philosophy and theology as a kind of "historical knowledge" echoes in many aspects Giambattista Vico's (1668–1744) account of how philosophy and philology supportively work together to help understand the human mind and, further, to interpret and explain human history. We should mention at least one of the—say, in informal language, "legendary"—inspired critical reflections of Prof. Emery's on his own area of expertise, i.e., Kent Emery, Jr., "Two New Heuristic Instruments and the Ideal Order of Research in Medieval Philosophy", in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 52 (2010), p. 235 (pp. 235–250). There is a further—of course, "unofficial"—legend about Prof. Emery, namely that he would be preparing a—to our times—path-breaking work with the title "The Spirit of Medieval Studies".

tura on the *Sentences*", with an edition of the "Tabula Quaestionum". This is a truly new research area, since very little is known about James of Metz's life and, in this regard, almost everything has to be deduced from his unedited commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, which James of Metz read twice. The author provides detailed information about the *status quaestionis* regarding manuscripts and various redactions of Jacob of Metz's commentary. And he also explores traces of (a possible) reception of James of Metz's works, which is a problematic subject indeed, for James of Metz is never directly cited by authors such as Durand of Saint-Pourçain and Hervaeus Natalis, but at the same time it is arguably undisputable that those authors knew his work. Above all, Chris Schabel follows Kent Emery's steps in carefully dealing with "identities, dates, locations, manuscripts, and redactions", as a previous work for future inquiries into "doctrinal questions".[4] By providing, in an appendix, a complete list of questions and citations for all manuscript versions, Chris Schabel envisions to revise "the *status quaestionis* on the who, when, where, and what of these enigmatic questions on the *Sentences*". Stephen Brown, in "Peter Aureoli's Various Uses of Averroes to Illustrate the Sapiential Character of Declarative Theology", contributes with a further study on the topic of the epistemic appraisal of theological knowledge. Such an appraisal shaped late 13th- and early 14th-century understandings of theology. If Durandus of Saint-Pourçain could speak in the Prologue to his first *Commentary on the Sentences* (1307–1308) of three meanings of "theology", the author emphasizes the second, inspired by Augustine, in his *De Trinitate* XIV, which sees theology as "a habit which brings understanding of the articles of the faith and defends them against error". This "declarative theology" is centered on the aim of gaining a more thorough understanding of the articles of faith. On the habit of these articles one can put the question whether it is a science or not—therefore, whether theology regarding its basic truths is a kind of scientific knowledge or not. The usual answer is negative, for articles of faith, strictly speaking, are not demonstrable by means of natural reason: they lack natural evidence. After Gerard of Bologna's evaluations of Durandus of Saint-Porçain's position, the Franciscan Peter Aureoli, in a different way, restated the question about declarative theology. Stephen Brown explains that in his recasting of Augustine's and Richard of Saint-Victor's declarative theology, Aureoli actually combined it with the philosophical context of Aristotle and Averroes and, by doing so, was the author of "a new chapter on the sapiential character of theology".

4 Cf. the previous note.

In the **Fourth Part**, authors deal with metaphysical themes and their epistemic presuppositions, touching on the works of medieval masters such as Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, on the research of whom Kent Emery, Jr. has greatly contributed, both with scholarly studies and with critical editions—for example, Scotus's *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima*, *Quaestio de formalitatibus* and *Reportationes parisienses*, and Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* III. Timothy B. Noone, in "*Primum cognitum* at the End of the 13th Century: Raymundus Rigaldus and Duns Scotus", recognizes that much has been written about Scotus's theory of cognition and epistemology, but that a convincing, really comprehensive picture of its several partial aspects is still missing. The author calls our attention to the general features of Scotus's theory by studying an unpublished work by Raymundus Rigaldus O.F.M., a series of disputations held ca. 1287, probably in Paris. Especially through the first three questions of the *Quaestiones* we can obtain "a fuller sense" of the point of departure of the human finite mind, according to Scotus, in *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* I d. 3. In particular, we can obtain a background of Scotus's account of the *primum cognitum* in his theory of cognition. Timothy B. Noone also edited, in an appendix, the first three questions of Raymundus Rigaldus's *Quaestiones disputatae*, of which a single manuscript is known. Garrett R. Smith, in his "*Esse consecutive cognitum*: A Fourteenth-Century Theory of Divine Ideas", deals with the topic of divine ideas, which, according to him, "are models by which God creates" and "the means by which God knows creation". There is a particular difficulty regarding the second aspect just mentioned: if divine essence is the primary object of divine cognition and creatures are the secondary objects, how does the divine intellect cognize both its primary and secondary objects "without some sort of discursive movement"? This movement, of course, would violate the premised doctrine of divine immutability. Garrett R. Smith explains that in 14th-century scholasticism the *consecutio* theory was proposed as a solution to the puzzle, and Iacobus de Aesculo apparently was the first to defend it, in an approach which both had influence (on Petrus Thomae, for instance) and received some criticism (by Guillelmus de Alnwick, for example). At any rate, the author sees the origin of that theory in Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, and he also offers an edition of the—for the purpose of his argument decisive—*Quaestio odinaria* 4 of James of Ascoli, i.e., "Quaeritur utrum notitia actualis creaturae praesupponatur in Deo notitiae habituali eiusdem".

The **Fifth Part** of the *Festschrift* is dedicated to Meister Eckhart's theological and philosophical legacy. Jan A. Aertsen, in "More Than One Eckhart? The Parisian Eckhart and the 'Opus tripartitum'—The Need for a More Homogeneous Picture of His Thought", explores the essentials of Eckhart's metaphysics, particularly the "scholastic" picture of the Meister, having in view his—today most disputed—*Quaestio parisiensis* I. Jan A. Aertsen analyzes Eckhart's claim that God is "understanding" (*intelligere*), and not "being" (*esse*), in which case understanding should be taken as the ground of being. Eckhart's reasons for this stance must also be searched in his selective (metaphysical) reading of biblical passages. In fact, the explanation of Eckhart's thesis, which assumes that *intellect* and *being* belong to different orders, will reveal an innovative doctrine of transcendentals. Alessandro Palazzo, in "Eckhart and the Power of Imagination", assumes the difficulty of properly characterizing Eckhart as a thinker. A mystic? Theologian? Preacher? Metaphysician? Eckhart's image as an exegete and preacher has nowadays become stronger, but another side of him remains unexplored: Eckhart at least *also* as a "natural philosopher". This can be investigated through the analysis of Eckhart's symbolic reading of Scriptures, which are supposed to clearly contain teachings or principles, conclusions and properties *of natural philosophy*. However, natural doctrines are needed in order to interpret the corresponding passages. The author investigates Eckhart's approach to nature by exploring "different aspects of the relationship between mind and body: maternal imagination, psychosomatic effects, and fascination". In particular, Eckhart's view on the power of imagination—the power of the soul "to influence the body and external matter"—is examined, in comparison to medieval sources. Loris Sturlese, in "*Locutio emphatica*: Argumentative Strategies in Meister Eckhart's German Sermons", analyzes the characteristics of Eckhart's sermons. He defends the thesis that Latin sermons are not open to a "historical" reading, but they are rather the "result of a consciously literary intention and process of composition". Although a similar verdict about Eckhart's German sermons might be proposed, the author believes that the following question persists: "what is the relationship between the historical orality of Eckhart's actual preaching and the written sermons that constitute his literary legacy?" Unlike his fellows—educated, just like him, in scholastic theology—, Eckhart paid attention to preaching *also in the vernacular*; Sturlese thus explores this aspect and Eckhart's unique interest in *literarily* producing and recording—beyond Latin, also—German sermons. In order to understand literary aspects of the written German sermons, *which can then reveal connections* between the written form of sermons and historical orality and teaching purposes of preaching, Sturlese explores the notion of "emphatic locution" (*locutio emphatica*). It is a rhetori-

cal tool indeed, full of semantic import, however, which seemed to have been used by Eckhart as a preaching skill to communicate "emotion" *and* "truth", i.e., to point out to, by means of powerful figures of speech, the underlying rational meaning of words. Eckhart wrote sermons in the vernacular as well as in Latin "as a choice in favor of an emphatic style"—i.e., semantically powerful vernacular expressions—"in order to profit from its communicative advantages" or rhetorical strength for rational persuasion.

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Kent Emery's scholarly studies were above all dedicated to Denys the Carthusian (1702/3–1471)[5] and, again, the mystical modes of theology and philosophy in the Late Middle Ages. In fact, Denys the Carthusian's articulation of a solution or at least an intellectually grounded position to dilemmas concerning the conflict between mystical *and* scholastic modes of theology and philosophy are enormously comprehensive and absolutely respectable—and it gives voice to Prof. Emery's own view of the deepest and most appropriate understanding of the medieval (*lato sensu*) "philosophical" enterprise as a whole. As it is now well known, in many cases the distinction between mystical and scholastic theology was understood as a sharp distinction between an affective union with God and the attempt of understanding God, divine attributes and actions by means of (an unassisted) natural reason. For many, the right way of interpreting pseudo-Dionysius's[6] *De mystica theologia* was through the defense of the thesis that, for a purely "affective movement of the will towards God", intellectual speculation had to be abandoned. In this sense, Hugh of Balma, O.Cart (fl. 1300) famously divorced mystical and scholastic theology, since his view was one according to which the desired affective union with

5 The two volumes which appeared as *Dionysii Cartusiensis Opera selecta. Tomus I* (*Prolegomena*). *Bibliotheca manuscripta IA–IB: Studia bibliographica* (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis 121–121a), Turnhout 1991, 884 pp., giving rise to a multivolume critical edition, coordinated by Kent Emery, Jr. himself, definitely gave Prof. Emery the status of leading authority of his times on Denys the Carthusian.

6 For Denys of Rijkel, who wrote commentaries on all of his writings, pseudo-Dionysius was by far the greatest authority of Christian wisdom. Cf., in this regard, Kent Emery, Jr., "*Sapientissimus Aristoteles* and *theologissimus Dionysius*: The Reading of Aristotle and the Understanding of Nature in Denys the Carthusian", in: Andreas Speer and Albert Zimmermann (eds.), *Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21/2), Berlin 1992, pp. 572–606.

God "required neither a preceding nor a concomitant act of the intellect".[7] Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) played a special role in confronting this view, asserting the role of theoretical efforts within mystical theology. Kent Emery, Jr. made explicit that Nicholas of Cusa emphasized the "intellectual character of the negative dialectic found in pseudo-Dionysius's mystical theology" and, within this context, "of the ascent to the infinite God", Nicholas of Cusa "developed his famous principle of the coincidence of opposites".[8] Truly, this kind of attitude had an immediate impact on Denys the Carthusian's own "intellectualist" approach to mystical thought and contemplation.[9] Denys did certainly not relativize the thesis of a sharp difference between a "natural-philosophical wisdom" and a "supernatural-theological wisdom", though he saw a kind of analogical coordination between them, to be measured through supernatural *sapientia* by means of divine revelation, which can never possibly be contradicted by philosophical views. But the Carthusian monk of Roermond, who was educated in the *via Thomae* in Cologne, and nonetheless in many aspects departed from Aquinas, partially due to his voracious and eclectic reading of everything he could find about ancient and medieval philosophers and patristic and medieval theologians, actually envisaged, as we learn from his incredibly prolific literary production—especially from his *De contemplatione* (1440–1445), the *Elementatio philosophica* (ca. 1465), the *Elementatio theologica* (ca. 1465) and the *Commentaria* on all works by the Areopagite (1466–1467)—the possibility of reconciling so many philosophical theories and scholastic theological doctrines by means of a unifying "light of mystical theology".[10] Truly, such an

7 Cf. Kent Emery, Jr., "Mysticism and the Coincidence of Opposites in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France", in: *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 45:1 (1984), 3 (pp. 3–23).

8 Ibid., p. 4.

9 Cf., for example, Kent Emery, "Denys the Carthusian and the Doxography of Scholastic Theology", in: M.D. Jordan and K. Emery, Jr. (eds.), Ad litteram*: Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers*, Notre Dame, IN 1992, pp. 327–359; Idem, "Twofold Wisdom and Contemplation in Denys of Ryckel (Dionysius Cartusiensis, 1402–1471)", in: *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 18 (1988), pp. 107–134 (pp. 99–134); Idem, "Fondements théoriques de la réception de la beauté sensible dans les écrits de Denys le Chartreux (1402–1471)", in: Kent Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot—Brookfield 1996, pp. 320–324 (pp. 307–324). Denys the Carthusian corresponded with Nicholas of Cusa, and he even dedicated some works (at least three writings) to him; cf. Kent Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian (1402/3–71)", in: E. Craig (ed.), *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London—New York: Routledge, Vol. 2, 1998, p. 884 (pp. 884–887); Idem, "Denys the Carthusian", in: Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 2002, p. 243 (pp. 243–244).

10 Cf., especially, Kent Emery, Jr., "Twofold Wisdom and Contemplation in Denys of Ryckel

effort for an intellectually well-sustained synthesis can certainly be connected to Denys of Rijkel's "threefold order of wisdom", i.e., "natural wisdom naturally acquired" (philosophy), "supernatural wisdom naturally acquired" (scholastic theology) and "supernatural wisdom supernaturally bestowed" (mystical theology), which, in Prof. Emery's own words, "are isomorphic": "[…]; formally, each mode lays the foundation for the one above. The highest form of wisdom is mystical contemplation, which, by means of an intellectual intuition of the divine being, rises above ordinary ratiocination and is suspended immediately in the blinding "darkness" of divine light".[11]

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The **Sixth Part** entails contributions which explain and critically interpret the ways in which some key 14th–15th century thinkers shaped and practiced the mystical mode of philosophical and theological thought. Of course, Jean Gerson's (1363–1429) engagement in reforming universities and criticism against old scholasticism and Ioannes de Indagine's, O.Cart. (†1475) mystical mode of theologizing reveal much of Denis the Carthusian's spiritual and intellectual concerns, i.e., of the author whose work and thought Kent Emery, Jr. so masterfully investigated and exposed. Stephen M. Metzger, in "The *Tractatus de mistica theologia* by Ioannes de Indagine, O.Cart. (†1475)", presents a central work of the "most prolific author of the Middle Ages", i.e., Ioannes de Indagine, a monk of the Charterhouse "Salvatorberg" in Erfurt. The author characterizes the interest of the Chartusian Order "in matters of spirituality and contemplation" and the revival of mystical theology in the middle of the 15th century—a revival which was also shaped by the reception and interpretation of authors such as Hugh of Balma and Jean Gerson, and portrayed by thinkers such as Nicholas of Cusa, (the Carthusian) Vincent of Aggsbach (1389–1464), Denys of Rijkel, and of course John of Indagine himself. At the heart of the debate about the nature of theological knowledge was the question of how to understand the relationship between intellect and affection in mystical contemplation, in which there was a particular controversy regarding the role of the intellect in mystical union—in fact, *previous to* and *in or concomitant to* the mystical union. Although Ioannes de Indagine did not directly address these controversial topics in his two major treatises on mystical theology, he was certainly

(Dionysius Cartusiensis, 1402–1471)", cit., pp. 99–134; and also, again, Idem, "*Sapientissimus Aristoteles* and *theologissimus Dionysius* …", cit., pp. 572–606.

11 Idem, "Denys the Carthusian" … (footnote 9, above), cit., p. 243.

aware of them. Being influenced by Hugh of Balma, Jean Gerson, and his confrère Iacobus de Jüteborg (1381?–1465), Ioannes de Indagine's understanding of mystical theology is rather "traditional", i.e., "affective", though "intellectually rigorous" and "philosophically sophisticated": contemplation is a "savorous" knowledge, which exceeds any knowledge by means of natural reason and is even superior to theological knowledge taught in schools and at universities. Stephen M. Metzger also provides the first edition of the latest of Ioannes de Indagine's treatises on mystical theology, namely the *Tractatus de mistica theologia* (ca. 1457–1468). Daniel Hobbins, in "A Newly Discovered Recension of Gerson's *Annotatio doctorum aliquorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt*: Evidence for Gerson's Reading of *De imitatione Christi*?", describes one of the shortest works by Jean Gerson, a list of authorities who "spoke" about contemplation, a selective bibliography, which might be understood as a way to provide some guidance regarding Christian literature on contemplation. In Gerson's eclectic list, which embodied the mystical tradition in the Latin West, one finds a group of "approved authorities", from pseudo-Dionysius to Bonaventure, who wrote about contemplation. After characterizing the (three different) recensions of the *Annotatio*, the author reveals to have discovered a new, fourth, recension—after manuscripts found in Giessen and Greifswald, unknown to scholars such as André Combes and Palémon Glorieux—, the study and edition of which ("Annotatio quorundam doctorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt venerabilis magistri Johannis Gerson") is his main purpose. Moreover, in the additions made by Gerson in the same Giessen manuscript, Daniel Hobbins discovered that a brief and famous passage from *De imitatione Christi* is quoted, which can then be considered the earliest evidence of the "readership" of this book.

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The volume's **Seventh and Last Part** focuses on Kent Emery's interest in the Renaissance, Counter-Reformation, and Baroque Scholasticism, not only because of new theoretical configurations of medieval schools of thought—partially demanded by new cultural, institutional, and political circumstances of the 16th–17th centuries—, which ultimately tested the historical possibilities of the medieval intellectual project and might be viewed as its very last extension, but also because, on the theological level, it was highly influenced indeed by the mystical and spiritual literature of the 15th century—thus, quite properly said, by the "scholastic *and* mystical modes of doing theology".[12] In fact,

12 We should remember that Prof. Emery's Ph.D. thesis (1976) had as its title *Benet of Canfield:*

at least in what concerns the SIEPM or the areas of expert work by medievalists, Kent Emery, Jr.—above all through his methodological advise—helped creating the more recent research field of Latin American Scholasticism, i.e., the project currently described, in many scholarly publications, as "*Scholastica colonialis*: Reception and Develoment of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America, in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries".[13] Accordingly, Roberto Hofmeister Pich, in "Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) on John Duns Scotus's Metaphysical Groundworks of Theology: The Controversies on Infinity", explores the continuities and developments of Scotus's metaphysics and philosophical theology in the controversial work of the most renowned Scotist of Latin America during the colonial period. The author characterizes Briceño's Scotism—which the Chilean master constructs by establishing oppositions with and by showing mistaken interpretations of Scotus by Thomistic (in particular Jesuit) authors—through an analysis of the concept of "infinity", i.e., an intrinsic mode and affection of God. In *Controversy* 5 of Briceño's *Prima Pars Celebriorum Controversiarum in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilis* (Madrid 1639), concerning infinity, three debates are described and analyzed: The first aspect is Briceño's conceptual understanding of infinity as such; the second point is the problem of how infinity should be conceived insofar as it has to be *essentially* predicated of both the divine nature and the essential attributes; the third controversial discussion concerns the question whether all "properties" in God, and specifically the "divine persons", are "formally infinite". Alfredo Santiago Culleton, in "Antonio Ruiz de Montoya's *Firestone of Divine Love* (*Sílex del divino amor*): The Spiritual Journey of a Jesuit among the Guaraní", explores the work of the Jesuit Antonio Ruiz de Montoya (who was born and died in Lima, 1585–1652), a central figure of Paraguay missions, i.e., the political and spiritual enterprise of the Jesuits amid the Guarani populations. Ruiz de Montoya was the founder of several "missions" (*reducciones*) in Guayrá, and later became

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Counter-Reformation Spirituality and its Mediaeval Origins (687 pp.); he later published a book on Benet of Canfield's (1562–1610) masterpiece on mysticism, i.e., *Rule of Perfection* (1609); cf. Kent Emery, Jr., *Renaissance Dialectic and Renaissance Piety: Benet of Canfield's Rule of Perfection* (Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies 50), Binghamton—New York 1987, 323 pp. Cf. also Kent Emery, Jr., "The Carthusians, Intermediaries for the Teaching of John Ruysbroeck during the Period of Early Reform and in the Counter-Reformation", in: *Analecta Cartusiana* (*Salzburg*), 43 (1979), pp. 100–129, and, again, Idem, "Mysticism and the Coincidence of Opposites in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France", cit., pp. 3–23.

13 Cf. R.H. Pich and A.S. Culleton, "*Scholastica colonialis*", in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 52 (2010), pp. 25–45.

both a hero defending the *reducciones* against Brazilian-Portuguese invaders and the superior of all of them. The author describes two works of Ruiz de Montoya, namely the *Conquista espiritual* [*The Spiritual Conquest*] (1639) and the *Sílex del divino amor* [*Firestone of Divine Love*] (1640). The first work offers important anthropological, missiological, and mystical perspectives, the combination of which gives the *Spiritual Conquest* a "fantastic-realistic" taste, as the "wonderful element" links the "description" of nature with "symbolic" and "spiritual" meanings. The *Sílex del divino amor* [*Firestone of Divine Love*] is a mystical work, in which Ruiz de Montoya reveals his strong connection with Ignatian spirituality and acquaintance with patristic, medieval, and baroque mystical authors and works, which he uses to give voice to his own inner experience. In particular, the Jesuit missionary shows a remarkable talent to describe the novelties of the "new" continent, above all the richness and diversity of its natural environment, making it a world of spiritual and theological symbols. In the final essay, Guy Guldentops, in "Hyacinthe de Chalvet on Beauty—Keeping Up Anti-Scholastic Appearances", expounds aspects of the thought of a 17th century "little-known [French] Dominican theologian", namely Hyacinthe de Chalvet (1605–1683). Although some might think, from the study of Chalvet's theological pieces—above all his treatise on moral theology and political theory, titled *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas ex utroque suggestu*—, that Chalvet was a "staunch Thomist", the author shows that this interpretation is wrong. In spite of appearances, Chalvet actually makes the attempt of explaining the mysteries of faith greatly departing from the scholastic method of theologizing, but rather using a rhetorical, literary style. For example, he dealt with the topic of "beauty", which, in Chalvet's *Theologus Ecclesiastes*, immediately folllowed a treatise on the goodness of God and was structured by three questions, in which the Dominican theologian discussed the notion of beauty in general, divine beauty, and created beauty. Chalvet's work on beauty has the particular traces of much of 17th-century theological (spiritual) literature: it is a "reader" (*compilatio*), where the main tasks of the author are to justify his selection of texts and to rhetorically make use of them. Such a methodology dissociates Chalvet from Aquinas, a dissociation that we could already see in the fact that Chalvet—unlike Aquinas—connects beauty with goodness, but not with the good *and the true*.

PART 1

Conceptual Approaches

CHAPTER 1

Les notions de puissance et d'harmonie chez Porphyre

Stephen Gersh

1 La doctrine de la puissance

La notion d'une hiérarchie de principes dont le rang dans cette hiérarchie est lié à la puissance, est fondamentale dans la métaphysique de Porphyre[1]. La dualité aristotélicienne de la puissance et de la possibilité est, chez Porphyre, transformée en une dichotomie : puissance parfaite et puissance imparfaite ; l'opposition aristotélicienne de notions distinctes est alors convertie en polarité à l'intérieur d'un *continuum*, dans les deux cas grâce à l'intervention de la théorie stoïcienne des principes actif et passif[2].

1 Dans cette étude, nous citons les écrits porphyriens d'après les éditions suivantes : (a) *De Abstinentia*, (éd. J. Bouffartigue et M. Patillon), *Porphyre, De l'Abstinence, introduction, texte établi et traduit*, Paris 1977–1979, 2 Vols. [*De abst.*] ; (b) *De antro nympharum* : *Porphyry, The Cave of the Nymphs in the Odyssey. A Revised Text with Translation by Seminar Classics 609* (= Arethusa Monographs 1), Buffalo, N.Y. 1969 [*De antr. nymph.*] ; (c) *Fragmenta*, (ed. A. Smith), *Porphyrii fragmenta*, Stuttgart – Leipzig 1993 ; (d) *Ad Gaurum*, (éd. L. Brisson *et alii*), *Porphyre – Sur la manière dont l'embryon reçoit l'âme. Études d'introduction, texte grec, traduction française*, Paris 2012 [*Ad Gaur.*] ; (e) *In Ptolemaei Harmonica*, (ed. I. Düring), *Die Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios. Porphyrios Kommentar zur Harmonielehre des Ptolemaios*, New York – Londres 1980 [facsmilé de la version *Göteborgs Hogskolas Årsskrift* 36 (1930)] [*In Harm.*] ; (f) *In Platonis Parmenidem*, (éd. P. Hadot), in : Pierre Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, Paris 1968 [*In Parm.*] ; (g) *De regressu animae*, (éd. J. Bidez), in : Joseph Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre, Le philosophe néo-platonicien. Avec les fragments des traités Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων et* De regressu animae, Hildesheim 1964 (réimpression de l'édition publiée à Ghent en 1913) ; Smith, cit. [*De regr. anim.*] ; (h) *Sententiae*, (ed. E. Lamberz), *Porphyrii Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*, Leipzig 1975 ; L. Brisson *et alii* (éds.), *Porphyre, Sentences. Études d'introduction, texte grec et traduction française. Commentaire*, Paris 2005 [*Sent.*] ; (i) *De simulacris*, Bidez, cit., Smith, cit. [*De simul.*] ; (j) *In Platonis Timaeum*, (ed. A.R. Sodano), *Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta*, Napoli 1964 [*In Tim.*].

2 Sur la transformation des notions (d'origine aristotelicienne) de δύναμις et ἐνέργεια dans le néoplatonisme voir maintenant G. Aubry, *Dieu sans la puissance*. Dunamis *et* Energeia *chez Aristote et chez Plotin*, Paris 2006.

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Dans les *Sententiae*, cette gradation de puissance est utilisée dans de nombreux contextes. Elle sous-tend la doctrine de la procession et du retour ; par exemple dans un passage où « la perfection » (τελειότης) est associée au retour des réalités secondes vers les réalités premières, tandis que l'« imperfection » (τὸ ἀτελές) explique la descente du « plus haut » vers le « plus bas »[3], la première s'appliquant, comme on peut le supposer, à des mouvements tels que celui de l'âme individuelle vers l'intellect, et la seconde à des mouvements tels que ceux des âmes individuelles vers les corps.

Le terme même de « puissance » (δύναμις) n'est pas associé, dans ce texte, aux idées de perfection et d'imperfection, bien que ce mot apparaisse dans une argumentation semblable où Porphyre élabore sa fameuse interprétation du mythe du *Banquet* de Platon[4] :

> Lorsqu'elle [i.e. l'âme immatérielle] s'incline vers la matière, elle manque de toutes choses et elle est vide de sa propre puissance, mais lorsqu'elle s'élève vers l'intellect, elle possède alors la plénitude de toutes ses puissances. Ainsi, ceux qui ont les premiers identifié cette propriété de l'âme ont, à juste titre, appelé par énigme la première 'Pauvreté' et la seconde 'Abondance'[5].

Ailleurs, le pôle parfait du *continuum* de la puissance – responsable du retour vers le principe supérieur et de la permanence de sa transcendance – est désigné comme « surabondance de puissance » (δυνάμεως περιουσία)[6]. En outre, le *continuum* reliant perfection et imperfection possède une corrélation directe avec au moins deux *continua* supplémentaires : celui de l'« unification » (ἑνίζεσθαι) et celui de la « division » (μερίζεσθαι)[7] et chacun respectivement, de « puissance » (δύναμις) et de « masse » (ὄγκος)[8]. En d'autres termes, une per-

3 Cf. *Sent.* 30. 21. 5–8.

4 Pour cette interprétation du mythe de *Poros* et *Penia* (une allégorie inventée par Platon lui-même (*Symp.* 203 B)) cf. Plotin, *Enn.* III. 5. 9. 30 ff. Chez Plotin, nous ne trouvons pas le mot δύναμις dans le sens technique utilisé plus tard dans le même contexte par Porphyre.

5 Cf. *Sent.* 37. 45. 5–9 : « ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ὕλην ῥεπούσῃ ἀπορία πάντων καὶ τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως κένωσις, εἰς δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἀναγομένη τὸ πλῆρες αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τῆς πάσης εὑρίσκετο, τὴν μὲν εἰκότως Πενίαν, τὴν δὲ Πόρον οἱ τοῦτο πρῶτον γνόντες τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ᾐνίξαντο ». Cf. ibid. 40. 51. 3 ff.

6 Ibid., II. 5. 4 et 32. 29. 7.

7 Ibid., II. 5. 1–4 et 33. 36. 4 ff.

8 Ibid., 34. 39. 4–12 et 35. 39. 13 ff.

fection plus grande correspond à plus d'unification et à plus de puissance, une imperfection plus grande à plus de division et à une masse plus grande.

La doctrine de la gradation de la puissance se trouve dans d'autres textes porphyriens, et certains arguments du *Commentaire des harmoniques* de Ptolémée présentent un intérêt particulier sous ce rapport[9].

La définition initiale du texte de Ptolémée, selon laquelle la science des harmoniques correspond au pouvoir de percevoir la différence du haut et du bas dans les sons, conduit Porphyre à envisager un contraste entre les deux « sortes » de puissance subjectivement en relation avec l'âme qui perçoit les sons. « Nous devons interpréter la puissance, ici, non pas comme ce qui est appelé possibilité – car cette dernière est imparfaite et n'a pas encore atteint un état stable, bien qu'elle soit apte à parvenir à cet état – mais comme ce qui l'on appelle puissance, c'est-à-dire comme ce qui est capable d'agir de manière parfaite conformément à sa nature – signification qui est implicite lorsque nous parlons des conditions et des branches de la connaissance comme de 'puissances' »[10].

D'autres passages, dans le même commentaire, concernant les gammes musicales, donnent à Porphyre l'occasion d'examiner une opposition entre les deux « niveaux » de puissance, objectivement en relation avec le son entendu. Son interprétation habituelle des hauteurs des sons musicaux comme de niveaux spécifiques de puissance, est développée, dans un sens, au cours d'une description des quatre tétracordes constituant le système grec classique de la double-octave – les hauteurs spécifiques des sons correspondent à des niveaux spécifiques de puissance[11] – et, dans un autre sens, lorsqu'il rend compte de la disjonction entre le second et le troisième tétracorde – un intervalle spécifique est en corrélation avec un niveau spécifique de puissance[12].

Un autre passage semble, au premier abord, plus problématique, du fait que Porphyre décrit la sensation qu'a l'oreille d'entendre deux hauteurs (de sons) jouées en même temps. On perçoit alors un son prédominant qui n'est dû ni

9 Cf. S. Gersh, « Porphyry's Commentary on the 'Harmonics' of Ptolemy and Neoplatonic Musical Theory », in : S. Gersh and C. Kannengiesser (eds.), *Platonism in Late Antiquity*, Notre Dame 1992, pp. 141–155 (réimpression in : S. Gersh, *Reading Plato, Tracing Plato*, Aldershot 2005).

10 Cf. *In Harm.* 6. 33–7. 5 : « δύναμιν δ' ἀκουστέον οὐ τὴν παρὰ τῇ δυνάμει λεγομένην – ἀτελὴς γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὔπω μὲν ἐν ἕξει, ἐπιτήδειος δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν – ἀλλὰ τὴν παρὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κεκλημένην τῷ οἷάν τε εἶναι ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη τελείως πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, καθ' ὃ σημαινόμενον καὶ τὰς ἕξεις δυνάμεις λέγομεν καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ».

11 Ibid., 166. 15–16.

12 Ibid., 169. 2–4.

au plus haut ni au plus bas, mais est un mélange dans lequel l'un ne couvre pas l'autre, ou manifeste une puissance « excessive ou insuffisante par rapport à l'autre » (ἢ ὑπερβάλλουσα τῆς θατέρου ἢ ἐλλείπουσα)[13]. Toutefois, cette négation d'une opposition entre deux niveaux de puissance se rapporte seulement à l'effet sensoriel qui est celui d'une « forme unique » (ἕν τι εἶδος) – c'est-à-dire l'intervalle entendu – et non aux processus sous-jacents fondés sur le jeu combiné de plusieurs puissances. La conception suggérée ici, selon laquelle les différences qualitatives proviennent de (différences) quantitatives, résulte de la découverte venant des théoriciens de la musique pythagoricienne, qui veulent que les accords spécifiques viennent de raisons spécifiques. Cette conception influence une grande partie de la discussion catégorielle de Porphyre dans le même traité[14].

Les notions de types opposés de puissance, dans le cas de l'âme qui perçoit, et de niveaux opposés de puissance dans celui du son entendu, sont de toute évidence les aspects d'une seule et unique théorie du *continuum*. Que les deux sortes de puissance correspondent à deux niveaux de puissance, c'est là la conséquence de la conception émanative dans laquelle un déclin de la perfection est, simultanément, un accroissement de l'imperfection ; que les puissances dans le sujet percevant et l'objet perçu correspondent, cela vient de l'adhésion au principe épistémologique selon lequel le même est connu par le même.

Dans d'autres écrits porphyriens, la même doctrine d'une gradation de la puissance est présente. Le *Commentaire sur le Parménide*, lorsqu'il décrit « le pouvoir infini » (ἄπειρος δύναμις) de l'Un indique une connexion avec les notions de limite et d'indéfini[15], tandis que le *De abstinentia* et le *De antro nympharum* reprennent la doctrine de la Surabondance et de la Pauvreté en termes similaires à ceux des *Sententiae*[16]. De manière plus intéressante, un concept déjà implicite dans la théorie du *continuum* devient explicite dans le *De abstinentia* : un niveau, pris isolément, peut être vu comme un manque de puissance par rapport aux intelligibles, et comme une abondance de puissance par rapport aux sensibles[17]. Naturellement, ce mode d'expression ne fait sens que dans le cas d'une corrélation inverse entre puissance parfaite et puissance imparfaite.

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13 Cf. ibid., 89. 17–22.

14 Cf. le débat avec Ptolémée et les Pythagoriciens in : ibid. 29. 27 ff.

15 Cf. *In Parm*. I. 25–26.

16 Cf. *De abst*. III. 27. 4 ; *De antr. nymph*. 16. 18. 4–5.

17 Cf. *De abst*. I. 30. 6.

2 Puissance et harmonie

2.1 *Puissance et relation*

Un problème important dans la doctrine métaphysique porphyrienne est celui du lien entre les causes incorporelles et les effets corporels. Pour le résoudre, la notion de puissance est mise largement à contribution, et, dans l'une des *Sentences*, Porphyre démontre que les incorporels ne sont pas spatialement présents dans les corps mais « se penchent vers eux… par relation (avec eux) » (πρὸς αὐτὰ ῥέψαντα… τῇ σχέσει)[18] ; ils ne sont pas présents substantiellement ni mélangés à eux « mais communiquent une certaine puissance grâce à cette inclination » (τῇ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ῥοπῆς ὑποστάσει τινὸς δυνάμεως μεταδίδωσι)[19]. Ailleurs (*Sentence* 27), la même doctrine est exposée avec plusieurs détails nouveaux : l'incorporel va là où il le souhaite mais sans passer par l'espace, il n'est pas non plus comprimé par une masse corporelle, mais il se trouve quelque part « en vertu d'une certaine disposition » (διαθέσει τοίνυν ποιᾷ)[20] ; il n'est pas enfermé dans le corps, mais « permet aux puissances de grandir, lorsqu'elles tendent vers l'extérieur » (ὑποστῆσαι δυνάμεις ῥεπούσας… εἰς τὸ ἔξω)[21]. Dans cet ensemble de textes, le lien des causes incorporelles et des effets corporels se réalise à travers une puissance qui émane, à l'extérieur, du principe supérieur, et, deuxièmement, ce lien de cause à effet est également révélé comme « relation » (σχέσις) subsistent entre incorporel et corporel. Dans les deux cas, pouvons-nous ajouter, la connotation du lien entre unité et multiplicité est claire.

2.2 *Relation et raison*

Des développements supplémentaires de ces concepts apparaissent au cours de la discussion de la transmigration dans la *Sentence 29*. Porphyre, ici, envisage une âme qui reste unie à l'Être[22] et dont la substance ne change pas de lieu[23]. Cette âme préside aux corps qui, eux, changent de lieu[24] ; le type du corps – son rang ou sa position[25] – étant déterminé selon la disposition de

18 Cf. *Sent.* 3. 2. 1–4.

19 Ibid., 4. 2. 5–9.

20 Cf. *Sent.* 27. 16. 4–14.

21 Ibid., 28. 17. 1–6. Cf. Porphyre chez Stobée : *Floril.* 1. 354. 4 ff. et chez Némésius : *De nat. hom.* 136. 11.

22 Cf. *Sent.* 29. 18. 4–5.

23 Ibid., 29. 18. 16–19. 1.

24 Ibid., 29. 9. 1–2.

25 Ibid., 29. 19. 5–6.

l'âme[26] et la convenance du corps[27]. Dans cet exposé des conditions à l'intérieur desquelles prennent place les cycles de transmigration, un rôle particulièrement important est joué par une sorte d'hypostase intermédiaire entre l'âme et les corps, appelée « esprit » (πνεῦμα)[28]. Cet esprit, vraisemblablement semi-corporel, est formé à partir des sphères célestes[29] lorsque l'âme descend à travers les sphères célestes vers une incarnation terrestre ; cet esprit aussi, pendant les transmigrations de l'âme, subit un certain nombre de classements additionnels. En accord avec son penchant à résider dans un corps, l'âme possède « une raison particulière qui fait qu'elle a établi une relation avec tel corps déterminé pendant sa vie » (λόγος… μερικός… καθ'ὃν σχέσιν ἔσχε πρὸς τὸ ποιὸν σῶμα ἐν τῷ βιοῦν)[30]. Ce dernier, à son tour, l'entraîne à graver sur l'esprit[31], obscur et dépourvu de caractères, une forme de l'imagination[32], de nature spatiale[33], processus également décrit comme l'attirance d'une image[34] ou d'une ombre[35].

Cet exposé de la transmigration des âmes reprend des notions des passages précédents, mais fait, à tout le moins, une addition significative. La notion d'esprit qui est ou bien parallèle ou bien analogue au concept d'une puissance communiquée est, peut-être, reprise des textes antérieurs, car les deux

26 Ibid., 29. 19. 4–5.

27 Ibid., 29. 19. 3.

28 Le seul endroit où Plotin renvoie explicitement à l'esprit comme véhicule de l'âme à la manière de Porphyre se trouve en *Enn.* III. 6. 5. 24–30. Cependant, tous les éléments constitutifs de cette doctrine tellement caractéristique des néoplatoniciens postérieurs existent déjà dans la pensée plotinienne. Par exemple, cf. *Enn.* IV. 3. 9. 4–10 ; IV. 3. 15. 1–4 ; ibid., IV. 3. 24. 21–25. Cf. ibid., III. 5. 6, 35–47. Mais il y a des renvois au *pneuma* dans le sens technique des stoïciens partout dans les *Enneades*. Cf. *Enn.* IV. 7. 4. 1–6, IV. 7. 7. 1–8, IV. 7. 8. 28–29, IV. 7. 8/1. 32–33, VI. 7. 12. 19–26, etc.

29 Cf. *Sent.* 29. 18. 7.

30 Ibid., 29. 18. 7–10.

31 Ibid., 29. 18. 13.

32 Ibid., 29. 18. 10–11.

33 Ibid., 29. 18. 2.

34 Ibid., 29. 18. 5, 29. 18. 10–11 et 29. 20. 1.

35 Ibid., 29. 18. 12–13 et 29. 19. 15. Sur la doctrine du véhicule pneumatique de l'âme dans la philosophie de l'antiquité tardive cf. E.R. Dodds (éd.), *Proclus : The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary*, Oxford 1933, ²1963 ; G. Verbeke, *L'Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma*, Paris – Louvain 1945, pp. 351–385 ; A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition. A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism*, The Hague 1974, pp. 152–158 ; J.F. Finamore, *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul*, Chico, CA 1985.

idées sont associées à celles d'indétermination et d'obscurité[36]. Une autre réutilisation est celle de la notion de relation qui subsiste entre le principe incorporel et le monde corporel, ici spécifiquement comprise comme celle d'une âme individuelle et des divers corps humains dans lesquels elle est incarnée[37]. Mais l'élément nouveau, dans l'exposé de la transmigration de l'âme, c'est l'association de cette relation avec la notion de « raison » (λόγος) qui accompagne l'âme aussi bien dans chaque incarnations qu'entre les incarnation elles-mêmes.

Le concept de raison dans la *Sentence* 29 peut s'expliquer par référence à d'autres textes porphyriens. La connexion de la raison et de la puissance se trouve dans le *Commentaire du Timée* où l'Âme du monde est dite posséder « des raisons harmoniques » (λόγοι ἁρμονικοί) qui sont des images des réalités divines supérieures et qui relient, les unes aux autres, les nombreuses puissances présentes dans cette Âme[38]. L'association raison/relation est soulignée dans différents passages du *Commentaire sur les harmoniques*, où Porphyre parle de la « raison d'une relation » (λόγος… τῆς σχέσεως)[39], ou encore de la « raison ayant une relation » (λόγος… σχέσιν ἔχων)[40], ou enfin considère simplement les deux mots comme synonymes[41]. Toutefois, les connexions de la raison avec la puissance et la relation ne déterminent qu'en partie la signification de la raison ; celle-là doit aussi être comprise comme existant à plusieurs niveaux ontologiques.

Porphyre écrit :

> Le terme 'raison' est employé en de nombreux sens. Il peut très bien signifier la raison physique : celle de la puissance séminale qui produit l'ensemble des activités de la nature elle-même. Mais les mathématiciens, eux aussi, parlent d'une raison des nombres (dans le sens ou raison est employé aujourd'hui dans le monde de la banque) qui suppose la relation d'unités semblables avec une autre, par le jeu de proportions. C'est pourquoi, la raison la plus importante et qui prédomine est celle qui maintient simultanément la relation et l'addition du surgissement naturel des choses les unes par rapport aux autres, et que le raisonnement de

36 Cf. note 15.

37 Porphyre récuse la transmigration des âmes rationelles dans des corps d'animaux.

38 Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 69 (= Proclus : *In Tim.* II. 214. 4–215. 5).

39 Cf. *In Harm.* 12. 9–10.

40 Ibid., 12. 11–12. Cf. ibid., 125. 19–20.

41 Ibid., 92. 9–10 (citation de Thrasylle).

> l'âme imite à sa manière. C'est elle qui confère forme à la matière, puisque la matière est informée comme au travers d'un calcul et d'une addition. Les penchants et les dispositions qui surgissent en elle sont donnés ensemble selon leur rapport et affinité réciproques. Dans un mode analogue d'harmonisation, toutes choses sont régies à la fois selon leur mode individuel de causalité et selon le 'cadre' (περιοχή) du tout. Le dieu qui est le guide de toutes choses utilise ce genre de raison, ou en raisonnant comme s'il avait une connaissance et une pensée divines : c'est en fonction du projet divin que la nature produit chaque chose dans ce monde[42].

Ce passage est l'analyse la plus longue du mot grec λόγος chez Porphyre, et il est remarquable non seulement par le soin avec lequel sont classées les différentes significations – il appelle une comparaison avec un texte similaire chez Théon de Smyrne[43] – mais aussi à cause du fait qu'il applique une terminologie quasi mathématique à la raison démiurgique – « addition » (ἐξαριθμουμένη), « calcul » (κεφαλαιουμένη), etc.

D'autres passages chez Porphyre viennent en parallèle à ces sens de λόγος, et il peut être utile d'en donner ici la liste :

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42 Ibid., 12. 6–20 : « πολλαχῶς δὲ τοῦ λόγου λεγομένου λέγεται οὐχ ἧττον λόγος καὶ ὁ φυσικός, ὅ τε τῆς σπερματικῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ὁ κατὰ τήν σύνταξιν τῶν αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως ἐνεργειῶν. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν λόγον, οἵός ἐστι καὶ τραπεζητικός, καὶ τὸν τῆς τῶν ὁμογενῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως ἐν ταῖς ἀναλογίαις. διὸ καὶ κυριώτατος καὶ πάντων προηγούμενός ἐστι λόγος ὁ ἅμα τε τὴν σχέσιν ἔχων καὶ τὸν συμψηφισμὸν τῆς συγκεφαλαιώσεως τῆς φυσικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων, ὃν ὥσπερ μεμίμηται καὶ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμός. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ὕλης εἰδοποιός. εἰδοποιεῖται γὰρ ἡ ὕλη καθάπερ ἐξαριθμουμένη καὶ κεφαλαιουμένη μετὰ συντάξεως τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν προσεγγινομένων αὐτῇ παθῶν καὶ διαθέσεων κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν σχέσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν, ὧν ἀναλόγως συναρμοζομένων κατά τε τὰς ἑκάστων ἀπεργασίας καὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς περιοχὴν τὰ ὅλα διοικεῖται, ᾧ χρῆται λόγῳ καὶ λογισμῷ καθάπερ ἱερὰν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην καὶ διανόησιν ὁ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμὼν θεὸς καθ' ὃν ἡ φύσις ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ παρέχεται ».

43 Cf. Theo Smyrnaeus, *Expos. rer. math*. 72. 24–73. 15. A l'instar de Porphyre, Theo distingue : (i) « raison séminale » (ὁ σπερματικός), (ii) « celle d'une proportion, selon laquelle on dit qu'une chose a un raison à une autre » (ὁ τῆς ἀναλογίας καθ'ὃν λέγεται ἔχειν λόγον τόδε πρὸς τόδε), (iii) « la raison d'une forme » (ὁ τοῦ εἴδους). Entre les sens de raison il faut signaler aussi : « celle dans l'esprit » (ἐνδιάθετος), « celle dans l'expression » (προφορικός), « celle des éléments » (στοιχείων), « la définition qui révèle l'essence et la substance » (ὁ ὅρος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνων), « le syllogism » (ὁ συλλογισμός), « l'induction » (ἐπαγωγή), et beaucoup d'autres.

(i) *Le* λόγος *physique*. Porphyre parle d'une raison dans la semence[44] : d'une « raison séminale » (λόγος σπερματικός) répandue en toutes choses[45] – sous le contrôle de Zeus-Démiurge[46]. Sa descente dans le substratum matériel est symbolisée par le dieu Priape[47].

(ii) *Le* λόγος *mathématique*. Cette raison représente la proportion entre des choses de même type[48]. On en trouve en exemple dans les « multiples » (πολλαπλάσιοι) comme 2 :1, 3 :1 ; les « surparticuliers » (ἐπιμόριοι) comme 3 :2, 4 :3, et des « surdivisés » (ἐπιμερεῖς) comme 5 :3, 7 :4[49]. Elle est rendue manifeste, spatialement, dans la division des cordes du monocorde[50], et, temporellement, dans la partition harmonique[51]. Cette raison ou *ratio* est donc le fondement de l'« harmonie » (ἁρμονία)[52].

Une caractéristique supplémentaire de la raison notée par Porphyre implique une opposition avec la notion d'« excédant » (ὑπεροχή). Ainsi, 6 :3 et 2 :1 ont la même raison, c'est-à-dire double, encore que les « excédants » diffèrent, c'est-à-dire 3 dans le premier cas, et 1 dans le second[53].

La raison mathématique est aussi ce qui est associé principiellement au degré de l'âme dans la théorie métaphysique de Porphyre. Ce point de doctrine est implicite dans son exégèse du *Timée*, dans laquelle l'Âme du monde est dite mouvoir le corps du monde selon les meilleures raisons[54].

(iii) *Le* λόγος *formel*. Porphyre parle de raison en rapport avec la « forme » (εἶδος) et la « cause » (αἴτιον)[55] comme de ce qui confère la forme à la matière[56]. Elle représente l'activité du Démiurge[57] ou d'Hermès[58], et, en tant que « raison

44 Cf. *Ad Gaur*. 14. 1. Cf. *In Tim*. fr. 51 (= Proclus : *In Tim*. I. 396. 20–21).
45 Cf. *De simul*. 8. 17* 16–18 (= 359F Smith).
46 Ibid., 3. 6* 9–10 (= 354T Smith).
47 Ibid., 7. 10* 20–11* 1.
48 Cf. *In harm*. 87. 21 ff. et 113. 1 ff. Cf. Théon de Smyrne : *Expos. rer. math*. 73. 16–17.
49 Cf. *In harm*. 85. 26–30 et 88. 18–20.
50 Ibid., 66. 20–67. 10.
51 Ibid., 37. 22–24.
52 Ibid., 9. 12–24 et 29. 18–19.
53 Ibid., 91. 19–92. 8 (citation de Thrasylle).
54 Cf. *De abst*. II. 37. 2. Cf. *In Tim*. fr. 69 (= Proclus : *In Tim*. II. 214. 4–215. 5).
55 Cf. *In harm*. 12. 5–6 et 13. 12–14. Cf. ibid., 8. 16–17.
56 Ibid., 13. 21–24.
57 Cf. *De simul*. 10. 18* 12–14 (360F Smith).
58 Ibid., 8. 17* 15–16 (359F Smith).

démiurgique », capable de produire les choses sans la matière[59], elle est mise en opposition avec la raison séminale[60]. D'une manière générale, elle est le fondement des substances et des qualités[61].

2.3 *Raison et harmonie*

Une autre question importante dans la métaphysique porphyrienne, c'est celle du lien entre causes unitaires et multiplicité des effets. Pour répondre à cette question, Porphyre découvre un rôle significatif à la notion de raison, et, dans un passage, il établit que « la raison requiert forcément deux choses, car elle appartient à la catégorie des 'relationnels', et est perçue dans la relation de certaines choses avec une autre » (ἐν δυεῖν γὰρ ὁ λόγος πάντως, ἅτ'ὢν τῶν πρός τι, καῖ ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τινῶν θεωρούμενος)[62]. Que l'auteur ne s'intéresse pas simplement à l'évidente dualité des raisons mathématiques comme 2:1 et 3:2, mais aussi à une caractéristique fondamentale de la raison comme telle, cela est précisé par d'autres textes. Ainsi, la raison démiurgique est décrite comme quelque chose qui donne à la fois une multiplicité de tendances et de dispositions dans les objets corporels[63], et, dans ce sens, comme quelque chose qui assure l'unité des diverses parties du cosmos visible : les lettres dans les mots, et les lignes dans les figures géométriques[64]. Lorsque le problème est de lier des causes unitaires avec plus de deux effets, Porphyre introduit la notion supplémentaire d'harmonie. De plus, la raison démiurgique est dite donner à la fois les tendances et les dispositions corporelles « en un rapport réciproque et une concordance » (κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν σχέσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν)[65], tandis que l'Âme du monde est appelée Harmonie parce qu'elle est une multiplicité ordonnée par le Démiurge, et parce qu'elle régit les choses corporelles selon « les raisons harmoniques qui lient la multiplicité des puissances en elle-même » (οἱ ἁρμονικοὶ λόγοι… ὡς συνδέοντες τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάμεων)[66].

59 Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 51 (= Proclus : *In Tim.* I. 396. 19–26).

60 Cf. *De simul.* 8. 17* 15–18 (359F Smith).

61 Cf. *In harm.* 59. 14–16. Cf. ibid., 9. 11–17 et 19. 4 ff.

62 Ibid., 113. 3–4.

63 Ibid., 12. 15–17.

64 Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 37 (= Philoponus : *De aetern. mund.* VI. 8. 148. 9–23).

65 Cf. *In harm.* 12. 16–17.

66 Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 69 (= Proclus : *In Tim.* II. 214. 16–18).

3 La doctrine de l'harmonie

La notion d'harmonie en tant qu'elle est présente aux différents niveaux de la réalité apparaît dans de nombreux textes de Porphyre[67]. L'idée est, dans une certaine mesure, extrapolée de la théorie musicale dans laquelle elle correspond à une gamme de sons ascendants du fait de l'imposition de raisons variées, bien qu'à strictement parler, l'harmonie musicale ne soit que la manifestation auditive d'un principe ontologique universel.

Dans les *Sententiae*, il y a un exemple frappant de la notion d'harmonie, utilisée pour expliquer comment l'âme impassible est présente dans le corps passible, et dirige la sensibilité de ce dernier. Ici, Porphyre établit une analogie entre, d'une part, un musicien répondant passiblement aux cordes de son instrument en tant que manifestation extériorisée d'une « harmonie séparée » (ἁρμονία χωριστή) qui, impassiblement produit la résonance, et, d'autre part, l'être animé répondant de manière passible à l'objet perçu par les sens en tant que manifestation extérieure de l'âme séparable causant, impassiblement, la sensation[68].

Cette analogie emprunte une idée du *Phédon* de Platon[69] transformée par une interprétation plotinienne[70], et elle contient plusieurs traits douteux, en particulier le parallèle entre le contrôle de son instrument par le musicien et la réaction de l'être animé aux objets sensibles est quelque peu forcé. Cependant, les importantes notions métaphysiques d'« harmonie » (ἁρμονία) d'une part, et de quelque chose qui est « harmonisé » (ἡρμοσμένον) d'autre part, sont assez bien cernées.

Cette dichotomie ressort également d'autres textes. Dans le *Commentaire sur les harmoniques*, il y a un passage où Porphyre démontre que « la différence entre ce qui est harmonisé et l'harmonie est semblable à la différence entre le nombré et le nombre. Car ce qui est 'nombré' est un nombre dans la

67 La présence de notions *harmoniques* est plus marquante dans la pensée de Porphyre que dans celle de Plotin. Cependant, on trouve souvent dans les *Ennéades* des *images* ou *métaphores* qui dérivent de la science musicale. Sur ce sujet cf. S. Gersh, « Plotinus on *Harmonia*. Musical Metaphors and Their Uses in the Enneads », in : J. Dillon and M. Dixsaut (eds.), *Agonistes. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, Aldershot 2005, pp. 195–207.

68 Cf. *Sent*. 18. 9. 1–13.

69 Cf. Plato, *Phaed*. 85e–86d.

70 Cf. Plotinus, *Enn*. III. 6. 4. 41–52. Pour une analyse comparative de cette image musicale chez Plotin et chez Porphyry cf. L. Brisson *et alii, Porphyre. Sentences*, Tome II, pp. 485–496.

matière, ou accompagnant la matière »[71]. La corrélation de la dualité avec celle de « non-matériel » et de « matériel » semble impliquer une correspondance supplémentaire avec celle de rationnel et de sensible. C'est, probablement, ce que Porphyre a dans l'esprit lorsqu'il commente plus loin, dans le même traité, que « ce qui est harmonisé ne peut jamais être jugé sans l'aide de la sensation. Néanmoins, le jugement ne vient pas de la sensation, mais de la raison par le moyen de la sensation »[72].

D'autres textes ont un ton plus réservé lorsqu'ils suggèrent qu'une simple dichotomie : harmonie/non-matériel/rationnel opposée à harmonisé/matériel/sensible, ne représente pas la position ultime de Porphyre. Dans un fragment du *Commentaire sur le Timée*, ce dernier semble admettre que l'Âme du monde est non seulement « selon la meilleure harmonie » (κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην ἁρμονίαν) – voulant dire qu'elle est construite en accord avec l'échelle diatonique – mais qu'elle est aussi « harmonisée » (ἥρμοσται)[73]. Il est possible d'extrapoler à partir de cela que, pour Porphyre le Démiurge correspond à l'Harmonie seule, l'Âme du monde à l'Harmonie et à l'harmonisé, et le corps du monde à l'harmonisé seul[74].

Le *De abstinentia* aussi entraîne ce corollaire que les âmes ne sont pas de pures harmonies sans aucun mélange d'harmonisé, car elles ne sont pas présentées comme totalement impassibles devant les stimuli externes. De même que certains corps ont une structure telle qu'ils peuvent résonner en réponse à tel ou tel son audible, de même les âmes possèdent des dispositions telles qu'elles sont par résonance touchées par des passions venant du corps[75].

4 Métaphysique et cosmologie de Porphyre

4.1 *Le schéma métaphysique*

Cette comparaison des textes dans les paragraphes précédents suffit sans doute à indiquer que Porphyre a eu affaire à un certain nombre de concepts étroitement liés. À la base de cette ontologie se trouve la notion de puissance en tant que *continuum* entre perfection et imperfection, le degré ontologique d'une

71 Cf. *In harm*. 12. 2–5 : « διαφέρει γὰρ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον ἁρμονίας, ᾗ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμοῦ. εἶναι γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ σὺν ὕλῃ, τό δ' ἡμοσμένον ἁρμονίαν ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ σὺν ὕλῃ ».

72 Ibid. 19. 17–19 : « οὕτω μή ποτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως οὐκ ἂν κριθείη τὸ ἡρμοσμένον. οὐ μέντοι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἂν εἴη τὸ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ».

73 Cf. *In Tim*. fr. 69 (= Proclus, *In Tim*. II. 214. 4–26).

74 Cf. Olympiodore, *In Phaed*. 221. 10–13, etc.

75 Cf. *De abst*. I. 43. 1.

hypostase, ou d'un principe, étant déterminé par la position, sur ce *continuum*, de la puissance qu'il possède en lui. Pour Porphyre, le monde réel est constitué d'une multiplicité de niveaux ontologique différents, dont chacun est l'effet du précédent et la cause du suivant, le rôle causal d'une hypostase ou d'un principe étant déterminé par le degré de puissance qui émane de lui vers l'extérieur. Lorsque deux principes sont mis en parallèle dans ce sens, il est possible de parler d'une « relation » (σχέσιν) ou d'une « raison » (λόγος) qui les relie entre eux, et, lorsque plus de deux principes sont mis en parallèle, on peut parler d'une « harmonie » (ἁρμονία) sous-tendant les multiples différences de puissances.

À la lumière de tout de qui précède, il semble maintenant possible de suggérer une certaine idée d'ensemble de l'ontologie qu'implique le développement de la puissance.

Une première conclusion est que les manifestations variées de la puissance : relation, raison et harmonie, ont une priorité ontologique sur les hypostases déterminées par elles. Porphyre, en fait, suggère qu'une raison a priorité sur les choses rationalisées, dans son exposé de la hiérarchie des raisons[76] ; il montre aussi qu'une harmonie a priorité sur ce qu'elle harmonise, dans le cas de l'analogie entre l'âme et le musicien[77]. Mais pouvons-nous aussi conclure qu'une relation a priorité sur ce qu'elle relie ? Que la réponse à cette question soit affirmative, pour Porphyre et pour d'autres néoplatoniciens, cela semble inévitable et l'on peut facilement comprendre ce point de vue si l'on admet que la relation, elle aussi, est l'expression d'une puissance.

Une seconde conclusion suit de très près celle qui précède. C'est que relation, raison et harmonie ont elles-mêmes un caractère non-spatial et intemporel, même si leurs effets peuvent se manifester dans le domaine de l'espace et du temps. Porphyre est parfaitement explicite sur ce point lorsqu'il démontre que le déroulement du mythe cosmologique chez Platon n'indique aucune succession de temps, mais une « raison du devenir » (λόγος γενέσεως)[78]. Autrement dit, lorsque Platon décrit les étapes de la production, par la Démiurge, du monde visible, il trace en réalité le déploiement d'une formule intemporelle dans la manifestation d'une réalité temporelle.

Bien entendu, Porphyre s'intéresse non seulement à la corrélation d'un jeu de concepts métaphysiques dans l'abstrait, mais aussi à des applications spécifiques dans l'ordre physique. Ainsi, l'ontologie commande la cosmologie.

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76 Cf. note 42.

77 Cf. note 68.

78 Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 37 (= Philoponus, *De aetern. mund.* VI. 8. 148. 9–23).

4.2 *Notions cosmologiques*

Les éléments de la reconstruction de la cosmologie porphyrienne sont plutôt limités, mais suffisants pour indiquer l'application qui y est faite de concepts tels que puissance, raison et harmonie. Cette cosmologie est basée sur la corrélation du macrocosme et du microcosme – il en avait été de même, déjà, chez les Stoïciens et chez Plotin – la corrélation étant, dès l'origine, celle d'un cosmos doué d'âme avec celle de l'être humain individuel.

Le traité *Ad Gaurum* fait un usage particulièrement important de ces idées et insiste sur le rôle du « Tout » (τὸ πᾶν) comme supplément à l'activité propre des parents humains dans la formation de l'embryon.

Porphyre, ici, reprend l'enseignement des Chaldéens selon lequel il y a émanation éternelle du monde intelligible qui non seulement fait tourner les sphères célestes, mais aussi attribue des âmes appropriées aux créatures vivantes. Cette émanation pénètre le cosmos visible au point le plus oriental appelé « la porte des âmes, le 'tuyau-du-souffle' de l'univers, le centre et l'horoscope » (ψυχῶν πύλη καὶ εἴσπνοια τοῦ παντὸς… κέντρον καὶ ὡροσκόπος)[79].

L'idée que le cosmos est une respiration[80] dans les âmes souligne avec force son statut de créature vivante. Cette dernière idée est reprise dans le *De abstinentia* où la représentation traditionnelle du corps du monde est donnée comme un corps enveloppé par une âme incorporelle et se mouvant par elle-même[81]. Les fragments du *De regressu animae* parlent de l'attribution d'une sensibilité humaine aux « hauteurs éthérées et empyrées du cosmos et du firmament céleste » (*aetheriae vel empyriae mundi sublimitates et firmamenta caelestia*)[82], cette formulation « chaldéenne » ne prenant sa pleine signification que si l'on suppose que les sphères célestes sont animées par les facultés distinctes de l'Âme cosmique qui pénètre toutes choses. Un fragment du *Commentaire sur le Timée* fait allusion à la formation graduelle du véhicule ou partie irrationnelle de l'âme, lorsqu'elle descend à travers les cercles célestes vers une incarnation terrestre, et sa dissolution graduelle lors de son voyage de retour ; de tels véhicules sont « des composés formés à partir des sphères célestes » (φυράματα… ἐκ τῶν οὐρανίων σφαιρῶν). En d'autres termes, les parties inférieures de l'âme humaine, dont les activités sont localisées dans différentes par-

79 Cf. *Ad Gaur*. 16. 48–50.

80 La notion d'une respiration du cosmos est, encore une fois, plus typique de la pensée de Porphyre que de celle de son maître. Néanmoins, Plotin parle d'un *pneuma* autour ou â l'intérieur de la terre. Cf. *Enn*. IV. 4. 26. 23–29.

81 Cf. *De abst*. II. 37. 1–2.

82 Cf. *De regr. anim*. fr. 6. 34* 24–25 (= 287F Smith).

ties du corps humain, dérivent des facultés irrationnelles de l'Âme du monde qui sont, de manière analogue, réparties dans les régions planétaires[83].

Un autre passage du même traité propose une information plus précise : les âmes humaines acquièrent à la fois leurs caractéristiques vitales et celles qui sont « nobles », lorsqu'elles descendent du cercle de la Lune auquel préside la déesse Athéna[84].

C'est dans le contexte de cette étroite interdépendance psychique et corporelle du macrocosme et du microcosme que l'application de concepts tels que puissance, raison et harmonie doit être comprise.

Le rôle de la puissance dans la théorie cosmologique de Porphyre est sous-entendu dans le même texte *Ad Gaurum* dont il a été question plus haut : la région en effet qui entoure le point le plus oriental du cosmos, ou « porte des âmes » est, dit Porphyre, « remplie de puissance » (δυναμοῦται)[85]. Naturellement, le processus de la descente de l'âme dans le corps suppose l'émanation de puissance venant du monde intelligible, et cette puissance se diffuse depuis la « porte la plus orientale » jusqu'en bas, après avoir traversé les huit sphères célestes en mouvement.

Ailleurs, Porphyre parle de la diffusion de puissance à travers les sphères en termes à la fois mythologiques et astronomiques : un exemple de descente de réalités divines dans le devenir, au cours de laquelle ces réalités répandent leurs puissances comme une semence, est donné dans la transmission de puissance émanée de Caelus (i.e. la sphère des étoiles fixes) vers Saturne, et de Saturne vers Jupiter. Ainsi donc, « les puissances descendent du ciel et des planètes » (κατίασι δὲ δυνάμεις ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν πλανωμένων)[86]. Dans les fragments du *De cultu simulacrorum* se trouvent des analyses plus importantes sur ces thèmes, avec différents niveaux de puissance associés à des régions précises du cosmos, et des éléments physiques spécifiques répandus dans ces régions célestes : la puissance éthérée au-dessus du cercle de la Lune (symbolisé par Héra), à l'intérieur de ce cercle la puissance de l'air (Léto), à l'intérieur du précédent celle de l'eau (Océan) et dans le précédent encore celle de la terre (Hestia, etc.) en cercles concentriques de taille décroissante[87]. Ce même traité

83 Cf. *In Tim*. fr. 80 (= Proclus, *In Tim*. III. 234. 18–30). Le fragment finit par citer *Orac. Chald*. fr. 61 des Places.

84 Cf. *In Tim*. fr. 22 (= Proclus : *In Tim*. I. 165. 16–23).

85 Cf. *Ad Gaur*. 16. 48–50. Sur la doctrine astrologique ici cf. M. Zambon, *Porphyre et le Moyen-Platonisme*, Paris 2002, pp. 271–272.

86 Cf. *De antr. nymph*. 16. 18. 10–17.

87 Cf. *De simul*. frs. 4–5. 7* 5–10 (= 356F Smith), 8. 11* 14–15 (359F Smith), 7. 10* 16–20 (= 358F Smith).

relie différents niveaux de puissance aux phases spécifiques des orbites quotidienne et annuelle du Soleil : ceux-ci expliquent son mouvement circulaire (symbolisé par Dionysos), son cours annuel à travers les douze maisons du Zodiaque (Héraclès) et son contrôle des processus de la génération et de la destruction dans le monde inférieur (Hécate)[88].

Les applications cosmologiques de la notion de raison sont, elles aussi, étendues, et, là, Porphyre semble penser en premier lieu en termes de raison mathématique par rapport à l'espace et au temps[89].

Un fragment du *Commentaire du Timée* mentionne la présence de raisons comme 4 :3, 3 :2 et 9 :8 dans les distances spatiales séparant les sphères planétaires, et démontre que ces intervalles manifestés dans le corps du monde sont le reflet d'autres intervalles contenus dans l'Âme du monde[90]. Les termes de la conclusion : « et ainsi surgit l'harmonie dont la raison dans la substance de l'âme est aussi tissée dans le corps du monde » (*ita provenire concentum cuius ratio in substantia animae contexta mundano quoque corpore*) comporte le mot grec λόγος traduit en latin par *ratio*.

Ce passage traite de l'immanence d'un principe supérieur dans l'étendue spatiale du macrocosme et utilise explicitement le concept de raison. D'autres textes se rapportent à l'immanence de tels principes dans l'étendue spatiale et temporelle du macrocosme et du microcosme sans faire référence explicitement à ce terme. Toutefois, puisque ces textes indiquent la liaison des principes supérieur et inférieur et la division mathématique de ce dernier, et que ces deux caractéristiques sont associées à la notion porphyrienne de raison, il est possible, semble-t-il, de sous-entendre le mot manquant.

Les pages finales des *Sententiae* parlent des durées variées de la rotation des corps célestes, comme le Soleil, la Lune, Vénus, et de l'année qui les contient toutes, comme « parachevant leur somme dans le mouvement de l'âme à l'imitation de laquelle ces corps célestes se meuvent » (κεφαλαιούμενος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν, ἧς κατὰ μίμησιν κινουμένων τούτων…)[91]. Porphyre ajoute que les

88 Ibid. fr. 8. 13* 18–20 (= 359F Smith), 8. 13* 3–7 (= 359F Smith), 8. 14* 18–15* 4 (= 359F Smith).

89 Il faut remarquer ici que chez Plotin le terme σχέσις – qui se rapproche de la notion de raison employée dans cet argument par Porphyre – joue fréquemment un rôle cosmologique. À la vérité, on rencontre ce terme le plus souvent dans un contexte astrologique où les σχέσεις (= σχήματα) correspondent aux positions, figures, et aspects des corps célestes. Cf. Plotin, *Enn.* IV. 4. 34. 8–11 (λόγος + σχέσις), IV. 4. 35. 8 ff. (λόγος + σχέσις + συμφωνία). Cet ensemble de notions a été intégré dans l'image assez compliquée de la nature universelle comme danseuse in : *Enn.* IV. 4. 33. 1 ff.

90 Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 72 (= Macrobius, *In somn. Scip.* II. 3. 12–15).

91 Cf. *Sent.* 44. 59. 13–21.

corps célestes aussi bien que l'âme cosmique agissent dans le temps : ils diffèrent cependant en ce que le premier (le corps céleste) implique des intervalles, et est associé à des mouvements spatiaux (αἱ κατὰ τόπον κινήσεις). Le *Commentaire sur le Timée* lie la durée des descentes des âmes humaines et de leurs remontées au nombre des sphères célestes qu'elles doivent traverser : chaque âme traverse cinq sphères chaque fois qu'elle descend ou remonte, et la traversée de chacune des sphères dure mille ans ; par conséquent, le cycle complet d'une transmigration dure dix mille ans[92]. Un autre passage du même ouvrage oppose la similitude des durées de rotation de Mercure, Vénus et du Soleil, à la dissemblance de celles de Mars, Jupiter et Saturne, mettant en relation ce fait avec les différents modes de retour dont jouissent les intellects associés à chacune des sphères célestes[93]. À l'intérieur de l'Hebdomade enveloppant le Tout : « Être » (οὐσία), « Intellect » (νοῦς) et « Vie » (ζωή), Saturne, Jupiter et Mars représentent l'être, l'intellect, et la vie dans l'Être ; le Soleil, Vénus et Mercure, l'être, l'intellect et la vie dans l'Intellect ; et la Lune, la Vie seulement. Du fait que les intellects des trois sphères planétaires supérieures accomplissent des retours normaux – dans l'Être – de l'être en lui-même, de l'intellect vers l'être, et de la vie, par l'intermédiaire de l'intellect, vers l'être, alors que les intellects des trois sphères célestes inférieures ont des retours a-normaux – dans l'Intellect – de l'être à travers l'intellect vers la vie, de l'intellect à travers la vie vers lui-même, et de la vie à travers l'être vers l'intellect, les durées de rotation qui en sont la conséquence sont plus dissemblables ou plus semblables chacune par rapport à l'autre[94].

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92 Cf. *In Tim.* fr. 16 (= Proclus, *In Tim.* I. 147. 6–24).

93 Ibid., fr. 79 (= Proclus, *In Tim.* III. 64. 8–65. 7).

94 Porphyre semble envisager ici le schéma de participation suivant :

être ↔ *Saturne*
intellect ↑ être *Jupiter* **Être**
vie ↑ intellect ↑ être *Mars*

être ↓ intellect ↓ vie *Soleil*
intellect ↓ vie ↑ *Vénus* **Intellect**
vie ↑ être ↓ intellect *Mercure*

vie – *Lune* **Vie**

On entrevoit dans cette structure hebdomatique – plutôt qu'ennéadique comme d'habitude dans la métaphysique de Porphyre – l'influence de l'astrologie *chaldaïque*.

Ces trois groupes de textes précisent l'immanence des principes supérieurs dans les principes inférieurs, dans des contextes à la fois macro et microcosmiques : des l'Âme du monde dans les sphères célestes, des âmes humaines dans leurs véhicules et leurs corps terrestres, des intellects dans les sphères planétaires. Dans le cas du premier et du dernier texte, en particulier, il est évident que la structure du principe supérieur – temporel mais non-spatial lorsqu'il s'agit de l'Âme, intemporel et non-spatial lorsqu'il s'agit de l'Intellect – est, d'une certaine manière, la cause de l'extension mathématique spatio-temporelle au principe inférieur. Comme nous l'avons vu, cette connexion entre niveaux distincts de la réalité est une fonction caractéristique de la raison.

Le rôle de l'harmonie dans la théorie cosmologique de Porphyre souligne dans une certaine mesure l'importance de la raison, puisque, selon les définitions habituelles, une harmonie est une combinaison de raisons.

Quelques passages du *Commentaire sur le Timée* se rapportent à l'harmonie qui pénètre le cosmos. Dans l'un d'eux, Porphyre explique que le Démiurge avait le projet de faire toutes choses semblables à lui-même, en les comblant d'« harmonie, de symétrie et d'ordre » (ἁρμονία, συμμετρία, τάξις)[95]. Un autre passage interprète l'aptitude des différentes parties du cosmos à recevoir des genres spécifiques d'âmes, comme l'indication d'une « concordance » (εὐαρμοστία) pénétrant toutes choses[96].

Ces notions générales concernant l'harmonie reçoivent leur application dans deux contextes plus spécialisés.

Dans le premier cas, il y a plusieurs passages de Porphyre, conservés dans le latin de Macrobe, qui se rapportent à l'harmonie inhérente aux mouvements des sphères célestes. Sur ce point précis de l'exégèse du *Timée*, Porphyre fait une analyse détaillée des raisons harmoniques qui constituent la base de l'échelle musicale de Pythagore – la « quarte » (διὰ τεσσάρων), la « quinte » (διὰ πέντε), l'« octave » (διὰ πασῶν), l'« octave et quinte » (διὰ πασῶν καὶ διὰ πέντε), et la « double-octave » (δὶς διὰ πασῶν) – avec un addendum ayant pour but d'étendre « l'harmonie céleste » (*harmonia caelestis*) aux multiples de ces intervalles[97]. Ces extraits en latin font comprendre que ces raisons de l'harmonie céleste ne sont pas simplement représentées par des distances spatiales entre les sphères, ou par des durées de rotation, mais sont manifestées par les sons effectivement produits par les planètes lorsqu'elles traversent l'atmosphère. De plus, le fait que ces raisons de l'harmonie céleste constituent des accords simples plutôt

95 Cf. *In Tim*. fr. 46 (= Proclus, *In Tim*. I. 366. 13–27).

96 Ibid., fr. 21 (= Proclus, *In Tim*. I. 162. 27–163. 21).

97 Ibid., fr. 66 (= Macrobius, *In somn. Scip*. II. 1. 14–25).

que des combinaisons dissonantes provient de ce que « la raison, présente dans le monde divin, est cause de l'harmonie dans le son » (*ratio quae divinis inest fit sono causa modulaminis*)[98]. Un autre passage relie l'exégèse du *Timée* aux idées que l'on trouve dans le mythe d'Er de la *République*, chez les « théologiens » et chez Hésiode, à savoir que le son de chaque sphère céleste correspond à une Sirène ou à une Muse, la neuvième Muse symbolisent l'« accord unique et suprême résultant de tous les autres » (*una maxima concinentia… ex omnibus*)[99].

Que la notion d'harmonie implique l'immanence d'un principe supérieur dans un niveau inférieur de la réalité, cela est rendu spécialement évident par le second passage. Cette idée est corroborée par un autre groupe de textes utilisant les concepts d'harmonie pour expliquer l'immanence d'un principe supérieur dans le microcosme.

Dans *Ad Gaurum*, les Chapitres 13 et 16 décrivent le processus par lequel l'âme individuelle s'incorpore dans un embryon humain, en utilisant une terminologie largement empruntée à l'harmonique[100].

Cette doctrine dans son ensemble peut être résumée sous les rubriques suivantes :

(a) L'âme provient de l'émanation diffusée grâce au « tuyau-du-souffle » de l'univers[101].
(b) La participation du corps embryonnaire dans l'âme n'est pas spatiale, mais conforme « à leur appropriation réciproque et à leur accord » (κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα καὶ συναρμοστίαν)[102].
(c) La participation dépend de l'accord tonique de l'âme d'une part et du corps de l'autre, en sorte que ces deux accords puissent « s'harmoniser » (συναρμόζεσθαι)[103].
(d) Cette consonance entre accords est semblable à celle d'un octave qui sépare deux sons appelés « proslambanomène » (προσλαμβάνομενος) et « mèse » (μέση) dans les gammes musicales. De la même manière qu'il n'y

98 Ibid., fr. 65 (= Macrobius, *In somn. Scip.* II. 1. 5–7).
99 ibid., fr. 68 (= Macrobius, *In somn. Scip.* II. 3. 1–3).
100 Sur les Chapitres 13 et 16 cf. L. Brisson *et alii, Porphyre. Sur la manière dont l'embryon reçoit l'âme*, pp. 285–293 et 299–304.
101 Cf. *Ad Gaur.* 16. 47–49.
102 Ibid., 13. 60–63. Voir sur ce point G. Aubry, « Capacité et convenance. La notion d'ἐπιτηδειότης dans la théorie porphyrienne de l'embryon », in : L. Brisson – H. Congourdeau – J.-L. Solère (éds.), *L'embryon. Formation et animation*, Paris 2008, pp. 139–155.
103 Ibid., 13. 64.

a pas de consonance d'octave lorsque le son le plus haut et le son le plus bas ne sont pas exactement accordés, de même l'incarnation de l'âme n'a pas lieu lorsque l'âme et le corps ne sont pas exactement d'accord[104].

(e) La participation est analogue au rapport entre un « corps d'instrument » (σῶμα ὀργανικόν) et « celui qui joue de cet instrument » (ὁ χρώμενος τῷ ὀργάνῳ)[105].

(f) La participation du corps embryonnaire dans l'âme exige que ce corps embryonnaire puisse atteindre un certain niveau de puissance : il ne doit pas être « imparfait » (ἀτελές)[106].

(g) La participation est dépendante d'un accord conformé aux « raisons de la nature » (οἱ λόγοι τῆς φύσεως)[107].

(h) La participation du corps embryonnaire dans l'âme n'est pas temporelle, mais « immédiate » (εὐθύς) lorsque l'accord est parfait[108].

(i) Le corps ne peut posséder qu'une seule âme parmi la multitude de celles qui descendent par le « tuyau-du-souffle »[109].

Cette théorie rassemble en elle tous les thèmes réunis dans la doctrine de Porphyre – puissance, raison, harmonie – et offre l'un des exemples les plus intéressants de l'ontologie harmonique de l'Antiquité tardive[110].

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104 Ibid., 16. 55–74.

105 Ibid., 13. 66–69.

106 Ibid., 13. 69 et 16. 82.

107 Ibid., 13. 63–65.

108 Ibid., 16. 74.

109 Ibid., 16. 74–75.

110 Je voudrais remercier les membres de l'UPR 76 du CNRS, Paris (responsable D. O'Brien) de quelques observations savantes à la suite de la présentation orale de ce texte. *In primis* je remercie Mme. H. Merle qui a corrigé la première version écrite et M.J.-B. Guillaumin qui m'a aidé plus récemment dans la préparation de cette version finale.

CHAPTER 2

La philosophie comme considération, la contemplation et ses moyens selon Bernard de Clairvaux

Christian Trottmann

Bernard de Clairvaux attire l'attention au début du Livre II du *De consideratione* sur la différence entre considération et contemplation :

> En effet, celle-ci (la contemplation) suppose la vérité déjà connue, tandis que la première (la considération) a plus particulièrement pour but la recherche de la vérité ; aussi définirai-je volontiers la contemplation, une intuition claire et certaine des choses par l'œil de l'esprit, ou, en d'autres termes, l'acte par lequel l'esprit embrasse une vérité connue, indubitable. Quant à la considération, je dirai que c'est un effort de la pensée, une application de l'esprit à la recherche de la vérité ; ce qui n'empêche pas qu'on n'emploie bien souvent ces deux mots l'un pour l'autre[1].

On rechercherait en vain une articulation de la philosophie et de la théologie chez Bernard. Il n'entend jamais ce dernier terme latinisé par Abélard qu'en mauvaise part. En revanche ce qui pose un problème c'est la possibilité d'un accès de la considération philosophique à la contemplation[2].

1 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *De consideratione* II, II, (éd. Jean Leclercq, Henri Rochais *et alii*), Sancti Bernardi Opera, Roma 1957–1977, III, p. 414 (désormais SBO) : « Quod haec ad rerum certitudinem, illa ad inquisitionem magis se habeat. Iuxta quem sensum potest contemplatio quidem diffiniri verus certus que intuitus animi de quacumque re, sive apprehensio veri non dubia, consideratio autem intensa ad vestigandum cogitatio, vel intensio animi vestigantis verum. Quamquam soleant ambae pro invicem usurpari ». Nous utilisons la traduction Charpentier sans hésiter à la modifier si nécessaire.

2 Sur ce thème, Cf. entre autres : *Saint Bernard et son temps*, Dijon 1928–1929 ; *Saint Bernard Théologien, Actes du Congrès de Dijon, 15–19 septembre 1953* (Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis IX), Roma 1953 ; *S. Bernardo : pubblicazione commemorative nell'VIII centenario della sua morte*, ed. A. Gemelli, Milano 1954 ; *Studi su s. Bernardo di Chiaravalle nell'ottavo centenario della canonizzazione : convegno internazionale, Certosa di Firenze (6–9 novembre 1974)*, Roma 1975 ; *Bernardus Magister, Papers Presented at the Nonacentenary of the Birth of Saint*

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1 Considération et contemplation, une opposition irréductible ?

Car dans cette application à la recherche de la vérité, nous reconnaissons l'élan de la philosophie, en quête de la sagesse, mais qui sait qu'elle ne la possède pas. Au contraire, la contemplation suppose une vérité déjà connue, indubitable. Cela est-il d'ailleurs possible ici-bas ? Rappelons encore que Bernard, commentant le verset du Cantique, 5, 1 qui revient si souvent dans ses écrits distingue trois degrés de la contemplation dont seul le dernier est parfait et correspond au dernier degré de la charité atteint seulement à la résurrection finale voire au jugement dernier ainsi qu'il le précise à la fin du *De diligendo Deo*[3] :

> Ainsi l'âme du croyant commence par "manger son pain", mais, hélas, "à la sueur de son front". Car "demeurant dans la chair, elle marche encore par la foi" qui, bien sûr, doit "agir par amour", la foi "sans les œuvres étant morte". De plus son action même est sa nourriture, comme dit le Seigneur : "Ma nourriture c'est de faire la volonté de mon Père"[4].

Bernard of Clairvaux (Cistercian Studies 135), ed. J.R. Sommerfeldt, Kalamazoo 1992 ; *Bernard de Clairvaux. Histoire, mentalités, spiritualité, Introduction aux œuvres complètes* (*Colloque de Lyon-Cîteaux-Dijon*), SC 380, 1992 ; *Saint Bernard et la philosophie*, ed. R. Brague, Paris 1993 ; *Themenheft „Bernhard von Clairvaux"* (Cistercienzer Chronik 110), ed. K. Lauterer, Bregenz 2003 ; G. Fossati, *Bernardo di Chiaravalle tra azione e contemplazione*, Casamari 2004 ; *Sapientia Dei-Scientia Mundi, Bernardo de Claraval e o seu tempo*, in : *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 60 : 3 (2004) ; *Truth as Gift : Studies in Medieval Cistercian History in Honnor of John R. Somerfeldt*, eds. M.L. Dutton, D.M. La Corte et P. Lockey, Kalamazoo 2004 ; Ch. Trottmann, « *Murenulas aureas faciemus*… Dire la contemplazione : Guiguo du Pont, lettore di Bernardo di Chiaravalle », in : *Ai limiti dell'imagine*, Macerata 2005, pp. 81–103 ; *Sapere e contemplare il mistero : Bernardo e Tommaso – Atti dell'inaugurazione della "cattedra Benedetto XVI di teologia e spiritualità cisterciense", Abbazia di Santa Croce in Gerusalemme – Angelicum, Roma 8–10 novembre 2007*, ed. I. Biffi *et alii*, Milano 2009 ; T. Kobusch, « Contemplation intérieure : vers la métaphysique contemplative, d'Origène au XIIe siècle », in : Ch. Trottmann (ed.), *Vie active et vie contemplative au Moyen Age et au seuil de la Renaissance*, Roma 2009, pp. 91–109 ; I. Biffi, *Tutta la dolcezza della terra. Cristo e i monaci medievali. Bernardo di Clairvaux, Aelredo di Rievaulx, Gertrude di Helfta e Giovanni di Ford*, Milano 2004 ; *La filosofia monastica : "sapere Gesù"*, Milano 2014.

3 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo* XI, 32, (SC 393), Paris 1993, pp. 140–145.

4 Ibid., p. 140 : « Primo ergo fidelis anima comedit panem suum, sed, heu ! in sudore vultus sui. In carne quippe manens adhuc ambulat per fidem, quam sane operari per dilectionem necesse est, quia, si non operatur, mortua est. Porro ipsum opus cibus est, dicente Domino : *Meus cibus est, ut faciam voluntatem Patris mei* ».

Si elle accède à quelque contemplation à ce premier degré du banquet de la sagesse, l'âme encore prisonnière du corps ici-bas est ainsi renvoyée aussitôt par les exigences de la charité, à l'action. Aux âmes séparées du corps par la mort il est permis de passer de la nourriture solide de l'action à la boisson. Mais précise Bernard citant la suite du verset du Cantique (5, 1), celle d'un vin mêlé de lait. Le mélange pourra sembler choquant aux amateurs des vins de Vougeot plantés par les moines de Cîteaux. Rappelons l'exégèse eschatologique que Bernard propose de ce verset :

> En effet, elle mélange encore au vin de l'amour divin la douceur d'un attachement naturel qui lui fait désirer reprendre son corps mais dans son état glorifié. Le vin de la sainte charité qu'elle a bu l'échauffe déjà, mais pas encore jusqu'à l'ivresse complète, car pour le moment cette ardeur est modérée par le mélange du lait[5].

Quel est cet obstacle qui empêche l'âme d'accéder au quatrième degré de l'amour de Dieu ? Comprenons ici que le passage du deuxième au troisième degré de la contemplation est soumis à la même exigence que celui du troisième au quatrième degré de la charité. Grâce à la résurrection, le désir légitime qu'a l'âme, de régir son corps et qui l'empêchait encore de tourner toute son attention vers la contemplation de Dieu, va pouvoir être résorbé, ainsi que ce qui pouvait rester de l'amour de soi, dans l'amour de Dieu, mais pas avant : « D'ailleurs ordinairement, l'ivresse fait chavirer les esprits et les rend totalement oublieux d'eux-mêmes. Or cette âme ne s'est pas totalement oubliée ; elle continue à songer à la résurrection de son propre corps »[6]. De cet attachement légitime au corps qui, en attendant sa résurrection, l'empêche de goûter le vin pur conduisant les bien-aimés à l'ivresse, l'âme ne sera libérée qu'en retrouvant son corps glorifié :

> Cependant, une fois cette faveur obtenue, la seule précisément qui lui faisait défaut, qu'est-ce qui l'empêche désormais de se quitter elle-même d'une certaine façon et d'entrer tout entière en Dieu, [...] Pourquoi s'étonner désormais "qu'elle s'enivre à l'abondance de la maison de Dieu"

5 Ibid., pp. 140–142 : « Vino enim divini amoris miscet etiam tunc dulcedinem naturalis affectionis, qua resumere corpus suum, ipsumque glorificatum, desiderat. Aestuat ergo iam tunc sanctae caritatis potata vino, sed plane nondum usque ad ebrietatem, quoniam temperat interim ardorem illum huius lactis permixtio ».

6 Ibid., p. 142 : « Ebrietas denique solet evertere mentes, atque omnino reddere immemores sui. At non ex toto sui oblita est, quae adhuc de proprio corpore cogitat suscitando ».

> quand, libérée de tout souci de soi, "elle boit", en toute sécurité, "le vin nouveau", sans mélange, avec le Christ "dans la maison de son Père"?[7].

Ce dernier "souci de soi", légitime se résorbe ainsi dans l'amour de Dieu. C'est en lui que l'âme en vient à s'aimer elle-même sans réserve ni repli sur soi. L'accès au dernier degré de la contemplation suppose la levée de ce dernier obstacle, condition pour parvenir à la perfection de la charité mais aussi de la connaissance de soi-même en même temps donc que de la vérité divine. Avec la faiblesse de la volonté qui lui venait de sa division, disparaît toute duperie de soi par laquelle l'âme pouvait encore en se faisant des illusions se masquer la vérité sur elle-même. Ce n'est en effet que dans le face à face définitif que le philosophe élu et ressuscité accède de manière définitive à la vérité sur Dieu et en même temps sur lui-même.

Or, il ne saurait s'agir pour Bernard d'un accès individuel à la joie définitive. L'entrée dans la fête du banquet céleste est collective. Elle concerne tout le corps mystique du Christ, et l'on sait les conséquences qu'en tirera le Pape Jean XXII:

> Mangez avant la mort; buvez après la mort; enivrez-vous après la résurrection. C'est à bon droit qu'ils sont désormais "très chers", ceux que la charité enivre; à bon droit enivrés, ceux qui méritent d'être introduits "aux noces de l'Agneau"; "ils mangent et boivent à sa table dans son royaume", quand le Christ "fait paraître devant lui l'Église glorieuse, sans tache ni ride ni rien de semblable"[8].

L'ivresse parfaite est ainsi suspendue à l'entrée dans la salle du banquet des derniers convives. Le troisième degré de la contemplation est donc réservé au jugement dernier. Avec la disparition du souci d'un corps glorifié, une résorption complète de l'amour propre, permet alors aux âmes, d'atteindre une parfaite similitude avec Dieu. Surtout, réunies entre elles pour former le corps mystique et l'épouse du Christ, elles peuvent entrer dans la parfaite béatitude.

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7 Ibid.: « Ceterum hoc adepto, quod solum utique deerat, quid iam impedit a se ipsa quodammodo abire, et ire totam in Deum, […] quid mirum iam *si inebriatur ab ubertate domus Dei*, cum, nulla mordente cura de proprio, secura *bibit* purum et *novum illud* cum Christo *in domo Patris eius*? ».

8 Ibid., 33, p. 144: « Comedite ante mortem, bibite post mortem, inebriamini post resurrectionem. Merito iam carissimi, qui caritate inebriantur; merito inebriati, qui *ad nuptias Agni* introduci merentur, *edentes et bibentes super mensam illius in regno suo*, quando *sibi iam exhibet gloriosam Ecclesiam, non habentem maculam neque rugam aut aliquid huiusmodi* ».

Telle est pour Bernard l'ultime « coupe de la sagesse » qui n'est accessible selon lui qu'au dernier jour : « De là cette satiété sans dégoût, cette curiosité insatiable mais sans inquiétude, ce désir éternel et impossible à assouvir qui pourtant ignore la privation, enfin cette sobre ivresse qui se gorge de la vérité et non de vin pur, qui ne provient pas d'un débordement de vin mais qui brûle de l'amour de Dieu »[9]. Bernard évoque ici le rapport le plus ultime à la vérité. C'est l'accès au quatrième degré de la charité qu'il décrit ainsi, et s'il laisse encore place à un désir insatiable au cœur même de la béatitude parfaite, c'est précisément parce qu'il s'agit du banquet de la sagesse où l'ivresse parfaite ne laisse pas oublier au philosophe que la vérité divine dont il s'enivre ne saurait être épuisée ni d'un trait ni même par sa béatitude éternelle.

Ce grand écart entre la recherche philosophique de la vérité dans la considération qui sait son imperfection et une parfaite contemplation réservée aux bienheureux et encore, après le jugement dernier, pourrait désespérer le lecteur de Bernard de trouver un accès de la philosophie à la contemplation. Notre but est ici de montrer qu'un tel accès existe et passe même par une spéculation très libre dans laquelle le théologien privé ne craint nullement d'avancer ses opinions en les présentant certes comme telles.

La considération à laquelle Bernard invite le Pape Eugène III est, il est vrai avant tout connaissance de soi, version bernardine du socratisme chrétien dont nous verrons bientôt comment elle s'inscrit dans cette tradition qui court au moins depuis Origène :

> Que ta considération commence par toi-même, et ne la fais pas porter sur ce qui est hors de toi, en te négligeant toi-même. Que te servirait en effet de gagner l'univers si tu venais à te perdre toi (Mt 16, 26) ? Sois sage tant qu'il te plaira, je dis qu'il manquera toujours quelque chose à ta sagesse si tu ne l'es pour toi-même. Que lui manquera-t-il donc ? A mon avis, tout. Quand tu connaîtrais tous les mystères à la fois, combien la terre est vaste, le ciel élevé, l'océan profond, si tu ne te connais pas toi-même, tu ressembles à un homme qui bâtirait sans fondement, amassant des ruines au lieu d'élever un édifice. Tout ce que tu construiras hors de toi-même sera comme un tas de poussière exposé à tous les vents. Non, il ne saurait être savant celui qui ne l'est pas de soi-même. Un vrai savant sera d'abord savant de lui-même et boira en premier lieu de l'eau de son propre puits[10].

9 Ibid. : « Hinc illa satietas sine fastidio ; hinc insatiabilis illa sine inquietudine curiositas ; hinc aeternum illud atque inexplebile desiderium, nesciens egestatem ; hinc denique sobria illa ebrietas, vero, non mero ingurgitans, non madens vino, sed ardens Deo ».

10 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *De consideratione* II, III, 6, citant Pr 5 : 15, SBO III, p. 414 : « A

La philosophie de Bernard est ainsi avant tout réflexive, centrée sur le sujet en quête de connaissance de lui-même. Tout écart par rapport à ce centrage sur soi le ferait tomber dans une curiosité condamnable, selon une perspective héritée de saint Augustin, et lui ferait perdre sa dimension sapientielle de science savoureuse, selon l'étymologie médiévale commune ici implicite voulant que la *sapientia* soit *sapida scientia*.

Pourtant, juste avant d'opérer ce recentrage réflexif de la considération, Bernard lui reconnaît un éventail objectif très large résumé en quatre objets : « Pour en venir maintenant à l'objet même de la considération, je crois qu'on peut en assigner quatre qui se présentent d'eux-mêmes à la pensée : vous d'abord, puis ce qui est au-dessous de vous, autour de vous et au-dessus de vous »[11]. Ce qui est en dessous de nous se rapportera à la nature ou à la hiérarchie humaine et ne nous intéressera pas au premier chef. Ce qui est autour de nous donnera lieu dans le cas du pape à des développements historiquement intéressants sur son entourage immédiat, sa maison pontificale et sa bonne gestion. Mais là encore rien qui soit susceptible de retenir notre intérêt de philosophe. Reste le connais-toi toi-même et la connaissance de ce qui est au-dessus de nous.

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te tua consideratio inchoet, ne frustra extendaris in alia, te neglecto. Quid tibi prodest si universum mundum lucreris, te unum perdens ? Et si sapiens sis, deest tibi ad sapientiam, si tibi non fueris. Quantum vero ? Ut quidem senserim ego, totum. Noveris licet omnia mysteria, noveris lata terrae, alta caeli, profunda maris, si te nescieris, eris similis aedificanti sine fundamento, ruinam, non structuram faciens. Quidquid exstruxeris extra te, erit instar congesti pulveris, ventis obnoxium. *Non ergo sapiens, qui sibi non est. Sapiens sibi sapiens erit : et bibet de fonte putei sui primus ipse* ». À rapprocher de Saint Augustin, *De trinitate* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne 15), IV, I, 1, pp. 336–337 : « Scientiam terrestrium coelestiumque rerum magni aestimare solet genus humanum : in quo profecto meliores sunt qui huic scientiae praeponunt nosse semetipsos ; laudabiliorque est animus cui nota est vel infirmitas sua, quam qui ea non respecta, vias siderum scrutatur etiam cogniturus, aut qui jam cognitas tenet, ignorans ipse qua ingrediatur ad salutem ac firmitatem suam ». Sur le sens socratique d'une telle conversion, et sa postérité platonicienne, cf. également *De civitate dei* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne 14), VIII, 3 sq., pp. 236 sq. ; ainsi que son écho chez Pétrarque, *De Sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia*, III, 4–5, éd. et trad. Ch. Carraud, Grenoble 2000, pp. 80–83.

11 Bernard de Clairvaux, *De consideratione* II, III, 6, citant Pr 5 : 15, SBO III, p. 414 : « Iam quod ad considerationis attinet fructum, quatuor, ut occurrunt, tibi consideranda reor : te, quae sub te, quae circa te, quae supra te sunt ».

2 La Considération comme "connais-toi toi-même"

Une fois détachée de ce qui est autour d'elle, au-dessus ou en dessous, la considération se déploie comme connais-toi toi-même selon trois modalités objectives et ainsi que nous le verrons ensuite, trois modalités subjectives. Car le *scito teipsum* se décline en trois questions : *Quid ? Quis ? Qualis ?*, qui renvoient les unes aux autres et dynamisent le chemin d'humilité du connais-toi toi-même. Elles sont développées au livre II du *De consideratione* :

> Et cette considération de toi-même se divise en trois parties différentes ; tu peux considérer en effet ce que tu es, qui tu es et quel tu es. Ce que tu es se rapporte à la nature ; qui tu es, à la personne, et quel tu es, aux mœurs. Qu'es-tu en effet ? Un homme. Qui es-tu ? Le Pape ou le souverain Pontife. Enfin quel es-tu ? Bienveillant, doux et le reste[12].

Rappelons ici que le *De consideratione* est adressé par Bernard au Pape Eugène III qui est issu de son ordre, mais que l'exercice du pouvoir pontifical pourrait détourner de la vie contemplative. La distinction nature / personne pourrait paraître une transposition d'éléments repris à la théologie trinitaire, mais il s'agit bien ici d'un déploiement anthropologique du connais-toi toi-même. Relevons au passage que la première question est celle qui appelle le moins de développements et que la seconde semble renvoyer la personne du Pape à sa seule fonction. C'est que l'une comme l'autre donnent plus de prise à la duperie de soi et renvoient à la troisième qui recentre la vérité du connais-toi toi-même sur la réalité éthique de la personne.

2.1 Quid ? *Souviens-toi pape que tu es mortel*

Le philosophe ne peut donc manquer de relever la brièveté avec laquelle l'auteur du *De consideratione* passe sur la question de la nature humaine :

> Quoique la considération du premier de ces trois points, convienne plutôt à un philosophe qu'à un successeur des Apôtres, pourtant il y a dans la définition de l'homme, qu'on appelle un animal raisonnable et sujet à la mort, quelque chose qui mérite encore de fixer ton attention, si tu permets que nous nous y arrêtions. D'ailleurs je ne vois rien dans cet

12 Ibid., II, IV, 7, SBO III, p. 415 : « Et haec tui consideratio in tria quaedam dividitur, si consideres quid, quis et qualis sis : quid in natura, quis in persona, qualis in moribus ; quid, verbi gratia, homo ; quis, Papa vel Summus Pontifex ; qualis, benignus, mansuetus vel quidquid tale ».

> examen qui répugne ni à ta profession religieuse ni à ton rang, j'y vois même quelque avantage pour ton salut. En effet, si tu considères que tu es en même temps raisonnable et mortel, tu arrives immédiatement à cette double conséquence, digne de l'attention d'un homme sage et réfléchi, que d'être mortel abaisse l'être raisonnable, et que d'être raisonnable relève l'être mortel. S'il se présente encore sur ce point quelques remarques à faire, je les ferai plus tard et peut-être avec plus de fruit qu'en ce moment, à cause de l'enchaînement des sujets à traiter[13].

Bernard semble à première vue opposer la préoccupation du philosophe qui cherche à connaître la nature humaine et celle de l'apôtre qui devrait s'activer à la convertir. Or le moine ne se trouve-t-il pas dans une position médiane entre ces deux soucis ? Il s'en tient ici à reprendre en la modifiant la définition que l'on trouve chez Aristote : comme animal raisonnable, l'homme est sujet à la mort. Rompu à la dialectique, Bernard oppose dans une belle rhétorique, la condition mortelle de l'animal qui rappelle l'homme à l'humilité et sa raison qui l'incite à s'élever au-dessus de son animalité. La réflexion sur la nature et la condition de l'homme appellerait de plus longs développements philosophiques, mais Bernard coupe court, les renvoyant à plus tard. On les retrouvera au Chapitre IX, mais encore très discrets après les longs chapitres évoquant la fonction pontificale. Il est vrai qu'on trouve déjà au Livre I Chapitre VIII un enseignement sur les vertus cardinales et leur rapport à la piété. Mais l'exercice spirituel auquel l'Abbé invite son ancien moine est d'abord pratique et commence par un effort de mémoire.

2.2 Quis ? *Souviens-toi pape que tu fus moine*

Savoir qui il est, ce n'est pas s'en tenir à la gloire à laquelle il est parvenu au moment où Bernard écrit, mais aussi se souvenir d'où il est venu, de son passé monastique :

13 Ibid. : « Quamquam primum illud philosophicum sit magis quam apostolicum vestigare, attamen est in diffinitione hominis, quem dicunt animal rationale, mortale. Quod diligentius intueri si libet, licet. Non est quod tuae in eo aut professioni obviet, aut dignitati ; est vero quod saluti afferre queat. Nam consideranti duo haec simul, rationale mortale que is tibi exinde occurrit fructus, ut et mortale, quod in te est rationale humiliet, et rursum rationale, mortale confortet, quod neutrum neglectui erit homini circumspecto. Si qua adhuc praesens consideranda requirit locus, tractabuntur infra, et forte utilius ex partium collatione ».

> Qui es-tu aujourd'hui et à partir d'où y as-tu été élevé ? Voilà ce que nous avons à examiner. Toutefois sur ce dernier point, – qu'étais-tu auparavant ? – j'aurais tendance à penser qu'il vaudrait mieux que je passe pour laisser plutôt pareil sujet à tes méditations. Pourtant, qu'il me soit permis de te dire qu'il serait indigne de toi que ton action reste en-deçà de la perfection, quand on est allé te prendre parmi les plus parfaits. N'y aurait-il pas en effet pour toi de quoi rougir de te retrouver le plus petit dans un poste élevé, quand tu te souviens d'avoir été grand dans une condition obscure ? Tu n'as pas oublié ta première profession religieuse, si elle t'a été arrachée des mains, elle n'a pas pour autant été effacée de ton esprit, ni bannie de ton cœur. Ce ne sera jamais sans fruit que tu l'auras devant les yeux dans l'exercice du souverain pouvoir, dans le jugement des causes portées à ton tribunal et dans toutes tes entreprises. Cette considération te fera mépriser les honneurs au sein des honneurs mêmes, ce qui n'est pas peu de chose[14].

Une première dialectique subtile confronte ici au sein même de son « quis est », de l'identité personnelle d'Eugène III, deux composantes fondamentales : la gloire de la fonction pontificale et la profession monastique qu'il avait d'abord prononcée. Pas question de se laisser griser par le faste de la cour pontificale, Bernard y revient dans les chapitres suivants. Mais surtout, il s'agit, dans la façon même d'exercer le pouvoir spirituel suprême de conserver la manière requise par l'humilité de sa profession monastique originelle et de garder présent à l'esprit le renoncement inhérent aux trois vœux dans l'exercice même de la fonction souveraine.

2.3 *Dialectique du* quid *et du* quis

A cette première dialectique interne à la réflexion sur le *quis es*, succède une autre qui le met en relation avec le *quid es*. Ce qu'il est, son « quid est », Eugène III comme chacun d'entre nous, l'a reçu comme sa nature humaine, toutefois il bénéficie aussi d'une grâce personnelle qui hisse son « quis est »

14 Ibid., II, V, 8, SBO III, pp. 415–416 : « Nunc quis sis et de quo sis factus, advertendum. Quamquam quod dixi "de quo", id mihi praetereundum putem, tuae potius relinquendum agnitioni. Illud dico indignum tibi, citra perfectum agere de tanta assumpto perfectione. Quidni erubescas minimus inveniri in magnis, qui te recordaris magnum in minimis exstitisse ? Non es oblitus primae professionis ; non excidit menti quae subducta est manui, sed ne affectui quidem. Ipsam ad singula tua imperia, iudicia, instituta, habere prae oculis non erit inutile. Haec te consideratio facit honoris contemptorem in honore ipso. Atque id magnum ».

de la profession monastique au trône suprême. S'il est devenu quelque chose : « id quod est », entendons quelqu'un, dans la société, c'est cette fois par cette double grâce : monastique, puis pontificale. Leur caractère exceptionnel ne doit pas nous laisser perdre de vue qu'il en va ainsi pour chacun d'entre nous : le *quid* de notre nature humaine est une condition reçue avec ses forces et faiblesses physiques et morales, mais le *quis*, la personne que nous devenons, découle de nos choix fondamentaux, comme celui de la vie monastique en quête de la perfection évangélique dans le cas du moine, mais aussi et en-deçà, des grâces reçues et de la fortune sociale et politique. Qui je suis, revêt ainsi une dimension sociale : le personnage que je montre aux yeux des autres, mais c'est avant tout qui je veux être par mes choix fondamentaux. Toutefois, de l'un à l'autre, il n'y a rien que je n'aie reçu.

Dans la démarche philosophique du connais-toi toi-même il serait risqué de s'arrêter à sa dignité sociale, voire personnelle (*quis*), et c'est pourquoi il convient de garder en même temps en mémoire l'humilité de sa condition humaine (*quid*) :

> Eh bien, considérons ces deux points de vue en même temps ; car, comme je te l'ai rappelé plus haut, ainsi rapprochés l'un de l'autre, ils se font valoir mutuellement davantage. J'ai dit plus haut qu'en considérant ce que tu es, tu apercevais d'abord que tu es homme, car homme tu l'es de naissance. Mais si tu te demandes ensuite qui tu es, le mot de la réponse est le nom même de ta dignité personnelle : à savoir évêque, ce que tu es devenu, mais que tu n'étais pas de naissance. Lequel des deux : ce que tu es devenu ou ce que tu étais de naissance, te semble correspondre le mieux à ce qui t'appartient en propre au premier chef ? N'est-ce pas ce que tu es par le fait de ta naissance ? Aussi te conseillé-je de considérer d'abord ce que tu es avant tout, c'est-à-dire de considérer l'homme en toi, puisque c'est ce que tu es de naissance[15].

Nous l'avons compris, le rappel à l'humilité de la nature humaine, du *quid* ne vient pas seulement en manifester la petitesse par rapport au cosmos ou le

15 Ibid., II, IX, 17, p. 425 : « Tractemus utrumque simul, nam, ut praefatum me memini, collatae ex invicem ambae res utiliores fient. Dixi supra consideranti quid sis, naturam occurrere, qua es homo : nam homo natus es. Porro percunctanti quis, personae respondebitur nomen, quod est episcopus : quod quidem factus, non natus es. Quid tibi horum videtur ad purum esse tui principalius pertinere, quod factus an quod natus ? Nonne quod natus ? Hoc ergo consulo consideres maxime, quod maxime es, hominem videlicet, quod et natus es ».

(quasi) néant par rapport à Dieu, il vient faire contrepoids à l'estime excessive que la personne pourrait avoir de soi (*quis*) au vu soit de son rang social, soit même de son engagement moral. Cet exercice spirituel conduit au troisième objet de la considération, intermédiaire entre les deux autres et pourtant radicalement différent : celui de la qualité morale effective de la personne, de son progrès sur le chemin des vertus.

Avant de venir à ce troisième objet, comprenons comment et pourquoi l'exercice précédent y conduit. Car le texte glisse du *quid* au *qualis natus*. Entendons que nul ne nait coiffé, surtout pas évidemment de la tiare papale :

> Mais si tu ne veux perdre tout le fruit et l'avantage de ta considération, il ne faut pas te contenter d'examiner ce que tu es, mais quel tu es par ta naissance. Commence donc par te dépouiller de la défroque que tu as reçue de tes pères et qui fut maudite dès le commencement du monde. Déchire ce voile de feuillage qui ne cache que ta honte et ne peut guérir tes plaies ; enfin écarte ce prestige d'une gloire éphémère, cet éclat d'emprunt et mensonger, et considère à nu ta propre nudité, car c'est nu que tu es sorti du sein de ta mère (Jb 1, 21). Etais-tu déjà couronné ?[16].

La symbolique des feuilles de figuier, nous fait comprendre que l'enseignement ne vaut pas seulement pour le Pape Eugène III, revêtu de ses ornements pontificaux, mais pour tout homme qui s'engage ici à la suite de Socrate et de Bernard sur le chemin du connais-toi toi-même. L'exercice qui fait contraster le *quis* et ce qu'il peut comporter de gloire mondaine, voire aussi bien d'ailleurs d'opprobre sociale et le *quid* d'une nature humaine en son dépouillement, permet de faire tomber les masques, surtout celui de la duperie de soi par laquelle chacun s'excuse de sa faiblesse et manque de la mettre à nu devant Dieu pour qu'elle soit guérie. Le personnage social que nous avons à jouer n'est-il pas le principal obstacle à la prise de conscience de la nudité de notre condition humaine ? Car, la nature humaine en sa nudité originelle reste blessée par le péché :

16 Ibid., II, IX, 18, p. 425 : « Nec modo quid natus, sed et qualis natus, oportet attendas, si non vis tuae considerationis fructu et utilitate fraudari. Tolle proinde nunc hereditaria haec perizomata ab initio maledicta. Dirumpe velamen foliorum celantium ignominiam, non plagam curantium. Dele fucum fugacis honoris huius et male coloratae nitorem gloriae, ut nude nudum consideres, quia nudus egressus es de utero matris tuae. Numquid infulatus ? ».

> … car il est accablé de misères, de beaucoup de misères même, de celles du corps et de celles de l'âme : en est-il une seule dont puisse être exempt celui qui naît dans le péché, avec un corps périssable et un esprit stérile pour le bien ? On peut bien dire qu'il en est rempli, puisque à l'infirmité du corps et à l'aveuglement de l'esprit, s'ajoutent la transmission d'une souillure héréditaire et la nécessité de mourir. C'est pour toi un salutaire rapprochement à faire que de songer qu'en même temps que tu es pape, tu es, je ne dis pas tu as été, tu es encore une méprisable poussière[17].

Etait-il nécessaire de rappeler cet état post-lapsaire ? Oui, car précisément l'exercice spirituel qui consiste à garder cette blessure originelle, non seulement en mémoire, mais ouverte afin qu'elle puisse être guérie et ouvrir à son tour la voie d'une divinisation de l'homme, fonde la possibilité du progrès dans la connaissance de soi.

2.4 *Du calice au* qualis

Ainsi cet enseignement de Bernard sur le connais-toi toi-même ne se contente-t-il pas de nous rappeler que le roi est nu. Car c'est devant Dieu qu'il est requis de se mettre à nu pour progresser sur le chemin qualitatif des vertus. Mieux, cette mise à nu n'est pas seulement humaine humilité, elle rejoint ainsi la divine humiliation de la kénose :

> Imite la nature, ou plutôt l'auteur même de la nature, ce qui est plus digne, en rapprochant dans ta pensée ce qu'il y a de plus grand de ce qu'il y a de plus petit. La nature n'a-t-elle pas associé en la personne humaine, un souffle de vie à une vile poussière ? L'Auteur même de la nature n'a-t-il pas, en sa propre personne, uni notre limon au Verbe de Dieu ? Inspire-toi donc de la pensée de notre double origine et du mystère de notre rédemption afin de ne point t'enorgueillir dans le haut rang que tu occupes, mais de concevoir d'humbles sentiments de toi-même et d'aimer ceux qui partagent ton humilité[18].

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17 Ibid., II, IX, 18, p. 426 : « … repletus multis miseriis, et propterea cum fletu. Et vere multis, quia corporis et animae simul. Quid enim calamitate vacat nascenti in peccato, fragili corpore et mente sterili ? Vere ergo repletus, cui infirmitas corporis et fatuitas cordis cumulatur traduce sordis, mortis addictione. Salubris copula, ut cogitans te Summum Pontificem, attendas pariter vilissimum cinerem non fuisse, sed esse ».

18 Ibid. : « Imitetur cogitatio naturam ; imitetur et, quod dignius est, Auctorem naturae, summa ima que consocians. Nonne natura in persona hominis vili limo vitae spiraculum colligavit ? Nonne Auctor naturae in sui persona Verbum limum que contemperavit ? Ita

La dynamique qui permet le progrès dans les vertus à partir de l'humilité est donc celle-là même d'où procède la rédemption. L'exercice spirituel qui consiste à tenir ensemble grandeur du rang social et petitesse d'une nature humaine blessée, est relayé par celui pratiqué par le Verbe divin dans son Incarnation et dans son sacrifice rédempteur. Le socratisme de Bernard est bien ainsi un socratisme chrétien, appuyant un exercice humain de l'humilité sur les mystères du Dieu fait homme et du salut qu'il apporte. Or, cet exercice spirituel permet d'accéder à quelque réalisme dans la connaissance de soi en débouchant sur la troisième instance : celle qualitative et éthique du « *qualis sis* ».

2.5 Qualis*: version bernardine du μηδεν ἀγαν*

Car en considérant quel (*qualis*) nous sommes, nous nous tenons en un juste milieu entre grandeur et misère, nature et dignité humaine. Dans la considération du troisième sujet de la connaissance de soi : *qualis sis*, nous découvrons comme la manière bernardine de pratiquer le μηδεν ἀγαν de la tradition philosophique :

> Si tu considères combien grand tu es, considère aussi, considère surtout quel tu es. Car voilà la considération qui te retient en toi-même, ne te permettant ni de prendre ton essor loin de toi, ni de t'égarer dans des idées de grandeur et de gloire qui sont au-dessus de toi (Ps 130, 2). Oui, ancré en toi-même, garde toi bien, soit de descendre plus bas que toi, soit de t'élever plus haut, de t'égarer au loin, de te disperser au large. Maintiens-toi dans un juste milieu si tu ne veux point excéder la mesure : seul le milieu est sûr, car le milieu est siège de la mesure, et que dans la mesure seule, se tient la vertu. Aussi voyons-nous le Sage regarder comme un lieu d'exil tout ce qui n'est pas renfermé dans une juste mesure ; il ne saurait se tenir au loin, ce qui serait outrepasser la mesure ; ni au large, ce qui serait en sortir ; ni même en haut, ce qui serait l'excéder ; ni en bas, ce qui serait rester en-deçà d'elle[19].

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tibi sume formam tam de nostrae concretione originis quam de sacramento redemptionis, ut, altus sedens, non alta sapiens sis, sed humilia de te sentiens humilibus que consentiens ».

19 Ibid., II, X, 19, p. 426 : « Proinde si consideras quantus es, cogita etiam qualis, et maxime. Haec te sane consideratio tenet in te, nec a te avolare sinit, non ambulare in magnis, neque in mirabilibus super te. In te consistito, non infra deici, non attolli supra, non evadere in longius, non extendi in latius. Tene medium, si non vis perdere modum. Locus medius tutus est. Medium sedes modi, et modus virtus. Omnem extra modum mansionem, sapiens exsilium reputat. Propterea non est illi habitare in longo, quod ultra modum

Le paragraphe 19 offre ainsi un passage du *quantus* au *qualis*, des grandeurs sociales à la vérité éthique. Il mériterait d'être cité intégralement. Mais nous reconnaissons déjà dans ces quelques lignes l'héritage delphique, nourri, il est vrai de la sagesse des psaumes. Au cœur même d'une considération centrée sur le sujet : *quid*, *quis*, *qualis*, ce dernier objet opère encore un recentrage vertueux du sujet en lui-même. Mieux que cela, il s'agit de l'ancrer au plus profond de lui-même par la modération. Ainsi recentrée sur le sujet et sa qualité morale, la considération se superpose parfaitement avec l'exercice vertueux de la modération. Les développements sur la longueur, la largeur, la profondeur et la hauteur ne sauraient manquer de faire songer à ceux de saint Paul en Ep 3, 18. Mais Bernard s'empresse de rectifier : il ne s'agit pas de celles de Dieu qu'il évoquera plus loin (au Livre V, § 27–32), mais bien de l'homme. Il ne manque pas d'ailleurs, de donner une explication morale très concrète des quatre écarts possibles par rapport à la mesure :

> En effet, se promettre de longs jours, n'est-ce pas se laisser emporter au-delà de toutes limites en dépassant les bornes de la vie par l'étendue de ses projets ? C'est en agissant ainsi qu'on voit des hommes, exilés hors d'eux-mêmes et oublieux du moment où ils vivent, sortir de la vie présente pour s'élancer, par de vains projets, vers d'autres temps, mais dont ils ne tireront aucun profit et qui n'adviendront pas même dans leur avenir. Il en est de même de l'esprit qui veut embrasser trop de choses à la fois, il ne peut manquer d'être déchiré par la multitude de ses soucis ; car en tendant trop une étoffe on l'amincit d'abord, puis on la déchire. Quant aux pensées présomptueuses qui nous élèvent, qu'est-ce autre chose que le prélude d'une chute plus profonde ? Tu sais bien qu'il est dit : "C'est pour retomber que le cœur s'exalte (Pr 18, 12)". D'un autre côté, l'abattement excessif d'une âme pusillanime ne ressemble que trop à un engloutissement sans espoir. L'homme fort ne se laissera jamais abattre ainsi ; l'homme prudent se gardera bien de faire fond sur les espérances incertaines d'une longue vie ; l'homme modéré non-seulement ne se laissera point aller à des soucis exagérés, mais s'abstiendra de tout excès, sans toutefois négliger les choses nécessaires ; enfin l'homme juste ne présumera pas trop de sa justice[20].

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sit ; sed ne in lato quidem, quod extra sit ; porro nec in alto vel imo, quod alterum supra, alterum infra sit ».

20 Ibid., II, X, 19, p. 427 : « Qui igitur longa sibi metitur tempora, nonne vere ingreditur iter exterminii, transiens vitae terminos productiori sollicitudine ? Inde est quod homines in praesenti a sese exsules per oblivionem, in alia per inanem sollicitudinem migrant

Les quatre excès dénoncés sont ramenés à des attitudes concrètes qui n'ont rien perdu de leur actualité. La recherche du bien-être n'est-elle pas pour nos contemporains, cette vaine quête d'un prolongement indéfini de la vie ? L'hyperactivité est encore un mal du siècle, comme aussi le stress qui l'accompagne, sans oublier la dépression qui touche même une jeunesse pusillanime et désespérée. Mais Bernard propose un remède simple : les quatre vertus cardinales. C'est sur elles que débouche naturellement un chemin d'humilité parvenu à la modération. On remarquera que si la force s'avère le meilleur antidépresseur gardant de l'aspiration des profondeurs, la tempérance se révèle comme une antistress efficace, tandis que la prudence gardera des faux espoirs de longévité et la justice de la vaine gloire. Enseignement moral du plus grand classicisme qui n'a rien perdu de son actualité car sa valeur traverse les époques.

2.6 *Trois modalités subjectives de la considération ?*

Or si la considération est triple quant à son objet, elle l'est aussi quant à sa modalité d'application. Distinguer entre le sujet et l'objet lorsqu'il s'agit du connais-toi toi-même pourra paraître dénué de sens. Pourtant, lorsqu'au Livre V, dévolu proprement à la contemplation, Bernard revient sur la considération, il en distingue trois dimensions fondamentales :

> Celui-là est grand qui regarde les sens comme un bien commun à tous les habitants de la cité de ce monde et s'efforce d'en acquitter le prix en les faisant servir à son salut et à celui des autres ; mais je n'estime pas moins grand celui qui s'en sert comme d'un marchepied pour s'élever, par la philosophie, jusqu'à la connaissance des choses invisibles ; toutefois de ces deux genres de vie l'un est plus utile et l'autre plus doux ; mais l'homme le plus grand de tous est celui qui, dédaignant de se servir des choses visibles et des sens, autant toutefois que cela est possible à la fragilité humaine, s'est fait une habitude de s'envoler, sur l'aile de la contemplation, vers ces hauteurs sublimes, non en gravissant des degrés,

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saecula, non profutura, immo nec futura. Similiter animus distentus in multa, multis laceretur curis necesse est. Nempe immoderata extensio extenuationem, et extenuatio nimia scissionem facit. Iam vero alta praesumptio, quid nisi ruinosa praecipitatio est ? Legisti namque : Ante ruinam exaltatur cor. Quid e regione nimiae pusillanimitatis deiectio, nisi desperata quaedam absorptio est ? In hanc fortis non deicietur, prudens longioris vitae non abducetur incerto ; modestus moderabitur curas, temperabit a superfluis, non deerit necessariis. Porro iustus altiora se non praesumet ».

> mais par des extases subites. C'est selon moi de ce dernier genre (de considération) que relèvent les ravissements de Paul…[21].

Le premier type de considération que Bernard appelle dispensative consiste en une manière éthique de s'approprier les réalités sensibles pour remonter à Dieu. Relevant de la volonté avec une visée pratique, il nous semble qu'elle peut être rapportée à la vie active en sa dimension proprement éthique. Rappelons ce qu'en dit plus exactement Bernard lorsqu'il entend définir chacune des trois considérations :

> Veux-tu que j'appelle chacune de ces trois considérations par le nom qui lui convient ? Nous nommerons, si cela te convient, la première dispensative, la seconde estimative et la troisième spéculative. Des définitions argumentées viendront éclairer ces trois dénominations. La considération que j'appelle dispensative est celle qui se sert de manière ordonnée et sociable, des sens et des choses sensibles pour mériter Dieu[22].

La première forme de considération use donc des réalités sensibles « ordinate et socialiter », entendons selon un ordre moral et dans une pratique sociale de bon aloi. Il s'agit bien, non d'une considération théorique, mais d'un *usus* visant à mériter celui dont on ne peut que jouir en une ultime béatitude : Dieu. De plus, la *dispensatio* ne suppose-t-elle pas aussi un rapport technique au monde, qui se l'approprie et le dépense sagement en vue des fins dernières ? Si la dispensative correspond à ce point de vue pratique, voire technique, l'estimative en viendra quant à elle, à un regard plus théorique. Nous l'avons d'ailleurs vu rapporter explicitement dans le passage précédent, plus spécifiquement à la philosophie : « L'estimative examine et pèse chaque chose avec

21 Ibid., V, II, 4, p. 468 : « Magnus ille, qui usum sensuum, quasdam veluti civium opes, expendere satagit, dispensando in suam et multorum salutem. Nec ille minor qui hunc sibi gradum ad illa invisibilia philosophando constituit, nisi quod hoc dulcius, illud utilius, hoc felicius, illud fortius esse constat. At omnium maximus, qui spreto ipso usu rerum et sensuum, quantum quidem humanae fragilitati fas est, non ascensoriis gradibus, sed inopinatis excessibus, avolare interdum contemplando ad illa sublimia consuevit. Ad hoc ultimum genus illos pertinere reor excessus Pauli… ».

22 Ibid., p. 469 : « Vis tibi has considerationis species propriis distingui nominibus ? Dicamus, si placet, primam dispensativam, secundam aestimativam, tertiam speculativam. Horum nominum rationes definitiones declarabunt. Dispensativa est consideratio sensibus sensibilibusque rebus ordinate et socialiter utens ad promerendum Deum ».

attention et prudence, pour rechercher en elle une connaissance de Dieu »[23]. Remarquons que si la première vise la possession et non la connaissance de Dieu en partant des choses sensibles en tant que sensibles, la seconde scrute leur valeur rationnelle dans une investigation intellectuelle qui partant d'elles, vise Dieu. Certes, elle comporte une dimension de prudence qui la lie encore à la dimension éthique, mais son investigation rationnelle (*scrutans et ponderans*) ne considère pas tant l'usage des réalités qu'elle mesure ainsi, que la connaissance de leur nature.

Quant à la troisième, dans la référence aux extases de Paul ne relève-t-elle pas plutôt de la contemplation mystique que de la considération philosophique ? Rappelons encore la définition qu'en propose Bernard :

> … enfin la considération spéculative se recueille en elle-même, et, aidée de la grâce de Dieu, elle se dégage des choses humaines pour ne contempler que Dieu. Vous voyez déjà, je pense, que la troisième est la conséquence des deux autres, et que ces dernières, si elles ne se rapportent point à elles pourront bien paraître ce qu'on en a dit, mais ne le seront point effectivement[24].

Ce recueillement intérieur correspond bien au mouvement de la *prosochè*, légué aux Pères grecs puis latins par le néoplatonisme et il débouche sur une spéculation métaphysique contemplative qui n'est autre que celle de la mystique spéculative. Theo Kobusch a bien montré cette filiation de Bernard qui le place dans la droite ligne du Socratisme chrétien des moments patristiques et monastique de l'Histoire de la philosophie et de la théologie[25]. Mais on relèvera encore dans le passage que nous venons de citer que pour Bernard, les trois formes de considération sont indissociables et ordonnées : les deux pre-

23 Ibid. : « Aestimativa est consideratio prudenter ac diligenter quaeque scrutans et ponderans ad vestigandum Deum ».

24 Ibid. : « Speculativa est consideratio se in se colligens, et, quantum divinitus adjuvatur, rebus humanis eximens ad contemplandum Deum. Puto vigilanter advertis aliarum hanc esse fructum, caeteras, si non referantur ad istam, quod dicuntur videri posse, sed non esse ».

25 Cf. Theo Kobusch, « Metaphysik als geistige Übung, zum Problem der Philosophie bei Bernhard von Clairvaux », in : *Cistercienser Kronik* 106 : 1 (1999), pp. 57–68 ; id., *Christliche Philosophie. Die Entdeckung der Subjektivität*, Darmstadt 2006 ; id., « La pensée de Bernard : un héritage de la 'philosophie chrétienne' », in : Ch. Trottmann *et alii* (eds.), *Bernard de Clairvaux et la pensée des cisterciens – Actes du Colloque de Troyes, 28–30 octobre 2010*, numéro spécial de la *Revue Cîteaux* 63 (2012), pp. 15–26.

mières doivent mener à la troisième seule susceptible de les faire parvenir à leur sens ultime. Certains pourraient être tentés, au regard du premier passage que nous avions cité du Livre V, de cantonner la philosophie à la seule considération estimative. Mais pour Bernard, celle-ci serait impraticable sans les deux autres : la dispensative qui y dispose, mais surtout, la spéculative qui lui donne sens. Bernard y insiste c'est en cette dernière que les deux premières formes de considération trouvent leur accomplissement :

> Il est clair ; en effet, que si la première n'a pas le regard tourné vers celle-ci, elle sème à pleines mains pour ne rien moissonner ; quant à la seconde, si elle ne mène à la troisième, il est clair qu'elle chemine toujours et n'arrive jamais au but. Aussi dirai-je que la première désire les choses, la seconde les flaire et la troisième les savoure. Il est vrai que les deux premières conduisent au même résultat, mais beaucoup plus lentement, avec cette différence encore que la première y mène par une voie plus pénible, et la seconde par un chemin plus doux et plus tranquille[26].

Retenons ici la leçon de Bernard. La dispensative, qui correspond à la vie active est vaine si elle ne conserve pas un regard, une visée (*intuitus*) en direction de la vie contemplative. Elle demeure, même ainsi finalisée, plus pénible que la voie plus particulièrement philosophique d'une investigation intellectuelle de la nature. Toutefois, celle-ci serait un « chemin qui ne mène nulle part » (risque qui guette toute philosophie mondaine qui se refermerait sur cette recherche naturelle), si elle ne débouchait aussi sur une spéculation métaphysique. On soulignera ici que la saveur à laquelle conduisent les deux premières dimensions de la considération est bien une spéculation contemplative nourrie d'une grâce mystique. Les trois dimensions de la considération nous semblent ainsi indissociablement philosophiques et ordonnées à une spéculation inspirée par la mystique.

Rappelons les précisions apportées par Bernard à la fin du premier paragraphe du Chapitre II du Livre V où nous l'avons vu assimiler la considération spéculative au rapt de Paul :

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26 Bernard de Clairvaux, *De consideratione* V, IV, SBO III, p. 469 : « Et prior quidem absque intuitu huius multa serit, et nihil metit, sequens vero nisi ad istam se dirigat, vadit, sed non evadit. Ergo quod prima optat, secunda odorat, tertia gustat. Ad quem tamen gustum perducunt et caeterae, etsi tardius : nisi quod prima laboriosius, secunda quietius pervenitur ».

> C'étaient des élévations impétueuses et non de paisibles ascensions; aussi rapporte-t-il lui-même qu'il fut enlevé plutôt qu'il ne monta (2 Co 12, 14), et, dit-il ailleurs: "Si nous sommes ravis en esprit, c'est pour Dieu (2 Co 5, 13)". Or voici comment ces trois états différents se produisent: la considération, dans le lieu même de son exil, se trouvant élevée au-dessus des choses de la terre, par l'application à la vertu et par le secours de la grâce de Dieu, réprime les sens pour en prévenir les excès, leur assigne des limites pour en empêcher les écarts, ou les fuit de peur d'en être souillée; elle se montre ainsi plus puissante dans le premier cas, plus indépendante dans le second et plus pure dans le troisième. Car l'indépendance et la pureté sont les deux ailes sur lesquelles la considération prend son essor[27].

On notera au passage le tour plus ascétique que prend la considération estimative dans ce dernier passage afin de disposer plus efficacement aux élévations mystiques. Car la mystique contemplative avant le siècle d'or n'est nullement l'apanage de quelques religieuses ravies en extase, elle est l'aboutissement d'une vigilante philosophie chrétienne, passant par l'effort éthique et la science de la nature, mais pour aboutir à une union savoureuse à Dieu[28]. Les fruits associés à chacune des formes de la considération: puissance, liberté et pureté s'ordonnent ainsi en vue de l'envol spéculatif. Or nous avons déjà montré ailleurs[29] que Bernard s'inscrit ainsi dans la lignée d'une tripartition de

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27 Ibid., pp. 468–469: « Excessus, non ascensus: nam raptum potius fuisse, quam ascendisse ipse se perhibet (II Co 12, 1–4). Inde est quod dicebat: Sive mente excedimus, Deo (Id. 5, 13). Porro haec tria ita contingunt, cum consideratio, etsi in loco peregrinationis suae, virtutis studio, et adjutorio gratiae facta superior, sensualitatem aut premit ne insolescat, aut cogit ne evagetur, aut fugit ne inquinet. In primo potentior, in secundo liberior, in tertio purior. Puritatis siquidem et alacritatis pariter alis fit ille volatus ».

28 Notons que Saint Bonaventure, qui un siècle après Bernard, distingue dans les termes de la scolastique universitaire, une telle connaissance de Dieu dans des élévations anagogiques, des grâces spéciales sortant de la loi commune, concédées aux mystiques, considère qu'elle doit être désirée par tout homme juste ici-bas; cf. Saint Bonaventure, *In II Sent*., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ad. 6, cit., (ed. Quaracchi), t. II, p. 546: « Haec enim est, in qua mirabiliter inflammatur affectio, sicut eis patet, qui aliquoties consueverunt ad anagogicos elevari excessus. Hunc modum cognoscendi arbitror cuilibet viro iusto in via ista esse quaerendum; quodsi Deus aliquid ultra faciet, hoc privilegium est speciale, non legis communis ».

29 Cf. Ch. Trottmann, « Bernard de Clairvaux et l'inflexion cistercienne du socratisme chrétien », in: Ch. Trottmann *et alii* (eds.), *Bernard de Clairvaux et la pensée des cisterciens – Actes du Colloque de Troyes, 28–30 octobre 2010*, numéro spécial de la *Revue Cîteaux* 63 (2012), pp. 45–61.

la philosophie Chrétienne qui s'origine chez Origène et se retrouve tout au long du Moyen Age, en particulier dans les Commentaires du *Cantique des cantiques* jusqu'au docteur melliflue, voire jusqu'au XIIIe siècle[30]. Nous nous contenterons ici d'en reprendre l'expression la plus achevée que l'on trouve chez saint Grégoire le Grand dans le *Prologue* de son *Commentaire du Cantique*:

> Ce livre vient en troisième parmi ceux de Salomon. Les anciens avaient coutume de dire qu'il y a trois genres de vie: la vie morale, la vie naturelle et la vie contemplative, que les Grecs appelèrent vie éthique, physique, théorique. C'est des *Proverbes* que ressort la vie morale… De l'*Ecclésiaste* la vie naturelle… Quant à la vie contemplative, c'est du *Cantique des cantiques* qu'elle ressort… Or la vie des trois patriarches fut caractéristique de chacun de ces trois genres de vie: celle d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob. C'est évidemment la spécificité morale qu'Abraham a atteinte en obéissant. Isaac représenta la vie naturelle en creusant des puits. Car le fait de creuser des puits signifie ici scruter avec une attention systématique toutes les réalités inférieures, par une considération naturelle. Jacob obtint quant à lui la vie contemplative, lui qui vit les anges qui montaient et qui descendaient[31].

Cette lecture peut être traduite dans le tableau suivant que nous pouvons compléter en associant à ces trois dimensions de la philosophie les trois formes de la considération que nous venons d'étudier chez Bernard[32]:

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30 Cf. G. Dahan, «Origène et Jean Cassien dans un *Liber de philosophia Salomonis*», in: *AHDLMA* 60 (1985), pp. 135–162.

31 Cf. Grégoire le Grand, *In Canticum canticorum*, Prol., (éd. P. Verbraken), CCL 144, Tunhout 1963, p. 12: «Salomonis tertius in opusculis eius ponitur. Veteres enim tres vitae ordines esse dixerunt: moralem, naturalem et contemplativam: quas graeci vitas ethicam, fisicam, theoricam nominaverunt. In Proverbiis quoque moralis vita exprimitur, ubi dicitur: *Audi, fili mi, sapientiam meam et prudentiae meae inclina aurem tuam*. In Ecclesiasten vero, naturalis: ibi quippe, quod omnia ad finem tendant, consideratur, cum dicitur: *Vanitas vanitantium et omnia vanitas*. In Canticis vero canticorum contemplativa vita exprimitur, dum in eis ipsius domini adventus et adspectus desideratur, cum sponsi voce dicitur: *Veni de Libano, veni*. Hos etiam ordines trium patriarcharum vita signavit: Abraham, Isaac videlicet et Iacob. Moralitatem quippe Abraham oboediendo tenuit. Isaac vero naturalem vitam puteos fodiendo figuravit: in imo enim, puteos fodere est per considerationem naturalem omnia, quae infra sunt, perscrutando rimari. Iacob vero contemplativam vitam tenuit, qui ascendentes et descendentes angelos vidit».

32 Sans le faire explicitement, Theo Kobusch le suggère, «Metaphysik als…», cit., p. 60 et note 16.

Philosophie morale	Philosophie de la nature	Philosophie inspective
Proverbes	Ecclésiaste	Cantique
Abraham obéit	Isaac creuse des puits	Jacob voit l'échelle
Considération dispensative	Considération estimative	Considération spéculative
Plus puissante	Plus libre	Plus pure

Bernard s'inscrit ainsi dans la grande tradition du Socratisme Chrétien dont il est le fleuron, comme l'avait bien vu Pierre Courcelle[33]. Ajoutons ici comme nous l'avons montré à la suite d'É. Gilson et L. Couloubaritsis qu'il donne au Socratisme une inflexion particulière en assignant à sa philosophie d'aller de l'humilité à la contemplation en passant par le détour de la charité[34]. C'est au début du de *Gradibus humilitatis* que Bernard trace ce chemin en trois étapes de la recherche de la vérité en faisant allusion au verset du Cantique (5, 1) : « Le premier mets est donc celui de l'humilité qui purge avec amertume ; le second est celui de la charité qui console avec douceur ; et le troisième est celui de la contemplation qui rend une âme solide par la force qu'elle lui donne »[35].

2.7 *Structure de la philosophie de Bernard, le primat de l'humilité*

L'humilité est bien le point de départ de la philosophie de Bernard[36]. Elle seule, permet le regard de vérité sur soi-même requis par le « connais-toi toi-même ». Ce n'est pas un hasard si c'est au début du *De gradibus* que Bernard fait de cette vertu bénédictine un chemin christique de vérité :

33 Cf. Pierre Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même, de Socrate à saint Bernard*, Paris 1974–1975, 3 Vols.

34 Cf. Ch. Trottmann, « Bernard de Clairvaux et l'inflexion cistercienne du socratisme chrétien », cit., pp. 54–58 ; É. Gilson, *Histoire de la philosophie au Moyen Age*, Paris 1986², pp. 297 sq. et L. Couloubaritsis, *Histoire de la philosophie ancienne et médiévale*, Paris 1998, p. 1103.

35 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *Liber de gradibus humilitatis* II, 5, SBO III, p. 19 : « Primus ergo cibus est humilitatis, purgatorius cum amaritudine ; secundus caritatis, consolatorius cum dulcedine ; tertius contemplationis, solidus cum fortitudine ».

36 Cf. J.-L. Chrétien, « L'humilité selon saint Bernard », in : *Communio* X : 4 (1985), pp. 112–127 ; Rémi Brague, « L'anthropologie de l'humilité », in : Rémi Brague (ed), *Saint Bernard et la philosophie*, Paris 1993, pp. 129–152.

> La voie, c'est l'humilité qui conduit à la vérité ; l'une représente le travail et l'autre en est le fruit. Mais qui me dit, me répondez-vous, qu'il est question dans ce passage, de l'humilité, puisque le Seigneur se contente de dire en général : "Je suis la voie" ? Ecoutez, c'est lui-même qui vous le dit assez clairement quand il ajoute : "Apprenez de moi que je suis doux et humble de cœur (Mt 11, 29)". Il se donne donc comme exemple d'humilité et modèle de douceur. Si on l'imite, on ne marche point dans les ténèbres mais on a la lumière de vie (Jn 8, 12). Or qu'est-ce que la lumière de vie, sinon la vérité, la vérité, dis-je, qui illumine tout homme venant en ce monde et lui montre où est la vraie vie ?[37].

La faisant contraster avec celle des sages et des prudents aux yeux du monde, c'est la vraie philosophie que Bernard entend ici sauver et exposer comme celle qui se pratique à l'ombre des cloîtres et pour qui la connaissance de la vérité se superpose avec la perfection de l'humilité : « *perfectio humilitatis, cognitio veritatis* »[38]. Cette voie est bien celle d'une recherche de la vérité pensée comme connais-toi toi-même philosophique, mais dans la douceur et l'humilité du cœur du Christ.

Or il précise encore que ceux qui peinent car ils se sont engagés dans cette ascension reçoivent déjà en chemin le soulagement de la charité. La référence aux trois nourritures de l'humilité, de la charité et de la contemplation prend sens, nous l'avons déjà vu de la référence au *Cantique* (5, 1), centrale pour la pensée de Bernard qui explique que la charité est cette nourriture adaptée aux âmes déjà purgées par l'humilité, mais encore trop faibles pour profiter de l'ivresse du vin, qui doivent se contenter de lait et d'huile[39]. La cha-

37 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *Liber de gradibus humilitatis* I, 1, SBO III, pp. 16–17 : « Viam dicit humilitatem, quae ducit ad veritatem : altera labor, altera fructus laboris est. Unde sciam, inquis, quod ibi de humilitate locutus sit, cum indeterminate dixerit : Ego sum via ? Audi apertius : Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde (Mt 11. 29). Se ergo proponit humilitatis exemplum, mansuetudinis formam. Si imitaris eum, non ambulas in tenebris, sed habebis lumen vitae (Jn 8, 12). Quid est lumen vitae, nisi veritas, quae illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ostendit ubi sit vera vita ? ».

38 Ibid., II, 5, p. 20.

39 Ibid., II, 4, pp. 18–19 : « Bonus cibus caritas, quae media in ferculo Salomonis consistens, […] Ibi siquidem apponitur pax, patientia, benignitas, longanimitas, gaudium in Spiritu Sancto […] Habet et humilitas in eodem ferculo suas epulas, panem scilicet doloris et vinum compunctionis, quas primo Veritas incipientibus offert […] Habet ibidem contemplatio ex adipe frumenti solidum cibum sapientiae, cum vino quod laetificat cor hominis, ad quem Veritas perfectos invitat, dicens : Comedite amici… […] propter imperfectas videlicet animas, quae dum adhuc solidum illum cibum minus capere possunt, lacte interim

rité est au cœur du chemin philosophique de Bernard vers la vérité car elle est la nourriture des « progressants » que nous retrouvons en particulier chez Denys le pseudo-Aréopagite entre les commençants, et les parfaits. Les débutants doivent se purger de leurs convoitises par l'humilité. Les progressants trouveront sur le plateau de la charité toutes les autres vertus qui en sont les fruits énumérés en Galates, 5, 23 : paix, patience, longanimité, joie… L'amour de charité apparaît ainsi comme un détour rendu nécessaire par l'impossibilité pour les progressants d'accéder directement de l'humilité dans le « connais-toi toi-même » à la contemplation de Dieu réservée aux parfaits. Ce n'est plus tant la physique et le mépris des créatures qu'elle peut induire à la suite de l'Ecclésiaste, qui vient s'interposer entre éthique de l'humilité et contemplation mystique, que le détour de la charité fraternelle. C'est là une première inflexion majeure apportée par Bernard au Socratisme Chrétien. Peut-être l'Abbé cistercien tire-t-il ainsi les conséquences philosophiques des exigences de la vie cénobitique ? Le moine, comme tout chrétien, ne progresse pas seul vers Dieu. Or ce détour de la charité mis en avant par Bernard prend bientôt une profondeur eschatologique.

2.8 *Le détour de la charité : un socratisme eschatologique*

Ce détour par la charité est ainsi au cœur d'un ordre philosophique dans la quête de la vérité qui veut que nous la recherchions d'abord en nous-même puis dans le prochain avant de la considérer en elle-même[40]. Or cet ordre est fondé selon Bernard sur celui de l'enseignement moral du Christ tel qu'il le présente dans les béatitudes : celle des cœurs purs est précédée par celle des miséricordieux, venant elle-même après celle des doux[41]. C'est ainsi la Vérité divine qui veut avant de se livrer elle-même dans sa contemplation, qu'une âme compatisse aux misères d'autrui. Les miséricordieux qui pleurent avec

caritatis pro pane, oleo pro vino nutriendae sunt. Quae recte media describitur, quia eius suavitas nec incipientibus praesto est, prohibente timore, nec perfectis satis est, pro abundantiori contemplationis dulcedine ».

40 Ibid., III, 6, p. 20 : « Inquirimus namque veritatem in nobis, in proximis, in sui natura. In nobis, nosmetipsos diiudicando : in proximis, eorum malis compatiendo ; in sui natura mundo corde contemplando ».

41 Ibid. : « Observa sicut numerum, ita et ordinem. Primo te doceat Veritas ipsa, quod prius in proximis quam in sui debeat inquiri natura. Post hoc accipies, cur prius in te, quam in proximis inquirere debeas. In numero siquidem beatitudinum, quas suo sermone distinxit, prius misericordes, quam mundicordes posuit (Mt 5, 7–8). Misericordes quippe cito in proximis veritatem deprehendunt, dum suos affectus in illos extendunt : dum sic per caritatem se illis conformant, ut illorum vel bona, vel mala, tamquam propria sentiant ».

ceux qui pleurent, purifient ainsi leur cœur et se réjouiront d'autant plus de contempler en elle-même la vérité pour laquelle ils auront ainsi par charité partagé joies et misères du prochain.

Le détour par la charité fraternelle en direction de la parfaite charité divine prend ainsi une dimension eschatologique avec Bernard et c'est selon nous la seconde inflexion spécifique qu'il donne au socratisme chrétien, en particulier dans le *De diligendo Deo*[42]. Nous avons vu en effet dès le début de cet article que le dernier degré de la charité où l'âme ne s'aime plus elle-même que pour Dieu correspond avec la contemplation suprême qui ne saurait être atteinte avant le jugement dernier, car tant qu'il subsiste en l'âme un désir légitime relatif au corps, elle n'est pas libre de tout amour propre pour se tourner vers Dieu[43]. L'anthropologie chrétienne de Bernard tire ici toutes les conséquences métaphysiques de son réalisme. C'est tout l'homme, corps et âme, qui doit être sauvé lors de la résurrection de la chair. Elle en tire les conséquences morales pour la volonté qui ne sera parfaitement tournée vers Dieu qu'après la résurrection finale. Mieux, il n'en va pas ici de la seule eschatologie individuelle des âmes, mais de l'eschatologie collective de tous les élus. Si donc la contemplation parfaite est reléguée au dernier jour, celui du jugement général, n'y a-t-il pas place pour une contemplation certes imparfaite en ce monde ? Les transports mystiques de la considération spéculative n'en sont-ils pas la garantie, permettant l'accès à une connaissance de ce qui est au-dessus de nous ?

3 Ouverture de la troisième forme de considération, spéculative et possibilité de connaître les réalités situées au-dessus de nous

Or ce qui concerne la considération de ce qui est au-dessus de nous ne relève pas des seules élévations mystiques d'une contemplation spéculative conçue sur le modèle du rapt de Paul :

> Quoique les livres précédents soient intitulés *de la Considération*, il s'y mêle néanmoins bien des choses qui ont rapport à l'action, puisqu'ils montrent et enseignent quelquefois, non-seulement ce qu'il est nécessaire de considérer, mais encore ce qu'il est indispensable de faire. Il n'en sera pas ainsi de celui-ci qui ne doit rouler que sur la considération. En effet, les choses qui sont placées au-dessus de vous, or ce sont celles dont

42 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo* VIII 23–XI 33, pp. 116–145.

43 Ibid., XI, 30, p. 136.

> il me reste à vous parler, ne réclament de vous aucune action, elles ne vous demandent que de les contempler[44].

Elle laisse de côté ce qui peut avoir rapport à la vie active et à l'éthique, et bien des développements des quatre premiers livres du *De consideratione* s'étendaient en conseils pratiques au pape sur sa manière d'agir dans l'Église et au-delà. Toutefois, la considération dispensative, si elle s'en tenait aux réalités inférieures sans ordonner leur bon usage vers les supérieures ferait fausse route :

> Aussi voudrais-je, mon cher Eugène, qu'avec la sagacité qui vous distingue, vous fissiez cette judicieuse remarque que votre considération s'égare toutes les fois qu'elle descend de ces choses supérieures aux choses inférieures et visibles pour apprendre à les connaître, à en user, à les ordonner ou à les régler selon que votre devoir l'exige. Si pourtant elle ne s'arrête à celles-ci que pour arriver aux premières, elle ne s'écarte pas trop de son objet ; et même en suivant cette voie elle retourne, en effet, comme un exilé dans sa patrie ; on ne saurait faire un usage plus digne et plus élevé des créatures présentes et visibles que de s'en servir, selon le sage conseil de saint Paul. Pour voir et comprendre par elles les choses invisibles qui se trouvent en Dieu (Rm 1, 20)[45].

Passer ainsi des réalités visibles aux invisibles semblerait la prérogative par excellence de la considération spéculative, mais l'estimative en constitue le point de départ. Or, si elle part des réalités qui sont autour de nous, ne perdons pas de vue que la considération menée dans le cinquième livre vise les réalités qui sont au-dessus de nous. Relevons ce très beau verbe forgé par Bernard pour rendre compte de la philosophie spéculative : « repatriare ». Tout philo-

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44 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *De consideratione* V, I, 1, SBO III, p. 467 : « Libri superiores, etsi De consideratione inscribantur, plurimum tamen habent actionis admixtum, dum res aliquas non considerandas tantum, sed agendas docent vel monent. At qui in manibus modo est, sola in consideratione versabitur. Quae enim supra sunt, – id quidem instat –, actu non indigent, sed inspectu ».

45 Ibid. : « Et hoc velim sollerter advertas, vir sagacissime Eugeni, quia toties peregrinatur consideratio tua, quoties ab illis rebus ad ista deflectitur inferiora et visibilia, sive intuenda ad notitiam, sive appetenda ad usum, sive pro officio disponenda vel actitanda. Si tamen ita versatur in his, ut per haec illa requirat, haud procul exsulat. Sic considerare, repatriare est. Sublimior iste praesentium ac dignior usus rerum, cum, iuxta sapientiam Pauli, "invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur" ».

sophe, dans son activité même de « considerare » est un rapatrié de la Jérusalem céleste, pris dans le mouvement de *reditus* qui attire vers Dieu les meilleurs esprits. La sidération passe bien plus haut que les étoiles dans ce divin siphonage par lequel Dieu rappelle à lui les âmes de prédilection. Encore Bernard fait-il la différence entre notre mode de connaissance qui a besoin de s'élever du visible à l'invisible et celui des anges :

> Les citoyens de la céleste patrie n'ont pas besoin de semblables degrés pour s'élever jusque-là, mais ils sont indispensables aux exilés. C'est bien la pensée de celui qui s'exprimait ainsi, puisqu'après avoir dit que les choses invisibles peuvent être aperçues au moyen des choses visibles, il ajoute expressément "par une créature de ce monde." En effet, qu'est-il besoin de degrés pour monter encore, à celui qui est déjà assis sur le trône ?[46].

Eux jouissent d'une connaissance matutinale qui leur permet de voir toute réalité créée dans le Verbe divin, avant même qu'elle ait été créée.

Après ces développements du Chapitre I sur les modalités de la considération portant sur les réalités situées au-dessus de nous, Bernard en vient au Chapitre II à la distinction entre les trois formes de considérations que nous avons étudiée plus haut. Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet en évoquant les anges et Dieu il lui faut encore s'attarder au Chapitre III à des réflexions méthodologiques qui retiendront notre intérêt :

> Peut-être me direz-vous que j'ai assez expliqué par quelle voie on monte et qu'il me reste à dire maintenant où, il faut monter. Vous êtes dans l'erreur si vous croyez que je puisse le faire ; sur ce chapitre, la parole est impuissante. Voulez-vous que je vous dépeigne ce que l'œil de l'homme n'a jamais vu, ce que son oreille n'a jamais entendu, ce dont son cœur n'a pas, la moindre idée (I Co 2, 9) ? "Dieu seul, nous dit l'Apôtre, nous l'a révélé par son esprit (ibid. 10)." [...] Nous avons trois moyens de connaître les êtres placés au-dessus de nous, c'est-à-dire Dieu et les anges ; ce sont l'opinion, la foi et l'intelligence[47].

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46 Ibid. : « Sane hac scala cives non egent, sed exsules. Quod vidit ipse huius sententiae auctor, qui, cum diceret invisibilia per visibilia conspici, signanter posuit : a creatura mundi. Et vere quid opus scalae tenenti iam solium ? ».

47 Ibid., V, III, 5, SBO III, p. 470 : « "Dixisti", inquis, "satis qua ascendatur ; etiam quo ascendendum dicere habes". Falleris, si id speras : ineffabile est. Tu me existimas loqui quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit ? "Nobis, inquit, revelavit Deus

On ne saurait être surpris de voir ainsi la foi et l'intelligence réquisitionnées au service d'une théologie certes plus méditative qu'argumentée. En revanche, la présence de l'opinion aura de quoi surprendre. Bernard n'a-t-il pas à la suite de Guillaume de Saint Thierry, critiqué Abélard sur sa tendance précisément à réduire la foi à l'opinion[48] ? C'est l'un des chefs d'accusation qui sera repris au Chapitre IV de la Lettre 190 :

> Dès les premières lignes de sa Théologie ou plutôt de sa Stultologie, il définit la foi une opinion, comme s'il était loisible à chacun de penser et de dire ce que bon lui semble, comme si les mystères de notre foi dépendaient du caprice de l'esprit humain, quand au contraire ils sont appuyés sur les solides et inébranlables fondements de la vérité[49].

Le reproche concerne d'abord le caractère incertain de la foi ainsi définie par Abélard comme une estimation, simple croyance relevant de l'opinion sans certitude. Rappelons encore qu'Hugues de Saint-Victor place dans le *De sacramentis*, la foi entre la science et l'opinion sur une échelle de la certitude dont les degrés les plus bas sont la négation ou le doute[50]. Selon Hugues, influencé en cela comme Abélard par les réflexions linguistiques sur l'argumentation

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per Spiritum suum". Ergo quae supra sunt, non verbo docentur, sed Spiritu revelantur. […] Is, et qui cum eo sunt beati spiritus, tribus modis, veluti viis totidem, nostra sunt consideratione vestigandi, opinione, fide, intellectu ».

48 Sur l'historique de la critique menant au concile de Sens, on pourra voir les articles de Jean Leclercq (OSB), « Les formes successives de la lettre-traité de Saint Bernard contre Abélard », in : *Revue Bénédictine* 78 (1968), pp. 87–105, et « Les lettres de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry à Saint Bernard », in : *Revue Bénédictine* 79 (1969), pp. 375–391 ; également la synthèse de Jean Jolivet & Jacques Verger, *Le siècle de saint Bernard et Abélard*, Paris 2006, pp. 206–212 ; Jean Jolivet, « Sur quelques critiques de la théologie d'Abélard », in : id., *Aspects de la pensée médiévale. Abélard, doctrines du langage*, Paris 1987, pp. 7–51. Pour l'arrière-plan, voir aussi Jean-Marie Déchanet, « L'amitié d'Abélard et de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry », in : *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 35 (1939), pp. 761–774 ; revenant sur la question de la foi chez Guillaume, Abélard et Bernard : Christophe Grellard, « Scepticisme et incroyance. La querelle entre Abélard et Guillaume de Saint-Thierry sur le statut de la foi », in : Ch. Trottmann *et alii* (eds.), *Bernard de Clairvaux et la pensée des cisterciens – Actes du Colloque de Troyes, 28–30 octobre 2010*, numéro spécial de la *Revue Cîteaux* 63 (2012), pp. 245–261.

49 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *Lettre 190 sur les erreurs d'Abélard* IV, 9, SBO VIII, p. 24 : « Denique in primo limine Theologiae, vel potius Stultilogiae suae, fidem diffinit aestimationem. Quasi cuique in ea sentire et loqui quae libeat liceat, aut pendeant sub incerto in vagis ac variis opinionibus nostrae fidei sacramenta et non magis certa veritate subsistant ».

50 Cf. Hugues de Saint Victor, *De sacramentis*, PL 176, 330 C–D : « … si quis plenam ac gene-

et la conviction sur la base des *Topiques* de Cicéron et de leur commentaire par Boèce, la différence psychologique ne tient plus qu'au fait que les croyants assument leur affirmation d'un des deux possibles, tandis que les opinants s'en tiennent à le trouver plus probable que l'autre. Mais cela permet-il d'assumer pleinement la définition de la foi comme vertu théologale ? Guillaume de Saint Thierry reprochera à Abélard de ne pas y parvenir vraiment[51]. Toutefois la portée du reproche de Bernard ne s'en tient pas au fait que la certitude de la foi est ainsi lésée. Il suggère aussi que celui qui définit la foi comme une assertion ou une opinion parmi d'autres va avoir tendance à défendre la sienne propre éventuellement contre ses prédécesseurs dans la foi, préférant ainsi son caprice humain à la vérité inébranlable de la foi garantie par le poids de la tradition. N'est-ce pas dans la poursuite capricieuse de son opinion personnelle contre la foi de ses prédécesseurs que le théologien devient *stultus* ? On aurait vite fait d'attribuer ici à Bernard un simple argument d'autorité lorsqu'au chapitre suivant, il reproche à Abélard de s'opposer de manière frontale à l'ensemble des Pères en niant la nécessité de la Rédemption : « gardez donc pour vous ce qui est à vous ; pour moi, je ne veux écouter que les prophètes et les apôtres, je prétends ne suivre que l'Évangile, mais non pas celui que Pierre Abélard a fabriqué. L'Église ne veut point non plus de ce cinquième évangile »[52]. Pourtant, Bernard ne se réclame-t-il pas des seuls prophètes et apôtres contre les opinions trop personnelles avancées par Abélard ? En fait c'est en tant qu'ils sont inspirés par l'Esprit Saint qu'ils méritent son adhésion de foi et non en vertu d'une autorité personnelle, voire charismatique. N'est-ce pas ce qui est

ralem diffinitionem fidei signare voluerit dicere potest : « Fidem esse certitudinem quamdam animi de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constitutam ». Sunt enim quidam qui audita statim animo repellunt et contradicunt his quae dicuntur : et hi sunt negantes. Alii in iis quae audiunt alteram quamcunque partem eligunt ad existimationem, sed non approbant ad affirmationem. Quamvis enim unum ex duobus magis probabile intelligunt, utrum tamen adhuc idipsum verum sit asserere non praesumunt : hi sunt opinantes. Alii sic alteram partem approbant, ut ejus approbationem etiam in assertionem assumant : hi sunt credentes. Post ista genera cognitionis illud perfectius sequitur cum res non ex auditu solo, sed per suam praesentiam notificatur. Perfectius enim agnoscunt qui ipsam rem ut est in sua praesentia comprehendunt, hi sunt scientes. Primi ergo sunt negantes, secundi dubitantes, tertii opinantes, quarti credentes, quinti scientes ».

51 Sur l'opposition entre Guillaume et Abélard relativement à la foi, cf. Ch Grellard, « Scepticisme et incroyance… », cit., pp. 251–256.

52 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *Lettre 190 sur les erreurs d'Abélard* V, 12, SBO VIII, p. 27 : « Tibi proinde sint quae tua sunt. Ego Prophetas et Apostolos audio, oboedio Evangelio, sed non Evangelio secundum Petrum. Tu novum nobis condis Evangelium ? Quintum Ecclesia Evangelistam non recipit ».

reproché à Abélard de substituer le brio de ses cogitations et argumentations humaines et personnelles à l'accueil de la lumière de la vérité révélée, transmise à travers la tradition des Pères, par l'Esprit Saint lui-même :

> Vous êtes absolument seul de votre avis. Où l'avez-vous pris ? Ce n'est bien certainement ni chez le Sage, ni chez aucun prophète, ni chez l'Apôtre, ni surtout chez le Seigneur. Le Docteur des nations ne nous apprend que ce qu'il a lui-même appris à l'école du Seigneur (1 Co 11, 23), et le Docteur de tous les hommes déclare que sa doctrine n'est pas sa doctrine, attendu, dit-il, que "ce n'est pas de moi-même que je parle (Jn 7, 16 ; 14, 10 et 8, 44)." Mais vous, c'est de votre propre fonds que vous parlez, et ce que vous nous enseignez, vous ne le tenez de personne. Or c'est le propre du menteur de ne parler que d'après lui-même ; [...] Mais, comme vous dépassez en lumières ceux qui furent vos maîtres, vous rejetez le sentiment de tous les docteurs que l'Église a comptés depuis les apôtres, en ajoutant même avec audace que, s'ils pensent tous de même, vous, vous ne pensez point comme eux. Après une semblable déclaration, c'est en vain que je vous proposerais leur foi et leur doctrine…[53].

L'entêtement d'Abélard dans une opinion contraire à la foi de l'Église pourrait être assimilé à celui de l'hérétique. Or le reproche de Bernard va à la fois moins loin et plus loin, il ne concerne pas seulement le contenu de la foi en l'occurrence au mystère de la Rédemption, mais le rapport à la vérité et à l'inspiration. L'Apôtre ne parle pas de lui-même mais sous la motion du Saint Esprit qui l'inspire. Au contraire, c'est l'attachement d'Abélard à ses propres lumières, celles de son génie personnel, qui l'empêche d'accueillir la révélation commune et l'amène à défendre son opinion seul contre tous les Pères et docteurs de l'Église.

Ce détour par la Lettre 190 et les réflexions de son temps sur la foi et l'opinion nous amène à nous étonner de retrouver sous la plume de Bernard dans le

53 Ibid., pp. 12–13 : « Hoc plane nemini, te excepto, videtur ; tu videris ubi videris. Non enim hoc a sapiente, non a Propheta, non ab Apostolo, non denique ab ipso Domino accepisti Magister gentium accepit a Domino quod et tradidit nobis. Magister omnium suam doctrinam fatetur non esse suam : "Non" enim, ait, "a meipso loquor". Tu vero de tuo nobis tradis, et quod a nemine accepisti. Qui loquitur mendacium de suo loquitur. [...] Sed qui venerunt post Apostolos, Doctores non recipis, homo qui super omnes docentes te intellexisti. Denique non erubescis dicere quod adversum te omnes sentiant, cum ab invicem non dissentiant. Frustra proinde illorum tibi fidem doctrinam que proponerem, quos iam proscripsisti : ad Prophetas te ducam ».

dernier livre du *De consideratione*, cette dernière, aux côtés de la foi et de l'intelligence, comme une des trois sources de la spéculation métaphysique et théologique portant sur ce qui est au-dessus de nous. C'est qu'elle y est clairement distinguée des deux autres, comme si Bernard semblait en quelque sorte tirer la leçon de la querelle qui l'a opposé à Abélard sur cette question de la foi et de l'opinion :

> Or l'intelligence s'appuie sur la raison, la foi sur l'autorité, et l'opinion sur le vraisemblable. Il n'y a que les deux premières qui possèdent, avec certitude, la vérité ; mais elle est obscure et voilée pour la foi, claire et manifeste pour l'intelligence. Quant à l'opinion, elle n'est pas en possession de la vérité, on pourrait même dire qu'elle recherche la vérité par le vraisemblable plutôt qu'elle ne la possède[54].

Les trois protagonistes étaient présentes chez Hugues de Saint-Victor, à ceci près qu'il y était question de science et non d'intelligence. Notons toutefois la différence : la certitude de la foi n'est pas entamée selon Bernard par le fait qu'elle n'atteint la vérité que de manière obscure et voilée. Nous pouvons comprendre que c'est la même vérité divine qui est atteinte, mais de manière obscure, « clausam », comme celui qui ne laisse pas voir ses sentiments intérieurs et au contraire directement, de manière claire (*nudam*) dans le cas de ce que Hugues appelait la science, l'intelligence des bienheureux qui la considère sans intermédiaire. Car c'est bien la même vérité qui était encore voilée dans la foi (*involutam*) et qui apparait alors de manière manifeste. Mais du fait qu'il s'agit de la même vérité, la foi n'en est pas ébranlée pour Bernard qui lui confère la même certitude qu'à la science. Il n'en va pas de même de l'opinion. Elle ne possède rien de manière certaine, comme ce serait le cas nous l'avons vu plus haut dans le cas de la contemplation jouissant d'une appréhension du vrai dénuée de doute (*apprehensio veri non dubia*), tandis que l'opinion recherche plutôt qu'elle n'appréhende (*quaerit potius quam apprehendit*) le vrai (au neutre, *verum*, non pas *veritas*) et cela par ce qui lui ressemble : *veri similia*. À ce que le philosophe recherche la vérité selon les différents modes de

54 Cf. Bernard de Clairvaux, *De consideratione* V, III, 5, SBO III, p. 470 : « Is, et qui cum eo sunt beati spiritus, tribus modis, veluti viis totidem, nostra sunt consideratione vestigandi, opinione, fide, intellectu. Quorum intellectus rationi innititur, fides auctoritati, opinio sola veri similitudine se tuetur. Habent illa duo certam veritatem, sed fides clausam et involutam, intelligentia nudam et manifestam ; ceterum opinio, certi nihil habens, verum per veri similia quaerit potius quam apprehendit ».

la considération, rien d'étonnant. En revanche, lorsque sa considération se met à porter sur ce qui est au-dessus de lui, les objets plus propres à la théologie : Dieu et les anges, il aurait besoin de recourir à l'opinion et au vraisemblable ? Quel est donc le statut de l'opinion dans une investigation théologique qui ne soit pas stultologique ? C'est que non seulement les trois instances sont bien distinguées, la foi étant aussi certaine que la science, mais Bernard s'attache à les reprendre deux par deux pour montrer les dommages qui pourraient résulter de leur confusion mutuelle. Il faut bien se garder de confondre ces trois moyens entre eux ; ainsi la foi ne doit pas accepter pour certain ce qui n'est que d'opinion, ni l'opinion remettre en question ce que la foi tient pour sûr et certain. D'ailleurs l'une ne peut affirmer sans être téméraire, ni l'autre hésiter sans être chancelante[55]. Accepter pour certain ce qui n'est qu'une opinion peut être dans la vie courante une manière de se dévoyer si par exemple celui qui vous indique le chemin n'en est pas sûr. Mais dans le cas de la foi, ceux qui s'attachent aux visions et révélations privées ne sont-ils pas en situation de confondre le donné de foi de la révélation commune et les belles images ou paroles qui accompagnent une expérience mystique plus personnelle ? En matière mystique, l'imagination a vite fait de se substituer à l'adhésion de foi. De même, celle-ci pourra être ébranlée par l'opinion. L'étude même de la théologie et de ses variantes, ne pourra-t-elle représenter un danger pour une foi affaiblie et flanquée d'une raison faible ? Si l'hésitation propre à l'opinion entre deux explications s'insinue, la foi peut devenir chancelante. Mais par ailleurs une opinion trop humaine et sans fondement théologal ne peut se substituer à la foi et son affirmation trop péremptoire sera présomptueuse et parfois ridicule. Ne la rencontre-t-on pas parfois chez certains prédicateurs zélés mais insuffisamment sanctifiés ou charismatiques ? De même pour l'intelligence et l'opinion :

> J'en dirai autant de l'intelligence : si elle prétend rompre le sceau de la foi, elle se rend coupable d'effraction et d'une sacrilège curiosité. Il est arrivé bien souvent de prendre l'opinion pour l'intelligence, c'est une erreur ; en tout cas, si on peut confondre quelquefois l'opinion avec l'intelligence, on ne saurait jamais tomber dans la confusion contraire et prendre l'intelligence pour l'opinion. Pourquoi cela ? Parce que si l'une peut se tromper, l'autre ne le peut pas ; ou si elle le peut, c'est qu'elle n'est

55 Ibid., p. 6 : « Omnino cavenda confusio, ne aut incertum opinionis fides figat, aut, quod firmum fixum que est fidei, opinio revocet in quaestionem. Et hoc sciendum, quia opinio, si habet assertionem, temeraria est ; fides, si habet haesitationem, infirma est ».

> pas l'intelligence, mais simplement une opinion. L'intelligence proprement dite non-seulement est sûre qu'elle possède la vérité ; mais encore elle en a la connaissance intime[56].

La première situation où la curiosité de l'intelligence essaie de pénétrer les mystères de la foi ne se rencontre-t-elle pas chez certains qui par les sciences des religions tentent de comprendre de l'extérieur un « fait religieux » qui leur demeure étranger ? Quant à l'erreur qui fait prendre l'opinion pour l'intelligence, il ne s'agit peut-être pas tant de l'affirmation présomptueuse de l'opinion rencontrée plus haut, que de l'adhésion naïve à des vérités qui ont l'apparence de la certitude scientifique, mais ne sont en fait que des hypothèses théoriques. Ainsi le rationalisme scientiste ne peut-il se pratiquer de cette manière crédule et faire confiance aux scientifiques faute de pouvoir comprendre et vérifier rationnellement leurs hypothèses ? L'attitude inverse semble moins probable aux yeux de Bernard qui consisterait à prendre la science pour une simple opinion. Mais elle peut en résulter. Le relativisme contemporain ne relève-t-il pas de cette idée qu'en l'absence d'une vérité unique et assurée, on n'a que des vérités partielles, ne proposant que des points de vue différents, voire opposés et constituant finalement autant d'opinions incertaines ? La véritable intelligence qui connait une vérité par une évidence scientifique ne saurait quant à elle se prendre pour une simple opinion. Ces réflexions de Bernard permettent d'écarter les principaux obstacles épistémologiques à la recherche théologique pour parvenir ainsi à une définition précise de ces trois moyens d'investigation de la vérité :

> Voici comment on pourrait définir ces trois moyens. La foi est une jouissance anticipée de la volonté qui nous fait goûter avec certitude la vérité avant même qu'elle nous soit dévoilée ; l'intelligence est la connaissance certaine, évidente d'une chose qui ne tombe pas sous les sens ; l'opinion enfin consiste à tenir pour vraie une chose qu'on ne sait pas être fausse. Ainsi, comme je le disais plus haut, la foi n'admet point d'incertitude, ou si elle en admet, elle n'est plus la foi, mais une simple opinion. En quoi donc diffère-t-elle de l'intelligence ? En ce que, si elle exclut toute

56 Ibid., pp. 470–471 : « … item intellectus, si signata fidei tentet irrumpere, reputatur effractor, scrutator maiestatis. Multi suam opinionem intellectum putaverunt, et erraverunt. Et quidem opinio potest putari intellectus ; intellectus opinio non potest. Unde hoc accidit ? Profecto quia haec falli potest, ille non potest ; aut, si falli potuit, intellectus non fuit, sed opinio. Verus nempe intellectus certam habet non modo veritatem, sed notitiam veritatis ».

> incertitude de même que l'intelligence, elle a néanmoins un voile que l'intelligence n'a pas. Enfin ce que l'intelligence possède n'exige plus de recherches de sa part, ou s'il en exige encore c'est une preuve que l'intelligence ne le possède pas. Au contraire, il n'y a rien que nous désirions plus connaître que ce que nous possédons par la foi, et le comble de la félicité sera pour nous de voir sans voile et sans obscurité ce que nous ne possédons maintenant que par la foi[57].

Notons au passage que la définition de la foi semble en rapporter l'acte à la volonté et non à l'intelligence comme le fera Thomas d'Aquin au siècle suivant. C'est que la certitude de la vérité de foi s'accompagne selon Bernard, pour la volonté d'une jouissance anticipée dans la charité, comprenons, pourvu que cette foi soit contemplative. L'intelligence notons-le, est la connaissance certaine, mais d'une réalité invisible. Sa certitude ne vient donc pas d'une évidence sensible, mais bien de celle de l'intellection même. N'avons-nous pas là un « verum index sui » avant l'heure ? Quant à l'opinion, elle porte sur une vérité qui demeure falsifiable pourrait-on dire après Popper, mais ne l'a pas été pour l'heure. Bernard peut ainsi insister à nouveau sur le fait que la foi n'est pas moins certaine que l'intelligence, simplement, comme nous le disions plus haut elle aspire à ce que soit levé le voile qui fait encore écran entre elle et la vérité nue qui sera contemplée par les bienheureux dans la Patrie céleste. Nulle concurrence entre foi et raison scientifique, mais un accomplissement de la foi dans la vision bienheureuse, pour Bernard, comme déjà pour Hugues de Saint-Victor selon la lecture que nous en proposions plus haut.

Reste à comprendre quel peut bien être le rôle de l'opinion dans ce domaine d'investigation. Sa mise en œuvre au chapitre suivant consacré aux anges peut nous permettre de le comprendre, comme aussi celle des deux autres moyens. Tout d'abord, la Foi, appuyée sur les Écritures nous enseigne l'existence des anges et quelques caractéristiques de leur nature ou de leur grâce propre :

> Et d'abord qu'il existe dans la céleste patrie des esprits bienheureux doués de puissance et de gloire, formant des personnes parfaitement distinctes entre elles, mais classées selon leurs dignités et gardant, dès le

57 Ibid., p. 471 : « Possumus singula haec ita diffinire : fides est voluntaria quaedam et certa praelibatio necdum propalatae veritatis ; intellectus est rei cuiuscumque invisibilis certa et manifesta notitia ; opinio est quasi pro vero habere aliquid, quod falsum esse nescias. Ergo, ut dixi, fides ambiguum non habet, aut, si habet, fides non est, sed opinio. Quid igitur distat ab intellectu ? Nempe quod, etsi non habet incertum non magis quam intellectus, habet tamen involucrum, quod non intellectus ».

> premier jour de leur existence, le rang qui leur a été assigné [...] Tout cela, nous le savons par les saintes Lettres, et la foi nous l'enseigne[58].

Nous coupons le texte pour éviter ici d'entrer dans le détail des développements théologiques que supposerait l'analyse des différents éléments retenus comme donné de foi reçu à partir de l'Écriture. Soulignons juste que l'existence des anges, leur gloire et leur béatitude sont ainsi affirmés, mais aussi leur hiérarchie sans plus de précision sur son organisation. Quant à l'essence spirituelle de ces intelligences séparées, ce n'est pas la foi qui nous la fait connaître, mais directement notre propre intelligence. Bernard n'hésite pas à ranger la question du corps des anges, suscitant des désaccords entre théologiens, au rang de ce qui relève de l'opinion, en revanche, il n'en va pas de même de leur nature spirituelle :

> Quant au corps de ces esprits bienheureux, non-seulement on n'est pas d'accord sur sa nature, mais on ne l'est pas même sur son existence ; aussi ne ferai-je aucune difficulté de me ranger au sentiment de ceux qui voudront reléguer ce point au nombre des pures opinions ; mais que ces esprits soient des intelligences, c'est ce que nous savons non par la foi ou par l'opinion, mais par notre propre intelligence, attendu que s'il en était autrement ils ne pourraient jouir de la possession de Dieu[59].

Certes, on pourrait se demander si la foi n'est pas présupposée à la saisie métaphysique de la nature spirituelle des anges. N'est-ce pas parce que nous les croyons bienheureux, en possession de Dieu que nous les savons spirituels ? Nous ne sommes certes pas ici avec Bernard au régime d'une théologie purement naturelle des intelligences séparées de type aristotélicien, mais plus proche des spéculations métaphysiques d'Anselme partant du donné de foi. Toutefois Bernard précise bien ici explicitement que ce n'est pas par la foi que nous comprenons que ces esprits sont dotés (*praeditos*) d'intelligence. C'est en effet par l'intelligence que nous comprenons que ces esprits ne peuvent à la fois être dénués d'une telle intelligence (*expertes*) et participer (*participes*) à la

58 Ibid., v, iv, 7, pp. 471–472 : « Et primo quidem cives spiritus esse illic potentes, gloriosos, beatos, distinctos in personas, dispositos in dignitates, ab initio stantes in ordine suo [...] Haec omnia legendo comperimus, fide tenemus ».

59 Ibid., p. 472 : « Quamquam de corporibus horum non modo unde sint, sed an aliquatenus sint, haeret sententia aliquorum. Unde si quis inter opinabilia magis id ponendum censuerit, non contendo. Porro intellectu praeditos, non fide, non opinione, sed intellectu capimus, quia non possunt huius expertes et Dei simul participes esse ».

béatitude divine. Notons au passage la présence du thème néoplatonicien de la participation. Nous avons là une sorte de raisonnement par l'absurde dont il nous faut saisir les implications métaphysiques. Nous ne sommes pas encore devant la difficulté qui opposera l'aristotélisme de Thomas d'Aquin à Averroès et plus largement à une métaphysique arabe postulant la possibilité d'une connaissance intuitive des intelligences séparées. Pour Thomas au contraire, rappelons-le, nous ne pouvons connaître l'invisible qu'à partir du visible et les formes intelligibles ne nous sont accessibles que par abstraction à partir du donné sensible. Pour Bernard, comprenons qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une contemplation intuitive qui nous livrerait une connaissance directe de l'essence des anges. C'est par une double négation que nous comprenons en une intuition de notre propre intelligence que ces êtres à qui nous prêtons une contemplation de Dieu bien supérieure à la nôtre ne peuvent pas ne pas être des intelligences. Mais précisément, dans ces conditions, comment accéder à leur essence et discerner ce qui les distingue les unes des autres afin de contempler nous-mêmes les hiérarchies célestes ? C'est là que Bernard entend livrer une spéculation métaphysique qui ne relève ni de la foi qui procède par ouï-dire, ni de l'intelligence qui possèderait justement une telle contemplation directe de l'essence des intelligences angéliques. Reste ici l'opinion :

> Les anges ont des noms que nous savons pour les avoir entendus et qui nous permettent de conjecturer et même de discerner parmi ces esprits bienheureux, des choses que l'oreille n'a jamais entendues, telles que leurs ministères, leurs mérites, leurs rangs et leurs ordres ; mais il faut bien le reconnaître, ce que nous en savons sans l'avoir appris par l'ouïe, n'appartient pas à la foi, puisque "la foi nous vient par l'ouïe" (Rm 10, 17) ; par conséquent ce que je vais en dire n'est qu'une pure opinion de ma part[60].

Si l'on peut effectivement trouver çà et là dans l'Écriture, des noms correspondant aux différents ordres des hiérarchies angéliques et glaner des renseignements sur leurs ministères ou leur dignité, cela ne suffira pas à les ordonner selon les neuf chœurs distingués par Denys qui entendait ainsi christianiser les *Ennéades* néoplatoniciennes. C'est en effet dans l'ordre que leur assigne le Pseudo-Aréopagite que nous retrouvons leurs noms dont il existe certes une

60 Ibid. : « Sunt et nomina quaedam nota nobis similiter ex auditu, per quae harum beatitudinum, etiam quae non liquido mortalium percepit auditus, officia, merita, gradus, ordines, utcumque a nobis conjici et discerni queunt. Sed enim quod ex auditu non est, iam non ex fide, nam "Fides ex auditu". Itaque opinando ista dixerimus ».

origine plus ténue pour certains que pour d'autres dans les Écritures. Sans citer sa source et ignorant tout ce qu'elle doit aux spéculations métaphysiques néoplatoniciennes, Bernard rapporte ce qu'il va en dire au domaine de l'opinion. Mais de quelle opinion s'agit-il ? Culture d'érudit qui ne dit pas ses sources ? S'il la revendique comme opinion personnelle, c'est qu'elle relève de sa propre contemplation nourrie de la *lectio* monastique. Mais précisément, il joue sur le rapprochement entre « fides ex auditu » et l'allusion de saint Paul aux mystères que l'oreille n'a pas entendus… Il fait bien la différence entre ce qui lui vient de la foi dans l'audition et éventuellement la lecture de la révélation et ce qui relève de l'inspiration divine du contemplatif en sa grâce singulière. Ce qui en résulte reste de l'ordre de l'opinion, mais pas n'importe quelle opinion, celle du théologien privé, dira-t-on plus tard. Encore faut-il que celui-ci en soit conscient et c'est précisément ce qui fait la différence entre Bernard et Abélard. Ce dernier n'hésite pas à affirmer ses innovations même contre l'ensemble de la tradition patristique. Bernard quant à lui, assume au contraire cette tradition pour s'aventurer à des conjectures à partir des noms donnés aux différents esprits bienheureux. La base scripturaire est ténue car c'est à partir de ces seuls noms que ces derniers peuvent être distingués et de manière conjecturale (*conjici et discerni queunt*). La spéculation métaphysique a donc bien une place dans la théologie de Bernard à condition qu'elle soit menée en conscience qu'elle n'engage que l'opinion de théologien privé de celui qui s'y livre. Ne constitue-t-elle pas pourtant une nécessité de la recherche et du progrès en théologie ? Bien sûr Bernard n'accepterait pas ce dernier terme et se défendrait de s'adonner à une telle stultologie. Mais lorsqu'il en vient à la considération sur ce qui est au-dessus de nous, n'est-il pas obligé en conscience de s'avancer sur cette voie de l'opinion, certes encadrée par la foi et l'intelligence :

> Car dans quel but ces noms nous auraient-ils été révélés, s'il ne nous était pas permis, sauf le respect dû à la foi, de rechercher ce que ces noms expriment ? Or voici ces noms Anges, Archanges, Vertus, Puissances, Principautés, Dominations, Trônes, Chérubins et Séraphins. Que signifient-ils ? N'y a-t-il aucune différence entre ces esprits qu'on appelle simplement anges et ceux qu'on nomme Archanges ?[61].

61 Ibid. : « Ad quid enim caelestium nomina innotuerunt, si ne opinari quidem salva fide aliquid licet de rebus, quarum nomina sunt ? Angeli, Archangeli, Virtutes, Potestates, Principatus, Dominationes, Throni, Cherubim et Seraphim, haec nomina. Quae significata eorum ? Nulla ne inter illos spiritus qui simpliciter Angeli, et eos qui Archangeli nuncupantur, distantia ? ».

Bernard se fait ainsi un devoir d'éclairer son frère et pape, mais nous ne pouvons ici lui emboîter le pas dans la visite du Ciel si savoureuse qui se poursuit dans ce chapitre et jusqu'à la fin du Livre V du *De consideratione*. Contentons-nous de rappeler deux moments parmi les plus savoureux de la contemplation sobre et profonde de Bernard qui suivent cette explication où les ordres angéliques prennent sens : l'hénologie scalaire (1) qui établit cette fois une échelle non pas entre les êtres, mais entre les formes d'unité de celle du tas de cailloux à celle des Personnes de la Trinité au Chapitre VIII, § 18 et 19 que nous résumons ici encore sous forme de tableau, ou encore (2) sur la conception virginale de Marie.

Hénologie scalaire

Unité souveraine	Union consubstantielle entre les trois Personnes divines.
De faveur (*dignativa*)	Union hypostatique des trois substances avec la Personne du Verbe
De volonté (*votiva*)	L'âme adhérant à Dieu de toutes ses forces ne fait plus qu'un esprit avec lui
De sentiment (*consentanea*)	Une seule âme, un seul corps dans la charité
Unité « potestative »	Unité de vie cohérente par la vertu
Unité native	Unité de l'âme et du corps
Unité « conjugative »	Deux ne faisant qu'une seule chair
Unité constitutive	Membres d'un corps
Unité collective	Pierres en tas

Ce que nous avons l'audace d'appeler « Théococotte » renvoie au rôle de cuisson assignée par la Vierge Marie en son sein des trois substances : divinité, corps et âme du Christ, grâce au levain de la foi :

> Je vais plus loin encore, et je crois que ce ne serait pas faire un rapprochement déplacé que d'entendre les trois mesures de farine qui, mélangées et fermentées, deviennent un pain, comme il est dit dans l'Évangile (Mt 13, 33 et Lc 13, 21), avec les trois essences unies en la Personne de Jésus-Christ. Oh ! Comme une femme les avait bien fait fermenter ensemble, puisque le Verbe de Dieu ne cessa point d'être uni au corps et à l'âme séparés l'un de l'autre. Jusque dans la séparation, l'unité demeura inséparable : la division qui se produisit en partie dans cette unité ne put rien sur elle et la laissa subsister dans toutes les trois. Deux d'entre elles ont pu être

> unies ou séparées, l'unité personnelle n'en subsista pas moins constamment dans les trois essences ; et même après la mort de l'homme, le Verbe, l'âme et le corps en Jésus-Christ ne cessèrent point de faire un seul et même Christ, une seule et même Personne. C'est, je pense, dans le sein de la vierge Marie que se sont produits ce mélange et cette fermentation, et la femme qui a fait l'un et l'autre n'est autre que Marie, et son levain fut sa foi[62].

Conclusion

De la philosophie à la contemplation, il y a bien un chemin pour Bernard, mais qui passe tout d'abord par le connais-toi toi-même. L'humilité conduit à une exploration de la connaissance de soi passant par trois questions : *quid, quis et qualis sis* ? Mais il n'y a pas d'accès direct de la connaissance de soi à celle de Dieu. Mieux, les trois modalités de la considération : dispensative, estimative et contemplative, assument la division des trois parties de la philosophie ou genres de vie associées par Grégoire le Grand (qui se situe ainsi au cœur d'une tradition socratique allant d'Origène à Bernard) aux trois livres attribués à Salomon : philosophie morale, naturelle, métaphysique. Le détour de la charité est ainsi requis en vue d'accéder à la contemplation dont la perfection ne saurait être qu'eschatologique. Reste pourtant une place pour une considération spéculative qui se nourrit de la contemplation mystique et partage les opinions de théologien privé dont Bernard, après ses démêlés avec Abélard, pense clairement le statut, entre foi et intelligence.

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62 Ibid., v, x, 22, pp. 484–485 : « Sed et illa tria sata de Evangelio, mixta et fermentata in panem unum, si quis ad haec tria dixerit pertinere, non incongrue id mihi facere videbitur. Quam bene ea mulier fermentavit, ut nec divisione quidem facta carnis et animae, a carne vel anima Verbum divideretur ! Mansit et in separatione inseparabilis unitas. Nec enim quae ex parte contigit separatio potuit unitati praescribere, permanenti in totis tribus. Sive coniunctis, sive disiunctis duobus, nihilominus perseveravit in tribus unitas personalis. Aeque unus Christus una que persona, Verbum, anima et caro, etiam mortuo homine, perduravit. In utero Virginis, ut sentio ego, commixtio haec et fermentatio facta est, et ipsa mulier quae miscuit, et fermentavit ; nam fermentum non immerito fortasse dixerim fidem Mariae ».

CHAPTER 3

Contemplation and Philosophy: A Historical and Systematic Approach

Andreas Speer

Introduction: A Twofold Starting Point

What is the relation between contemplation and philosophy? In the present paper, I will deal with this question and try to give an answer from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view.

The historical prospect is concerned with the contribution of the debates of a millennium which we commonly call "medieval" (and so will I, pragmatically leaving aside the fact that this term has become more and more misleading) to this perennial question regarding the understanding of philosophy. In the following I will look at a highly complex story, which was embraced in very different ways in the various cultures of a millennium which emerged out of the Hellenistic Late Ancient world. In doing so, my focus lies on a very specific constellation in the occidental Latin world. More precisely, I will evaluate the thesis that something has happened particularly in the 13th century, which substantially hurt the original marriage between philosophy and contemplation. And although the contemplative approach to philosophy was not completely lost and is valid even in present times, it has become less self-evident and more fragile to the point that it is even seen as an anachronistic remnant.

My point of departure is the meeting of the long lasting Platonic tradition—which had over centuries become a kind of connatural mode of a Christian philosophy—with the Aristotelian philosophy. The latter was "rediscovered" in a rather short period of less than a century between the middle of the 12th century, if one takes the very first translations into Latin as reference, and the middle of the 13th century, when Robert Grosseteste completed the translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* followed by the revisions and new translations by William of Moerbeke. Even though there is a close relation between philosophy and contemplation in both philosophical traditions, the particular situation in the 13th century callenged precisely this relation and led to a severe debate about the epistemological status and the scope of the contemplative endeavour.

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This is where the systematic question arises. What in fact is the relation between contemplation and philosophy? In order to elaborate this question a third key term has to be introduced: wisdom, since wisdom—*sophia* or *sapientia*—denotes the epistemological foundation for the understanding of the relation between philosophy and contemplation. Because of this wisdom became a decisive criterion for the diverse concepts of the mutual understanding of contemplation and philosophy.

1 The Missing Link: Wisdom

As I have just noted, the missing link between contemplation and philosophy is wisdom. The strong connection and even parallelism between "theoria" and "sophia" is part of the founding narrative of "philosophia"—methodologically developed and conceptualized by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* and in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Not only is "sophia" the first candidate for the "episteme zetoumene", the first science Aristotle is looking for; there is a strong parallelism between the criteria by which Aristotle defines the wise man and wisdom, because "theses characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge".[1] The very same characteristics are used in the Sixth Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* for distinguishing wisdom (*sophia*) from prudence (*phronesis*) and in the Tenth Book for defining the human activity which is in accordance with the highest excellence.[2] This activity, which will amount to complete happiness (*teleia eudaimonia*), is contemplative (*theoretike*).

The entanglement of contemplation and wisdom also connects theory and practice insofar as *theoria* or contemplation becomes the human activity which is in accordance with the highest excellence and the habit of the first science. Therefore, this theoretical ideal is objectively determined by the highest good due to human nature in general, not by subjective well-being. Contrary to later commentators and particularly to Thomas Aquinas, for Aristotle the "adeptio finis" does not introduce any specifications, which are concerned with an individual in search of his or her perfection: it is just the contemplative life, which is worthy of fulfilling the criteria of true excellence.[3]

1 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A, 2 (982a20–23).

2 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 7–8 (1141a16–b31) and X, 7 (1177a20–b27).

3 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* X, 7–8 (1177a11–1179a32) and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I–II, q. 1, a. 8 c.; q. 3, a. 1 c. et a. 4 c. See. A. Speer, "Das Glück des Menschen (S.th. I–II,

However, the proposed theoretical ideal remains quite abstract. What is really the content of the "noesis noeseos"? What does the "nous" contemplate while contemplating itself or its act? There is one exception in Book Lambda of the *Metaphysics*, when Aristotle talks about the "divine substance", the object of "theologia", the other name for his "episteme zetoumene". There, we find a list of predicates, which Thomas Aquinas thought defined the realm of what he calls the theology of the philosophers or the knowledge of the speculative sciences.[4] According to Thomas, this knowledge is concerned with the understanding of separate substances as a result of our understanding of the natures and quiddities of these sensible things.[5] But even if we do not follow Aquinas's analysis of the intellective life and do not stick with his conviction of an intellect totally bound to the species and phantasms—the sensible, imaginative and intellectual species—, the question as to what the theoretical life is, i.e., what the wise man actually contemplates, must be raised.

Before we can reasonably deal with this question, we have to go back to the first century and to the well-known scene of the Act of the Apostles: Saint Paul's famous speech on the Areopagus (Acts 17:22 sqq.). In this speech, the apostle defines the hermeneutics for more than a millennium: his claim to show who the unknown God is served as the standard for Christian thinkers, who then became theologians according to the Pauline model, which is to justify Christian religious experience and religious practice in terms of the highest theoretical science.

We must not underestimate the very fact that in Early Christianity theology was chosen as the main intellectual domain for the encounter with the predominant Hellenistic culture. This is a clear indication of the epistemic level on which the discourse concerning the validity claim of revealed truth has to be carried out. Moreover, this program of a natural theology, according to Rom. 1:20, was connected with the methodological ideal of a demonstrative science which Boethius, Augustine and others, as well as their medieval commentators, wanted to apply even to the doctrine of the Trinity.[6] This expansion of

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qq. 1–5)", in: A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa theologiae. Werkinterpretationen*, Berlin—New York 2005, pp. 141–167, especially pp. 155–161.

4 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Λ, 6–10 (1071b3–1075a24); see S. Menn, "Aristotle's Theology", in: C. Shields (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, Oxford 2012, pp. 422–464; R. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God", in: *Phronesis* 14 (1969), pp. 63–74; E. Berti, "Da chi è amato il motore immobile? Su Aristoteles, *Metaph.* XII, 6–72", in: *Méthexis* 10 (1997), pp. 59–82.

5 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 41; *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 3; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 88.

6 See exemplarily Augustine's *De trinitate* (CCCL 50 and 50A) and Boethius' *De sancta trinitate*,

natural theology might be seen as a very slight modification lacking a deeper significance, but in fact it introduced a fundamental difference with respect to the ancient tradition and the previous understanding of theology. Different from the Aristotelian notion, theology now had a very specific cognitive content, which became the focus of further philosophical and theological speculations. What the intellect now contemplates is no longer its own activity or some highly abstract and general principles, but the divine substance, as for example Boethius states in his treatise on the Trinity: in contemplating the divine substance the first speculative science is "scientia divina" in the proper and full sense.[7] Boethius gives the impression that it is natural reasoning alone that discovers the proper object of theology, the divine essence and its deepest expression in the threefold predication of divinity, and that reason is able to find the proper theological language. This becomes obvious from the little treatise "Whether Father, Son and Holy Spirit are substantially predicated of the Divinity" (*Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur*).[8] The entire treatise is a famous exercise of a speculative predication theory without even invoking Sacred Scripture. The main reason for this possibility is "the universal character of the rules and doctrines through which the authority of that same religion is perceived"; for Boethius, this is the main reason why the Christian religion is called catholic or universal.[9]

This general model of Christian wisdom—apart from its differentiations between Boethius, Augustine and Ps.-Dionysius, who became part of this picture when the *Corpus dionysiacum* entered the Latin theological discourse in the 9th century at the court of Louis the Pius and the Abbey of Saint-Denis[10]—persisted more or less unquestioned until the 12th century. Particularly influen-

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(ed. Moreschini). Cf. A. Speer, "Im Spannungsfeld der Weisheit. Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Metaphysik, Religion und Theologie", in: M. Erler und T. Kobusch (Hrsg.), *Metaphysik und Religion: zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens*, München 2002, pp. 649–672, especially pp. 649–651.

7 See Boethius, *De sancta trinitate*, 2, (ed. C. Moreschini), *Boethius* [Bibliotheca Teubneriana], Leipzig 2000, pp. 168,68–169,78.

8 See Boethius, *Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur*, (ed. C. Moreschini), pp. 182–185.

9 See Boethius, *De sancta trinitate*, 1, (ed. C. Moreschini), p. 167,34–39: "Christianae religionis reverentiam plures usurpant, sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter universalium praecepta regularum, quibus eiusdem religionis cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanavit, catholica vel universalis vocatur".

10 See T. Boiadjiev—G. Kapriev—A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter* (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 9), Louvain-la-Neuve—Turnhout 2000.

tial was Augustine's new reading of the Stoic definition of wisdom as the true understanding of all human and divine things. In the Twelfth and Fourteenth Book of *De trinitate*, Augustine introduced a powerful distinction between the intellectual comprehension of the eternal things—which is wisdom in the proper sense—and the rational, discursive understanding of the temporal things. At the same time, he subordinates the latter, knowledge of the sciences and of philosophy, to the former, the knowledge of theology, which alone can be called wisdom.[11] This distinction between *scientia* and *sapientia*, which is based on the idea that wisdom contemplates that which is eternal ("sapientia contemplatur aeterna"), became the leading narrative for the following centuries in particular for the Augustinian tradition.[12]

2 A New Paradigm

There are already strong indications in the 12th century that this model was contested and had to be rethought. Michael Grabmann and Artur Michael Landgraf, among others, pointed to the rich history of the various attempts to defend a unified model of theology as the first speculative science, in the footsteps of Augustine and Boethius in the period before Aristotle entered the theological and philosophical discourse.[13] Among those early scholastic attempts

11 See Augustine, *De trinitate* XII, 14–15 (CCSL 50, pp. 374–380), and XIV, 1, 3 (CCSL 50A, pp. 423–424); cf. A. Speer, "Im Spannungsfeld der Weisheit", note 6, pp. 655–658.

12 See Augustine, *De trinitate* XV, 3 (CCSL 50A, p. 467,105–112): "in quarto decimo autem de sapientia hominis uera, id est dei munere in eius ipsius dei participatione donata, quae ab scientia distincta est disputatur, et eo peruenit disputatio ut trinitas appareat in imagine dei quod est homo secundum mentem quae renouatur in agnitione dei secundum imaginem eius qui creauit hominem ad imaginem suam et sic percipit sapientiam ubi contemplatio est aeternorum". Cf. Isidore of Seville, *Liber differentiarum* XXXVI (CCSL 111A, pp. 94,148–95,5): "Scientia enim temporalia bene utitur, atque in euitandis malis, seu intelligendis uel adpetendis bonis uersatur: sapientia autem tantummodo aeterna contemplatur". Cf. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, lib. 18 § 54 (PL 1708, p. 143 A): "Sin uero a quibusdam potest in hac adhuc corruptibili carne uiuentibus, sed tamen inaestimabili uirtute crescentibus, quodam contemplationis acumine aeterna dei claritas uideri; hoc quoque a beati iob sententia non abhorret qui ait: abscondita est ab oculis omnium uiuentium; quoniam quisquis sapientiam quae deus est, uidet, huic uitae funditus moritur, ne iam eius amore teneatur". Cf. Andreas of St. Victor, *Expositio historica in parabolis*, (CCCM 53B, p. 10,107 sq.): "Secundum Augustinum quoque sapientia distat a scientia, quia hac aeterna contemplamur, …".

13 See M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, Freiburg i.B. 1911 (unverän-

one can find such diverse conceptions as those of Peter Abelard, Alan of Lille, Gilbert of Poitiers, Hugh of Saint-Victor and Peter Lombard.[14] But it was the rediscovery of Aristotle that gave rise to a severe debate in which the Aristotelian understanding of *sophia* and *theoria* functioned as a touchstone for the conception and understanding of both theology and philosophy.

Thomas S. Kuhn has provided us with an analysis of how those processes gain their dynamics: from the appearance of anomalies to a first crises and the occurrence of new theories, to reactions to those crises, and finally to the necessity of a revolution which leads to a paradigm shift and ultimately to a new "Weltbild". There is a marvelous chapter in Grabmann's *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, in which he deals with divisions and theories of sciences from the 12th to the early 13th century, including very interesting and still unedited material from Bamberg, Munich and Paris, followed by a chapter devoted to the library of the scholastics in the 12th century, which focusses on the supply and use of new material.[15] Those chapters could be analyzed, according to Kuhn's hermeneutics, as a transition from one paradigm to the other; but this has to be the task of another study.

There is another case which might show the suitability of this hermeneutical scheme for the question of this paper, namely the question of how Aristotle entered and influenced the discussions on the understanding of wisdom and contemplation. This case is related to a theological commonplace: the 35th distinction of the third book on the *Sentences*, where the question concerning the three intellectual gifts (*dona*), i.e., *sapientia*, *intellectus* and *scientia*, is raised. The starting point for every commentator are the classic Augustinian arguments, which Peter Lombard had collected from the Twelfth and Fourteenth Book of *De trinitate*.[16] According to Augustine, wisdom and contemplation go hand in hand. Both are directed at the divine and eternal things,[17] because wisdom is nothing but the contemplation of eternal truth.[18]

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derter Nachdruck Berlin 1988), 2 Bände; A.M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, Regensburg 1952–1956, 4 Teile (9 Bände).

14 See the second volume of Martin Grabmanns masterpiece: *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, note 13; see also M. Dreyer, *Razionalità scientifica e teologia* (*Storia della teologia medievale* 24), Milano 2001.

15 See M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode*, note 13, Band 2, pp. 28–94.

16 See Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, lib. III, dist. 35, cap. 1–3, Grottaferrata 1981, Vol. II, pp. 198–201.

17 See *Sententiae*, lib. III, dist. 35, cap. 1 [5], Grottaferrata 1981, Vol. II, p. 199; cf. Augustine, *De trinitate* XII, 14, 22 (CCCM 50, p. 375,7–22).

18 See *Sententiae*, lib. III, dist. 35, cap. 2 [2], Grottaferrata 1981, Vol. II, p. 200, 27–28: "sapientia vero ad solius aeternae veritatis contemplationem et delectationem".

One of the first examples of the presence of Aristotle within the context of the question on wisdom as a divine gift can be found in Distinction 35 of the Third Book of Bonaventure's commentary on the *Sentences* (ca. 1250–1252). Bonaventure gives a fourfold distinction of wisdom, which, as he maintains, is usually accepted by "philosophi" and "sancti" as well:[19] (i) *communiter*, i.e., acquiring general knowledge of the things (*cognitio rerum generalis*) in the sense of knowing divine as well as human things, i.e., as Aristotle says, to know all things, as far as possible;[20] (ii) *minus communiter*, insofar as wisdom comprehends only eternal things—following Augustine's distinction—or the highest causes, as the "philosophus" states;[21] (iii) *proprie*, meaning that wisdom is understood—in accordance with Augustine's definition in the Fourteenth Book of *De trinitate*—as piety or as "theosebia";[22] and finally (iv) *magis proprie*, as the experimental knowledge of God (*cognitio Dei experimentalis*) and as an internal tasting (*gustus interior*). Here again, Aristotle—besides Gregory the Great, Dionysius the Areopagite and Bernard of Clairvaux—is mentioned as the main authority for explaining the affective part of wisdom as a conjunction of the two correspondents (*coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti*).[23]

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19 See Bonaventure, *III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 c., Opera omnia III, p. 774a: "Dicendum quod sapientia quadrupliciter accipi consuevit tam a philosophis quam a Sanctis, videlicet communiter et minus communiter et proprie et magis proprie".

20 See Bonaventure, *III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 c., Opera omnia III, p. 774a: "Communiter accipiendo sapientiam, sic sapientia dicit cognitio rerum generalem, secundum quod eam definit Augustinus et Philosophus, quod 'sapientia est cognitio rerum divinarum et humanarum'; et Philosophus in Prima Philosophia dicit, quod 'sapiens est qui omnia novit, secundum quod convenit' ". Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A, 2 (982a8–9).

21 See *III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 c., Opera omnia III, p. 774a: "Alio modo dicitur sapientia minus communiter; et sic sapientia dicit cognitionem non quamcumque, sed cognitionem sublimen, videlicet rerum aeternarum. … secundum quod exponit Augustinus dices, quod 'sapientia est cognitio aeternorum, scientia vero est cognitio creatorum'; et scientiam dicit Philosophus, quod sapientia est 'cognitio causarum altissimarum' ". Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* A, 1 (981b27–29); Augustine, *De trinitate* XIV,1,3 (see note 11).

22 See *III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 c., Opera omnia III, p. 774a: "Tertio modo accipitur sapientia proprie; et sic nominat cognitionem Dei secundum pietatem. … Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate … dicens ibidem, quod pietas et sapientia idem est quod theosebia". Cf. Augustine, *De trinitate* XIV,1,1 (CCSL 50A, p. 421).

23 See *III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 c., Opera omnia III, p. 774b: "Quarto modo dicitur sapientia magis proprie, et sic nominat cognitionem Dei experimentalem … Et quoniam ad gustum interiorem, in quo est delectatio, necessario requiritur actus affectionis ad coniungendum et actus cognitionis ad apprehendendum, secundum illud Philosophi, qui dicit, quod 'delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti cum sensu eiusdem' ". Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II, 2 und III, 7.

The fourfold unfolding of wisdom, which corresponds with a fourfold distinction of knowledge (*scientia*), underlines the introductory statement that this *divisio sapientiae* is accepted by the "philosophi" and the "sancti" alike. In this context, the "philosophus" stands for the "philosophi". But the systematic impact of Aristotle on the understanding of wisdom and contemplation, which is essentially affective and qualified as experiential knowledge (*cognitio experimentalis*), remains arbitrary, for contemplation in the true sense does not only lead to an affirmative assent, but also makes us understand that which we believe through good reasons and coherent arguments. In fact, this position reflects the traditional concept of Christian wisdom as defined by Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite.

When we turn to Bonaventure's contemporary Thomas Aquinas and to his commentary on the *Sentences* (1252–1256), Aristotle seems to have replaced Augustine altogether. In the three *quaestiunculae* of the very same *locus classicus* in *Sententiarum* III, d. 35, a. 1 on the divine gift of wisdom (*de dono sapientiae*), apart from some biblical quotations, the arguments all derive from the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Thomas, this is not only a formality. He unfolds his *solutiones* within an Aristotelian framework. Wisdom is defined as a certain eminent sufficiency in knowing, bearing in itself a certitude regarding great and extraordinary things, which are unknown to the others.[24] This eminent sufficiency, which occurs by a certain affinity to the divine[25] and must be understood as a "virtus intellectualis" acquired "per studium et doctrinam", and which is inclined to the "intellectus principiorum",[26] leads to the ability of judging all things, as Aristotle says in the First Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and—in accordance with the Aristotelian adage "sapientis est ordinare"—of directing the others through this eminence.[27] One can already

24 See Thomas Aquinas, *In III Sent.*, d. 35., a. 1, solutio 1 (n. 111): "Sapientia secundum nominis sui usum videtur importare eminentem quamdam sufficientiam in cognoscendo, ut et in seipso certitudinem habeat de magnis et mirabilibus quae aliis ignota sunt …".

25 See *In III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, sol. 1 (n. 113): "talis sufficientia accidit per affinitatem ad divina, sicut dicit Dionysius de Hierotheo in 2 cap. de div. nom.". Cf. Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, *De divinis nominibus* II, 9 (PG 3, p. 647).

26 See *In III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, sol. 1 (n. 112): "Haec autem sufficientia in quibusdam quidem est per studium et doctrinam, adiuncta vivacitati intellectus. Et talis sapientia a Philosopho ponitur virtus intellectualis in VI Eth.". Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, 6 (1141a5 sqq.). *In III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 1 (n. 114): "… sapientia quae est virtus intellectualis ad intellectum principiorum …". Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, 7 (1141a19–20).

27 See *In III Sent.*, d. 35, a. 1, sol. 1 (n. 111): "… et possit de omnibus iudicare, quia 'unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit', possit etiam de alios ordinare per dictam eminentiam". Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* I, 3 (1094b27–28); *Metaphysics* A, 2 (982a17–19).

notice the famous criteria which Thomas systematically unfolds in his commentary on *Metaphysics* A 2—another standard place for determining the question on wisdom—regarding the firstness and commonness, the certainty and knowability, and the place of wisdom within the order of scientific knowledge.[28] In general, Thomas concludes, "the science which considers first and universal causes must also be the one which considers the universal end of all things, which is the greatest good in the whole of nature".[29]

3 The Division of the Discourses on Wisdom, Theology and Contemplation

Let us turn to our second case. In the context of the first redaction of the first half of the first book of the *Summa contra gentiles*—shortly after giving up his plan to revise his *Sentence commentary*—Thomas Aquinas composed his commentary on Boethius' *De trinitate*.[30] In this unique commentary, i.e., unique for the entire 13th century, Thomas examines Boethius' understanding of theology within the context of the Aristotelian tripartition of the theoretical sciences in great detail. Boethius had taken Aristotle's determination of the "theologike episteme" literally and had brought it to bear even on the mysteries of Christian faith, especially the Trinity and Incarnation, which became the cognitive content of this theological science. For Boethius, the first speculative science is the "scientia divina", in the proper and full sense of contemplating the divine substance without either matter or motion, e.g., fully separated and abstract. This science does not "play with imaginations, but rather apprehend[s] that form which is pure form and no image, which is being itself [*ipsum esse*] and the source of being".[31]

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28 See Thomas Aquinas, *In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio* I, lect. 2, (edd. M.R. Cathala et R.M. Spiazzi), nn. 36–51; see especially nn. 44–51.

29 See *In Metaph*. I, lect. 2 (edd. Cathala et Spiazzi), n. 51: "Unde scientia, quae considerat primas et universales causas, oportet eitam quod consideret universalem finem omnium, quod est optimum in tota natura".

30 See J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Vestigia 13), Fribourg 1993, pp. 141–156, 486 sq., 503 sq.

31 See Boethius, *De sancta trinitate*, 2, (ed. Moreschini), pp. 168,68–169,83: "Nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, [...] theologica, sine motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam Dei substantia et materia et motu caret): [...] in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque deduci ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam, quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est".

Aquinas, as is well known, did not follow Boethius in the direction of a unified theological understanding of a first speculative science, which also maintains the primacy with regard to the ordering capacity of knowledge according to the firstness of its principles as well as with respect to the primacy of its proper subject. In six points, I will briefly summarize Aquinas' fundamental shift in reading Boethius, which deeply influenced the understanding of the first science and its related act of contemplation. This shift is not so much an anomaly as it is a break with a tradition.

(i) Thomas introduces a twofold distinction of divine science, one handed down by the philosophers and the other by those who, through faith, participate in the divine knowledge, the first proceeding "secundum modum nostrum", the second "secundum modum ipsorum divinorum".[32] This distinction between the theology of the philosophers and Christian theology reflects one of the most important innovations that have been achieved in the second quarter of the 13th century, namely Christian theology's becoming a science distinct from philosophy. Thomas' solution in his *De trinitate* commentary is based on the two ways in which the divine can be studied. Insofar as it is the common principle of all beings, the divine being is treated by philosophers, since, by the light of natural reason, man can consider the divine being only through its effects. Therefore, the subject proper to this science, which considers that which is common to all beings, is not the divine being, but being as being (*ens in quantum est ens*). The study of the divine as it is in itself, which can be known only insofar as it reveals itself is the concern of another theology, which investigates divine things for their own sake as the subject of the science; this is the theology taught in Sacred Scripture.[33]

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32 See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De trinitate*, q. 2, a. 2 c., (ed. Leonina), 50, p. 95,65–77: "Et secundum hoc de diuinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum diuina, et sic de diuinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam diuinam dicentes; alia secundum modum ipsorum diuinorum, ut ipsa diuina secundum se ipsa capiantur, que quidem perfecte in statu uie nobis est impossibilis, set fit nobis in statu uie quedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem diuinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inheremus ipsi prime ueritati propter se ipsam".

33 See *Super Boetium De trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 c., (ed. Leonina), 50, p. 154,175–182: "Sic ergo theologia siue scientia diuina est duplex: una in qua considerantur res diuine non tamquam subiectum scientie, set tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia quam philosophi prosequntur, que alio nomine metaphisica dicitur; alia uero que ipsas res diuinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur". For further consequences of this distinction see P. Porro, "Il posto della metafisica

(ii) The necessity of the division into two types of theology has an epistemological foundation and is rooted in a conception of the human intellect, which has and is no longer an organ for knowing the divine as the *intelligentia* is for Boethius.[34] Because the human intellect is by its nature a *ratio* and therefore essentially limited, it cannot reach—even in its fullest activity—objects like the divine essence, which is completely separated from matter and motion (*sine materia et motu*).[35] For philosophical theology, i.e., metaphysics, investigates beings separate in the second sense as its subjects, and beings separate from matter and motion as the principles of its subject; the theology of Sacred Scripture treats beings separate from matter and motion, although it concerns some items in matter and motion insofar as they are needed to throw light on divine things.[36]

(iii) This division has severe consequences for the understanding of the most excellent act of speculative thinking, namely contemplation, since the two theologies have two different ends with regard to their related speculative sciences: the metaphysical end in accordance with the realm of natural reason is the

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nella divisone delle scienze speculative di Tommaso d'Aquino (*Super Boetium De Trinitate*, qq. v–vi)", in: G. d'Onofrio (ed.), *La Divisione della filosofia e le ue ragioni. Lettera di testi medievali (vi–xiii secolo)*, Roma 2001, pp. 185–249, in particular pp. 220 sqq.

34 See e.g. Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* v, 4, 30, (ed. C. Moreschini), Leipzig 2000, p. 149,86–88: "Intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum, ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur".

35 See Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri posteriorum* i, 1, (ed. Leonina), i*,2, pp. 4,33–5,50; *De veritate*, q. 15, a. 1 c., (ed. Leonina), 17,2, p. 479,284–292; ibid., ad 8, (ed. Leonina), 17,2, p. 482,512–526; J. Péghaire, *Intellectus et ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris—Ottawa 1936, pp. 126–129; A. Speer, "Vernunft; Verstand. iii. Mittelalter, D. Hochmittelalter", in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Basel 2001, Band 11, coll. 781 sq.

36 See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 c., (ed. Leonina), 50, p. 54,185–198: "dupliciter potest esse aliquid a materia et motu separatum secundum esse: uno modo sic quod de ratione ipsius rei que separata dicitur sit quod nullo modo in materia et motu esse possit, sicut Deus et angeli dicuntur a materia et motu separati; alio modo sic quod nonsit de raione eius quod sit in materia et motu, set possit esse sine materia et motu quamuis quandoque inueniatur in maetria et motu, et sic ens et substantia et potentia et actus sunt separata a materia et motu non dependent sicut mathematica dependebant, que nunquam nisi in materia esse possunt quamuis sine materia sensibili possint intelligi". Cf. *Super Boetium De trinitate*, q. 6, a. 1, (ed. Leonina), 50, pp. 162,327–163,395, where Thomas relates the question of the twofold understanding of *separatio* to a twofold understanding of *resolution*; see P. Porro, "Il posto della metafisica", note 33, pp. 208–214.

understanding of that which is first in common, namely the first concepts and self-evident principles, etc.; the theological end in the proper sense remains the *visio Dei*, meaning that God is the true object and the final goal of contemplation.[37] Therefore (and already in the abovementioned *distinctio* 35 of Book III of his *Sentence commentary*), Aquinas distinguishes between contemplation (*contemplatio*) in the true sense, by which one contemplates God as such, and speculation (*speculatio*), by which one sees the divine in created things like in a mirror ("in speculo inspicit").[38]

(iv) Although contemplative felicity according to the philosophers consists in the contemplation of God,[39] one is still faced with a dilemma: if we are not able to achieve an understanding of separate substances through the intellectual knowledge which depends on phantasms, it will not be possible for us in the present state of life to achieve divine knowledge in the true sense.[40] Thomas, in his famous Chapter 48 of Book III of his *Summa contra gentiles*, calls the various models offered by the philosophers to overcome this dilemma wishful thinking of the noble minds in trying to escape from the dilemma and the related existential fear that the natural goal of our highest intellectual capacity cannot be achieved by natural means.[41] But on the other hand, the fulfilment of the

37 See *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 37 [2152]: "ultima felicitas hominis non consistit nisi in contemplatione Dei".

38 See *In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, q. 3 c.: "Unde et nomen contemplationis significat illum actum principalem, quo quis Deum in seipso contemplatur; sed speculatio magis nominat illum actum quo quis divina in rebus creatis quasi in speculo inspicit. Et similiter etiam felicitas contemplativa, de qua philosophi tractaverunt, in contemplatione Dei consistit: quia, secundum philosophum, consistit in actu altissimae potentiae quae in nobis est, scilicet intellectus, et in habitu nobilissimo, scilicet sapientia, et etiam objecto dignissimo, quod Deus est".

39 See above note 38.

40 This is Aquinas' argument in *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 41 [2190]: "Si autem dicatur quod est possibile esse aliquam talem speculativam scientiam quamvis adhuc non sit inventa, hoc nihil est: quia non est possibile per aliqua principia nobis nota ad intelligendas substantias praedictas devenire. Omnia enim propria principia cuiuscumque scientiae dependent ex principiis primis indemonstrabilibus per se notis, quorum cognitionem a sensibilibus accipimus, ut patet in fine posteriorum. Sensibilia autem non sufficienter ducunt in cognitionem rerum immaterialium, ut per superiores rationes est probatum. Non est ergo possibile aliquam scientiam esse per quam ad intelligendas substantias separatas perveniri possit".

41 See *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 48 [2259–2261]: "Sed hoc non potest homo assequi per scientias speculativas, quibus in hac vita veritatem cognoscimus. Non est igitur pos-

natural desire, which goes beyond the limitations of natural reason, becomes the touchstone for the general Aristotelian premise that any desire naturally includes the possibility of its fulfilment—even if this takes place in the afterlife.[42]

(v) This metaphysical division provides Aquinas with the opportunity to speak of a double truth and of a twofold wisdom without running into the dilemma of exclusion, which, for instance, Étienne Tempier encounters in his letter accompanying the syllabus from 7 March 1277.[43] In his *Summa contra gentiles*, Thomas

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sibile quod ultima felicitas hominis sit in hac vita. Propter has autem et huiusmodi rationes, Alexander et Averroes posuerunt ultimam hominis felicitatem non esse in cognitione humana, quae est per scientias speculativas, sed per continuationem cum substantia separata, quam esse credebant possibilem homini in hac vita. Quia vero Aristoteles vidit quod non est alia cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per scientias speculativas, posuit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam, sed suo modo. In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia". See C. Steel, "Medieval Philosophy: an Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the 'Averroistic' Ideal of Happiness", in: J.A. Aertsen und A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin—New York 1998, pp. 152–174; and the answer by J.A. Aertsen, "Mittelalterliche Philosophie: ein unmögliches Projekt? Zur Wende des Philosophieverständnisses im 13. Jahrhundert", in: J.A. Aertsen und A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 27), Berlin—New York 1999, pp. 12–27.

42 See *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 48 [2257]: "Impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane: 'natura enim nihil facit frustra'. Esset autem inane desiderium naturae si nunquam posset impleri. Est igitur implebile desiderium naturale hominis. Non autem in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod impleatur post hanc vitam. Est igitur felicitas ultima hominis post hanc vitam". Cf. Aristotle, *De Caelo* II, 11 (291b13–14); and Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in De caelo*, lect. 16 [442].

43 See *Epistola scripta a Stephano episcopo Parisiensis anno 1277*, in: *La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire*, (ed. D. Piché), Paris 1999, p. 74: "Dicunt enim ea esse uera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint due contrarie ueritates, et quasi contra ueritatem sacre scripture sit ueritas in dictis gentilium dampnatorum, de quibus scriptum est: "Perdam sapientiam sapientium", quia uera sapientia perdit falsam sapientiam". See A. Speer, "*Sapientia nostra*. Zum Verhältnis von philosophischer und theologischer Weisheit in den Pariser Debatten am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts", in: J.A. Aertsen—K. Emery, Jr.—A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin—New York 2001, pp. 248–275, especially pp. 248–251; id., "The Power of Wisdom: Four Case Studies of a Late Thirteenth Century Debate", in: J. Canning—E. King—M. Staub (eds.), *Knowledge,*

speaks of a "duplex modus veritatis" with respect to the cognition of God.[44] This twofold truth concerns the two ways of comprehending the divine intelligibles (*divina intelligibilia*): one truth is accessible for natural reason through questioning and inquiry, the other fully exceeds the capacity of the human intellect.[45] The double truth does not signify an opposition but originates from the insight that the human intellect is limited, as it is bound to its material conditions and cannot cognize the divine things "ex parte ipsius Dei", but only "ex parte cognitionis nostrae".[46]

(vi) While the place of metaphysics as the first science within the realm of natural reason remains undisputed, Thomas has to struggle to define the place of theology as the *sacra doctrina* within the systematic order of the sciences, wanting to fully apply the criteria of Aristotelian epistemology. Thomas' well-known solution to assign theology to those sciences, which rely, with respect to their principles, on subordinate sciences, and to shift the evidence of the principles to the knowledge of the saints, in fact calls into question the status of theology within the philosophical order of the sciences and especially its status as the ordering wisdom.[47] Thomas defends this claim by emphasizing the certainty of revelation against the mistakes and errors of natural reasoning; moreover,

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Discipline and Power in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of David Luscombe (STGM 106), Leiden—Boston 2011, pp. 175–199, especially pp. 178–181.

44 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 3 [14]: "Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae eitam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis".

45 See *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 4 [21]: "Duplici igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur".

46 See *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 9 [51]: "Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex veritas; sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet".

47 See *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 2 c. & ad 1, and *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 6: "Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia". Cf. M.-D. Chenu. *La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle*, Troisième édition revue et augmentée (Bibliothèque Thomiste 23), Paris 1957, in particular Chapter 5. See for this A. Speer, "Theologie als Wissenschaft: Vergessenes Erbe und Herausforderung. Hinführung zu Chenus ‚Theologie als Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert'", in: M.-D. Chenu, *Die Theologie als Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert* (Collection Chenu 4), aus dem Französischen von M. Lauble, Ostfildern 2008, pp. 7–32, in particular pp. 16–26.

he connects the necessity of revelation to man's natural desire.[48] As a consequence, however, one has to accept a special position of theology within the order of the sciences. Since the principles of theology are not evidently known and accessible by natural reason, they cannot serve in the same way as ordering principles to the other sciences as the principles of metaphysics do. They only provide the ground for judgment as far as someone embraces the conception of theology and therefore its principles.[49]

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In fact, it was not Thomas Aquinas who shaped the field, rather it was Aristotle and his scientific paradigm. But it was Thomas who more precisely and more clearly understood Aristotle's intentions and brought them and their implications to bear on the key questions concerning the understanding of *sophia* and *theologia* as the first science and the related epistemic habit, i.e., *theoria* or contemplation. The many immediate critical reactions of his contemporaries and of his subsequent followers can be read as supporting this analysis. With regard to the many debates in Aquinas' aftermath, which already emerged during his lifetime, three exemplary cases should be pointed out, which address the question at stake from different angles.

4 *Sapientia christiana*

Bonaventure seems to accept the division between metaphysics and theology, i.e., *sacra doctrina* as well, but he reads this distinction according to the Augustinian distinction between *scientia* and *sapientia*. Only theology obtains the place of true wisdom in terms of a *scientia prima* to which all knowledge (*scientia*) has to be traced back. Closely related to his epistemology, "reductio" becomes a key term within Bonaventure's concept of metaphysics. Therefore,

48 See *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 4–8.

49 See *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2: "Propria autem huius scientiae [scil. sacrae doctrinae] cognitio est, quae est per revelationem: non autem quae est per naturalem rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad eam probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum iudicare de eis". Cf. *In I Sent.*, prol., a. 1, (ed. A. Oliva), *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la 'sacra doctrina'* (Bibliothèque Thomiste 58), Paris 2006, p. 313,47–49: "Ita cum finis totius philosophie sit infra finem theologie et ordinatus ad ipsum, theologia debt omnibus aliis scientiis imperare et uti hiisque in eis traduntur". See L. Bianchi, *Pour une histoire de la "double verité"*, Paris 2008, pp. 89–92.

reductio means an analysis of concepts and of understanding in order to disclose the metaphysical constitution of beings. The intellect does not proceed by simply accumulating data, it rather regards the essence of beings, which is to say that it understands effects together with their underlying causes. Thus, the intellect understands how beings are interconnected and related to their common goal.[50] With reference to a full and certain understanding of a single being, *reductio* means that we must understand this single being not only as such (*in se*), nor as it is in the soul (*in anima*), but also and especially insofar as it is in the eternal standard (*in arte aeterna*), also known as the eternal creative art.[51] Thus, *reductio* leads not only to a "common" goal but to the "first" one. Therefore, a full and complete understanding ("intellectus plene resolvens") does not only include the contemplation of an eternal being as such as its very end, i.e., a being that possesses the *rationes* of all beings in its purity; moreover, nothing can be known without refering to the divine being as the *primum cognitum*, i.e., without grasping the necessary causal relation expressed by truth and goodness.[52]

In the first collation of his *Collationes in Hexaemeron*—a series of public sermons from Paris from April and May of 1273, which reflect the condemnation of 10 December 1270, before he became cardinal bishop of Albano—, Bonaventure gives a definition of what a true metaphysics must be about: emanation (*emanatio*), exemplarity (*exemplaritas*), and consummation (*consummatio*), by which he alludes to being "illuminated by the spiritual radiation

50 See Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 28, dub. 1, Opera omnia I, p. 504a.

51 See *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi*, q. 4 c., Opera omnia V, pp. 23b–24a: "Si ergo ad plenam cognitionem fit recursus ad veritatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et ad lucem omnino infallibilem; necesse est, quod in huiusmodi cognitione recurratur ad artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, inquam dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilitatem scibili. Unde cum res habeant esse in mente et in proprio genere et in arte aeterna, non sufficit ipsi animae ad certitudinalem scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se, vel secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utrobique sunt mutabiles, nisi aliquo modo attingat eas, in quantum sunt in arte aeterna".

52 See *In I Sent.*, d. 28, dub. 1, Opera omnia I, p. 504a: "Intellectu autem resolvente perfecte, non potest intelligi aliquid, primo ente non intellecto". *In II Sent.*, d. 1. p. 2, dub. 2, Opera omnia II, p. 52a: "… sed intellectu plene ad causas comparante non potest intelligi non intellecto illo, maxime cum illud dicit habitudinem necessariam et relationem ad causam, sicut verum et bonum". Cf. A. Speer, *"Principalissimum fundamentum*. Die Stellung des Guten und das Metaphysikverständnis Bonaventuras", in: W. Goris (Hrsg.), *Die Metaphysik und das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter—Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren* (RTPM—Bibliotheca 2), Leuven 1999, pp. 105–138, especially pp. 115 sq. and 122.

and reduced to the highest".[53] What Bonaventure calls "our entire metaphysics" ("haec est tota nostra metaphysica"), is a claim for an alternative exemplaristic metaphysics deeply rooted in the Augustinian tradition. This alternative concept of metaphysics is related to an alternative model of contemplation, which Bonaventure—for the first time in his *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*—elaborated following of the Victorines, in particular Richard of St. Victor.[54]

This model played an important role for the contemplative life among Franciscan mystics and was also picked up by Denys the Carthusian.[55] In his *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, Bonaventure associates the six steps of contemplation with the six days of creation and the seventh day with the "raptus" or the "exstasis mentis", because nothing that does not exceed its capacities suffices the soul.[56] And he describes the perfect contemplation (*perfecta contemplatio*) as mental excess (*excessus mentalis*), as the highest form of illumination (*summa illuminatio*), which exists in the sublimity of the mind (*in sublimitate mentis*) and reaches beyond the investigation of the human intellect (*ultra humani intellectus investigationem*).[57]

Philosophical contemplation, on the contrary, which is based on the light of natural reason, is related to the first vision (*prima visio*), based on the natu-

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53 See *Collationes in Hexaemeron* I, 17, Opera omnia V, p. 332b: "Hoc est medium metaphysicum reducens, et haec est tota nostra metaphysica: de emanatione, de exemplaritate, de consummatione, scilicet illuminari per radios spirituales et reduci ad summum. Et sic eris verus metaphysicus".

54 See the introduction by S. Brown to *Bonaventure, The Journey oft he Mind to God*, transl. by Ph. Boehner, Edited, with Introduction and Notes by S. Brown, Indianapolis—Cambridge 1993, pp. XV sq.

55 See K. Emery, Jr., "Twofold Wisdom and Contemplation in Denys of Ryckel (Dionysius Cartusiensis, 1402–1471)", in: *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 18 (1988), pp. 99–134 (repr. in: Kent Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies form the Later Middle Ages*, Variorum 1996); see also Kurt Ruh, *Bonaventura deutsch. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Franziskaner-Mystik und -Scholastik* (Bibliotheca Germanica 7), Bern 1956, and in his magisterial history of mysticism: *Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik—Band 2: Frauenmystik und Franziskanische Mystik der Frühzeit*, München 1993, in particular Chapters 25–29.

56 See Bonaventure, *De scientia Christi* q. 6 c., Opera omnia V, p. 35a: "… nihil sufficit animae nisi eius cpacitatem excedat". Concerning the structure of the *Collationes in Hexameron* see K. Emery, Jr, "Reading the World Rightly and Squarely: Bonaventure's Doctrine of the Cardinal Virtues", in: *Traditio* 39 (1983), pp. 183–218, especially pp. 185 sq. (repr. in: Kent Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies form the Later Middle Ages*, Variorum 1996).

57 See *Collationes in Hexaemeron* XX, 10–11, Opera Omnia V, p. 427a. See A. Speer, *Triplex veritas. Wahrheitsverständnis und philosophische Denkform Bonaventuras* (Fransziskanische Forschungen 32), Werl/Westf. 1987, pp. 77–79.

ral light only. This qualification already implies a determination of the extent of philosophical knowledge and points to a fundamental epistemological critique. This critique is especially directed at the knowledge that is founded on reason alone, but also at the possibility of a perfect comprehension of the highest truth on the basis of an acquired and, therefore, created wisdom. Bonaventure accuses the philosophers of having "sought to reach wisdom, and truth was leading them: and they promised to give wisdom, that is, beatitude, that is, an intellect in possession of its goal".[58] But "passing from knowledge to wisdom is not assured".[59] Thus, it is philosophy's incompetence to direct man towards his final goal, i.e., towards happiness, that defines its limitation.

The philosophical and metaphysical criticism in the late Parisian *Collationes* and, in particular, in the *Collationes in Hexaemeron* points to a fundamental epistemological critique by articulating philosophy's limitation to uncover the foundation of the certainty of knowledge. Philosophy is the way to other knowledge, not the goal; "whoever comes to stay there, falls into darkness".[60] In Bonaventure the critical attitude of the Augustinian epistemology with respect to natural human understanding fully comes to light. For Bonaventure, the limited project of the weak intellect, which is closely related to the Aristotelian philosophical project, even points to the limits of this project. His epistemological criticism leads to a fundamental critique of metaphysics, more precisely, of the metaphysics of the Aristotelian type from the viewpoint of an exemplaristic metaphysics, which goes hand in hand with the renewed concept of a "sapientia christiana".[61]

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58 See *Collationes in Hexaemeron* V, 22, Opera Omnia V, p. 357b: "Has novem scientias dederunt philosophi et illustrati sunt. Deus enim illis revelavit. Postmodum voluerunt ad sapientiam perveniere, et veritas trahebat eos; et promiserunt dare sapientiam, hoc est beatitudinem, hoc est intellectum adeptum".

59 See *Collationes in Hexaemeron* XIX, 3, Opera Omnia V, p. 420b: "Non est ergo securus transitus a scientia ad sapientiam".

60 See *De septem donis Spiritus sancti* IV, 12, Opera Omnia V, p. 476a: "Philosophica scientia via est ad alias scientias, sed qui ubi vult stare cadit in tenebras".

61 See *Collationes in Hexaemeron* I, 9–10, Opera Omnia V, p. 330b. It is Bonaventure who for the first time uses *sapientia christiana* in a distinct terminological sense, while Augustine usually speaks of *doctrina christiana*. See A. Speer, "*Sapientia christiana*—Augustinus und die *longue durée* einer christlichen Weisheit", in: C. Mayer—C. Müller (Hrsg), *Augustinus: Bildung—Wissen—Weisheit* (Cassiciacum 39,7 = Res et Signa. Augustinus-Studien 8), Würzburg 2011, pp. 69–90, especially pp. 69–72.

5 A Special Light

As a master in theology at the University of Paris, it was also the task of Henry of Ghent to define theology's place as wisdom in the proper sense within the framework of the sciences. But although he took Aristotle's theory of sciences as a necessary point of reference, he openly attacked and refused Thomas Aquinas' model of subalternation—meaning that *in statu viatoris* we borrow the lacking evidence of the theological principles from the saints, the angels or even from God, to whom they are evidently known[62]—to define the scientific status of theology. To him, Thomas' understanding of subalternation clearly subverts theology's status as a science.

For Henry, true knowledge (*scientia*) does not only require the evidence of principles, but also evidence with respect to that which is known. While knowledge in the broadest sense of the word (*scire large accepto*) requires only cognition free from any kind of deception,[63] knowledge in the strict sense (*stricte sumendo scientia*), i.e. science properly speaking, calls "not only for any kind of certain cognition, but for a kind of knowledge, whose truth becomes evident to the intellect through the evidence of a thing [*ex evidentia rei*]".[64] But how can theology then be called wisdom, especially in relationship to other sciences, if our intellect is lacking evidence with respect to the principles as well as to the object known?

To answer this, Henry grounds the excellence of wisdom on the excellence of that which is known (*scitum*). Contrary to knowledge (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*) provides an understanding of what is the by far most known and that which is the first cause of everything. Therefore, if one takes the two terms *sapientia* and *scientia* both in a strict (*stricte*) and in the broader (*large*) sense of the word, only theology can be properly called wisdom. Henry seems to adopt Augustine's solution from the Twelfth and Fourteenth Book of *De trinitate*, but he does not simply borrow it. He is aware of the special position of theology, and he is looking for a solution to determine it within the framework of the other sciences.

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62 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 2 c.

63 See Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 1, q. 1, (ed. G. Wilson), Opera Omnia XXI, p. 10,93–94: "Dicendum quod scire large accepto ad omnem notitiam certam qua cognoscitur res sicut est absque omni fallacia et deceptione".

64 See *Summa*, a. 6, q. 2, (ed. Badius), p. 42^{v}B: "Stricte vero appellatur scientia non quaecunque certa notitia, sed solummodo eorum quorum veritas intellectui ex rei euidentia apparet".

When theology is defined in terms of scientific knowledge—which according to Henry is superior to "blind" faith based only on another's testimony (*ex auditu*), because the blind is lacking the conception of things that he is talking about[65]—, then theology is in the same way bound to the *modus cognoscendi* and to the limits of the wayfarer's intellect. But since scientific knowledge consists in knowing things according to their evidence, which becomes clear to the intellect, a theologian needs a special grace, a light, which surpasses the *lumen naturale*, but does not reach the *lumen gloriae* to comprehend the proper object of theology, God, which exceeds the objects of all sciences by its excellence and evidence, in an appropriate manner. To acquire theological knowledge the *lumen naturale* operates together with some kind of supernatural light different from the *lumen fidei*; this special light Henry calls the "lumen medium".[66] According to Henry, this disposition of a special "lumen medium"—heavily criticized by Peter Aureol in his *Commentary on the Sentences*[67]—belongs to the intrinsic principles of theology known only to the true believer, whereas the natural understanding remains a necessary basis of the extrinsic principles

65 See *Summa*, a. 13, q. 3, (ed. Badius), p. 92^{v}IK: "Dicendum quod ad perfectam notitiam intellectus, quam quaerit dicens de re, duo debent concurrere. Unum est assensus veritatis. Alterum est iudicium de eo quod verum esse asserit. Hoc secundum non potest esse sine perceptione veritatis ex rei vel rationis euidentia, secundum quod dicitur in principio Ethico⟨rum⟩. Unusquisque bene iudicat quae cognoscit. Primum autem bene potest esse sine secundo et sine omnis perceptione veritatis euidenti. Assentit enim intellectus aliquando veritati propter auctoritatem dicentis et attestantis, licet eam ex euidentia omnino non percipiat. Secundum quem modum consentimus eis et asserimus tanquam vera quae cognoscimus ex historiis quas aliqua auctoritate constat esse conscriptas; et talis notitia fidelium de his quae tenent esse vera solo lumine fidei. Unde est notitia quasi ex auditu sine aliqua perceptione veritatis ex euidentia rei aut rationis … Est enim quodam modo talis qualem habet caecus de coloribus: credendo ea quae videntes quos veraces esse sciuit, de coloribus attestantur esse vera: quorum notitiam ex solo auditu nullo autem modo ex rerum euidentiam capere potest". But there is a difference between the blind and the believer: "Differt tamen in hoc quod caecus nec terminos cognoscit, cum disputat vel audit disputare de coloribus, et sola credulitate ex puris naturalibus de coloribus alterius testimonio acquiescit: fidelis autem necessario terminos credibilium cognoscit antequam complexiones credat". See R. Työrinoja, "*Lumen medium*. Henry of Ghent on the Accessibility of Theological Truth", in: G. Holmström-Hintikka (ed.), *Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times* (Synthese Library 288), Dordrecht—Boston—London 2000, pp. 161–182, here pp. 168 sq.

66 See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XII, q. 2, (ed. J. Decorte), Opera Omnia XVI, pp. 14,20–15,23.

67 See R. Työrinoja, "Auriole's Critique of Henry of Ghent's *Lumen medium*", in: J.A. Aertsen und A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin—New York 1998, pp. 622–628.

of theology.[68] In this respect, the *lumen medium*, which he also calls *lumen theologicum*, operates by the evidence of reason (*ex evidentia rationis*).[69]

For Henry, it is therefore theology alone that can fulfill man's natural desire to acquire the most perfect knowledge, i.e., to contemplate God in his very essence, because only theology combines both natural and supernatural instruments to overcome the weakness of the human intellect: like a bat that cannot see the sun, our intellect cannot attain the perfect cognition of the first truth on purely natural grounds.[70] In this respect theology provides a knowledge that surpasses metaphysical speculation. Theology excels all sciences providing a superior knowledge, and therefore it is, properly speaking, called wisdom, insofar as theology does not only consider being as it is uttered by the first truth, but also with respect to the final goal, the highest good.[71] This is not only a speculative definition. Theology also considers the final goal of all operations

68 See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XII, q. 2, (ed. J. Decorte), Opera Omnia XVI, pp. 26,75–27,1: "Postquam autem tale intelligere terminorum incomplexorum alicuius complexi theologici habitum est dicto modo ex sensu, puta quid est Deus, quid esse, quid trinus, quid unus, licet non ut est complexum est credibile, sed magis ut naturaliter cognoscibile, cum postmodum ex illis terminis ex auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae seu Dei proponuntur articuli credibilium complexi ex illis terminis incomplexis constituti, quibus articulis propter illam auctoritatem cum adiutorio fidei infusae creditur et firmiter eorum incomplexa adiutorio supernaturalis luminis, excedentis fidem et lumen fidei cognitione magis determinata et magis particulari quam etat cognitio quam philosophi ex puro lumine naturali protuerunt habere de illis. … in eodem lumine virtute talium principiorum extrinsecorum cognoscuntur principia theologiae intrinseca, et ex illis collectione demonstrativa cognoscuntur conclusiones quae ex illis sequuntur, quae non in se nec ex se cognoscuntur cognitione suorum terminorum, sed solum ex principiis et in illis cognitis cognitione terminorum. Et per hoc habetur habitus intellectivus de principiis tam extrinsecis quam intrinsecis theologiae, et scientificus simpliciter de conclusionibus crediblibus".

69 See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XII, q. 2, (ed. J. Decorte), Opera Omnia XVI, pp. 20,43–21,51; see Marialucrezia Leone, "Metaphysics, Theology and the Natural Desire to Know Separate Substances in Henry of Ghent", in: *Quaestio* (*Metaphysica—sapientia—scientia divina. The Subject and Status of First Philosophy in the Middle Ages*) 5 (2005), pp. 513–526, especially pp. 522–525.

70 See Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 24, q. 1, (ed. Badius), p. 137^{v}E.

71 Ibid., a. 6, q. 2, (ed. Badius), p. 43^{v}N: "Quare cum theologia considerat causas altissimas et profundiora er altiora circa illas, quam scientia humana possit attingere, et maxime circa illam causam, quae Deus est, qui et causarum et omnium est principium, ut dicitur primo Metaphysicae; quam summe considerat ut est primum principium onium: omnes ens inquantum verum producendo in esse a prima veritate, quae ipse est; et ut est omnium finis ultimus: omne ens inquantum bonum, in bonum ultimum, quod ipse est reducendo quoad bene esse".

with regard to the practical concern that all operations and all practical knowledge are ordered towards the beatific vision as the ultimate beatitude.[72] Here, through the question of wisdom a particular practical moment determines the understanding of theology, which is commonly conceived as speculative.[73]

This should not be surprising at all, because the practical dimension of theology articulates the question of man's perfection, which is the condition to attaining the true certitude. The question of certitude obviously defines the scope for the epistemological and metaphysical questions involved. If one takes this hermeneutical approach seriously, one can also see the two epistemological preconditions, which serve as a point of departure for Henry's thinking: (i) the awareness of the weakness of the intellect and its lacking ability to attain the genuine and pure truth (*syncera veritas*); this precondition traces back the question of certainty beyond the principles; and (ii) the continuity of man's cognition, which defines the scope of the epistemology bridging, to a certain extent, natural and supernatural reasoning. Consequently, Henry—following Bonaventure—attributes the *a priori* knowledge of the first and proper object, the divine being, to theology, while philosophy provides only an *a posteriori* knowledge of it, insofar as it belongs to the subject of metaphysics.[74]

Henry and his followers—who mentioned particularly Augustine, Anselm and Hugh of St. Victor in their long list of authorities in favour of their position—indicate a fundamental change concerning the discussions on the scientific status of theology, which is reported e.g. in the Prosper of Emilia's *Duo candelabra Parisiensia* or even earlier in the Prologue to the commentary on the *Sentences* by Durandus of St. Pourçain. Stephen Brown has broadly and

72 Ibid., a. 7, q. 6, (ed. Badius), p. 55^{r}O: "Nunc autem ita est quod theologia finem ultimum operandorum considerat: ad quem fines omnium operationum et scientiarum praedictarum ordinantur secundum divinam visionem et amorem: quia in eis consistit ultima beatitudo".

73 See A. Speer, "*Sapientia nostra*. Zum Verhältnis von philosophischer und theologischer Weisheit in den Pariser Debatten am Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts", note 43, pp. 260–266.

74 See Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 7, q. 6, ad 2, (ed. Badius), p. 56^{r}R: "Et quia isto modo considerandi deum, ut scilicet consideratur in scientiis philosophicis, non est deus id quod primo mens in rebus concipit (dico conceptione discretiva discernendo ipsum ab aliis; conceptione enim absoluta est id quod etiam in naturali notitia mens primo concipit, ut infra ostendatur), immo primus conceptus discretivus naturalis cognitionis ex creaturis est ratio entis simpliciter sub quo concipit secundario rationem entis principitati et principiantis". Cf. ibid., a. 24, q. 9, (ed. Badius), p. 146^{v}. See W. Goris, "Die Vergegenwärtigung des Heils. Thomas von Aquin und die Folgezeit", in: J.A. Aertsen und M. Pickavé (Hrsg.), *Ende und Vollendung. Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 29), Berlin—New York 2002, pp. 417–433, here pp. 424–428 and 431.

deeply analyzed the new paradigms of persuasive, defensive and declarative as well as deductive theology and their respective modes of understanding theology.[75] This debate is totally separated from a parallel debate which concerns the status and the subject of metaphysics, as Albert Zimmermann has largely shown.[76] Thus, we do have two first sciences in two separated institutional discourses.

6 Detached Contemplation

Meister Eckhart seems to have ignored the opposition of "philosophi" and "theologi", which dominated the discourses in the 13th century as well as Aquinas' distinction of two kinds of theology. At the beginning of his Sermon on the feastday of St. Augustine, which Eckhart preached as a university sermon during his first period as *magister actu regens* at the University of Paris—he adopts the Boethian model of a unified theology and extends it even to the wisdom of Sacred Scripture, which is equally accessible to reason as the wisdom of pagan philosophers, since there is only one source and one root ("fons et radix") of the truth, from which all that is true proceeds according to being and understanding, to Scriptures and nature.[77] On this hermeneutical principle Eckhart also built his *Opus tripartitum*. In his great unfinished project, which brings together a propositional system based on fourteen axioms, the *Quaestio*-method of Scholastic theology and scriptural exegesis, Eckhart bridges the gap between scriptural exegesis and speculative thought as well as the gaps between natural reasoning and divine revelation.

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75 See S.F. Brown, *"Duo Candelabra Parisiensia*: Prosper of Reggio in Emilia's Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study", in: J.A. Aertsen—K. Emery, Jr.—A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin—New York 2000, pp. 320–356.

76 See A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen* (RTPM—Bibliotheca 1), 2., erw. Aufl., Leuven 1998.

77 See Meister Eckhart, *In Iohanem*, n. 185 (Lateinische Werke III, pp. 154,14–155,2): "Secundum hoc ergo convenienter valde scriptura sacra sic exponitur, ut in ipsa sint consona, quae philosophi de rerum naturis et ipsarum proprietatibus scripserunt, praesertim cum ex uno fonte et una radice procedat veritatis omne quod verum est, sive essendo sive cognoscendo, in scriptura et in natura".

This understanding of theology, which is rooted in the transcendental foundation on first concepts, which likewise function as pathways to contemplate God's essence, points to the underlying truth that the human soul has a direct access to God. This assumption is based on the epistemic presupposition that the true human nature is intellective and not rational (a position which he borrowed from Albert the Great), as Eckhart points out in his *Sermo* 15 "Quidam homo nobilis".[78] This is the core of Eckhart's anthropology, which he unfolds in a critical discussion of Aristotle's (and implicitly Aquinas') anthropology. A rational man ("ain vernunftiger mentsch") comprehends himself in an intellective manner and is himself detached ("im selber abgeschaiden") from all matter and forms. The more he is detached from all things and turned to himself, and the more he understands all things clearly in himself without turning outwards, the more human he is.[79] Therefore, man is able to achieve the contemplative goal even in this life when he is able to become a noble man (*homo nobilis*). This anthropology entails substantial changes concerning the understanding of contemplation.

(i) *Theoria* or contemplation is no longer understood as a perfection stemming from a pursuit for wisdom, which can be fulfilled by a specific intellectual act, e.g., seeing the separate substances. Eckhart even speaks about the detachment of the understanding from form and image ("abgeschaidenhait des verstenntniss sunder form vnd bild"). Only in this, understanding understands all things in itself without turning outwards and without transforming itself. This requires simplicity, because the more simply man understands all multiplicity, the more he remains unchangeable in himself—such as Boethius says that "God is an immovable good, standing still in himself, untouched and unmoved and moving all things". Therefore, Eckhart concludes, "a simple understanding is in itself so pure that it understands the pure, naked divine being without a medium [*sunder mittel*]".[80]

78 See Meister Eckhart, *Sermo* 15 *Homo quidam nobilis* (DW I, p. 250,5–6).

79 See *Sermo* 15 *Homo quidam nobilis* (DW I, p. 250,6–10): "Ein vernúnftiger mentsch ist, der sich selber vernúnfteklichen verstát vnd in im selber abgeschaiden ist von allen materien vnd formen. ie me er abgeschaiden ist von allen dingen vnd in sich selber gekeret, ie me er aellú ding clarlich vnd vernúnfteklich bekennet in im selber sunder uskeren: ie me es ain mentsch ist".

80 See *Sermo* 15 *Homo quidam nobilis* (DW I, p. 250,11–17): "Nû spriche ich: wie mac daz gesîn, daz abegescheidenheit des verstantnisses sunder forme und bilde in im selber alliu dinc verstât sunder ûzkêren und verwandlunge sîn selbes? Ich spriche, ez kome von sîner einvalticheit; wan ie lûterer einvaltiger der mensche sîn selbes in im selber ist, ie ein-

(ii) Since man's perfection consists in the union with God, Eckhart emphasizes the understanding of wisdom as a turning to the interior. That is why he introduces, commenting on *Sap*. 7:7 "invocavi, et venit in me spiritus sapientiae", the famous Augustinian *dictum* "Noli foras ire, in te ipsum intra" from Chapter 39 of *De vera religione*, which he takes to be the starting point to unfold his understanding of wisdom as entering the interior man.[81] Contemplation is nothing but a turning to the interior, since hidden in the depths of the soul, "in abdito mentis", there is the inextinguishable light ("inextinguibile lumen") of the uncreated divine wisdom, which only the intellect as such ("intellectus inquantum intellectus est") is able to grasp. In order to be able to grasp this light, man has to turn towards the internal and finally has to transcend himself to the self-knowledge of God, who alone knows himself in himself.[82]

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valticlîcher er alle manicvalticheit in im selber verstât und blîbet unwandelbære in im selber. Boethius sprichet: got ist ein unbewegelich guot, in im selber stille stânde, unberüeret und unbeweget und alliu dinc bewegende. Ein einvaltic verstantnisse ist sô lûter in im selber, daz ez begrîfet daz lûter blôz götlich wesen sunder mittel". Cf. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, lib. 3, m. IX, (ed. C. Moreschini), p. 79,1.

81 See Meister Eckhart, *Expositio libri Sapientiae* (*In Sap*.), n. 89 (LW II, p. 421,1–5). Cf. Augustine, *De vera religione*, XXXIX, 72 (CCSL 32, p. 234,12 sq.). For the complex structure of Eckhart's exegesis see A. Speer, "Zwischen Erfurt und Paris: Eckharts Projekt im Kontext. Mit einer Bibelauslegung von Sap. 7,7–10 und Joh. 1,11–13", in: A. Speer und L. Wegener (Hrsg.), *Meister Eckhart in Erfurt* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 32), Berlin—New York 2005, pp. 3–33, especially pp. 15–26 and 30–33.

82 See *In Sap*., nn. 94–95 (LW II, pp. 428,4–429,4): "Lumen quidem sapientiae, sub ratione sapientiae, non recipitur in corporibus, sed nec in anima rationali, ut natura sive ens est in natura, sed in ipso solo ⟨intellectu⟩, inquantum intellectus est [...]. 'Eo enim imago est, quo dei capax est', ut ait Augustinus. Patet igitur ratio, quare lumen sapientiae hoc ipso est inexstinguibile, quo in intellectu recipitur. Ad hoc facit quod Plato probat animam eo esse immortalem, quo capax est et subiectum sapientiae. Et concordat Augustinus libro *De immortalitate animae*; item quod ipse Augustinus docet quod in abdito mentis semper lucet, quamvis lateat, lumen divinum". Cf. Andreas Speer, "Abditum mentis", in: A. Beccarisi—R. Imbach—P. Porro (Hrsg.), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung* (CPTMA Beiheft 4), Hamburg 2008, pp. 447–474, in particular pp. 461–466. See also *Sermo* 15 *Homo quidam nobilis* (DW I, p. 252,1–7): "Ich hân ouch mê gesprochen von dem êrsten beginne und von dem lesten ende. Der vater ist ein begin der gotheit, wan er begrîfet sich selben in im selber. ûz dem gât daz êwige wort inne blîbende, und der heilige geist vliuzet von in beiden inne blîbende und gebirt in niht, wan er ein ende ist der gotheit inne blîbende und aller crêatûren, dâ einiu lûteriu ruowe ist und ein rasten alles des, daz wesen ie gewan. Daz begin ist durch des endes willen, wan in dem lesten ende ruowet allez daz, daz vernünftic wesen ie gewan".

(iii) True contemplation is no longer a specific intellective activity opposed to, for instance, the practical life, which leads to a specific way of life—be it philosophical, be it religious. Therefore, all interpretations which stylize Eckhart as an intellectual who follows a mere philosophical ideal in the footsteps of the Arabic commentators, fall too short.[83] The very same is true with regard to some sort of so-called mystical interpretations, which falsely invoke a certain mystical practice. Pivotal in this context is Eckhart's interpretation of the well-known biblical narrative of Martha and Maria, the two exemplary figures of the active and the contemplative life, in *Sermo* 86 "Intravit Iesus in quoddam castellum". Eckhart does not only seem to invert the priority between active and contemplative life when he praises Martha over Maria in the first instance. He rather subverts the idea that contemplation is connected to a specific form of contemplative life. Both sisters, Martha and Maria, have to transform themselves to maturity, which means that they have to overcome the temptation to remain in their respective lifeform and to enjoy it.[84] Already in his early *Erfurter Reden*, his *Talks of Instruction*, Eckhart blames those people, who are not content unless they are "there or there, or do this or that". Those people, even if they want to leave everything behind and to live in a cell or in a cloister, remain unresigned (*ungelazen*) and full of self-will (*eigen willen*).[85]

(iv) Finally, contemplation in the true sense is not even an activity at all. For man can achieve what is the contemplative goal, i.e., seeing God in his essence in this life. But this perfection should not be understood in terms of the Aristotelian acquisition of knowledge based on intentional acts and modes of habitualization, which are able to generate knowledge. Eckhart inverts this Aristotelian model, which understands contemplation in terms of the realization of a potentiality, by pointing out that only through a turning to passivity, calmness (*gelazzenheit*), annihilation, detachment (*abgescheidenheit*), unknowing (*unwizzen*) and unbecoming (*entwerden*) we can attain transcendental consciousness of the identity with the respective ground (*grunt*), the united one (*ein einig ein*), which Eckhart describes as birthing (*geburt*) and

83 See exemplary K. Flasch, *Meister Eckhart. Die Geburt der „Deutschen Mystik" aus dem Geist der arabischen Philosophie*, München 2006.

84 See Meister Eckhart, *Sermo* 86 *Intravit Iesus in quoddam castellum* (DW III, p. 491,6–17).

85 See Meister Eckhart, *Die rede der unterscheidunge*, 3 (DW V, pp. 191,5–192,2): "Die menschen sprechent: eyâ, herre, ich wölte gerne, daz mir alsô wol mit gote wære und alsô vil andâht hæte und vride mit gote, als ander liute hânt, und wölte, daz mir alsô wære oder ich alsô arm sî, oder: mir enwirt niemer reht, ich ensî denne dâ oder dâ und tuo sus oder sô, ich muoz in ellende sîn oder in einer klûsen oder in einem klôster".

breaking-through (*durchbrechen*). All instructions Eckhart gave to his audience point to a practice that is more a way of life than an ethical theory and that is directly deduced from the mind's attraction towards the one.[86]

Philosophy and Contemplation: Concluding Remarks

Looking back, we can clearly see that the contemplative ideal is still there, but that, as a philosophical ideal, contemplation has become more fragile due to sceptical limitation and speculative expansion. This can be considered as a significant outcome of the encounter between philosophy and Christianity, which took place in Late Antiquity. Finally, it was the transformation of *theoria* and *sophia* in connection with the Christian ideal of contemplation of the divine mysteries that provided the ground for a deeper understanding of the Aristotelian concept of a first science and its related epistemological conditions, when the Aristotelian understanding of *episteme* and the place of *sophia* and *theologia* within it became the new paradigm. This paradigm served as a point of reference even for those who maintained a critical distance, as we have seen in Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and also Meister Eckhart.

There is another witness, who is famous for his encyclopedic approach, because he "read everything". So, those who read his work, read everything. By quoting this proverb, Kent Emery introduces his most famous author Denys the Carthusian in an article in which he shows that Denys has accepted and adopted the model of a twofold wisdom and twofold contemplation. In his programmatic treatise on contemplation *De contemplatione*, Denys unfolds a systematic view on wisdom in relation to the capacities of the human mind. Although there is a direct natural, philosophical wisdom, the human desire for beatitude goes beyond this philosophical wisdom; it requires supernatural wisdom, which can be divided into scholastic wisdom (*sapientia scholastica*), which is infused, but requires human endeavour (*humanum studium*), and supernatural wisdom in the proper sense, through which the human mind becomes connatural to divine things and is conformed to them in affection. This "mystical" wisdom calls for the most powerful act of contemplation, which discerns the divine things intellectually in a clear intuition.[87] Therefore, con-

86 See the "moralis instructio" *In Ioh.*, n. 105 and nn. 111–115 (LW 3, p. 90 and pp. 95–100); see the detailed analysis in: A. Speer, "Zwischen Erfurt und Paris", note 81, pp. 22–25 and 32 sq.

87 See Dionysius Cartusiensis, *De contemplatione*, lib. I, art. 2, Opera omnia 41, p. 137ab: "Est itaque in hominibus primo quaedam sapientia naturalis et acquisita ac philosophica; [...] Verum, quum homo propter supernaturalem beatitudinem sit creatus, non ei suffecit sapi-

templation in the proper sense, which can be characterized as affective, immediate and sincere cognition, only befits the superessential divinity and that which refers to it.[88] In this respect, contemplation as an act of the rational soul points to very fact of the human mind's nature as an image of the first mind (*primae mentis imago*) and sign of divine light (*divinae lucis signaculum*).[89]

This sets the narrative for a short history of what the most excellent philosophers contributed to the understanding of contemplation followed by the question of whether the philosophical cognition of divine things can be properly called contemplation.[90] Although Denys acknowledges what philosophers—in particular the Greeks and the Arabs—thought of contemplation as the highest intellectual activity and of a contemplative life, he finally adopts the Augustinian criticism and dismisses the philosopher's possibility to cognize and to contemplate the divine things. Whoever claims to know God "philosophice" is, in fact, a liar (*mendax*).[91]

What, then, was the contribution of the medieval debates to the question of contemplation and philosophy? From an epistemological point of view, the most fundamental contribution seems to be the division of the highest theoretical science: wisdom or theology. As a consequence, also the understanding of contemplation had to be evaluated: (i) from an epistemological perspective, which takes the finiteness of natural reason into account; and (ii) with respect to its proper object: here, the various answers reflect the division into

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entia naturalis, sed fide ac supernaturali sapientia eguit; […] Insuper, sapientia ista supernaturalis est duplex. Una quae numeratur inter dona gratiae gratis data: quae scholastica nuncupatur, quia humano discitur studio, […] Alia demum supernaturalis sapientia ponitur inter dona gratiae gratum facientis, quoniam sine gratia ista et caritate nequit haberi; estne desuper infra, formata ac salutaris; […] Unde sapientia quasi sapida scientia dicitur, […] Postremo, huius sapientiae actus potissime contemplatio ipsa asseritur, sicut post pauca clarius deducetur". See K. Emery, Jr., "Twofold Wisdom and Contemplation in Denys of Ryckel", note 55, pp. 108 sq.

88 See *De contemplatione*, lib. 1, art. 3, Opera omnia 41, pp. 137a–138b: "Denique, contemplatio proprie sumpta, est superessentialis Divinitatis et eorum quae referruntur ad eam, affectuosa, prompta atque sincera cognitio".

89 See *De contemplatione*, lib. 1, art. 5, Opera omnia 41, p, 139ab.

90 See *De contemplatione*, lib. 1, art. 9, Opera omnia 41, pp. 142b–143b: "Quid de contemplatione summi philosophi sint locuti", and art. 10, Opera omnia 41, pp. 143b–144b: "An philosophica divinorum cognitio mereatur dici contemplatio".

91 See *De contemplatione*, lib. 1, art. 10, Opera omnia 41, p. 144b: "etsi philosophice Deum cognoscat, est tamen de illorum catalogo de quibus loquitur Paulus apostolus: Dicunt se nosse Deum, factis autem negant. Ad quos utique pertinet illud Joannis apostoli: Qui dicit se nosse Deum et mandata ejus non servat, mendax est".

a philosophical and a theological wisdom, into a first science as metaphysics based on natural reason alone, and a theology which considers first and foremost revealed truth. But this division of the "theological" discourse in the 13th century did not lead to a simple restitution of the ancient ideal of *sophia* and *theoria*,[92] precisely because there is no such philosophical contemplation that can actually compete with what philosophy had achieved in its lucky marriage with Christian theology. The contemplative has already taken a glance at the paradise (or beyond the "murus paradisi", as Nicolaus Cusanus says[93]), which can never be revoked, because it belongs to the nature and the dynamics of our mind. This might be the greatest contribution of medieval philosophy to the understanding of contemplation.

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92 See A. Speer, "The Division of Metaphysical Discourses: Boethius, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart", in: R. Friedman—K. Emery, Jr.—A. Speer (eds.), *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown* (STGM 105), Leiden—Boston 2011, pp. 91–116.

93 See e.g. Nicolaus Cusanus, *De visione Dei*, c. 13, n. 51, Opera omnia VI, p. 44, 11 sq.: "Omnis enim conceptus terminatur in muro paradisi". See A. Speer, "Verstandesmetaphysik. Bonaventura und Nicolaus Cusanus über die (Un-)Möglichkeit des Wissens des Unendlichen", in: M. Pickavé (Hrsg.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), Berlin—New York 2003, pp. 525–553, especially pp. 544–551.

CHAPTER 4

The Two "Late Middle Ages"

William J. Courtenay

Introduction

In the periodization of medieval history, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are usually placed together under one title: The Late Middle Ages. Renaissance historians also claim those centuries as one territory, subdivided into Early Renaissance and High Renaissance. Even among intellectual and religious historians it is common to speak of a late medieval period between the age of high scholasticism of the thirteenth century and the Reformation of the sixteenth. Whether looked at as a period of decline, of a disintegration of the "Scholastic Synthesis" of faith and reason, a synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christian Philosophy, as did Étienne Gilson, or as a period of positive growth and transformation leading to the dawn of the modern era, as did Heiko Oberman, it has been common practice to view that two-hundred year period as one cultural unit.[1]

It is noteworthy, however, that some of the leading intellectual and cultural historians of the last two generations who have tried to identify the distinctive characteristics of the period gave most of their attention to the fifteenth century despite the continuity that they claimed existed between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Jan Huizinga in his *Waning of the Middle Ages* saw it as one period, although the majority of his examples were drawn from the Burgundian court of the fifteenth century.[2] Oberman saw a current of Nominalism that ran from William of Ockham through Gregory of Rimini, Nicole Oresme, Marsilius of Inghen, Pierre d' Ailly, and Jean Gerson, to Gabriel Biel at the end of the fifteenth, yet he was most familiar with the fifteenth century and much of his view of the late Middle Ages was shaped by a retrospective vision informed by what it supposedly led to, namely the Reformation and the early modern era.[3]

1 É. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, New York 1937, pp. 61–121; Id., *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, New York—London 1954, pp. 85–89; Id., *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, New York 1955, pp. 471–520. For a contrasting view, see H.A. Oberman, *The Dawn of the Reformation. Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought*, Edinburgh 1986.

2 J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, London ^{6}1955.

3 H.A. Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with attention to its Relation

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Most scholars today are well aware of important differences between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, whether they think of those differences as shifts in currents of thought within one and the same period or as a more decisive turning point around 1400, a wind-shift, that transformed the balance of elements that were present before and after. Among the features of fifteenth-century thought that have been contrasted with those of the fourteenth century are the resurgence of various forms of Platonism, the growth of Realism, a diminished role of the meta-linguistic approach to theology and natural philosophy, the reappearance of schools of thought and the heated conflicts between them, the growth and popularization of interest in astrology and magic, and the impact on educational institutions and intellectual life of the religious reform movements of the period, from the Brethren of the Common Life, to the Observant movements, the Benedictine Melk reform in the Danube valley, and the important role of urban Carthusian houses for late medieval spirituality. These changes between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are numerous and significant enough to warrant separating them into distinct periods with a dividing line roughly at 1400.

The causes, however, that lie behind these shifts that make the fifteenth century in so many ways a different world from the fourteenth are various and complex, and are not yet well understood. This can be illustrated by looking at the background or context of two aspects of that change that concern the intellectual life of universities, namely the move away from a philosophical, meta-linguistic approach to theology and the reemergence of competing schools of thought. If one were to identify one major event that preceded these changes, whether a precipitating event (as some have viewed it) or simply as coincidental, it would be the Papal Schism and the effect it had not only on the understanding of the Christian church in Western Europe but on educational institutions and the lives of those who attended or taught in them. And among other factors that have been pointed to as contributing to a decline in the meta-linguistic approach to theology and an increase in Realism one should include a growth in anti-English sentiment due to the negative outcomes for the French of warfare in the northern half of France in conflict with the English and their allies. But the relation between those two factors on the one hand (schism and warfare) and the intellectual shifts I have mentioned on the other are far from self-evident. More than a half-century separates the battle of Crécy from Jean Gerson's response to the University of Oxford's reaction to the Parisian posi-

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to the Renaissance", in: *Harvard Theological Review* 53 (1960), pp. 47–76; Id., *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, Cambridge, Mass. 1963.

tion on the Schism, or Gerson's repudiation of sophistical argumentation in theology that he associated with English theologians. And in what way would the existence of two popes and divided allegiances across Europe create or strengthen competing schools of thought that do not divide along the lines of papal allegiance or national boundaries? The answers are not simple, and thus the hypotheses I offer will differ from much of the analysis offered to date and will also modify some of the conclusions I myself have offered in the past.

1 The Introduction and Reactions to Philosophical Theology

From the time of the introduction of English logic and theology into Paris, a process that may have begun as early as the second decade of the fourteenth century and came to full flower in the early 1340s, two reactions competed against each other. One reaction was a fascination with the newer approaches and techniques for the analysis of authoritative texts in philosophy and theology, and for the ability of those techniques of analysis to solve or at least advance the understanding of theological questions. The other reaction was one of distrust over the use of a meta-linguistic approach to theological problems, the application of distinctions based on various forms of supposition, composite and divided senses, common versus strict uses of words and phrases (*ex virtute sermonis*), as applied to authoritative texts, along with the endangerment of the traditional understanding of the Aristotelian categories and, correspondingly, natural philosophy.

Even before any reshaping effect of English thought was in evidence at Paris, John XXII expressed his concern for the direction of theological teaching at Paris. In the first year of his pontificate, in May 1317, he wrote a letter to the University of Paris, praising the importance and mission of the university but deploring its current shortcomings. Some arts masters were guilty of not completing their lecture courses, of abandoning the search for wisdom in favor of philosophical errors, of allowing promotions to the magisterium without the required examination, disputations, and determination, and of spending more time in litigation than in teaching.[4] Theologians, neglecting or postpon-

4 *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (henceforth cited as CUP), (ed. H. Denifle et E. Chatelain), Paris 1891, Vol. II, n. 741, p. 200: "nonnulli ex vobis … habentes magisterii dignitatem, nec attendentes quod incassum bonum agitur, si priusquam veniatur ad terminum deseratur, legere libros incipiunt, sed negligentia vel animi levitate vel alia inconstantia ipsos debito modo non finiunt sed deserunt imperfectos; nonnulli alii plus sapere quam oportet sapere contra doctrinam apostoli molientes inherendo philosophorum erroribus veram sophie intelligen-

ing treatment of proper doctrine, presumably referring to the Bible and the Fathers, pursued useless, inquisitive, and superfluous philosophical questions and subtleties.[5] The letter was written six months after the pope had responded favorably to the first collective petition for benefice support from university masters and in the context of papal appeals to prelates to support scholars in similar ways.[6] In the midst of papal largess, persons informed about current teaching and practices at Paris were complaining about the laxity of arts masters in upholding academic regulations and inappropriate teaching among regent masters in theology.

Although the failings of the faculty of arts are detailed at greater length, it is the language describing the single failing of the faculty of theology that concerns us. It had been reported to John that some theological masters were more interested in discussing philosophical questions than theological texts, and the type of philosophy that interested them is described with terms (*curiosus*, *subtilitas*) that had negative connotations. This complaint about an excessive use of philosophy in teaching theology at Paris thus came well before Ockham's works or even before news of his opinions had reached Paris.

What and who Pope John and his informants might have had in mind is difficult to answer. John's letter is too early to be a reaction to Peter Aureol, who in any event maintained a good relationship with the pope, who appointed him archbishop of Aix less than a year before Aureol's death in January 1322. We

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tiam derelinquunt, et cum deberent ad consolationem cordium ipsorum …, decipiuntur per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam secundum traditiones hominum, fideique catholice documenta minus debite venerantur; quidam vero minus ydonei et indigni, quidam etiam sine debito examine ad statum magisterii assumuntur; alii quoque solemnium disputationum et determinationum frequentiam consuetam ab olim in Parisiensi studio pretermittunt; quidam actu regentes, qui tenerentur insistere exercitio lectionum, litigiorum anfractibus et advocationum strepitibus et forensibus occupationibus se involvunt …".

5 Ibid., pp. 200–201: "quidam etiam theologi, postpositis vel neglectis canonicis necessariis utilibus et edificativis doctrinis, curiosis inutilibus et supervacuis philosophie questionibus et subtilitatibus se immiscent, ex quibus ipsius studii disciplina dissolvitur, luminis ejus splendor offenditur et postsequens studentium utilitas multipliciter impeditur". In addition to the three registered copies of this letter among the common letters (Vatican City, ASV, Reg. Aven. 5, f. 192^{v}, and Reg. Vat. 65, f. 319^{v}) and secret letters (Reg. Vat. 110, f. 48^{r}), the pope sent a copy to the bishop of Paris, requesting that the chancellor and university masters ensure that the abuses be corrected (Reg. Vat. 110, f. 48^{v}); *Lettres secrètes du pape Jean XXII relatives à la France*, (ed. A. Coulon and S. Clémencet), Paris 1900, Vol. I, p. 178.

6 For the papal provisions, see *Rotuli Parisienses. Supplications to the Pope from the University of Paris*, (ed. W.J. Courtenay), Leiden 2002, Vol. I, pp. 31–38; for papal letters to prelates, see *CUP* II, pp. 198–200.

can also rule out Durand of St. Pourçain. His views were controversial, but that was because of his departure from the teaching of Aquinas, not because his approach to theology was overly philosophical. Moreover, in the years before 1317 Durand was teaching at the papal *studium* in Avignon, not at Paris, and he was appointed bishop of Limoux by John in the first year of his pontificate.

The papal letter was probably in response to events and concerns at Paris in the previous year or two, which had been brought to the pope's attention. Since the theologians whose practices were being attacked were masters, the issue was not likely to have been the thirteen articles of frater Bartholomew, bachelor of theology, which were censured at Paris in 1316.[7] A better candidate would be a master of theology who is known to have a strong interest in logic and philosophy, such as Radulphus Brito, regent master in theology at Paris and provisor of the Sorbonne by 1315, who had previously been a prominent master in the arts faculty.[8] In addition to commentaries on Aristotle's logic and physics, Brito authored several *sophismata*, a treatise *de modis significandi*, and a question on *causa susceptionis magis et minus*, which explores a question that was also treated by two other contemporaries at Paris, Thomas Wilton and Walter Burley, under a similar title.

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7 K. Michalski, "La révocation par Frère Barthélemy, en 1316, de 13 thèses incriminées", in: A. Lang; J. Lechner; M. Schmaus (Hrsg.), *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres*, Münster 1935, Band 2, pp. 1091–1098.

8 Radulphus Brito has long been confused with Radulphus de Hotot, who was also a regent master in theology at Paris in the early fourteenth century. Radulphus Reginaldi Brito is almost certainly identical with Radulphus de Plebe Diriaco from Brittany, master of theology by June 1315 [P. Glorieux, *Aux origines de la Sorbonne*, Paris 1965, Vol. II, pp. 530–531], who was a famous master in the faculty of arts in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and provisor of the Sorbonne from 1315 to 1320 [Glorieux, *Aux origines*, Paris 1966, Vol. I, pp. 209, 210, 213]. If he did not die in 1320, as Glorieux assumed, he may be identical with the *dominus* Rodulphus Brito living in the rue du Four or the Raulfus Brito in the rue de St-Hilaire at Paris in 1329–1330 [W.J. Courtenay, *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 227–228]. Radulphus de Hotot, on the other hand, was from Normandy and was an active regent master in theology at Paris in the first decade of the fourteenth century but not attested to after 1309 [*CUP* II, p. 127n]. The later probably came either from one of several villages named Hautot in the diocese of Rouen, or from Hottot in the diocese of Bayeux. By the second decade of the fourteenth century there was another, younger, Radulphus de Hotot, in this case probably from the village of that name south of Bayeux, who was master of arts when he represented the Norman nation along with Guillelmus de Hotot (later DTh) in witnessing a document in November 1317 [Glorieux, *Aux origines*, Vol. I, p. 210], and who may be identical with Rodulphus Sellonis de Hotot, DMed in 1337, from the diocese of Bayeux [*Rotuli Parisienses*, Vol. I, p. 82].

Similarities between the writings of Radulphus Brito and those of Wilton and Burley suggests that the context may have been the introduction of newer approaches in logic, and correspondingly in theology, that had developed at Oxford in the opening decade of the fourteenth century and which may have been transmitted to Paris by Oxford scholars, especially ones from Merton College, who went to Paris to complete their theological studies. For example, Thomas Wilton, who began his studies in theology at Merton College by 1300, went to Paris before 1308, was bachelor of theology there by 1311, and was regent master by 1314. Walter Burley, also at Merton College by 1305, went to Paris in 1310 to continue his studies in theology. Neither Wilton nor Burley espoused the type of views that would later make Ockham controversial, but their commitment to terminist logic and, perhaps more tellingly, their willingness to explore philosophical issues in a theological context may have appeared to their Parisian contemporaries as useless curiosity or immersing oneself in philosophical questions and subtleties while purporting to expound on theological texts and questions. Wilton's *Quaestio de susceptione magis et minus* was presented at Paris while he was regent master in theology. Burley would have reached the baccalaureate stage in theology by 1317 and would have been involved in disputations and biblical lectures in the previous two years. We do not know what works of Burley may have been written at Paris between 1310 and 1317, although it is likely that the early version of his *De puritate artis logicae* and certainly the early version of his *Expositio librorum Physicorum* predate 1317. Although the Parisian theological program required lectures on two books of the Bible before one entered on lectures on the *Sentences*, both Wilton and Burley were previously familiar with the theological program at Oxford in which lectures on the *Sentences* immediately followed the period of attending lectures in theology, often while simultaneously continuing lectures in philosophy in the faculty of arts. At Oxford the biblical lectures of a bachelor followed his lectures on the *Sentences* and occupied no more than a year. The Oxford program thus placed arts and theology in closer association than at Paris, where the idea that the student of theology was preparing to become a "Master of the Sacred Page" was reinforced by a two-year period of biblical lectures before reading the *Sentences*.

It is impossible to know whether it was practices introduced by English students, bachelors, and masters active in the theological faculty at Paris in the 1313 to 1317 period that were the intended target of Pope John's letter. Certainly Thomas Wilton was in good standing with the pope in November 1317, when Wilton was made canon of St. Paul's in London with expectation of a prebend.[9]

9 *Rotuli Parisienses*, Vol. 1, pp. 32–33. Other Parisian regents in theology receiving papal graces

The best candidates for persons familiar with disputations and lectures in the faculty of theology in 1313–1316, who had close contacts with the papal curia and John XXII in 1316–1317, and who might have been inclined to inform the Pope on such matters are Peter of Palude O.P., and Jacques Fournier, O.Cist., neither of whom appear to have been touched by newer methods in logic nor their application to theological questions.

Pending further exploration, one can say two things. First, the type of approaches and questions being pursued by some masters and bachelors of theology at Paris before 1316 prepared the ground for the reception of English texts and methods when they later became available at Paris. And secondly, the language employed by John ("inutilibus et supervacuis philosophie questionibus et subtilitatibus") shaped the vocabulary of anti-innovation for a century or more. For example, the letter Clement VI wrote to the University of Paris in May 1346, after almost a decade-long struggle over Ockhamism and the *secta Occamica* at Paris and long-presumed to be directed precisely at those targets, says much the same thing—albeit articulated at greater length and with a richer vocabulary.[10] Although Benedict XII, as far as we know, never wrote a letter comparable to those—the ostensible cause of his strong displeasure with the University in 1339 concerned its abuse of its privileges rather than its teaching—the arts faculty at Paris responded to papal pressure by forbidding the use of Ockham's works either in public or private teaching and by launching a witch-hunt against those in or associated with the *secta Occamica*. A number of strong voices at the University of Paris at this time, not the least Conrad of Megenberg, opposed the direction that philosophical and theological analysis had taken at the University. In the second quarter of the fourteenth century opposition to a meta-linguistic approach in theology and natural philos-

were Galterus de Auxiaco, Guillelmus Bernardi de Narbonne, Johannes Parvi dictus Briquebec, Raynerius Alemanni, Radulphus Reginaldi Britoni, and Johannes de Blangiaco.

10 *CUP* II, n. 1125, pp. 587–589, at 588: "Plerique quoque theologi, quod deflendum est amarius, de textu Biblie, originalibus et dictis sanctorum ac doctorum expositionibus (ex quibus vera illa acquiritur theologia, cui non attribuendum est quicquid ab hominibus sciri potest, ubi plane nulla vanitatis et curiositatis noxia reperitur, sed hoc quo fides saluberrima, que ad veram ducit beatitudinem, initatur [*sic*], gignitur, roboratur et defenditur) non curantes, philosophicis questionibus et aliis curiosis disputationibus et suspectis oppinionibus doctrinisque peregrinis et variis se involvunt, non verentes in illis expendere dies suos, que nec domi nec militie nec alicubi prosunt, et ommissis necessariis supervacua docere et dicere satagunt in tanta temporis egestate, sic quod, unde deberent prodire fructus uberes sicut antiquitus reficientes fideles delectabiter ad salutem, pestifera pululant quandoque semina, et in perniciosam segetem, de quo profecto dolendum est, coalescunt".

ophy was based on different attitudes toward appropriate methods of analysis and different assumptions about the real status of the Aristotelian categories. Opposition had little or nothing to do with whether these tendencies emanated from England.

Despite internal and external opposition to the direction of philosophical and theological studies at Paris, especially the effects of English logic and theology, the newer techniques and a favorable use of fourteenth-century English authors flourished at Paris until well after the beginning of the papal schism. This is true not only of Parisian masters coming from the Low Countries and German-speaking lands, such as John Hiltalinger of Basel, James of Eltville, Henry Totting of Oyta, or Marsilius of Inghen, but also of French masters born and raised not far from Paris, such as Pierre d'Ailly, from the Soissonais. Whether or not the University of Paris developed its own brand of Terminist philosophy uninfected by English thought and exemplified through Jean Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen, as has been proposed[11] but which I don't believe was the case, those authors end up on the reading list of the *via moderna* in the fifteenth century, not on that of the *via antiqua*. The reshaping or rebalancing of thought at Paris and an effective campaign against English influences in philosophy and theology came not in 1340 but at the end of the fourteenth century, when a declining interest in a metalinguistic approach to theology and a perceived need for curricular direction among the vast number of fourteenth-century scholastic authors, coincided with the reformist agenda of Jean Gerson, whose reputation and persuasive powers altered the intellectual landscape at Paris. Gerson's call for a return to the *tritum iter*, the worn and proven path, based on the authorities from the last half of the thirteenth century broadly construed, echoed in a theological context the language of the inception oaths in the faculty of arts, that one should adhere to Aristotle, Averroes, the ancient commentators, and particularly the expositors whose interpretive commentaries could be found in the book shops of the University quarter in the early fourteenth century, namely Albert, Thomas, Giles of Rome, and others. If that message was only moderately successful in the 1340s, it became far more successful in the opening decades of the fifteenth century.

What relationship, if any, did this have with attitudes of Parisian masters toward the English and things English in the course of the Hundred Year's War?

11 Z. Kaluza, *Les Querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et realists aux confins du XIV^e^ et du XV^e^ siècles*, Bergamo 1988; Id., "Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur le statut du 29 décembre 1340 et le prétendu statut perdu contra Ockham", in: L. Bianchi (ed.), *Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 197–258.

Apart from ending or almost ending the presence of English students at Paris, which had already been declining since the second decade of the fourteenth century, and thus altering the geographical composition of the University community, the military conflict between England and France had little discernable effect on teaching at Paris in the early stages of the war. Although children of the higher nobility were present at the University in far greater numbers in this period than was once thought, the decimation of French knighthood at Crécy and later at Poitiers went largely unmentioned in documentation associated with Paris masters. The vast majority of students and masters were not of the nobility, and if some of the masters had benefited from the patronage of a prince or nobleman, the laws of inheritance and succession ensured that another patron would take his place and offer similar employment or support.

Events of the 1350s and 1360s, however, created a different environment. This had nothing to do with lost battles or any supposed loss of national pride (a concept requiring a sense of national identity that did not yet exist), but with loss of income. The devastation to villages and parish churches across Brittany, Normandy, Maine-Anjou, Picardy, and large sections of the ecclesiastical provinces of Sens and Reims wrought by English troops and their allies reduced or annihilated the tithe income of many parish churches that formed a substantial part of the non-instructional income of Paris masters. Papal petitions from Parisian masters in these years are a catalogue of devastation and complaints of loss of income. And opponents of the French monarchy, who a generation or two earlier would have been described in documents as the enemies of the king of France, e.g. supporters of Pope Boniface in 1303, begin to be described in this period as "the enemies of France," a phrase describing the English and their allies. In order to better position oneself for the acquisition of vacant benefices that still had income, masters attached themselves to influential patrons in increasing numbers even while remaining active regents at Paris. This growth in clientage, particularly marked during the pontificate of Innocent VI, thrust Parisian masters into the world and political concerns of the aristocracy far more than in an earlier period.

There remained, however, a "disconnect" between the growing animosity among most Parisian masters toward the English in the second half of the fourteenth century (I say 'most', because some Parisian scholars fished for patrons in both waters) and attitudes toward English elements in the curriculum and methodology of the faculties of arts and theology at Paris. The large turnover in ecclesiastical positions because of death by plague, beginning in 1348 and recurring in the 1360s, meant that there were undamaged churches and tithe income available to Parisian supplicants. And anti-English sentiment among masters from Scotland was offset by potentially positive attitudes among those

from regions in Germany and from Bohemia that had maintained ties with England and Oxford. The pattern of loss and resupplication for benefices, along with numerous cases in which Parisian scholars, passing through English-held territory, were stripped of their personal possessions, probably built up a negative attitude toward the English that may eventually have colored the way certain English texts and methods used in the faculties of arts and theology were viewed. But I think most students and masters did not make a connection between English warfare and English theology. Pierre d'Ailly's *Questiones super Sententias*, composed shortly before 1380, is saturated with citations from English authors and the application of English methods of analysis found in Sentences commentaries of Parisian theologians from the previous forty years. And even Étienne Gaudet, a Parisian theologian from the Auvergne, writing around 1383, conceded the preeminence of the English in philosophy and theology and of the French in civil and canon law.[12]

The shift in attitude at the curricular level required a decline in the fascination with meta-linguistic approaches in philosophy and theology that were attacked earlier but which only ceased to be attractive or desirable among Parisian bachelors of theology at the end of the fourteenth century. A choice in approaches, techniques of analysis, and a choice in sources to be read and cited benefited from a parallel change in climate that had been gradually gathering force in the second half of the fourteenth century, namely a reaction to the overwhelming mass of available scholastic authors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries whose works one was expected to know. One might say that the growth in the secondary literature of scholasticism, both in arts and in theology, had reached a stage that exceeded, far exceeded, the grasp of most students. Where should one begin? Which authors formed the core of the curriculum and which ones should be used to add flavor or set up the discussion on some particular issue?

As long as the purpose of theological study was to use the techniques of scholastic analysis to uncover complexities of meaning in theological texts and in so doing advance the understanding of specific theological problems as well

12 Paris, BnF, lat. 16408, f. 257^{v}, cited by Zenon Kaluza, *Querelles doctrinales à Paris*, p. 26: "Quamvis enim nostris temporibus clerici Anglicani in multis facultatibus, artibus, et scientiis floruisse noscantur, puta in artibus liberalibus, philosophia et theologia, et multa scripta notabilia super hiis posteris relinquisse, ut puta dominus quondam archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, scilicet Thomas Braduardin, bone memorie quondam primas Ybernie, dominus Almakanus, magister Guillelmus Okam cognominatus etc., tamen in iure canonico et civili non noscantur super alias nationes excellentiam habuisse nec ad presens habere noscuntur".

as display the knowledge and cleverness of the scholar, the wealth of available scholastic authors, especially those of the fourteenth century, among whom one could find useful analyses and arguments, was a benefit, not a handicap. This was the predominant pattern of theological analysis and writing throughout the second and third quarters of the fourteenth century at Paris. If the amount of that material became too vast and overwhelming, or when the purpose of theological study shifted from individual questions of current interest to a more integrated doctrinal approach aimed at understanding and defending the faith, then the context in which meta-linguistic methods had flourished no longer existed.

I think that Jean Gerson's recommendations to his former colleagues at the Collège de Navarre in 1400 for curricular reform in theology, although they were clearly driven by concerns for orthodox teaching and a distaste for sophistical reasoning, are more a response to the lack of a prioritized, graduated structure within the curriculum than they are a rejection, *tout court*, of fourteenth-century, modern authors. Gerson's concern, as he says, was for the beginning student of theology, the *novus auditor*.[13] And it is for the beginning student—not the advanced bachelor or master—that he recommended the *tritum iter*, the well-trodden path.[14] In a subsequent letter to the same group a few months later, he criticizes those who, like children, first avidly grab at the unripe fruit rather than seek what is mature and healthy.[15]

In the wake of my having presented these observations in a paper at Leuven some years ago, Andrea Robiglio and Zenon Kaluza wrote an in-depth study of

13 Jean Gerson, Letter 5 (*Jucundum est*) of April 29, 1400, (ed. P. Glorieux), *Oeuvres Complètes*, 10 Vols., Paris 1960–1973, II, p. 33: "Ad haec dignoscenda solers sit theologiae novus auditor consulere unum e multis cujus sibi doctrina, mores famaque complaceant, qui longo multoque vivendi, legendi ad bene vivendi exercitio docere faciliter possit, quam amplecti doctinam interrogantis studium moresque desiderent sive pro parte illa theologiae quae inter scolasticos magis vertitur, sive pro illa quae legentis mores aedificet, regulet et componat, sive pro illa quae praedicantibus congruit".

14 Ibid., p. 32: "Sequamur tritum iter commodius plane et ab errorum scandalorumque discrimine remotius. Tot habemus sapientiae salutaris fontes vivos, ne quaeso cisternas dissipatas fodiendo casso nos, immo stulto labore fatigemus".

15 Jean Gerson, Letter 7, l.c., *Oeuvres Complètes*, II, pp. 42–43: "Bene actum esset cum humana natura quae cognitionis avida est si seposita curiositate vel audiendi vel afferendi semper aliquid novi, ipsa jam bene inventis sobria humilitate prius uteretur. Qua super re quamdam vel non parvam epistolam vobis scripsisse memini. Attamen hoc non potest aut vix potest persuaderi scolasticis, praesertim junioribus. Delectat quippe eos nescio quomodo citius vel transcribere vel studere recentius complata quam vetera, more puerorum qui novos fructus licet acerbiores, edunt avidus quam maturos, digestos et sanos".

the history of the expression *tritum iter*, arguing at the end that Gerson meant by that phrase that the traditional, common path, as reflected in the teaching of Thomas, Bonaventura, and other acceptable theologians of that era, was the only path, the only way for contemporary theologians, both students and masters.[16] There is no doubt that by 1400 Gerson had become convinced that excessive speculation, unchecked *curiositas*, and concern with *subtilitates* were improper to theological instruction at any level, with a grave potentiality for error and consequent scandal to the church. Yet I don't find him rejecting the useful arguments and observations of "modern," fourteenth-century authors, even English authors, simply because they were more recent or English. Some of the evidence for Gerson's alleged animosity toward things English or Oxfordian does not bear up under close scrutiny. For example, Gerson's so-called polemic against the University of Oxford is simply a gloss on the University of Oxford's proposals for ending the schism, written in 1396, which has nothing to do with his opinions about English theology, one way or the other.[17] His remarks were purely a heated reply to Oxford's statements about the Parisian proposals to end the schism. If Gerson had been opposed to the writings and arguments of all English theologians, he would not have attached his plan for a revised theological curriculum to a letter sent to Pierre d'Ailly in April 1400, knowing as he did that d'Ailly's interest in the works of fourteenth-century English theologians and their techniques of analysis had not declined. Nor would he later, in his *Contra curiositatem studentium* of 1402, have praised so highly Henry Totting of Oyta, widely known at Paris as the abbreviator and disseminator of Adam Wodeham's *Lectura in sententias*.[18]

The concerns for Gerson in 1400 were two-fold. With what interpretive sources should a young student of theology begin, and what sources should form the core of the curriculum? His answer is to propose a reading list beginning with questions on the *Sentences*, especially (*praesertim*) but not necessarily exclusively, those of Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Durand of St. Pourçain, along with Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta*. And he follows that imme-

16 A.A. Robiglio and Z. Kaluza, "Appunti sulla 'strada battuta'", in: *Bulletin Du Cange* 63 (2005), pp. 251–267.

17 Gilbert Ouy, "Gerson et l'Angleterrre. A propos d'un texte polémique retrouvé du Chancelier de Paris contre l'Université d'Oxford, 1396", in: A.H.T. Levi (ed.), *Humanism in France at the End of the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance*, Manchester—New York 1970, pp. 43–81.

18 Jean Gerson, *Contra curiositatem studentium*, l.c., *Oeuvres Complètes*, III, pp. 241–242: "Venerabilis et venerandus doctor magister Henricus de Hoyta qui pro sui merito veteribus aequari et inter eruditissimos logicos, metaphysicos et theologos numerari potest …".

diately by recommending Gregory the Great's *Dialogues*, the *Vitae patrum*, the *Confessions* of Augustine, and works of Bernard of Clairvaux, and Richard of St. Victor. The mention of all of these works, including those of Bonaventure and Thomas, comes several paragraphs after Gerson used the phrase *tritum iter* and are examples of where one should begin, the common or preferred path, not a definition of the only path. More recent authors (*recentiores*) are not forbidden; in fact they excel in many things, as he says. But they please him less in that they mix into theology terms and approaches that purely concern physics or metaphysics or logic.[19]

The *tritum iter* that Gerson was recommending, therefore, was not the result of a fork in the road, a divergence of paths, only one of which could or should be taken. That is reading into Gerson's letter of 1400 the split between the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna* that lies a decade or two later. I think Gerson's image is rather of a central path, the well-worn path, along which there might be subpaths or byways for theologians well-grounded in the traditional sources. He was differentiating between what sources formed the ground level and core of the theological program, especially for beginners, and which should be distinguished from other sources that might prove useful but were not part of the core. He was not describing an ideological divide.

There is no question that the most frequent use of the *tritum iter*, the trodden path, was to distinguish a proper way from a wrong way, the latter sometimes considered heretical as opposed to true doctrine. Nevertheless, the expression was also used, as Robiglio and Kaluza noted, in a monastic context to insist that the eremitic life should not be attempted until one had fully suppressed or reshaped the individual will through life in community under the authority and training of an abbot. Only after *conversio* or *conversatio morum*, the perfecting of the monastic life, through life in community should one attempt the more austere and difficult life of the solitary hermit.

The question posed by Guillaume Euvrie in his letter to Gerson in 1403 was not the question of which ideological path to choose, or what works or group of authors should be at the beginning of a long reading list.[20] Euvrie, at the

19 Jean Gerson, Letter 5 (*Jucundum est*), l.c., *Oeuvres Complètes*, II, pp. 33–34: "Ad primum juvant, exempli gratia, quaestiones super Sententias et praesertim illorum doctorum qui purius ac solidius conscripserunt, inter quales, meo judicio, dominus Bonaventura et sanctus Thomas et Durandus videntur numerandi. Excellit quidem in suis quotlibetis Henricus de Gandavo. Excellunt recentiores in multis, in quibus hoc unum minus placet quod pure physicalia aut metaphysicalia aut quod amplius pudet logicalia, sub terminis theologicis involuta miscuere".

20 É. Pellegrin, "Un humaniste du temps de Charles VI: Guillaume Euvrie", in: *Bulletin IRHT* 15 (1967–1968), pp. 17–18.

time a young arts master entering upon theological study, was asking what model, what specific doctor should be followed and imitated. His question presupposes not only that one needs a path, but that one needs a specific doctor to imitate and, if need be, defend. He wants an authority to follow that will eliminate the need for independent, innovative thinking, and who will simultaneously guarantee doctrinal safety. Apart from the fact that Euvrie's letter comes three years after Gerson's recommendations for the revision of the Parisian theological curriculum—Gerson's *tritum iter* was not in answer to Euvrie's question—Euvrie approached the theological curriculum differently. He wanted a safe shortcut to a long and confusing reading list, a safe model or doctor to follow in the face of conflicting approaches and ideologies.[21] With that attitude we are entering a different world than prevailed for most of the fourteenth century.

The first step in the direction of bypassing or avoiding the hard work of wide reading and individual creativity already occurred in the third quarter of the fourteenth century at Paris (and also at Oxford) when bachelors reading the *Sentences* modified or reread a previous commentary that had met with acceptance, *lectura secundum alium*. Doing so avoided charges of erroneous teaching that resulted from attempts at individual innovation, and it guaranteed solid instruction for the theological students attending the lectures. It also avoided a lot of work on the part of the bachelor. A second step was to limit the number of authors that needed to be read by identifying specific ones that should be "followed". Here individual 'thinking' is replaced by group 'defending'. And that brings me to the second topic, the return of schools of thought.

2 The Return of Schools of Thought and the Papal Schism

The research problem of the reemergence of competing schools of thought and the origins of the two *viae* presupposes the disappearance of an aspect of intellectual life at Paris and Oxford that is well attested to in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.[22] And the issue of disappearance and reappearance

21 It is noteworthy that Euvrie graduated first in his class of licentiates for the faculty of theology at Paris in 1424; see Thomas Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates in Theology, A.D. 1373–1500. A Biographical Register*, Vol. 1: *The Religious Orders*, Leiden 2004, p. 28.

22 On the declining importance of schools of thought in the fourteenth century, see W.J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England*, Princeton 1987, pp. 171–192; Id., "The Parisian Faculty of Theology in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries", in: J. Aertsen; K. Emery, Jr.; A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Nach der Verurteilungen von*

(when, where, why, by whom, and to what extent) is not a simple matter. First, the "schools" of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were confined to the mendicant orders, and although philosophical issues were debated, the participants were all theologians. The "schools" of the early fifteenth century thrived among secular students and masters in the faculty of arts as much if not more than in theology, and neither the *Formalizantes* nor the Thomists were confined, respectively, to the Franciscan or Dominican orders. There is, therefore, at the very least, a discontinuity between the disciplines and the participants of school conflicts in the late thirteenth and early fifteenth centuries.

Secondly, the evidence for the disappearance of schools of thought in the early decades of the fourteenth century is based on the content and character of *Sentences* commentaries and disputed questions among mendicant bachelors and masters at Oxford and Paris, which show a growing freedom and independence of thought beginning as early as the second decade of the fourteenth century. Since the pressure toward conformity and defense of school doctrine was aimed largely at university bachelors, and appears to have been unsuccessful, it is easy to form a picture of the disappearance of schools of thought in the fourteenth century.

A different approach to the academic context of the intellectual history of that period, one which takes into account other centers of learning besides Paris and Oxford and that pays adequate attention to the structure of mendicant education, the different levels of instruction in the mendicant convents at Paris, and the relationship between the religious orders and the universities, suggests a different picture that has implications for the emergence of schools of thought at the end of the fourteenth century. First, then, I want to discuss certain aspects of the academic structure of Paris in contrast to other centers of learning in continental Europe, for example Cologne, and then, secondly, to look more closely at how those factors helped shape the changes that occurred immediately before and after 1400.

1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin 2001, pp. 233–247. On the reemergence of Schools of Thought, see Kaluza, *Les Querelles doctrinales*; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, "Albertistae, thomistae und nominales: die philosophisch-historischen Hintergründe der Intellektlehre des Wessel Gansfort", in: F. Akkerman; G.C. Huisman; A.J. Vanderjagt (eds.), *Wessel Gansfort (1419–1489) and Northern Humanism*, Leiden 1993, pp. 71–96; Id., "Late Medieval Schools of Thought in the Mirror of University Textbooks", in: M.J.F.M. Hoenen; J.H.J. Schneider; G. Wieland (eds.), *Philosophy and Learning: Universities in the Middle Ages*, Leiden 1995, pp. 329–369.

2.1 *Paris*

Numerically speaking, the arts faculty at Paris was the largest and constitutionally dominant part of the University, and instruction on the works of Aristotle and other authoritative philosophical texts was done by secular arts masters. The mendicant convents at Paris offered very little instruction in the arts curriculum. Those houses of study at Paris concentrated on theological training, their students having had training in logic, natural philosophy and theology before being sent to Paris. The libraries of the mendicant convents were well stocked in philosophical texts, but the teaching program was almost entirely theological.

The mendicant *studia* at Paris were independent of the University and not controlled by its regulations even though each convent had a chair in theology that gave its occupant the right to participate and vote in meetings of the faculty of theology and to recommend candidates for the baccalaureate, licensing, and inception. Only those students appointed by the order to go to Paris to read the *Sentences* and to be licensed were, technically speaking, members of the university community and obliged to follow the rules and regulations of the faculty of theology. The majority of students at the mendicant convents, however, were sent there by their province, not by the order, for advanced training in theology that would permit them to be lectors at convents of the order.[23] They were, again technically speaking, not members of the university community and not subject to any of its regulations, although they could and probably did attend disputations in the faculty of theology.

The intellectual context in which mendicant bachelors and masters of theology operated at Paris was shaped by the customs and concerns of the faculty of theology, which toward the end of the fourteenth century was dominated numerically and qualitatively by secular masters. The questions treated in lectures and debates were those that had come to have importance in the faculty during the fourteenth century, and with few exceptions they were a very different set of questions from those debated in the second half of the thirteenth century. Topics chosen as questions by mendicant masters conformed to an agenda recognized and accepted by the larger body. In such an atmosphere, school debates among mendicant masters, for example, a Dominican Thomist against a Franciscan Scotist, appear to have been rare, or at least have left few traces in the written record. Mendicant bachelors and masters were expected

23 On the lectorate program in the mendicant convents at Paris, see W.J. Courtenay, "The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century", in: P. Biller and B. Dobson (eds.), *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life. Essays in Honor of Gordon Leff*, Westbridge, Engl. 1999, pp. 77–92.

to engage all their academic contemporaries in the faculty and not engage in private battles between the orders, which belonged to an earlier era. What was important was to demonstrate knowledge of the entire scholastic tradition and be flexibly creative in one's analysis and solutions, not simply to defend positions linked to one part of the scholastic past.

Whatever training in a particular school tradition mendicant students may have acquired in their earlier education in provincial *studia* had to be suspended during their time in the Paris theological program leading to the doctorate. Whether that was also true for students in the lectorate program at Paris is another matter and cannot be answered for lack of documentation. The implications of this for the continuation or reemergence of schools of thought at Paris is considerable. At the very least, defense of school positions was discouraged, and the intellectual atmosphere of the theological faculty was not conducive to it. Some controversial topics rooted in one tradition or another, such as Scotistic use of the formal distinction as applied to the instances of creation or the Trinity, or Thomistic views on the Immaculate Conception, were at various times excluded from debate and preaching, although they boiled up from time to time.[24]

Another factor that needs to be brought into the picture is the degree of intellectual rigor among those mendicant students sent to the University of Paris for the baccalaureate and doctorate by their respective orders. While the lectorate program at the Paris convents maintained a geographical diversity based on quota requirements among the provinces of each order and probably maintained as well a higher-than-average intellectual niveau because of competition at the provincial level, appointment to the baccalaureate program followed the political structure and administrative needs of the orders. Over 75 percent of Dominican candidates and over 50 percent of Franciscan candidates were French, and most of them were sent to Paris after serving in administrative positions within those orders. For them, and for those orders, the purpose of the Parisian doctorate in theology was to prepare them for leadership positions in the order and in the church. It is small wonder that in the second half of the fourteenth century Parisian Dominican and Franciscan masters of theology contributed so little to scholastic thought. Although the Carmelite Order

24 A peace agreement between the Thomists and Scotists at Paris concerming the use of a formal distinction in discussing these issues is referred to by Francis Meyronnes and Pierre Roger, commenting on the Sentences in 1320; see *François de Meyronnes—Pierre Roger, Disputatio* (*1320–1321*) (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Age 9), (ed. J. Barbet), Paris 1961, pp. 24–29. Dominicans at Paris who in the 1380s preached in support of Thomas' position on the Immaculate Conception were condemned; see *CUP* III, pp. 486–533.

was more quota-conscious in its selection of candidates for the Paris doctorate, they also used it to credential their administrative leadership, as did the Benedictines and Cluniacs. By the time the faculty of theology began to keep records on the academic ranking of licentiates, the poorer performance of most of the monastic and mendicant candidates, especially after 1390, is clearly evident.[25] Only the Augustinian Hermits, who favored their Italian and German provinces, and the Cistercians, who promoted bachelors from Germany and Eastern Europe alongside French candidates, maintained some international balance and, whether as a result or not, a far higher degree of intellectual accomplishment.

In sum, there were two factors that led to a decline of "school" ideology at the baccalaureate level at Paris among the mendicant orders in the course of the fourteenth century. One was the structure of the university theological program itself that obliged mendicant bachelors to pursue the questions and approaches current at the time according to an agenda set by the entire body, including especially the secular masters. The other factor was a declining interest in intellectual achievement on the part of many if not most mendicant bachelors. Getting through the theological program and getting on with life were what mattered. The first of those conditions, namely the expectations and regulations of a university faculty of theology, did not exist in several other important academic centers, such as Cologne, which allowed a different atmosphere with regard to school traditions.

2.2 *Cologne*

In the absence of a university before 1388 there were no faculties of arts or theology at Cologne. Instruction in both these disciplines took place at the mendicant convents, the cathedral, through limited programs at several collegiate churches, and through private teaching. Cologne was a *studium generale* for all four mendicant orders and offered instruction in logic, natural philosophy, and theology to students sent there from other convents and provinces. Thus, in contrast to Paris, the mendicant convents at Cologne taught philosophy as well as theology. And because theological instruction was primarily in the hands of the mendicant convents, theological debates, curricularly necessary for preparation both for the lectorate as well as subsequent university

25 Thomas Sullivan, "Merit Ranking and Career Patterns: The Parisian Faculty of Theology in the Late Middle Ages", in: W.J. Courtenay and J. Miethke (eds.), *Universities and Schooling in Medieval Society*, Leiden 2000, pp. 127–163; Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates*, l.c., Vol. 1, pp. 19–49.

training, were conducted among masters and advanced students at the various convents, that is, mendicants debating mendicants. Moreover, because the academic leadership of the convent was not involved in a university program that required a continual turnover in staff, as friars finished a degree and were moved elsewhere according to the needs of the order and to make room for new candidates, there seems to have been far greater teaching continuity at Cologne and at other *studia generalia* of the mendicant orders than at Paris. One result of this situation was that when newer universities were established, such as at Prague, Vienna, or Cologne, or when older universities, such as Bologna, obtained a faculty of theology, such faculties were initially constituted out of masters in the religious convents of those cities, expanded, as in the case of Cologne and Vienna, with secular masters of theology exiled from Paris because of the papal schism.

The implications of the pre-1378 academic structure of Cologne for the issue of school traditions in the fourteenth century may be considerable. The domination of the mendicant houses of study for both philosophy and theology provided a structure in which older schools of thought could maintain themselves as generations of mendicant scholars sharpened their disputational skills against each other. And longer periods of instruction, *in situ*, for mendicant masters of theology also allowed for the dissemination of a particular intellectual approach or school of thought.

This may be why it is at places such as Cologne that we find evidence, for example, of Thomism in the middle of the fourteenth century, long after it had disappeared or had gone underground at Oxford or Paris. German scholars of a previous generation, such as Martin Grabmann, when trying to trace Thomism between the late thirteenth century and the revival of Thomism at the beginning of the fifteenth century, drew on examples outside a university context, such as the Dominican theologian, Henricus de Cervo, who taught at Cologne in the third quarter of the fourteenth century.[26] For Grabmann the case of Cervo proved the continuity of Thomism throughout the century. Yet it does not disprove the disruption of Thomism in the university context, but does prove its preservation elsewhere, which may have been crucial.

26 M. Grabmann, "Der Sentenzenkommenatar des Magister Henricus de Cervo und die Kölner Dominikanertheologie des 14. Jahrhunderts", in: *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 12 (1942), pp. 98–117; reprinted in: Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, München 1956, Band III, pp. 352–369. See also W.J. Courtenay, "From *Studia* to University. Cologne in the Fourteenth Century", in: A. Speer und A. Berger (Hrsg.), *Wissenschaft mit Zukunft*, Köln 2016, pp. 33–50.

Given the close connection between the lectorate program at Paris and the provincial *studia*, we might well expect that mendicant school traditions remained current at Paris at that lower level. It is questionable, however, whether that influenced in any way the emergence of Thomism, or Albertism, or Scotism among secular masters of arts at Paris in the early decades of the fifteenth century. It is equally questionable—or at least not very clear—how the papal schism that began in 1378 created a climate or educational structure for the emergence of those schools. The first two decades of the schism produced a flow of Urbanist students and masters out of Paris without any corresponding inflow. Not until the early fifteenth century, in the altered climate of the early conciliar epoch, does one encounter an ebb tide of German masters back into Paris.

Concluding Remarks

Among the many differences between the intellectual climate and practices of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the reform of the university curriculum in theology and the reemergence of schools of thought are among the most remarkable, and the turning point falls roughly at 1400. The curricular shift is distinguished by a decline in the meta-linguistic approach to theology and the impact of religious reform movements on the structure and content of university education. The second shift is linked to the reemergence of realism at Paris, the interpretation of Aristotle, and a sense of party-identity somewhat parallel to political and social allegiances in the world outside universities. This second development had strong roots in the curricular choices and approaches in the faculty of arts, but it also had considerable ramifications in the area of theology. How, if at all, are these two phenomena related?

Both issues are raised in the context of Gerson's reform of the curriculum in the faculty of theology at Paris, although it is the first issue that receives the most attention. Theological training should begin with the Bible, a select group of Patristic writers extending into the twelfth century, and a few major scholastic figures of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. That foundation is likely to increase spirituality and to curb undesirable innovations as the student progresses to a higher level. But that approach does not identify one particular theologian or interpreter of Aristotle who should be followed and defended. Gerson was opposed to the *Formalizantes*, as was d'Ailly, but the post-1400 Gerson cannot be placed in the camp of the Thomists or Albertists. We do not know precisely how Gerson responded to Euvrie's demand for one scholastic doctor as model, but he may have suggested a combination of sev-

eral "safe" authors. Gerson was more concerned with a graduated structure of theological training, from basics to an advanced level, avoiding useless and dangerous excursions under the impulse of *curiositas* and pride in sophistical reasoning. To that degree fixed and competing schools of thought ran counter to the type of theological reform to which Gerson was committed.

It would seem, therefore, that these two aspects of the changing intellectual climate at the opening of the fifteenth century, while they may both have been products of reorganization and realignment, are to a large degree separate phenomena. Their causes and contexts, however, are still in need of further study and clarification.

CHAPTER 5

Die scotische Unterscheidung von Essenz und Energie bei Georgios Scholarios und die inneren Quellen der palamitischen Tradition

Georgi Kapriev

Georgios Scholarios, ab 1454 unter dem Namen Gennadios II. Patriarch von Konstantinopel, wird seit den 30er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts als „byzantinischer Thomist" und sogar als „der größte unter den byzantinischen Thomisten"[1] bezeichnet, obwohl er seit 1444 der Anführer der palamitischen Partei in Konstantinopel war. Er wurde danach ständig zu den Prothomisten in Byzanz gezählt, obschon bereits früh klar wurde, dass er für mehrere Schulen offen war, von denen er sich jedoch nur im geringen Umfang beeinflussen ließ[2]. Bereits Anfang der 1930er Jahre vertrat Martin Jugie die bis heute einflussreiche These, dass Scholarios bei seiner Formulierung der (in der byzantinischen Philosophie vertretenen und für den systematischen Palamismus emblematischen) Essenz-Energie-Unterscheidung von dem Distinktionsschema des Duns Scotus, der *distinctio formalis a parte rei*, Gebrauch machte[3]. Heutzutage gilt diese Feststellung als anerkannte Forschungsposition.

Diese Problemlage erfährt in jüngerer Zeit ein wachsendes Interesse. Einerseits pflegt man, wie noch in den dreißiger Jahren, die Lösung des Scholarios der dem Palamas zugeschriebenen *distinctio realis* gegenüberzustellen. Man versucht, die Unvereinbarkeit beider Positionen aufzuzeigen. Man suggeriert dabei, dass durch die Anwendung der lateinischen (thomasischen, aber auch scotischen) metaphysisch begründeten Logik Scholarios einen Ausgang aus der Sackgasse der logischen und philosophischen Unschlüssigkeit des Palamas und seiner Nachfolger (im Zeitraum von etwa 100 Jahren) gefunden habe. Von diesem Standpunkt aus wird in der Forschung dem Scholarios ein nicht- oder bestenfalls nominal-palamitischer Charakter zugeschrieben. Andererseits werden inzwischen Stimmen laut, die nur ganz allgemein eine palamitische, auch

1 G. Podskalsky, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz*, München 1977, p. 179.

2 Cf. R.P. Guichardan, *Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles: Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios*, Lyon 1933, pp. 183–184.

3 M. Jugie, „Introduction", in: *Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios* (= OCGS), (ed. L. Petit et al.), t. III, Paris 1930, p. XVIII.

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den Scholarios einschließende Tradition postulieren, die dabei auch mit den Positionen Bonaventuras und Scotus' vereinbar sein soll.

Der vorliegende Text möchte durch einen kritischen Vergleich der Positionen des Scholarios und des Palamas die Frage nach dem Bestehen oder dem Mangel an innerem Entwicklungspotenzial der palamitischen Überlieferung für die Lösung des Scholarios und nach der Art und Weise seines Bezugs auf die abendländische Tradition stellen.

1 Die Position des Scholarios

In seinen speziell dieser Fragestellung gewidmeten Abhandlungen stellt Scholarios seine Position in einer für die abendländische Scholastik nachvollziehbaren Begrifflichkeit dar[4]. Als Ausgangspunkt für seine Deutung der Unterscheidung zwischen der göttlichen Essenz und ihrer Energie nennt er sechs numerisch geordnete Voraussetzungen: Die erste lautet: „Die göttliche Essenz ist unendlich (unbegrenzt – ἄπειρος)". An zweiter Stelle erklärt er, dass beide, sowohl die Essenz als auch die Energie, ein „πρᾶγμα", ein Ding sind. Der in der lateinischen Terminologie geschulte Scholarios verdeutlicht, dass die göttliche Energie, sei sie die interne (ἡ ἔνδον), sei sie die externe (ἡ ἔξω), kein „πρᾶγμα" schlechthin, wie etwa die göttliche Essenz, ist, sondern vielmehr „τι τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἐν τῷ πράγματι". Die Energie ist also etwas zum Ding gehöriges, das eng mit dem „τὸ τί ἐστι" des Dinges in Verbindung steht, und sie ist im Ding. Scholarios bemerkt, dass die göttliche Energie weder etwas Unteilbares (ἄτομος) ist, das neben der Essenz besteht, noch dass sie sich von der göttlichen Essenz trennen lässt. Essenz und Energie könnten zwar, so führt Scholarios weiter aus, Teile eines Ganzen sein, nicht aber im Fall des Göttlichen, das unteilbar ist. Sie könnten noch potentiell (ἐν δυνάμει) präsent sein. Gott ist aber völlig der Wirklichkeit nach; es gibt in ihm keine Potenz. Die Essenz und die Energie Gottes sind also auf vollkommene Weise wirklich. An sechster Stelle betont Scholarios, dass im Unterschied zu allem anderen Seienden das Sein Gottes schlechthin notwendig ist. Seiner Natur nach ist in Gott kein Erstes und Letztes

4 Ich konzentriere mich auf die Behandlung von drei Punkten: Kapitel 94 seines Kommentars über *De ente et essentia* des Thomas von Aquin in seiner eigenen Übersetzung (*Commentarius in De ente et essentia* [= *Commentarius*], in: OCGS, t. VI), die Kapitel 6, 10 und 11 seiner Schrift gegen die Akindynisten (*Contra Acindynistas*, in: OCGS, t. III) und den Traktat über die Unterscheidung zwischen der göttlichen Essenz und ihrer Energie (*Distinctio inter essentiam divinam et suas operationes* [= *Distinctio*], in: OCGS, t. III). Es wird angenommen, dass die ersteren zwei Schriften 1445 und die letztere 1458 entstanden sind.

(προτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον). Gott ist demnach auf keine Weise zusammengesetzt: weder aufgrund des Prinzips der Essenz (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας), noch aufgrund des Ranges (μέρος) der Energie[5].

Für Scholarios ist es hier wichtig, dass von Gott nichts akzidentell prädiziert werden kann (τοῦ δὲ Θεοῦ συμβεβεκὸς μὲν οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖσθαι δύναται). Die kreativen Akte werden so genannt, da die von Gott geschaffene Wirklichkeit Teil daran hat. Wie steht es aber, so fragt Scholarios, mit der göttlichen Weisheit, der Gutheit und den ähnlichen Kräften? Namen wie „Weiser", „Guter", etc., kommen Gott nicht zufällig (ἐπεισοδιώδη) zu, sondern sie benennen die αὐτοσοφία, die αὐτοαγαθότητα, die αὐτοδύναμις Gottes, d. h. seine essentiellen Kräfte, indem die διάκρισις der Namen ihrer eigenen Wahrheit folgt. Selbst die Kräfte, die jedem Geschöpf zueigen sind, bestehen aufgrund des Seins und der Aktivität der ihm eigenen Natur, und sie werden diesem Umstand gemäß ausgesagt. Weder gibt es eine „Kraft" schlechthin, noch wird eine solche ausgesagt. Indessen ist nur Gott eigentlich und wahrhaft mächtig; er ist allmächtig und unendlich mächtig, allgütig und übergütig. Die Namen wie „Weiser" und „Guter" sind Namen seiner Vollkommenheit oder Energie[6]. Es sind insbesondere die essentiellen Energien, bei denen gefragt wird, auf welche Art und Weise sie von der Essenz zu unterscheiden sind.

Um die Unterscheidung zu verdeutlichen, führt Scholarios in Rücksicht auf Gott und die Gottesnamen eine Alternative ein: Es könne sich um eine πραγματικὴ διαφορά (*distinctio realis*) oder aber um eine Unterscheidung nur dem Gedanken nach (*distinctio rationis tantum*) handeln, bei der unser Intellekt (νοῦς) die Bezeichnung und die Trennung (διάκρισις) vollzieht[7]. Eingangs erklärt er, dass jede διάκρισις entweder eine πραγματική oder κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ist. Er deutet hier die πραγματική als Lösung des Gregorios Palamas und die κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην als Lösung von Barlaam und Akindynos. Letztere brandmarkt er als der Wahrheit entgegengesetzt. Beide Arten sind allerdings vielfältig und weisen verschiedene Varianten auf[8].

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5 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, p. 281,5–24.

6 *Distinctio*, 4, in: OCGS, t. III, pp. 233,1–234,30.

7 *Distinctio*, 3, in: OCGS, t. III, pp. 231,14–19.

8 *Distinctio*, 1, in: OCGS, t. III, pp. 228,19–21; 28–33. Die stärkste Variante der πραγματικὴ διάκρισις ist die Unterscheidung wie die zwischen Gott und Schöpfung, d. h. die Unterscheidung sowohl der Essenz als auch den Eigenschaften nach. Schwächer ist die Unterteilung der Gattung in Arten, noch schwächer ist die Unterscheidung zwischen den Individuen einer Art (sie unterscheiden sich untereinander nur der Zahl und nicht der Essenz nach), am schwächsten ist die Unterscheidung zwischen der Essenz und ihren Eigenschaften (συμβεβεκότα). Alle diese Unterscheidungsarten nennt man allerdings πραγματικῶς – ibid, p. 229,1–25. Die κατ'

Scholarios wendet sich scharf gegen die Deutung der Unterscheidung der Essenz und der Energie als eine Unterscheidung der Vernunft (λόγος), d. h. dem Gedanken nach (ἐπινοίᾳ), auf der Barlaam und Akindynos bestanden haben, auch in seinem Kommentar über *De ente et essentia*. Er verwirft die Behauptungen, dass diese Unterscheidung eine nur innerhalb der Seele aufgrund von Gedanken zweiter Intention (δεύτεραι ἐπίνοιαι) gebildete Distinktion ist, die dabei keine direkte Entsprechung auf der Seite des Objekts hat. Diese Thesen, die sogleich als häretisch verworfen werden, seien nicht nur falsch, sondern auch unmöglich. Die Heilige Schrift beweist, so Scholarios weiter, wahrhaft diese Unterscheidung in Hinsicht auf Gott, indem sie lehrt, dass in Gott Gerechtigkeit, Weisheit und Gutheit sind, wodurch er gerecht, weise und gut genannt wird. Dasselbe vermitteln auch die Lehrer der Kirche, ohne die Einheit und die Einfachheit Gottes preiszugeben[9].

Die Unkenntnis der Unterscheidungsarten von seiten Barlaams und Akindynos' muss der Grund sein, so insistiert Scholarios, dass sie diese Unterscheidung nur als eine der Vernunft nach und nicht als πραγματική gedeutet haben. Es handelt sich aber um dieselbe Unterscheidungsart, nach der die Essenz und die Hypostasen Gottes differenziert werden[10]. Auch im Fall der Essenz und der Energie sind wir nicht imstande, diese im eigentlichen Sinn auszusagen und zu denken. Es wäre also auch hier unangemessen, klar zwischen πραγματικῶς oder κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην zu unterscheiden. Wenn man völlig der Sache nach unterscheidet, dann muss das Göttliche aus mehreren gemeinsam seienden und getrennten Dingen zusammengesetzt sein. In diesem Fall muss der den Geschöpfen zukommende Mangel (der in eben jener Trennung besteht) Gott zugeschrieben werden. Gott ist aber über-erfüllt und über-vollkommen. Auch die Energien sind ihm auf eine über-vollkommene Weise mitseiend, so dass sie der Natur und der Einfachheit nach eins sind, und sie sind in ihm, und sie sind er. Wenn sie aber nur der Vernunft und dem Gedanken nach der strengen Definition der Distinktionen folgend unterschieden würden, dann wäre die Unterscheidung haltlos und überheblich (περιττή), da die heilige Theologie Namen Gottes behaupten würde, die von den Namen verschieden sind, die die Werke Gottes offenbaren. Die Energien mit ihren Namen und die Namen

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ἐπίνοιαν διάκρισις wird als die Unterscheidung zusammengefasst, die ihrem Sein nach nur dem Gedanken zugehört und den zweiten Intentionen des Intellekts (δεύτερα νοητά) zugerechnet wird. In diesem Fall besteht der Unterschied nicht im Ding (ἐν δὲ τῷ πράγματι οὐκ εἰσιν) – *Distinctio*, 2, in: ibid., p. 230,1–11.

9 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, pp. 281,28–282,17.

10 *Contra Acindynistas*, 6, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 215,1–9.

für die heilige Essenz dürfen nicht in Einem zusammengebracht werden, weil die Energien ein Überschuss in Hinsicht auf die heilige Essenz sind[11].

Die Frage, inwieweit man die Energien „Dinge" (πράγματα) nennen soll und kann, beschäftigt Scholarios eingehend. Der Ausgangspunkt ist, dass jede der göttlichen Energien ein πρᾶγμα in Gott ist, so wie auch jede der Hypostasen nicht bloß dem Gedanken nach ein πρᾶγμα ist. Man sagt auf dieselbe Weise, dass die göttliche Essenz ein πρᾶγμα ist, das aber genauer von dem unterschieden wird, was dem Ding zugehörig und im Ding ist (τὶ τοῦ πράγματος κἀν τῷ πράγματι)[12]. Jede der göttlichen Energien ist also, darauf insistiert Scholarios, irgendein Ding (πρᾶγμά τι) in dem einen und einfachen πρᾶγμα der göttlichen Essenz, und jede von ihnen hat ihren λόγος, der das Sosein (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) offenbart. Sie unterscheiden sich untereinander der Sache nach. Sie unterscheiden sich dabei nicht nur untereinander, sondern auch von der göttlichen Essenz wirklich und formal (ἔργῳ τε καὶ εἰδικῶς). Sie unterscheiden sich der Washeit nach (τῷ τί ἐστι). Sie werden nicht nur unseren Gedanken gemäß unterschieden, sondern auch gemäß der wirksamen und unterscheidenden Wahrheit. Es ist ein Fehler zu sagen, dass sie sich nur dem Wort nach, d. h. dem menschlichen Gedanken nach, unterscheiden[13].

In seinem Kommentar zu *De ente et essentia* verfeinert Scholarios seine Auffassung in Auseinandersetzung mit Thomas von Aquin. Er besteht darauf, dass in ihrer Unterscheidung die Essenz und die Energie Gottes ihrer Bestimmung nach nicht als zwei Dinge, sondern als zwei Sachverhalte (οὐ δύο πράγματα ἀλλὰ δύο τινά) auftreten, die dem Ding zugehören und in dem Ding sind. Es ist ein großer Unterschied, über zwei Dinge oder aber über δύο τινά τοῦ τε πράγματος ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ πράγματι zu sprechen. Es geht in diesem Fall um eine Unterscheidung sowohl der Vernunft, als auch der Natur der Sache und nicht nur der Vernunft, d. h. dem Gedanken, nach. Sie unterliegt einer zweifachen Bestimmung. Sie wird zwar von der Seele erzeugt, ohne aber dadurch die Unterscheidung in der Sache zu verlieren. Daraus, dass Gott einfach ist, folgt nicht, dass es falsch ist, wenn der Nous die Essenz und die Energie zugleich unterscheidet[14]. Obschon alle Unterscheidungen dieser Art oberhalb der πραγματικὴ διάκρισις sind, so führt Scholarios an dieser Stelle aus, werden sie doch reale (πραγματικάς) genannt, also unter den Begriff der πραγματική gebracht[15]. Er

11 *Distinctio*, 5, in: OCGS, t. III, pp. 235,27–236,6; 237,36–238,11.

12 *Distinctio*, 6, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 238,21–26.

13 Ibid., pp. 238,29–239,4.

14 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, p. 283,20–28.

15 Ibid., p. 283,33–35.

äußert die Meinung, dass die Position von Barlaam und Akindynos ein Ergebnis ihrer Beschäftigung mit den ins Griechische übersetzten Büchern des Thomas ist[16]. Weil sie diese Unstimmigkeit erkannt haben, so schließt Scholarios, haben der heilige Gregorios von Thessaloniki und die alten Lehrer der byzantinischen Kirche gesagt, dass die Essenz und die Energie Gottes sich πραγματικῶς unterscheiden, ohne dass die Energien πράγματα im eigentlichen Sinn seien. Auf diese Weise werden auch Hypostasen der Trinität πράγματα genannt. Man spricht in diesem Fall von τι τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἐν τῷ πράγματι. Essenz und Energie werden nicht nur durch den Gedanken voneinander unterschieden[17].

Die Ordnung (τάξις) und die Unterscheidung (διάκρισις) der Essenz Gottes und seiner Energie, so überlegt Scholarios auch in *Contra Acindynistas*, sind nicht einfach zu fassen. Man kann über die göttliche Essenz wie auch über die göttliche Energie nicht sagen, sie seien ein πρᾶγμα im Sinne eines Individuums (ἄτομον), wie manche glauben, die sich dadurch dem Vorwurf ausgesetzt sehen, sie verträten die Zusammengesetztheit Gottes oder seien Polytheisten. Sie werden aber als etwas verstanden und verkündigt, das dem Ding zugehörig ist und im Ding ist. Essenz und Energie sind voneinander als πραγματικά und als der Natur der Dinge zueigen zu unterscheiden[18]. Sie sind nicht ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, sie unterscheiden sich wirklich (οὐσιοδῶς)[19]. Es besteht keine Essenz ohne Energie; die Energie ist der Essenz untrennbar verbunden. Hierbei handelt es sich um eine nicht umkehrbare Relation. Auf diese Weise, so Scholarios weiter, werden nicht nur Essenz und Energie, sondern auch die Existenz und die τόποι bestimmt[20].

Scholarios erklärt – und hier folgt er Basileios –, dass das Prinzip (λόγος) der Energie mit dem der Essenz nicht identisch ist. Das wird durch die Bestimmung (ὁρισμός) und durch die Natur der Dinge evident. Aufgrund der einfachen und unkörperlichen Natur Gottes nimmt aber bei Gott die Energie den Logos der Essenz an, d.h. die Existenzweise (τρόπος τῆς ὕπάρξεως), die den beiden gemeinsam ist. Alle der Essenz zugehörige Würde (παντὸς ἀξιώματος) wird der Energie übertragen. Weil die göttliche Natur unendlich, ungeschaffen und ewig ist, so ist auch ihre Energie all dies. In Gott gehört die Energie derselben Ordnung wie die göttliche Natur an. Im Falle der geschaffen Wesen verhält es sich anders; hier gehören auch die essentiellen Energien begrifflich dem Bereich der Eigenschaft (συμβεβεκός) zu.

16 Ibid., pp. 282,35–283,19.

17 Ibid., p. 285,4–14.

18 *Contra Acindynistas*, 6, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 214,28–35.

19 Ibid., 10, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 224,16–19.

20 Ibid., p. 224,25–30.

Scholarios präzisiert seine erste Voraussetzung: Die Essenz Gottes ist ihrer Form nach (εἰδικῶς) unendlich (unbegrenzt). Die Energie ist jedoch ihrer Form nach nicht ἄπειρος. Eine Mehrheit von Unbegrenzten ist unmöglich. Die Energie hat allerdings Existenz gemäß der Essenz (μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας ὕπαρξιν ἔχειν) und besteht als etwas dem Unbegrenzten Zugehöriges. Weil die Energie dieselbe Existenzweise wie die Essenz, d. h. die Existenz der zwingend notwendigen göttlichen Einfachheit, hat, sind Essenz und Energie ein Unbegrenztes, und sie sind in Gott. Aus diesem Grund darf man der formalen Unterscheidung (τῆς εἰδικῆς διακρίσεως) nicht zuschreiben, dass sie eine Teilung der Dinge oder eine Zusammensetzung nach sich zieht, weil ihr gemäß Essenz und Energie auf dem einen Zugrundeliegenden und Höchsteinfachen der göttlichen Natur (φύσις) gründen[21].

Schon früher in dieser Schrift (*Contra Acindynistas*), als er ein langes Basileios-Zitat deutet, erklärt Scholarios den hier gemeinten Naturbegriff und begründet die Rechtmäßigkeit der Verwendung der *distinctio formalis* im Fall der Essenz-Energie-Unterscheidung. Die Seinsprinzipien (λόγοι) der Essenz und der Energie unterscheiden sich. Hier beruft er sich auf Basileios. Die Natur der göttlichen Essenz und die Natur der göttlichen Energie sind nicht identisch. Natur nenne ich, so verdeutlicht er, die naturgemäße Bezeichnung des Logos, der das Sosein (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), wie auch die Eigentümlichkeiten der Bestimmung äußert, wodurch das Bezeichnete ist und wirkt, und damit eine Naturgestalt hat. Scholarios greift hier auf die Formel des Basileios zurück, der von einem „τρόπος τὸ φύσει πρὸς τὸ θέσει καὶ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν" spricht. Er ist überzeugt, dass dieser Naturbegriff dienlich ist, diese Bestimmung zu leisten, da er auch mit den „erhabenen Methoden" (κατὰ τὰς ὑψηλοτέρας μεθόδους) übereinstimmt. Seine Lösung lautet, dass die göttlichen Essenz und Energie aufgrund der Natur der Dinge (ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως) „oder eher, wie man sagt, formal (εἰδικῶς) sich untereinander unterscheiden"[22]. Er besteht also darauf, dass die Essenz und die Energie Gottes der Vernunft nach unterschieden werden, aber doch in dem Wissen, dass sie auch dem πρᾶγμα nach unterschieden sind, indem er die Betonung wiederholt auf die Existenz legt[23]. Die Unterscheidung Essenz-Energie ist weder πραγματικῶς noch unserem Gedanken nach, weil sie eine Unterscheidung der Form und dem Logos des τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι nach ist[24].

Es ist für die vorliegende Darstellung nicht unwichtig, auch die von Scholarios angeführten Beispiele und Analogien darzustellen.

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21 Ibid., p. 226,5–16.

22 Ibid., 6, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 215,22–34.

23 Ibid., 11, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 226,25–29.

24 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, p. 284,31–36.

Die Entsprechung der Unterscheidung Essenz-Energie mit der Differenz der Hypostasen wird in allen seinen Abhandlungen mehrfach vorgebracht. Er betont, dass die Geburt und das Hervorgehenlassen, die Vaterschaft und die Sohnschaft sich auf dieselbe Weise unterscheiden, wie sich die Essenz und die Energie und dadurch das Sein, die Existenz, die Weisheit, die Gutheit etc. unterscheiden, d. h. der Form und dem Logos des τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι nach. Auch im Fall der Hypostasen geht es um eine wahrhafte und nicht um eine von der menschlichen Seele abhängige Unterscheidung von πράγματα, die der Einfachheit der Essenz nicht widerspricht[25]. In diesem Kontext werden die Natur, die Hypostasen und der Wille Gottes durch dieselbe Unterscheidungsart differenziert[26].

Die andere Vergleichsbasis bildet der Bereich des Anthropologischen. Man unterscheidet etwa mancherlei in Sokrates, so bemerkt Scholarios. Es besteht ein wirklicher Unterschied zwischen der Essenz und dem darauf Gestützten, wodurch beispielsweise Sokrates aufgrund der Einheit seiner Person nicht in Einzelteile zerfällt[27]. Von derselben Unterscheidungsart macht man Gebrauch, wenn man bezüglich des Menschen Namen wie Weisheit, Gutheit, Gerechtigkeit etc. aussagt. Sie sind Namen, die der Seele dem Logos der entsprechenden Hexis nach zukommen, wobei die Energie der Ursprung der Hexis ist (ἀρχὴ τῆς ἕξεως ἡ ἐνέργεια). Daraus werden die Namen abgeleitet, durch die diejenigen benannt werden, die die entsprechenden Hexeis haben. So ist der Weise derjenige, der die Weisheit hat. Weisheit wird von dem Menschen prädiziert, insoweit diese Hexis in den Blick genommen wird. Auf dieselbe Weise wird die Gerechtigkeit ausgesagt. Der Vollzug der Gerechtigkeit ist jedoch etwas anderes als der Vollzug der Weisheit. Sie sind auf verschiedene Weisen in den Menschen anzutreffen. Gerechtigkeit und Weisheit unterscheiden sich πραγματικῶς im Menschen. Sie unterscheiden sich dabei nicht nur untereinander, sondern auch in Rücksicht auf den einzelnen Menschen, in dem sie sich wirklich unterscheiden. Die Unterscheidung ist in dieser Hinsicht sehr klar (ἰσχυροτέρῳ διακρίσεως τρόπῳ). Die seelischen Vollkommenheiten des Menschen, die Hexeis und Energien der Seele werden als der menschlichen Seele eigen betrachtet. Sie existieren weder zufällig, noch sind sie gleicher Abstammung. Es ist aber eine eingeborene Kraft der Seele, die zu ihnen in Beziehung steht[28]. Wenn man einen Menschen weise oder gerecht nennt, erkennt der menschliche Nous die Weisheit und die Gerechtigkeit ungetrennt vom Sein des Menschen. Auf die-

25 Cf. ibid., pp. 282,17–23; 284,21–32.

26 Cf. e.g. *Distinctio*, 5, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 237,27–35.

27 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, p. 283,28–32.

28 *Distinctio*, 3, in: OCGS, t. III, pp. 231,29–232,36.

selbe Weise werden etwa bei Petrus als Zugrundeliegendem seine Gattung und Art erkannt, die im erkennenden Nous nur dem Gedanken nach sind und entstehen. Sie sind aber dem Seienden eigen und werden nicht von dem Nous seiner Kraft oder seinem Willen nach hervorgebracht[29]. Letztendlich sind die Gedanken zweiter Intention selbst Taten des weisen menschlichen Intellekts, und sie sind in ihm, wobei sie sich von ihm dennoch unterscheiden[30].

Wie bereits erwähnt, werden Barlaam und Akindynos von Scholarios wegen ihrer Meinung angegriffen, dass, wenn die Essenz und die Energie Gottes πράγματα in Gott sein sollen, Gott dann zusammengesetzt sein müsse, und infolge dessen die Unterscheidung lediglich eine Unterscheidung κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην sein dürfe. Er identifiziert ihre Position mit der von Thomas von Aquin geprägten Ansicht. Thomas besteht darauf, so Scholarios, dass Essenz und Energie Gottes nicht πραγματικῶς, sondern λόγῳ unterschieden werden müssen. Weil die Unterscheidung eine Unterscheidung der Vernunft ist, hat Thomas die Distinktion nicht berücksichtigt, die als eine formale (εἰδικὴ [διαφορά]) bzw. als eine der Natur des Dinges nach zu bestimmen ist. Insofern diese von der realen Unterscheidung verschieden und nicht so stark ist, so schließt Scholarios, dass sie κατ' ἐπίνοιαν sei. Barlaam und Akindynos haben die ins Griechische übersetzten Bücher des Thomas kennengelernt und sich mit seiner Weisheit bewaffnet – so Scholarios polemisch – und gegen die ost-römische Kirche gewendet. Dabei haben sie nicht bemerkt, dass viele der lateinischen Lehrer mit dem heiligen Gregorios von Thessaloniki übereinstimmen und auf eine „der Sicht unserer Kirche ähnliche Weise" diese Probleme betrachten[31]. Im Vorwort seines Kommentars über *De ente et essentia* bestimmt er diese lateinischen Lehrer näher, indem er erklärt, dass einige unter den späteren lateinischen Denkern orthodoxer als Thomas und „näher zu uns und der Wahrheit" sind: es geht, so betont er, um diejenigen um Meister Johannes Scotus[32].

2 Die Parallelität zur scotischen Position

Die Parallelität zwischen dem Verfahren des Scholarios und der scotischen Logik ist evident. Im Fall der *distinctio formalis* ist sie sowohl inhaltlich, als auch lexikalisch feststellbar.

29 Ibid., 5, p. 236,6–14.

30 Ibid., 6, p. 238,27–29.

31 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, pp. 282,35–283,19; 284,2–5.

32 *Commentarius*, Prooemium, in: OCGS, t. VI, p. 180,33–35.

Duns Scotus war nicht der erste abendländische Denker, der von der „formalen" Unterscheidung *ex natura rei* Gebrauch machte. Sie fand ursprünglich im Bereich der Trinitätsproblematik Verwendung, zu der Gilbert de la Porrée einen entscheidenden Anstoß gab. Gleichwohl wird die *distinctio formalis* als eine typisch scotische Doktrin betrachtet, weil Scotus sie konsequent durchführt. Dabei ist er bestrebt, solche *proprietates* adäquat zu unterscheiden, die keine Akzidentien, sondern *unitive contenta* sind. Die *distinctio formalis* dient der Bildung einer objektiven Basis der verschiedenen Begriffe einer Sache. Scotus besteht auf der *identitas realis*, die implizit im Begriff von *continentia unitiva* enthalten ist, der aber auch für eine „formale Nicht-Identität" Raum lässt. Auf diese Weise werden auch die verschiedenen *perfectiones* der göttlichen Essenz gedeutet. Sie sind definitiv keine verschiedenen *res*; die göttliche Natur ist eine einfache. Es muss jedoch betont werden, dass selbst in Gott ein formaler Unterschied festzustellen ist. Das gilt auch für die geschaffenen Essenzen, obschon die Ungeschaffenheit und die Unendlichkeit der göttlichen Essenz und ihrer Vollkommenheiten im Vergleich mit den geschaffenen Essenzen und ihren begrenzten Vollkommenheiten auch im Fall der *continentia unitiva* einen erheblichen Unterschied machen. In beiden Fällen sind aber die *perfectiones* nicht als real unterschieden (*realiter differentes*) zu verstehen, als ob sie einzelne Naturen seien. Die derart unterschiedenen *entitates* sind keine *diversae res*: sie werden in einer und derselben *res* betrachtet und sind keine einzelne und voneinander unabhängig existierenden Dinge. Sie sind zueinander *realiter* identisch und unterscheiden sich voneinander *formaliter et quidditative*. Die dadurch zu unterscheidenden Objekte bestimmt Scotus als *formalitates* oder *realitates*. Der formale Unterschied hat seinen Grund nicht im Intellekt, sondern ergibt sich *ex parte* bzw. *ex natura rei*. Das betrifft auch die *potentia divina*. Durch den Begriff der *continentia unitiva* differenziert Scotus die „formale" von der rein „rationalen", die ein Ergebnis der Vernunfttätigkeit ist und sogar eine Fiktion sein kann, und der völlig „realen" Unterscheidung. Die *distinctio rationalis* bzw. *intentionis* ermöglicht es Scotus gemäß nicht, die Frage nach den essentiellen oder inhärenten Eigenschaften zu beantworten. Die *distinctio realis* unterscheidet sich ihrerseits von der formalen Unterscheidung dadurch, dass sie eine Distinktion zwischen zwei eigenständigen *res* ist, während die formale zwischen zwei *formalitates* oder *realitates* (Wirklichkeiten, aber nicht Dinge) unterscheidet. Das der *distinctio realis* Unterliegende kann aktuell teilbar oder geteilt sein; die formale Distinktion unterscheidet zwischen zwei positiven Seiendheiten (*entitates*), die prinzipiell untrennbar sind. Alles, was der *distinctio realis* unterliegt, hat eine reale eigenständige Existenz; die *distinctio formalis* umfasst aber solches, das eine Existenzmöglichkeit nur in Bezug auf sein Subjekt erwirbt. Wenn die reale Unterscheidung eine schlichte Nicht-

Identität erweist, zeigt die formale eine Nicht-Identität *secundum quid*. Während die reale Unterscheidung die Einfachheit negiert, ist die formale mit der Einfachheit vereinbar[33].

Schon längst sind Zweifel an einem direkten Einfluss des Scotus auf Scholarios geäußert worden. Mit guten Gründen wird zwar neuerdings vermutet, dass Scholarios während seines Konzilsaufenthalts in Ferrara und Florenz Bonaventuras *De mysterio Trinitatis* („die wirkliche Inspiration für die scotische formale Distinktion") und Werke des Scotus selbst kennengelernt, wie auch Lehrveranstaltungen des scotistisch geprägten Magisters Augustinus von Ferrara besucht haben kann[34]. Für den Besuch der Lehrveranstaltungen existieren keine Nachweise; ebenso wenig können ins Griechische übersetzte Texte des Scotus nachgewiesen werden.

Christiaan W. Kappes identifiziert überzeugend die von Prochoros Kydones übersetzten Werke des Dominikaners Hervaeus Natalis[35], der gelegentlich von scotischen Denkfiguren Gebrauch macht, als einziges schriftlich verfügbares Verbindungsglied zwischen Scotus und Scholarios[36]. Hervaeus wird diese Rolle durch seine Deutung der Seinsäußerungen der Trinität und die Anwendung der *distinctio formalis in divinis ex parte rei* (der *distinctio rationalis* gegenübergestellt), indem er zwischen der Essenz Gottes und den Attributen unterscheidet, indem die göttlichen Attribute nicht als *res*, sondern als *formalitates* verstanden werden, die die göttliche Essenz durchdringen. Hervaeus zieht zwischen der Realität und der Formalität der Dinge einen fundamentalen Unterschied ein. Darüber hinaus bestimmt er die göttliche, auch den Attributen eigene, Unendlichkeit positiv und betrachtet sie als den Grund der Koexistenz von formal unterschiedenen Hypostasen und Attributen in der göttlichen Essenz. Für Hervaeus tritt – wie auch für Scotus –, eine weitere, formale notwendige Unterscheidung hinzu: Er unterscheidet zwischen Intellekt und Wille in der göttlichen Essenz. Nicht zuletzt ist auch seine Auffassung von den zweiten

33 O. Georgiev, „John Duns Scotus. Distinctio formalis", in: *Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur* 10 (2004), pp. 212–227 (bulgarisch); J.A. Aertsen, *Mediaeval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, Leiden – Boston 2012, pp. 422–426.

34 C.W. Kappes, „Foreword", in: J.I. Goff, Caritas in Primo*: A Historical Theological Study of Bonaventure's „Quaestiones Disputatae de Mysterio Ss. Trinitatis"*, New Bedford 2015, pp. XVII–XXVI.

35 Auszüge aus dem Buch II seines Sentenzenkommentars und den *Quaestiones quodlibetales*.

36 C.W. Kappes, „The Latin Sources of the Palamite Theology of George-Gennadius Scholarius", in: *Rivista Nicolaus* 40 (2013), pp. 95–98.

Intentionen zu erwähnen. Sie setzt voraus, dass für jedes *ens rationis* ein korrespondierendes Objekt besteht. Sie stimmen mit den Thesen und der Begrifflichkeit der Schule der Modisten und insbesondere denen des (dem Scholarios wohl bekannten) Radulphus Brito überein. Ihnen zufolge sind die zweiten Intentionen – insbesondere *species* und *genus* –, Schöpfungen des Intellekts, dennoch aber von den Dingen initiiert. Sie reflektieren einen realen Modus des Seins außerhalb der Seele. Dabei verwendet Hervaeus auch die disjunktiven Transzendentalien, und zwar auf eine Weise, die eng mit den Thesen Bonaventuras in Verbindung steht. Es ist möglich, dass Scholarios hier von Richard von Middleton beeinflusst ist, dessen Werk er nach eigenem Zeugnis kennt. Neben weiteren inhaltlichen Berührungspunkten steht Scholarios auch seinem Vokabular und seiner Phraseologie nach bei der Begründung der *distinctio formalis ex parte rei* Hervaeus nahe[37].

Es ist festzustellen, dass Scholarios, wenn auch nicht unbedingt auf direktem Wege, mit den zeitgenössischen logischen Verfahren der Scholastik vertraut war, da er von diesen „erhabenen Methoden"[38] Gebrauch machte und mit ihnen in Übereinstimmung blieb. Zu erwähnen bleibt, dass er diese Verfahren selektiv und instrumental verwendete, ohne sich einer der großen scholastischen Schulen zu verpflichten.

3 Scholarios vs. Palamas

Die Versuche, Palamas und Scholarios wegen der Unterscheidung von Essenz und Energie radikal gegenüber zu stellen, haben bereits eine lange Geschichte. Schon in seinem „klassisch" zu nennenden Aufsatz über die palamitische Auseinandersetzung behauptet Martin Jugie eine reale Unterscheidung zwischen Essenz und Energie seitens Palamas[39]. Ebenfalls war es in den 1930er Jahren üblich, die entscheidende Grenzlinie zwischen beiden aufgrund der Unendlichkeitsauffassungen zu ziehen. Demnach habe Palamas die Essenz als eine unendliche, die Energie aber als eine real endliche gedeutet. Als Ergebnis sei seine Lösung eine *distinctio realis minor* gewesen. Scholarios habe demgegenüber neben der Unendlichkeit der Essenz eine formale Endlichkeit, aber eine reale Unendlichkeit der Energie angenommen, wodurch er sich entschei-

37 Cf. ibid., pp. 95–113.

38 Scholarios, *Contra Acindynistas*, 6, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 215,33–34.

39 M. Jugie, „Palamite (Controverse)", in: M. Vacant et al. (eds.), *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, t. XI/2, Paris 1932, cols. 1777–1818.

dend von Palamas distanziert haben soll[40]. Heutzutage gilt dieses Verdikt beinahe selbstverständlich. John A. Demetracopoulos etwa führt die *distinctio realis* des Palamas zunächst als naturgegebenes Faktum, ohne jegliche Referenz, ein[41]. Etwas später bekräftigt er diese Bestimmung durch einen ganz allgemeinen Satz des Palamas (aus seinen *Antirrhetika* gegen Akindynos, II, 19, 91), wonach er die Titel von mehreren Schriften des Palamas und der gegenwärtigen Forschungsliteratur (überraschenderweise auch von mir) auflistet[42]. Christiaan W. Kappes erwähnt ebenfalls flüchtig „die reale Distinktion der palamitischen Metaphysik" und die „palamitische Emphase auf der realen Distinktion"[43] ohne jeglichen Nachweis. Neuerdings wird die „πραγματικὴ διάκρισις" des Palamas heftig diskutiert[44]. In seinem ausführlichen Aufsatz versucht John Demetracopoulos zu suggerieren, dass manche palamitischen Denker durch eine Mischung aus der griechischen Patristik und der thomasischen Erklärung der göttlichen Mannigfaltigkeit die Unterscheidung Essenz-Energie als eine Distinktion κατ' ἐπίνοιαν zu verstehen pflegten. Die Übersetzung von „intentio" und „ratio" durch „ἐπίνοια" und „λόγος" durch Demetrios Kydones habe Demetracopoulos zufolge eine wichtige Rolle für etliche Palamiten gespielt, um durch die gemäßigtere thomistische Darstellung die Unterscheidung neu zu formulieren. Das Wort ἐπίνοια, das sich in den Schriften des Palamas kaum findet, sollte eine zentrale Stelle in den Werken von mehreren, wenn nicht allen Autoren der palamitischen „Partei" im Laufe des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts einnehmen; deswegen sei die Position dieser Nachfolger des Palamas vielmehr (im Sinne von Éndre von Ivanka) als Neo-Palamismus zu verstehen. Demetracopoulos möchte in diesem Zusammenhang Georgios Scholarios lieber außer Acht lassen, da seine Interpretation der palamitischen Unterscheidung derart idiosynkratisch sei, dass sie schwerlich als eine palamitische beschrieben werden könne. Seine Position sei höchstens dem Namen nach palamitisch[45]. Dem-

40 V. Grumel, „Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot et Georges Scholarios devant le problème de la simplicité divine", in: *Échos d'Orient* 34 (1935), p. 95.

41 J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God's 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium", in: M. Hinterberger and C. Schabel (eds.), *Greeks, Latins and Intellectual History 1204–1500*, Leuven – Paris – Walpole, MA 2011, p. 264.

42 Id., ibid., p. 272.

43 C.W. Kappes, „The Latin Sources of the Palamite Theology of George-Gennadius Scholarius" (wie Anm. 36), pp. 91; 101.

44 Cf. e.g. C. Athanasopoulos and C. Schneider (eds.), *Essay on Divine Essence and Divine Energies: Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy*, Cambridge 2013.

45 J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God's 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium" (wie Anm. 41), pp. 264; 271; 280.

gegenüber erklären Christiaan W. Kappes, Jared I. Goff und Thomas A. Giltner, dass Scotus und seine Doktrin von der göttlichen Unendlichkeit und die formale (bzw. quasi-reale) Unterscheidung von Essenz und Energie (bzw. die Unterscheidung von Essenz und Vollkommenheiten) zu Palamas passe. Ihrer Auffassung nach gibt es gute Gründe, die palamitische Überlieferung (d. h. die Linie von Palamas bis zu Scholarios und seinen Nachfolgern) als eine einheitliche zu betrachten, und sie mit der „franziskanischen" Tradition (d. h. mit den Programmen von Bonaventura und insbesondere von Scotus) als vereinbar zu betrachten[46]. Es bleibt in dieser Situation nichts anderes übrig, als der Versuch, die eigentliche Position des Palamas zu entschlüsseln.

Eine ausführlichere Erörterung der Position des Palamas ist umso dringlicher, da er die einzige von Scholarios mehrfach in diesem Zusammenhang erwähnte Autorität ist[47]. Alle anderen Autoritäten werden allgemein als „die alten Lehrer unserer Kirche" erwähnt. „Der heilige Gregorios von Thessaloniki" ist Scholarios nach derjenige, der die Art und Weise (τρόπος) der Unterscheidung zwischen der Essenz Gottes und seiner Energie aufgrund der Dogmen der Kirche Christi adäquat dargestellt hat. Von ihm, der mit den älteren Lehrern in Einklang steht, lässt sich die ganze Kirche belehren. Der heilige Gregorios und die alten Lehrer unserer Kirche haben gesagt, so hebt Scholarios hervor, dass die Essenz und die Energie sich πραγματικῶς unterscheiden, ohne darauf zu bestehen, dass die Energien (wie etwa die Hypostasen) πράγματα im eigentlichen Sinn sind. Was hat Palamas eigentlich gelehrt?

4 Die Position des Palamas

In seiner Polemik ist es das Hauptanliegen des Palamas, die Ungeschaffenheit der essentiellen göttlichen Energien und ihre Gleichewigkeit mit der Essenz Gottes sicherzustellen, indem er die Existenz einer unzusammengesetzten Gottheit bekräftigt. Die Art der Unterscheidung wird vor diesem Hintergrund behauptet.

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46 C.W. Kappes – J.I. Goff – T.A. Giltner, „Palamas among the Scholastics: A Review Essay Discussing D. Bradshaw, C. Athanasopoulos, C. Schneider et al., *Divine Essence and Divine Energies: Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy* (Cambridge: James and Clarke, 2013)", in: *Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 55 (2014), pp. 175–220.

47 Cf. e.g. *Contra Acindynistas*, 6, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 214,19–25; *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, pp. 282,28–29; 284,8–9; 285,4–14.

Es ist unmöglich, darauf insistiert er, ohne Energie zu wirken und zu schaffen, so wie es unmöglich ist, ohne Existenz zu existieren. Ebenso ist es unmöglich, über die Existenz Gottes wie über eine geschaffene Existenz zu sprechen, im Hintergrund aber zugleich anzunehmen, dass Gott ungeschaffen sei. Gleiches gelte auch für das Wirken Gottes[48]. Die Energie Gottes ist ungeschaffen und mit Gott gleich-ewig (συναΐδιος); Gott ist von Ewigkeit her wirkend und allmächtig (ἐνεργὴς καὶ παντοδύναμος)[49]. Nicht das Wirken und die Energie, darauf macht Palamas aufmerksam, sondern das Erleiden von Wirkung und Affekt (τὸ πάσχειν καὶ τὸ πάθος) ergeben die Zusammensetzung. Gott aber wirkt, ohne Wirkung zu erleiden und ohne sich zu verändern[50]. Die Einfachheit und das Nichtzusammengesetztsein Gottes setzen nicht voraus, dass man die göttliche δύναμις als Schöpfung betrachtet, und dabei ablehnt, dass sie προαιώνιος sei, sondern umgekehrt[51]. Die Energien sind Gott der Natur nach und ungetrennt (φυσικώς καὶ ἀχωρίστως) eigen. Der Name „Gott" bezeichnet auch das um Gott herum Geschaute, das ihm der Natur nach eigen ist (τὰ περὶ τὸν Θεὸν φυσικῶς θεωρούμενα). Es ist gerade die Energie Gottes, die er, ohne deswegen zusammengesetzt zu sein, seiner Natur nach und von Ewigkeit her hat[52]. Gott ist einer und ewig auf unteilbare Weise[53]. Die Essenz und die Energie Gottes sind eins (ἕν)[54]. Gott ist gänzlich (ὅλος) Essenz und gänzlich Energie[55]. Die göttliche Essenz und die göttliche Energie sind ungeteilt (ἀχωρίστως) und omnipräsent (παρούσης). Den Theologen zufolge sind sie unteilbar geteilt (μερίζεται ἀμερίστως), während die göttliche Natur ganz und gar unteilbar verbleibt[56]. Ähnliche Sätze ziehen sich durch das ganze Werk des Palamas. Sie prägen auch die Art und Weise, wie er die Differenz zwischen Essenz und Energien Gottes beschreibt. Trotz einer bereits erwähnten Meinung zählt zu diesen Sätzen auch die positive Behauptung der Unendlichkeit der Energien, die mit der göttlichen Unendlichkeit zusammenfällt. Gott und alles, was um ihn herum steht, ist unendlich; sie sind das Unendliche (τὸ ἄπερος), so insistiert Palamas mit einem

48 *Capita* 150, 139, in: Gregorios Palamas, Suggrámmata, (ed. P. Christou et al.), tom. V, Thessaloniki 1992, p. 113,18–23.

49 Id., ibid., 140, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. V, pp. 113,30; 114,1.

50 Ibid., 145, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. V, p. 116,8–10.

51 *Contra Gregoram*, II, 20, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. IV, p. 280,4–17.

52 Ibid., II, 21, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. IV, pp. 280,30–31; 280,34–35; 281,19–20.

53 *De divinis operationibus*, 8, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. II, p. 102,6–9.

54 Ibid., 4, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. II, p. 99,4–6.

55 *Contra Acindynum*, IV, 15, 41, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. III, p. 270,12–13.

56 *Capita* 150, 74, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. V, p. 77,11–14.

Athanasios-Zitat[57]. Mit Maximus besteht er darauf, dass die ἄναρχα ἔργα Gottes die Unsterblichkeit und die Unendlichkeit (ἡ ἀπειρία) und die Seiendheit (ἡ ὀντότης) sind, die um Gott herum wirklich geschaut werden[58]. Die Unendlichkeit zählt auf eine selbstverständliche Weise zur ontologischen Verfassung der Energien.

Es ist zu bemerken, dass Palamas die Unterscheidung von göttlicher Energie und Essenz nicht in das begriffliche Schema von πραγματικῶς und κατ' ἐπίνοιαν bringt. Allerdings sind ihm gemäß sowohl die Essenz als die Energie wie auch die Hypostasen als Seiendheiten Gottes zu bestimmen. Es sind drei Seiendheiten Gottes: Essenz, Energien und die drei göttliche Hypostasen[59]. Diese verschiedenen Seiendheiten verursachen aber keine reale Teilung der Gottheit: Gott existiert uns gemäß als Trinität (τριάς), aber er ist nicht dreifach (οὐ τριπλοῦς). Wiederum in Analogie mit den Hypostasen nennt Palamas die Energien „Dinge", die aber keine Essenzen sind: „πράγματά ἐστι κἂν οὐκ οὐσίαι"[60]. Wieso sind sie Dinge, so fragt Palamas rhetorisch im Sinne des Gregoras, aber keine Essenzen?[61] Diese Frage bedarf einer Deutung, weil die Erklärung des Palamas für das heutzutage gängige Verständnis seltsam klingt. Das Seiende, das ohne weitere Bestimmung ist (τὸ ὁπωσδήποτε ὄν), wird nicht nur Ding genannt. Nur das absolut Betrachtete ist Natur, das zu einem Absoluten gehörige ist naturhaft (φυσικῶς) und ist zu den Akzidenzien oder Eigenschaften zu zählen. Gott aber hat keine Akzidenzien, nichts ist ihm κατὰ συμβεβηκός zueigen. Die Energien sind Gott naturhaft (φυσικῶς) zu eigen, ohne Akzidenzien zu sein[62].

Was ist hier mit „Ding" gemeint? Ganz in der Tradition der byzantinischen Philosophie versteht Palamas unter „πρᾶγμα" im allgemeinen Sinne nicht unbedingt eine selbständige Substanz oder eine *res* im Sinne der Universitätsscholastik. Das Konkretum von πρᾶξις besagt undifferenziert schlicht etwas „Wirkliches" oder „Wirkendes" und daher „etwas Existierendes". Palamas zeigt klar, dass die Hypostase selbst primär als ein Wirkendes erkannt wird. Wenn die Essenz keine von ihr unterschiedene Energie hätte, dann würde sie nicht völlig wirklich existieren, und sie würde lediglich als Gedankenbild betrachtet. So ist etwa der im Allgemeinen (καθόλου) betrachtete Mensch einer, der nicht denken, meinen, sehen, sprechen, essen etc. kann. Er würde also keine von der Essenz unterschiedene Energie haben, die zeigt, dass er eine Hypostase ist. Der

57 *De divinis operationibus*, 10, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. II, p. 104,16–17.

58 *Triades*, III, 3, 8, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. I, p. 686,19–21.

59 *Capita* 150, 75, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. V, p. 77,26–27.

60 *Contra Gregoram*, II, 20, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. IV, p. 280,35.

61 Ibid., 21, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. IV, p. 281,8.

62 Ibid., (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. IV, p. 281,8–13.

Mensch überhaupt ist vollkommen nichtexistierend (τελέως ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος). Wenn aber der Mensch wenigstens eine innernatürliche Energie (ἐνέργεια ἔμφυτος) hat, die von seiner Essenz unterschieden ist, so kann man wegen der ἐνέργεια ἔμφυτος erkennen, dass der Mensch eine Hypostase ist und dass er nicht nichtexistierend ist. Und weil solche Energien nicht einzeln vorliegen, wird klar, dass der Mensch in vielen Hypostasen ist[63]. Die Hypostase wird als eigentlich existierend und seiend zuerst durch ihre Wirkung erkannt. Ihre Existenzwirkung erweist sie als ein πρᾶγμα. Συμβεβηκός ist ebenfalls nicht restlos durch „Akzidenz" zu übersetzen. Wir kennen auch untrennbare Symbebekota (ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα), wie Palamas bemerkt[64]. Damit sind also auch essentielle Eigenschaften gemeint. Von Gott, der absolut unveränderlich bleibt, kann aber nichts κατὰ συμβεβηκός prädiziert werden. Die göttliche Energie in Gott ist weder Essenz noch Akzidenz, obschon sie von einigen Theologen als Quasi-Akzidenz (συμβεβηκός πως) bezeichnet wird, die dadurch lediglich zeigen möchten, dass sie in Gott, aber doch keine Essenz ist[65]. Offensichtlich ist bei Palamas mit „Ding" und „Seiendes" nicht nur die Substanz oder das Substrat gemeint. Der scholastische Satz „*accidens non est ens sed entis*", aus dem folgt, dass das Akzidenz kein Seiendes ist, gilt für Palamas und die von ihm ererbte Tradition nicht. Das Seiende ist alles, wovon Sein prädiziert werden kann, ohne dass es deshalb eine Essenz oder Substanz sein muss. Die Bestimmung der Energie als πρᾶγμα und Seiendes setzt nicht verbindlich eine *distinctio realis* voraus.

Palamas verschärft diesen Punkt durch den Sachverhalt, dass es im Fall der Kreaturen, die einer Gattung angehören, zwar auf der Ebene der Energie eine Ähnlichkeit gibt. Die Energie ist jedoch jeder geschaffenen Hypostase eigen, und die kontingente Hypostase wirkt ihr selbst gemäß[66]. Demgegenüber sind das Leben und die Kraft etwas, das der Vater, der Sohn und der Heilige Geist in sich haben. Die höchste Trinität ist nichts anderes als Gott selbst (ἀυτός ἐστιν ὁ θεός); die höchste Monade ist nichts anderes als Gott selbst. Es gibt keine Differenz der Trinität von der Monade[67]. Gott ist in allem mit sich selbst identisch. Die Energie der drei göttlichen Hypostasen ist eine nicht im Sinne der Ähnlichkeit, wie bei uns, sondern sie ist wahrhaft und numerisch eine[68]. Die

63 *Capita* 150, 136, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. v, p. 112,7–19.
64 Ibid., 127, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. v, p. 107,1.
65 Ibid., (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. v, p. 107,3–5; 8–11.
66 Ibid., 112, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. v, p. 97,9–12.
67 Ibid., 113, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. v, p. 98,1–3; 8–12.
68 Ibid., 138, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. v, p. 113,7–8.

Unterscheidung zwischen der Essenz und der Energie Gottes ist uns keineswegs empirisch gegeben. Die Rolle des Intellekts (νοῦς) lässt sich in diesem Fall nicht umgehen.

Man sagt, so beginnt Palamas seine ausführliche Überlegung, dass über dem Eingang zur Schule Platons geschrieben stand: „Keiner, der nichts von Geometrie versteht, trete hier ein". Der Geometrie völlig unkundig ist jeder, der unfähig ist, über das Unteilbare als Teilbares (περὶ τῶν ἀχώριστων ὡς κεχωρισμένων) zu denken und zu sprechen. Es ist zum Beispiel eine Grenze ohne ein Begrenztes unmöglich. Die Geometrie handelt fast immer von Grenzen, wobei die Grenzen oft an sich und ohne Behandlung des Begrenzten behandelt und vorausgesetzt werden, weil der Nous das Unteilbare teilt. Wenn man noch nicht gelernt hat, durch seinen Intellekt (νοῦς) den Leib von dem, was sich um ihn herum befindet, zu trennen, wie kann man über die Natur an sich sprechen, die doch nicht nur von dem ihr Zugehörenden ungetrennt ist, sondern ohne es überhaupt nicht existieren kann? Wie kann man über das Allgemeine als Allgemeines sprechen, wenn es in den Einzelnen existiert? Sie werden nur durch den Intellekt und die Vernunft unterschieden. Zunächst wird die Mehrheit der Einzelnen verstanden, wobei das Allgemeine gar keine Existenz ohne sie hat, wie die wahre Vernunft lehrt. Wie kann man über das durch den Nous Erreichbare und das Noetische sprechen? Wie kann man uns verstehen, wenn wir sagen, dass jeder Nous Gedanken (διανοήματα) hat und unser Nous als jeder einzelne Gedanke existiert? Wird man nicht über unsere Aussagen lachen und schreien, dass wir behaupten, jeder Mensch solle danach zwei und sogar viele Intellekte haben? Wenn man in solchen Fällen über das Untrennbare als geteilt (περὶ τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων ὡς διῃρημένων) nicht zu sprechen oder zu denken vermag, wie wäre man fähig, über solches in Hinsicht auf Gott zu sprechen und zu denken, wobei die Theologen darauf bestehen, dass es viele solche Einheiten und Unterscheidungen gibt. Weder hebt der Satz, dass „die Einheiten den Unterscheidungen überlegen und vorausgehend sind"[69], ihren Bestand auf, noch verhindert er ihn. Die Akindynisten sind nicht imstande, die unteilbare Teilung (ἀδιαίρετος διαίρεσις) in Hinsicht auf Gott zu akzeptieren und zu verstehen, auch wenn sie hören, dass wir im Einklang mit den Heiligen über die geteilte Einheit (διῃρημένη ἕνωσις) sprechen, weil einiges in Gott zu verstehen ist, anderes aber nicht. Gott ist eine Eins, die ihrer Essenz nach nicht erfassbar ist. Sie ist jedoch ihrer Energie gemäß aus ihren Geschöpfen zu verstehen. Gott ist seinem ewigen Willen, seiner ewigen Vorsehung, seiner ewigen Weisheit gemäß, die auf uns gerichtet sind, oder, um es nach dem heiligen Maximus zu sagen, seiner

69 Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, 2, 11 (PG 3, 652A).

unendlichen Kraft (ἄπειρος δύναμις), Weisheit und Gutheit gemäß zu verstehen. Wenn Barlaam, Akindynos und ihre Nachfolger hören, dass wir sagen, dass diese notwendig sind, werfen sie uns vor, dass wir über mehrere Götter und mehrere unerschaffene Dinge sprechen, wobei wir Gott zu einem zusammengesetzten Wesen machen. Gott teilt sich jedoch ungeteilt (ἀδιαιρέτως διαιρεῖται) und eint sich geteilt (συνάπτεται διῃρεμένως). Er erfährt keine Vermehrung und keine Zusammensetzung[70].

Es lohnt sich, diese langatmige Ausführung aufmerksam zu verfolgen, um die Position des Palamas und ihre unmögliche Verknüpfung mit der *distinctio realis* in all ihren Formen nachzuvollziehen. Er verzichtet keineswegs auf seine These, dass die Essenz und die Energien, sowohl bei Kontingentem, als auch bei Gott, als verschiedene „Dinge" oder „Seiende" sich notwendigerweise voneinander unterscheiden. Zugleich zeigt er damit, dass es sich sowohl beim Kontingenten, als auch bei Gott um eine „unteilbare Teilung" handelt, die sich unter dem Primat der Einheit vollzieht. Aus diesem Grund darf man sie nicht als verschiedene Substanzen oder Subjekte deuten. Im Gegenteil, sie sind durch den Intellekt fassbare verschiedene Aspekte desselben Objektes. Dieser Umstand betrifft insbesondere die Gottheit mit ihrer totalen und empirisch nicht zugänglichen Identität. Die Unterscheidung ist weder πραγματικῶς noch als κατ' ἐπίνοιαν. Sie ist eine wirkliche, aber keine reale Distinktion. Palamas hat gute Gründe, sie begrifflich nicht näher zu definieren.

Palamas dienen die Analogien mit den kontingenten Seienden häufig als Beispiel, wobei er die Unterscheidung des Einzelnen und seiner Natur, des Allgemeinen im Einzelnen, der Grenze und des Begrenzten nutzt. Besonders oft kommt die Parallelität mit der Seele und ihren Vermögen, dem Nous und seinen Gedanken bzw. seinem Wissen vor[71]. In Hinsicht auf die Gottheit ist zunächst der Vergleich mit den Hypostasen zu nennen. An einer wichtigen Stelle sagt Palamas: Dem unerschaffenen Göttlichen ist nicht nur die Unterscheidung nach der Essenz und drei Hypostasen eigen, sondern auch die Unterscheidung seiner πρόοδοι und Energien, die am [göttlichen] Seienden partizipieren, aber ihr Sein nicht aufgrund der Teilhabe am göttlichen Sein haben[72]. Ein anderes, gut etabliertes Beispiel ist die Unterscheidung des göttlichen Willens, der göttlichen Weisheit, Vorsehung und Gutheit von der göttlichen Essenz[73].

In seinem späten systematischen Werk fasst Palamas die Energienlehre zusammen und antwortet dort auf die gegen ihn vorgebrachten Hauptvorwürfe.

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70 Palamas, *Capita* 150, 81, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. V, pp. 80,30–82,7.

71 Cf. *De divinis operationibus*, 5, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. II, p. 100,9–23.

72 *De unitate et diversitate Dei*, 12, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. II, p. 77,25–29.

73 *Contra Gregoram*, II, 20, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. IV, p. 279,26–31.

Gott hat (ἔχει) etwas, das nicht Essenz ist (μὴ ἔστιν οὐσια). Daraus ergibt sich dennoch nicht, dass es ein Akzidenz ist: Gott hat keine Akzidentien. Es ist kein Akzidenz, weil es absolut unveränderlich ist, aber es ist gleichwohl keine Essenz, weil es nicht zu dem zählt, was selbständig subsistieren kann (τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστηκότων ἐστί). Daraus, dass es kein Akzidenz und keine Essenz ist, folgt dennoch nicht, dass es kein Seiendes oder Existierendes ist. Es existiert, und zwar wahrhaft (ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστιν). Einige Theologen, das hebt Palamas hervor, nennen es in einem uneigentlichen Sinn „Akzidenz". Sie tun es aber nur, um die Tatsache zu betonen, dass es keine Essenz ist. An dieser Stelle greift Palamas zu zwei Analogien. Die erste weist auf die Hypostasen hin. Sie sind ebenfalls weder Essenz (οὐσία) noch Akzidenz Gottes, aber sie existieren. Dasselbe trifft auf die göttliche Energie Gottes (ἡ θεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια) zu. Daraus folgt die Analogie, dass weder die Hypostasen noch die Energie ein eigenes Prinzip der Essenz (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) haben. Die zweite Analogie steht mit dem göttlichen Willen im Zusammenhang. Da Gott nicht bloß der Natur nach, weil in diesem Fall der Schöpfungsakt einen notwendigen Charakter haben müsste, sondern seinem Willen nach schafft, muss man das Wollen (τὸ βούλεσθαι) und das Sein der Natur nach (τὸ πεφυκέναι) als voneinander verschieden begreifen. Der göttliche Wille ist also von der göttlichen Natur unterschieden (ἡ θεία βουλὴ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἕτερον). Der Wille unterscheidet sich von der Natur und ist keine Essenz, aber er existiert und ist Gott eigen, der nicht nur Essenz, sondern auch Willen hat, dem gemäß er schafft. Man könne, so Palamas, den Willen auch „Akzidenz" nennen. Er ist aber doch kein Akzidenz, weil er keine Zusammensetzung und keinen Unterschied mit sich bringt. Gott hat also sowohl Essenz als auch Nicht-Essenz, die kein Akzidenz, sondern göttlicher Wille und göttliche Energie (βουλὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια) ist[74].

5 Palamas im Vergleich zu Scholarios

Eine unvoreingenommene und nicht anachronistische Lektüre der Texte des Palamas und des Scholarios muss zugestehen, dass beide Positionen inhaltlich identisch sind. Selbst die Gedankenfiguren und die Analogien stimmen überein. Auch in dieser Hinsicht hat Scholarios einen schärferen Blick als seine Interpreten bewiesen, wenn er Palamas ohne zu zögern als seine Hauptautorität zitiert. Selbst die angebliche Differenz aufgrund der Endlichkeit bzw. Unendlichkeit der Energien bei Palamas und Scholarios erwies sich als unzu-

74 *Capita* 150, 135, (ed. P. Christou et al.), t. v, pp. 111,14–112,6.

treffend. Die bereits angeführte Meinung, dass die Interpretation des Scholarios der palamitischen Distinktion schwerlich als eine palamitische und bestenfalls als eine nominal palamitische zu verstehen sei[75], ist vor diesem Hintergrund vehement zurückzuweisen.

Es bestehen dennoch Unterschiede im Bereich des Formalen, d. h. der Art und Weise der Formulierung einerseits und der Auffassung einiger Begriffe andererseits, die eine Deutung verlangen. Als erster Schritt in diese Richtung muss der Sachverhalt vorausgesetzt werden, dass Gregorios Palamas sich anhand der ihm überlieferten Begrifflichkeit und des entsprechenden logischen Instrumentariums äußerte, ohne die scholastische Tradition kennengelernt zu haben. Er selbst wird kaum die ersten Thomas-Übersetzungen rezipiert haben.

Die Meinung, dass in Hinsicht auf die Unterscheidungen in der Gottheit die Kirchenväter der Ansicht waren, dass Gott einfach *ex parte obiecti*, aber vielfach *ex parte subiecti* (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν oder λόγῳ, d. h. konzeptuell oder durch die Vernunft) sei[76], ist angesichts der Beleglage schwerlich nachzuweisen. Man kann im Gegenteil zeigen, dass schon Athanasios von Alexandrien, der die absolute Einfachheit des göttlichen Seins betont, eine Unterscheidung zwischen der Essenz Gottes und dem göttlichen Willen macht, den er als Kraft Gottes περὶ αὐτόν deutet, ohne dadurch die Unterscheidung bloß als Unterscheidung dem Begriff nach zu propagieren. Auf dieselbe Weise unterscheiden die Kappadokier zwischen der Essenz und den Wirkungen Gottes, indem dieses Unterscheidungsschema bei Maximus Confessor und Johannes Damaskenos eine feste Bedeutung erhält[77]. In diesem Zusammenhang ist die Unentschiedenheit von Demetracopoulos auffällig, ob Basileios der Große bei der Bestimmung der göttlichen Namen als „ἐπίνοιαι" eine *distinctio a parte rei* zwischen den göttlichen Namen (nach dem sogenannten stoischen Modell) oder eine *distinctio a parte mentis* (nach dem sogenannten plotinischen Modell) meint[78].

Schon Roger Guichardan und Venance Grumel haben darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die „griechischen Väter" lediglich zwei Distinktionen verwende-

75 J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God's 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium" (wie Anm. 41), p. 264.

76 Ibid.

77 Darüber habe ich ausführlich in: G. Kapriev, *Philosophie in Byzanz*, Würzburg 2005, pp. 21–22; 25; 61–65; 126–127 u. a. argumentiert. Noch ausführlicher ist dieser Umstand in: D. Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West. Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom*, Cambridge 2004, und J.-C. Larchet, *La théologie des énergies divines. Des origines à saint Jean Damascène*, Paris 2010 behandelt.

78 J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God's 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium" (wie Anm. 41), p. 268.

ten. Eine διαφορὰ τῷ πράγματι (die von Guichardan gebrauchte Bezeichnung πραγματική ist nicht zutreffend, so Grumel) und eine διαφορὰ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν. Vergleicht man diese Unterscheidungen mit ihren scholastischen Gegenstücken, so entspricht die erste der *distinctio realis maior* und die zweite allen anderen Arten (incl. der *distinctio realis minor*). Es mangelt, so schließt Grumel, an einem Unterscheidungsschema, das dem lateinischen entsprechen könnte[79]. Demetracopoulos führt seinerseits aus, dass Basileios, indem er sich auf die stoische Logik stützt, durch die Unterscheidung κατ' ἐπίνοιαν oder λόγῳ die Aufgliederung des Seienden nach seinen Teilen, kategorialen Eigenschaften und Zuständen oder Wirkungen bezeichnet. In der Begrifflichkeit der Scholastik umfasst dieses Unterscheidungsschema, so Demetracopoulos, die *distinctio realis minor* und die *distincitio rationis cum fundamento in re*[80]. Demetracopoulos bemerkt weiterhin, dass die Palamiten um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts, wie etwa Philotheos Kokkinos und Neilos Kabasilas, das Konzept von ἐπίνοια wie in den trinitarischen Debatten des 4. und 5. Jahrhunderts verwendet haben[81]. Auch Palamas war in diese Situation verwickelt. Gerade vor diesem Hintergrund verzichtete er darauf, die Unterscheidung Essenz-Energie durch ein technisches Vokabular zu qualifizieren. Die Versuche etlicher seiner zeitgenössischen Anhänger, eine klarere logische Formel zu prägen, führten zu zweifelhaften Ergebnissen.

Auch später, als einige Palamiten inspiriert durch Thomas von Aquin versuchten, durch die mittlerweile auch in Byzanz etablierte thomasische Begrifflichkeit die Unterscheidung klarer zu formulieren, sah die Lage nicht viel besser aus. Infolge dieses Versuches wurde die Begrifflichkeit bei einigen Autoren ambivalent[82]. Den Grund dafür hat Scholarios, wie wir gesehen haben, bereits erklärt[83]. Man muss dazu sagen, dass die erörterte Position nicht nur Barlaam und Akindynos (wenn sie überhaupt von Thomas beeinflusst waren) irritierte. Es ist jedoch ein philosophiegeschichtliches Missverständnis, wegen des thomasischen Einflusses bei den Palamiten einen Krypto-Thomismus (oder irgendwelche „heimliche" bzw. nicht reglementierte „Blicke nach Westen") zu

79 Cf. R.P. Guichardan, *Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en Occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles: Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios* (wie Anm. 2), pp. 41–49; V. Grumel, „Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot et Georges Scholarios devant le problème de la simplicité divine" (wie Anm. 40), pp. 85–87.

80 J.A. Demetracopoulos, „Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God's 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium" (wie Anm. 41), pp. 265–266.

81 Ibid., p. 283, Anm. 56.

82 Cf. Ibid., pp. 292–368.

83 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, pp. 282,35–283,19; 284,2–5.

diagnostizieren, oder aber von einem „thomistischen Palamismus" bzw. einem von Palamas inhaltlich abweichenden Neo-Palamismus zu sprechen, der darüber hinaus bei den meisten (wenn nicht allen) seinen Nachfolgern festzustellen sei.

Die gesamte byzantinische theozentrische Überlieferung, insbesondere nach der Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts (und die Palamiten machten da keine Ausnahme), lehnte es zwar entschieden ab, in der Dogmatik lateinische „Innovationen" zu akzeptieren oder sie mit gutem Willen zu diskutieren. Völlig anders aber sind die Verhältnisse im Bereich der spekulativen Theologie, die in Byzanz als Teil der Philosophie gesehen wurde. Die Erörterung und die Präzisierung der Theologoumena-Formulierungen hatten ihren Platz innerhalb des Bereichs des Diskursiven. In diesem Bereich wurde der Begriffs- und Methodenaustausch, wie auch die Entlehnung von logischen Techniken zum Zweck der Förderung der typischen „byzantinischen Subtilität"[84] prinzipiell gebilligt, ganz gleich, woher die Quellen stammten. Innerhalb der Philosophie mussten die Palamiten und auch die anderen byzantinischen Denker ihre Beschäftigung mit den im Westen ausgearbeiteten technischen Verfahren nicht verbergen. Sie war vielmehr ein selbstverständlicher Vorgang[85].

Unter den palamitisch geprägten Denkern war Scholarios wie niemand sonst mit den abendländischen Entwicklungen in der Logik vertraut. Der Vergleich der Positionen von Scholarios und Palamas hat gezeigt, dass Scholarios sowohl die thomistischen als auch die scotistischen Theorien in diesem Bereich für eine fachlich präzisere und auch für die abendländische Denkkultur einsichtige Formulierung der authentisch palamitischen Position nutzten konnte. Es ist bemerkenswert, dass er aus der abendländischen Philosophieüberlieferung nicht nur Formeln und dialektische Verfahren entlehnte. Falls man einen massiven Einfluss des Thomas auf Scholarios feststellen will, so ist er nicht so sehr in seinem dialektischen Instrumentarium, sondern in seiner Begrifflichkeit zu entdecken. In unserem Fall ist es nicht zuletzt wichtig zu erfassen, dass „Ding" und „Seiendes" bei ihm kaum mehr im palamitischen und für die frühere byzantinische Tradition üblichen Sinn, sondern strikt in der Perspektive des thomasischen Begriffsapparats konzipiert sind[86]. Das Stre-

84 J.M. Garrigues, *Maxime le Confesseur*, Paris 1976, p. 174.

85 Siehe ausführlicher G. Kapriev, „Lateinische Einflüsse auf die Antilateiner. Philosophie versus Kirchenpolitik?", in: M. Hinterberger and C. Schabel (eds.), *Greeks, Latins and Intellectual History 1204–1500*, Leuven – Paris – Walpole, MA 2011, pp. 385–395.

86 Cf. e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, 1, 1, resp.; *Summa theologiae*, 1, 39, 3, ad 3; J.A. Aertsen, *Mediaeval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought* (wie Anm. 33), pp. 223–224.

ben des Scholarios, die Kontinuität der palamitischen Doktrin auch vor diesem Hintergrund zu bewahren, hat die primäre Bestimmung der Energie als ein πρᾶγμα in Gott und die unverzügliche Erläuterung, dass sie kein πρᾶγμα im strengen Sinn des Wortes, der etwa für die göttliche Essenz gilt, sondern vielmehr τι τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἐν τῷ πράγματι ist, zum Ergebnis[87]. Das ist auch der Grund, die Auffassung des Palamas, die im Prinzip mit der Auffassung des Scholarios zusammenfällt, allgemein als eine πραγματικὴ διάκρισις zu beschreiben. Scholarios setzt sie damit in Kontrast zur κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην und in Korrespondenz mit der Begrifflichkeit des Palamas. Unmittelbar darauf untergliedert er – was in der byzantinischen Tradition unüblich ist – die Unterscheidungen πραγματική[88]. Er schließt, mit Emphase auf der göttlichen Unendlichkeit und der Unterscheidung der Hypostasen, dass es auch hier völlig unangemessen wäre, schlicht πραγματικῶς oder κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνην zu unterscheiden[89]. Er stellt letztlich fest, dass diese Unterscheidungen, obwohl sie über der Ebene der πραγματικὴ διάκρισις liegen, real (πραγματικάς) zu nennen seien und damit unter den Begriff der πραγματική fallen[90]. Scholarios verwendet die thomistische Metaphysik und die (auch scotische) metaphysische Logik nicht als intellektuelle Waffe, um die Theologie des Palamas zu sezieren[91]. Ganz im Gegenteil gelingt es ihm, einerseits die eigentliche Position des Palamas positiv zu qualifizieren und andererseits ihre im Rahmen der fachlich präziseren scotischen Distinktionstheorie korrekte Formulierung zu prägen.

In diesem Punkt ist Kappes zuzustimmen, dass die Orthodoxie die mächtigere regulative Idee ist, die die Trinitätstheologie des Scholarios dominiert. Er bemerkt dabei, dass Jugies' Urteil eines offenen Scotismus des Scholarios wahr wäre, wenn man die konfessionellen Motive des Scholarios mitbedenkt[92]. Scholarios' Beziehung zum Scotismus lässt sich damit als eine instrumentelle beschreiben. Es ist hinzuzufügen, dass Scholarios neben der Orthodoxie im Allgemeinen die palamitische Überlieferung und die von ihr weitergeführten Linien des ostchristlichen Gottesdenkens als seine Motivationsbasis anerkennt. Das ist dennoch nicht der einzige Grund seines Vorgehens.

Ein anderes Hauptanliegen des Scholarios war der intellektuelle Ost-West-Dialog. Sein Bezug auf die lateinische Kultur- und Philosophietradition ist als

87 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, p. 281,6–8; *Distinctio*, 6, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 238,21–26.

88 *Distinctio*, 1, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 228,19–33.

89 *Distinctio*, 5, in: OCGS, t. III, p. 235,25–32.

90 *Commentarius*, 94, in: OCGS, t. VI, p. 283,33–35.

91 C.W. Kappes, „The Latin Sources of the Palamite Theology of George-Gennadius Scholarius" (wie Anm. 36), p. 80.

92 Ibid., p. 105.

„engagierte Rezeption" zu verstehen. Diese bezeichnet eine klare Parteinahme für die oströmische Tradition, die jedoch für eine Aneignung der Leistungen und Erträge der zeitgenössischen lateinischen Kultur offen ist. Als eine mögliche Gefahr, die von der Scholastik ausgehen konnte, betrachtete Scholarios lediglich die eventuellen Verschiebungen und Verwechslungen der dogmatischen Inhalte. Die philosophische Logik hielt er hingegen für universell. Er fasste die Ost-West-Gegenüberstellung nicht als Konfrontation zweier Kulturen, sondern als Konkurrenz zweier Traditionen einer Kultur auf, die er für vereinbar und komplementär hielt. In diesem Kontext war sein Ziel, die orthodoxe spekulative Lehre, wie sie von den Vätern entwickelt wurde, vor dem Hintergrund der präzisesten logischen Verfahren zu entfalten. Sie sollte gegenüber der lateinischen Scholastik seiner Zeit präsentierbar und diskussionsfähig werden. Sie sollte als ein Gegenüber der lateinischen Kultur auftreten können, um mit den Vertretern dieser Kultur zu debattieren und in einen Dialog zu kommen. Scholarios suchte bewusst nach einer Synthese der Entwicklungen der lateinischen Tradition und der romäischen Überlieferung, die er überzeugt vertrat[93].

Im Fall der Unterscheidung von Essenz-Energie und des damit verbundenen konzeptuellen Kontextes konnte seiner Feststellung nach das thomasische dialektische Instrumentarium diesen Zweck nicht erfüllen. Seine deklarierte Bezugnahme auf die franziskanische und im Besonderen auf die scotische logische Doktrin wurde durch das Bestehen inhaltlich-metaphysischer Parallelen zwischen der franziskanischen und der byzantinischen und insbesondere der palamitischen Überlieferung weiter motiviert. Er schätzte die franziskanische Lehre im Vergleich zur thomasischen als „orthodoxer" ein. Es handelt sich hierbei um Positionen wie etwa die Deutung der göttlichen Einfachheit als reale Ungeteiltheit, die positive Bestimmung der göttlichen Unendlichkeit, das univoke Verständnis des Seins und die entsprechende Legitimität der disjunktiven Seinsbestimmungen etc.[94]. Scholarios schuf damit jedoch keine neuen metaphysischen Motive, um sie der palamitischen Lehre zu implantieren. Im Gegenteil schätzte er sie als Lehren ein, die organisch in seine Lehre passen. Offensichtlich hielt er die franziskanische Tradition für eine legitime Linie des abendländischen Denkens und suchte durch die Anwendung ihrer Verfahren eine Erweiterung des Dialogs mit dem Westen und eine Etablierung der Lehren des Palamismus auch innerhalb dieses Dialogs zu erreichen.

93 G. Kapriev, „Vier Arten und Weisen, den Westen zu bewältigen", in: *Knotenpunkt Byzanz. Wissensformen und Kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 36), in: A. Speer und P. Steinkrüger (Hrsg.), Berlin – Boston 2012, pp. 28–29.

94 Siehe C.W. Kappes, „Foreword" (wie Anm. 34), *passim*.

Schluss

Zusammenfassend muss betont werden, dass Scholarios weder die Zurückweisung oder die inhaltliche Änderung der palamitischen Hauptposition noch die Prägung einer milderen Version der Unterscheidung Essenz-Energie bei Palamas erstrebte. Ganz im Gegenteil blieb er der eigenen Position des Palamas nicht nur deklarativ, sondern auch inhaltlich durchaus treu. Er lieferte aber eine „Übersetzung" der Thesen des Palamas in die Sprache der abendländischen Scholastik und insbesondere der scotischen Logik, deren Verfahren er als methodisch präziser ansah. Auf diese Weise gelang ihm eine logisch subtilere und allgemeinere Formulierung, die darüber hinaus nicht mehr von den byzantinischen Debatten des 14. Jahrhunderts und ihrer Lexik abhängig war. Dadurch eröffnete er noch eine weitere Möglichkeit, mit der abendländischen Tradition in einen konzeptuellen Dialog einzutreten, ohne dabei die palamitische Position preiszugeben. Wenn man das von Scholarios Geleistete in einem Satz zusammenfassen will, so hat Scholarios vor allem eine innere Entfaltung der Ressourcen der palamitischen und damit der byzantinischen theozentrischen Überlieferung verwirklicht[95].

95 Für die sprachliche Korrektur des Textes bin ich meinen Freunden Thomas Barton, Michael Chronz und Lars Reuke dankbar.

PART 2

Struggling with Philosophy

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CHAPTER 6

What a Philosopher May Learn from Theologians. Albert the Great on the Principles of Movement in Humans (*De anima* III, 9–11)

Carlos Steel

1 A Theological Digression in a Philosophical Work

In his paraphrase of *De anima* III, 9–11, after having investigated with Aristotle what the principles of movement are in animals, Albert inserts a long digression, in which he discusses different principles of movement not found in Aristotle, but distinguished by "Platonists and theologians": "Et est digressio declarans alias diversitates moventium secundum Platonicos et theologos".[1] This theological digression in a philosophical treatise is surprising, as is the connection of the theologians with Platonists. Why did Albert insert it? As is well known, Aristotle defines the soul of animals by two powers: the capacity of judgment, which is performed in sense perception and thought, and the capacity of initiating movement in respect of place.[2] Having discussed at length the cognitive faculties of the soul in II, 3–III, 8, Aristotle finally turns in Chapters III, 9–11 to an examination of the principles of locomotion in animals. In fact, animals are notoriously self-movers. What is it that sets an animal in motion, me for example, taking in the middle of summer a bus, a train, a plane, a bus to arrive at Notre Dame University? As Albert explains with Aristotle, there is no need to search for a special principle to explain the initiation of movement. It suffices to understand how desire and cognition interact in animals. All animals desire to obtain whatever is pleasurable, beneficial to them, and to avoid the opposite. Without desire and objects appearing to animals as desirable there would be no movement with respect of place. Desire, Albert explains, is undoubtedly the primary *motor* of an animal, but it is not by itself

1 See Albert the Great, *De anima* III, tr. 4, c. 10, p. 240,41–43. All references are to the *Editio Coloniensis*, when available. Other references are to the Borgnet edition. References to *De anima* are abbreviated as DA, to *De homine* as DH.

2 Aristotle means the capacity of locomotion. See Albert de Great, DA, p. 229,75–78: "non de omni motu locali animati corporis, sed de motore istius motus tantum, quo animal totum procedit de loco ad locum per organa ad hoc a natura formata".

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a sufficient and complete cause. It must be connected to a cognitive principle, which proposes to the desire desirable objects. This may be imagination, which proposes to the animal what is pleasurable and attractive to the sensitive desire, or disgusting or painful. More important for human animals is the role of the intellect, which presents to the soul not only what is pleasant (or not) at this moment, but what is good (or bad) for it on a longer term, what is beneficial (or harmful) for its whole being and must be pursued (or avoided). The intellect cannot assume this role in its theoretical speculation, but only in its practical function. The intellect is practical when it is related to desire, and desire, in its turn, is not a blind urge, but must be informed by the intellect. It is the interaction between desire and judgment that explains, Aristotle says, how animals start moving. Only the connection between these two principles (or three, if we distinguish phantasia from intellect) offers the "sufficiens et universalis causa" of movement (231, 76–77). Albert likes to describe the respective role of intellect and desire as follows. The practical intellect decides, determines, dictates, orders, announces what object the animal has to pursue or avoid (*decernit, praecipit, nuntiat*). The will (or rational desire), when it consents, executes this order and performs what is commanded (*prosequitur, perficit hoc quod praeceptum est*).[3] Without the consent of the will, nothing will happen, whatever the intellect may have commanded. In this sense the will is the first mover of the animal, its *imperator*. As a free power, which is "the entire and only cause of itself" (*tota et sola causa sui*, 234, 86), it resembles a dictator ruling over his state *ad libitum*, whereas the practical intellect resembles a wise monarch who only commands what is beneficial to the republic.[4] Having given its consent the will sets in movement nerves and muscles.[5] According to Aristotle, then,

3 See Albert de Great, DA, p. 231,80–86: "Intelligentia practica decernit et praecipit, ad quid movendum est et propter quid et qualiter et ubi et quando et quantum et cetera huiusmodi; appetitus autem sequitur et perficit hoc quod praeceptum est ab intelligentia. Sic ergo duo in genere sunt moventia in homine"; ibid., p. 234,13–14 (38–41): "non exigantur nisi haec duo, decernens scilicet et prosequens"; ibid., p. 235,17–18: "in omni motu exiguntur ad minus duo moventia, quorum unum nuntiat de motu, et alterum prosequitur"; ibid., p. 238,39–51: "unum quidem movens est ut decernens motum, alterum autem est sicut impetum faciens in motu"; ibid., *De principiis motus processivi*, p. 57,23–25: "quaedam [principia] movent nuntium facientes de motu et quaedam sicut eligentes et quaedam sicut facientes impetum".

4 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 235,1–9: "Regnum voluntatis simile est regno tyranni, quoniam leges edit ad libitum […]. Regnum autem intellectus practici simile est monarchiae, in qua rex sapiens dominatur nihil omnino decernens nisi secundum rationem utilitatis reipublicae".

5 Ibid., DA, p. 234,8–12: "appetitiva potentia post imperium intellectus vel phantasiae motum et actionem exsequitur movendo lacertos et musculos ad motum perficiendum".

two principles play a role in the initiation of movement with respect to place, desire and intellect, or three if we further distinguish between phantasia and intellect as distinct cognitive principles. A further distinction could be made between the sensitive desire and the will or rational appetite (though Aristotle is less explicit about that distinction). All this is excellently explained by Albert following Aristotle's teaching.[6] But why then does he find it necessary to add the digression at the end according to the Platonists and theologians? As he explains in the introductory sentence of the digression: "If we ourselves"—that is Albert himself, not just following Aristotle—"would mention all principles of movement that set in movement a species of human actions, there will be much more diversity among these principles".[7] What are these additional principles Albert did not find in Aristotle? If we browse through the digression, we find *synderesis*, the innate habitus of the first principles of morality, *conscientia*, *liberum arbitrium*, the Augustinian distinction between *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior*, the *sensualitas*, the distinction in sensitive desire between the concupiscible and the irascible. The last distinction, which is accepted by all patristic authors and medieval theologians, is of course of Platonic origin. Aristotle refers to this division (432a25 and 433b4), but does not consider it functional in an investigation of the principles of movement. Albert, however, considers it an important contribution to an explanation of animal movement, and therefore he includes it in this digression. Even for *synderesis* one could invoke a Platonic authority. In the celebrated gloss on Jerome's commentary on Ezechiel, the doctrine is attributed to some followers of Plato ("plerique iuxta Platonem"), who not only introduced a tripartite distinction of the soul into the concupiscible, irascible and rational part, but also introduced a fourth power in the soul, "which the Greeks call synderesis, the flash [*scintilla*] of conscience, which even in Cain is not extinguished".[8] But what about the other principles,

6 An excellent summary of Albert's doctrine is found in the two first chapters of tractatus 2 of *De principiis motus processivi*, which he composed after the *De anima*.

7 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 240,44–46: "Si vero nos dicamus omnia moventia quaecumque movent speciem operabilium, circa quae sunt motus hominum, tunc multa diversitas erit in moventibus".

8 Cf. *Glossa marginalis super Hieronymum in Ezechiel* 1,10, CCL 75, pp. 11,209–12,223: "Quartam supra haec et extra haec tria ponunt, quam Graeci vocant synderesim, quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque non extinguitur". On the origin of the doctrine of the *synderesis* and on Albert's development of the doctrine, see O. Lottin, "La syndérèse chez Albert le Grand et chez Thomas d' Aquin", in: *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie* 30 (1928), pp. 18–44; id., *Psychologie et morale au XIIe et XIIe siècles*, Louvain 1949; H. Anzulewicz, "Grundlagen von Individuum und Individualität in der Anthropologie des Albertus Magnus", in: J.A. Aertsen—A. Speer

for which no Platonic authority is found, such as the two parts of reason and sensuality and why the special emphasis on *liberum arbitrium*?

2 *De homine*: A First Synthesis of Theological and Philosophical Psychology

Let us turn to another work of Albert, *De homine*, completed about ten years before the *De anima*, some time before 1243.[9] This monumental work is in fact entirely devoted to the study of the human soul and its different parts and faculties (vegetative, sensitive, rational and motive). Only at the very end is there a short discussion of the human body, but only "insofar as it pertains to a theologian" to deal with it, that is to say, the question about the state of the body of Adam in paradise before the fall. After having examined the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational or intellective powers of the soul, Albert turns in the last section to an investigation of the "vires motivae animae".[10] Having first explained what locomotion (*motus processivus*) in animals is,[11] he sets out to explain what the different principles of movement are: "deinde quaeritur de singulis viribus moventibus".[12] This long section is divided into two parts: (1) "de his quae movent per apprehensionem et appetitum";[13] (2) "de his quae

(Hrsg.), *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 24), Berlin—New York 1996, pp. 124–160; M. Pangallo, *Legge di Dio. Sinderesi e Coscienza nelle 'Quaestiones' di S. Alberto Magno* (Studi Tomistici 63), Città del Vaticano 1997; J. Müller, *Natürliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus Magnus*, Münster 2001; Ch. Trottman, "La syndérèse selon Albert le Grand", in: W. Senner et alii (Hrsg.), *Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven*, Berlin 2001, pp. 255–273; id., "*comedit, deditque viro suo*. La syndérèse entre sensualité et intellect dans la théologie morale au tournant du second quart du XIIIe siècle", in: Gr. Federici Vescovini et alii (eds.), *Corpore e anima, sensi interni e intelletto dai secoli XIII–XIV ai post-cartesiani e spinoziani* (Textes et Études du Moyen Age 30), Turnhout 2005, pp. 161–187.

9 On Albert's doctrine in *De homine* cf. H. Anzulewicz, "The Concept of Man in Albert the Great", in: I. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy and the Sciences*, Leiden—Boston 2013, pp. 325–346. I am also indebted to Anzulewicz's introduction and annotations in the monumental edition of *De homine* in the *Editio Coloniensis* (2008) and to his comments on a first draft of this article.

10 Cf. Albert the Great, DH, pp. 474–555.

11 Ibid., pp. 475,6–479,24.

12 Ibid., p. 479,26.

13 Ibid., pp. 479,28: section pp. 479,35–503,57.

antecedunt eas quae non nisi imperant motum".[14] The first group of principles corresponds to what we can learn from Aristotle's *De anima*. Albert discusses in this section the apprehensive powers (practical intellect and imagination) and the appetitive powers (the will, the irascible and the concupiscible).[15] These principles produce movement only by commanding it ("quae non nisi imperant motum"), but do not execute the movement itself, which is left to the nerves and the muscles and the *spiritus* operative in them.[16]

What, then, are the other principles "which come before those that command" ("quae antecedunt eas quae non nisi imperant motum")? Albert notices that they cannot so easily be known, because their existence is only *indirectly* grasped through the cognitive and appetitive principles we discussed before. In fact, the philosophers rarely talk about them, but the saints often discuss them.[17] Albert distinguishes six such principles: (1) sensuality, (2) reason with its superior and inferior part, (3) free judgment (*liberum arbitrium*), (4) *synderesis*, (5) conscience, (6) the image of God. If we examine the authorities quoted by Albert for these principles, they are only saints. This is evidently the case for the doctrine of the "imago dei", which is based upon a biblical passage (*Genesis* 1:23): here Augustine's explanation in *De trinitate* is the main source. From the same Augustinian work comes the distinction between the inferior and

14 Ibid., p. 479,28–29: section pp. 504,1–555,26.

15 Cf. Albert the Great, DH, p. 479,29–31: "Moventes autem per apprehensionem et appetitum sunt tres, scilicet intellectus practicus et phantasia et partes appetitus. Primo igitur quaerendum est de intellectu practico"; ibid., p. 487,2–3: "Deinde quaeritur de phantasia movente"; ibid., p. 488,10–14: "Deinde quaeritur de partibus appetitus. Et quia dicit Philosophus quod "in rationabili voluntas fit et in irrationabili desiderium et animus", innuuntur tres partes esse appetitus, scilicet voluntas ex parte rationalis animae, et desiderium sive concupiscibilis et animus sive irascibilis ex parte irrationalis animae, hoc est sensibilis. Quaerendum igitur est primo de voluntate; secundo de concupiscibili; tertio de irascibili; quarto de tribus in communi".

16 On de difference between the commandment of movement and its execution through bodily organs cf. Albert the Great, DH, pp. 476,40–58; 493,41–494,42; 555,6–15; id., *Physica*, pp. 606,80–607,4; id., *Quaestio de synderesi*, p. 23, 57–60: "potentiae motivae, quarum est motus, sunt duobus modis: aut enim sunt imperatae sicut virtutes affixae musculis et nervis; aut sunt imperantes sicut appetitivae". The metaphor of the 'imperium' is already in Avicenna, *Liber VII Nat.*, (ed. Van Riet), pars 1, c. 5, pp. 82,40–83,55, in particular 43–43: "motiva est duobus modis, quia aut est movens ideo qui imperat motui, aut est movens ideo quia est efficiens motum", quoted by Albert in *De homine*, p. 493,44–47.

17 Cf. Albert the Great, DH, p. 504,4–5: "Quaerendum de his motivis quae antecedunt istas, licet non possint cognosci nisi per praehabitas, eo quod non ponuntur a philosophis nisi raro, sed a sanctis tractantur".

superior part of reason (but Albert also refers to Damascene).[18] Augustine is again the main authority on sensuality.[19] For the celebrated doctrine of *synderesis*, Saint Basil is quoted from his homely on the *Proverbs* (PG 31, 405C, 1772B) and the celebrated gloss on Saint Jerome's commentary on *Ezechiel* 1:10. On conscience the main authority is Saint Paul's Letter to the Romans and Damascene.[20] Finally, there is the doctrine of the *liberum arbitrium*: here again we have no philosophical authorities; only saints are quoted: Damascene, Bernard (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*), Anselm (*De libero arbitrio*) and again Augustine with the classic definition "liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis", which is in fact first found in Peter the Lombard. Interestingly, Albert does not consider the doctrine of the *liberum arbitrium* as peripatetic or philosophical. It is a doctrine elaborated by patristic authors and early medieval theologians, mainly in the context of an explanation of original sin and the relation between human freedom and divine grace. In fact, Albert never discusses the question of *liberum arbitrium* in his Aristotelian works, but only in his theological works, such as the *Sentences*, the *Summa theologiae* and *De homine*.[21] We find it also discussed in the *De anima*, but only in the digression "secundum theologos".[22] The same observations could be made about *synderesis*, conscience and sensuality, which were all originally discussed in a theological context. This original theological context is evident in the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard. In Book II, Distinction 24, Peter attempts to explain with Augustine the fall of Adam. What was the natural power and grace Adam had before the fall? Could he have resisted the temptation and remained without sin? Was the fall due to our sensuality and its unavoidable attraction or should we search for an explanation in human reason, and in particular in the distinction between its two parts?

18 Cf. Augustine, *De trinitate* XII, III, 3; John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, 2, c. 22.

19 Reference to Augustine, *De trinitate* XII, XII, 17, though the term *sensualitas* is not used. It is through Peter the Lombard (cf. II *Sentences*, d. 24) that the doctrine of *sensualitas* becomes well-established.

20 Cf. Rom. 2:15; 9:1; 13:15; John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, IV, c. 22.

21 Cf. A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen nach den Quellen* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters IV 6), Münster 1906, Band 2, p. 455: "Albert erblickt in der Lehre vom *liberum arbitrium* nicht ein Ergebnis der aristotelisch-peripatetischen Philosophie, sondern eine Leistung der Patristik und der christlichen Frühscholastik. In seinen Ausführungen über diesen Gegenstand bezieht er sich nämlich fast ausschliesslich auf theologische Autoritäten, auf Augustinus, Bernardus, Johannes Damascenus".

22 There is also an interesting discussion of *liberum arbitrium* in the "Digressio declarans, quot et quae principia et qualiter sint motus processivi", in: *De principiis motus processivi*, tr. II, c. 2, in particular p. 59,24–52.

In the course of his explanation, Peter Lombard has to clarify what the different parts of the soul are that may play a role in a moral or immoral choice. He thus explains what "free judgment" is, the natural capacity of humans to choose between good or evil. Here Peter finds the origin of sin, not in sensuality which only represents a temptation. He further explains what sensuality is and what the role is of the two parts of reason; Peter even once mentions conscience. He concludes: "We inserted this about the parts of the soul so that the nature of the soul itself may be more fully known and that may be understood to what part in the soul corresponds free judgment".[23]

Distinction 24 in Book II offered all medieval commentators on the *Sentences* an ideal opportunity to discuss the different parts of the soul that are not analysed in Aristotle's *De anima*, but come from the theological tradition. If we look up Albert's own commentary on that distinction, we see that he examines at length what *liberum arbitrum*, sensuality and the twofold division of reason is, and what role they play in the origin of sin. In his own commentary on this distinction, Thomas Aquinas devotes his second question to "the powers annexed to free judgment" ("de viribus [*scripsi*: virtutibus *ed.*] libero arbitrio adiunctis"). He too discusses, besides *liberum arbitrium*, *synderesis*, conscience, the two parts of reason and sensuality.

It was certainly Albert's ambition to integrate within his theological synthesis *De homine* the two traditions on the different parts or powers of the soul: the philosophical-peripatetic and the theological-Augustinian. However, as Artur Schneider already noticed in his seminal study on Albert's psychology, this attempt was not very successful. Instead of an integration, we have in *De homine* a juxtaposition—or should we say superposition?—of both views.[24] The failure of this synthesis is particularly evident in the exposition about the

23 Cf. Peter of Lombard, *Sent.* II d. 24, c. 12, § 6: "Haec de animae partibus inseruimus, ut ipsius animae natura plenius cognosceretur, et secundum quam sui portionem in ea sit liberum arbitrium intelligatur".

24 Cf. A. Schneider, cit., p. 443: "Dieses eigenartige, in methodischer Hinsicht nichts weniger als geschickte Verfahren illustriert so recht, wie sehr Albert sich bemüht, die geplante Synthese zwischen den aristotelischen und augustinischen Elementen um jeden Preis durchzuführen. Es ist nämlich keineswegs anzunehmen, dass er von vornherein darauf ausgegangen wäre, an die philosophisch-peripatetische Vermögenslehre noch die theologisch-augustinische als solche gesondert anzureihen. Zweifellos hat er auch hier ursprünglich die aus beiden Schulen herstammenden Gedankenmassen zu einem in sich einheitlichen Ganzen vereinigen wollen. Aber er fühlt sich außer stände, die Vermögen, welche im Anschluß an Augustin von den christlichen Frühscholastikern der Seele zugeschrieben wurden, unter den von den Peripatetikern gelehrten in irgendwie harmonischer Weise unterzubringen".

motive powers of the soul. After having presented the philosophical view on these powers, Albert discusses in a second part the powers distinguished by theologians, which are not found in the Aristotelian tradition. This juxtaposition leads to a needless duplication of psychic powers. As an evident example of this reduplication, Schneider refers to the doctrine of the *synderesis*, the innate dispositional knowledge of the first principles of moral action, which Albert considers as the foundation of our moral self-determination.[25] Why do we need this additional principle, if we have in the Aristotelian analysis the practical intellect, which assumes the same function?[26] In fact, Albert sometimes attributes to the practical intellect the function of the *synderesis*. This is clearly the case in III, tract. 4, Chapter 6 of the *De anima*, where Albert comments on Aristotle's claim that "the intellect is always right, but desire and imagination are both right and not right".[27] Albert explains that Aristotle's statement concerns the pure intellect, which has nothing mixed with imagination:

> This intellect is nothing but a habitual power [*potentia habitualis*], namely the habitual knowledge of the principles of moral action, in which there is no error, such as you shall not kill, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not steal, justice must be honoured, god must be worshiped, parents respected, the republic must be established. [...] Therefore, some authors call this intellect the natural criterion of judgment [*naturale iudicatorium*], in which the universal principles of right are described.[28]

The author Albert refers to is Saint Basil.[29] However, in the passage quoted above Basil does not call our intellect a natural criterion, but the *synderesis*. This is also Albert's own view throughout his work.[30] In the theological digression in *De anima*, he characterizes *synderesis* as a "habitus operabilium universales, qui sunt quasi prima principia morum, circa quae numquam incidit error".[31] But this is exactly what he said before in Chapter 6 about the practical intellect itself. Why, then, should we need an extra principle (*synderesis*) if the intellect

25 Ibid., p. 547: "Gründ der sittlichen Selbstbestimmung".

26 Ibid.: "Diese Verdopplung zeigt uns, dass es unserem Scholastiker vielfach an der nötigen Übersicht und kritischen Schärfe gebricht".

27 Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III 10 (433a26–27).

28 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 235,29–40.

29 Cf. Basil, *Hom.* 5 secundum translationem Rufini (PG 31, 1772B).

30 In some context not only *synderesis*, but conscience itself may be considered as a natural criterion of judgment. See Albert the Great, *Quaestiones*, pp. 20,62–67; 26,1–20.

31 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 240,66–68.

itself has already this function of ultimate foundation of morality? Albert formulates himself such an objection in his treatise on *synderesis* in *De homine*:

> The philosophers, from the perspective of reason, do not posit another power moving towards the good by way of cognition or judgment but the practical intellect or practical reason. As *synderesis* is such a power of the soul, it will be the same power as practical reason or intellect.[32]

In his answer, Albert admits that, if we take intellect in a large sense (*generaliter*) for every rational power of the soul that moves with cognition, we can say that it also encompasses *synderesis* as one of its habitual parts.[33] *Synderesis*, however, has a specific content, the habit of the first moral principles, which is, as such, not included in the meaning of the intellect, though the intellect is the power under which this habit is subsumed. When in *De anima* 433a26–27 Aristotle claims that the intellect is always true, he may have had in mind not just the intellect, but the intellect insofar as it encompasses the habit of the *synderesis*.[34] In Albert's understanding, the practical intellect possesses in the *synderesis* the first universal principles of morality. The introduction of the concept of *synderesis* offers an irrefutable foundation of practical reasoning, which is absent from Aristotle's own moral thought, where the virtue of the practical intellect, prudence, allows us to make the right decision at the right moment. The doctrine of *synderesis* has, as we have seen, a non-Aristotelian origin: it is a Stoic moral doctrine adopted and transformed by Christian thinkers. Its integration in the Aristotelian moral doctrine is not a duplication, as Schneider suggested, but a valuable supplement, as Albert assumed. It remained however a huge problem for later scholasticism to integrate into one moral doctrine prudence as supreme virtue and conscience / *synderesis*.[35]

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32 Cf. Albert the Great, DH, p. 529,10–14.

33 Cf. Albert the Great, DH, pp. 530,62–531,6.

34 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 235,29–40; cf. also Thomas de Aquino, *Sent. in De anima*, (ed. Leonina), III, c. IX: "Et dicit quod 'omnis intellectus est rectus': quod intelligendum est de intellectu principiorum. Non enim erramus circa prima principia in operabilibus". Even modern commentators have difficulty with this passage. Cf., for instance, the remark made by D. Hamlyn, *Aristotle—De anima*, Oxford 1993, p. 152: "That the intellect is always right is a characteristic exaggeration. Presumably Aristotle said this to differentiate the concept of the good as an end from the concept of the apparent good".

35 Cf. Th. Deman, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Somme Théologique: La prudence, 2a–2ae, qu. 47–56*, troisième édition mise à jour par J.-P. Torrell, Paris 2006.

Schneider's critical assessment of Albert's attempt at synthesis is right if one considers only *De homine*, where Albert, after the section wherein the Aristotelian psychology is presented, devotes a special section to the motive principles that are distinguished by the saints. There is no attempt made to integrate the two traditions. What does it mean to say that the principles analysed by the saints are prior (*antecedent*) to those analysed by the philosophers? Are they more fundamental? Are they ontologically presupposed as foundations? But this seems excluded, as they are rather specifications of the more general principles, such as intellect or will. Why, then, are they said to be prior? No explanation is given.

3 Return to the Digression: A New Attempt of Integration

Let us now return to the digression in the *De anima*, which comes ten years after *De homine*, and see how Albert attempts here to integrate the theological principles of human action within the Aristotelian framework of moral psychology. As he says, if we want to discern *all* principles of human action, we should not limit our investigation to only those principles that are *qua* subject different, as two separate parts or faculties of the soul, such as the apprehensive and the desiring principle. We should also distinguish within each faculty the different dispositions (*habitus*), either innate or acquired, it may have. Such a differentiation may reveal a multiplicity of powers (*virtutes*) within the same psychic faculty.[36] Take the apprehensive power of the intellect: as we shall see, one can distinguish here *synderesis* and conscience and the inferior and superior part of reason as different principles of action. Within the appetitive power, again, we can distinguish within the will "free judgment" and within the sensitive appetite *sensualitas*. Let us now examine this "diversity of moving principles" in more detail, following Albert's exposition in the digression. As

36 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 240,44–59: "Si vero nos dicamus omnia moventia quaecumque movent speciem operabilium, circa quae sunt motus hominum, tunc multa diversitas erit in moventibus; tunc enim non determinabimus tantum partes animae motivas subiecto ab aliis partibus differentes, sed accipiemus omnem partem moventem, quaecumque potentia cum habitu suo uno nomine vocatur et ab alia habituali potentia differt tam in habitu quam in actu, licet sit eadem illi in subiecto et quamvis circa idem operetur. Et hoc est dividere moventia potius per virtutes quam per partes; una enim pars animae secundum subiectum multas habere potest virtutes, quibus perficitur ad opus et ad motum, et quando potentia habitualiter sumitur, hoc est cum habitu uno nomine vocatur, tunc differt a seipsa, secundum quod cum alio habitu nominatur".

in his previous works, Albert distinguishes between (A) cognitive or apprehensive principles, which determine movement by decree ("moventes tamquam decernentes motum"), such as intellect and imagination, and (B) principles that initiate movement by desire, such as the will and the sensitive appetite.

Albert subsumes under the intellect (A) the following principles of human action: (1) *synderesis*; (2) *conscientia*; (3) *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior*. (1) *Synderesis* is, as we have seen, the innate *habitus* that makes us know the first principles of morality. It does not suffice, however, to intuit the universal principles. In action we have to come down to the particular subsumed under the universal principle, as happens in a practical syllogism. In this reasoning the universal principles contained in the habit of *synderesis* offer the major principle ("you shall not steal"), whereas cogitative reason formulates in the minor a concrete instance of the universal principle ("This is theft"). (2) *Conscience* is the conscious application by reason of the general moral principles to a particular action; conscience obliges us to act in a particular way and makes us responsible for that act. Whereas the first intuition of principles is always right, conscience may err. As we have seen, *synderesis* is the innate *habitus* of the first moral principles expressed in natural law. However, besides natural law, which only offers universal general principles, there is also divine law and positive human law, which is expressed in particular rules. Our conscience must therefore not only be related to the principles of natural law, but also to those of divine law and those of positive law. In order to explain how we have within our mind both the principles of divine law and those of positive law regulating our actions ("habitus in operabilibus regentes"), Albert develops an original interpretation of (3) the Augustinian distinction between the two parts of reason.[37] The superior part stands for reason insofar as it is informed by divine law.[38] When thus "informed", the superior reason not only knows the universal principles of morality, but also different divinely revealed rules for *particular*

37 Albert discusses the Augustinian distinction in many of his works and his interpretation is not always consistent with what we find in the *De anima*. Cf. II *Sent*. d. 24, a. 14; *De IV coaeq*., tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, p. 3, and *Summa theologiae* II, tr. 15, q. 93. In *De homine* Albert only discusses "the acts of reason following Damascene" because, as he says, it has been determined before what the superior and inferior part of reason are (cf. DH, p. 505,5–9): "Et quia supra notatum est, quid sit ratio practica et speculativa, et quid portio inferior et quid portio superior, et quomodo differant a se invicem et a sensualitate, et quomodo gradus temptationum sunt in ipsis". It is not clear where this has been determined before, certainly not in *De homine*. Maybe Albert refers to previous works such as the *De IV coaequaevis*. See the note of the editor H. Anzulewicz *ad locum*.

38 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 241,7–12: "Illa quidem pars quae informata iure divino regit in operibus, vocata est 'superior portio rationis', eo quod superiori iure perficitur, quod simil-

circumstances (as respect of the Sabbath). When we apply in practical reasoning these principles in a concrete instance, we act out of conscience with respect to the divine law. The inferior part of reason has an acquired knowledge of the rules we have to follow according to positive law and customs in a political context. The principles of positive law are not always and everywhere right: they depend on the time and place where one lives, and may even in certain circumstances be suspended or changed. These principles are like the leaden rules Aristotle mentions, which were used for buildings in Lesbos, where the rule is "not rigid but adapts itself to the stones".[39] No matter how uncertain and variable this *habitus* of the inferior reason may be, it teaches us "To live well among bad people" ("docens bene conversari inter pravos") through a behaviour that corresponds to the morality of custom and positive law.[40] Albert's view is excellently formulated in the *quaestio de synderesi*:

> Someone may be regulated [in his actions] towards his end [1] by some universal principles: this is [the function of] *synderesis*, which contains in itself the universal principles of right, about which there is no error, just as there is an intuition of [first] principles in theoretical knowledge; [2] or regulated by particular rules to a particular action: and these principles can be taken either [2a] from the first rightness, and this is [the function of] the superior reason [...]; or [2b] from the inferior things, [...] and this is [the function of] the inferior reason.[41]

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itudo quaedam est aequitatis et rectitudinis divinae. Vocatur autem a quibusdam 'ratio sapientiae'". Cf. Augustine, *De trinitate*, XII, XIV, 22.

39 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, pp. 236,1–12; 241,23–24. Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, V, 10, 1137b25–30.

40 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 241,18–26: "Pars autem, quae informatur iure humano, quod positivum est et consuetudine approbatum, nihil habet perpetuo rectum, sed potius particulare est totum et locale et temporale et secundum casus variatum id ex quo ipsa regit opera, sicut variatur regula Lesbiae aedificationis, sicut diximus superius. Et hanc vocant inferiorem portionem rationis. Vocatur autem a nonnullis 'ratio scientiae'". Cf Augustine, *De trinitate*, XII, XIV, 22.

41 Cf. Albert the Great, *Quaestio de synderesi*, p. 234,17–28: "aut enim regulatur aliquis ad finem universalibus quibusdam principiis; et sic est synderesis, quae habet apud se universalia iuris, circa quae non est error, sicut est intellectus principiorum in speculativis. Aut regulatur particularibus regulis determinatis ad speciale opus; et istae regulae vel sunt acceptae a prima rectitudine; et sic est superior ratio [...]; vel sunt acceptae a rebus inferioribus [...]; et penes has est ratio inferior". The attribution of the *quaestiones* to Albert is uncertain. Whoever the author may have been, he certainly expresses Albert's views on *synderesis*, conscience and reason in a systematic way.

The appetitive power (B) of the will is enhanced by the habitus of free judgment (*liberum arbitrium*). According to Albert the will is by definition a free power, if we take to be free in the Aristotelian sense as to be master of ourselves and of what we do or do not, without being enslaved to some other power. The will is absolutely master of its own acts: it is free to will or not to will something, without any necessity. Even the judgment of reason cannot force the will to choose what has been 'decided'.[42] In this sense the will is the faculty of all faculties. For only when we want to do something, we do it: reasoning, walking, studying, praying. The will is "motor aliarum virium ad actus".[43] However, when this absolutely free power is regulated and disciplined by deliberative reason, as it should be, the acquired capacity ("potentia habitualis") resulting from both reason and will is what is traditionally called *liberum arbitrium*.[44] This capacity of free judgment makes a human agent the ultimate arbiter of what he chooses to do or not. Because of that capacity he can be accused or excused, punished or rewarded, as he is responsible for his actions. This free judgment is, alas, often perverse, but it is the will, the absolute source of freedom, that is the "principal cause of perversion", not reason whose function is judgment.[45]

Thus far we have only examined what the primary movers in the human soul are: intellect, reason, and will. There are, however, also secondary principles of movement on the level of our sensibility. Following Aristotle Albert attributes an important role to imagination in the initiation of motion. Connected to imagination, a cognitive power, is the "vis aestimativa", the sensitive power of estimation or valuation of a concrete situation regarding what is beneficial or detrimental for the animal. Though not explicitly mentioned by Aristotle, it is for Albert a Peripatetic doctrine, as it is found in Avicenna.[46] Albert explains what this sensitive power is in a digression at the beginning of *De anima* III.

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42 Cf. Albert the Great, *De principiis motus processivi*, p. 59,15–16: "Facto autem decreto non necessario fit motus, quia forte non eligit, quod ex iudicio decretum est. In hoc enim anima differt a natura".

43 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 241,70–71; id., *Super Ethicam*, pp. 284,90–91; 444,79; id., DH, pp. 442,28; 519,6–7; id., *De bono*, p. 291,19.

44 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 241,77–84: "Quoniam tamen haec potentia quae voluntas vocatur, ut ordinata a ratione deliberante accipitur et tam deliberatio quam appetitus voluntatis in idem feruntur, tunc facultas talis sic ex utroque ordinatim procedens liberum arbitrium vocatur; arbitrium quidem propter rationem deliberantem et arbitrantem, et liberum propter voluntatis libertatem".

45 Ibid., p. 242,12–19.

46 Cf. B. Ashley, "Anthropology: Albert the Great on the Cogitative Power", in: I. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy and the Sciences*, Leiden—Boston 2013, pp. 319 ff.

The *vis aestimativa* is connected to imagination, not to the intellect, because it considers what is beneficial or harmful not in its universality (as good or bad), but in its particularity as presented by the imagination. Yet this capacity of evaluation is not identical with imagination, as is evident from the fact that we can have imaginations and yet do not feel effects of sorrow or pleasure nor inclinations to avoid or pursue an object. Through the connection with sensitive desire the *aestimativa* is not purely an apprehensive power, but also a motivating one.[47] The function of this power is evident from experience, and confirmed by the Peripatetic tradition.

More difficult is it to insert within a philosophical psychology what the theologians call the *sensualitas*. This is not the same thing as the sensitivity, i.e. sense perception and the corresponding sensitive desires, which humans have in common with animals. *Sensualitas* is a term heavily loaded with theological connotations since Augustine identified it with the role of the serpent in the temptation of Eve. *Sensualitas* is not just a neutral cognitive and appetitive faculty, but is always already affected by sin, or tending towards sin.[48] What is exactly its function and how could it be integrated in a philosophical doctrine on the powers of the soul? In the digression of the *De anima* Albert first notices with Aristotle that sense perception itself is not just a neutral cognitive faculty, but that it is capable of initiating movement. Fot it is what at first informs the animal that there is something pleasurable or painful in what is perceived, though these value-aspects are accidentally linked to the sense objects.[49] Hence, sense perception itself can be said to "initiate movement" (*movens sensus*). This complex interaction of sensitive apprehension and desire before the intervention of any judgment of reason may be called *sensualitas*. Albert insists that it is not one single power, but a combination of powers.[50] It is

47 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 167,58–62.

48 On *sensualitas* cf. *De IV coaeq.*, tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, p. 3, q. 1; II *Sent* d. 24, a. 8–14, 16; *Summa theologiae* II t. 15, q. 62; and the *Quaestio de sensualitate et eius motibus*. Cf. A. Schneider, cit., pp. 444–446.

49 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 242,36–40: "Est etiam movens sensus sicut primo nuntians delectabile vel triste sensu per accidens, et quia omne movens aliquid habet desiderii, ideo sensualitas vocatur motus ille animalium qui afficit ipsam ex quinque sensibus corporis".

50 Cf. *De IV coaeq.*, tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, p. 3, q. 1, p. 703a: "dicendum quod [...] sensualitas non supponit vim unam, sed plures [...]. Secundum Augustinum illa pars concupiscentiae quae nobis communis est cum brutis, dicitur sensualitas, et illa est tota pars animae sensibilis, quae reficitur et delectatur in delectabilibus corporalibus, et ita comprehendit concupiscibilem et irascibilem ex parte motivarum sensibilium et apprehensionum delectabilis,

a capacity to apprehend through the senses what is pleasurable or painful and to react immediately by pursuing or avoiding an object without being directed by reason: "sensualitas dicitur potentia apprehensiva delectabilis et appetitiva ipsius ante iudicium rationis".[51] It affects the animal "ex quinque sensibus corporis", and sets it in movement towards the pleasurable, before the consent of reason. On the level of sensuality there is already in humans a first tendency to sinful acts. However, before the consent of reason, this cannot be more than a venial sin. Because of this tendency to perversion it is said to be by theologians "perpetuae corruptionis".[52] For that reason all moral and political institutions urge us to avoid the pleasures of sensuality.

It is not clear how *sensualitas* is related to the twofold *irascible* and *concupiscible* powers of the sensitive desire, to which Albert turns in the next section of the digression. They must be presented in the digression because Aristotle did not include them among the motive powers of the soul, whereas all Platonists and theologians rightly embrace them. Albert, however, does not explain in this text how they are connected to the *sensualitas*. In fact, that question had remained unsettled in the tradition after Lombard, and Albert himself seems to hesitate as he defended different positions throughout his career. In some works, as in the *Sentences* commentary, Albert seems to consider the irascible and the concupiscible as subdivisions of the *sensualitas*, or he takes *sensualitas* as a generic power before the subdivision.[53] In the above quoted passage from de *De IV coaequaevis*, however, he states that the irascible and concupiscible powers, in interaction with the *aestimativa*, constitute sensuality.[54] The clearest and most coherent view is found in the *Quaestio de sensualitate et eius*

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et aestimationem ipsius ex parte cognitivarum virium sensibilis animae". Cf. also DH, p. 502,46 and p. 504,31.

51 Cf. *De IV coaeq*., tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, p. 3, q. 1, p. 702.

52 Cf. Albert the Great, DA, p. 242,40–43: "Et quia talis motus nullo secundum se regimine gubernatur, sed inclinatur in omne delectabile oblatum, ideo dicitur sensualitas perpetuae esse corruptionis". The expression "perpetuae corruptionis" is also found in *De IV coaeq*., tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, q. 2, p. 713a. Cf. also *Quaest*., pp. 219,22–23; 224,22–23, where we find "perpetuae inordinationis". I could not find the origin of this expression ("dicitur"), which is also used by Thomas Aquinas: cf. II *Sent*. d. 24, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3; q. 3, a. 2, arg. 3; a. 3 arg. 5; III *Sent*. d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, q. 2, arg. 2; ad 2; *ST* I–II, q. 74, a. 3, arg. 2.

53 Cf. Albert the Great, *De IV coaeq*., tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, p. 3, q. 1, p. 703b: "dicendum quod sensualitas dicitur ab objecto sensibilis animae in communi, circa quod est apprehensio ad concupiscentiam vel delectationem ordinata. Sunt tamen qui dicunt sensualitatem esse *unam vim*, quae est *ante* concupiscibilem et irascibilem, quae sunt partes desiderii: sensualitas enim primus impulsus est ad delectabile sensuum secundum eos".

54 Cf. note 50, above.

motibus. The argument goes as follows. Although the appetitive faculty of the sensitive soul is substantially one, one may distinguish in it different powers, depending on whether it is elevated to the level of reason or rather pressed down to the carnal level. When sensitive desire comes close to reason, it is articulated into the irascible and the concupiscible powers, which are moved by their respective objects according to specific reasons—the *bonum arduum* or the *bonum delectabile*—, which does not happen without deliberation. Indeed, both powers can be persuaded by reason and though they are not rational by essence, they may become rational by participation. In fact, they are the seats of the moral virtues, when they are properly disciplined.[55] Inarticulated sensuality, however, is found when sensitive desire is pressed down to the carnal level. It is the immediate inclination of the sensitive appetite to things that please the flesh and is as such rebellious to reason. It cannot be disciplined and moralised through virtuous dispositions. Hence one can only try to refrain it and keep it under control of reason: "refrenabile per praeventum rationis".[56] Because sensuality does not await a perfect apprehension, through which the proper reasons of the perceived object are clearly known, but is stimulated by the desirable object apprehended under some confused common nature, it is not yet an articulated appetite. The irascible and the concupiscible, on the contrary, are clearly distinguished according to their proper objects.[57]

55 Cf. Albert the Great, *Quaest.*, pp. 219,52–220,1: "Sed quia virtutum sensitivarum quaedam sunt magis elevatae ad rationem, quaedam magis depressae ad carnem, licet vis appetitiva sit una secundum substantiam, tamen habet diversam rationem, secundum quod elevatur aliquatenus ad rationem et secundum quod deprimitur ad carnem; et secundum quod elevatur ad rationem, sequuntur eam irascibilis et concupiscibilis, prout moventur a suis obiectis secundum proprias rationes, quod non fit sine deliberatione vel perfecta apprehensione; et illae, licet non sint per essentiam de natura rationis, participant tamen cum ratione ut obaudibiles rationi et persuasibiles a ratione". Cf. also II *Sent*. d. 24, a. 9, p. 408a; *De IV coaeq*., tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, p. 3, q. 1, p. 701b: "dicendum secundum quosdam quod sensualitas supra sensibilem naturam addit ordinabilitatem ad rationem, et penes hoc est differentia sensualitatis et sensibilitatis".

56 Cf. Albert the Great, *Quaest.*, p. 220,19; cf. also ibid., p. 219,23 with the notes of the editors.

57 Ibid., p. 220,2–13: "Secundum autem quod deprimitur ad carnem, sequitur eam sensualitas, in qua est prima inclinatio appetitus eorum quae conveniunt carni; et ideo, cum non exspectet perfectam apprehensionem, qua determinatur unumquodque secundum propriam rationem, non movetur a propriis rationibus delectabilis vel alterius modi, sed ab appetibili sub confusa communitate; et ideo non est in ea irascibilis et concupiscibilis, prout sunt distinctae secundum proprias rationes obiectorum, sed remanet unus appetitus non-distinctus, idem in substantia cum irascibili et concupiscibili". Thomas exposes the same view in II *Sent*. d. 24, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3: "Sic ergo dico quod irascibilis et concupis-

4 The Reasons of the Theologians

The complex discussion how the irascible and the concupiscible are related to *sensualitas* follows from the introduction of a theological notion within a philosophical context (an explanation of the powers of movements in the soul). In fact, as Albert observes in *De IV coaequaevis*, the distinction of sensuality from sensibility is related to the theological question of whether our actions are meritorious or not.[58] Without the theological discussion of original sin and its punishment (the rebellion of the flesh against reason), which started with Augustine, nobody would have thought it was necessary to add sensuality as different from the irascible and concupiscible, which are morally neutral powers of the sensitive soul.[59] Albert makes a similar remark in *De resurrectione* about the *motivae potentiae* in general (*synderesis*, *liberum arbitrium*, *superior et inferior pars rationis*, the will): all these power are directed towards actions insofar as they are meritorious or not.[60] The perspective of the theologian is

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cibilis nominant appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod completus est, et per diversa distinctus, et versus rationem tendens; unde et in homine irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi obtemperant. Sensualitas autem nominat sensitivum appetitum, secundum quod est incompletus et indeterminatus, et magis depressus; et ideo dicitur, quod in ea non potest esse virtus, et quod est perpetuae corruptionis; et ex ipsa sua indeterminatione quamdam unitatem habet, ut quaedam vis dicatur". Cf. also *ST* I, q. 81, a. 2 c.: "appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur, sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem".

58 Cf. Albert the Great, *De IV coaeq.*, tr. 4, q. 69, a. 3, p. 3, q. 1, p. 701a: "Item quaeritur, Utrum idem sit sensualitas, quod sensibilitas? Et videtur, quod non: quia sensibilitas inest omnibus habentibus sensum, sensualitas autem non videtur inesse, eo quod ipsa actum habet meriti et demeriti".

59 The author of the second part of the *Summa theologiae* raises the question why the philosophers discovered the different motivating powers, including concupiscible and irascible desire, but did not recognize sensuality as a different principle of movement. As he says, the reason may be that "we", theologians, understand by the term "sensuality" a desire which is related to reason as a power of deception of the devil and that power is not known to philosophers. Cf. *Summa theologiae* II, tr. 15, q. 92, p. 199b.

60 Cf. Albert the Great, *De resurrectione*, p. 162,35–43: "Deinde quaeritur de motivis. […]. Cum enim omnes istae potentiae sint ordinatae ad opera meriti vel demeriti, quaeritur primo de ipsis, qualiter secundum actus proprios et simplices coniunguntur deo, et postea, qualiter secundum actus compositos, sicut est frui". Peter of Aureol stands in this tradition when he comments on Distinction 24 of II *Sentences* and explains why Peter the Lombard here treats free judgment, synderesis, conscience, the two parts of reason and sensuality (cf. *Liber II Sententiarum*, (ed. Zannetti), Roma 1605, p. 261): "theologus autem tractat de

indeed different from that of the philosopher because he deals with what is meritorious, as Albert clearly says in his *Ethics*: "We do not speak here in a theological manner nor do we speak of the progress of the soul according to merit and grace, but we talk only about the soul insofar as its nature proceeds from the first cause".[61]

In *De homine* Albert gives another explanation of the different perspective of the theologian and the philosopher. One might ask the question, he says, why no philosopher ever put *synderesis* among the motive powers of the soul, whereas many saints did so.[62] In his reply to this objection Albert observes that philosophers only distinguish the faculties of the soul according to their general objects, and if they consider objects of human action (*operabilia*) they do it with respect to the "reasons of human right". The saints, however, distinguish the powers of the soul according to both divine and human right, considering both the general principles of right and its particular applications. Because of this special perspective they posited *synderesis* and also the superior part of reason, which adheres to the contemplation of divine right according to eternal reasons. This perspective is alien to philosophers.[63]

A similar objection is raised in the *Quaestio de synderesi*: is *synderesis* not a superfluous addition, a duplication of the practical intellect? The author answers that, though there is already a sufficient explanation of movement through the interaction of will and intellect, the other principles such as *synderesis* are not superfluous.[64] In fact, the philosopher discusses principles that explain movement in general (*universales motivae*) whereas the theologian

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merito et de demerito actus animae, sicut moralis de moralitate actus: ergo ad eum pertinet tractare de potentiis animae, inquantum in eis existit meritum et demeritum".

61 Cf. Albert the Great, *Ethica* VI, tr. 2, c. 18, p. 434a: "Non enim hic theologice loquimur, nec de profectu animae quo per meritum et gratiam proficit sed tantum loquimur de anima secundum quod natura sua processio quaedam est a causa prima ex materia corporis et in materiam corporis educta per omnes motores medios determinata".

62 Cf. text quoted above on p. 165.

63 Cf. Albert the Great, DH, p. 531,37–47: "Ad id quod quaeritur ulterius, quare philosophi non fecerint mentionem de synderesi, dicendum quod philosophi distinguunt potentias secundum obiecta generalia; et si considerant operabilia, faciunt hoc secundum rationes iuris humani. Sancti autem specialius distinguunt secundum ius divinum et humanum, et secundum principia iuris et particularia inventa; et ideo sancti ponunt synderesim ad principia et portionem superiorem rationis, quae inhaerescit iustitiae divinae contemplandae secundum rationes aeternas, quarum neutram ponunt philosophi".

64 Cf. Albert the Great, *Quaest.*, p. 234,53–57: "Neque oportet, quod superfluat, licet sufficiens ratio movendi habeatur per intellectum et voluntatem, quoniam illae sunt universales motivae, et illae quas considerat theologus, sunt speciales contentae sub illis".

considers special powers contained within the former. The theologians must consider what orders the motions of the soul *spiritualiter*. From this spiritual consideration follow more distinctions. What regulates movement is twofold: either it is the end towards which movement tends or it is something that rules (*regulans*) the movement itself. (1) In the first sense one can consider the soul as image of God and the powers following from this directing the soul to God. (2) In the regulation of movement we have *synderesis*, conscience, free judgment and the two parts of reason.[65]

Conclusion

The digression in the *De anima* is an interesting test-case for an evaluation of Albert and in particular of his attempt to integrate elements of the theological tradition within his philosophical work. Why did he feel the need for this digression? Usually Albert avoids talking about theological subjects within a philosophical treatise and he often insists on this separation between philosophy and theology. In a philosophical work one should not expect arguments about the resurrection, about grace and merit, about miracles.[66] Why then this digression in his *De anima*? In my view, Albert must have considered what the theologians have to say about *synderesis*, free judgment, sensuality, etc., as an essential complement, and even an improvement of what Aristotle says in III, 9–11. He introduces these principles not to make a theological digression in a philosophical work, but because they contribute to a philosophical understanding of human action, though they were first discussed in a theological context. After all, there is something frustrating in Aristotle's account, as David Hamlyn notices: "Aristotle's account of animal and human movement is vitiated by a failure to make a proper distinction between action or behaviour and the bodily movement which a physiologist might be concerned with".[67] One could also say with Peter of Aureol that Aristotle argues in the *De anima*

65 Ibid., p. 234,7–13: "Et quia naturalis non habet considerare ea quae spiritualiter ordinant motum, ideo ulterius non dividit eas. Sed hoc est theologi, qui considerat ea quae spiritualiter ordinant in motu, penes autem quae ulterius accipit alias speciales potentias motivas. Quod enim ordinat motum, vel est finis motus; et secundum hoc sumuntur potentiae imaginis, per quas anima fertur in deum vel actu vel potentia. Aut est regulans ad finem, et hoc est duobus modis".

66 Cf. the celebrated passages quoted and commented by A. de Libera, *Albert le Grand et la philosophie*, Paris 1990, pp. 39–41.

67 Cf. D. Hamlyn, cit., p. 153.

as a natural philosopher explaining animal behaviour. When he deals, however, with moral action in his *Ethics* he makes different distinctions within the soul than in the *De anima*.[68] If from an ethical perspective one would explain the principles of action differently, this is *a fortiori* the case from a theological perspective. Thus the *vires motivae* originally introduced in a theological context (to explain freedom and grace, sin, moral responsibility) may contribute to explain human action as distinguished from animal behaviour. The introduction of *synderesis*, conscience and *liberum arbitrium* is undoubtedly an enrichment of the Aristotelian moral psychology; some elements of the doctrine go back to Hellenistic philosophy, in particular Stoicism with its emphasis on conscience and natural law. The Augustinian doctrine of the two parts of reason enlarges the concept of conscience so as to include also our relation to divine and positive law. Similarly the introduction of *sensualitas*, however incoherent at first it may seem, helps us to better understand the ambivalent nature of sensuality, and to examine what are the primary movements of human passions before the consent of reason: a doctrine that again has a Stoic origin, but was enriched and further developed by Augustine in an attempt to understand the consequences of original sin.[69] Remarkably, Albert does not include in his digression in the *De anima* the doctrine of the "imago Dei" (which is fundamental in the corresponding section on the principles of movement in *De homine*), probably because he considered it alien to a philosophical analysis. Let us finally notice that Albert is pleased to introduce the Platonist together with the theologians to make the digression less theological but of general philosophical significance.

The digression in the *De anima* should make us aware that the distinction Albert introduces between theology and philosophy is less radical than often assumed in recent scholarship. I decided to present some musings on this digression to Kent Emery, not only because he is an admirer of Albert, but, above all, because he has always argued that all attempts to cut off theological

68 Cf. Petrus Aureoli, II *Sent.*, d. 24, q. un., p. 261: "Hinc est quod Aristoteles aliam et aliam divisionem dat de potentiis animae in libro *Ethicorum* ubi determinat de anima in ordine ad virtutes, et aliam in libro *De Anima*, ubi determinat de ea absolute".

69 On the question on whether the first movements are already sin, cf. Albert's interesting *Quaestio de primis motibus* with abundant annotations by the editors in the *Editio Coloniensis*. Cf. also R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*. Oxford 2002, Wu Tianyue, "Are First Movements Venial Sins? Augustinian Doctrine and Aquinas's Reinterpretation", in: G. Van Riel and P. d'Hoine (eds.), *Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought*, Leuven 2014, pp. 475–494.

issues from philosophy are not only historically wrong when studying medieval philosophy, but also infertile. For it is precisely in the confrontation with a tradition of interpreting Christian revelation that medieval philosophy made the greatest contribution to the development of philosophical ideas. As Étienne Gilson wonderfully formulates it: "le christianisme a changé le cours de l'histoire de la philosophie, en ouvrant à la raison humaine, par l'intermédiaire de la foi, des perspectives qu'elle n'avait pas encore découvertes".[70]

70 Cf. É. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, Paris 1932, p. 13.

CHAPTER 7

Dreams and Divinatory Dreams in Albert the Great's *Liber de somno et vigilia*

Silvia Donati

1 The Aristotelian Background

Aristotle's three works on sleep belong to the so-called *Parva naturalia*, a collection of short treatises on natural philosophy, serving as a complement to the *De anima*. The collection deals with a wide range of life functions that are common to the soul and the body insofar as they involve both psychic and bodily processes. The investigation of sleep in the *De somno et vigilia* is a central moment of Aristotle's inquiry, since sleep is a basic function of animal life: given that sense perception cannot be exercised without interruption, in Aristotle's view, the temporary deactivation of the perceptual power that takes place during sleep is essential to the preservation of animal life. In contrast, the investigation of the phenomena of dreaming and of divination through dreams in the *De insomniis* and the *De divinatione per somnum*, respectively, plays only an accessory role within Aristotle's inquiry, since those phenomena have no specific function in animal life; hence, they are addressed by Aristotle only as occasional concomitants of the phenomenon of sleep.[1] For Aristotle, a dream is a perceptual appearance, a phantasm (φάντασμα), arising from the movement of the sense-impressions, an appearance that we become aware of when we are asleep and in virtue of our being asleep; the second clause serves to distinguish dreaming from cases of perceptual awareness of the external world occasionally taking place during sleep, especially in the stage of light sleep that immediately precedes waking.[2] It is important to stress that—since we believe that we are having some sense perception, for instance that we are seeing or hearing something—for Aristotle a dream is some kind of sensory experience, pertaining to the sensitive faculty. Since, however, the senses are not active

1 Cf. Aristoteles, *De insomniis, De divinatione per somnum*, übers. u. erläutert v. Ph.J. van der Eijk, Berlin 1994, p. 49; Ph.J. van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge 2005, pp. 179, 204.

2 Aristoteles, *De insomniis*, c. 3, 462a27–31.

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during sleep, this appearance cannot be produced by a real object affecting our senses at the precise moment our dream occurs; therefore, the problem of explaining how this perceptual awareness is produced arises. Aristotle solves the problem by appealing to the φανταστικόν or imagination, the power of the perceptive faculty to which he ascribes the capability of operating on remnants of past perceptual affections.[3] In his view, perceptual affections resulting from actual sense-perceptions—in Aristotle's terminology, movements (κινήσεις)—remain for a certain time in a so to say potential state in the sense-organs after the external stimuli have ceased.[4] Those remnants of sense perceptions, reactivated during sleep either in their original form or combined and distorted in different ways, constitute the material of dreams.[5] Dreaming, however, is a kind of illusionary awareness, since we believe to be perceiving something which, in fact, is not there. The illusionary nature of dreaming appearances is explained by Aristotle through reference to the perceptual power which he sometimes calls principle of perception—normally identified by scholastic authors with the common sense (*sensus communis*)—, which in his view coordinates and controls the activities of the special senses; this power also checks the conformity of our sense perceptions with the external world: since it is impeded in its functions during sleep, it is not able to distinguish a mere sense remnant from the actual perception of an existing object.[6]

Whereas Aristotle's discussion of dreams in the *De insomniis* is clearly in line with the previous discussion of sleep in the *De somno et vigilia*, Aristotelian scholars stress the peculiar character of the *De divinatione*. There is little psychological analysis in the *De divinatione* and this work is more a treatise on natural philosophy in the wide sense than a psychological treatise.[7] Aristotle even shows a certain sloppiness in his use of technical terminology and there seem to be some tensions between his position in the *De divinatione* and the psychological doctrines developed in other works.[8] Moreover, the treatise has a decidedly polemical approach, more interested in assessing current views on divination than in developing its own solution.[9] Indeed, divination is a trou-

3 Ibid., c. 1, 459a14–22.

4 Ibid., c. 2, 459a24–b23, 460a32–b3.

5 Ibid., c. 3, 460b28–461b1.

6 Ibid., c. 3, 461b1–462a8.

7 Aristoteles, *De insomniis, De divinatione per somnum*, p. 87.

8 Ibid., pp. 62–67; Van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy*, cit., pp. 202–203; see also below, note 64.

9 Cf. Van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy*, cit., pp. 203–204.

blesome topic for Aristotle because—as he makes clear at the beginning of the *De divinatione*—on the one hand, the popular belief that dreams have some significance is not easily dispelled and, on the other hand, it is difficult to find a rational explanation for it. Aristotle is very critical of supernatural explanations understanding divinatory dreams as messages sent to human beings by God. In his view, this kind of explanation conflicts with the observed fact that the recipients of divinatory dreams are in most cases ordinary people or even people whose rational power is impaired; this would not be the case if divinatory dreams were indeed sent by God.[10] In opposition to supernatural accounts, Aristotle looks for a natural explanation. His analysis is based on the theoretical distinction of three possible ways in which a dream fulfilled in a future event can be related to the event fulfilling it:[11] it may be related to the future event (1) as its cause, as, for instance, fatigue is the cause of a fever, or (2) as its sign, as the roughness of the tongue is a sign of someone having a fever, or (3) the correspondence between the dream and the event may be merely a matter of coincidence, as taking a walk at the same time of a solar eclipse is neither a cause nor a sign of the eclipse, but the concomitance between the two events is only a matter of coincidence. Typical examples of case (1) are dreams bringing about their own fulfillment insofar as they suggest a certain course of action to the dreaming subject which he will adopt in the future.[12] Aristotle does not precisely clarify the logical structure of case (2), but—as is indicated by his examples and by his explicit reference to the medical science—what he seems to have in mind is the medical practice of assigning a prognostic value to dreams in the diagnosis of future diseases that was especially valued in the Hippocratic School.[13] The assumption underlying this practice is that certain dreams are caused by a physical disorder that remains otherwise unnoticed at the time of the dream and will later result in some disease. The interpretation of those dreams consists in tracing them back to the physical disturbances by which they are caused and in recognizing those disturbances as the causes of some imminent diseases. Thus, as in case (1), in case (2) too, the 'precognitive' value of the dream rests on a causal relation linking the dream to a future event: the dream can serve as a sign of a future illness because the physical disorder causing the dream is also the cause of that future illness. For Aristotle, the psycho-physical justification of this medical practice lays in the assump-

10 Aristoteles, *De divinatione per somnum*, c. 1, 462b12–26.

11 Ibid., c. 1, 462b26–463a4.

12 Ibid., c. 1, 463a21–31.

13 Ibid., c. 1, 463a4–7; cf. Van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy*, cit., pp. 192–201.

tion that slight stimulations, which remain unnoticed during the time of being awake because they are overshadowed by stronger stimuli, become noticeable during sleep, when slight stimulations are magnified due to the absence of stronger stimulations.[14] As is clear from the abovementioned discussion, the paradigmatic examples of both case (1) and (2) are situations in which the event prefigured by the dream is dependent on the dreaming subject, either because this event is an action performed by the dreaming subject or because it is some phenomenon—for instance a disease—occurring in the dreaming subject. Typical examples of case (3), in which the correspondence between the dream and the future event is only a matter of coincidence, are dreams of future events that are independent of the dreaming subject, like, for instance, distant events, such as a naval battle, or some other event taking place far away from the subject.[15] In this case, there seems to be no causal relation linking the dream to the future event so that, according to Aristotle's scheme, no precognitive value can be ascribed to the dream.

Although Aristotle maintains that the fulfillment of dreams concerning events unrelated to the dreaming subject is in most cases only a matter of coincidence, he does suggest the possibility that sometimes the correspondence between the dream and the future event is not merely coincidental, although he is very non-committal to his suggestion.[16] Aristotle introduces his explanation as a correction to Democritus' account of divination. Aristotle reports that Democritus explained divinatory dreams as the result of idols (εἴδωλα) and emanations (ἀπόρροιαι) originating from the external objects and affecting the dreaming subject. Aristotle's own explanation is close to Democritus, but he talks of movements (κινήσεις) instead of idols and emanations. His idea seems to be that such movements originating from external distant objects travel in the atmosphere reaching the dreaming subject and affecting him. As in the case of internal stimuli, Aristotle points out that, whereas those external stimuli remain largely unnoticed during waking time, they become more noticeable during sleep, since, on the one hand, they are less easily dissipated thanks to the quietness of the atmosphere during night time and, on the other hand, a

14 Aristoteles, *De divinatione per somnum*, c. 1, 463a7–21.

15 Ibid., c. 1, 463a31–b11.

16 Ibid., c. 2, 463b31–464a19. For the interpretation of this passage, cf. Aristoteles, *De insomniis, De divinatione per somnum*, pp. 306–316. For a recent discussion and different interpretation of this passage of the *De divinatione*, cf. F. Radovic, "Aristotle on Prevision through Dreams", in: *Ancient Philosophy* 36:2 [forthcoming]. I wish to thank Filip Radovic for making his paper available to me before publication.

sleeping body is more sensitive to light stimulations. The details of the explanation are not worked out by Aristotle and thus Aristotelian scholars puzzle over the precise way in which Aristotle's account could work. An authoritative interpretation advanced by Philip van der Eijk suggests that those dreams based on external stimulations should be understood according to the pattern of the dreams based on internal physical conditions. They should in fact be understood as signs of the future events they prefigure due to their being triggered by the same external factors that are also the causes of the future events. Thus, according to this interpretation, unlike dreams belonging to category (3)—cases of foresight due to coincidence—this kind of dreams would have a precognitive value because of causal relations linking them to future events.[17]

Although allowing for some kinds of precognitive dreams, Aristotle's overall attitude towards divination seems to be rather dismissive. Divination does not at all meet the criteria of the Aristotelian notion of science. As is once again stressed by Van der Eijk, it can at best provide some sort of accidental and uncontrolled 'foreseeing'. In most cases, it is just the result of coincidence. Moreover, it often occurs to people with weak or inactive intellectual powers. Finally, it is not reliable, since its correctness can be established only afterwards, when the event that was foreseen has taken place. Before this moment, due to the fact that any event is the result of a sum of circumstances, it is always possible to remain unfulfilled, since its fulfillment can be prevented by some countervailing factor.[18]

2 Albert's Doctrine of Divination

Within the Medieval Latin tradition, Aristotle's three treatises on sleep were transmitted as parts of a single text known under the general title "De somno et vigilia".[19] Albert the Great's commentary on this text, his *Liber de somno et vigilia*, consists of three books corresponding to the three Aristotelian treatises;[20] specifically, the commentary on the *De divinatione*, which is the focus of

17 Cf. Aristoteles, *De insomniis, De divinatione per somnum*, pp. 307–308; Van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy*, cit., pp. 201–202.

18 Cf. Aristoteles, *De insomniis, De divinatione per somnum*, p. 60; Van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy*, cit., p. 204.

19 Cf. P. De Leemans, "Parva naturalia, Commentaries on Aristotle's", in: H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, Dordrecht 2011, Vol. 2, pp. 917–923, especially p. 917.

20 I am currently preparing the critical edition of Albert's *Liber de somno et vigilia* within a research project of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). In the following, cita-

this contribution, corresponds to Book III of Albert's commentary. The *Liber de somno et vigilia* was probably written around 1256,[21] and thus it is one of the earliest Latin commentaries on the Aristotelian treatises on sleep, its most significant antecedent being the commentary by the English master Adam of Bocfeld, who probably in the 1240s wrote an impressive *corpus* of literal commentaries on Aristotle's *Libri naturales* and the *Metaphysics*.[22] The *Liber de somno et vigilia* is part of Albert's monumental project of a philosophical *summa*, based on the Aristotelian *corpus* and initiated around 1250 by the commentary on the *Physics*. The purpose and the method of this project are carefully described by Albert in the commentary on the *Physics*.[23] Focusing his attention on the philosophy of nature, he explains that his work in this field has two main purposes: on the one hand, it was supposed to provide a comprehensive explanation of that branch of philosophy; on the other hand, it should provide a systematic exposition of Aristotle's *Libri naturales*. The second aim is subordinated to the first, in the sense that if there was some section of the philosophy of nature not exhaustively treated by Aristotle or not covered at all by an Aristotelian treatise—so Albert—, he would feel free to fill in the gaps either by completing Aristotle's works or even by writing treatises of his own. Thus, the primary aim of Albert's enterprise is to produce what we could call an 'encyclopedia' of natural sciences. This encyclopedia will be substantially based on the Aristotelian *corpus*, insofar as it will mainly consist of commentaries on Aristotle. Yet, commenting on Aristotle will not itself be the main purpose of the project, but rather the privileged instrument used to implement the project.

The *Liber de somno et vigilia* is a perfect example of Albert's method as a commentator.[24] Book I and Book II, which deal with Aristotle's treatises *De somno*

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tions of this work will be quoted according to the provisional text prepared for the critical edition, but references to the Borgnet edition (cura ac labore Augusti Borgnet, Beati Alberti Magni … *Opera omnia*, Parisiis 1890, Vol. 9, pp. 121–207) will also be made.

21 The date of the collection of Albert's writings related to the Aristotelian corpus of the *Parva naturalia* is discussed in detail in the introduction to the volume: Alberti Magni *De nutrimento et nutrito, De sensu et sensato, De memoria et reminiscentia*, (ed. S. Donati), Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia* VII, 2a, Münster in W. 2017, pp. XXIV–XXVI.

22 On Adam of Bocfeld's literary production, cf. O. Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), Turnhout 1994, Vol. 1, pp. 24–30.

23 Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, I, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. P. Hossfeld), Alberti Magni *Opera omnia* IV,1, Münster i. W. 1987, p. 1, ll. 1–49. On Albert's project, cf. S. Donati, "Alberts des Großen Konzept der *scientiae naturales*: Zur Konstitution einer peripatetischen Enzyklopädie der Naturwissenschaften", in: L. Honnefelder (Hrsg.), *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee*, Berlin 2011, pp. 354–381, 524–538.

24 On Albert's *Liber de somno et vigilia*, cf. also S. Donati, "Albert the Great as a Commentator

et vigilia and *De insomniis*, respectively, conform to the traditional model of an Aristotelian commentary, following the structure of Aristotle's treatises in their exposition and occasionally complementing the literal exposition with digressions containing further information required for the elucidation of Aristotle's texts. However, as Albert makes clear at the beginning of Book III, this method cannot be applied in the discussion of divination, which is the topic of Aristotle's treatise *De divinatione*. Not only is there strong disagreement among philosophers, even within the Peripatetic school, on this topic. More importantly, Aristotle's treatment itself is severely inadequate, although, in Albert's opinion, it nevertheless remains the best available philosophical discussion of the subject.[25] In fact, some of the shortcomings that Albert detected within the treatise correspond to the peculiarities troubling modern interpreters, too. Because of this difficult situation, in tr. 1 of Book III Albert sets out to provide an independent treatment of the problem of divination, which will serve as an introduction to the exposition of Aristotle's text in tr. 2.

Whereas Aristotle's attitude towards divination is that of a basic skepticism, Albert belongs to a long philosophical tradition regarding the existence of prophetic experiences—not only of supernatural, but also of natural forms of prophecy—as a fact. Indeed, as we shall see in more detail in the following, Albert distinguishes between various kinds of natural experiences—among them divinatory dreams—that are conducive to the prevision of future events or, more generally, to the cognition of mysterious things. Specifically, for Albert, the existence of divinatory dreams is a fact proved by experience. His aim in the treatise is to provide a philosophical explanation of divinatory dreams

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of Aristotle's *De somno et vigilia*: The Influence of the Arabic Tradition", in: B. Bydén and F. Radovic (eds.), *The* Parva Naturalia *in Greek, Arabic, and Latin Aristotelianism: Supplementing the Science of the Soul*, Dordrecht [forthcoming].

25 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 178a: "Et hoc ipsum quod de divinatione dicit Aristoteles breve quidem est et imperfectum et habet in se plurimas dubitationes. Dico autem breve quia carens probatione, sed simplex et parum philosophiae habens videtur esse narratio, nec species somniorum neque probationem somnia aliquid significari in se continens. Imperfectum autem est quoniam, licet sine magicis et astronomicis non possit ars interpretandi somnia ab aliquo adipisci, tamen solis physicis sufficienter scitur ex qualibus et quibus simulacris consistit somnium de quo debet esse divinatio, et hoc nec ab Aristotele neque a quoquam philosophorum determinatum invenitur. Plurimas autem habet dubitationes quia et in incerto relinquit causam talium somniorum. Nec etiam eius quod dicit, quod similitudines inspiciens est iudex somniorum, determinavit modum et causam. Tamen hoc quod dicit Aristoteles plus appropinquat veritati quam aliquid quod ante vel post aliquis scripserit philosophorum cuius scripta ad nos devenerunt".

understood as a natural phenomenon, as opposed to the supernatural kind of prophetic experiences whose investigation falls into the scope of theology. More precisely, divinatory dreams so understood are regarded as a phenomenon pertaining to the world of nature, which therefore conforms to the laws of nature. Accordingly, although the interpretation of divinatory dreams belongs to the magical arts, in Albert's view, the investigation of their possibility falls into the scope of the philosophy of nature.[26] In accordance with his understanding of prophecy as a phenomenon belonging to the order of nature, Albert's account of divination is also characterized by an attitude much more positive than Aristotle's, striving to precisely define its cognitive procedures and defending the cognitive value of its prognostications. As we shall see—within the limits that are caused by the contingent nature of its object—, for Albert, the art of divination does yield valuable knowledge, due to the application of a specific methodology and the exploitation of the results of natural sciences.

Albert's doctrine of divination has repeatedly raised the attention of scholars in recent years.[27] In my contribution, I intend to address Albert's theory of divinatory dreams from the viewpoint of its relation to Aristotle, i.e., as an interpretation of Aristotle's *De divinatione* in the context of the 13th and early 14th century commentary tradition of this Aristotelian treatise.[28] Specifically, I will focus on a group of commentaries that originated at the Arts Faculties of Paris and Oxford in the years ca. 1240–1300: the commentaries of the English masters

26 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 178a. See above, note 25.

27 Among recent studies on Albert's theory of divination, cf. T. Ricklin, "Albert le Grand commentateur: L'exemple du *De somno et vigilia III, 1*", in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 45 (1998), pp. 31–55; A. Palazzo, "Philosophi aliter loquuntur de prophetia quam sancti. Alberto il Grande e la profezia naturale", in: M. Bettetini; F. Paparella; R. Furlan (eds.), *Immaginario e immaginazione nel medioevo* (Féderation Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 51), Louvain-La-Neuve 2009, pp. 179–201; A. Palazzo, "The Scientific Significance of Fate and Celestial Influences in Some Mature Works by Albert the Great: *De fato, De somno et vigilia, De intellectu et intelligibili, Mineralia*", in: A. Beccarisi; R. Imbach; P. Porro (eds.), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung* (Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi Beiheft 4), Hamburg 2008, pp. 55–78; Ch. Grellard, "La réception médiévale du *De somno et vigilia*. Approche anthropologique et épistémologique du rêve, d'Albert le Grand à Jean Buridan", in: Ch. Grellard et P.M. Morel (eds.), *Les* Parva Naturalia *d'Aristote. Fortune antique et médiévale*, Paris 2010, pp. 221–237.

28 On the 13th and early 14th century reception of Albert's interpretation, see also Grellard, "La réception", cit., pp. 232–237.

Adam of Bocfeld (1240s)[29] and Geoffrey of Aspall (late 1250s or early 1260s),[30] an anonymous Parisian commentary sometimes ascribed to Siger of Brabant (1270s),[31] the commentary of the Parisian master James of Douai (1270s),[32] an anonymous commentary possibly authored by the Parisian master Radulphus Brito (1290s),[33] and the commentaries by the English masters Simon of Faver-

29 Adam de Bocfeld, *Sententia super De somno et vigilia*, MS Oxford, Balliol College, 313, fols. 144^{vb}–157^{vb}. Note that in the following quotations of unpublished texts minor mistakes will be corrected without annotation.

30 Like his predecessor Adam of Bocfeld, Geoffrey of Aspall produced a *corpus* of commentaries on the *Libri naturales* and the *Metaphysics*. On Geoffrey of Aspall's literary production, cf. O. Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), Turnhout 1998, Vol. 3, pp. 31–35; S. Donati, "Goffredo di Aspall († 1287) e alcuni commenti anonimi ai *Libri naturales* nei mss. London, Wellcome Hist. Med. Libr., 333 e Todi, BC, 23 (*Qq. super I De gen. et corr.*, *Qq. super Phys. V, VI*)", Part 1, in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 23 (2012), pp. 245–320, especially pp. 246–257. For the text of Geoffrey's commentary, cf. S. Ebbesen, "Geoffrey of Aspall, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*. An Edition", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 83 (2014), pp. 257–341. Geoffrey's commentary on Aristotle's treatises on sleep may be more or less contemporary to or slightly later than Albert's commentary, but an influence of Albert's work is not apparent; cf. Ebbesen, "Geoffrey of Aspall, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*", cit., p. 261.

31 Anonymus, *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*, MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 9559, fols. 47ra–51^{rb}. I wish to thank Sten Ebbesen for making his reproductions of the relevant folios of this manuscript available to me. On the authorship of this anonymous commentary, cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant* (Philosophes médiévaux XXI), Louvain—Paris 1977, pp. 197–202; O. Weijers et M. Calma, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), Turnhout 2012, Vol. 9, pp, 82–83 and the bibliography mentioned there.

32 On Jacques of Douai's literary production, cf. O. Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), Turnhout 2008, Vol. 4, pp. 100–103. For the date of James' commentary, cf. S. Ebbesen, "James of Douai On Dreams", in: *Cahiers de l'Institute du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 84 (2015), pp. 22–92, which also contains the critical edition of the sections of the commentary devoted to the *De insomniis* and the *De divinatione*. I wish to thank Sten Ebbesen for making this text available to me before publication.

33 Anonymus, *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*, MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. E.1.252, fols. fols. 217^{rb}–225^{rb}. For the text of some of the questions of this commentary, cf. S. Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on Memory and Dreams. An edition", in: *Cahiers de L'Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 85 (2016), pp. 11–86. On Radulphus Brito's literary production, cf. O. Weijers et M. Calma, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres* (*ca. 1200–1500*), Turnhout 2010, Vol. 8, pp. 43–64. On this anonymous commentary and on its authorship, cf. I. Costa, *Il commento di Radulfo Brito all'Etica Nicomachea. Editione critica del testo con uno studio critico, storico e dottrinale*, diss. Università

sham (late 1270s or early 1280s)[34] and Walter Burley (1300–1306).[35] My analysis will be focused on the following aspects of Albert's doctrine: (i) its ontological presuppositions, (ii) its reconstruction of the psychological mechanism producing divinatory dreams, (iii) its explanation of the metaphoric nature of divinatory dreams, (iv) its assessment of the art of divination and of its methods, and (v) its discussion of the precognitive value of divination.

3 The Ontological Presuppositions

Although Aristotle's threefold division of dreams into causes, signs and chance concomitants is first introduced in tr. 2 within the exposition of the Aristotelian passage, it is obvious that it underlies Albert's discussion of divinatory dreams in tr. 1. Chance concomitances are set aside by Albert as irrelevant for divination. Concerning the other two categories, compared to Aristotle, Albert puts a stronger focus on the internal or external factor triggering dreams of precognitive value. Divinatory dreams are distinguished from meaningless dreams by the fact that they have a link to reality insofar as there is some real factor triggering them. Specifically, Albert's analysis is centered on divinatory dreams triggered by some external factor. Indeed, the central question, to which the entire discussion of divination contained in tr. 1 is devoted, is whether and to what extent dreams caused by factors that are external to—even distant from—the dreaming subject are possible. Accordingly, in the following discussion, we will also concentrate on this kind of dreams.

In Albert's scheme, the logical structure underlying this kind of divinatory dreams seems to be basically the same as that which we have detected in Aristotle's theory: the 'precognitive' value of such dreams is based on the fact that the external factor triggering a dream is also the cause of the future event prefigured by the dream. The causal doctrine on which Albert's theory of divination rests is well known. It is an ontological model resulting from the influence of a variety of philosophical traditions, from the Arabic and the Jewish Peripateti-

degli Studi di Salerno / Universé de Paris IV—Sorbonne 2007, pp. 158–162. I wish to thank Iacopo Costa for making his unpublished dissertation available to me.

34 Cf. S. Ebbesen, "Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*. An Edition", in: *Cahiers de L'Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 82 (2013), pp. 90–145. On the date of Simon's commentary, cf. cit., p. 90.

35 Cf. Ch. Thomsen Thörnqvist, "Walter Burley's Expositio on Aristotle's Treatises on Sleep and Dreaming. An Edition", in: *Cahiers de L'Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 83 (2014), pp. 379–515. On the date of Walter's commentary, cf. cit., p. 380.

cism to the Neoplatonic tradition of the *De causis*, and the astrological tradition transmitted by the Hermetic and the Ptolemaic *corpus*.[36] In Albert's philosophical production, it is especially addressed in two works—the commentary on the *Physics*, Book II, and the treatise *De fato*—which are chronologically close to the *Liber de somno et vigilia*, both dating back to the 1250s like the *De somno et vigilia*. In short, this doctrine maintains that the sublunary world is governed by the First Cause through the mediation of the celestial movers and of the celestial orbs.[37] The "celestial" influence, that from the stars comes to the sublunary world, is conceived as an active form unfolding in the Cosmos, reaching all layers of reality, from its highest to its lowest level, loosing progressively unity and perfection and gaining complexity and diversity due to the action of the different layers of reality through which it subsequently operates. Specifically, granted that this form is one in itself and according to its essence, there are two factors contributing to its diversification: on the one hand, the different astral conjunctions from which it results and, on the other hand, its different sublunary recipients. The different conjunctions of the stars affect the celestial form with respect to its power, producing a plurality of different powers (*virtutes*); in contrast, the sublunary recipients and their different dispositions affect it with respect to its mode of existence, i.e., the way in which it is realized in the sublunary world.[38] The celestial form is carried to the sublunary world by a physical medium, namely the light rays of the stars that reach the earth.[39] In the sublunary world, it governs all natural processes; through their bodies, it also affects human beings, not only in their natural functions, but—to a certain extent—also in their behavior, insofar as it causes that individual human beings are inclined to a certain course of action rather than another.[40] For Albert, this celestial power that reaches the sublunary world via the light rays

36 Cf. H. Anzulewicz, "*Fatum*. Das Phänomen des Schicksals und die Freiheit des Menschen nach Albertus Magnus", in: J.A. Aertsen; K. Emery; A. Speer (eds.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin—New York 2001, pp. 507–534, especially pp. 520–531; Palazzo, "The Scientific Significance", cit., and the bibliography mentioned there.

37 Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, II, tr. 2, cc. 19–21, (ed. P. Hossfeld), pp. 126–130; Albertus Magnus, *De fato*, a. 2–3, (ed. P. Simon), Alberti Magni *Opera omnia* XVII,1, Münster i. W 1975, pp. 67–72. For an outline of Albert's doctrine in the *Liber de somno et vigilia*, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, cc. 9, 11, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 189b–190b, 193a–194b.

38 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De fato*, a. 2, p. 68, l. 31–p. 69, l. 43.

39 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 9, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 189b–190a.

40 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 8, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 188b–189a.

coming from the stars and affects individual sublunary events as a remote cause is the external trigger for divinatory dreams insofar as it also affects human beings. Accordingly, the prognostic value of divinatory dreams lies in the fact that the same factor, the celestial form, is the external trigger for a divinatory dream and the cause of the future event prefigured by the dream.

Albert discusses his view against a number of ancient and medieval philosophers. Particularly significant for our purpose is his discussion of the Peripatetic Arabic and Jewish tradition, among whose representatives he mentions Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes and Isaac Israeli.[41] According to Albert, in their defense of the possibility of divinatory dreams, all of those philosophers agree in appealing to an immediate action of the intelligences on human imagination as the cause of divinatory dreams—a theory that, in his understanding, is close to both the popular and the philosophic view that divinatory dreams are sent to human beings by God. Albert's basic objection against this theory positing a sort of non-physical action of the intelligences on human imagination is that it violates the principles of natural philosophy, according to which the celestial movers act on the sublunary world only through the mediation of the celestial bodies. It is worth noting that those Arabic and Jewish philosophers probably felt legitimated in their view because the idea that divinatory dreams are sent to human beings by the First Cause through the mediation of the separate agent intellect was contained in the Arabic version of the *Parva naturalia*, a text which was not a translation but an adaptation of the Greek original.[42] Albert, however, did not know the Arabic text of the *Parva naturalia*. Judging from the vantage point of the Greek-Latin translation,[43] he correctly

41 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, cc. 6–8, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 184b–189a.

42 Cf. R. Hansberger, "*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*. Aristotle's *Parva naturalia* in Arabic Guise", in: Ch. Grellard et P.M. Morel (eds.), *Les* Parva Naturalia *d'Aristote. Fortune antique et médiévale*, Paris 2010, pp. 143–162; Ead., "How Aristotle Came to Believe in God-given Dreams: The Arabic Version of the *De divinatione per somnum*", in: L. Marlow (ed.), *Dreaming across Boundaries: The Interpretation of Dreams in Islamic Lands*, Boston, Mass. 2008, pp. 50–77.

43 As far as we know, Albert knew Aristotle's treatises on sleep via the Greek-Latin translation labelled "Translatio vetus", an anonymous translation compiled in the 12th century. The *Translatio vetus* belonged to the so-called *Corpus vetustius*, a collection of Latin translations of the *Libri naturales* and the *Metaphysics* that, with some possible later exceptions, were produced in the 12th century. Cf. De Leemans, "Parva naturalia, Commentaries on Aristotle's", cit., p. 918; P. De Leemans, "*Secundum viam naturae et doctrinae*. Lire le *De motu animalium* et les *Parva naturalia* d'Aristote au Moyen Âge", in: Ch. Grellard et P.M. Morel

perceived the interpretation of those philosophers as grossly misunderstanding Aristotle's authentic thought on divination. Moreover, that Albert was able to find support in passages of the Aristotelian *corpus* concerning the claim that the processes of the sublunary world are subjected to the influence of the stars, has been repeatedly pointed out by scholars.[44] More interesting with reference to our present purpose, however, is that Albert also seems to read Aristotle's *De divinatione* as an endorsement of his theory of the astral influences as the external triggers for divinatory dreams. The piece of evidence on which Albert's interpretation rests, is the passage of the *De divinatione* mentioned above, in which Aristotle addresses Democritus' appeals to 'idols' and 'emanations' as the source of divinatory dreams:

> As for dreams that do not contain causes of the kind we have described, but outlandish ones, either in time or place or magnitude, or in none of those ways, but where those experiencing the dreams still have no causal initiatives within themselves, the following account (unless the prevision is due to coincidence) would seem preferable to that of Democritus, who attributes it to images and emanations. When something has moved a portion of water or air, and this in turn has moved another, then even when the initial impulse has ceased, it results in a similar sort of movement continuing up to a certain point, although the original mover is not present. In this way it is possible that some sort of movement and perception reaches the soul of dreamers, coming from the objects whence Democritus derives his images and emanations.[45]

(eds.), *Les* Parva Naturalia *d'Aristote. Fortune antique et médiévale*, Paris 2010, pp. 197–220, especially p. 201.

44 Cf. Palazzo, "The Scientific Significance", cit., p. 61; Grellard, "La réception médiévale", cit., p. 230.

45 Aristoteles, *De divinatione per somnum*, c. 2, 463b31–464a11; English translation from: *Aristotle on Sleep and Dreams*, A Text and Translation with Introduction, Notes and Glossary, by D. Gallop, Warminster 1991, p. 113. For the Latin text of this passage (*Translatio vetus*), cf. Aristotelis *De insomniis et De divinatione per somnum* (Philosophia antiqua 2), A New Edition of the Greek Text with the Latin Translations, (ed. H.J. Drossaart Lulofs), Leiden 1947, p. 42, ll. 1–8: "De hiis vero sompniis que *non huiusmodi habent origines, set* dissolutiones *vel temporibus vel locis vel magnitudinibus, vel horum quidem nichil,* dum nequaquam *in se ipsis* habent *principium qui vident sompnium, nisi previsio fiat ab accidente,* huiusmodi *utique* fit *magis* vel *ut dicit Democritus ydola et defluxiones* qui causas ponit. *Quemadmodum enim cum quid* moverit *aquam vel aerem, hoc aliud movit, et quiescente illo accidit huiusmodi motum prodire usque ad aliquid, illo quod movit non presente, sic nichil prohibet*

As shown above, in this passage, following Democritus, Aristotle suggests the possibility that some divinatory dreams can be traced back to external stimuli—'motions' in Aristotle's vocabulary—reaching the dreaming subject from external objects. Obviously, there is no idea of 'astral' influences in Aristotle's text; indeed, what Aristotle has in mind are effects produced by just ordinary sublunary things. In Albert's interpretation, however, Aristotle's mention of Democritus provides the link to the doctrine of the astral influences. Albert reads this passage in the light of Aristotle's criticism of previous theories of light in *De anima* II, 7. There (418b13–16), Aristotle criticizes some of his predecessors for describing light as an effluence from a body and thus as a corporeal entity. Although modern commentators read Aristotle's remark as an allusion to Empedocles' doctrine of light,[46] in his commentary on the *De anima*,[47] Albert understands it as a reference to Democritus, who is mentioned by Aristotle later on in the chapter.[48] In Albert's reading, it is an atomistic doctrine of light as an emanation of infinitely small bodies from the stars that Aristotle is rejecting here. The keystone of his interpretation of the passage from the *De divinatione* is the couple of related terms ἀπορροή and ἀπόρροιαι—in the Latin translation 'defluxus' and 'defluxiones'—, which can be found in the text of the *De divinatione* and in the parallel passage of the *De anima*. For Albert, this terminological similarity is an indication that, in the two passages, Aristotle is talking about the same thing, namely the light rays coming to the sublunary world from the stars. Given that in his doctrine the light rays are the physical medium carrying the astral influence from the stars to the sublunary

motum aliquem et sensum propinquare *ad animas sompniantes, a quibus ille ydola facit et defluxiones*".

46 Cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, Edited with Introduction and Commentary by D. Ross, Oxford 1961, p. 243.

47 Albertus Magnus, *De anima*, II, tr. 3, c. 3, (ed. C. Stroick), Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia* VII,1, Münster i. W. 1968, p. 111, ll. 13–58: "Oportet autem subtilius intrare ad inquirendum de lumine et accipere sententias, quaecumque dictae sunt de ipso, ut verius sciatur natura eius. Sententiae autem de lumine valde differentes et multae sunt et reducuntur ad quinque. Quarum una antiqui Democriti fuit, qui de omnibus curam habuit; qui dixit lumen esse corpus pervium, quod defluit continue a corpore luminoso. […] Illi autem qui lumen corpus esse dixerunt, in duas sectas se diviserunt. Democriti enim schola tenuit, quod lumen esset corpora minutissima, quae continue defluunt a corpore luminoso in corpora transparentia, et coniuncta ubique partibus eorum illuminant ea et cadentia super corpora terminata faciunt colores eorum diversos. […] E contra autem dixit Aristoteles in secundo De anima, quod nec ignis est nec omnino corpus nec defluxus aliquis corporis, eo quod defluens a corpore est corpus […]".

48 Aristoteles, *De anima*, II, c. 7, 419a15.

world, for him, Aristotle's reference to emanations as the causes of divinatory dreams is an indirect allusion to the astral origin of divinatory dreams. In conclusion, according to Albert, the doctrine ascribed to Democritus in the passage of the *De divinatione* is a theory which suggests that divinatory dreams are triggered by the stars exerting their influence on the sublunary world through the light rays that reach the earth from the celestial spheres. This view is basically shared by Aristotle, the only point of disagreement being Democritus' corpuscular theory of light:

> De his vero somniis quae non huiusmodi quales diximus habent origines quae sint in somniante per modum causae vel signi primitus, sed potius sunt dilationes sive distantiae magnae temporum vel locorum inter somniantem et eventum somniorum aut etiam, si nulla sit distantia inter somniantem et rem somnii, sed tamen hoc sit certum, quod somnium primam originem non habet in somniante sed extra ipsum, aliter omnino dicendum est. Haec enim somnia non sunt in somniante secundum causam quae sit in corpore vel in anima, nisi forte dicatur fieri per accidens, ut diximus superius de casuali incursu. Sed non potest dici hoc de somniis quae vere et secundum artem divinationem habent, ut diximus superius. Huiusmodi igitur somnia magis dicenda sunt fieri velut dicit Democritus, qui defluxiones a caelestibus factas et idola defluentia causas dicit et facit esse talium somniorum. Sed nos in hoc differimus a Democrito, quod ipse dixit defluxiones esse corpora parva atomalia quae fluunt a corporibus luminosis et lux vocantur et per poros intrant in corpora somniantium et sunt pars animae in eis, et tunc somnianti apparent idola quae in talibus lucibus defluxerunt. Sed nos istam opinionem alibi improbavimus, sed in hoc convenimus cum eo, quod dicimus formam cum lumine defluere et corpora tangere et afficere et ea fortiter movere, cum non alia passione detinentur, et hunc motum animam tangere, eo quod omnis motus qui in corpore fit pervenit ad animam, et tunc parat anima imaginationes, et forte aliquando intelligentias, quibus est explicabilis in re talis forma per modum quem supra digessimus.[49]

Obviously, Albert's interpretation of the Democritus passage is based on a misunderstanding. However, his reading is historically important, since by means

49 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 2, c. 6, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 203a–b. Since the above-mentioned text is included in the paraphrasis of Aristotle's passage, in which Albert rephrases it in his own words, it seems correct to include Aristotle under the pronoun "we".

of this piece of 'creative' interpretation he is able to put the doctrine of the astral origin of divinatory dreams directly under the aegis of Aristotle. Thus, in his interpretation, unlike most ancient and medieval philosophers who explained divinatory dreams by appealing to some immediate, non-physical action of the intelligences or of God, Aristotle correctly identifies the immediate physical cause of such dreams, namely the astral influence carried to the sublunary world by the light rays. His interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine on this point is probably the reason for his positive assessment of Aristotle's analysis as the best philosophical explanation of divination available. Albert seems to be the first Medieval Latin commentator of the *De divinatione* to have read the Democritus passage in the light of the doctrine of the 'astral' influence on the sublunary world. We may compare Albert's interpretation of the passage with that of an earlier Latin commentator, the English master Adam of Bocfeld. In Adam's exposition, we find no trace of the idea of an 'astral' influence affecting the dreaming activity of human beings. On Adam's—basically correct—reading, all that Aristotle is talking about in the passage are images originating from distant sublunary objects.[50] For him, Aristotle's aim is to provide a confirmation for his own view, namely that some dreams concerning remote objects are not related to those objects in a merely accidental way, but as signs of those distant objects insofar as they are produced by images originating from them. Thus, in the passage, Aristotle appeals to Democritus' similar doctrine as a supporting authority:

> Consequenter, cum dicit: "De hiis vero somniis", removet tertiam dubitationem, quae sic potest introduci: quia determinatum est in parte praecedente quod somnia quae sunt de rebus a somniantibus loco et tempore distantibus dicuntur somnia quae sunt accidentia et non causae vel signa, ex hoc posset aliquis putare quod universaliter omnia somnia quae sunt de rebus sic distantibus sunt accidentia eventuum et nulla huiusmodi causae vel signa. Hoc intendit removere declarans quod quaedam huiusmodi somnia sunt per defluctionem idolorum rerum a somniante distantium usque ad animam dormientis, ad quae idola convertens se anima,

50 To explain the way in which those 'idols' travel in the atmosphere, Adam appeals to several different models of transmission, i.e., the transmission of smells, light rays and sounds; cf. Adam de Bocfeld, *Sententia super De sensu et sensato*, MS Oxford, Balliol College, 313, fol. 157ra: "De praedicta tamen idolorum defluxione mirum est quomodo fiat; licet enim possibile sit, ut videtur secundum Commentatorem in praedicto exemplo de odore, de modo tamen eiusdem dubium est […]".

> somniat de rebus quarum sunt idola, quae quidem somnia non sunt accidentia eventuum nec immissiones a Deo factae, sed sunt vera signa eventuum in rebus a somniantibus valde distantibus […]. Et sunt huiusmodi somnia signa eventuum et non accidentia quae, ut dicit Democritus, a praedictis idolorum defluxibus sunt causata. Et in hoc confirmat intentionem suam auctoritate Democriti.[51]

No allusion to the idea of 'astral' influences as the trigger for divinatory dreams can be found in the commentary by Geoffrey of Aspall. Like Adam, Geoffrey understands the 'idols' mentioned by Aristotle in the Democritus passage as ordinary perceptual stimulations—in medieval technical terminology 'sensible species'—originating from the external sublunary objects and affecting the dreaming subject.[52] The picture changes completely, however, in the late 13th and in early 14th century commentary tradition. The influence of Albert's 'astrological' reading of Aristotle's theory of divination on 14th century commentators—notably on John of Jandun and John Buridan—has already been noticed by scholars.[53] The investigation of the 13th century tradition furthermore shows that Albert's reading became the standard interpretation from the 1270s onwards.[54] It is adopted, for instance, in an anonymous commentary sometimes ascribed to Siger of Brabant (1270s?),[55] in the commentaries

51 Adam de Bocfeld, *Sententia super De somno et vigilia*, MS Oxford, Balliol College, 313, fol. 156$^{va–b}$.

52 Cf. Ebbesen, "Geoffrey of Aspall, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*", cit., pp. 338–340: "Consequenter quaeritur de fluxibus idolorum, et est dubitatio, cum de nocte non sit medium illuminatum, qualiter potest color multiplicare suam speciem sine luce educente ipsam de potentia ad actum […]".

53 Cf. Grellard, "La réception médiévale", cit., pp. 232–237.

54 Possible traces of Albert's "astrological" interpretation are also to be found in Boethius of Dacia's treatise *De somniis*. However, unlike Albert, Boethius seems to trace back to the influence of the celestial bodies only dreams that have their immediate origine in some physical disposition of the dreaming subject. Cf. Boethii Daci *De somniis*, (ed. N.G. Pedersen), Boethii Daci *Opera*, Vol. 6,2, Hauniae 1976, pp. 381–391, especially p. 386, l. 130–p. 387, l. 158. On the epistemological implications of Boethius' interpretation, cf. Grellard, "La réception médiévale", cit., pp. 235–237.

55 Cf. Anonymus, *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*, MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 9559, fol. 50$^{va–b}$: "Quaeritur utrum scientia de divinatione sit scientia immissa a Deo necne […]. Quaedam autem [*sc.* somnia] fiunt in nobis ex influentia caelesti, non ita quod immediate intelligentia aliqua influat nobis similitudinem alicuius effectus futuri, sed mediante aliquo vehiculo corporali, ut lumine vel aliquo tali […]".

by James of Douai (1270s)[56] and Simon of Faversham (1280s),[57] in an anonymous commentary possibly authored by the Parisian master Radulphus Brito (1290s),[58] and in the commentary by Walter Burley (around 1300).[59] The commentary by the Parisian master James of Douai is particularly interesting in this respect, since he not only derives the general view of the 'astral' origin of divinatory dreams from Albert, but also, more specifically, the 'astrologic' reading of the Democritus passage:

> Consequenter cum dicit ⟨2.463b31⟩ *De hiis vero* determinat de somniis quae non accipiunt originem ex nobis [...]. Primo dicit quod de huiusmodi somniis quae non habent origines ex nobis sed causantur a rebus habentibus dilationes, i.e. distantias, a nobis, et hoc vel temporibus vel locis vel magnitudinibus, sicut somnia de bello Troiano aut de hiis quae fiunt in principio orientis; vel dato quod non causetur ab aliquo sic distante, a nobis, dummodo somnium non habet originem ex somniante, tale, inquam, somnium erit consimiliter vel magis quam dicit Democritus, i.e. faciens causam somniorum defluxiones et idola progredientia a corpore caeli. Propter quod est intelligendum quod Democritus sic posuit fieri somnia ex nobis originem non accipientia, dixit enim quod a corpore luminoso egrediebantur quaedam corpora parva, sicut a corpore caeli,

56 Cf. "Utrum divinatio futurorum per somnia sit possibilis", "Utrum influentia caelestis possit imprimi in anima nostra", in: Ebbesen, "James of Douai on Dreams", cit., pp. 86–88, 91–92.

57 Cf. S. Ebbesen, "Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*", cit., p. 143: "Aliquando autem somnia accipiunt originem a corporibus superioribus, corpora enim superiora influunt virtutem in corpora et partes corporis et virtutes assignatas organis corporeis; phantasia autem non ligata format quaedam idola convenientia influentiae corporis caelestis, et ipsa formata mittit ad sensum communem, quia ibi accidit ista passio quae dicitur somnium, et ibi alterato organo sensus communis ex tali alteratione apparent ipsi animae similitudines effectuum futurorum [per istas similitudines effectuum futurorum]. Per istas autem similitudines contingit multotiens quod homo prognosticet de multis quae accidunt, unde ex dispositione corporum caelestium prognosticat aliquis de fertilitate terrae et de bellis".

58 Cf. Anonymus, *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*, MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. E.1.252, fols. 224va–225^{rb}; Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on Memory", cit., pp. 71–80: "Utrum somnia per quae contingit divinare immittantur a Deo"; "Consequenter quaeritur, quia Philosophus dicit quod quaedam sunt somnia quae non habent originem a nobis sed a corpore caelesti, utrum corpus caeleste possit agere in animam humanam".

59 Cf. Ch. Thomsen Thörnqvist, "Walter Burley's *Expositio*", cit., p. 509, ll. 6–14.

et deferebantur usque ad corpus dormientis, et in corpore dormientis intrabant per poros corporis, et ulterius deferebantur usque ad imaginationem, et tunc imaginatio format sibi idolum similius illi influentiae quam potest, et dicebat fieri somnium. Sed ista non est sententia Aristotelis, sed est sibi similis […].[60]

4 The Psychological Explanation

As mentioned above, Aristotle's account of divination devotes little attention to the psychic processes that produce divinatory dreams, confining himself to the remark that during sleep we become aware of slight internal and external stimuli that remain unnoticed during waking time due to stronger stimulations by which we are affected. The lack of a detailed psychological analysis is also one of the shortcomings perceived by Albert in Aristotle's treatment of the topic and he devotes considerable time to filling in this gap by explaining the psychic mechanism that produces divinatory dreams. In discussing Albert's analysis, we should preliminarily recall that Albert allows for a wide range of natural experiences conducive to the prevision of future events, notably—besides divinatory dreams—also visions and prophecies; moreover, in his view, even the description 'divinatory dream' does not refer to a single phenomenon, but to a variety of related phenomena. These different kinds of experiences—divinatory dreams, visions and prophecies—are ordered according to a *scala* characterized by an increasing involvement of the intellective power and an increasing degree of clarity.[61] Albert finds some evidence for his view in Aristotle, who, in the *De insomniis*, mentions some kind of experiences occurring during sleep that involve some degree of intellectual awareness.[62] In Albert's opinion, however, Aristotle devotes little attention to the issue altogether, failing to

60 Quoted from Ebbesen, "James of Douai on Dreams", cit., p. 82.

61 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 10, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 190b–193a.

62 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 3, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 180b: "Revocetur igitur ad memoriam quod supra diximus, scilicet in aliquibus somniis esse veras intelligentias praeter ipsa phantasmata, et haec secundum Aristotelis doctrinam diximus non proprie somnia vocari"; ibid., c. 10, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 192a–b: "Septimus autem gradus est quando adhuc in somno vere et expresse apparent intelligentiae sine simulacris, et tale videtur fuisse somnium Scipionis de colentibus iustitiam quod ad aethereas sedes recipiantur. Causa autem talis somnii est fulgor intellectus agentis et splendor, qui sua radiatione ad se totam trahit animam et avertit ab imaginum motu. Intentio enim animae, quando tota fertur ad intellectum et excellenter est in ipso, abstrahitur a consideratione sensibilium in vigilia et a perceptione imaginum in somno; talis autem in som-

provide a precise classification of the different kinds of divinatory dreams[63] and confining himself to the discussion of the lowest form of divination. Since the focus of our inquiry is on Albert's interpretation of Aristotle's treatise, we will also concentrate on Albert's account of this basic form of divination in the following discussion.

Aristotelian scholars have detected some tensions between Aristotle's treatment of divinatory dreams in the *De divinatione* and his general account of dreams in the *De insomniis*. Whereas, according to the general doctrine of the *De insomniis*, the material of dreams consists of remnants of past perceptions stored in the sense organs, Aristotle's discussion of divination in the *De divinatione* seems to imply that divinatory dreams originate from affections occurring in the dreaming subject precisely at the time of the dream.[64] Indeed, although the word φαντάσματα occurs in the treatise once,[65] there is no reference to the power of imagination (φανταστικόν) as the source of the perceptual appearances constituting divinatory dreams. In contrast, Albert seems to aim at a unified account of dreams, covering not only the case of ordinary, meaningless dreams, but also the special case of divinatory dreams. Accordingly, in the opening chapter of his exposition of Aristotle's treatise *De insomniis*, at the end of a brief outline of the Peripatetic doctrine of dreams, he stresses the general character of his account, universally applying to all kinds of dreams.[66] Although not all the details of Albert's account are clear, there are indeed two general features that, in Albert's view, seem to be shared by ordinary and div-

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nio frequenter optimas invenit intelligentias et demonstrationes quas in vigilia invenire non poterat, dum exterioribus sensibilibus vel imaginabilibus detinebatur […]. Scias autem quod etiam in hoc gradu forma movens venit a corpore, sed potentior intellectus animae talis qualem diximus superius esse sapientis animam nimia luce intellectus ex forma concipit veras intelligentias. Et hoc est quod dixit Aristoteles, quod in somnis aliquando sunt verae intelligentiae, et huc usque et non ultra procedit visio somnialis". For the corresponding passage, cf. Aristoteles, *De insomniis*, c. 1, 458b15–25; Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, II, tr. 1, c. 2, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 160a–b.

63 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 178a; above, note 25.

64 Cf. Aristoteles, *De insomniis*, *De divinatione per somnum*, pp. 317–318.

65 Aristoteles, *De divinatione per somnum*, c. 2, 464b9.

66 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, II, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 159a–b: "Hoc igitur est quod volumus praemittere, ut sequentium facilior sit intellectus. Sunt autem multa genera somniorum, de quibus omnibus in sequentibus ostendemus diversitatem et causam. Sed ⟨haec⟩ communiter de esse somniorum in omnibus generibus somniorum vera sunt et secundum Peripateticos, Averroem et Alfarabium et Abhamidin, philosophos dicta".

inatory dreams. (i) Since the special senses are not active during sleep, the perceptual appearances that dreams consist of do not result from actual perceptions of external objects affecting the sense organs at the time of the dream, but are supplied by the imagination.[67] (ii) Dreaming is not merely the work of the imagination, but also the sensitive power is affected. However, given that the special senses are deactivated, what is affected in the dreaming process is the common sense. In particular, the images supplied by imagination are transported towards the organ of the common sense and there, i.e., in the place where the nerves coming from the organs of the special senses meet, they affect the sensitive power, thus completing the psychic process resulting in a dream.[68] In analyzing Albert's reconstruction, we should recall that the Arabic doctrine of the interior senses—a doctrine elaborated by Arabic thinkers as a systematization of Aristotle's scattered remarks on the interior powers of the sensitive soul[69]—is a constitutive element of Albert's reception of Aristotelian psychology, also underlying his doctrine of dreams. Especially significant for the present purpose is Avicenna's distinction of a double power corresponding to Aristotle's imagination, i.e., a receptive power storing images derived from sense perceptions—in Avicenna's terminology the "imagination" (*ḫayāl*; imaginatio)—and a more active power—in Avicenna's terminology the "imag-

67 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, II, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 159a: "Dicamus igitur [...] quod motus somnii est ex imaginatione, quam quidam phantasiam vocant".

68 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, II, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 158a–159a: "[...]. Homo in somno sensibiliter et non imaginabiliter tantum afficitur. Sensibilis autem affectio nullatenus potest fieri nisi patiente organo sensus aliquid a sensibilibus formis. Cuius enim est potentia, eiusdem est et actus, ut in praecedenti libro habitum est; potentia autem sensibiliter afficiendi non est nisi sensus; et ideo oportet quod, cum actualiter sic afficitur, quod haec affectio sit aliqualiter in organis sensuum [...]. Sed si velimus scire ubi sit terminus motus huius, revocemus ad memoriam praedicta ubi diximus quod affectio sensibilis necessario est in organis sensuum. Cum autem organa sensuum secundum suas divisiones clausa sint, oportet necessario quod, si aliquid recipiunt, quod sit in loco ubi magis appropinquant ad calidum vaporem interius, quia, quanto vapor somni ad exteriora fluit, tanto magis infrigidatur; interius autem, licet frigidus sit, tamen non adeo frigidus est quin plus habeat de caliditate quae est a principio quod elevat ipsum quam in loco ubi plus distat ab illo eodem principio. Ex hoc igitur relinquitur quod nervi sensibiles in concavitatibus suis spiritum sensibilem habentes, in loco ubi conveniunt ad organa sensus communis directum ad cor per conlimitationem quam habet cum illo, afficiuntur sensibilibus formis provenientibus a thesauro imaginationis in vapore spirituali, quem elevat principium caloris".

69 On this theory, cf. E.R. Harvey, *The Inward Wits. Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance* (Warburg Institute Surveys 6), London, 1975.

inative faculty" (*qūwa mutaḫayyila*; virtus imaginativa)—, to which that which we understand as the act of imagination properly belongs. Avicenna describes this activity as combining and separating images or images and intentions, i.e., connotational attributes that exist in sensible objects, but are not grasped by the external senses, such as, for instance, 'agreeable' or 'harmful'. For Avicenna, the power involved in prophetic activity is the imaginative faculty.[70] Avicenna's distinction of the two kinds of 'imagination' underlies Albert's general account of the dreaming process: while the starting point of that process are perceptual data stored in the imagination, it also seems to involve the activity of a higher power, namely the imaginative power, performing more complex operations on those mental representations.[71] Both factors also seem to be involved in the production of that particular kind of dreams that are divinatory dreams. Specifically, although Albert especially emphasizes the active role of the imaginative power that supplies mental representations and operates on them, it seems safe to assume that the ultimate source of the process are sensible data stored in the imagination.

There is, however, a point which essentially distinguishes the process resulting in divinatory dreams from the process producing ordinary, meaningless dreams. Whereas the latter is a spontaneous process, as stressed above, the former is the reaction to some real stimulation. Specifically, in the case under consideration, i.e., the case of divinatory dreams caused by factors that are external to the dreaming subject, the dream is a reaction to an external stimulation, the celestial form reaching the dreaming subject via the light rays. In analyzing the psychic process resulting in divinatory dreams, Albert is well aware of the theoretical difficulties involved in the notion of an affection originating from an external factor. In his view, the possibility that the celestial form triggering divinatory dreams affects the dreaming subject via the external senses is ruled out not only by the fact that the external senses are not active during sleep, but also by the fact that such a form, being completely devoid of perceptible features, is altogether imperceptible.[72] Albert's solution draws on the notion that the

70 On Avicenna's distinction between those two powers and its relevance for his doctrine of prophecy, cf. D. Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West* (Warburg Institute Studies and Texts 1), London—Turin 2000, pp. 157–160.

71 Albertus Mangus, *De somno et vigilia*, II, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 158b–159a. Some discrepancies between Albert's technical terminology and that used in Avicenna's Latin translation as well as a certain inconsistency on Albert's side sometimes make the interpretation of his position uncertain.

72 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 4, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 182a–b: "[…]. Dicendum quod influentia illa […] communis est valde et indeterminata et habet deter-

celestial form does not affect the dreaming subject as an object of perception, but as a mover first acting on the body and, through the body, also influencing the vegetative and the sensitive soul. In the normal course of events, when the soul's attention is distracted by stronger stimulations, this external influence affecting the soul's activity remains hidden. However, when the action of distracting factors subsides, like during sleep, for instance, the soul becomes aware of an influence of this kind, which then acts on the soul in a perceptible way (*perceptibiliter*). The perceptual appearances supplied by the imagination in the form of a dream are one of the ways in which that celestial influence manifests itself in the soul.

> […] Ex quo [*sc.* illa influentia] effluit in lumen caeleste et elementa, motiva est corporis et animae vegetabilis et sensibilis; motus autem talis non efficitur in anima sensibili et corpore secundum potestatem primi influentis, sed potius secundum potestatem recipientis animae sensibilis et corporis, et ideo illa forma sic afficiens animam sensibilem est ei loco passionis inclinantis ad hoc quod movet. Cum autem anima sic informata et affecta est, tunc ipsa per imaginativam parat et fingit simulacra quibus hoc repraesentetur […] per omnem eundem modum quo timens imaginatur terribilia et quo amans concupiscibilia somnia et esuriens simulacra ciborum. Forma enim ex influentia superiorum afficiens, agit in animam perceptibiliter quando anima vacat a tumultu sensuum et est quietum medium per quod venit ad animam quam tangit, et tunc facit in ea quod solent facere prius inductae passiones.[73]

As is clear from the preceding passage, Albert's explanation rests on the similarity between the action of the celestial form and that of interior factors—such as passions and emotions—that influence the soul, causing that it is inclined to a certain course of action rather than another. The implicit assumption underlying Albert's argument is the notion that, when stimulated, imagination reacts by conjuring perceptual representations that, in some way, correspond to the stimulus affecting it. Hence, as in the case of ordinary emotions affecting the soul as a principle of action, imagination answers to the stimulation by conjuring appropriate representations—in the case of fear, for instance, images of

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minari a particularibus per naturam particularem vel ex proposito, et ideo illa in se non habet figuram neque colorem neque quantitatem […]. Licet enim non sit figurabilis nec qualitatem sensibilem habens […]".

73 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 4, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 182b.

frightening things, in the case of love, in contrast, images of lovely things. Similarly, it reacts to the celestial form, affecting the soul as a sign or as a cause of future events by conjuring appropriate representations. On the one hand—in Albert's terminology—the imagination "looks for" representations corresponding to the celestial form, as it always does when it is affected by some stimulus; on the other hand, the celestial form affecting the soul uses the imaginative power as an instrument to manifest itself as it also uses the other bodily and psychic powers:

> Similiter igitur per omnia videtur dicendum quod formae caelitus evectae ad nos corpora nostra tangentes fortissime movent et suas imprimunt virtutes, licet non sentiantur propter exteriorem tumultum, et ideo, quando alienatio fit a sensibus, quocumque modo id fiat, tunc percipiuntur motus eius sicut patiens percipit motus passionis, licet non moveat ut passio sed potius ut signum et quaedam causa futurorum. Anima autem imaginativa, ad quam pervenit motus huiusmodi formae, recipit motum secundum modum possibilem sibi, et hoc est ad formas imaginationis. Quaerit igitur formas simulacrorum quibus explicabitur talis forma sicut quaerit formas quibus explicatur amor venereorum in eo qui a tali detinetur concupiscentia. Ad praeparationem talium imaginum inclinat forma caelestis iniacens somnianti et movens eum et facit vires corporis et animae sibi instrumentaliter deservire sicut facit in materia quam movet ad alterationem et generationern, sicut diximus superius. Et ideo talibus instrumentis multiplicantur ei multa simulacra, sicut in materia multiplicantur ei multa agentia sub ipsa. Et exinde est quod tunc fit somnium factorum multorum et dictorum in quibus demonstratur talis formae explicatio.[74]

Albert's idea of the imagination as a device which reacts to stimulation by providing appropriate representations is widely accepted in the later tradition.[75]

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74 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 9, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 190a–b.

75 Cf. Ebbesen, "Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*", cit., pp. 142–143; Anonymus, *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*, MS Firenze, Bibl. Naz. Centr., E. 1. 252, fol. 224^{vb}; Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on Memory", cit., p. 75: "[…]. Et illa phantasia sic mota virtute corporis caelestis format phantasma simile illi effectui cuius causa est motus corporis caelestis, et istud phantasma mittitur ad sensum communem, et tunc homo incipit somniare, et sic fiunt somnia de futuris"; Ch. Thornqvist, "Walter Burley's *Expositio*", cit., p. 508, l. 1–p. 509, l. 14; for the commentary by James of Douai, cf. the passage quoted below. A similar idea is also introduced in Boethius of Dacia's treatise *De somniis*, p. 386, ll. 133–145: "Ex qua cum in corpore dormientis fit calefactio magna vel modica […]

Once again, the commentary by James of Douai stands out for its closeness to Albert's, emphasizing the similarity between the action of the celestial form and that of emotional states and psychic affections on the imagination:

> Vult enim Philosophus quod habitudo et influentia caelestis defertur usque ad corpus somniantis per lumen aut per aliquod vehiculum corporeum, et ipsum alterat, et ipsum corpus alteratum ulterius alterat phantasiam, phantasia autem sic excitata ex aliquo motu existente in ipsa virtute influentiae format sibi aliquod phantasma similius influentiae quam potest, quo facto defertur ad sensum communem et fit somnium per quod contingit divinare futura. Et illud est rationabile, nam cum aliquis est in passione et tunc somniat, ⟨***⟩ et eodem modo rationabile est quod aliquis sic immutatur ab influentia quod formet idolum sibi consimile illi influentiae, et adhuc rationabilius quanto illa influentia est maioris virtutis quam passio, et istum modum declarat Philosophus, quia sicut cum aliquis movit aerem aut aquam et hoc, sc. aer vel aqua mota movet aliud, et quiescente illo quod primo movit contingit huiusmodi motum prodire sive procedere usque ad aliquid distans et non praesente etiam illo quod primo movit; sic etiam nihil prohibet aliquem motum et sensum, i.e. idolum potens immutare sensum et defluxiones ab ipso caelo procedere usque ad animas somniantes, a quibus motibus et defluxionibus ipsa anima somniantis facit idola quae sunt principium somniorum per quae divinantur futura.[76]

5 The Metaphorical Character of Divinatory Dreams

In his explanation of the origin of divinatory dreams, Albert's starting point is Aristotle's claim that the soul becomes more receptive to slight stimulations during sleep because of the absence of stronger stimulations. However, in Albert's reading, Aristotle's claim acquires an ethical connotation that is far from its originally purely psychological dimension. Albert understands Aristotle's empirical observation in the light of an ascetic attitude requiring a process

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quam cum percipit virtus imaginativa, format idolum conveniens illi passioni, et somniat dormiens se ambulare per ignem […]. Hoc enim est de ratione virtutis imaginativae, scilicet formare idolum ad imitationem et similitudinem rei, cuius motum percipit, propter quod et imaginativa dicta est".

76 Quoted from Ebbesen, "James of Douai on Dreams", cit., pp. 82–83.

of spiritual purification as a necessary condition for divination:[77] in his understanding, the ability to grasp the signs coming from the stars particularly manifests itself in people capable of controlling the demands of their sensuality and distancing themselves from worldly concerns. Moreover, Albert's theory of divination is characterized by a decidedly intellectualistic connotation, which obviously conflicts with Aristotle's assumption that specifically people with weak intellective powers are receptive to divinatory dreams. As has already been mentioned, Albert distinguishes a variety of prophetic experiences characterized by an increasing involvement of the intellective power. In his view, however, a certain degree of intellectual activity is required even for the lowest form of divination, which is represented by divinatory dreams. In fact, divinatory dreams belong to the imagination only insofar as it operates under the control of the intellective power, which enables it to integrate the images it evokes into a narrative order; therefore, while other animal species merely participate in dreaming activity, only human beings can perform divinations.[78]

While spiritual purity and strength of mind are appropriate conditions for divination, the opposite conditions obviously have a disturbing influence on divination: physical affections and emotional conditions have distorting effects on perceptual appearances supplied by imagination, impairing their clarity of representation. But even if the activity of imagination is free from the influence of disturbing factors, in Albert's view there still remains an unbridgeable gap between the lowest kind of divination—divinatory dreams in their most basic form—and the object represented by it. The epistemological assumptions underlying Albert's argument are (a) that the starting point of our knowledge of external objects are perceptual representations and (b) that an external object is known by means of an appropriate representation only when it is grasped by means of its own representation or by means of the representation of its convertible cause. Albert's point is that condition (b) cannot be satisfied in the case of divinatory dreams. As he points out, the external object that we

77 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 12, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 195a–196b.

78 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 11, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 194b: "Ex dictis etiam patet quod solus homo vere somniat et videt alias visiones, quoniam, licet phantasmata in aliis moveantur animalibus, tamen non ordinate; ordinem enim quo phantasia hominis ordinat directe ea quae faciunt ad explicationem formae caelestis ad actum procedentis habet imaginatio ex coniunctione sui cum anima intellectuali; propter quod ipsa maioris est potestatis, et ideo alia animalia non habent nisi corticem somniorum, ut optime dicit Averroes, et cum somniant et aliqua faciunt ad formae caelestis inclinationem, tunc tamen hoc ipsum non percipiunt nec hoc est eis causa operum, sed aguntur a forma caelesti sicut a quadam natura".

become aware of through a divinatory dream is a contingent future event. At the time of the dream, this individual event cannot be grasped by means of its own representation, since it does not exist yet. Neither can it be grasped by means of the representation of its convertible cause, since the external factor triggering a divinatory dream—the celestial form that affects the imaginative power by affecting the body—is only a remote, universal cause that needs to be further specified by a variety of additional factors in order to actually produce the individual event represented by the dream. Given that divinatory dreams cannot supply appropriate representations of the future events they signify, it follows that they represent their objects by means of images that properly belong to something else ("phantasmata aliena") and that are related to those objects by a more or less close similarity. This means, for Albert, that a divinatory dream essentially is a "metaphoric" representation of its object.

> Si autem quaeritur quare non fit per sensibilia et imaginabilia propria, cum lucidius et compendiosius sciretur ex propriis quam metaphoricis, et compendium eligit natura, eo quod non abundat superfluis, videtur mihi esse dicendum quod talia omnia de quibus est somnium praecipue sunt contingentia de futuro; haec autem non sunt in se antequam fiant nec etiam habent causam stantem et ordinatam; propter quod nec similitudine propria suae essentiae neque etiam similitudine causae fieri possunt in anima, praecipue cum omnes similitudines quae sunt in anima fiant per abstractionem a rebus. Ex quo igitur non possunt fieri simulacro proprio neque simulacro causarum, sequitur necessario quod per propria simulacra quae non aliena significatione talia praeostendant talia praesignari non possunt. Si igitur praesignantur, oportet quod hoc fiat per aliquam influentiam superiorum et simulacro alieno, non proprio. Oportet autem quod illa influentia sit aliqua valde remota causa. Et tunc, quando ista influentia tangit animam, percipietur in ipsa in phantasmate alieno, eo quod proprium in se vel in causa sua non habuit, ut diximus. Alienum autem phantasma non ostendit nisi per similitudines et metaphoras; oportet igitur in talibus somniis esse metaphorice accepta phantasmata.[79]

79 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 4, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 182a. Cf. Anonymus, *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*, MS Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr., E. 1.252, fol. 224^{vb}; Ebbesen, "Radulphus Brito on Memory", cit., p. 75: "Sed Albertus quaerit quae est causa quare illa somnia apparent sub enigmatibus et figuris et non in propria forma […]. Dicit quod hoc est quia illa futura non habent esse neque in se neque in suis causis propinquis; in se non sunt, quia futura sunt quae sunt in con-

The "metaphoric" nature of divinatory dreams explains why they require interpretation. For, as Albert makes clear in paraphrasing Aristotle, everybody is able to understand the meaning of a dream representing reality as it is. It is precisely in the case of a dream that represents a future event by means of images that properly belong to something else—and are thus metaphoric—that it is necessary to resort to people with a special ability or training enabling them to detect the meaning of the dream conveyed by its external appearances.[80]

6 The Art of Divination and Its Method

In the *De divinatione*, Aristotle distinguishes dreams that represent reality as it is (εὐθυονειρίαι) and dreams distorting reality. He maintains that only the latter require interpretation, linking the procedure of interpreting dreams with a special ability to detect similarities among different things. As suggested by his comparison to water reflections that are disturbed by the movement of the water, Aristotle here seems to allude to the ability to bring together the scattered fragments of images constituting a dream, making them a coherent representation, and to extrapolate from this to the object signified by the dream. From Aristotle's remarks, however, it is not clear whether what he is talking about is a natural talent or whether it is a skill acquired through special training.[81]

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stellatione quae est causa remota illorum, et ita non habent figuram vel colorem, et ideo non apparent sub proprio phantasmate, et illa prius somniantur quam habeant produci in re, quia quanto aliquid est magis dispositum ad recipiendum aliquid, tanto citius effectus talis inducitur; modo phantasia est magis disposita ad recipiendum phantasma talis effectus futuri quam sit materia ad eius receptionem, et ideo illa somnia prius apparent in phantasia quam fiant in re extra".

80 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 2, c. 8, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 206b; quoted below; Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 10, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 191a: "Tertius autem gradus huius formae est quando movet adeo expresse quod per metaphoras convenientes exponitur. Et ista sunt somnia quae sapientes interpretantur et ad quae est inventa ars interpretandi in scientiis magicis".

81 Aristoteles, *De divinatione per somnum*, c. 2, 464b5–16. For an English translation, cf. Aristotle, *On Sleep and Dreams*, p. 115: "But the most skilled interpreter of dreams is one who can observe resemblances. For anyone can interpret direct dream-visions. By resemblances, I mean that the appearances (*phantasmata*) are akin to images in water, as indeed we have said before. In that medium, if there is much disturbance, the reflection becomes in no way similar, nor do the images resemble real objects at all. Indeed, it would take a

What is left unclear by Aristotle is made clear by Albert. For him, the interpretation of dreams is a rational process resulting from the application of specific techniques. Albert's explanation rests on his peculiar notion of divinatory dreams as the result of astral influences on the dreaming subject. Since the genesis of divinatory dreams conforms to the general rules governing the action of the celestial form on the sublunary world, it is Albert's view that also in the case of divinatory dreams there are two additional factors, besides the celestial form, that contribute to shaping the action of the celestial form: on the one hand, the specific conjunction of the stars at the time of the dream—a circumstance which, in turn, depends on the time and place of the occurrence of the dream—and, on the other hand, the disposition of the recipient. Given that they affect the action of the celestial form on the dreaming subject, Albert thinks that these factors must be taken into account in the interpretation of dreams. Thus, in the introductory chapter that opens Book III of his *Liber de somno et vigilia*, Albert refers to Aristotle's introduction of the art of divination as a procedure based on the investigation of similarities, pointing to the disappointing shortness of this description, which fails to elucidate the specific methodology of the art of divination and its theoretical foundations.[82] Later on, in his exposition of the relevant Aristotelian passage, he integrates Aristotle's description by introducing all of the specific factors that need to be taken into account in the interpretation of a dream. There, he presents the interpretation of a dream as a procedure that traces the dreaming appearances back to their celestial cause and, in so doing, must also take the concomitant circumstances of the dream, i.e., the time and the location in which the dream takes place as well as the dispositions of the dreaming subject, into consideration:

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clever interpreter of reflections to be able to detect readily and to comprehend the scattered and distorted fragments of images as being those of a man, or a horse, or whatever. Likewise in the case before us, of grasping what this dream signifies. For direct dream-vision is erased by movement". For the Latin translation (*Translatio vetus*), cf. Aristotelis *De insomniis et De divinatione per somnum*, (ed. Drossaart Lulofs), p. 46, ll. 1–11: "Artificiosissimus autem est iudex sompniorum qui potest similitudines inspicere: recta enim sompnia iudicare cuiusque est, dico autem similitudines, quoniam similia accidunt fantasmata eis que in aquis sunt ydolis, sicut et prius diximus. Ibi vero si multus fiat motus, non similis fit apparitio et ydola veris. Promptus quidem significantias iudicare erit qui potest cito sentire et inspicere divulsa et distorta ydolorum, quoniam est hominis vel equi aut cuiuscumque. Et ibi quidem similiter potest sompnium hoc: motus enim inpedit rectum sompnium".

82 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 1, (ed. Borgnet), p. 178a; quoted above, note 25.

> Artificiosissimus autem iudex est somniorum qui bene similitudines potest ex facultate naturae et artis inspicere, hoc modo quod et similitudines in se et ad caeıestia et ad locum et passionem somniantis et complexionem comparet, et tunc secundum haec vaticinetur [...]. Et promptus erit iudex in talibus qui cito conicit et componit divulsa et distorta idolorum, sic ex motu confusorum dicens quod hoc est hominis et hoc equi, et sic de quibuslibet aliis. Ille enim simili facultate quam habet in aquis motis iudicandi idola potest etiam iudicare somnium hoc vel illud. Et cum habet simulacra, non est ei ⟨opus⟩ nisi quod transferat ad significata secundum modum quem diximus, et tunc coniecturatum est somnium. Idola autem diligenter perspiciat quaecumque sunt secundum causam apparentia, etsi divulsa videantur, quia motus subiecti frequenter impedit rectum somnium. Et cum scitur causa motus et idolum redigitur ad formam, tunc potest conici somnium, dummodo attendantur praecipue loca et tempora et complexiones et mores somniantium, ut superius diximus. Hoc autem docere magicae scientiae pertinet et non physicae.[83]

As is clear from the passage just quoted, according to Albert, the teaching of the specific techniques used in the interpretation of divinatory dreams belongs to the magical arts. As pointed out by scholars, however, Albert's notion of divination entails the collaboration of different disciplines.[84] Albert's main source of inspiration in this respect is the project of a 'scientific' astrology—a *corpus* of solidly established astrological disciplines investigating the effects of the stars on the sublunary world—developed by the Greek mathematician and astronomer Claudius Ptolemaeus (ca. AD 100–170). In his *Opus quadripartitum*, which was the medieval thinkers' undisputed authority for astrology, Ptolemaeus describes the investigation of the sublunary effects of the stars as the "second part" of astronomy and, therefore, as presupposing the results of the "first part", i.e., the science investigating the stars, their shapes, movements,

83 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 2, c. 9, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 206b–207b; cf. also Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 11, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 194a: "Sicut autem omnium caelestium effectus semper variatur ad motum planetarum et horas climatum et climata, ita fit etiam de motu formae de qua diximus, et quod praecipue variat, hoc est diversus situs caelestium et climata. Et ideo in arte interpretationis somniorum magi praecipiunt in diversis horis et terris aliter et aliter interpretari somnia, et praecipue secundum mansiones lunae et accessiones, eo quod illa ut vicina corporibus generatorum existens, plurimum habet dominium mutandi corpora".

84 Cf. Grellard, "La réception médiévale", cit., pp. 224–227.

and reciprocal positions—in other words, mathematical astronomy.[85] Similarly, Albert's understanding of the art of divination as a technique tracing back divinatory dreams to their 'astral' cause also suggests the idea of a discipline based on astronomy. Moreover, in Albert's view, the art of divination is a discipline that also presupposes the results of the science of nature. Indeed, as he stresses explicitly referring to Ptolemy's authority, since the action of the stars is affected by the nature of its sublunary recipients, the elaboration of prognostications on the sublunary effects of the stars profits from the knowledge of the laws ruling the physical processes:

> Propter quod praecipit (*sc*. Ptolemaeus) quod divinans in astris non faciat nisi iudicium commune, quia non nisi formam communem non appropriatam elicere potest ex astris. Appropriatio autem est commixtionis et materiae et virtutum agentium et patientium quae sunt in materia, et ista per astra non sciuntur, sed ex physicis rationibus rerum. Propter quod etiam ipse praecipit quod doctor et iudex astrorum non sit imperitus in physicis.[86]

Once again, we may notice that no trace of the 'astrological' interpretation adopted by Albert can be found in earlier commentaries,[87] whereas Albert's interpretation serves as a source of inspiration for the later commentary tra-

85 Cf. Ptolemaeus, *Opus Quadripartitum*, tr. 1, c. 1, in: *Liber Ptholomei quattuor tractatuum cum Centiloquio eiusdem Ptholomei et commento Haly*, Venetiis 1484, fol. a2. On Ptolemaeus and his conception of astrology, cf. G.J. Toomer, "Ptolemy", in: Ch. Coulston Gillespie (ed.), *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, New York 1981, Vol. 11, pp. 186–206, especially p. 198.

86 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 11, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, p. 194a.

87 We may compare Albert's 'creative' approach to the more matter-of-fact exposition of the earlier commentator Adam of Bocfeld, in which we can find no trace of Albert's 'astrologic' interpretation; cf. Adam de Bocfeld, *Sententia super De somno et vigilia*, MS Oxford, Balliol College, 313, fol. 157$^{rb–va}$: "In hac parte, ut dictum est, intendit determinare qui sunt optimi et artificiosissimi somniorum interpretatores, intendens quod tales sunt qui sciunt subtiliter similitudines inspicere, scilicet phantasmatum et simulacrorum sensibilium ad invicem et etiam ad suos eventus, licet parvam habuerint similitudinem et etiam cum simulacra sint distorta […]. Sicut igitur intuentes in aqua mota simulacra distorta prompti et potentes sunt reddere eorum significationem qui subtiliter sciunt inspicere similitudines simulacrorum ad ea quorum sunt simulacra, ut scilicet utrum sint simulacra hominis vel equi aut alterius, omnino similiter inspicientes in somniis simulacra distorta prompti et potentes sunt eorum significationem determinare qui subtiliter sciunt eorum similitudines inspicere ad ea quorum sunt simulacra, et tales merentur dici artificiosissimi et optimi somniorum interpretatores […]".

dition. For instance, the Parisian commentator James of Douai is obviously influenced by Albert, understanding Aristotle's description of divination as a search for similarities in terms of similarities linking the dreaming appearances to the celestial influence causing them. Hence, in his explanation, the interpretation of a dream consists in a rational procedure which—reasoning on the basis of similarities—traces the dreaming appearances back to their celestial cause and then derives the prophecy that a future event will take place from that cause.[88] A similar 'astrological' interpretation is also testified by the commentary of the English commentator Simon of Faversham who also, like Albert, stresses the need to take the dispositions of the dreaming subject into account when interpreting divinatory dreams.[89]

7 The 'Precognitive' Value of Divination

Aristotle's understanding of divination is characterized by a decidedly antideterministic flavor. Although some dreams may have a precognitive value because they are either the cause or the sign of a future event, Aristotle stresses that their fulfillment can always be prevented by some countervailing factors prevailing over the cause producing the dream:

88 Cf. Ebbesen, "James of Douai on Dreams", cit., p. 85: "Consequenter cum dicit ⟨2.464b5⟩ *Artificiosissimus autem* ostendit Philosophus quis optimus interpres somniorum, et dicit Philosophus quod artificiosissimus iudex somniorum et expositor, qui potest similitudines inspicere. Cum enim, sicut prius dictum est, ipsa somnia causentur ex influentia corporis caelestis, oportet quod si aliquis velit iudicare futura per somnia, quod sciat considerare similitudinem inter somnium et influxum caelestem, ita quod oportet quod sciat somnium in quam constellationem ducit, et ulterius quod sciat quae constellatio quem effectum futurum nata sit producere".

89 Cf. Ebbesen, "Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*", cit., p. 143: "Iuxta quod est intelligendum quod bonus divinator futurorum per somnia oportet quod inspiciat similitudinem in somno visam, et quod iudicet differentiam rerum et similitudinum. Oportet etiam quod figuret quae similitudo existens in anima sit signum cuius effectus. Oportet etiam quod videat quae sunt similitudines corporum caelestium et illorum influentiae, et oportet videre cuiusmodi passiones ipsa corpora caelestia causant, et tunc in quo causant tales passiones. Oportet etiam quod respiciat ad mores somniantium si somn⟨i⟩um ipsorum conveniat ipsum iudicare, quia dicit Averroes quod bonum divinationem oportet attendere ad operationes \et/ ad fidem quam homines acceperunt a nativitate, et oportet attendere ad complexionem, omnia enim ista sunt de consideratione sapientissimi divinatoris somniorum".

> That many dreams are not fulfilled is in no way surprising. The same holds form many signs of bodily events or of the weather, e.g. of rain or wind. For if another movement should take place, prevailing over the one from which (when it was going to happen) the sign occurred, then the latter movement does not occur. And many well-made plans for actions needing to be carried out have been undone because of other causes that prevailed. For, in general, not everything that was going to happen actually does happen; nor is what will be the same as what is going to be. But even so, one should say that there are causes of a certain kind, from which no fulfilment ensued, and that these things are natural signs of certain things that failed to occur.[90]

Aristotle's anti-deterministic approach is wholeheartedly shared by Albert. However, it is not surprising that his understanding of Aristotle's view is shaped by his overall 'astrological' interpretation of the *De divinatione*. Central to his understanding is the idea that the celestial influence as the source of both the divinatory dream and the future event prefigured by that dream acts only as a remote cause, which, in order to actually produce its effects, needs to be specified by a number of additional factors. For Albert this implies that the fulfillment of the prognostication based on a dream can always be prevented by some of those additional factors failing to materialize. More generally, for Albert, the ineradicable fallibility of our previsions of future events is rooted in the fact that the celestial influence that is the remote cause of those future events, operates in the sublunary world. This means that its effects are also affected by the contingency that, due to matter and contrariety, essentially belongs to the sublunary world. In other words, given that the sublunary world is intrinsically contingent, it is always possible that the actual course of events deviates from that which had been prognosticated on the basis of its remote, celestial cause. Albert makes this point clear, for instance, in a passage of

90 Aristoteles, *De divinatione per somnum*, c. 2, 463b22–31, English translation in: Aristotle, *On Sleep and Dreams*, pp. 111, 113; for the Latin translation (*Translatio vetus*), cf. Aristotelis *De insomniis et De divinatione per somnum*, (ed. Drossaart Lulofs), p. 40, ll. 9–20: "Quoniam vero non eveniunt multa sompniorum, nichil inconveniens: neque enim eorum que in corporibus sunt signorum et celestium, velud aquarum et ventorum: si enim alius vehementior isto accidit motus, a quo futuri factum est signum, non fit. Et multa consulta bene que fieri expediebat dissoluta sunt propter alias digniores inchoationes. Omnino enim non omne fit contingens, neque vero idem quod futurum et quod utrumlibet. Verumptamen principia quidem dicendum esse, a quibus non perfecta sunt, et signa fuerunt hec aliquorum que non fiunt".

the commentary on the *Physics*, in which he propounds an anti-deterministic interpretation of the notion of 'fate', also appealing to Aristotle's *De divinatione* as one of its authorities:

> Trahunt enim fata, secundum quod ex immobili dispositione caelestium et providentiae dependent, non tamen trahuntur necessario inferiora, eo quod non in toto oboedibilia sunt periodo superiorum. Et hoc eleganter docet Ptolemaeus in Quadripartito, ubi dicit, quod licet caelestis effectus immobilis sit, non tamen participatur immobiliter, eo quod participatur per aliud et per accidens. Per aliud enim participatur, quia per materiam inferiorum elementorum, quae cum habeant contrarium et disposita sint frequenter contrariis dispositionibus, retrahunt caelestem effectum, ut non hoc modo procedat in inferiora, quo exit a superioribus. Per accidens autem participatur, quia participatur per esse. Esse autem suum sicut esse omnis essentiae necessario variatur secundum variationem subiecti, in quo est, quia dicit Aristoteles, quod proportionaliter est esse formae secundum diversitatem materiae, in qua est. Et hoc est quod innuit Aristoteles in secundo De somno et vigilia dicens, quod effectus superiorum saepe variatur propter dispositionem diversam et oppositam inferiorum, sicut bene consulta mutantur consiliis aliis magis opportune superveni-entibus.[91]

Given their intrinsic fallibility, prognostications derived from divinations obviously fail to satisfy the conditions required for scientific knowledge in the

91 Albertus Magnus, *Physica*, II, tr. 2, c. 20, p. 128, ll. 61–83. Cf. the parallel passage in Albert's *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 11, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 193b–194a: "Nec lateat nos quod ista forma sic movens, licet afficiat corpora, tamen non imponit necessitatem. Est enim illa forma causa remota, ad cuius causalitatem appropriandam plurima exiguntur in elementis et elementatis antequam ad actum perveniat ultimum, ex quorum quolibet impedita potest evacuari, cum tamen in primis moventibus verissime aliquid futurum significaverit quod etiam absque dubio evenisset, si concausativa cum ipso ad causandum concurrissent, sed in his fuit impedimentum. Et ideo dixit Ptolemaeus in Alarba quod stellae movent per aliud et per accidens et non de necessitate evenit id ad quod movent, intelligens quod per alia movent quia movent per media alia corpora in quibus multum mutantur earum virtutes. Per accidens autem movere dicit quando movent per quaedam quae, nisi concomitantia fuerint et organice sub ipsis moventia, iterum non eveniunt. Propter quod praecipit quod divinans in astris non faciat nisi iudicium commune, quia non nisi formam communem non appropriatam elicere potest ex astris; appropriatio autem est commixtionis et materiae et virtutum agentium et patientium quae sunt in materia […]".

proper sense. Albert addresses this problem in technical terms in his treatise *De fato*, where he generally considers the disciplines investigating the influence of the stars on the sublunary world, i.e. astrological disciplines, as opposed to mathematical astronomy. As he remarks there, the astrological disciplines—unlike mathematical astronomy—do not proceed by way of demonstrative arguments, but by way of 'conjectures'.[92] The use of the word 'conjecture', which is also the technical term used by Albert to refer to the procedure applied in the interpretation of dreams ("somnium coniecturare"), is revealing. As Albert makes clear in the passage, it indicates an argument that, being based on general and mutable signs, yields a conclusion that is essentially fallible:

> Coniecturatio autem, cum sit ex signis mutabilibus, generat habitum minoris certitudinis, quam sit scientia vel opinio. Cum enim huiusmodi signa sint communia et mutabilia, non potest haberi ex ipsis via syllogistica, eo quod nec in omnibus nec in pluribus includunt significatum, sed quantum est de se, sunt iudicia quaedam multis de causis mutabilia, sicut patet per antedicta. Et ideo saepe astronomus dicit verum et tamen non evenit, quod dicit, quia dictum suum fuit quoad dispositionem caelestium verissimum, sed haec dispositio a mutabilitate inferiorum exclusa est.[93]

Although Albert stresses the conjectural—and therefore fallible—nature of prognostications of future events, as has already been mentioned, his attitude towards divination is more positive than Aristotle's. Once again, his source of inspiration is Ptolemaeus. Ptolemaeus' aim in the *Opus quadripartitum* is to provide a solid foundation for the variety of disciplines dealing with astrological matters by carefully investigating their presuppositions and their limits. Ptolemaeus' assessment of astrological disciplines serves as a model for Albert's discussion of the theoretical foundation of the art of divination. Appealing to Ptolemaeus for the notion that the fallibility of prognostications of future events is rooted in the essential contingency that affects the recipient of the

92 Albertus Magnus, *De fato*, a. 4, p. 73, ll. 36–44: "Dicendum, quod duae partes sunt astronomiae, sicut dicit Ptolemaeus: una est de sitibus superiorum et quantitatibus eorum et passionibus propriis; et ad hanc per demonstrationem pervenitur. Alia est de effectibus astrorum in inferioribus, qui in rebus mutabilibus mutabiliter recipiuntur; et ideo ad hanc non pervenitur nisi per coniecturam, et oportet astronomum in ista parte secundum aliquid physicum esse et ex signis physicis coniecturari".

93 Albertus Magnus, *De fato*, a. 4, p. 73, ll. 45–56.

action of the stars—the sublunary world—,[94] Albert's endorses Ptolemaeus' attempt to legitimate divination as a valid cognitive process, yielding, within its own limits, valuable information. Indeed, echoing Ptolemy, Albert stresses that, when a prediction fails to come true, the blame does not lie on divination in itself, but on those practitioners that contribute to its discredit by raising expectations that cannot be satisfied by divinatory prognostications, as they present those prognostications as necessary truths, although they are intrinsically fallible due the contingent nature of their object:

> Et haec est causa quare non deceptus videtur decipi astronomus et augur et magus et interpres somniorum et visionum et omnis similiter divinus. Omne enim fere tale genus hominum deceptionibus gaudet, et parum litterati existentes putant necessarium esse quod contingens est. Et pronuntiant tamquam absque impedimento futurum aliquid, et cum non evenit, faciunt scientias vilescere in conspectu hominum imperitorum, cum defectus non sit in scientia, sed potius in eis qui abutuntur ea. Propter quod etiam Ptolemaeus sapiens dicit non esse iudicandum nisi generaliter valde et cum protestatione cauta, quia stellae ea qua faciunt faciunt per aliud et per accidens, ex quibus multa in significatis suis occurrunt impedimenta.[95]

Albert's logical approach, considering divination an argumentative procedure defined by the specific nature of its arguments, sets the standard for late 13th and 14th century commentators, who devote special attention to precisely analyzing their logical structure.[96] The English commentators Simon of Faversham and Walter Burley are especially interesting for our purpose because of their explicit reliance on Albert. Both commentators follow Albert in his criticism of incompetent practitioners that attribute an absolute necessity to divinatory precognitions. To characterize the logical structure of divinatory prognostications, they recur to the notion of 'conditional' necessity. Given that the event prognosticated through divination will necessarily occur, provided that no countervailing circumstance takes place, the kind of necessity belonging to divinatory prognostications is conditional necessity and their logical form is that of a conditional proposition:

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94 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 1, c. 11, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 193b–194a; quoted above, note 91.

95 Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, III, tr. 2, c. 5, (ed. Borgnet), Vol. 9, pp. 202b–203a.

96 On the logical models adopted by the 114th century commentators John of Jandun and John Buridan, cf. Grellard, "La réception médiévale", cit., pp. 235–237.

> [...] Dicendum, quod cognitio de significatione somniorum non est certa nisi sub condicione, nec potest aliter interpretator somniorum certitudinaliter dicere effectum somni euenire, sed potest per suam scientiam scire effectum euenire, nisi alius fortior motus superueniat. Unde non debet absolute dicere, quod talis effectus eueniet, sed debet dicere, quod talis effectus eueniet, nisi impediatur. Et ideo dicit Albertus, quod astrologi nostri temporis et interpretatores somniorum errant certitudinaliter asserentes, quod talis effectus eueniet. Unde faciunt scientiam astrologicam uilescere, cum tamen defectus non sit in ea.[97]

Conclusion

The present contribution is devoted to the theory of divination developed by Albert in his commentary on Aristotle's *De divinatione*, which corresponds to Book III of his *Liber de somno et vigilia*. Methodologically, the commentary on the *De divinatione* perfectly embodies the model of a 'creative' interpretation (commenting on Aristotle and completing Aristotle) described by Albert in Book I of his commentary on the *Physics*. Tr. 1 of the commentary contains an original treatment of the problem of divination that, for Albert, serves as an introduction to Aristotle's—in his view—unsatisfactory explanation of this phenomenon, developing Aristotle's fragmentary account and elucidating its implicit assumptions. Albert's interpretation is developed against the background of a wide philosophical tradition that stretches from Late Antiquity to Arabic and Jewish philosophy. Following Aristotle in his naturalistic approach to divination, Albert reads Aristotle's treatise in the light of a doctrine of the 'astral' influences that is especially indebted to the Hermetic and Ptolemaic tradition. From this perspective, the phenomenon of divinatory dreams is understood within a comprehensive cosmological model as one of the effects of the influence of the stars on the sublunary world and thus as conforming to the rules that govern the action of the stars on the earth. Ptolemy's scientific

97 Thomsen Thörnqvist, "Walter Burley's *Expositio*", cit., p. 509, l. 15–p. 510 l. 1; see also p. 512, l. 17–p. 513, l. 4. Ebbesen, "Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum De somno et vigilia*", cit., p. 145: "Iuxta quod intelligendum quod bonus divinator non debet dicere absolute quod talis effectus eveniet, sed dicet quod eveniet addendo praedictam condicionem quod eveniet nisi fortior motus superveniat. Unde dicit Albertus quod astrologi eo quod nomine absoluto utuntur suam scientiam vilescunt in conspectu hominum, dicunt enim talem effectum simpliciter evenire, unde quando non eveni[un]t, homines scientiam increpant, et scientia non est increpanda, sed ea utentes increpandi sunt".

project serves as a source of inspiration for Albert, also in its epistemological consequences: in his rationalistic approach, Albert's understanding of the art of divination is inspired by the model—elaborated by Ptolemaeus in his *Opus quadripartitum*—of a *corpus* of astrological disciplines developed according to scientific principles. With his 'astrological' reading of the Aristotelian treatise, Albert provides an interpretation that, because of its originality and its wide systematic scope, represents a milestone in the history of the reception of Aristotle's *De divinatione* and durably shaped the later medieval interpretation of the Aristotelian treatise. It is not surprising that the *Liber de somno et vigilia*—to which the commentary on the *De divinatione* belongs as Book III—, with more than sixty manuscripts copies dating from the 13th to the 15th century, is one of the most successful works within Albert's entire philosophical production.[98]

98 On the manuscript tradition of Albert's *Liber de somno et vigilia*, cf. W. Fauser, *Codices manuscripti operum Alberti Magni*, Münster in W. 1982, Pars I, pp. 113–118; Id., "Albertus-Magnus-Handschriften", in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 24 (1982), pp. 115–129; ibid., 25 (1983), pp. 100–120; ibid. 26 (1984), pp. 127–151.

CHAPTER 8

Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon and the Magicians on the Power of Words

Steven P. Marrone

Sometime in 1266 or 1267 Roger Bacon wrote his *Opus maius*. It was one of three works Bacon composed in those years intended for Pope Clement IV, who had written to him in 1266 inquiring about his reputedly path-breaking investigations into the sciences.[1] Bacon's hope was to win over the pope for his plans to inaugurate a reform of all the fields of higher learning. In Book 4, where Bacon was advancing ideas that together constituted a small treatise on the science of astrology, he took time to lay bare his thoughts on the power of the spoken word:

> For since the word [*verbum*] is generated from the natural interior parts [of the human body] and is formed by thought and by careful oversight, and [since] man takes delight in it and it is the most proper instrument of the rational soul, therefore it has the greatest efficacy of all the things that are produced by man, especially when it is brought forth with firm intention, great desire and unflinching confidence.[2]

By itself, the assertion seems innocuous enough. But in fact what Bacon was doing here required a good deal of courage. For Bacon was taking a stand on what had become a controversial issue by the time of the 1260s. His defense of the power of words was part of an effort to lay down a theory explaining in terms acceptable to the natural philosopher how incantations, of a special

1 On Bacon's chronology, see A.G. Little, "Introduction: On Roger Bacon's Life and Works", in: A.G. Little (ed.), *Roger Bacon Essays*, Oxford 1914, pp. 1–31; id., "Rogerus Bacon O.F.M.", in: C.H. Lohr (ed.), "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Robertus-Wilgelmus", in: *Traditio* 29 (1973), pp. 115–121; and especially J.M.G. Hackett, "The Meaning of Experimental Science (*scientia experimentalis*) in the Philosophy of Roger Bacon", PhD Thesis, University of Toronto 1983, pp. 40–47.

2 Roger Bacon, *Opus maius* IV, Treatise on Astrology, in: J.H. Bridges (ed.), *The "Opus Maius" of Roger Bacon*, 2 Vols. and Suppl., Oxford 1897 and London 1900, Vol. 1, p. 399.

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sort, managed to produce the wondrous effects that some magicians of his day claimed they did. Bacon was thus inserting himself into the debate over the reality and the power of magic.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the thirteenth century represented a golden age in western Europe for the arts of learned magic. The introduction into western literate circles in the twelfth century of a massive amount of the learning of the ancient Greek world and of medieval Arabic and Hebrew traditions, which inaugurated the rise of scholastic thought and an appreciation of what were already by the end of the 1100s being called the sciences, brought with it a host of works professing themselves to be about various sorts of an erudite magic. By the thirteenth century enough of these latter compositions had been translated into Latin and circulated among Latinate scholars for there to be the beginnings of practiced magic among a western educated elite.[3] One type of this magic was dependent on a resurgent astrology but identifiable in particular by the engraving or founding of images, talismans reportedly capable of working marvels, and this was already in the twelfth century referred to as a "science of images".[4] When Bacon came to write his *Opus maius* this science could already claim a dominant place among what Norman Cohn has taught us to regard as actually practiced forms of ritual or ceremonial magic.[5]

For an example of a medieval Latin text professing, among other things, a science of images, we can do no better than a work translated from Arabic into Castilian Spanish at the court of King Alfonso X in 1256 or shortly thereafter and then subsequently, and probably not by many years, from Spanish into Latin.[6] This is the work known to the west as *Picatrix*, Latin version of the original *Ghāyat al-hakīm* or *Aim of the Sage*, composed in Spain by an anonymous Arabic author in the mid-eleventh century. Though *Picatrix* apparently did not circulate outside of Spain before the fifteenth century—the first author to refer to it is the Florentine Neoplatonist, Marsilio Ficino—it can stand for us as representative of a type of work familiar elsewhere in western Europe by the second half of the thirteenth century. It draws on magical traditions active in the Arabic world by the ninth century and reaching back to Sābian texts record-

3 On the introduction and rise of learned magic in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries see the comments of S.P. Marrone, *A History of Science, Magic and Belief from Medieval to Early Modern Europe*, London 2015, pp. 18–30 and all of Ch. 3.

4 Ibid., pp. 19–21, on early, twelfth-century, references to a "science of images".

5 See N. Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons. The Demonization of Christians in Medieval Christendom*, rev. ed., Chicago 1993, pp. 102–111.

6 See *Picatrix—The Latin Version of the Ghāyat Al-Hakīm*, (ed. D. Pingree), London 1986, p. 1.

ing practices established even earlier in Harrān, now in modern Turkey.[7] Here is a work openly advertising its magical nature and ready to present to the curious reader detailed instructions for producing a magical operation.

Picatrix begins by explaining that it will deal with necromancy. But then it adds that necromancy needs to be divided into two parts, the theoretical and the practical.[8] For our purposes we need concern ourselves at first only with what it has to say about theory. The text makes it plain that the sort of necromancy it has in mind is that having to do with the fabrication of magical images, or what it calls the "opus ymaginum", or work of images.[9] This means, as the text readily makes clear, that the theory behind such work should be identified as the "science of images".[10] *Picatrix* then goes on to explain more precisely what sorts of knowledge fall under the subject of such a science. Not surprisingly the anonymous author turns first to knowledge of the heavens. In his words, the theoretical part of the science deals with "the locations of the fixed stars, because from them are drawn the heavenly figures [*figure*] and forms, and with how [the stars] project their rays into the self-moving planets, and [finally] with how to know the figures of the heavens [*figuras celi*] at the times when [the practitioners] intend to accomplish that which they are inquiring about".[11] As is immediately clear, and as the author confesses in the succeeding sentence, the knowledge in question concerns the choosing of propitious times ("de electionibus horarum et temporum") for any particular undertaking.[12] It is, in short, the greater part of what we would call "astrology", devoted in this instance to determining the proper time for the casting of images.[13]

So far, nothing surprising for a science of the making of images or talismans for accomplishing marvelous ends. But then the author turns to a second component of the theoretical knowledge with which *Picatrix* will deal. And here we are introduced to a subject more in line with the powers referred to at the very beginning of this article. For the anonymous author says that a second

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7 See D. Pingree, "Some of the Sources of the *Ghāyat al-hakīm*", in: *Journal of the Warbourg and Courtauld Institutes* 43 (1980), pp. 1–2 and 15.

8 See *Picatrix* I, i and ii, (ed. Pingree), pp. 5, l. 2, and 6, ll. 6–7.

9 See *Picatrix* I, ii, (ed. Pingree), p. 6, ll. 10–11.

10 Ibid., p. 6, ll. 38–39.

11 Ibid., p. 6, ll. 7–10: "… scientia locorum stellarum fixarum, quia ex eis componuntur celestes figure et forme celi, et quomodo radios suos proiciunt in planetas se moventes, et ad sciendum figuras celi quando intendunt illud facere quod querunt".

12 Ibid., p. 6, ll. 10–11.

13 As the author says (ibid., p. 6, ll. 13–15), "… ad habendam propriam constellationem et convenientem rebus pro quibus ymagines funduntur".

part of the necromancy with which *Picatrix* is concerned has to do with words (*verba*). As he puts it, the reason is that certain words "possess in themselves the power of necromancy".[14] So words, too, are involved in the founding of images to be used in the science of images. Indeed, as the author hastens to add, the proper words pronounced at the selected times revealed by recourse to astrology enable one to produce an image of extraordinary strength. That is because one will thereby be combining the power drawn from the celestial figures with the power of words, from which combination results greater concentrated strength than if one relied simply on one of the constituent powers by itself.[15]

All in all, *Picatrix* thus envisions for the science of images a complicated ceremonial. At one point in the text the author steps back to look at his subject, and he comments that the science he is concerned with can be divided into three parts. The second part most closely matches the science of images described so far. It would appear, moreover, to be the sub-science that the majority of *Picatrix*'s pages is devoted to, laying out the practical details of fabricating the myriad images one might want to use to obtain countless marvelous ends. Here it is called simply the "science of the stars" (*sciencia stellarum*). In addition to the astrological selection of a propitious time, the author specifically mentions the kind of activities the fabricator of the images will have to perform.[16] First comes prayer to the relevant stars. And then, presumably at the time of the casting of the images, there follow fumigations and sometimes even sacrifices. Finally we come to matters of greater significance for us. For as the text makes plain, incantations (*orationes*) are also necessary, as well perhaps as acts of inscription (*scripta*). We see then that the words whose power *Picatrix* has previously extolled can be both spoken, in the form of incantations, or inscribed, presumably as chiseled into the image objects themselves. We have arrived therefore at a form of magic dependent in part on the proffering of incantations and the inscribing of scripts. This art thus relies on the special power of the spoken or written word.

At about the same time that *Picatrix* was being rendered into Latin, a much more famous text was emerging in the Latin west. Almost surely authored by the physician and astrologer Campanus of Novara, this is the work known from the early fourteenth century on as the *Speculum astronomiae* or *Mirror of*

14 Ibid., p. 6, ll. 15–16: "… quia verba in se habent nigromancie virtutem".

15 Ibid., p. 6, ll. 19–20: "Et maior fortitudo est quando plures fortitudines ad invicem coniunguntur; et tunc est completa virtus nigromancie".

16 See *Picatrix* II, v, (ed. Pingree), p. 46, ll. 3–16.

Astronomy.[17] It was probably composed in the mid-1260s, and it undertook a defense of many of the arts connected at the time to astrology.[18] Unlike *Picatrix*, which simply presented its magical prescriptions without comment, the *Speculum* conceded that much of astrology was considered illicit, at least by many theologians of the day. Its job was therefore to redeem as many of the parts of astrology as was possible by weeding out those uses that were truly illicit, constituting a body of literature that could justifiably be associated with necromancy—a term always used in the *Speculum* as a pejorative. The plan for doing this was to examine all the relevant literature available at the time in Latin, singling out those works that were truly dangerous but indicating how many suspected texts were in fact perfectly legitimate representatives of a noble art.[19] And while this is just what the *Speculum* does, it can be argued that its even more pressing purpose was to defend the art discussion of which occupies the whole of Chapter 11, by far the longest in the whole book.[20] This art was, as the text makes clear, the science of images.

The author of the *Speculum* works his way to the science of images by way of examining writings dedicated to the second part of the science of astronomy in the most general sense, and that is the science of astral judgments (*sciencia iudiciorum astrorum*), judicial astronomy or what we would call astrology pure and simple.[21] Under this rubric the *Speculum* identifies four operative parts, of which the last concerns judgments made regarding the selection of suitable hours (*de electionibus horarum laudabilium*) for the accomplishment of certain tasks.[22] Of course, we have seen this same focus in *Picatrix*. In the *Speculum*, the author proceeds immediately by saying that subordinate to the art of selecting the suitable time is an even more circumscribed part of astrology, known as

17 Though the *Speculum* has long been attributed to Albert the Great, A. Paravicini Bagliani (in: *Le Speculum Astronomiae, une énigme? Enquête sur les manuscrits*, Florence 2001) has almost conclusively demonstrated that Campanus was its author.

18 For dating, see P. Zambelli, *The Speculum Astronomiae and its Enigma*, Dordrecht—Boston 1992, p. 3. The text of the *Speculum* has been given a near-critical edition by S. Caroti, M. Pereira and S. Zamponi working under the direction of P. Zambelli (*Speculum astronomiae*, Pisa 1977), which edition is reproduced unaltered at the end of Zambelli's work. All references to the *Speculum* in this article will be to this latter printing of the text.

19 See *Speculum astronomiae*, Prooemium, (ed. Caroti et al.), in: Zambelli, *The Speculum Astronomiae and its Enigma*, p. 208.

20 N. Weill-Parot, *Les «images astrologiques» au moyen âge et à la Renaissance. Spéculations intellectuelles et pratiques magiques* (*XIIe–XVe siècle*), Paris 2002, p. 84, makes just this claim.

21 See *Speculum astronomiae* 3, (ed. Caroti et al.), pp. 218–220, ll. 2–4.

22 See *Speculum astronomiae* 4, (ed. Caroti et al.), p. 222, l. 6.

the "science of images".[23] Quoting an unnamed work, the *Speculum* comments that this science of images constitutes in fact the highest point of all astronomy (*sublimitas astronomiae*).[24] It then goes on to note that because some works of necromancy themselves deal with the fabricating of images for accomplishing wondrous works, they have attempted to draw over themselves the mantle of so illustrious, and legitimate, an art.[25]

For the time being, the *Speculum* passes over such necromantic texts. But in Chapter 11 it returns to them with the intention of showing how they are clearly distinguishable from the legitimate works of the science of images which they attempt to simulate. Of these illegitimate, indeed dangerous, images there were two sorts, each linked to an art that the *Speculum* author quickly describes. On one side stood the art of "abominable" images, whose manufacture required fumigation and the invocation of names, presumably of spirits and which, according to the *Speculum*, in many cases were said to be the names of angels, though our author suspects that they really applied to demons.[26] On the other side was an art slightly less wicked than the first, but "detestable" all the same. Here were to be performed the inscription of characters and the exorcism—which is to say, again the invocation—of names, recipes for which were to be found, so the author says, prominently in the Solomonic literature circulating at the time. The images fabricated in both sorts of art the author of the *Speculum* denominates with what appears to be at least from his point of view a technical term, "necromantic images".[27] These were the images that imitated the perfectly legitimate images of the science of images, behind which they hid to camouflage their abominable or detestable nature. Our author explains that he has quickly perused the literature dealing with these arts so that he should have a passing acquaintance with what their promoters were engaged in and be equipped to refute their claims for efficacy.[28]

After listing the titles of the books related to these two arts that were to be shunned, the author then turns to the sort of image he wanted to promote. Here was to be located the science of images extolled before as residing at the high point of astronomy, and which resulted in fabrications not only legitimate but also much to be praised. Here, too, the *Speculum* has a technical

23 Ibid., p. 222, ll. 7–8.

24 Ibid., p. 222, l. 8: "… sublimitas astronomiae est imaginum scientia". In fact, this quotation came from a work identified below at n. 32 and which the *Speculum* praises.

25 Ibid., p. 222, ll. 8–12.

26 For these two types, see *Speculum* 11, (ed. Caroti et al.), p. 240.

27 Ibid., pp. 240–242, ll. 34–35.

28 Ibid., p. 242, ll. 35–44.

term to describe such items: "astronomical images" (*imagines astronomicae*).[29] It would in fact appear that the *Speculum* is the first text to employ this term and that Campanus invented it precisely to set a kind of wonder-working image, the use of which he wanted to support, against those other images that he conceded the theologians were justified in attacking. Moreover, our author explains how the art of such image-making differed from the other two image-concocting arts that he had firmly rejected.[30] Unlike the art of the abominable images, this legitimate art or science employs no fumigations or invocations. Unlike the art of detestable images, it shuns exorcisms and the inscription of characters. As the text makes plain, this art produces images that draw their power solely from the celestial figures to which the images are related and whose form they often reproduce.

In other words, the author of the *Speculum* is attempting to convince its readers that there exists a science of images that looks superficially like the art put forward by works such as the *Picatrix* we have examined, but that avoids the necromantic evils this latter art entails. It makes no appeal to spirits—angels or demons—but consists entirely in fabricating artifacts designed to correspond to images represented by the stars and planets and cast or engraved at a precise moment determined solely by recourse to astrology, astronomy's judicial science. Of course that means that this valuable art does not appeal to the power of words. Thus in trying to defend the science of images against the aspersions cast upon it by the critics of the day, the *Speculum* abandons one of the basic foundations that books like *Picatrix* established for the art that they wanted to promote. Whether there ever were any written works that fit the requirements laid down by the *Speculum* is a matter for historical investigation. Nicolas Weill-Parot has argued convincingly that no such works existed at the time when the *Speculum* was composed.[31] For its part, the *Speculum* can point to only one book that it feels sets forth a set of practical prescriptions for the art or science it is engaged in promoting. That work is the *De imaginibus* attributed in the *Speculum*'s time to Thabit ibn Qurra.[32] In fact, the *De imaginibus* arose from precisely the same Hārranian traditions of talismanic magic that *Picatrix* drew upon, and it made room for the very employment of words or incantations that the *Speculum* wanted to eschew.[33]

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29 Ibid., p. 246, l. 103.

30 See ibid., p. 248, ll. 103–106.

31 See Weill-Parot, *Les «images astrologiques»*, pp. 84–85.

32 See *Speculum astronomiae* 11, (ed. Caroti et al.), p. 248, ll. 128–131.

33 See the conclusions of D. Pingree, "Sources of the *Ghāyat al-hakīm*", p. 5.

All of which brings us back at last to Roger Bacon, with whom this essay began. For Bacon, as has been shown, came to the defense of the power of words in a way that implicated him directly in the debate about the legitimacy of the fashioning of wonder-working images that the *Speculum astronomiae* had opened at just about the time that Bacon was setting his pen to parchment.[34] In Book IV of his *Opus maius*, where Bacon laid down those words quoted before at the beginning, he set out to examine the claims of practical astronomy, or what we would call astrology. Indeed, he devoted a large section of the fourth part of his *Opus maius* to this practical science, which in addition to locating the place of the stars and planets at any moment also tracked the celestial signs or constellations (*figurae*) associated with them and used these latter to make judgments (*judicia*) about happenings in this world below. Not only was Bacon an enthusiastic promoter of the science of astrology, but he also insisted that in addition to formulating its "judgments" about the present, the past and the future—in the latter case yielding actual predictions—it also could be turned to producing "marvelous works" (*opera miranda*).[35] In other words, he was setting himself specifically in the context of the discussions in the two works we have just examined.

As Bacon recognized, however, many in his day spoke against what he called the mathematical arts (*mathematica*)—drawing upon a terminology already established in late Antiquity for what we would identify as astrology—and he realized that the weight of this disapproval fell most heavily upon that part of those arts involved in making judgments.[36] Yet he took it upon himself to respond to what he considered to be unjust attacks. Not that he did not accept as a fact that there was a predictive art relying upon following the motion of signs in the heavens that was to be condemned. This was what he denominated "false mathematics" (*mathematica falsa*) as opposed to the "true mathematics" (*mathematica vera*) he intended to support.[37] For Bacon, this meant that false mathematics could also be labeled a "magical art" (*ars magica*).[38] Throughout his life Bacon insisted on shunning the word "magic," applying it to none of the arts or sciences he condoned, even when what he was defending looks very much to our eyes the same as what was typically conceded to fall within

34 For an excellent, and exhaustive, examination of Bacon's stance on the power of words, see B. Delaurenti, *La puissance des mots. «Virtus verborum». Débats doctrinaux sur le pouvoir des incantations au Moyen Age*, Paris 2007, pp. 111–114 and 157–200.

35 For the foregoing, see Bacon, *Opus maius* I, 2, 2, (ed. Bridges), Vol. 1, pp. 109–110.

36 Bacon, *Opus maius*, section on judicial astronomy, (ed. Bridges), Vol. 1, pp. 238–239.

37 Ibid., p. 239.

38 Ibid., p. 240: "… falsa mathematica est ars magica".

the realm of magic. In this instance, the art he was rejecting abused the legitimate recourse to observation of the heavens for the purpose of predicting by adding on the deployment of characters, charms or incantations, conjurations and even sacrifices.[39] In the latter two cases—conjurations and sacrifices—the proponents of the art were in fact appealing to demonic assistance, to Bacon's eyes an absolutely horrendous occurrence.[40]

Still, there remained a part of astrology that was perfectly acceptable. It might seem, therefore, that Bacon was resorting to something like the argument of the author of the *Speculum astronomiae*. Here he was differentiating between a condemnable astrological art and another one perfectly benign by associating with the dangerous art the use of incantations, the appeal to words. As Bacon himself once explicitly claimed, true mathematics—the legitimate astrological art—could not be accused of turning to those nefarious sacrifices, conjurations, incantations or characters whose employ he had decried in the false art.[41] He even insisted that in ancient times the doctors of the church had known how to make the distinction and therefore had praised true mathematics. The novelty was that in his own day certain theologians, sadly ignorant of the details of both true mathematics and false, made a blanket condemnation of all astrology.[42] The same was true of many scholars of canon law who out of ignorance laid the sanctions of the church against a useful art.[43] Gratian himself, author of the basic textbook of canon law, the *Decretum*, made the same mistake.[44] And lest we think that Bacon was here defending merely a predictive astrology, we should look to his own words. It was noted earlier that Bacon considered astrology productive of marvelous works. By the time he had come to the section of his *Opus maius* comprising a treatise on astrology, he was ready to concede that his attention had all along been addressed to the fabrication of images. For the books upon which he relied for his knowledge of true mathematics were filled with the secrets of images (*imaginum secreta*).[45] In

39 Ibid., p. 240: "Haec [mathematica falsa] sibi usurpat considerationem coelestium characteribus, carminibus, conjurationibus, sacrificiis superstitionis, et fraudibus variis deformatam".

40 Ibid., p. 241.

41 Ibid., p. 242.

42 Ibid., p. 248. See also ibid., p. 239.

43 *Opus maius*, Treatise on Astrology, (ed. Bridges), Vol. 1, p. 394: "Utique theologi et decretistae non instructi in talibus, simulque videntes quod mala possunt fieri sicut et bona, negligunt haec [i.e. opera artis verae] et abhorrent, et computant inter magica".

44 See ibid., p. 396.

45 Ibid., p. 394.

fact, among them a signal place was occupied by the text attributed to the very Thabit ibn Qurra the *Speculum* had singled out.[46] He must have been following the plan of the *Speculum* to the letter.

Yet Bacon had in mind a much more radical initiative than had his contemporary, Campanus of Novara. Because despite the implication in the passages cited thus far that false mathematics—and now we can say that this meant the evil resort to astrological images—was differentiated from true mathematics—fabricating images in a legitimate way—by its reliance on incantation, its turning to the use of words, Bacon immediately makes it plain that the science of images he supported depended on words as well. Here appears the passage quoted at the beginning above. Bacon was thus positioning himself at an ideological point intermediate between the *Speculum* and *Picatrix*. He would not excise from his approved science of images the resort to incantation. The difference from wicked fabrication of images lay in the way the words were used. Detestable was the deployment of incantations designed to appeal to demons and seek their help. But there was a good way to proffer incantations. To Bacon's eyes words, if correctly framed, possessed a power of their own that could be harnessed for useful purposes. In short, Bacon had a theory of the power of words that undergirded a science of images beyond that of the *Speculum astronomiae* but short of that of *Picatrix*.[47]

As the quotation given at the beginning makes clear, according to Bacon, words fashioned by humans with the right intentions in mind possessed a force or power that was among the strongest that a human being could produce. The reason, he explained, was because the rational soul, the source of human word formation, was of greater dignity than the stars. Everyone, even those who condemned astrology, conceded that the stars exerted an influence on things here below at the time of their generation. Not surprisingly, therefore, words produced at the moment of the fabrication of something new had an effect on that object even greater than that of the heavens. The means, moreover, by which this influence was exercised came down to Bacon's notion of the multiplica-

46 Ibid.

47 It is this way of seeing Bacon that separates the interpretation given here from that of Delaurenti in the work cited above, note 34. Delaurenti sees Bacon's naturalist explanation of the power of words as clearly discernible from any magical usage. The present article recognizes instead an ambiguity. Bacon was defending a resort to words that many of his contemporaries would not have been able to differentiate from that of a book like *Picatrix*. As we shall soon see, Thomas Aquinas was among those who came to this conclusion.

tion of species.[48] By the terms of that theory, every active entity in the world generated a form in which its agent power was contained, and that form—a "species"—then passed along the power through the medium by successively generating identical forms along the way until the species reached the object.[49] There, it could work its influence, thereby terminating the active process begun originally at the point of the agent. For Bacon, words were either the sign of or identical to the species produced by the rational soul. They were therefore the exemplary, or the most effective, way the soul acted on the exterior world.

Bacon laid out the whole process he had in mind in unambiguous terms. It involved both the power of the stars and that of human words brought to bear on an image at the moment of its fabrication. As Bacon himself explained: "Since the preeminent operation of the rational soul is to use words effectively, formed with a [particular] intention [in mind], the [judicial] astronomer can put forth words at selected moments that will have an almost indescribable power".[50] Of course the proper moments were selected to coincide with a precise configuration of celestial and zodiacal signs.[51] When these two conditions were met—that is, the intentional focus of the soul and the right astronomical configuration—not only was the soul's active force enhanced but it was also permitted to produce a work—again an image—that itself had a remarkable ability to introduce change in the exterior world.[52] Bacon even took time to compare the artificial manufacture of the image to initial generation of a person at the moment of his or her birth. Thus the moment of the construction of the image was analogous to the moment of birth, a time when the newly made object was especially prone to receiving a constitutional complexion from the

48 Bacon, *Opus maius*, Treatise on Astrology, (ed. Bridges), Vol. 1, p. 396: "Et quoniam anima rationalis dignior est stellis, ideo sicut stellae et omnia faciunt virtutes suas et species in rebus extra … potest ergo anima rationalis, quae est substantia maxime activa inter omnia post Deum et angelos, facere et facit continue speciem suam et virtutem in corpus, cujus est actus, et in res extra".

49 For an account of Bacon on the multiplication of species, consult the section on Bacon in: D. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al Kindi to Kepler*, Chicago 1976, as well as Lindberg's introduction to his edition of Bacon's *De multiplicatione specierum*, published under the title *Roger Bacon's Philosophy of Nature*, Oxford 1983.

50 Bacon, *Opus maius*, Treatise on Astronomy, (ed. Bridges), Vol. 1, p. 395: "Et cum opus animae rationalis praecipuum sit verbis uti efficaciter et ex intentione formatis, potest astronomus formare verba temporibus electis quae ineffabiliem habebunt potestatem".

51 Ibid., p. 399: "Et si hujusmodi multiplicatio speciei et verbi prolatio fiant in constellatione debita, necesse est quod operatio valida consequatur …".

52 See ibid., pp. 395 and 396–397.

skies. This complexion was intimately linked to a power to act.[53] And so the result was a wonder-working image or talisman. Here Bacon actually employed the language he had once reserved for false mathematics to say that the image-making was accompanied by incantations and characters (*carminibus et characteribus*) uttered under just the right heavenly constellation.[54]

What had begun as a defense of much of astrology had thus metamorphosed into a justification of the use of incantation and incised characters ultimately to accomplish works of wonder. Bacon insisted that wise men had always turned to the deployment of characters and incantations.[55] It was a practice he applauded. And by these means image-objects were produced that could heal damaged bodies, force dangerous animals to flee, and call forth peacefully serpents from their subterranean haunts and fish from the deepest seas.[56] To all appearances Bacon was thus advocating the use of magic. Indeed, it was only external circumstances that permitted him to distinguish from the star-bound works he promoted (*opera stellificata*)—both images and the marvels they brought forth—those operations that by his narrow construction of the term he deigned to call "magical".[57] Magicians worked their damnable wonders primarily by deploying images constructed according to the regimen Bacon had described but for evil ends, though Bacon conceded that they also sometimes added in their own fraudulent incantations.[58] Moreover by such excesses they implicated themselves with demons. But fabricated images, if honestly and properly employed, were worthy of praise and should be counted among the glories of philosophy.[59]

Bacon knew what he was talking about when he said that in his day theologians were attacking many of the wonder-producing arts that he promoted. For

53 Ibid., p. 396.

54 Ibid.: "Et ideo in istis imaginibus, carminibus, et characteribus, constellatione debita compositis, recipiuntur virtutes stellarum et retinentur, ut possint per eas agere in res hujus mundi …". For the earlier mention of incantations and characters associated with false mathematics or evil astrology, see above, note 39.

55 Ibid., p. 395: "Ex hac radice incepit apud sapientes usus characterum et carminum".

56 Ibid.

57 For the phrase "opera stellificata", see ibid., but also p. 399 for the variant, "opera stellificanda".

58 Ibid., p. 395: "Sed magici maledicti induxerunt summam infamiam in hac parte, quum non solum in malis abusi sunt characteribus et carminibus scriptis a sapientibus contra nociva, et pro utilibus maximis, sed adjunxerunt mendosa carmina et characteres vanos et fraudulentos quibus homines seducuntur".

59 Ibid., p. 396.

just about the same time that Campanus was producing the *Speculum astronomiae* and Bacon composing his *Opus maius*, a soon-to-be-influential voice in the schools of theology was raising the alarm against much of what they had to say, even though he may not have been familiar with their work.[60] Thomas Aquinas brought together his *Summa contra gentiles*, or *Summa against the Gentiles*, after he had left his chair in the school of theology at Paris in 1259 but before the latter part of the 1260s.[61] And it is in this *Summa* that Thomas formulated one of his most sustained criticisms of the works of the magicians. Indeed, Thomas seems to have taken a bead on precisely the image-making operations that both the *Speculum* and Bacon had in mind. As he reported, there were those who claimed that the wondrous works performed in the magical arts were accomplished not by the intervention of spiritual substances—and, of course, we most readily think here of demons—but instead solely from the power of the heavenly bodies. One sign, so these same defenders of magic observed, was that in performing the magic they worked the magicians took care to determine the precise location of the stars in the heavens.[62]

Aquinas would have nothing of these efforts to normalize the science of images. In Chapters 103–106 of Book III of his *Summa* he laid out his arguments for why. First he noted that he had shown that it was not possible for an intellectual result to be caused by bodily principles. But it was clear that in the case of the magic he was referring to, many times intellectual effects were the result. For example, the practitioners of such magic were sometimes able to know the location of stolen goods. Such an end could not be attained by resort to heavenly bodies.[63] Even more importantly, it could be argued that whatever arose by the power of the celestial bodies had to be a natural effect. Here an example was provided by the natural form of a creature, which would have to be generated at the time of the creature's birth under the causal influence of the heavenly bodies. Again, however, the circumstances of the magic he was considering could not be made to fit this model. For by means of the magic unnatural operations were often obtained. Locked doors were mysteriously opened without the

60 Weill-Parot, *Les «images astrologiques»*, pp. 38–40, offers the convincing proposition that by the time Thomas composed the last part of his *Summa theologiae* he had read the *Speculum astronomiae*.

61 See S. Tugwell's introduction to Thomas in the volume he edited, *Albert and Thomas—Selected Writings*, Mahwah, N.J. 1988, pp. 251–252.

62 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* III, 104, Torino 1935, p. 345b.

63 Ibid.

intervention of any human agent, or people were made invisible. Once more, the cause could not have arisen in the heavenly bodies.[64]

Yet if the stars and planets were not sufficient to produce the effects the fabricators of images were able to perform, then there had to be some additional cause.[65] Here Thomas's attention immediately fell upon words. For it was known that in the fashioning of their images the magicians uttered phrases, sometimes speaking as if in conversation.[66] Indeed, it was plain that performing the magic of images required the operator to deploy vocables that carried significance or had a meaning (*voces significativae*). But here Thomas took a stand against what we have seen in Roger Bacon. For Thomas, words had no power solely in themselves. Instead, meaningful words derived their power from the involvement of an intellect that could understand what was being said. In fact, two intellects would be needed: one to proffer the words and the other to receive the proffered communication.[67] At least one of those must be the cause of the wonders that the image magicians performed. Thomas addressed himself to each in turn.

On the side of the proffering intellect he was dealing with a human mind, for of course the magicians saying the words were all human beings. But if the intellect of the magician was the cause of the wonder worked, it would have to be because that intellect was so powerful that by the simple generation of a concept, given concrete instantiation in the word pronounced, it could cause something to be—in this case, the effect brought about by the image magic.[68] This was simply nonsense. The essential nature of a thing was revealed by the power it possessed. For a human being, the power of mind was, as was commonly seen, to be able to have knowledge caused by external objects and not the reverse, to cause external objects by virtue of its conceptualizing act. If therefore some humans—magicians—managed to cause an effect in the external world simply by generating words carrying a conceptual content, they would have a power entirely different and extraordinary. They would thus have to be beings of a completely different nature from the usual human being.[69] No one would hold that that was true of magicians.[70]

64 See ibid., p. 346a.

65 As Thomas said, ibid., p. 345b: "Non igitur est verum omnes hujusmodi effectus sola virtute caelestium corporum causari".

66 Ibid.

67 Thomas, *Summa contra gentiles* III, 105, Torino 1935, p. 347a.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., p. 347b.

70 Ibid., p. 347a: "Non autem potest dici quod voces illae significativae a magis prolatae efficiaciam habent ex intellectu proferentis".

The power of the words used in image magic must therefore have been grounded in the capabilities of the intellect to whom the words were addressed.[71] And this would mean that the receiving intellect, understanding the significance of the words put forth, would upon hearing the words be induced to do something in the external world.[72] Thomas thought that this was obviously the case. Just attending to what the magicians did in working their image magic indicated that this was so. For the significant speech of such magicians amounted to invocations, supplications and adjurations, sometimes even commands. That would plainly make them elements in a conversation, directed toward a being who could understand them and take them as a reason to act.[73] The point was even plainer if one considered the characters and figures (*characteres et figurae*) often brought into image magic. As Thomas thought all would concede, no figure—we might say, geometric shape—could serve as a principle of either act or passive reception. Thus the figures themselves used in the magic could not act to dispose the image to receiving any power by which it could produce an effect in the external world. The only other option was then that the figures functioned as signs, and signs could be read only by intelligent beings.[74] Hence, the magical operations received their efficacy from that intelligent being to whom the communication of the magician was directed. As for characters, their very name gave them away. Characters were by necessity signs.[75] Again, the only plausible conclusion was that magicians performed their image magic by signaling a message to an intellectual nature (*intellectualis natura*), which then accomplished the desired operation.[76]

All that remained was for Thomas to inquire about what kind of being such an intellectual nature, the real active power in image magic, was. It had to be invisible, for the wonders magicians worked did not involve the active intervention of any sensible creature. That is why Thomas later referred to such beings as intelligible substances (*intellectuales substantiae*)—that is, intellects

71 Ibid., p. 347b: "Relinquitur igitur quod hujusmodi effectus compleantur per aliquem intellectum ad quem sermo proferentis per hujusmodi voces dirigitur".

72 Ibid., p. 347a.

73 Ibid., p. 347b: "[N]am hujusmodi significativae voces quibus magi utuntur, invocationes sunt, supplicationes, adjurationes, aut etiam imperia quasi ad alterum colloquentis".

74 Ibid., pp. 347b–348a.

75 Ibid., p. 348b.

76 Ibid., p. 348b: "[C]haracter enim signum est, in quo datur intelligi quod figuris hujusmodi non utuntur nisi ut signis exhibitis alicui intellectuali naturae".

of an entirely incorporeal sort, such as angels or demons.[77] The question was then whether the intellects to whom the magicians addressed their words and for whom they prepared their signs were good or bad. And Thomas was sure they were not good. To lend one's power to accomplishing anything contrary to virtue was not the mark of a well-disposed—that is, good—intellect. But the magical acts Thomas's magicians performed included adultery, theft and murder. Evil deeds (*maleficia*) were the mark, Thomas thought, of image magic. Furthermore, no well-disposed intellect would render services to scoundrels. But that was precisely what these magicians were: *homines scelerati*.[78] As Thomas felt he was forced to conclude, the real agents in the magic he was investigating were demons (*daemones vel diaboli*).[79]

Of course, this was just the conclusion that Roger Bacon had gone to such pains to avoid. And Thomas had established it by resolutely undermining Bacon's doctrine of the special power of words, as agents in themselves. If we look to the following decades, we can see moreover that Thomas was able to have his way. By the end of the thirteenth century theologians were generally in agreement that any magic, including the confection of images, was at its core diabolical. In the early decades of the fourteenth century, we see the first show trials accusing the defendants of performing ceremonial magic.[80] Deprived of the support of a naturalizing explanation such as Bacon's, image magic was put on the defensive. And among most of the educated elite, words were shorn of any but their semantic function, at least until the days of the great *magi* of the Renaissance.

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77 See the reference to "intellectuales substantiae" in: *Summa contra gentiles* III, 107, Torino 1935, p. 349b.

78 These two arguments are presented in: *Summa contra gentiles* III, 106, Torino 1935, pp. 348b–349a.

79 See for example *Summa contra gentiles* III, 107, Torino 1935, p. 351a.

80 For an introduction to these trials, see N. Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons*, rev. ed., Chapters 5 and 7.

CHAPTER 9

Can It be Proved, Following Thomas's Philosophical Principles, That the Human Soul is Naturally Incorruptible?

Bernardo Carlos Bazán †

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to present some of the questions that should be asked before deciding whether Thomas's arguments for the natural incorruptibility of the soul are consistent with his philosophical principles. Those questions are based on his natural philosophy and metaphysics, not on principles or doctrines that are foreign to his philosophical system. Thus, none of Thomas's arguments will be challenged from the perspective that thinking is a function of the brain—because that would be in complete opposition to his basic tenet that *immunitas a materia* is the condition for being intelligent and being understood by an intellect. This paper is therefore, from a methodological point of view, just an outline of an *internal* critique of Thomas's doctrine of the incorruptibility of the soul, and it investigates the claim that the incorruptibility of the soul follows from its very nature and can be proved philosophically—not with a similar claim that could be made on the grounds of theological or religious beliefs. It is nothing more than *a sketch* of an inquiry concerning the philosophical consistency of Thomas's doctrine on the incorruptibility of the soul. A complete, fair and accurate *exposé* about the subject would require a much longer study.

1 The Theoretical Framework in Which Thomas Postulates the Incorruptibility of the Soul

Two matters are equally central to Thomas's philosophical and theological reflections on human nature: the unity of the human composite, because "sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo est unum";[1] and the incorruptibility of the soul,

1 Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, Latin text of the Editio Leonina edited in *Suma teo-*

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because "infinitae etiam sunt auctoritates Sacrae Scripturae quae immortalitatem animae protestantur".[2]

For him, the unity of the human being depends upon the soul being the substantial form of the body, i.e., the first principle of actuality of the human composite. Thomas reached this conclusion in two stages, in Book II of *ScG*. First, in Chapter 56, he concluded that Aristotelian hylomorphism is the only theory capable of ensuring the unity of composite substances: "Ex duobus autem permanentibus non fit aliquid ratione unum nisi ex forma substantiali et materia". Then, after careful considerations of the arguments opposing the application of hylomorphism to the human being, he concluded that the human soul is united "secundum suam substantiam alicui corpori ut formam" (Chapter 70); that, as a substantial form, the soul is united to its body without intermediaries (Chapter 71); and that it is the form of the whole body and of each of its parts, otherwise "non esset forma substantialis talis corporis" (Chapter 72). He strengthened this conclusion arguing, against Averroes's, that the only way to prove that "hic homo intelligit" is to consider that the intellectual soul "secundum suam naturam est forma corporis" (Chapter 72).

By saying that the soul is the substantial form of the body Thomas implies two things: that the soul is the principle of actuality of its correlate, and that the soul and its correlate are joined or meet in the same act of being (*conveniunt in uno esse*) wherein the substance composed of matter and form subsists. There is no problem (*inconveniens*) in saying that the composite and the form subsist by the same act of being because the composite exists by the form and *neither* subsists apart from each other (*nec seorsum utrumque subsistat*).[3]

Because Thomas's understanding of Aristotelian hylomorphism was precise and correct, it can be said with confidence that, by stating that the human soul is a substantial form, he also meant that the soul is a correlate of matter, a co-principle of a material substance, and the unique source of all substantial determinations of this composite. In fact, Thomas should be credited for ridding the Aristotelian doctrine of many theoretical distortions that it suffered during the Middle Ages—such as universal hylomorphism and pluralism of substantial forms—all of which have in common an incorrect understanding of the notions of matter and form and their relationship. This text proves the point:

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lógica de Santo Tomás (Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos), with Translation and Notes by a commission of Dominican Friars presided by Fr. Francisco Barbado Viejo, Madrid 1957–1960, 16 Vols., I, q. 76, a. 1 (hereafter *ST* ...); id., *Summa contra gentiles*, (Editio Leonina Manualis), Roma 1934, II, c. 56 (hereafter *ScG* ...).

2 *ScG* II, c. 79.

3 *ScG* II, c. 68.

> Materia enim dicitur causa forme in quantum forma non est nisi in materia; et similiter forma est causa materie in quantum materia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam: *materia enim et forma dicuntur relatiue ad inuicem*, ut dicitur in II Phisicorum; dicuntur enim ad compositum sicut partes ad totum et simplex ad compositum.[4]

He knew, as well, that a substantial form without its material correlate is neither the subject of being nor consequently the subject of becoming—only the composite of matter and form is the subject of being and, consequently, the subject of generation and corruption:

> *Esse formarum naturalium non est ipsarum absolute, sed ipsorum compositorum*: non enim per se possunt subsistere. Et ideo ipsis formis per se loquendo non acquiritur esse, sed substantiis compositis. Unde *forma per se loquendo neque fit neque generatur, sed compositum*.[5]

> id quod fit proprie est compositum, non forma vel materia: *compositum enim est quod proprie habet esse*.[6]

Thomas understood well that Aristotle designed the structure of co-principles (matter, form and privation) with the specific goal of surmounting Parmenides's dilemma concerning the origin of being and the process of generation and corruption. This structure, therefore, applies only to substances that are capable of being generated and corrupted. Their co-principles exist only by virtue of their mutual relationship—only the composite is the subject of being, while its co-principles exist by the *actus essendi* of the composite. Matter and form are not the subject of generation and corruption. If they were, they had to be, in turn, composites of matter and form, and so on, *ad infinitum*:

> In omni transmutatione oportet esse aliquid subiectum transmutationis, quod est materia, et aliquid a quo transmutatur, quod est principium movens, et aliquid in quod transmutatur, quod est species et forma. Si ergo ipsa forma et materia generarentur, puta si non solum generaretur

4 Thomas de Aquino, *De principiis naturae*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma 1976, Tomus XLIII, paragraph 4, p. 44, v. 37–42.

5 Thomas de Aquino, *Scriptum super I et II libros Sententiarum*, (ed. R.P. Mandonnet O.P.), Paris 1929, II, d. 18, q. 2, a. 3 (hereafter *I Sent.* …; *II Sent.* …).

6 Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, (ed. R.P.M. Pession), Taurini—Roma 1949, q. 6, a. 3 (hereafter *Q. de potentia* …).

> hoc totum quod est aes rotundum, sed etiam ipsa rotunditas et ipsum aes, sequeretur quod tam forma quam materia habeant materiam et formam, et sic ibitur in infinitum in materiis et formis, quod est impossibile.[7]

Since the composite is, *per se*, the subject of the act of being (*esse*), only the composite is said to be generated or corrupted *per se*; its co-principles (matter and form) are said to be generated or corrupted *per accidens*, i.e., by the generation or corruption of the composite of which they are components:

> formae incipiunt esse in actu, compositis factis, non quod ipsae fiant per se, sed per accidens tantum.[8]

> formae enim proprie non fiunt, sed educuntur de potentia materiae in quantum materia quae est in potentia ad formam fit actu sub forma, quod est facere compositum.[9]

> Ipsa autem forma per se corrumpi non potest; set per accidens, corrupto composito, corrumpitur, in quantum deficit esse compositi quod est per formam.[10]

> Per accidens autem dicitur (aliqua forma corrumpi) per corruptionem sui subiecti.[11]

Let us clarify, before going any farther, that the Latin expression "per accidens", is not to be interpreted as meaning by chance, as an unforeseen event lacking necessity. In Thomas's philosophical language, *per accidens* is the opposite of *per se*, and in the context of our discussion it means that, since only the composite exists *per se*, only the composite is generated or corrupted *per se*, while its co-principles are not generated or corrupted *per se* (by themselves), but by the generation or corruption of the composite of which they are components. This remark seems obvious, but is important because, when Thomas applies

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7 Thomas de Aquino, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, (ed. M.R. Cathala O.P., retractatur cura et studio R. Spiazzi O.P.), Taurini—Roma 1964, XII, 3, n. 2443; VII, 7, n. 1419 (hereafter *In Metaph.* ...).

8 *ST* I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 1.

9 *In Metaph.*, VII, 7, n. 1423.

10 Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, (editio Leonina, ed. B.C. Bazán), Roma—Paris 1996, Tomus XXIV-1, q. 14, vv. 174–178 (hereafter *Q. de anima* ...).

11 *ST* IaIIae, q. 53, a. 1.

the doctrine to human beings, he introduces a subtle semantic modification: when corruption of the human composite happens, its formal co-principle—the rational soul—is not *corrupted* by accident, but *separated from the body* by accident.[12]

Obviously, a strict interpretation of hylomorphism should lead to the conclusion that, if the soul is the substantial form of the human composite, it must cease to be with the corruption of the composite of which it is a co-principle. True, it would be corruptible *per accidens*, but corruptible nonetheless. This is completely unacceptable for Thomas, because it goes against the "infinite" number of texts where the immortality of the human soul is proclaimed in the sacred Scriptures.

Realizing that his decision to secure the ontological unity of the human being by conceiving the soul as a substantial form has an inconvenient 'side effect', Thomas proceeds to adapt the notion of substantial form to the particular case of the human soul, by giving to the notion a new meaning that makes it capable of preserving both the incorruptibility of the soul and the unity of the human being. He defines his project in these terms: "ostendendum est per uerba Aristotelis, quod sic posuit intellectiuam animam esse formam quod tamen posuit eam incorruptibilem".[13] The fruit of his undertaking is the syncretic notion of 'subsistent substantial form'. Whether this notion is philosophically coherent is the main question in this paper.

Indeed, to be incorruptible the soul must be subsistent,[14] i.e., subject of the *actus essendi*. The human soul, according to Thomas, differs from other substantial forms by the fact that the latter subsist by the *actus essendi* of the composite of which they are co-principles, while the former subsists by itself and the human composite by the *actus essendi* of its substantial form:

> rationalis anima in hoc a ceteris formis differt, quod aliis formis non competit esse in quo ipsae subsistant, sed quo eis res formatae subsistant; anima vero rationalis sic habet esse ut in eo subsistens.[15]

> In hoc differt anima humana ab aliis formis, quod esse suum non dependet a corpore; unde nec esse individuatum eius a corpore dependet.[16]

12 Cf. *Q. de potentia*, q. 3, a. 9: "inter formas, sola rationalis anima a corpore separatur".

13 Thomas de Aquino, *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma 1976, Tomus XLIII, c. 1, vv. 576–579 (hereafter *DU* ...).

14 Cf. *ST* I, q. 75, a. 2: "aliquid subsistens".

15 *Q. de potentia*, q. 3, a. 9.

16 *Q. de anima*, q. 3, vv. 313–316.

At this moment I must emphasize that being subsistent is not a sufficient cause of incorruptibility (composite substances are subsistent entities and are nonetheless corruptible). For Aristotle and Thomas, incorruptibility belongs exclusively to subjects of being that are only forms, not composites of matter and form—a key to evaluate Thomas's demonstration of the incorruptibility of the soul. He argues that what is proper (*convenit*) to something cannot be separated from it; being (*esse*) is proper to the form by itself because the form is an act, but for *matter* it is a perfection that it acquires only when it is actualized by the form. Corruption "of matter" happens thus when the form separates from it. But it is impossible for the form to separate from itself. Consequently, neither a subsistent entity whose essence is only form, nor a substantial form that is subsistent by itself, are corruptible by themselves (*per se*). Here is his text:

> Id quod secundum se convenit alicui est inseparabile ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu quod acquirit formam; secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio quod separatur forma ab ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse.[17]

Although this text raises some critical questions and requires careful interpretation (for example, the awkward expression "corruption of matter"), it was chosen because Thomas wrote it for "beginners" (*incipientes*, *novitios*) in theological studies and we can expect that by using it he gave the most clear and coherent version of this key component of his argument for the incorruptibility of the soul. In a previous text, he gave a more precise version of the same doctrine:

> Esse per se consequitur formam: unumquodque enim habet esse secundum propriam formam. Vnde esse a forma nullo modo separari potest. Corrumpuntur igitur *composita* ex materia et forma per hoc quod amittunt formam ad quam consequitur esse; ipsa autem forma per se corrumpi non potest … *Si* igitur sit aliqua forma que sit habens esse, necesse est illam formam incorruptibilem esse: non enim separatur esse ab aliquo habente esse nisi per hoc quod separatur forma ab eo. Vnde *si* id quod habet esse sit ipsa forma, impossible est quod esse separetur ab eo.[18]

17 *ST* I, q. 75, a. 6.

18 *Q. de anima*, q. 14, vv. 169–185.

It is clear, therefore, that according to Thomas no form ceases to be *per se*. *If* it is a co-principle of a composite that is the subject of being, i.e., if it is a substantial form, it may cease to be, but only *per accidens*—the composite, however, ceases to be *per se* when it "looses" (*amittit*) its form. However, *if* the 'form' itself is the subject of being, it can never cease to be, even by accident, because a form cannot be separated from itself (it cannot "loose" itself). That is, for him, the case of the human soul, a subsistent form that is the subject of the act of being. Since the beginning of his career, Thomas has stated that the human soul possesses and exercises the act of being independently from the body. That was not surprising because he considered the soul to be an intellectual substance that performs the role of form (a position he held in his *Commentary on the Sentences*), but he kept saying the same thing after he made the soul a substantial form. Here are some texts that prove this continuity:

> anima est *forma absoluta*, non dependens a materia, quod convenit sibi propter assimilationem et propinquitatem ad Deum, *ipsa habet esse per se*, quod non habent aliae formae corporales. Unde *in anima invenitur compositio esse et quod est*, et non in aliis formis, quia ipsum esse non est formarum, sed compositi.[19]

> oportet quod anima intellectiua *habeat esse per se absolutum*, non dependens a corpore.[20]

> Forma igitur que habet operationem secundum aliquam sui potentiam uel uirtutem absque communicatione sue materie, *ipsa est que habet esse*, nec est per esse compositi tantum sicut alie forme, sed magis compositum est per esse eius.[21]

In short, whether Thomas thought that the soul was a substance or a substantial form, he never doubted that the soul was the subject of being. "Ipsa est quae habet esse" was his constant teaching. And equally constant was his teaching that, for the human being to have ontological unity, the act of being that the soul owns is also communicated to the composite:

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19 *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1 (1256, beginning of Thomas's career).

20 *Q. de anima*, q. 1, vv. 246–247 (written in Rome, 1266–1267).

21 *DU*, c. 1, vv. 644–649 (written in Paris, 1270).

> Anima sine dubio habet esse perfectum … *hoc ipsum esse quod est animae per se, fit esse conjuncti*: esse enim conjuncti non est nisi esse ipsius formae.[22]

> anima habet esse subsistens … et corpus trahitur ad esse eius.[23]

> Anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi est etiam ipsius animae.[24]

The argument leading to the conclusion that "anima est quae habet esse" has also been constant throughout his career: because *agere sequitur esse*, the way the human soul operates (its *modus operandi*) reveals the way it possesses being (its *modus essendi*); and since the human soul is capable of performing operations *per se*, without the participation of the body, like thinking and willing, it must be concluded that the soul is also capable of being *per se*, independently of the body. Here is a sample:

> *unumquodque hoc modo se habet ad operandum vel agendum, quomodo se habet ad esse* … unde cum in operatione aliarum formarum necesse sit *communicare* corpus, non autem in operatione rationalis animae, quae est *intelligere et velle*, necesse est ipsi rationali animae esse attribui quasi rei subsistenti, non autem aliis formis.[25]

> Intellectuale principium quod dicitur mens vel intellectus habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari nisi quod per se subsistit … Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum vel subsistens.[26]

Although the operations performed by the soul without the participation of the body are thinking (*intelligere*) and willing (*velle*), we will concentrate, *brevitatis causa*, on thinking.

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22 *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 2m.

23 Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, (editio Leonina, ed. J. Cos O.P.), Roma—Paris 2000, Tomus XXIV-2, a. 2, ad 8 (hereafter *Q. de spiritualibus creaturis* …).

24 *ST* I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 5.

25 *Q. de potentia*, q. 3, a. 9.

26 *ST* I, q. 75, a. 2.

According to Thomas, the human intellect, being a power of a substantial form of the body, is oriented by nature towards the knowledge of corporeal things, and what the intellect grasps of those things is their essence or quiddity. The following texts show the distinction between the 'material' object of our intellect (the things having individual existence outside the mind) and its 'formal' object (the essence of things, determined by their form):

> Ea igitur quae non habent esse nisi in materia individuali cognoscere est nobis *connaturale*, eo quod anima nostra per quam cognoscimus est forma alicuius materiae.[27]

> Potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili … Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est *quidditas sive natura* in materia corporali existens.[28]

> Intellectus informatur similitudine *quidditatis* rei.[29]

> *Quidditas rei* est proprium obiectum intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere quando, *reducentes illud in quod quid est*, sic de eo iudicamus.[30]

> intellectus autem solum apprehendit essentias rerum.[31]

Using Aristotle's statements that the intellect "thinks all things" and is "potentially all individuals"[32] as premises, Thomas argues that, in order to receive the forms of all corporeal realities and to know potentially all the individuals of a species, the receptive intellect must be free of all corporeal nature, and cannot use a corporeal organ, because having such a nature and such an organ, would prevent the intellect from having a non-distorted knowledge of all the corporeal things that are its objects. It is thus impossible that the intellectual principle be a body or use a bodily organ:

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27 *ST* I, q. 12, a. 4.

28 *ST* I, q. 84, a. 7.

29 *ST* I, q. 17, a. 3.

30 *ST* I, q. 17, a. 3, ad 1.

31 *ST* I, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2.

32 Cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, 429a18 and 430a11.

> Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua oportet quod nihil eorum habeat in sua natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret cognitionem aliorum … Si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis non posset omnia corpora cognoscere … Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum ….[33]

> Omne enim quod est in potentia ad aliquid et receptiuum eius caret eo ad quod est in potencia et cuius est receptivuus …; set intellectus noster sic intelligit intelligibilia quod est in potencia ad ea et susceptiuus eorum sicut sensus sensibilium; ergo caret omnino illis rebus que natus est intelligere; cum igitur *intellectus* noster sit natus intelligere omnes res sensibiles et corporeas, oportet quod careat omni natura corporali, sicut sensus uisus caret colore propter hoc quod est cognoscitiuus coloris … intellectus, si haberet aliquam naturam determinatam, illa natura sibi connaturalis prohiberet eum a cognitione aliarum naturarum.[34]

From the principle according to which there is a relation of proportionality between the power of the knower and its object of knowledge Thomas infers another conclusion. The things existing *extra animam* (which are what the intellectual operation aims for) are individuated by matter; they are knowable only by the senses, which are powers of knowledge linked to matter, but they remain, *qua* individuals, out of the reach of the intellect. The incorporeal intellect can reach the form of the individual things, but not as it exists in this matter—only the senses have this privilege. The intellect knows the form as abstracted from matter and the conditions of matter that are causes of its individuation; i.e., the intellect knows the form as it exists only in the intellect. It is not only the intellect that is immaterial, but the object of intellectual knowledge as well: *immunitas a materia* is the condition for knowing and being known:

> Intellectus humanus … non est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae quae est forma corporis … Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existen-

33 *ST* I, q. 75, a. 2.

34 Thomas de Aquino, *Sentencia libri De anima*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Préface de René A. Gauthier, Roma—Paris 1984, Tomus XLV-1, III, 1, vv. 131–150.

> tem, non tamen prout est in tali materia … (Sic vero cognoscere) est abstrahere formam a materia individuali quam repraesentant phantasmata.[35]

The theory of knowledge supporting the idea that the intellectual soul is a subsistent substantial form includes, according to the previous texts, four fundamental ideas: that the power of knowledge and the object known are proportionate; that knowledge is achieved through the reception of the form of the object; that the sensitive powers grasp the form of the object together with the material conditions that individuate it, while the intellect grasps the form by means of an abstraction that separates the form from the conditions of matter (this, in turn, requires as well the "separation" of the intellect from matter); and that there is a dichotomy between knowledge of the particular, attributed to the senses, and knowledge of the universal, attributed to the intellect. This text completes the picture:

> Materia autem est individuationis principium, ratio autem universalis accipitur secundum *abstractionem formae a materia particulari*. Dictum autem est supra quod *per se et directe intellectus est universalium*; *sensus autem singularium*, quorum etiam indirecte quodammodo est intellectus.[36]

Intellection, as the understanding of the abstract and universal essences, is achieved without communicating with the body:

> anima humana, quia excedit corporis capacitatem, remanet ei uirtus ad operandum operationes quasdam *sine communicatione* corporis, sicut intelligere et uelle. Vnde intellectus et uoluntas non sunt actus alicuius organi corporali.[37]

> *sine communicatione* materiae corporalis.[38]

> Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere operationem *absque communicatione* corporis.[39]

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35 *ST* I, q. 85, a. 1.

36 *ST* I, q. 86, a. 3.

37 *Q. de anima*, q. 10, vv. 253–258.

38 *Q. de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 2.

39 *ST* I, q. 84, a. 6.

This premise leads to the conclusion that the human soul is subsistent *per se* because it operates *per se*:

> Vnumquodque enim sic operatur secundum quod habet esse; intellectus autem *habet operationem in qua non communicat sibi corpus* … ex quo patet quod est operans per seipsum: ergo est substantia subsistens in suo esse.[40]

> *Vnumquodque autem operatur secundum quod est. Que enim per se habent esse, per se operantur* … Sic igitur patet quod principium intellectiuum quo homo intelligit habet esse eleuatum supra corpus, *non dependens* a corpore.[41]

Obviously, in all these texts, Thomas argues from an effect (having an operation independent from the body) to its cause (being independent from the body). Anyone could challenge the premise just by recalling that, according to Thomas,[42] the mind cannot think without the input of the sensitive powers linked to corporeal organs: "Operatio autem intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non est nisi in organo corporeo";[43] and no intellectual act is possible without sensible images: "non contingit hominem sine fantasmate intelligere".[44] Thomas has always dismissed this objection by stating that thinking depends on the body not as an instrument, but only insofar as the sensitive powers linked to corporeal organs provide *the object* of thought. I will quote only one, but very important, text of the many where Thomas develops this thesis:

> intelligere non est sine corpore, ita tamen quod sit *sicut obiectum, non sicut instrumentum*. Et ex hoc duo sequuntur. Vnum est quod intelligere est propria operatio anime et non indiget corpore nisi ut obiecto tantum … Aliud est quod illud quod habet *operationem per se*, habet *esse*

40 Thomas de Aquino, *Compendium theologiae*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma 1979, Tomus XLII, I, 84, vv. 3–8.

41 *Q. de anima*, q. 14, vv. 186–209, note; cf. also *Q. de anima*, q. 1, vv. 246–247, and *DU*, c. 1, vv. 644–649, quoted previously.

42 Who follows Aristotle, *De anima*, 431a17–18.

43 *ST* Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 5.

44 Thomas de Aquino, *Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, cuius secundus tractatus est De memoria et reminiscentia*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma—Paris 1985, Tomus XLV-2, II, 2, vv. 16–17.

> *et subsistenciam per se*, et illud quod non habet operationem per se, non habet esse per se; et ideo *intellectus* est forma subsistens, alie *potencie* sunt forme in materia.[45]

In his attempt to safeguard one of the foundations of his notion of subsistent form, Thomas reduces the role of the senses to that of external providers of raw materials required for an operation in which they do not participate in any intrinsic way. His solution raises, however, important questions that will be elaborated in the second part of my article. Before doing so we must examine the ultimate argument on which the subsistence of the soul rests. It concerns the origin of the human soul.

As we have already seen, when the subject of being is a hylomorphic composite, what is generated *per se* is the composite; its form, strictly speaking, is not subject to generation *per se* (*neque fit neque generatur*). This form, whose being consists in being united to the material subject, is caused by the begetter, a natural agent who unites the form to its ontological correlate: "si ergo forma illa non sit subsistens, sed esse suum sit solum in hoc quod uniatur ei cuius est forma, oportebit quod generans sit causa ipsius formae, sicut accidit in omnibus formis materialibus".[46] The natural agent prepares (*disponit*) an already existing material substance for the reception of a new form by altering its accidental configuration, and causes then the transmutation (change of form) in matter:

> agens naturale in generatione agit transmutando materiam ad formam—quod quidem fit secundum quod materia primo disponitur ad formam, et tandem consequitur formam, secundum quod generatio est terminus alterationis—necesse est quod ex parte agentis id quod immediate agit sit forma accidentalis correspondens dispositioni materie; set oportet ut forma accidentalis agat in uirtute forme substantialis, quasi instrumentum eius, alias non induceret agendo formam substantialem.[47]

The causality of natural agents operating by way of transmutation is exercised only over things that exist in matter.[48] And "being", for forms that are products of such transmutation, consists in "being united to matter"; these forms do not

45 *Sentencia libri De anima*, I, c. 2, vv. 68–79.

46 *Q. de potentia*, q. 3, a. 9, ad 6.

47 *Q. de anima*, q. 12, vv. 156–167.

48 *Q. de potentia*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 5.

exist except as correlates of matter: "esse formarum naturalium et corporalium non consistit nisi in unione ad materiam".[49] This is so because these forms are "educed" from the potency of matter by natural agents, by a begetter of the same species (who has the same substantial form in act): "non solum agens naturale disponit materiam, sed educit formam in actum".[50] The notion of *eductio formarum* deserves particular attention, for it is designed to counter the neo-Platonic and Avicennian notion of *inductio formarum*, according to which substantial forms come from superior agents, while natural agents merely prepare (*disponunt*) matter for the reception of the form that comes from without. For Thomas, on the contrary, the idea that accidental as well as substantial forms are educed from matter by natural agents would not be intelligible if forms did not pre-exist potentially in matter:

> utraque enim forma (accidentalis et substantialis) in materiae potentia *praeexistit*, unde agens naturale, quod materiam transmutat, non solum est causa formae accidentalis, sed etiam substantialis.[51]

> formae *praeexistunt* in potentia materiae sed reducuntur in actu per agens exterius naturale.[52]

A form, explains Thomas, can have potential existence in matter, virtual existence in the power of the agent that educes it from the potency of matter, universal existence in the intellect, and actual existence in the composite of which it is a component: "potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu … sed ⟨per⟩ hoc quod habet esse efficitur actu existens".[53] A form is educed from matter and comes to existence through generation only if it pre-exists in the passive potency of matter and in the active potency of the agent. This point needs to be understood correctly: forms are not generated (because they are not the subject of being); it is the composite that is generated by the begetter who educes the form into actuality from the potency of matter: "in generatione compositi ⟨formae⟩ sunt eductae de potentia in actu".[54]

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49 *Q. de potentia*, q. 3, a. 11.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., q. 3, a. 11, ad 10.

52 Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi*, (cura P.A. Odetto), Taurini—Roma 1949, q. 1, a. 8.

53 *Q. de potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

54 *In Metaph.*, VII, 7.

Thomas refers to this pre-existence of forms in matter in other terms. In II *Sententiarum*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, for example, he states that the *inchoate* state of forms in matter (*inchoatio formarum in materia*)—equivalent to the *ability* that matter has to be actualized by the form (*habilitas ad formam*)—has been given to matter by the creator, but this inchoate state is actualized by the power of the natural agent that educes the form from the potency of matter (*eductio earum in actum est per virtutem agentium naturalium*). In his *Commentary on the Physics*, Thomas explains that the "inchoatio formae" is the matter's *aptitudo* for being actualized by the natural agent who educes the form from it.[55] The three terms (*inchoatio, habilitas*, and *aptitudo*) define the natural pre-existence of forms in the potency of matter. The inchoate existence that forms have by nature in the potency of matter explains why the natural agent can educe them from matter into actual existence, just as the inchoate existence that the science of conclusions has in the universal principles allows the thinker to draw from them conclusions applicable to particulars:

> aliqua inchoatio est in natura, sicut forma existit in potentia materiae et scientia conclusionum in principiis universalibus, quia quod in particulari discitur, prius in universali sciebatur.[56]

If, by hypothesis, a form does not have the inchoate existence in the potency of matter that other forms enjoy, such a form, not being in the matter's passive potentiality, is not a possibility of nature. This also means that it is beyond natural efficient causality, because natural agents bring into existence other beings of their same species by educing their forms from the potentiality of matter: "cum omnis operatio creaturae praesupponat potentiam materiam, impossibile est quod aliqua creatura aliquam formam producat in esse quae non educitur de potentia materiae …".[57]

That is precisely what happens in the case of the human soul, which, according to Thomas, cannot be brought into existence by natural causes, and requires the intervention of a separate principle. That is the conclusion of the text previously quoted—"… et inde est quod anima rationalis a solo Deo creatur".

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55 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *In octo libros Physicorum expositio*, (cura et studio P.M. Maggiolo O.P.), Taurini—Roma 1954, II, 1: "inchoatio formae, cum non sit actus sed aptitudo ad actum" (hereafter *In Phys.* …).

56 Thomas de Aquino, *Scriptum super Sententiis* (Liber III): Tomus III* (Distinctiones 1–21), Tomus III** (Distinctiones 22–40), (ed. R.P. Maria F. Moos O.P.), Paris 1956, III, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 (hereafter *III Sent.* …).

57 *I Sent.*, d. 14, q. 3, a. 1.

Thomas considered this to be a doctrine commonly held by theologians and philosophers: "hoc communiter conceditur a theologis et a philosophis".[58] He justifies this doctrine on the grounds that the act of being of forms "educed" from the potency of matter is intrinsically linked to matter in the hylomorphic structure of the generated composite, which is the true subject of being; and consequently none of these forms are subsistent entities. But the human soul is a subsistent form, i.e., it is the subject of being; and consequently it can also be subject of becoming, independently from matter. If so, it cannot be generated by a natural agent from the potency of matter, but must be created by God:

> alie forme non sunt subsistentes, unde esse non est earum, set eis aliqua sunt; unde fieri earum est secundum quod materia uel subiectum reducitur de potentia in actu: et hoc est educi formam de potentia materie. Set ipsa anima habet esse subsistens; unde sibi proprie debetur fieri et corpus trahitur ad esse eius. Et propter hoc dicitur quod est ab extrinseco et quod non est educta de potentia materie.[59]

> anima humana, licet sit forma unita corpori, tamen excedit proportionem totius materie corporalis, et ideo non potest educi in actum de potentia materie per aliquod motum uel mutationem, sicut alie forme que sunt immerse materie.[60]

> Philosophus, in libro *De generatione animalium*, dicit 'relinquitur intellectus solus de foris advenire'. Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habet operationem sine corpore, est subsistens … et ita debetur sibi esse et fieri. Et cum sit immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo.[61]

We have now the essential components of Thomas's doctrine of the incorruptibility of the human soul. The unity of the human being is guaranteed because the soul is a *substantial form*. The intellectual operation, conceived as knowledge of universal forms abstracted from matter, is performed by the soul *without communication* with the body. This operational independence from the body is proof of the soul's ontological independence that makes of it a *subsistent form*. Being subsistent, i.e., subject of the *actus essendi*, the soul can also

58 *II Sent.*, d. 18, q. 2, a. 1.

59 *Q. de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 2, ad 8.

60 *Q. de anima*, q. 2, ad 12.

61 *ST* I, q. 118, a. 2.

be the subject of becoming (*fieri*). This is impossible for the other substantial forms, which, properly speaking, are neither the subject of being nor of becoming. The composite of which they are components is the subject of being, and the forms are educed from the potency of matter when the composite is generated. If it were said that the human soul comes to be in the same way, it would be equivalent to denying its subsistence. The soul cannot be a subsistent substantial form without being *created*, out of the patterns followed by natural causality. But subsistence is the condition for a form to be incorruptible. Therefore, the incorruptibility of the soul is dependent upon its being created. This text (partially quoted *supra*) articulates all these elements:

> Cum enim *agere non possit nisi quod est*, unumquodque hoc modo se habet ad operandum vel agendum, quomodo se habet ad esse. Unde, cum in operatione aliarum formarum necesse sit communicare corpus, non autem in operatione rationalis animae quae est intelligere et velle, *necesse est ipsi rationali animae esse attribui quasi rei subsistenti, non autem aliis formis*, et ex hoc est quod inter formas, sola rationalis anima a corpore separatur. Ex hoc ergo patet quod *anima rationalis exit in esse non sicut formae aliae*, quibus proprie non convenit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri facto quodam, sed *res quae fit, proprie et per se fit*. Quod autem fit, fit vel *ex materia vel ex nihilo*. Quod vero ex materia fit, necesse est fieri ex materia contrarietati subiecta: generationes enim ex contrariis sunt, secundum philosophum. Unde cum anima vel omnino materiam non habeat, vel ad minus non habeat materiam contrarietati subiectam, non potest fieri ex aliquo. Unde *restat quod exeat in esse per creationem*, quasi ex nihilo facta. Ponere autem quod *per generationem* corporis fiat, est ponere ipsam *non esse subsistentem*, et per consequens *cum corpore corrumpi*.[62]

The theory of knowledge plays a pivotal role in the establishment of the subsistence of the soul,[63] and of its creation.[64] But the idea of creation is the keystone of the whole doctrine concerning the incorruptibility of the soul. It is simple: if the soul is not created by God, it cannot be subsistent and, consequently, it cannot be incorruptible.

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62 *Q. de potentia*, q. 3, a. 9.

63 Cf. *DU*, c. 1, vv. 644–649: "Forma igitur que habet operationem secundum aliquam sui potentiam uel uirtutem absque communicatione sue materie, ipsa est que habet esse".

64 Cf. *DU*, c. 1, vv. 752–784: "cum habeat operationem sine corpore, non est esse suum solum in concretione ad materiam; unde non potest dici quod educatur de materia, sed magis quod est a principio extrinseco".

It is now time to elaborate the questions that, in my opinion, need to be answered cogently before accepting this theoretical construct as consistent with Thomas's own philosophical principles.

2 Questions Concerning the Arguments Based on the Theory of Knowledge

Although, for methodological reasons, Thomas's principle according to which immateriality is the condition to understand and be understood will not be challenged, his assumption that the soul performs the operations of thinking (*intelligere*) and willing (*velle*) by itself (*per se*) will be scrutinized in order to specify its exact meaning. First, this doctrine should not be understood as if the soul, by itself, were the immediate principle of those operations. In fact, Thomas always maintained that the essence of the soul, considered by him to be the first principle of operations, is distinct from its operational powers (*potentiae*), which are the immediate principles of operation.[65] We must keep this in mind because Thomas's continuous use of the synecdoche ('intellectus' for 'anima intellectiva') is often confusing. The intellect (immediate principle of intellection) is an operational power, and as such it is an accidental form. The intellectual soul (first principle of all operations of the living body) is the principle of being of the composite, and as such it is a substantial form. When Thomas says (awkwardly, in my opinion) that intellection is fulfilled without the participation of the body, he only means that the intellect does not use a corporeal organ in the performance of its operation, contrary to the other powers, that need organs to carry out the rest of the operations of which the human soul is the first principle. That is also what he means when he applies to the intellect the (controversial) Aristotelian term "separatus": he emphasizes, indeed, against Averroes and his followers, that the term applies to the *intellect* only, in the sense that it is an operational power that does not use a bodily organ, but not to the *soul*, which is united to the body by its very essence of substantial form:

> [Anima] separata quidem est *secundum virtutem intellectivam* … in materia est *inquantum est corporis forma* et terminus generationis humanae.[66]

65 Cf. *ST* I, q. 77, a. 1.

66 *ST* I, q. 76, a. 1.

> licet *intellectus secundum quod est potentia* quaedam non sit corporis actus, *essentia tamen animae* est corporis actus, in qua radicatur potentia intellectiva.[67]

> licet anima humana non habeat materiam partem sui, est tamen forma corporis, et ideo quod quid erat esse sui includit habitudinem ad corpus.[68]

The *first question* that should be asked concerning this doctrine is the one that Thomas himself raised in many of his texts,[69] and that Siger of Brabant repeated in his *Q. in III De anima*:[70] is it possible that a proper accident that emanates from the essence of the soul, like the intellect, could be simpler and more immaterial than the essence from which it emanates?

It could be argued that Thomas answered this question decisively every time that he encountered it. For instance, in *Quaestiones de anima*, q. 2, vv. 310–317 and in the reply to Objection 2, he states that, insofar as our soul is not entirely limited or restrained (*comprehensa*) by the body like the other forms, which are completely immersed (*immersa*) in their material correlate, it exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter and possesses an intellect capable of understanding immaterial intelligible objects; thus, the immateriality of the intellect is an effect (*consequitur*) of the fact that the essence of the soul raises above bodily matter. The same answer is found in *DU*, ch. 3, vv. 387–401: if the human soul was not subsistent, i.e., if it was dependent on the *actus essendi* of the composite to exist, like the other forms, it could not have immaterial powers; but the human soul is subsistent (*suum esse est*), and communicates its being to the body without being restrained (*comprehensa*) by it because its dignity is higher than the capacity of matter; consequently, it can have powers and operations that are beyond the reach of matter.

We can see in these replies that the subsistence of the soul (*ipsa est quae habet esse*), which was supposed to be proved by the immateriality of the intellectual operation, provides now the grounds on which the possibility of such an operation rests. Instead of arguing: "the soul is subsistent because it performs an operation independently from the body", it is now argued that "the

67 *ST* III, q. 46, a. 7, ad 1.

68 *Q. de anima*, q. 3, ad 20.

69 Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, arg. 4; d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 2; *ScG* II, 56; *Q. de anima*, q. 2, arg. 4 (with note 23–26); *ST* I, q. 76, a. 1, arg. 4; *DU*, ch. 3 (with note 387).

70 Cf. Siger de Brabant, *Q. in III de anima*, (edition critique B.C. Bazán), Louvain, 1972, q. 7, p. 23, vv. 18–19.

soul is capable of thinking without a bodily organ because it is subsistent". If we want to prevent from becoming a vicious circle what could be a mere difference between the *ordo inveniendi* and the *ordo demonstrandi*, the initial assumption in the order of discovery, namely that the intellectual operation is performed *absque communione corporis*, must be grounded in facts and arguments, not on the subsistence of the soul—which should be demonstrated using the operational independence as a premise.

From this requirement arises the *second question*: is it possible to reconcile the hypothetical independence of the intellect with the assertion, many times repeated, that the soul *cannot think* without images, i.e., without the cooperation of the internal corporeal senses that prepare the images.[71] This is not an opinion of Thomas the commentator of Aristotle, but a very personal doctrine that he defends even in his theological writings, where he says unequivocally that sensible images are needed to acquire knowledge and to understand already acquired knowledge,[72] to grasp the first principles of thinking,[73] and to reach self-knowledge.[74] He proves these assertions by the irrefutable fact that when sensorial organs are damaged or impeached from working properly, the activity of thinking stops or is hindered,[75] and vice versa when the bodily complexion and the senses are better, the individual is more capable of understanding, reasoning and judging.[76] The texts are numerous and I do not need to quote them in this outline. One will suffice as a synthesis of them all: "operatio intellectus compleri non potest sine operatione virtutum corporearum".[77]

Thomas tries to avoid the consequences that this acknowledgment entails for the subsistence and incorruptibility of the soul using two arguments. The first consists in saying that this dependency on sensible images and sensorial organs is a temporary condition that affects the soul only in this life, but will not affect it in the afterlife: "quandiu est anima in corpore non potest intelligere

71 Cf. *Sentencia libri De anima* III, 6, vv. 131–135: "'anima' *non potest intelligere* 'sine fantasmate'".

72 Cf. *Q. de anima*, q. 15, vv. 319–324; *ST* I, q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 1, ad 5; q. 85, a. 5, ad 2.

73 Cf. *ScG* II, c. 83; *ST* Ia IIae, q. 51, a. 1.

74 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma 1970–1973, Tomi XXII-1 et XXII-2, q. 10, a. 8, vv. 256–286 (hereafter *Q. de veritate* ...); *Q. de anima*, q. 20, vv. 465–478.

75 Cf. *Q. de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 2, ad 7; *ST* I, q. 84, a. 7; *Sentencia libri De anima* III, 1, vv. 240–270.

76 Cf. *ScG* II, 84; *Q. de anima*, q. 5, ad 5; q. 8, vv. 225–228; *Sentencia libri De anima* II, 19, vv. 96–114; *ST* I, q. 76, a. 5; q. 85, a. 7; Ia IIae, q. 50, a. 4, ad 3; IIa IIae, q. 51, a. 3.

77 *ScG* III, 84.

sine phantasmate … hunc modum destruitur corpore destructo".[78] This is not convincing, because the subsistence and incorruptibility of the soul—and the possibility of an afterlife and another *modus essendi*—should be demonstrated by the *modus intelligendi* that the soul has during its corporeal existence. Any attempt to minimize the strength of the operational dependence of the intellect vis-à-vis corporeal senses by appealing to another *modus intelligendi* and another *modus essendi* purportedly possessed by the soul in the afterlife is a *petitio principii* and, in fact, defeats its purpose, because it confirms that our *natural* way of thinking is dependent on the contribution of the senses and does not happen *absque communione corporis*. Thomas acknowledges this as a fact in the same text where he develops his ideas about the mode of thinking of separate souls:

> modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatum a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. Et ideo ad hoc unitur corpori, ut sit et operetur secundum naturam suam.[79]

This statement comes very close to admitting that the discourse on the mode of understanding of separate souls is theological in nature, or that it contains a philosophical fallacy—or is squarely an error similar to that of the "Platonici" that he denounces at the beginning of this text.

The second argument consists in reducing the senses to the role of mere providers of objects. Thomas accepts that intellection does not take place without the body, but specifies that the soul needs the body not as an organ of thinking (*non sicut instrumentum*), but just as an object (*sicut obiectum tantum*). This dependency does not diminish the capacity of the soul to think by itself (*per se*), and to exist by itself as a subsistent—and incorruptible—form.[80] The meaning of this subtle position needs to be clarified before we can ask supplementary questions about its consistency with the rest of Thomas's philosophy.

First of all, it mus be underlined that, according to Aristotle and Thomas, thinking (*intelligere*) is a passive operation, i.e., it consists in being acted upon

78 *ScG* II, 81; cf. *Q. de veritate*, q. 19, a. 1, vv. 332–388; *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1: "habet anima alium modum essendi cum fuerit separata … et alium modum intelligendi".

79 *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1.

80 Cf. *Sentencia libri De anima* I, 2, vv. 68–79; cf. ibid. I, 2, vv. 60–66; *ST* I, q. 72, a. 2, ad 3.

by what is thinkable, i.e., by the object; the intellect, correlatively, is a receptive power.[81] Following Aristotle,[82] Thomas states that, in the case of passive powers, the object holds the role of active principle and moving cause of the operation.[83] The object is the active principle of thinking because it is by the object that the operation of a passive power is formally specified.[84] The possible intellect, by itself, cannot specify its operations because by nature it is devoid of all forms; the agent intellect can abstract forms from sensible data (once they have been sufficiently "prepared" by the internal senses), but does not formally determine the act of thinking.[85] In fact, neither of the intellectual powers of the human soul suffices to specify formally the intellectual operation: that is a privilege reserved to the object presented by the senses.

From those remarks arises the *third question*: can it be asserted without contradiction that the intellect thinks *per se*, if the object that specifies the act of understanding cannot be attained without the corporeal senses? The scope of this question cannot be determined without clarifying what this object is, and how it is received by the intellect. According to Thomas, the object known and the mode of knowing it are proportionate to the nature of the cognitive power. For an intellect that is the immaterial and receptive power of a substantial form of matter, the object can only be the essence of material things having real existence *extra animam*, and its *modus intelligendi* must be necessarily abstractive:

> obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae […] Intellectus autem humanus … est quaedam virtus animae quae est forma corporis […] et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia […]. Et ideo … intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus.[86]

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81 Cf. *Sentencia libri De anima* III, 1, vv. 89–90: "est in potentia ad suum obiectum et susceptiuum eius".

82 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, 1072a30: "thought is moved by the object of thought".

83 Cf. *ST* I, q. 77, a. 3: "obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae sicut principium et causa movens"; *Sentencia libri De anima* II, 6, vv. 134–136: "Obiecta quidem potenciarum passiuarum comparantur ad operationes earum ut actiua, quia reducunt potencias in actum".

84 Cf. *Sentencia libri De anima* II, 6, v. 147: "specificatur operatio".

85 Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1: "lumen intellectuale in eo receptum [in the agent intellect] non est sufficiens ad determinandum propriam rei cognitionem nisi per species a rebus acceptas"; *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, ad 4: "lumen intellectus agentis in nobis non sufficit ad distinctam rerum cognitionem habendam nisi secundum species receptas quas informat".

86 *ST* I, q. 85, a. 1.

As we can see, Thomas distinguishes between the 'material' object of human knowledge, i.e., the things that exist *extra animam*, and its 'formal' object (what the intellect grasps of those things), i.e., the essence (*quidditas*) of those things. This essence has real existence only in material and individual things, cannot be grasped except from these things, and is not fully and truly understood unless it is known as existing in a particular thing outside the mind. But the dichotomy established by Thomas between the intellectual knowledge and the sensitive knowledge prevents the intellect from reaching the particular:

> Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens … De ratione autem huius naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali … Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, *cognosci non potest complete et vere*, *nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens*. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo *necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium quod convertat se ad phantasmata*, ut speculetur *naturam universalem in particulari existentem*.[87]

It appears then that, when Thomas says that the human intellect needs the body "sicut obiectum", he is also saying that a complete and true understanding of the real is not reached without the body, because without it, the intellect has nothing to think about, not even itself. It is of no avail to attempt to weaken this thesis by saying that the *species intelligibiles*, by which the possible intellect is perfected, are actually intelligible by the power of the agent intellect, because these species are actually similitudes of a determinate nature (i.e., are actually principles of formal specification of the act of understanding) not because of the operation of that power, but because of the knowledge assured by sensible images from which they have been abstracted.[88] It is of no avail either to say that sensible images are only similitudes of singular things and the accidents that individualize them, because, as Thomas explains, internal senses are also able to know the universal in the particular. If that were not the case, they would not be able to cause the *experimentum* that is the ground of arts and science, and we would not be able to obtain knowledge of the universals from

87 *ST* I, q. 84, a. 7.

88 Cf. *Q. de veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad 7: "intellectus possibilis recipit formas ut intelligibiles actu ex virtute intellectus agentis, sed ut similitudines determinatarum rerum ex cognitione phantasmatum".

sensible knowledge.[89] Images actualize intellection by presenting the form that specifies it as the act of thinking *this* determinate thing.[90] There are no acts of thinking that are not specified by an object, and there are no objects without images. In short, there is no intellection without the synergy of the intellectual and sensitive powers because the efficient causality of the agent intellect does not replace the specifying causality of the sensible object.[91] And all of these texts make clear another fundamental aspect of Thomas's theory of knowledge, namely that understanding attains its perfection when the intellect knows its formal object (the universalized essence) as existing in its material object (the singular thing having real act of being *extra animam*).

And this thesis raises *the fourth question*: can it be said without contradiction that the act of understanding is performed by the intellect *per se*, *sine communicatione corporis*, if that act includes knowledge of the particular and the application of the universal to the particular? Thomas acknowledges that images and the activity of sense powers are needed not only for the abstraction of the intelligible species, but also for the understanding of an already acquired knowledge, as well as for the application of the universal to the particular, and for the comprehension of the nature of the intellectual operation and the soul. According to him, there is *nothing* that the intellect understands without turning back to the sensible images. But this *conversio ad phantasmata* should not be misunderstood as an act of the intellect going back to a depot of images and grasping through them individual realities to which it applies the already abstracted universal essence. Images are similitudes (*species*) that do *not* actualize the intellect, but the internal senses; consequently only the senses can grasp their intentional content. So, when Thomas says that in order to understand reality "complete et vere" the intellect has to return to the images, he means that the internal senses must join in the act of understanding: "ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat … requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum".[92]

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89 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, (editio Leonina altera retractata, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma—Paris 1989, Tomus I-2, II, 20, vv. 257–271, in particular: "Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis et nullo modo cum hoc apprehenderet uniuersalem naturam in particulari, non esset possibile quod ex apprehensione sensus causaretur in nobis cognitio uniuersalis".

90 Cf. *Q. de anima*, q. 5, vv. 225–228: "[fantasmata] inueniuntur esse in actu respectu anime in quantum sunt similitudines determinatarum rerum".

91 Cf. *Q. de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 10, ad 4: "fantasma actu quidem habet similitudinem determinate nature … in potentia abstrahibilis a materialibus condicionibus […] parte uero intellectiua … non habet actu similitudines distinctarum rerum, set tamen actu habet lumen immateriale habens uirtutem abstrahendi"; cf. *ST* I, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4.

92 *ST* I, q. 84, a. 7.

The dichotomy between intellectual knowledge, which has the universal as object, and sensible knowledge, which has the particular as object, arises from the convergence of three ideas: (1) that all our cognitive powers are immaterial *and* receptive;[93] (2) that our cognitive powers are actualized by similitudes *of the forms* of their objects;[94] and (3) that the essence of a material thing and the thing itself are not identical.[95] This last idea points to the fact that material things are determined not only by their universal essence, but also by their accidents which, being based on matter, individualize them and singularize their essence. The *species* that actualize our cognitive powers are similitudes of the forms of the things known, not of their matter (which is the principle of individuation), and they are all immaterial, even those that actualize the senses (*sensus est receptivus formarum sine materia*). But sensible *species*, because they are received by a cognitive power linked to a material organ, are able to represent the material "conditions" that individualize the thing known, i.e., they are similitudes of the accidental forms proper to an individual object of knowledge. On the contrary, the intelligible species that actualize the intellect, because they are received by a cognitive power entirely separated from corporeal instruments, are similitudes only of the universalized essence of things and of the substantial form that is the principle of actuality of the essence: "quia intellectus omnino immaterialiter recipit, ideo formae quae sunt in intellectu speculativo, sunt similitudines rerum secundum formas tantum".[96] The intellect does not have a similitude of matter, nor a similitude of accidental forms and material conditions that singularize a thing; consequently it has no way of knowing the particular. The importance of this remark is fully appreciated when we realize that *intelligere* includes not only the simple apprehension of universals, but also judgment and reasoning.

This leads to the *fifth question*: can it be said, without contradiction, that judgment and reasoning are forms of understanding performed by the intellect *per se*, without the participation of the senses? In fact, Thomas recognizes that with simple apprehension we grasp only a dimension of the actually existing things, namely their quiddity, but not the properties, accidents and relations that individualize them, surrounding (*circumstantes*) their essence. These "cir-

93 Cf. *ScG* II, 62: "Omnis … virtus cognoscitiva, inquantum huiusmodi, est immaterialis"; *ST* Ia IIae, q. 22, a. 1: "intelligere et sentire est quoddam pati".

94 Cf. *Q. de veritate*, q. 8, a. 11, vv. 217–231: "Omnis autem actio est a forma; et ideo … non fit aliqua forma a rebus in nobis nisi quae sit similitudo formae".

95 Cf. *Sentencia libri De anima* III, 2, vv. 83–85: "in omnibus habentibus formam in materia non est omnino idem res et quod quid est eius".

96 *Q. de veritate*, q. 8, a. 11, vv. 217–231.

cumstances" of the essence are the object of the senses: "intellectus noster (qui) proprie est cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu, cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora".[97] If the intellect wants to know the thing perfectly, it must turn back to the images and, with the help of the internal senses, proceed to synthetize or separate in a judgment (composition or division) the abstract essence and the individualizing data it receives from the senses, thus reaching knowledge of the essence as being the essence of this thing in particular. Then it can proceed from one judgment to another, to reach conclusions through reasoning.[98] Understanding (*intelligere*) does not reach perfection with the apprehension of the essence; if that were the case, our mind "numquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo, sed solum intelligendo quod quid est".[99]

If we take now into consideration that universalized essences exist only in the intellect, and that in the nature of things only individual realities exist,[100] we can understand why Thomas placed truth—the adequate understanding of reality existing *extra animam*—in judgment, not in simple apprehension. In the latter the mind may indulge in the *consideration* of universals, because abstract essences are its formal object—although it will not *understand* them as essences of real things unless it turns back to the images: "intellectus noster … considerat naturas rerum in universali, et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata".[101] In judgment, however, the mind has no choice but to appeal to the cooperation of the senses, because in this second operation the mind is concerned with the way things *actually are*: "Prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate, ut dictum est, ideo veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione et in signo ejus quod est enuntiatio".[102] But actually existing things are singular, and are grasped only by the senses. Therefore senses participate intrinsically in the operation whereby mind reaches truth, the final goal of understanding.

All forms of judgment of the speculative reason (even those whose subject is universal) include a reference to actually existing singular things, and this

97 *ST* I, q. 18, a. 2.

98 Cf. *ST* I, q. 85, a. 5: "ratiocinari".

99 *ST* I, q. 58, a. 4.

100 Cf. *ScG* II, 75: "universalia non subsistant extra animam"; *In Metaph.*, XI, 2, n. 2174: "nihil est in rerum natura praeter singularia existens".

101 *ST* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5; cf. q. 85, a. 5, ad 2.

102 *I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7.

is so because the measure of the truth of all judgments is the thing actually existing *extra animam*, which is singular.[103] But only senses reach particular existing things. Therefore, senses participate in all forms of judgment of speculative reason, because they are related directly to actually existing singular things, while the intellect is related to them only through the sensible images: "cognitio sensus continuatur ad ipsas res sensibiles … eius [intellectus nostri] cognitio quodammodo ad phantasmata continuatur".[104] This is even more evident in the case of the demonstrations of the practical reason, where one of the premises is a universal proposition of the intellect and the other a singular judgment of the cogitative power, a sense power located in the brain.[105]

There is another dimension of our judgments and our capacity to formulate them as enunciations that sheds light on the participation of senses in the very act of understanding. All human operations take place in time, and understanding is not an exception. The objects that specify intellection are subject to time and we understand them in the horizon of time (*temporaliter*), grasping (*respiciens*) those which are present, recalling (*recolens*) those which are past, and predicting or estimating (*praevidens*) those which are in the future.[106] That is why, when we gaze at things, we place them naturally in a temporal framework in order to know those which are past as past, those which are present as present, and those which are future as future: "cognitio nostra est in tempore, et ideo intuitus noster respicit res secundum rationem temporis, scilicet presentis, preteriti, et futuri, ut scilicet cognoscat preterita ut preterita, presencia ut presencia, futura ut futura, et naturaliter".[107] Time, in fact, affects every one of the operations of the intellect. The experience (*experimentum*), for example, which is the source and permanent foundation of our universal conceptions, is constituted through time with the participation of all our senses, particularly

103 Cf. *ScG* I, c. 62: "Veritas enim nostri intellectus mensuratur a re quae est extra animam"; cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Peryermenias*, (editio Leonina altera retractata, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma—Paris 1989, Tomus I-1, I, 3, vv. 149–176; *Q. de veritate*, q. 1, a. 3, vv. 41–46; *ST* I, q. 21, a. 2.

104 *Q. de veritate*, q. 2, a. 6, vv. 57–82.

105 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Scriptum super Sententiis* (Liber IV, Distinctiones 23–50), Sancti Thomae Aquinatis *Opera Omnia*, Parma 1858, Tomus 7–2, IV, d. 50, q. 1, a. 3, ad s.c. 3 (hereafter *IV Sent.* …).

106 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *De rationibus fidei*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma 1969, Tomus XL, c. 10, vv. 18–22.

107 Thomas de Aquino, *Quodlibet* XI, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), *Quaestiones de Quolibet*, Roma—Paris 1996, Tomus XXV, q. 3, vv. 30–36. This *Quodlibet* was written ca. 1259.

the memory and the cogitative power; the inductive process by which we reach knowledge of universals requires time and is impossible without the senses.[108] The fact that time is an essential component of our judgments is a consequence of our dependency on sensible data, which explains why it is in conformity with our nature that the enunciations expressing our understanding of reality are articulated by means of temporal verbs: "ratio nostra connaturale habet secundum statum viae accipere cum tempore propter hoc quod ejus cognitio oritur a sensibilibus, quae in tempore sunt, ideo non potest formare enuntiationes nisi per verba temporalia".[109] At the level of simple apprehension, where the intellect deals with universals that are *supra tempus*, the intellect can put time into brackets, but at the level of judgments, where it deals with actually existing things, it has to place them in the horizon of time: it cannot apply universals to things without time being included in the very act of understanding:

> Et inde est quod in compositione et divisione semper noster intellectus adiungit tempus praeteritum vel futurum, non autem in intelligendo quod quid est. Intelligit enim quod quid est abstrahendo intelligibilia a sensibilium conditionibus: unde secundum illam operationem, neque sub tempore neque sub aliqua conditione sensibilium rerum intelligibile comprehendit. Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta ad res: et in hac applicatione necesse est cointelligi tempus.[110]

Time, however, is a continuous quantity of movement, grasped by the senses, particularly by the memory, the cogitative power, and the common sense, which is the root of the previous two.[111] The demonstration of this point would require a long analysis of texts that is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that all the components of the definition of time as "the number of movement in respect to the before and after"[112] are objects of sensible knowledge according to Thomas:

> *magnitudo* autem cognoscitur sensu: est enim unum de sensibilibus communibus; similiter autem et *motus*, precipue localis, cognoscitur in quan-

108 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Posteriorum* I, 30, vv. 31–82, and Aristotle, *Posterior analytics* I, 18, 81b2–9.

109 *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 3.

110 *ScG* II, c. 96.

111 Cf. *Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato* II, 3, vv. 280–281: "in quantum per ipsum [primum sensitiuum = common sense] cognoscimus tempus"; cf. Aristotle, *De memoria*, 451a17.

112 Aristotle, *Physics*, 219a30.

> tum cognoscitur distancia magnitudinis; *tempus* autem cognoscitur in quantum cognoscitur prius et posterius in motu: unde *hec tria sensu percipiuntur*.[113]

> *magnitudo*, et omnia consequentia, ut *motus* et quies et *numerus*, et hujusmodi, *dicuntur sensibilia communia per se* tantum.[114]

All these statements justify *the sixth question*: Is it possible to state without contradiction that the intellect understands *per se*, *sine communicatione corporis*, if the more perfect forms of understanding (judgment and reasoning) include time—grasped by the corporeal senses—as an essential component?

The six questions that were raised call attention to the fact that, according to Thomas's own theory of knowledge, the recognition that the intellect needs the body "sicut obiectum", implies the recognition that the act of understanding is not performed by the intellect alone (*per se*), because the object that specifies that act formally, i.e., intrinsically, is presented by the corporeal powers of cognition. If this is accepted, there are no grounds to state that the intellectual soul is subsistent, i.e., subject of being (*esse*), and consequently that it is incorruptible. All the questions are legitimized, in one aspect or another, by this text:

> Phantasma est *principium* nostre cognitionis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio, non sicut transiens, sed sicut *permanens* ut quoddam *fundamentum* intellectualis operationis; sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni *processu* scientie, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta, *in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit*, uel secundum perfectam repraesentationem, uel per negationem. Et ideo quando phantasmatum cognitio impeditur, oportet *totaliter impediri cognitionem intellectus*, etiam in diuinis.[115]

3 Questions Concerning the Arguments Based on Metaphysical Principles

The incorruptibility of the soul rests upon the idea that the soul—a form—is by itself the subject of the act of being (*est per se subsistens*; *ipsa est quae habet*

113 *Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato* II, 2, vv. 119–130.

114 *IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 2.

115 Thomas de Aquino, *Super Boetium De trinitate*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma—Paris 1992, Tomus L, q. 6, a. 2, ad 5.

esse). It is then fitting that the *first question* should be: What is required to be the subject of the act of being (*esse, actus essendi*)?

In his commentary on Boethius's *De hebdomadibus* (after 1259?) Thomas distinguishes between *esse* (the act of being) and *quod est* (that which is). He explains that just as the subject of *currere* (to run) is a *currens* (that which runs), the subject of *esse* is a *quod est* or *ens* (a being, "un étant", "un ente"). But, given the analogical meaning of 'ens', he clarifies that by this term he means the substance, the first category of being, to which it belongs to exist by itself (*subsistere*) as the proper subject of being:

> *ipsum esse non significatur sicut subiectum essendi*, sicut nec currere significatur sicut subiectum cursus … *id quod est* significatur sicut *subiectum essendi* uelud id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum currendi; et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit siue de currente quod currat in quantum subicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod *ens siue id quod est* sit in quantum participat actum essendi. Et hoc est quod dicit quod 'ipsum esse nondum est' quia non attribuitur sibi esse sicut subiecto essendi, sed id 'quod est, accepta essendi forma', scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi, 'est atque consistit', id est *in se ipso subsistit*. *Non enim dicitur ens proprie et per se nisi de substancia cuius est subsistere*; accidencia enim non dicuntur encia quasi ipsa *sint*, set inquantum eis substancia est aliquid.[116]

As the term 'substance' has several meanings, the two most relevant for our purpose being that of 'first substance' and 'essence',[117] it is important to confirm by other texts that it is indeed 'first substance' (*substantia prima*) that is meant by Thomas in the previous quotation. A few texts will eliminate any doubt in that respect. In *Quaestiones de potentia*, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3 he firmly states that it is proper to an individual substance to be by itself (*substantia individua proprium habet quod per se existat*), and in the response ad 3 he adds that only an individual substance is a subsistent entity (*nihil subsistat nisi individua substantia, quae hypostasis dicitur*). In *ST* I, q. 29, a. 2 he states that the substance is the subject or *suppositum* that subsists in its genus (*dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae*). In his *Commentary on Aristotle's*

116 Thomas de Aquino, *Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus*, (editio Leonina, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum), Roma—Paris 1992, Tomus L, l. 2, vv. 46–67 (hereafter *Expositio De ebdomadibus …*).

117 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, 8, 1017b10–27, and Thomas's Commentary V, 10; VII, 1, nn. 1270–1274.

Metaphysics XI, 3, n. 2197 he takes again the notion of substance as the prime referent of being—as opposite to accidents—and declares that being, absolutely considered, is that which has the act of being in itself (i.e., is the subject of being), namely the substance (*ens simpliciter dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia*).[118] And in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* X, 3, n. 1979 he makes clear that the substance which subsists *per se* as the subject of the act of being is the first substance or hypostasis, not the essence.[119] The essence, which is the correlate of *esse* in the metaphysical composition of finite beings, is not the subject of being, but the principle by which the substance has being and exercices this actuality as its subject:

> Esse pertinet et ad naturam et ad hypostasim: ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse.[120]

> *Essentia enim et forma in hoc conveniunt quod secundum utrumque dicitur esse illud quo aliquid est*.[121]

This distinction between substance as subject of the act of being and essence as principle of being and component of the substance is apparent in the case of substances that are composite of matter and form, whose essence—which is the formal object of our intellect—is not 'that which is', but that 'by which' the substance is: "quidditas compositi non est ipsum quod est, sed est hoc quo aliquid est, ut humanitate est homo".[122] The consequence of this distinction is that the subject of being—the actually existing being—is not identical to its essence (that is why "humanitas" is not predicated of "Socrates"): "in omnibus habentibus formam in materia non est omnino idem res et quod quid est eius: Sortes enim non est sua humanitas".[123] Thomas also states that in the case of separate substances, their simple quiddity is the subject of being (*subsis-*

118 See also *In Metaph*. XII, 1, n. 2419: "ens dicitur quasi esse habens; hoc autem solum est substantiae, quae subsistit".

119 Cf. ibid., X, 3, n. 1979: "substantia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo suppositum in genere substantiae, quod dicitur substantia prima et hypostasis, cuius proprie est subsistere. Alio modo quod quid est".

120 *ST* III, q. 17, a. 2.

121 *In Metaph*., V, 10, n. 904.

122 *II Sent*., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1.

123 *Sentencia libri De anima* III, 2, vv. 83–85; vv. 119–120: "tam in naturalibus quam in mathematicis differt res et quod quid est".

tit in esse), and that this does not invalidate the previous distinction between essence and subject of being for two reasons. First, because no essence exists except in its supposit: "nulla natura habet esse nisi in supposito suo … quidquid est in genere substantiae per se existens, rationem hypostasis habet, vel suppositi".[124] Second, because in the case of separate substances, which are pure forms, the supposit is identical to its essence: form is *all* they are, and the form they are is a *complete essence*:

> ut dicit Avicenna, ipsum simplex est sua quidditas … In simplicibus autem non differt re [ed. Moos: 'esse re'] natura et persona, quia natura non recipitur in aliqua materia … sed est per se subsistens.[125]
>
> In substantiis vero simplicibus nulla est differentia essentiae et subiecti.[126]
>
> non est in eis aliud habens quidditatem, et aliud quidditas ipsa.[127]
>
> in angelis enim quodlibet suppositum est sua natura: quidditas enim simplicis est ipsum simplex, … unde ipsa quidditas est in suo esse subsistens.[128]

We can conclude that in all cases the subject of being is a supposit (first substance, hypostasis), whether it has a composite essence to which it is not identical, or a simple essence to which it is identical *in re* while differing from it logically: "Essentia vero in substantiis quidem materialibus non est idem cum eis secundum rem neque penitus diversum, cum se habeat ut pars formalis; in substantiis vero immaterialibus est omnino idem secundum rem, sed differunt ratione".[129]

I am not directly interested here in separate substances. The only reason of my incursion in a theological domain is because it allows me to show that for Thomas the subject of being must be essentially complete. These texts, philosophical in nature, confirm this basic requirement:

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124 *III Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1.
125 Ibid., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3.
126 *Q. de potentia*, q. 9, a. 1.
127 *Q. de anima*, q. 17, ad 10.
128 *Q. de potentia*, q. 7, a. 4.
129 Ibid., q. 9, a. 1.

> substantia completa est proprium susceptivum ipsius esse.[130]
>
> substantia individua (est) quoddam completum per se existens.[131]
>
> indiuiduum autem in genere substantiae non solum habet ut per se possit subsistere, set quod sit aliquid completum in aliqua specie et genere substantie.[132]
>
> substancia est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie.[133]

The actually existing substance ('that which is'), if it is composite, has a complete essence which includes matter and form and possesses accidents that individualize it (like the accident quantity, without which such a substance can neither exist nor be conceived as existent); and if it is a simple separate substance, its *whole* essence is a form. The subject of being has always a complete essence because *esse* is the actuality of a complete whole, not of one of its parts: "ipsum esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed substantiae totius: eius enim actus est esse de quo possumus dicere quod sit … ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est".[134] That is precisely what Thomas means when he says that the subject of being is a "hoc aliquid demonstratum",[135] i.e., "quod est completum in esse et specie";[136] and that, vice-versa, only first substances are *hoc aliquid*.[137]

The *second question* follows naturally: which is the human subject of being?

The answer is clear: it is the human person. Thomas's position in this respect has always been the same: the supposit of human nature is a person or hypostasis;[138] and the person is the subsisting individual substance of intellectual nature.[139] 'Persona' is a 'supposit' of rational nature, but both 'persona' and

130 *ScG* II, 55.

131 *Q. de potentia*, q. 9, a. 3, ad 13.

132 *Q. de anima*, q. 1, vv. 197–200.

133 *Sentencia libri De anima* II, 1, vv. 65–83.

134 *ScG* II, 54.

135 Cf. *In Metaph.*, VII, 2, nn. 1291–1293.

136 Cf. *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, 1, vv. 96–117.

137 Cf. *In Metaph.*, VII, 3, n. 1323: "Esse enim hoc aliquid convenit solis substantiis".

138 Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 3, s.c. 1: "suppositum humanae naturae est idem quod hypostasis vel persona".

139 Cf. *Q. de potentia*, q. 6, ad 1: "persona est substantia individua que est hypostasis"; q. 10, a. 4: "persona vero est aliquid subsistens in genere substantiae".

'supposit' express an individual substance, i.e., the subject of being: "persona non addit supra hypostasim proprietatem distinguentem absolute, sed proprietatem distinguentem ad dignitatem pertinentem … Tam enim persona quam hypostasis est substantia individua".[140] Both the hypostasis (subject of a nature) and the first substance (subject of being) coincide in the person, which is the special name given to an individual substance of a rational nature: "nomen 'persona' est speciale nomen individui rationalis naturae. Utraque ergo specialitas [substantia et hypostasis] sub nomine personae continetur".[141] The person possesses the noblest mode of being, namely the mode of being of the rational substance, which exists by itself (*subsistens*), as a distinct and incommunicable being (*distinctum et incommunicabile*):

> modus existendi quem importat persona est dignissimum, ut scilicet aliquid sit per se existens.[142]

> persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura.[143]

> nomen personae non designat hoc solum quod est subsistens, quod videtur ad essentiam pertinere, sed etiam hoc quod est distinctum esse et incommunicabile.[144]

This last quotation leads to the *third question*: what is a human person?

Taking into account that, according to Boethius's definition, a 'person' is an individual substance of a rational nature, that to be individual implies to be *in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum*,[145] that in material substances the actually existing individual substance is not identical to its essence,[146] and, finally, that the subject of being is "quoddam completum per se existens" (cf. n. 131), Thomas carefully distinguishes between the abstract quiddity 'humanitas', the abstract universal 'homo' and the actually existing human being 'hic homo'. He made the distinction at the very beginning of his career, when he explained, in

140 *ST*, q. 40, a. 3, ad 1m.

141 *Q. de potentia*, q. 9, a. 2.

142 Ibid., q. 9, a. 3.

143 Cf. *ST* I, q. 29, a. 3.

144 *Q. de potentia*, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3m.

145 *ST* I, q. 29, a. 4.

146 Cf. *Q. de potentia*, q. 9, a. 1: "in rebus ex materia et forma compositis essentia non est omnino idem quod subiectum".

his *Commentary on the Sentences*, that indeed *humanitas*, the quiddity obtained by a process of abstraction that excludes (*cum praecisione*) the individuating conditions of matter, is not the actual subject of being because it does not meet the condition of expressing the complete reality of this subject, and cannot be predicated of it because a part is not predicated of the composite whole. 'Homo', in turn, which can be predicated of the whole composite because it signifies its essence and individuating principles—the latter indeterminately or universally—cannot be the subject of being either, because being undistinguished (*indistinctum*) is equivalent to being incomplete and in potency, which goes against the very notion of subject of being (*subsistens*). Consequently, only 'hic homo', a composite that comprehends all the essential and individuating principles determinately, meets the requirements for being a human person, i.e., a subject of being, a *hoc aliquid* actually existing:

> Quia 'humanitas' non includit in sua significatione totum quod est in re subsistente in natura, cum sit quasi pars, non praedicatur. Et quia non subsistit nisi quod est compositum … ideo '*humanitas*' [Parma: 'anima'!] *non subsistit*, sed Socrates, et ipse est habens humanitatem. 'Homo' autem significat utrumque, et essentialia et individuantia, sed diversimode, quia essentialia significat determinate, individuantia vero indeterminate, vel haec vel illa. Et ideo 'homo', cum sit totum, potest praedicari de Socrate et dicitur habens humanitatem. Sed quia esse indistinctum est incompletum, quasi ens in potentia, ideo *'homo' non subsistit* sed *'hic homo' cui convenit ratio personae*. Est ergo ratio personae quod sit subsistens distinctum et omnia comprehendens quae in re sunt.[147]

The same idea is strengthened in a text of his mature *Disputed Questions on the Power of God* (partially quoted above) where he underlines the fact that the formal meaning (*formalis significatio*) of a human person is taken from the rational nature in which it subsists distinctively, but, as nothing subsists distinctively in human nature unless it is individuated and diversified by matter, then this condition must also be materially signified (*materialiter significatum*) when trying to convey the meaning of human person—'materially' meant as indicative of the *subject* of the formal perfection:

> 'persona humana' significat subsistens distinctum in natura humana, et haec est formalis significatio … Sed quia distinctum subsistens in naturam

147 *III Sent.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3.

> humanam non est nisi aliquid per individualem materiam individuatum et ab aliis diversum, ideo oportet quod hoc sit materialiter significatum cum dicitur persona humana.[148]

The human person—the subsisting human being—is therefore an integral or complete whole, and no part of it can claim to be a person, i.e., the subject of being: "hoc nomine persona, ypostasis et suppositum integrum quoddam designant. Non enim potest dici quod manus aut caro aut quecumque alia partium sit persona, vel ypostasis aut suppositum, sed hoc totum quod est homo".[149] What defines a human person and distinguishes it from a hypothetical angelical person are three characteristics: as a composite whole, it subsists (has being) in its parts; as a substance whose receptive and abstractive mode of understanding depends on sensible data, it thinks discursively in a framework of space and time; and as a hylomorphic substance, it is a distinct and uncommunicable individual by the fact that its nature is received in matter:

> Tria quae sunt de ratione personae considerentur: scilicet subsistere, ratiocinari et individuum esse. *Subsistit* enim homo in partibus suis ex quibus componitur … *Ratiocinatur* homo discurrendo et inquirendo lumine intellectuali per continuum et tempus obumbrato ex hoc quod cognitionem a sensu et imagine accipit … *Incommunicabilitas* est in homine ex hoc quod natura sua receptibilis in materia fundamento per materiam determinatur.[150]

It is apparent, therefore, that the human subject of being is the person, more precisely this particular person (*hic homo*), individuated by matter, constituted by the union of this soul and this body: "ex unione animae et corporis constituitur 'homo', sed ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore hic homo, quod hypostasim et personam designat".[151] Only the individual human being is subsistent, i.e., has actual being in the nature of things, because only the individual is complete: "Homo autem particularis (quia universalem non assumpsit, cum non habeat esse in rerum natura) est quid subsistens, habens esse completum".[152] Only the composite of body and soul is a human person and a hypostasis, i.e., a subject of

148 *Q. de potentia*, q. 9, a. 4.

149 *Compendium theologiae* I, c. 211, vv. 6–16.

150 *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2.

151 *ScG* IV, c. 37.

152 *III Sent.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 2.

being, an actually subsisting entity: "in homine persona, hypostasis et suppositum est quod ex anima et corpore constituitur".[153] In fact, the human being—the human person—has no actual existence except as an individual subsisting in these particular flesh and bones; without these individuating determinations it exists only in the mind: "non enim est homo nisi in his carnibus et in his ossibus … natura humana non habet esse preter principia individuantia, nisi in intellectu".[154]

The *fourth question* should then be: is the human soul a person?

Thomas's answer to this question is explicit: *it is not*. I should be brief here, because, in a forceful text that contains his negative answer and the grounds of it, he explains that the soul is not a hypostasis, not something having a determinate mode of being (*hoc aliquid*), not something that you can place in a genus or in a species, for the simple reason that it is *a part* of the human nature, not a complete essence. The soul lacks the basic component of a subsistent entity, namely *completion*. It lacks therefore the basic requirement for being a human person:

> Anima autem, *licet sit incorruptibilis* non tamen est in alio genere quam corpus quia, cum sit pars humane nature, *non competit sibi esse in genere uel specie uel esse personam aut ypostasim* set composito. Vnde etiam *nec hoc aliquid* dici potest, si per hoc intelligatur ypostasis uel persona uel individuum in genere uel specie collocatum.[155]

Thomas states that the human soul, being only a part of the human essence, cannot meet without the body the requirements set as conditions for being a first substance, a human person, or a subject of being. We read indeed, in Book III of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, d. 5, q. 3, a. 2, that "anima separata non potest dici persona; proprie loquendo non est substantia alicuius naturae". And in *ST* I, q. 75, a. 4 he compares the soul to a hand or a foot and concludes that they are all parts of the human species, and therefore none of them can be considered a hypostasis or a person, i.e., a subject of the act of being: "non quaecumque substantia particularis est hypostasis vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae".[156]

153 *Compendium theologiae* I, c. 211, vv. 72–80.

154 *Sentencia libri De anima* II, 12, vv. 113–118.

155 Cf. *Q. de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 2, ad 16m, vv. 462–470.

156 *ST* I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 2.

The *fifth question* is then: can the soul be incorruptible, if it is not the subject of being?

It is obvious that Thomas thought so, as attested by the text of *Quaestio de spiritualibus creaturis* quoted above, and by numerous other texts where he defends the incorruptibility of the human soul. His position is that the soul is the subject of being *in spite* of not being a substance but a part of the composite substance, and that it keeps this privilege after the corruption of the substance of which it is a part. He was aware of the existence of a problem and formulated it in precise terms:

> Omne quod est per se subsistens est hoc aliquid in genere uel specie collocatum. Set anima humana, ut uidetur, non est hoc aliquid, nec collocatur in specie uel genere tamquam indiuiduum uel species, cum sit forma: esse enim in genere uel specie conuenit composito, non materie neque forme, nisi per reductionem. Ergo anima humana non est per se subsistens; et ita, corrupto corpore, remanere non potest.[157]

Thomas's response, however, is disappointing. In fact, he does not address the problem raised in the objection and practically repeats it, transformed into a statement of principle that leaves intact the contradiction denounced in the objection and makes it more apparent: "even if the soul can exist by itself [which means that it has a complete essence], it does not have an essence by itself" (*licet anima per se possit esse, non tamen per se habet speciem, cum sit pars speciei*). This is equivalent, according to the metaphysical principles reviewed above, to the statement: "the soul is capable of existing by itself even if it is not capable of existing by itself". The same contradiction is found in *Quaestiones de anima*, q. 1, ad 1: "etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam, sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei".

This raises the *sixth question*: did Thomas have any way to avoid the aforementioned contradiction?

He tried different solutions. The most common was the one based on the principle that "esse per se convenit formae" or that "esse per se consequitur formam". This principle allowes him to prove that *no form is per se subject of corruption*, but not to deny that substantial forms are corrupted *per accidens*, following the dissolution of the composite substance which is *per se* subject of being and *per se* subject of corruption, and of which those forms are parts. Based on the aforementioned principle, he goes on to argue that *if* there was a

157 *Q. de anima*, q. 14, ob. 21.

form that was itself the subject of the act of being, it would be impossible that such a form could be subjected to any form of corruption. The hypothesis is logically possible, but it does not exempt such a form from the requirement of having a complete essence. If a form subsists *per se*, it is because it is a first substance whose whole essence is just a form: "ut dicit Avicenna, ipsum simplex est sua quidditas".[158] The adequate correlate of the act of being is always a complete essence. But for Thomas the soul is just *pars speciei*, and consequently it cannot be subject of *esse*. Only angels could, without contradicting Thomas's principles, be subsistent and incorruptible forms—if they exist.[159]

Another solution is to grant essential completeness to the soul (a drastic step, compatible with some of the ideas expressed in the first two books of his *Commentary on the Sentences*). This, however, is an apparent solution, because it renders anthropological dualism inevitable (a doctrine unacceptable for Thomas), and makes it impossible to adopt hylomorphism as the best explanation of the unity of human beings (something he wished to do since Book II of *ScG*). It makes it impossible because, in order to be the substantial form and first principle of life of the human composite, the soul must be only a part of the human essence and not a complete essence in itself: "vivificare formaliter est substantiae quae est pars alicuius naturae et non habentis in se integram naturam speciei".[160] Granting essential completeness to the soul would have destroyed the transcendental relationship between matter and form, and consequently the unity of the composite. But when Thomas deals with subjects that have a heavy impact on his theological convictions—like the incorruptibility and creation of the soul—he tends to water down his philosophical principles, or to lend them a flexibility that he would not allow when examining other, strictly philosophical subjects. For example, when dealing with the creation of the soul in his *Summa theologiae*, he begins with the statement that only substances are properly the subject of being (*ens*) and, consequently, of becoming (*fieri*), but then he refers to the soul in the same terms that Avicenna would have used for separate substances: "in anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum, quod quidem ex necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se consequitur ad formam".[161]

158 *III Sent.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3.

159 In an article written as a tribute to John Wippel, I have argued that Aquinas did not provide valid philosophical demonstrations of the existence of angels; cf. B.C. Bazán, "On Angels and Human Beings. Did Thomas Succeed in Demonstrating the Existence of Angels?", in: *Archives d'histoire docrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 77 (2010), pp. 47–85.

160 *ST* I, q. 51, a. 1, ad 3.

161 *ST* I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 1.

Thomas also tried to avoid the contradiction by splitting the properties of substance in order to apply them separately to the soul. The substance or *hoc aliquid* (τόδε τί), according to Aristotle,[162] is whatever has an individual (τόδε), determinate (τί) and separate (χωριστόν) being, i.e., whatever subsist by itself as an essentially determined individual. Thomas fully agrees: a substance is *per se subsistens* (exists by itself, not in another), as a *hoc aliquid*, i.e., as a distinct individual possessing a determinate being incommunicable to others: "quod est hoc aliquid quasi per se subsistens et quod est separabile quia est ab omnibus distinctum et non communicabile multis".[163] Substance is separate, because it exists *per se*, independently from its accidents; and its being is determinate: "Duo enim sunt quae maxime propria videntur esse substantiae, quorum unum est quod sit separabilis … Aliud est quod substantia est hoc aliquid demonstratum".[164] The act of being that the substance has *per se* is individual and essentially determinate;[165] the substance is a complete whole that exists—like this determined individual that subsists *per se*.[166] In short, the subject of being subsists *per se* as an individual determined by a complete essence. There is no indication that the two characteristics (subsistence and essential completeness) could be separated, or that one of them could be attributed to an entity that does not possess the other. But that is precisely what Thomas does—with the best of intentions, namely to safeguard simultaneously the unity of man and the incorruptibility of the soul. He attributes *per se* subsistence to the soul, ensuring thus its incorruptibility, but denies that it has essential completeness, ensuring thus that it is a substantial form of the human composite: "anima est hoc aliquid ut per se potens subsistere, non quasi habens in se completam speciem, set quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut est forma corporis. Et sic simul est forma et hoc aliquid".[167] We can see that Thomas went from conceiving the soul as a substance that plays the role of a substantial form (*Commentary on the Sentences*), to conceiving it as a substantial form that enjoys one property of a substance—without meeting all the requirements for being one. The question is whether this splitting of the properties of the substance is consistent with his teachings.

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162 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, 8, 1017b; *Categories* 5, 3a7–b12.

163 *In Metaph.*, V, 10, n. 903.

164 Ibid., VII, 2, n. 1291.

165 Cf. *In Phys.*, I, 13, n. 118.

166 Cf. ibid., III, 10, n. 375: "aliquod totum simul existens sicut hoc aliquid"; IV, 17, n. 587: "hoc aliquid, idest res quaedam per se stans".

167 *Q. de anima*, q. 1, vv. 270–290.

Another adjustment—necessitated by the previous one—was to modify the causality of matter vis-à-vis the form. When hylomorphism is understood strictly, matter and form are correlatives, i.e., causes of each other's being: the form grants the act of being to matter, and matter provides the support where the composite and its components exist. But in this scenario, as we saw, the form exists by the *esse* of the composite—which is something that Thomas cannot accept for the human substantial form. So he made an *ad hoc* adjustement to the causality of matter: in the case of human beings, matter is not strictly (*simpliciter*) the support of the form's *esse*, but is the subject of the form in the sense that the subsistent soul exercises its act of being *in* the body—not in correlation with the body, not inseparably from the body, not as having the body as a support for the act:

> Forma autem et materia sibi invicem sunt causa quantum ad esse: forma quidem materiae in quantum dat ei esse actu; materia vero formae in quantum sustentat ipsam … Materia etiam quandoque non sustentat formam secundum esse simpliciter, sed secundum quod est forma huius, habens esse in hoc, sicut se habet corpus humanum ad animam rationale.[168]

Inevitably, if a substantial form is subsistent by itself, its relationship with matter could not be defined in the way the original hylomorphism does. This adjustment plays an important role in the explanation of the creation of the human soul. For Thomas, the matter to which the soul is related is not a matter from the potency of which it has been educed (*materia ex qua*), but a matter in which it exercices its own act of being granted by God (*materia in qua*). Whether this theory guarantees the unity of man and respects the causality of natural causes is a matter that deserves careful examination.

As we can see, all the solutions that Thomas could adopt to solve the contradiction between the subsistence of the soul and its nature of substantial form create more problems than they solve. The very foundation of the doctrine, namely that the soul is created by God, does not escape this assessment.

This raises our *seventh and last question*: can an incomplete being, such as the soul, be created?

I answered in some detail this question in an article entitled "The Doctrine of the Creation of the Soul in Aquinas",[169] where I concluded that it is impossible,

168 *In Metaph.*, v, 2, n. 775 (in this passage, Thomas expresses his personal ideas).

169 Cf. B.C. Bazán, "The Doctrine of the Creation of the Soul in Aquinas", in: K. Emery, Jr.—

and that Thomas's doctrine on the immediate creation of each individual soul contradicts some of his basic metaphysical principles. I do not see the need to repeat what was presented in that article, but it is important to recall my initial argument and the text that supports it. For Thomas, to be created is a kind of becoming that is proper only to a subject that can subsist *per se*, i.e., that can be subject of the *actus essendi*. Such a subject is a *complete individual substance* and, in the case of intellectual substances, a *person*:

> Creari enim est fieri quoddam. *Cum autem fieri terminetur ad esse simpliciter, eius est fieri quod habet esse subsistens*: et huiusmodi est *individuum completum in genere substantiae*, quod quidem in natura intellectualis dicitur *persona aut etiam hypostasis*. Formae vero et accidentia, et etiam partes, non dicuntur fieri nisi secundum quid, cum et esse non habeant in se subsistens, sed subsistant in alio.[170]

> formis non competit per se fieri, sed composito.[171]

Thomas has established that the human soul is neither a person nor a complete substance. The consequence is that the soul cannot be the subject of being. If so, neither can it be the object of an act of creation.

The questions that have been asked in this paper show enormous tension between Thomas's arguments for the incorruptibility of the soul and the principles of his theory of knowledge and metaphysics. From the point of view of his theory of knowledge the conflict follows this line of questioning: if we cannot understand without the cooperation of senses, how can he say that we think *sine communicatione corporis*? And if soul cannot accomplish its proper operation without the participation of our corporeal powers of knowledge, how can he infer that the soul, principle of that operation, is subsistent or exists by itself? And if the soul is not subsistent, how can he say that it is incorruptible? From the point of view of Thomas's metaphysics, the conflict is expressed by this line of questioning: if the subject of being is a first substance, essentially complete, or a person, and the soul on the other hand, is just a part of the human essence, and is not a first substance, a person or a hypostasis, how can he say that the soul is the subject of being (an entity *per se* subsistens)? And if

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R. Friedman—A. Speer (eds.), *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen Brown* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 105), Leiden—Boston 2011, pp. 515–569, especially pp. 544–549.

170 *ScG* IV, c. 48.

171 *ST* I, q. 91, a. 2.

it cannot be the subject of *esse*, how can he say that the soul be subject of *fieri*? And if it is not the subject of *fieri*, how can he say that the soul has not been educed from the potency of matter, but created by God? Finally, if the soul is not the subject of being and cannot be created, on what basis can he still justify that the soul is incorruptible?

When examining the options that Thomas had to overcome these conundrums, I left one for the final paragraph of this paper, which is: he could have accepted *all* the consequences of his own principles.

He accepted, reluctantly and with reservations as we have seen, that the soul was not, wholly or entirely (*omnino*), a determined individual substance (*hoc aliquid*), because it was not a subsistent entity complete in its nature:

> (non est sicut) subsistente completo in natura alicuius genere.[172]

> non omnino competit ei quod sit hoc aliquid.[173]

He accepted also—after establishing that only a *per se* subsistent agent can be the subject of operations—that the soul *is not properly speaking per se subsistent*, because this privilege can only be granted to something that is neither inherent in another (like an accident), nor a part of another, even if it can exist separated from the whole (like a ⟨severed⟩ hand). Now the soul is part of the human person and consequently it cannot be said to be the subject of operations—because it is not properly and *per se* subsistent:

> Agere convenit per se existenti […]. Proprie et per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est … inherens, neque est pars … ⟨sicut⟩ oculus vel manus […]. Operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes: dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum et palpat per manum […]. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam.[174]

It is true that Thomas insisted that the soul is subsistent; but the comparison with the subsistence of a ⟨severed⟩ hand makes clear that the meaning of this assertion is limited.

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172 *ST* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1.

173 *Sentencia libri De anima*, II, 1, vv. 108–113.

174 *ST* I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2.

Even if the soul keeps being after the dissolution of the composite of which it is a part, this state of the soul separated from the body is against its nature:

> Est igitur *contra naturam* animae absque corpore esse.[175]

> Esse sine corpore est sibi *contra naturam*.[176]

And even if Thomas insisted that the soul is incorruptible, he did not imply by this that there was personal immortality, because a soul separated from the body of which it is the substantial form is not a person, but just a part of the human person:

> Anima Abrahae non est, proprie loquendo, ipse Abraham, sed est pars ejus; et sic de aliis; unde vita animae Abrahae non sufficeret ad hoc quod Abraham sit vivens; vel quod Deus Abraham sit Deus viventis; sed exigitur vita totius conjuncti, scilicet animae et corporis.[177]

After accepting that the soul is not properly speaking a subsisting individual substance, that being separated from the body is contrary to the nature of things, and that the incorruptibility of the soul is not properly speaking the immortality of a human person, he could have accepted also the inevitable consequence that the soul is not, by nature, and properly speaking, incorruptible. It is difficult to say that he did not make that choice for philosophical reasons.[178]

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175 *ScG* IV, c. 79.

176 *ST* I, q. 118, a. 3.

177 *In IV Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2.

178 This article and the other two that I have quoted previously constitute a trilogy, united by the fact that they are tributes to three of my dearest friends and to their work in the field of mediaeval philosophy. Each article will be expanded and fully justified in my forthcoming book *L'âme humaine selon Thomas d'Aquin*.

CHAPTER 10

Henry of Ghent on Knowledge, Remembrance, and the Order of Cognitive Acts: The Problematic Legacy of Thomas Aquinas

Bernd Goehring

Introduction

In the programmatic, opening articles of his *Quaestiones ordinariae*, his massive *Summa*,[1] the thirteenth-century Parisian secular master Henry of Ghent (†1293)[2] deals with the scope and the limits of human knowledge. The manuscript tradition of these programmatic articles shows that in the course of his career Henry revised significant passages,[3] which underscores Henry's great interest in human cognition, and in particular his interest in the adequacy of our conceptual content throughout all stages of our human life. As Professor

1 For the chronology of Henry of Ghent's works see, in addition to the introductions to the volumes of the Leuven critical edition (Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*), the classic study by J. Gómez Caffarena, "Cronología de la 'Suma' de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus 'Quodlibeta' ", in: *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), pp. 116–133; see especially p. 130: "Ante todo, los 20 primeros artículos de la Suma serían anteriores a los Quodlibetos, pues nunca los citan y son en cambio siempre citados por ellos". Cf. id., *Ser participado y ser subsistente en la metafísica de Enrique de Gante* (Analecta Gregoriana 93), Rome 1958, p. 270. It seems that Franz Ehrle, in the 19th century, was the first to urge the study of cross-references in Henry's two major works. Cf. F. Ehrle, "Beiträge zu den Biographien berühmter Scholastiker. 1. Heinrich von Gent", in: *Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* 1 (1885), pp. 365–401, 507–508, especially p. 400. On the parts of Henry of Ghent's *Summa* see Gordon Wilson's essay in this volume.

2 On Henry's life and works cf. P. Porro, "An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent", in: W. Vanhamel (ed.), *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293)* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, 15), Leuven 1996, pp. 373–403; M. Laarmann, *Deus, primum cognitum. Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent (†1293)* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge 52), Münster i.W. 1999, pp. 18–32; G.A. Wilson, "Henry of Ghent's Written Legacy," in: id. (ed.), *A Companion to Henry of Ghent* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 23), Leiden 2011, pp. 3–23.

3 See B. Goehring, "Henry of Ghent on Human Knowledge and Its Limits", in: *Quaestio* 12 (2012), pp. 589–613.

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Kent Emery, Jr., noted in his seminal essay on "The Continuity of Cognition in Henry of Ghent", "each volume of the Leuven critical edition of Henry's *Opera omnia* reveals that he relentlessly revised his writings until the last moment, when he handed over a fair copy of his text to the Stationer's in Paris for publication in exemplar pieces (possibly he continued to revise even after that)".[4]

In the initial articles of the *Summa* Henry lays out the parameters for his theory of cognition and knowledge, which inform and shape his later examination of related issues. Henry states in Article 3, Question 2, that "the proper operation of a human being insofar as he is a human being, is to know and to understand, since it is his operation according to intellect and reason, through which he is truly a human being, according to the PHILOSOPHER [Aristotle] in Book X of the [*Nicomachean*] *Ethics*".[5] Thus, what makes human beings human is their use of reason. It is no coincidence that Henry explicitly refers to Aristotle's discussion of the contemplative life in the final book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (cf. 1178a5–8), since this marks the culmination of Aristotle's analysis of the human function (ἔργον / *ergon*) and what counts as performing it with virtue or excellence (ἀρετή / *aretê*). The right performance of the human function is intimately tied to happiness, the ultimate end of human well-being. In the first question of Article 5, which deals with the notion of *studium*, Henry describes this ultimate end in terms of our pursuit of knowledge:

> There is one end for human life at which a human being seeks to arrive, namely the complete comprehension of the highest true thing, at which he cannot arrive unless he progresses, as on a path, in cognizing through other true things that are related to it [...]. However, he can only progress through comprehension from one thing to another by diligently seeking knowledge, since human beings acquire knowledge only through study and inquiry [...].[6]

4 K. Emery, Jr., "The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent", in: J. Aertsen; K. Emery, Jr.; A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277/After the Condemnation of 1277* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), Berlin 2001, pp. 59–124, at p. 67, n. 20.

5 Henry of Ghent, *Summa* (*Quaestiones Ordinariae*), *art. I–V*, a. III, q. 2, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 21, Leuven 2005, p. 250, l. 27–p. 251, l. 30: "propria operatio hominis secundum quod homo est scire et intelligere, quia est eius operatio secundum intellectum et rationem, qua vere homo est, secundum PHILOSOPHUM X° *Ethicorum*".

6 Henry of Ghent, *Summa* (*Quaestiones ordinariae*), *art. I–V*, a. V, q. 1, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 21, Leuven 2005, p. 317, l. 26–p. 318, l. 31: "terminus unus est vitae humanae ad quem devenire homo intendit, scilicet notitia perfecta summi veri, ad quam pervenire non potest

Henry of Ghent thus emphasizes our effort, our study and investigation. According to him human beings in this life are appropriately described as pilgrims or wayfarers. Performing our human function involves gradual cognitive progress; furthermore, it is a continuing, life-long endeavor.

What is the scope of this characteristically human endeavor? In Article 3, Question 4, Henry describes our human cognitive capacities as significantly limited in their scope, in the way a craftsman's tools are limited to his particular craft. For instance, "through the tool of the blacksmith's craft a blacksmith cannot bring about the work of a carpenter".[7] By analogy, the tools or capacities with which human cognizers operate are suited chiefly for encountering the sensible, material world. When we desire to know the natures of things we are limited because we are dependent, at least in this life, on the support of our senses and what is sensible:

> Natural reason, in the sort of cognition that it has by purely natural means, uses as a tool a natural light to illuminate for itself the truths of things and to make them manifest for the intellect. However, this light, since it is natural, is limited to illuminating only the natural knowledge of a human being. Thus, since that natural knowledge occurs through the aid of the senses and what is sensible, the light that is completely natural to a human being illuminates merely for having knowledge of those things that are suited to be cognized via the senses. Only what is philosophically knowable is of this sort, beyond which there are many other things that exceed the natural intellect of a human being, since through sensible [characteristics] he cannot arrive at cognizing their essences, chiefly God's essence, since all sensible things are some effects that are in no way equal to His power, and without the cognition of a thing's essence he cannot have knowledge about the nature of a thing at all.[8]

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nisi ambulando in cognoscendo per alia vera quae sunt ad ipsum tamquam per viam [...]. Ambulare autem per notitiam ab uno in aliud non potest nisi studendo scientiae, cum homini scientia non contingat nisi per studium et investigationem [...]".

7 Henry of Ghent, *Summa* (*Quaestiones ordinariae*), *art. I–V*, a. III, q. 4, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 21, Leuven 2005, p. 258, l. 32: "instrumento artis fabrilis opus carpentationis faber efficere non potest".

8 Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. III, q. 4, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 21, Leuven 2005, p. 258, ll. 33–45: "[...] ratio naturalis in cognitione quae sibi ex puris naturalibus competit utitur ut instrumento lumine naturali sibi veritates rerum illustrante et eas intellectui manifestante. Lumen autem illud, quia naturale est, limitatum est ad solummodo notitiam hominis naturalem illustrandam. Cum ergo illa notitia quae naturalis est sit adminiculo sensuum et

In this essay, I investigate an aspect of our quest to fulfill our human function, our desire to acquire and use knowledge: I focus on a question about knowledge and remembrance. Assuming that the soul is the animating principle of a human being and that, in this life, it depends on a body for actualizing cognitive functions such as perceiving, remembering, and perhaps even thinking, can a separate soul have the same kind of cognitive operations as an embodied soul?[9] Henry of Ghent discusses in his *Quodlibet* VI, Question 8, "whether the separate soul remembers the things that it knew when it was conjoined [i.e. to a body]".[10]

The motivation for this question appears at least twofold—theological and philosophical. More specifically, the suggestion that the separate soul *does* remember the things it knew in an embodied state seems motivated, first, by the theological datum that Scripture suggests that there is memory after death. In the Gospel according to Luke, Chapter 16, Christ tells the story of *The rich man and Lazarus*. In Luke 16:25 we read that Abraham, with Lazarus by his side in heaven, is telling the rich man tormented in hell: "Son, remember that in your lifetime you received your good things […]" ("Fili, recordare […]").[11] In his reply the rich man recalls that he has five brothers, and asks Abraham to send Lazarus to warn them so that they won't have to go to the place of torment as well. The story ends with Abraham's reply that if they do not listen to Moses and the prophets, neither will they be convinced even if someone rises from the dead.

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sensibilium, lux homini connaturalis solum illustrat ad sciendum notitiam eorum quae mediante sensu nata sunt cognosci. Talia sunt illa quae sunt scibilia philosophica solum, praeter quae sunt plura alia, quae excedunt naturalem intellectum hominis, quia per sensibilia non potest ad illorum quidditates cognoscendas attingere, maxime autem Dei, quia omnia sensibilia sunt effectus quidam virtutem illius in nullo adaequantes, et sine cognitione eius quod quid est omnino scientia de natura rei haberi non potest […]".

9 Dominik Perler has argued that this '*post mortem* perspective' allows medieval thinkers to put into sharper focus problematic aspects in their theories of cognition. Cf. D. Perler, "Gibt es eine Erinnerung nach dem Tod? Zur methodischen Funktion der *post mortem*-Argumentation in der spätmittelalterlichen Erkenntnistheorie", in: J. Aertsen und M. Pickavé (Hrsg.), *Ende und Vollendung* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 29), Berlin 2001, pp. 448–464, at p. 449. Perler deals with Scotus and Ockham.

10 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 78, ll. 15–16: "[…] utrum anima separata recordetur eorum quae novit coniuncta". Disputed Christmas 1281, according to the chronology established by José Gómez Caffarena, "Cronología de la *Suma* de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus *Quodlibeta*", in: *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), pp. 116–133.

11 *Biblia Sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem* (ed. R. Weber et al.), Stuttgart ^{4}1994, Luke 16:25: "fili recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua".

Secondly, there is a philosophical issue, as noted by Henry; it seems that "if the separate soul could *not* remember through habitual dispositions acquired when it was embodied, these dispositions would be in it *pointlessly*".[12]

As we shall see, the question concerning the separate soul's memory helps us to clarify the nature of cognitive acts, and especially the nature of intellectual cognition. Henry analyses the phenomenon of remembering as involving two levels of cognitive acts of the same kind. He is especially interested in our acquisition and actualization of (dispositional) cognitive content. Henry ultimately rejects the idea that the soul, when it is separated from the body, can remember the things that it knew in an embodied state, i.e. as the animating principle of the whole human being.

1 Memory as Involving Image-Like Sensory Representations

Now, we may ask right away whether a disembodied soul can remember *at all* after death—i.e. when the *intellectual* soul of a human being is separated from the body and its functions, especially the sensory, organically realized capacities. Let's assume with Henry that *if* the intellectual soul has a characteristic operation or function of its own in which the body plays no role, it may be conceived as separable from the body in death.[13]

Yet according to an Aristotelian explanatory framework the faculty of *memory* is linked not to the intellective but to the *sensitive* part of the soul, and the actualization of *its* capacities requires *phantasmata*, that is, sensory representations of perceptible objects. As Richard Sorabji has emphasized,

> the *phantasma* involved in memory and thinking is taken in Aristotle's [*De memoria*] to be an image like a picture. The affection in soul and body is like a sort of picture the having of which, we say, is memory (450a28–30). It is an imprint of the *aisthêma* [i.e. the perceived object] like the mark of a signet ring (450a30–32). [...] the *phantasma* in memory is a copy (*eikôn*), and can be viewed as such (450b27, b30, 451a2).[14]

12 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 78, ll. 26–28, my emphasis: "Nisi anima separata per habitus acquisitos in corpore posset recordari separata, *frustra* ergo essent illi habitus in ea".

13 Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* I, 2, 403a10.

14 R. Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory*. Chicago ²2006, p. xvi. For further discussion of these issues see J. Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past*, Cambridge 1992, especially ch. 2; J. Annas, "Aristotle on Memory and the Self", in:

It seems that I can only remember the Cologne Cathedral, the *Kölner Dom*, which I saw again this summer, if I have stored an image-like representation of it which I can reactivate; yet my perceiving, storing and reactivating all require sensory cognitive capacities. And these capacities are realized via bodily organs. Even though the idea that all remembering involves some kind of image, copy or representation has appeared problematic to a number of thinkers (including, prominently in antiquity, Augustine in his *Confessiones*, *De trinitate*, and other writings,[15] and in the twentieth century Norman Malcolm[16]), it has not lost its appeal.

Moreover, in a well-known passage in *De anima* III, 8 (432a3–10), Aristotle suggests that not just remembering or imagining but indeed *all thinking*—for instance my thinking of statues—involves an image-like representation, since objects of thought are *not like* Platonic Forms, but rather tied to the extended, sensible world. Furthermore, in *De anima* II, 5 (417b21–22) we find the suggestion that our intellect is a capacity for thinking and comprehending universals, whereas our sensory capacities and their representations capture particulars.

Henry of Ghent is well aware of these considerations. Thus, he considers an important preliminary point regarding conceptual content (or knowledge—*notitia*) acquired by the *embodied* soul: "just as conceptual content is acquired through sensory representations, it is [also] activated through sensory representations"; and "since it cannot be acquired in any way without sensory representations, it cannot be activated [without them] either". We may call this the 'Principle of Acquisition and Activation'. The argument then continues that remembering involves content acquired in this manner and thus requires using

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M.C. Nussbaum and A. Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's* De anima, Oxford 1996, pp. 297–311; D. Nikulin, "Memory in Ancient Philosophy", in: id. (ed.), *Memory: A History* (Oxford Philosophical Concepts), Oxford 2015, pp. 35–84, especially pp. 60–66: "Aristotle on Memory and Recollection".

15 For Augustine's views on memory and recollection cf. my Ph.D. dissertation *Henry of Ghent on Cognition and Mental Representation*, Appendix A, Part 3: Augustine on *memoria* (Cornell University 2006). Cf. J. Müller, "Memory in Medieval Philosophy", in: D. Nikulin (ed.), *Memory: A History*, Oxford 2015, pp. 92–124, who points out the differences between Aristotle's and Augustine's conceptions of memory, and on p. 95, n. 6, quotes from Augustine's *Epistula* 7.1: "It seems to you that there can be no exercise of memory without images, or the apprehension of some objects presented by the imagination, which you have been pleased to call 'phantasiae'. For my part, I entertain a different opinion".

16 Cf. N. Malcolm, "Memory and Representation", in: *Noûs* 4 (1970), pp. 59–70; but see also the abstract of critical comments by Gareth Matthews, l.c., p. 71.

such representations (*phantasmata*), which appears impossible in the case of the disembodied soul.[17]

Thomas Aquinas discusses related issues in the first part of his *Summa theologiae*, q. 89 (drawing on material from the *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 19), with particular regard to our intellect's natural orientation in this life towards a sensory context. As Henry of Ghent will come to point out, Thomas Aquinas maintains a *different mode of understanding* in the case of the separate soul. To quote just one representative text from the first part of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, q. 89, a. 6:

> since intelligible forms remain in the separated soul and the condition of the separated soul is not the same as now, it follows that, by means of intelligible forms acquired here, the separated soul can understand the things it understood before, though *not in the same mode*—namely by turning to sensory representations—but rather in the mode that belongs to the separated soul.[18]

Henry too seeks to explain the notion of remembering in terms of understanding, but in his critical examination he will come to a different conclusion.

2 Two Senses of 'Remembering'—Remembering as a Second-Order Act

To address the question of the separate soul's memory with more precision, Henry seeks to clarify the key notion of 'remembering', or 'recollection' (*recordatio*). To this end Henry distinguishes two ways in which one might take the notion of remembering:

17 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 78, ll. 19–22: "Notitia ab anima in corpore acquisita, sicut acquiritur per phantasmata, sic per phantasmata exercetur, sed sine phantasmatibus non potest ullo modo acquiri, quare neque exerceri. Sed non recordatur per eam nisi utendo ea. Ergo etc.".

18 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 89, a. 6, corpus, (ed. Leonina), Vol. 5, Rome 1889, p. 381, my emphasis: "Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in anima separata, sicut dictum est, status autem animae separatae non sit idem sicut modo est, sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; *non tamen eodem modo*, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae".

First, we may take remembering as understanding something directly (*directe*), i.e. the soul's remembering x is *like* the soul's prior act of understanding x for the *first* time, it is a re-cognizing of x (*an intelligat ea quae intellexit existens in corpore*).

Second, we may take remembering as an indirect understanding, i.e. the soul's remembering x is the soul's understanding *that* it once understood x, namely when the soul was in a body (*an intelligat* ***se intellexisse*** *quae intellexit existens in corpore*).

According to Henry, only in this second way the term is properly used. In other words, the act of remembering is taken chiefly as a piece of self-knowledge about prior acts of intellectual cognition. We may call this kind of reflection a second-order act of understanding of a first-order act of understanding. Henry says that "the act of understanding of the separate soul reflects on the act of understanding of the conjoined soul"; it is "a reiteration and reflection of the act of understanding through itself *directed at itself*"; it is not directed at what has been primarily the object of understanding, except mediated through the act on which it now reflects.[19]

For example, I can have a first-order cognition of the Cologne Cathedral, which is the extramental object at which my cognitive act is directed. I can then subsequently reflect on this first-order cognition in another, second-order cognitive act. But this second-order cognitive act is not primarily directed at the Cathedral; rather it reflects on the first-order act, and only mediated through that first-order act is it indirectly related to the initial object, the Cathedral. This distinction enables us to identify different ways in which I can be directed at an object, that is, different intentional states, since my perceiving the Cologne Cathedral is not the same as my remembering my perceiving it.

Henry provides an example to illustrate how a second-order understanding *requires* a preceding first-order understanding. He considers the souls of infants which are said to lack even a first-order act of intellectual understanding (*omnino nihil intellexerunt*), e.g. that they are in a body. Henry claims that when the souls of infants are separated from their bodies they can nonetheless have some knowledge about their prior state, for instance that they once were embodied (*quod aliquando erant in corpore*). However, since the infants' souls never had a direct, first-order act of understanding with this content, they

19 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 79, ll. 45–49: "actum intelligendi separatum reflectendo super actum intelligendi coniunctum: talis enim actus intelligendi reiterationem et conversionem eius per se super se ipsum, non autem super ipsum principale intellectum nisi mediante actu super quem reflectitur, importatur nomine recordationis".

cannot be said to have the corresponding second-order act of understanding either. Rather, Henry argues, different *kinds* of cognition (*genera cognoscendi*) must be involved. As Henry points out, there is no reason—in principle—why a separate soul could not have some knowledge about its prior state according to a *different* way of knowing, but this cannot be called 'remembering' given Henry's definition above.[20]

The focus of our investigation has thus shifted from the question about the separate soul's memory to the more general question of how we can identify kinds of cognitive acts, and how these relate to cognitive content. Hence, we need to examine Henry's analysis of acts of intellectual cognition, with regard to both the embodied soul and the separate soul.

3 Reactivating, or Actualizing, Dispositional Content

Henry's discussion centers on the nature of cognitive acts. He asks when it is possible to consider two acts of understanding as entirely similar to each other (*consimile*). The reason is this: Henry holds that a higher-order act of remembering—an act of understanding that reflects on a preceding act of understanding—can only occur if (a) the content of understanding (some forms (*species*) or disposition (*habitus*) in intellect) and also (b) the mode of understanding remain the same throughout these cognitive processes.

Ad (a): Henry's insistence that there must be some content in remembering, and not merely an act of intellect, leads him to reject the idea that nothing persists in the embodied soul after the completion of a given (intellective) act. It seems obvious that in such a scenario—if no content remains after the completed act—remembering would be ruled out altogether. Henry says that this appears false since it would have the consequence that no person could become more competent through the effort of studying if there is no such retention and formation of habits of mind.[21] Why then should anyone desire to

20 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 82, l. 17–p. 83, l. 24: "Non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod non poterit scire ea quae novit in corpore aut operata est, quia nihil impedit quin secundum alium modum sciendi illa sciat, quemadmodum animae parvulorum separatae scire possunt, quod aliquando erant in corpore, quae tamen hoc numquam noverunt cum erant in corpore. Unde, etsi aliqua novit anima in corpore, si noscat illa cum est separata, et similiter cognoscat se illa novisse cum erat cum corpore, hoc non est recordari, sed est nosse alio genere cognoscendi illud quod novit aut egit prius in corpore".

21 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 80,

study and to acquire knowledge?[22] Henry interprets this emphasis on content as a reason for the Philosopher Aristotle to assert in *De anima* III, 4 (429a27 f.) that "the soul is a place of forms," or cognitive content. Thus, says Henry, "we must posit that something remains in the soul from the act of understanding from phantasms, whether this is called a habitual disposition [*habitus*] or a form [*species*]".[23]

Ad (b): Henry's idea that there must be similar cognitive acts, even though at different levels or orders, seems to be that remembrance or recollection requires a similarity in the way our intellective capacity is actualized. Again, the systematic motivation appears to be that for genuine remembering the kind of content that is involved in the actualization—the content which relates us to the object initially cognized—must remain the same. Now, Henry asks whether both the separate and the embodied soul understand based on the same cognitive content, in an *act* of understanding that is entirely similar. Henry considers the possibility that the separate soul could reflect on a previous act that is the same in kind and mode of understanding, by virtue of a higher-order act generated from the same content, "so that through an act of understanding that is entirely similar, based on the same forms or dispositions, the soul can turn again toward the same act in terms of form and mode of understanding, which is called remembering".[24] So Henry clearly seeks to avoid having to posit

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ll. 61–70: "Et erat QUORUNDAM opinio quod in anima coniuncta nihil habet esse, nisi quod consistit in actuali operatione actus intelligendi, ita quod nihil manet in anima ex illo, cum desinit actu intelligere. Et secundum istam opinionem planum est quod non potest recordari eorum quae novit in corpore. Sed hoc apparet falsum, quoniam tunc per exercitium in studio et actum intelligendi non esset unus habilior ad ipsum quam alius, aliis eisdem retentis, nec idem post exercitium quam ante. Quod aperte falsum est unde et PHILOSOPHUS dicit in III° *De anima* quod 'anima est locu[s] specierum' ".

22 What happens if *studium* leads to little or no retention of content has been nicely illustrated by American comedian Don Novello, who in his classic Father Guido Sarducci skit *The Five-Minute University* teaches in five minutes what the average college graduate remembers five years after graduation.

23 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 80, ll. 70–71: "Oportet igitur ponere quod remaneat aliquid in anima ex actu intelligendi a phantasmatibus, sive illud dicatur habitus sive species". For Henry of Ghent's reception of Aristotle's *De anima*, see B. Goehring, "Henry of Ghent's Use of Aristotle's *De anima* in Developing His Theory of Cognition", in: R. Friedman and J.-M. Counet (eds.), *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's* De anima (Philosophes médiévaux 58), Leuven 2013, pp. 63–99.

24 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 80, ll. 58–60: "ut sic per actum intelligendi consimilem ex eisdem speciebus sive habitibus possit reverti ad eundem actum in specie et modo intelligendi, quod appellatur recordari".

two different modes of understanding, according to whether the soul is in an embodied or disembodied state.

By contrast, Thomas Aquinas had maintained about human understanding or thinking (*intelligere*) *generally* that "to understand through a sensory representation is the characteristic operation of the soul according to its being united to a body; but after having been separated the soul will have a *different mode* of understanding, similar to other substances separate from bodies".[25] In this manner Thomas Aquinas sought to mark both continuity and difference in terms of the intellective acts of the embodied and disembodied soul: "There are two things to consider in acts, namely the kind of act and its mode. Now the kind of act is considered in terms of the object toward which the act of a cognitive power is directed by means of a form [*species*], which is a likeness of the object, whereas the mode of an act is thought of in terms of the power of an agent".[26] Thomas Aquinas gives the following example: "the fact that a person sees a stone happens because the stone's species is found in the eye, but that she sees it with keenness happens because of her good eyesight".[27]

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25 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 6, ad 3, (ed. Leonina), Vol. 5, Rome 1889, p. 204, my emphasis: "intelligere cum phantasmate est propria operatio animae secundum quod corpori est unita. Separata autem a corpore habebit *alium modum* intelligendi, similem aliis substantiis a corpore separatis, ut infra melius patebit". Cf. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 89, a. 1. On inconsistencies in Thomas Aquinas's account of the soul, given his own first principles, see B.C. Bazán, "The Creation of the Soul according to Thomas Aquinas", in: K. Emery, Jr.; R. Friedman; A. Speer (eds.), *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 105), Leiden 2011, pp. 515–569; cf. p. 525: "For instance, Thomas never questioned the Aristotelian principle according to which we cannot acquire knowledge concerning the sensible world—which is the proper object of human mind—or have access to already acquired knowledge about that world without the support of external and internal senses that, using corporeal organs, grasp the sensible forms and elaborate and conserve the images (*phantasmata*) of those forms. Thomas acknowledged that the operational link between intellection and images is so strong that the essence of intellection cannot be defined without mentioning the sensible image as its object."

26 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 89, a. 6, corpus, (ed. Leonina), Vol. 5, Rome 1889, p. 381: "in actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est obiecti similitudo; sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis".

27 Ibid.: "Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex species lapidis quae est in oculo; sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi".

Now, Henry discusses a view that reflects Thomas Aquinas's position. According to this opinion some cognitive content or form is retained in the intellect:

> through this form an object is represented *without* a sensory representation, which object was presented to the conjoined soul *in* a sensory representation [...] so that according to this the act of understanding of the separate soul and that of the soul existing in a body *differ* with respect to the state and the disposition of the intellective power.[28]

In other words, the suggestion is that even though the act of the separate soul and that of the embodied soul differ in the described way, they appear sufficiently similar to warrant concluding that "the separate soul remembers the things that it knew when it was in the body, with respect to the substance of the cognitive act and its object, although not with respect to the mode of cognizing".[29]

But to account for *remembering*, says Henry, it will not suffice to posit that some content remains and that the cognitive mode in which this content is reactivated changes. This would be against Aristotle's view and 'right reason'. Consequently, this legacy of Thomas Aquinas, the attempt to combine both continuity in terms of content and difference in terms of cognitive modes, is to be rejected. Rather, there must be some continuity also in terms of how our cognitive capacities operate, and how their acts are ordered towards each other, both in the case of the embodied and the disembodied soul.

Dispositions, and dispositional content, are generated from frequently performing similar acts.[30] The act at issue here is the act of understanding, which

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28 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 81, ll. 76–83, my emphasis: "per quam speciem dicunt obiectum praesentari *absque* phantasmate, quod animae coniunctae praesentabatur *in* phantasmate [...] ut secundum hoc actus intelligendi animae separatae et animae existentis in corpore *differunt* quoad modum intelligendi, qui sequitur statum et dispositionem virtutis intellectivae".

29 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 81, ll. 83–86: "anima separata recordatur eorum quae novit in corpore quoad substantiam actus cognoscendi et ipsius obiecti, non autem quoad cognoscendi modum".

30 See also the related discussion in Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8, (ed. G.A. Wilson—G. Etzkorn), Opera omnia 8, Leuven 2011, p. 62, ll. 204–205, where Henry emphasizes repeatedly that both in theoretical and in practical matters a disposition is "strengthened, or increased, and confirmed through frequent similar actions"—"per frequentes actiones consimiles intenditur seu augmentatur et firmatur".

in the case of the embodied soul is that of the entire human being, insofar as he or she is understanding. Now the human intellect's act belongs *essentially* to the entire human being, and only *accidentally* to a part of him, namely to his soul. Henry holds that if one thing or function belongs to two agents, it is impossible that what belongs to something accidentally can be used more perfectly than what belongs to it essentially.[31] We may call this the 'Principle of More Complete or Perfect Use'.

But what is a more complete or perfect use in the case of a disposition, or even dispositional content? Henry states that it is a more perfect use of a disposition (*usus habitus*) when through it the agent is not only inclined towards an act, but when the object itself, through which the act is completed, is also presented.

Let us now with Henry combine these claims and see what results for the possibility of cognition and remembering. Henry argues that what we contrast when we speak of 'the embodied soul vs. the separate soul' is really 'the entire human being vs. his soul when separated'.

This is what we find in the case of the entire human being, to whom the function of understanding belongs *essentially*: The entire human being can use a disposition, which merely inclines towards the act, but does not (fully) present the object, *only* together with a sensory representation. In other words, a human being who has in his soul a thing's form or dispositional content does not understand unless what is intelligible appears in a sensory representation.[32] By contrast, to a soul dispositional content belongs only *accidentally*, as to a part of a human being. As a consequence, the soul, taken by itself, can use such a disposition much less, namely less perfectly, and only insofar as the object is presented in a sensory representation. Hence, already in the first case (of the entire human being), where dispositional content is used, sensory representations are needed. *A fortiori*, sensory representations will definitely be needed in the second case (of a soul, taken by itself).

Therefore, Henry concludes, since the separate soul does not have sensory representations available, even though it has some disposition or dispositional content, it cannot use it or bring forth from it an act of understanding that is

31 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 81, ll. 96–98: "Cum autem aliquid convenit duobus, uni per se, alteri per accidens, impossibile est quod perfectius utatur illo id cui convenit per accidens, quam id cui convenit per se".

32 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 82, ll. 7–8: "[…] homo habens in se speciem rei sive habitum in anima non intelligit nisi appareat intelligibile in phantasmate".

entirely similar to the one that the embodied soul brought forth. Finally, let us recall Henry's definition of remembering as two cognitive acts that are *different in order* but the *same in kind*, and *based on the same content*: given this definition it is thus not possible that the separate soul remembers what it knew as part of a human being. As Henry emphasizes, this does not mean that cognition in some other way—facilitated by God—is barred or impossible, Henry's findings merely imply that this would not be remembering but rather knowing via a different kind of cognition.

Conclusion

When a human being actualizes his or her intellectual capacity and an object of cognition is represented in an act of understanding, then the object must be represented not only conceptually but also in a sensory context, through so-called phantasms. These phantasms preserve some particular characteristics of a given object. And this, Henry argues, is true both for the acquisition of conceptual content and for the use or reactivation of content that has already been acquired and is had dispositionally.

Since Henry analyses the phenomenon of remembering as involving two levels of cognitive acts of the same kind, Henry has to reject the idea that the soul, when it is separated from the body, can remember the things it knew in an embodied state, i.e. as the animating principle of the whole human being.[33]

Finally, Henry addresses the theological and philosophical issues that seem to have motivated the question originally. With regard to the Scriptural passages Henry asserts that 'remembering' ('recordari') is here taken broadly to mean bringing to cognition, calling to mind we might say, things that have been done or cognized, whether they belong to the same kind of cognition or not. Again Henry emphasizes that it is not properly called remembering unless we are dealing with the same kind of cognition.

What can Henry say in response to the objection that it would seem pointless to acquire dispositions or contents in this life which are of no use to the separate soul? Henry argues that something is not called pointless because in some condition that is greatly defective it cannot be used—such as the separate soul's condition, since it's beyond its nature. For example, a human being is

33 Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet VI*, q. 8, (ed. G. Wilson), Opera omnia 10, Leuven 1987, p. 82, ll. 15–16: "anima separata non recordatur eorum quae homo totus coniunctus cognovit sine ipsa anima, ut erat in eo".

not said to have sight pointlessly in complete darkness, where he cannot use it. Rather, if it were impossible to use it in *any* condition, mostly in the condition that is perfectly natural, then something would appear pointless.

PART 3

Understanding Theology

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CHAPTER 11

The Parts of Henry of Ghent's *Quaestiones Ordinariae* (*Summa*)

Gordon A. Wilson

Introduction

Because Henry of Ghent's *Summa* is based upon his ordinary lectures in the Theology Faculty at the university in Paris, it is a truly important text to examine in a volume dedicated to theology in the Middle Ages. And because of Prof. Emery's interest in as well as his contributions to understanding Henry's thought and influence, in addition to his descriptions of two manuscripts of Henry's *Summa* and his years of service on the editorial board of the "Leuven University Series, Henrici de Gandavo", a study of this text is most appropriate for this book.

The focus of this paper is upon the parts of Henry's *Summa*, that is both its physical and its conceptual divisions. After some preliminary remarks on the division of the *Summa* by the university in Paris in order to distribute this work, an analysis will be made of the physical division of the text in the extant manuscripts and their models, as well as in the Renaissance editions of his *Summa*. Finally, the conceptual divisions of the text will be presented to determine the extent to which the physical divisions were made according to the conceptual divisions of the text.

1 The *Summa* as a Text Distributed by Two Successive Parisian Exemplars

R. Macken and the individual editors of the Leuven series "Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*" have well documented that the text of Henry's *Summa* was distributed by means of two successive Parisian university exemplars which were divided into *peciae*. One can find lists of the *pecia* transitions of the first Parisian university exemplar in Macken's monumental *Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo*.[1] These transitions have been confirmed by the individual

1 R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo. I. Catalogue A–P*, XVIII + 677 pp. *II.*

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editors who have presented additional evidence of them in the Critical Studies which precede the printed volumes in the Leuven edition of the Henry of Ghent series.[2] The first Parisian university exemplar was divided into approximately 134 *peciae*, and explicit *pecia* transitions can be found in the manuscripts Brugge, *Stadsbibliotheek, ms. 179*, Brussel/Bruxelles, *Koninklijke Bibliotheek / Bibliothèque Royale IV 1202*, London, *British Library, ms. Royale 10.D.VI*, Paris, *BnF, lat. 15846*, Paris, *Bibl. de l'Université, ms. 34*, *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Vat lat. 854*, *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Vat. lat. 855*, and in the special case of *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Borghese 17*, which will be discussed separately below.

The second Parisian university exemplar was the source of four known manuscripts: Zwijnaarde, *C^tesse Goethals*, which is in a private collection, Padova, *Bibl. Capitolare c. 45*, Troyes, *Médiathèque du Grand Troyes*, *ms. 493* and *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. Ottobonianus lat. 624*. The Zwijnaarde manuscript is in two volumes, the first of which contains Articles 1–52 and the second of which contains Articles 53–75. There are numerous explicit indications of *pecia* transitions in both volumes of this manuscript. The *Padova* manuscript is incomplete and contains only Articles 1–52, but it also contains explicit indications of *pecia* transitions which correspond to those of the Zwijnaarde manuscript, and these have been documented in the secondary literature.[3] The Troyes manuscript begins with Article 53 and ends with Article 75. The *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms.*

Catalogue Q–Z. Répertoire, pp. 678–1306, Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia* I–II, Leuven—Leiden 1979, p. 1018.

2 See Henrici de Gandavo *Summa* (*Quaestiones ordinariae*), *art. 1–5*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXI, Leuven 2005, pp. xxv–lviii; id., *Summa, art. 31–34*, (ed. R. Macken cum Introd. generali ad edit. crit. *Summae* a L. Hödl), Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXVII, Leuven 1991, pp. xlvii–lviii; id., *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXVIII, Leuven 1994, pp. xxviii–xxx; id., *Summa, art. 41–46*, (ed. L. Hödl), Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXIX, Leuven 1998, pp. xiv–xvii; id., *Summa, art. 47–52*, (ed. M. Führer), Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXX, Leuven 2007, p. xvi. See also R. Macken, "Une acquisition importante de la Bibliothèque Royale Albert I^er de Bruxelles: un manuscrit de la «Summa» d'Henri de Gand portant nombre d'indications de pièces", in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 26 (1984), pp. 152–155 and R. Macken, "The Possible First Exemplar of the Articles 53–75 of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*", in: *Medioevo* 22 (1996), p. 483.

3 Cf. G.A. Wilson, "A Second Exemplar of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*", in: *Manuscripta* 38 (1994), pp. 42–50. See also Henrici de Gandavo *Summa, art. 1–5*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxvii–xxviii; id., *Summa, art. 31–34*, (ed. R. Macken), pp. lix–lxii; id., *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxxi–xxxii; id., *Summa, art. 41–46*, (ed. L. Hödl), pp. xiv–xviii; id., *Summa, art. 47–52*, (ed. M. Führer), p. xvii.

Ottobonianus lat. 624 manuscript, described in detail by Prof. Emery,[4] contains an abbreviation of Articles 1–57, but this is followed by the complete text of Articles 53–75. Although neither the Troyes manuscript nor the *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. Ottobonianus lat. 624* manuscript contains no known explicit or implicit indications of *pecia* transitions, a preliminary test collation of all the manuscripts for the first 100 lines of each *pecia* of the first Parisian university exemplar for both Articles 53–55 and Articles 60–62 revealed that these two manuscripts contain numerous variant readings in common with the Zwijnaarde manuscript,[5] a strong indication that they too were copied from the second Parisian university exemplar. However, because only three of these four manuscripts contain Articles 53–75, and of these only one, the Zwijnaarde manuscript, contains explicit *pecia* indications, it is not known with certainty how many *peciae* there were of this second Parisian university exemplar.[6]

The secondary literature has well documented that the text of Henry's *Summa* was one that was distributed by means of two exemplars divided into *pecia*. In writing, then, of the physical divisions of this text, one way in which this text was divided was by the university when the exemplars were prepared in *peciae* for distribution. But the groups of manuscripts stemming from these two models reveal other divisions of the text, namely how the *peciae* of these exemplars themselves were physically collected into groups.

2 The Physical Divisions of the Manuscripts

2.1 *The Second University Parisian Exemplar Divided into* Peciae

Manuscripts copied from the second exemplar, which is unfortunately now lost, explicitly state how the *Summa* was divided. For example, at the top of the first folio in the first volume of the Zwijnaarde manuscript the articles contained in the volume are identified as being the first part of Henry's *Summa*: "prima pars Summae magistri Henrici de Gandavo super primum Sententiarum [*sic*]" and in the explicit of the first volume, i.e. at the end of

4 K. Emery, Jr., "Two More Copies of Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, and the Heuristic of Critical Editions (Henry of Ghent and Denys the Carthusian)", in: *Manuscripta* 36 (1992), pp. 3–4.

5 Cf. Henrici de Gandavo *Summa* (*Quaestiones ordinariae*), *art. 53–55*, (edd. G.A. Wilson—G. Etzkorn), Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXXI, Leuven 2014, pp. xxix–xxx.

6 This situation is further complicated by the fact that in the second volume of the Zwijnaarde manuscript the numbering of the *peciae* does not continue from the previous volume, but begins anew with *pecia* one. In addition, most of the transitions in the second volume are noted by "hic" in the margins. See G.A. Wilson, "A Second Exemplar …", pp. 42–50.

Article 52, the copyist wrote "Explicit prima pars huius operis".[7] At the end a second hand also inscribed "Tabulam quaestionum ordinariarum in Deo magistri Henrici de Gandavo super primam partem Summae suae require in secunda parte huius Summae in fine".[8] In the second volume of the Zwijnaarde manuscript, which begins with Article 53, one finds "secunda pars Summae magistri Henrici de Gandavo [*lacuna*] Sententiarum [*sic*]". At the beginning in the superior margin there is a medieval inscription "Incipit 2ª pars". At the end of the second volume there is a list of questions contained in both volumes. In red one finds "Incipiunt quaestiones ordinariae de Deo magistri Henrici de Gandavo super primam partem Summae suae" and then added by a medieval hand is "… et super secundam". If the model for this manuscript were itself in two general groups, the first containing Articles 1–52 and the second containing Articles 53–75, then the Zwijnaarde manuscript faithfully replicated this division, because it as well is divided in the same way. The Vaticana, *Ottobonianus* manuscript confirms this division. It, as mentioned above, contains an abbreviation of Articles 1–57, but it is followed by the entire text of Articles 53–75, what the manuscript describes as "Pars secunda. De divinis personis". The four extant manuscripts copied from the second exemplar all attest to this division. The Zwijnaarde manuscript is in two volumes, the first containing part one and the second containing part two; the Padova manuscript containing solely part one, and the Troyes and Vaticana, *Ottobonianus* both containing only part two.

The actual bindings of manuscripts copied from the second university exemplar into codices, as well as the *explicits* and colophons in them, suggest that the exemplar itself collected Henry's *Summa* into a first and second part: the first part being Articles 1–52 and the second part being Articles 53–75.

2.2 *The First University Parisian Exemplar Divided into* Peciae

There are two manuscripts, both having explicit *pecia* transitions that correspond to those of the first Parisian university exemplar and both ending at the same location, namely after the last question of Article 61. These two manuscripts are Paris, *Bibl. Nat., lat.*, 15846 and *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Vat. lat.*, 855. At the end of *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Vat. lat.*, 855 the scribe has added "Explicit prima pars Summae magistri Henrici de Gandavo". Were the *peciae* of the first Parisian university exemplar physically gathered into a first and a second part, and the scribes of these two manuscripts copied only the first part? It is interesting to note that the end of Article 61 is in the middle of *pecia* 103. It seems

7 Cf. Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 47–52*, (ed. M. Führer), p. xviii.

8 Ibid.

that at some early point the entire *pecia* 103 was not available, but only the first part of it, namely to the end of Article 61, was available to medieval scribes.

In addition, the manuscript *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. Vat. lat. 854*, which also contains explicit *pecia* transitions that correspond to the first Parisian university exemplar separated the beginning of Article 62 from the end of Article 61 by three blank spaces, and this probably reflects the division of this material in its model. And because the manuscripts *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. Vat. lat. 856* and *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. Vat. lat. 857* used *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. Vat. lat. 854* as their direct or indirect source,[9] they also separated these two articles by blank spaces.

This much seems likely. The first Parisian university exemplar was gathered into two parts, the first which would have contained Articles 1 to 61 and the second which would have contained Articles 62 to 75. This is further confirmed by the important manuscript *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Borghese 17*.

2.3 *The Divisions of Henry's* Summa *in* Biblioteca *Vaticana,* Borghese 17

The manuscript *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Borghese 17*, containing Articles 53–75 of Henry's *Summa*, is an important manuscript because it bears the typical physical characteristics of an exemplar divided into *peciae*, at least for Articles 58–75, i.e. folios 51–218. However, these characteristics of an exemplar divided into *peciae* are noticeably missing for the first articles, namely Articles 53–57, i.e. folios 1–50. First, for example, the sheets of Articles 58–75 are worn, a probable result of repeated use, but the sheets of Articles 53–57 are not. Second, there are explicit *peciae* indications in folios 51–218, and these always appear in the upper margins on the rectos of the first sheet of each quire (which consisted of four folios); however there are no explicit *peciae* indications in folios 1–50, but where the exact locations of *pecia* transitions are known from other manuscripts, these locations in Articles 53–57 can be found anywhere on the sheets: recto, verso, "A" column, "B" column, etc. Third, there are implicit *pecia* transitions in folios 51–218. These usually occur on the versos of the fourth folio of a quire, where the length of the "B" column is different from the length of the "A" column. This asymmetry is not found in folios 1–50. Fourth, there are dual folds on the sheets of folios 51–218, but this is not the case for folios 1–50. These

9 Cf. A. Pelzer, *Codices Vaticani latini*. II, pars Prior: Codices 679–1134, Vaticana 1931, p. 228; R. Macken, *Bibl. man. H.G.*, pp. 797 and 801 (where one must read "854" instead of "855"); Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 1–5*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xvi–xvii; id., *Summa, art. 31–34*, (ed. R. Macken), pp. xc–xci; id., *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxxv–xxxviii; id., *Summa, art. 41–46*, (ed. L. Hödl), pp. lxxvi–lxxviii; id., *Summa, art. 47–52*, (ed. M. Führer), p. xii; id., *Summa, art. 53–55*, (edd. G.A. Wilson—G. Etzkorn), p. xv.

dual folds were probably made as the manuscript was transported from the *stationarius* to the workplace of the scribe and/or they were created when the scribe folded his *pecia* model so that the "A" column would be closer to the text he was copying—the far right margin of an "A" column would be at one location on the sheet for the recto and another location on the sheet for the verso, and hence the twofold crease.[10]

These different physical characteristic led J. Destrez,[11] M.-D. Chenu,[12] and A. Maier[13] to list this manuscript among *exemplaria* divided into *peciae*. Subsequently G. Battelli[14] and R. Macken[15] realized that it was only parts of this manuscript that were the exemplar divided into *pecia*. Indeed the research on the critical edition of *Summa*, aa. 53–55 indicates that this manuscript could not have been the first Parisian university exemplar for these articles: there are omissions in the text of the Borghese manuscript, and if it were truly the exemplar, these omissions would also appear in the manuscripts copied from it, but this is not the case. Furthermore, if it were the exemplar divided into *pecia*, these *pecia* would be beginning at the top of the recto, column A, on every fourth folio, but as mentioned above, this is not the case for Articles 53–57.[16]

The part of the manuscript which contains Articles 58–75 may indeed have been the exemplar divided into *pecia*, but the story is a complex one. G. Batteli has documented the paleographic differences within the *pecia* of this

10 For additional discussions of these four points, see G.A. Wilson—M. Miller, "Biblioteca Vaticana, *Borghese 17*: A Possible Exemplar Divided into *Peciae* of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*?", in: *Scriptorium* 68 (2014), pp. 105–114 and Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa*, *art. 53–55*, (edd. G.A. Wilson—G. Etzkorn), pp. xxxiii–xxxv.

11 Cf. J. Destrez, *La Pecia dans les manuscrits universitaires du XIII^e^ et du XIV^e^ siècles*, Paris 1935.

12 Cf. M.-D. Chenu, "*Exemplaria* universitaires des XIII^e^ et XIV^e^ siècles", in: *Scriptorium* 7 (1953), pp. 68–80, esp. pp. 74–75.

13 Cf. A. Maier, "Die Borghese-Handschriften der Bibliotheca Vaticana", in: *Traditio* (6) 1948, pp. 351–356, esp. pp. 353–354; ea., *Der letzte Katalog der Päpstlichen Bibliothek von Avignon (1594)* (Sussidi Eruditi 4), Roma 1952, p. 30, n. 40; ea., *Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae*, (Studi e Testi 170), Città del Vaticano 1953, p. 19.

14 Cf. G. Battelli, "'L'Exemplar' della Summa di Enrico di Gand", in: Rita LeJeune et Joseph Deckers (eds.), *Clio et son regard: Mélanges d'histoire, d'histoire d'art et d'archéologie offerts à Jacques Stiennon à l'occasion de ses vingt-cinq ans d'enseignement à l'Université de Liège*, Liège 1982, pp. 23–31.

15 R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta …*, II, p. 732 and id., "The Possible First Exemplar …", p. 480.

16 Cf. G.A. Wilson—M. Miller, "Biblioteca Vaticana, *Borghese 17* …", pp. 105–114 and Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa*, *art. 53–55*, (edd. G.A. Wilson—G. Etzkorn), pp. xxxiii–xxxv.

manuscript and has identified ten different groups and eight different hands which copied these.[17] Indeed, these *peciae* can be quite different, e.g. some have numerous *notabilia* whereas others have none. Furthermore there are ten *peciae* with implicit indications of transitions, as mentioned above. How is it possible that the scribe of a university exemplar divided into *peciae* who was using the university apograph as his model, i.e. a codex with a text which naturally flowed from the end of one folio to the beginning of the next, would have created the unused space at the end of these ten *peciae*? It seems that these ten may have been replacement *peciae*. The preliminary research on *Summa*, aa. 60–62, confirms this belief.[18] If there were replacement *pecia* of the first Parisian university exemplar, then this would mean that the latter articles of Henry's *Summa* were copied frequently and that there was a high demand for and interest in this text.[19]

But, one of the intriguing remarks in this manuscript comes on folio 117ra, where a medieval hand has added at the end of Article 61 "Explicit prima pars Summae Henrici de Gandavo" after which the rest of the column is blank.[20] That two manuscripts known to have been copied from the first Parisian university exemplar, namely Paris, *Bibl. Nat., lat.*, 15846 and *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. lat.*, *855*, end after the completion of Article 61, that one of these, namely *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *ms. lat.*, *855*, states that this is the end of the first part of Henry's *Summa*, and now manuscript *Biblioteca* Vaticana, *Borghese 17*, a manuscript which in parts was the first Parisian university exemplar divided into *peciae*, states quite explicitly that the end of Article 61 is the end of the first part of the *Summa*, seems compelling evidence that the first Parisian university exemplar was divided into two very unequal groups, namely Articles 1–61 and Articles 62–75.[21] And, yet the Borghese manuscript itself begins with Article 53,

17 Cf. G. Battelli, "'L'Exemplar' della Summa di Enrico di Gand", pp. 23–31.

18 Cf. Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 60–62*, (edd. G.A. Wilson—G. Etzkorn), Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXXII, Leuven [forthcoming].

19 This confirms R. Macken's observation that the *Summa* of Henry was one of the works in the Middle Ages "enjoying a great circulation" (R. Macken, "The Possible First Exemplar …", p. 486).

20 Cf. R. Macken, "The Possible First Exemplar …", p. 486; see especially plate three.

21 Cf. R. Macken, "The Possible First Exemplar …", p. 487: "But as such, this division in two parts, the second part starting with article 62, seems to be perfectly logical in the plan of Henry of Ghent himself, and again is a sign of the ancient character of this division, and of a direct contact of the author of these remarks with Henry during his life", and R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo*, II, p. 735: "Ceci pourrait suggérer qu'à l'origine le début de l'art. 62 était considéré comme le début de la 2^{e} partie, peut-être par Henri lui-même, mais que dans la suite cette division ne s'était pas conservée

the very place where manuscripts of the second exemplar say the second part of the *Summa* begins.

3 Physical Divisions of Manuscripts Independent of the University Exemplar Tradition

Those familiar with the critical studies which precede the Latin text in volumes of Henry's *Summa* edited in the "Leuven Series, Henrici de Gandavo," know that in addition to manuscripts copied from the first and second Parisian exemplars, some manuscripts were independent of these two exemplars and were copied using another model. Most important of these was the manuscript in the possession of Godfrey of Fontaines, namely Paris, *Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. lat. 15355*. In the volumes of the Leuven series edited to date, the editors have maintained that Godfrey, a student of Henry, probably had access to the *liber magistri*[22] that sat in the very school of Henry and that this was the probable model for Godfrey's manuscript. The manuscript is in two parts. The first part is from the initial prolog up to and including Article 26; and the second part picks up from the *prooemium* of Article 27 to the *prooemium* of Article 53, where it abruptly ends on fol. 219va with the words "Circa divinas autem personas in generali inquirenda sunt …". The ending of this manuscript is indeed curious: just into the prooemium of Article 53. R. Macken has written, "It ceases abruptly after the first lines of art. 53, apparently with the intention to begin again the same work in another codex"[23] and "[it is] as if the person who would continue copying the rest, abruptly changed his mind, and left the rest of this column, and the second column of this verso of the leaf, blank".[24] On the other hand, it is possible that the model of this manuscript ended abruptly at this point. This is confirmed by the manuscript Toulouse, *Bibliothèque municipale,*

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parce que l'ouvrage n'a jamais été achevé et cette seconde partie primitive était restée démesurément petite".

22 For discussions of Henry's *liber magistri*, see L. Hödl, "Literar- und Problem-geschichtliches zur neuen kritischen Edition der ‚Opera Omnia' des Heinrich van Gent", in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 32 (1985), p. 312, n. 44; Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 41–44*, (ed. L. Hödl), pp. lviii–lix *et* lxii–lxv; id., *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), p. xxii, n. 12; id., *Summa, art. 1–5*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxviii–xxix.

23 R. Macken, "The Possible First Exemplar …", p. 481; see especially plate one.

24 Ibid., p. 483, and on the same page the following comment by Macken "… Henry seems to have decided to write or to have someone write the following articles, from article 53 to the end of his *Summa*, elsewhere".

ms. 199. It begins with the prooemium of Article 27 and ends abruptly at the same location as Godfrey's manuscript. These two manuscripts share readings that are readings other than the readings of manuscripts copied from the first Parisian university exemplar and those copied from the second Parisian university exemplar. Yet, neither manuscript is a copy of the other. It seems that both manuscripts stem not from the university exemplars, but from another model, probably the *liber magistri*. The model for these two manuscripts was possibly in two gatherings: the first contained from the prolog through Article 26, and the second ran from the beginning of Article 27 up to and including the initial words of the prooemium of Article 53. One can only speculate that if there were a second codex of this model, it would have contained the text from these initial words of the prooemium of Article 53 to the end of Article 75 or perhaps from the initial words of the prooemium of Article 53 to the end of Article 61, followed by a another part which would have contained Article 62 to the end.

The evidence from the manuscripts copied from the second Parisian exemplar and from independent manuscripts stemming from the *liber magistri* suggests that the transition from Article 52 to Article 53 was the initial physical division of Henry's *Summa*. The manuscripts copied from the first Parisian university exemplar suggest that the transition from Article 61 to Article 62 marked the physical division of Henry's *Summa*. But, how do these physical divisions relate to the conceptual scheme and division of the *Summa*?

4 The Physical Divisions of the Renaissance Editions

There are two Renaissance printings of the *Summa* of Henry: the edition of Badius in 1520 and the edition of Scarparius in 1646. Badius bound the *Summa* in two volumes: the first contains the prolog up to and including Article 40 and the second contains the prooemium of Article 41 up to and including Article 75. The edition by Scarparius is in three volumes. The first contains tables, a valuable topical index, and table of contents plus the first articles, the second ends interestingly at the end of Article 52, and the third consists of Articles 53 to 75. Is this break between the second and third volume a result from the acquaintance by Scarparius with the division of the *Summa* that one finds of the material in the second exemplar?

5 Provisional Conclusion

The various models for the manuscripts of Henry's *Summa* seemed to have been gathered differently. The *liber magistri*, the source of Godfrey's manuscript, was probably in at least two codices, one of which ended with the opening words of the prooemium of Article 53. The first Parisian university exemplar organized the *peciae* in at least two groups, one of which ended at the end of Article 61. The *peciae* of the second Parisian exemplar were organized into two groups: the first of which consisted of Articles 1–52 and the second of which contained Articles 53–75. But do these physical divisions of the text reflect the conceptual divisions of the material contained in them or are these division merely the result of a convenient way to collect and bind what is a massive amount of material—the *Summa* after all is, in the words of J. Paulus, a "vaste programme"?[25] For this one needs to go to the text of the *Summa* to determine its structure and conceptual scheme.

6 The Structure of Henry's *Summa*

Henry's *Summa* is a text which lends itself to an outline, and this outline can be constructed by examining the prooemiums that precede each of the 75 articles and by studying the actual text of the questions in the *Summa*.

6.1 *An Outline*

In the prooemiums Henry sets the articles into an overall plan and in them he describes how the upcoming questions fit into this plan. For example, in the prooemium to Article 1, Henry writes that he plans to treat three general topics: 1) how theology is a science (Articles 1–19); 2) how there can be *locutio* about God (Article 20); and 3) what can be known about God and divine things (Articles 21 and following). The first topic on theology as a science is then subdivided into a section on the possibility of human knowledge in general (Articles 1–5) and a section on the knowledge that is particular to theology (Articles 6–19). It is at this point that Henry then lists the titles of the first five articles. In the prooemium of Article 21, he does something similar, namely provide a plan for the upcoming articles. One can find similar organizational plans in the prooemiums of Articles 28, 33, 35, 37, 41, 51, 53, and 62.

25 J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Études de Philosophie Médiévale 25), Paris 1938, p. xvi.

In addition, in the prooemium of Article 72, Henry wrote "Viso de relativis et communibus tam relativis quam absolutis in divinis, et hoc ab articulo xxi, et deinceps, sequitur videre de communibus tam relativis quam absolutis appropriate ad propria relative, et hoc quoad illorum communium appropriationem et modum appropriandi ad propria (Bad., II, fol. 255^{r})". And in the prooemium of Article 73 he stated "Viso a xxi articulo hucusque quae et qualia de Deo in se et absolute sunt intelligenda sequitur ultimo in hac parte nostrae disputationis ordinariae quomodo intellecta de eo sunt proferenda (Bad., II, fol. 263^{v})". These also provide insights into how he conceptualized the material.

In the prooemium of Article 21 Henry stated that he intended to treat two main subjects in his *Summa*: there was to be a section *De Deo* and a section *De creaturis*.[26] The section *De creaturis* was never completed[27] and perhaps never started, which led P. Bayerschmidt to describe the work as an "unfinished cathedral".[28]

In addition Articles 73–75 were the last intended articles of the section *De Deo*. In the prooemium of Article 73 Henry wrote: "Viso a 21 articulo hucusque quae et qualia de Deo in se et absolute sunt intelligenda, sequitur ultimo

26 In the prooemium of Article 21 (ed. Bad., I, fol. 123^{r}) Henry wrote of the order of theology: "Primum est de Deo, ut de subiecto principali huius scientiae. Secundum est de creaturis, ut de materia subiecto attributa". See also a. 19, q. 1 (ed. Bad., I, fol. 115^{v}K) where he again wrote about the order of theology: "Diversus est ordo considerandi de Deo in hac scientia et in scientiis philosophicis, quoniam ista scientia primo et principaliter considerat de Deo tamquam de eo de quo sunt eius prima principia, scilicet primi articuli fidei. Sunt enim de divina unitate in substantia, et trinitate in personis. Secundario autem et posterius considerat de creaturis sciendum relationem et attributionem quam habent ad Deum".

27 Cf. M. Santiago de Carvalho, "On the Unwritten Section of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*: *loquendo de productione creaturae*", in: G. Guldentops and C. Steel (eds.), *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought*, Leuven 2003, pp. 327–370; id., "Sobre o Projecto do 'Tractatus de productione creaturae' de Henrique de Gand", in: *Mediaevalia—Textos e Estudos* 11–12 (1997), pp. 211–230. See also Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 1–5*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xii–xv; id., *Summa, art. 31–34*, (ed. R. Macken), pp. xlv–xlvi; id., *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxvii–xxviii; id., *Summa, art. 41–46*, (ed. L. Hödl), pp. xlviii–xlix; id., *Summa, art. 47–52*, (ed. M. Führer), p. xv.

28 P. Bayerschmidt, *Die Seins- und Formmetaphysik des Heinrich von Gent in ihrer Anwendung auf die Christologie. Eine philosophie- und dogmengeschichtliche Studie* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* XXXVI, 3–4), Münster i. W. 1941, p. 6. See also Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet I*, (ed. R. Macken), pp. xxi–xxii; id., *Summa, art. 31–34*, (ed. R. Macken), pp. xlv–xlvi; id., *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxvii–xxviii; and id., *Summa, art. 1–5*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxii–xxv.

in hac parte nostrae disputationis ordinariae quomodo intellecta de eo sunt proferenda (Bad., II, fol. 263^{v}X)".

Based upon the information provided in these prooemiums, a general outline of the entire *Summa* can be constructed. In the following outline two breaks have been introduced to indicate the divisions of the text in the manuscripts copied from both exemplars, which were discussed above.

Outline of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*

I. **Praeamble**[29]
   A. Quomodo theologia de Deo et de rebus divinis sit scientia
      1. De scientia et scibili communiter et in generali[30]
         a. De possibilitate sciendi [= art. 1]
         b. De modo sciendi [= art. 2]
         c. De qualitate rei scibilis [= art. 3]
         d. De appetitu sciendi [= art. 4]
         e. De studio sciendi [= art. 5]
      2. De scientia et scibili theologiae in speciali[31] (= De theologia secundum se, quantum ad scientiam)[32]
         a. De theologia in se [= art. 6]
         b. De theologia in comparatione ad alias scientias [= art. 7]
         c. De causis theologiae[33]
            i. De finali causa [= art. 8]
            ii. De efficiente causa (de auctore seu effectore theologiae)[34]
               a. de auctore
                  i. de auctore theologiae [= art. 9]
                  ii. de auctoritate theologiae [= art. 10]
               b. de doctore [= art. 11]
               c. de auditore[35]
                  i. qualis debet esse auditor theologiae [= art. 12]
                  ii. de modo addiscendi theologiam [= art. 13]

29 From prooemium, art. 21.
30 From prooemium, art. 1.
31 From prooemium, art. 1.
32 From prooemium, art. 6.
33 From prooemium, art. 8.
34 From prooemium, art. 9.
35 From prooemium, art. 12.

iii. De causa formali
a. de forma tractandi et de forma tractatus[36]
i. de modo tradendi hanc scientiam [= art. 14]
ii. de modo exponendi theologiam[37]
a. ex parte ipsius scientiae exponendae [= art. 15]
b. ex parte ipsius expositionis exponendae [= art. 16]
c. ex parte eius cui exponenda est [= art. 17]
d. ex parte eius qui eam habet exponere [= art. 18]
iv. De causa materiali [= art. 19]

B. Quomodo in theologia de Deo et de divinis locutio sit habenda, et quomodo intellecta de eis sit exponenda[38] [= art. 20]

II. ***De Deo***[39]

A. Quae et qualia de Deo sunt intelligenda[40]
1. De Dei entitate[41]
a. An sit[42]
i. De Deo, an sit in se absolute [= art. 21]
ii. De Deo, an sit in comparatione ad nostram notitiam [= art. 22]
b. Quid sit[43]
i. De quidditate Dei in comparatione ad ipsum Deum [= art. 23]
ii. De quidditate Dei in comparatione ad nostram notitiam [= art. 24]
2. De unitate Dei simpliciter et absolute [= art. 25]
3. De natura et essentia Dei [= art. 26]
4. De vivere et vita Dei [= art. 27]

B. De eis quae pertinent ad Dei essentiales et naturales proprietates[44]

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36 From prooemium, art. 14.
37 From prooemium, art. 15.
38 From the prooemia, art. 1 and art. 20.
39 Prooemium of Article 21: "Primum de Deo ut de subiecto principali et secundum de creaturis ut de materia subiecto attributa".
40 From the prooemium, art. 21.
41 From the prooemium, art. 25.
42 From the prooemium, art. 21.
43 From the prooemium, art. 21.
44 From the prooemium, art. 28.

1. De proprietatibus Deo convenientibus ratione qua est essentia quaedam et natura,[45] i. e. de proprietatibus quasi Deo proprias et naturaliter Deo inditas.
    a. De Dei simplicitate
        i. Utrum in Deo sit aliqua compositio ex aliis [= art. 28]
        ii. Utrum Deus habeat aliquam compositionem ex aliis [= art. 29]
    b. De Dei immutabilitate [= art. 30]
    c. De Dei aeternitate [= art. 31]
2. De proprietatibus quae conveniunt Deo ratione qua est quaedam vita,[46] i.e. proprietates deitatis communes Deo et creaturae, et a creaturis translatae et Deo attributae secundum usum sermonis humani[47]
    a. De proprietatibus communibus substantialibus divinae essentiae a creaturis attributis in generali (in se et absolute)[48] [= art. 32]
    b. De proprietatibus communibus substantialibus divinae essentiae a creaturis attributis in speciali[49]
        i. Intellectus
            a. De ratione intelligibilis in Deo tanquam obiecti cognitionis intellectivae
                i. De ratione intelligibilis in Deo simpliciter [= art. 33]
                ii. De ratione veritatis in Deo [= art. 34]
            b. De ratione intellectus in Deo tanquam potentiae qua agit suam operationem intellectivam
                i. De potentia in Deo in generali [= art. 35]
                ii. De potentia in Deo in speciali, i.e. de potentia quae est intellectus [= art. 36]
            c. De ratione intellectus in Deo tanquam habitus, ut scilicet est ipsa divina scientia
                i. De ratione habitus in Deo generaliter [= art. 37]
                ii. De ratione habitus in Deo specialiter [= art. 38]
            d. De actu intelligendi qui est intelligere quasi elicitum de potentia et ex habitu per obiectum

45 From the prooemium, art. 28.

46 From the prooemium, art. 28.

47 From the prooemium, art. 53.

48 From the prooemium, art. 32 and art. 51.

49 From the prooemium, art. 33.

i. De actione Dei in generali [= art. 39]
ii. De actione Dei quae est intelligere in speciali [= art. 40]

ii. Voluntas
a. De volibili sive amabili in Deo[50]
i. De bonitate Dei [= art. 41]
ii. De perfectione Dei [= art. 42]
iii. De totalitate Dei [= art. 43]
iv. De infinitate Dei [= art. 44]
b. De voluntate Dei [= art. 45]
c. De habitu vel quasi habitu in voluntate Dei [= art. 46]
d. De actu volendi Dei [= art. 47]
iii. De actu voluntatis quae est velle in comparatione ad actum intellectus qui est intelligere[51] [= art. 48]
iv. De beatitudine Dei [= art. 49]
v. De delectatione Dei [= art. 50]

3. De illis proprietatibus quae pertinent ad ipsa secundum quod comparantur inter se et ad ipsam divinam essentiam[52]
a. De differentia attributorum inter se, et ab ipsa essentia [= art. 51]
b. De ordine attributorum inter se, et ad illa quae in ipsa essentia considerantur [= art. 52]

(Part two of the second exemplar and *liber magistri*)

C. Ad personarum distinctionem[53]
1. De eis quae pertinent ad propria[54]
A. De eis quae conveniunt singulis personis secundum se[55]
i. De eis quae conveniunt singulis personis secundum se in generali[56]
a. De divinis personis [= art. 53]
b. De modo emanandi unam personam ab alia [= art. 54]
ii. De proprietatibus personarum divinarum in speciali [= art. 55]

50 From the prooemium, art. 41.
51 From the prooemium, art. 33.
52 From the prooemium, art. 51.
53 From the prooemium, art. 53.
54 From the prooemium, art. 53.
55 From the prooemium, art. 53.
56 From the prooemium, art. 53.

B. De proprietatibus sed specialiter personarum realibus, in comparatione ad ipsas personas [= art. 56]
C. De proprietatibus personalibus quoad singulas personas in speciali[57]
i. Ad personam Patris [= art. 57–58]
ii. Ad personam Filii [= art. 59]
iii. De spiratione activa, quae est proprietas Patri et Filio communis [= art. 60]
iv. Ad personam Spiritus Sancti [= art. 61]

(Part two of the first exemplar)

2. De pertinentibus in divinis ad relationes communes quae consequuntur divinas personas distinctas et in esse constitutas[58]
A. De generibus relationum communium (identitas, equalitas, et similitudo) secundum se et absolute in divinis [= art. 62]
B. De tribus generibus relationum communium in comparatione[59]
i. De tribus generibus relationum in comparatione ad alia genera relationum quae sunt in potentiis et mensuris [= art. 63]
ii. De comparatione relativorum communium inter se [= art. 64]
iii. De relationibus communibus in comparatione ad sua principia causativa quae sunt unum et multum [= art. 65]
iv. De relationibus communibus in comparatione ad sua principia fundamentalia quae sunt substantia, quantitas, et qualitas [= art. 66]
v. De relationibus communibus in comparatione ad sua principia materialia, cuiusmodi sunt ipsa subiecta relata per huiusmodi relationes communes [= art. 67]
3. De relationibus communibus prout specialiter habent esse in Deo[60]
A. De relationibus communiter sive in generali quoad tria genera relationum communium, quae sunt identitas, equalitas, et similitudo [= art. 68]

57 From the prooemium, art. 57.
58 From the prooemium, art. 62. In the prooemium of Article 62: "Expedito hucusque a liii articulo …".
59 From the prooemium, art. 63.
60 From the prooemium, art. 68.

B. De unoquodque genere relationum communium prout habet esse in divinis in speciali[61]
   i. De identitate Dei [= art. 69]
   ii. De aequalitate Dei [= art. 70]
   iii. De similitudine Dei [= art. 71]

D. De appropriatione[62]
   1. De communibus tam relativis quam absolutis appropriates ad propria relative, et hoc quoad illorum communium appropriationem et modum appropriandi ad propria [= art. 72]

E. Quomodo intellecta de ipso sunt proferenda[63]
   1. Quomodo intellecta de Deo sint proferenda quoad eorum significationem seu nominationem per nomina incomplexa [= art. 73]
   2. Quomodo intellecta de Deo sint proferenda quoad illorum praedicationes per propositiones complexas
      a. Quomodo intellecta de Deo sint proferenda in generali quoad illorum praedicationes per propositiones complexas [= art. 74]
      b. Quomodo intellecta de Deo sint proferenda in speciali quoad illorum praedicationes per propositiones complexas [= art. 75]

III. *De creaturis* (intended but never completed)

Recognizing the distinction between the physical and schematic divisions of Henry's *Summa* allows one to understand correctly some of the comments in the manuscripts. For example on last folio (203^{v}) in the Troyes manuscript the note "prima pars summae magistri Henrici de Gandavo" is a reference to the end of the section *De Deo*, and not a reference to the physical division of the manuscript. And the manuscript Padova, *Bibl. Capitolare c. 45*, which ended after Article 52, contained the colophon "Laus tibi sit Christe quoniam liber explicit iste" which is a reference to the physical division of the manuscript, and not to the first book of the *Summa*, i.e. *De Deo*.[64]

61 From the prooemium, art. 69.

62 From the prooemium, art. 72. In the prooemium of Article 73: "… ab articulo xxi".

63 From the prooemia, art. 21 and 73. In the prooemium of Article 73: "Viso a xxi articulo hucusque quae et qualia de Deo in se et absolute sunt intelligenda, sequitur ultimo in hac parte nostrae disputationis ordinariae quomodo intellecta de eo sunt proferenda".

64 See M. Führer's analysis of this colophon as well as his comment "the manuscript is responding to some sort of traditional division of the text at this point in time" (Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 47–52*, (ed. M. Führer), p. xviii).

The division of the first exemplar between Articles 61 and 62 and the division of the second exemplar and the *liber magistri* between Articles 52 and 53 both occur at conceptual divisions of the text, although the two parts of the second exemplar and the *liber magistri* are less asymmetrical than the two parts of the first exemplar, and the break occurs between a slightly higher schematic division than the break of the first exemplar.

6.2 *Sections* De Deo *and* De creaturis

In addition to the schematic division of the *Summa* which can be reconstructed based upon the information in the prooemiums, there is also a conceptual structure in Henry's *Summa* which is revealed by the cross references in the questions which confirms the general outline given above. In the text of the articles and questions in the *Summa* there are numerous references like "… ut patebit inferius loquendo de creaturis", which seem to be references to the unachieved section *De creaturis*. Variations of this stock phrase begin only, as far as could be determined,[65] in the prooemium of Article 28. In Article 29, q. 6, there are six such references, the last being the final sentence of the question "Sed de hoc latius est perscrutandum loquendo de creaturis (Bad., I, fol. 174^{r}L)". These references have been listed and studied by M. de Carvalho.[66] However the last such explicit reference in Henry's *Summa* occurs in a. 49, q. 5. So one is faced with consternation: why do these explicit references like "loquendo de creaturis" end in Article 49?

Furthermore, if one examines the structure of Article 62, which concerns the common relations in God (identity, equality, and similarity), one finds four questions: question one treats common relations in God, but questions two and three are about common relations in both God and creatures, and question four is restricted to common relations in creatures. One can properly wonder: what is a question devoted exclusively to common relations in creatures doing in this section *De Deo*? Why was this not reserved to the intended section *De creaturis*? This could easily have been accomplished in the same manner Henry treated subsequent material in a. 29, q. 6, mentioned above, namely by writing "Sed de hoc latius est perscrutandum loquendo de creaturis".

The lack of the stock phrase "… ut patebit inferius loquendo de creaturis", or some variation of it in Articles 50 to 75, and the explicit inclusion of a ques-

65 Cf. Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 1–5*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. xxii–xxv.

66 M. Santiago de Carvalho, "On the Unwritten Section …", pp. 327–370; id., "Sobre o Projecto …", pp. 211–230.

tion concerning creatures in the section *De Deo* in Article 62 suggest that Henry changed his mind concerning composing a section *De creaturis*. But, when did he do this?

There are perhaps other internal references in Articles 53–75 which could provide clues to what Henry was intending to follow Article 75 in what would have been the section *De creaturis*. In the critical edition of *Summa*, aa. 53–55, there are a number of cross-references to prior and subsequent articles and questions in the *Summa*. In all there were over 450 such cross references. Of course many of these were to prior articles, and there were many references like "ut infra dicetur" which were references to subsequent elaborations in the same question. However, there were at least an estimated 150 references like "ut infra dicetur" which were to subsequent articles in the *Summa*. Perhaps an examination of the references like "ut infra dicetur" in the final five articles of the *Summa* might reveal what Henry was planning for the never composed Articles 76 and beyond.

The occurrences of "infra" references in Articles 70 to 75 can be listed:

1) art. 70, q. 1: "… infra in prima quaestione de similitudine in solutione secundi argumenti"
2) art. 71, q. 1: "… ut patet ex infra declarandis quaestione 3ª sequente"
3) art. 72, q. 1: "… ut infra videbitur" (a reference internal to a. 72, q. 1)
4) art. 72, q. 1: "… in sequentibus quaestionibus declarabitur"
5) art. 72, q. 1: "… inferius declarabitur iam in corpore quaestionis sequentis"
6) art. 72, q. 1: "… ut patebit in sequenti quaestione"
7) art. 72, q. 3: "… patebit in sequentibus quaestionibus"
8) art. 73, q. 1: "… ut infra patebit" (a reference internal to a. 73, q. 1)
9) art. 73, q. 2: "… ut infra videbitur"
10) art. 73, q. 2: "… in sequenti articulo, q. 9"
11) art. 73, q. 4: "… ut patebit in sequenti quaestione"
12) art. 73, q. 7: "… inferius loquendo de divinis praedicationibus" (a reference to a. 74, q. 4)
13) art. 73, q. 8: "… ut infra in fine quaestionis secundae articuli sequentis"
14) art. 73, q. 8: "… ut infra articulo sequenti quaestione 2ª et 3ª patebit"
15) art. 74, q. 1: "… de hoc erit sermo inferius" (a reference to a. 75, q. 2)
16) art. 74, q. 5: "… ut patebit in quaestione sequente"
17) art. 75, q. 2: "Ex quibus patebit demum …" (a reference internal to a. 75, q. 2)
18) art. 75, q. 5: "… amplius patebit" (a reference internal to a. 75, q. 5)
19) art. 75, q. 6: "prout iam inferius amplius declarabitur" (a reference internal to a. 75, q. 6)

There are three things which are immediately obvious about these nineteen references. First, there are only nineteen, unlike the estimated 150 plus "infra" references to subsequent articles and questions which one finds in Articles 53–55. Second, when these nineteen references are not internal to the question he is treating, Henry in these articles makes explicit references to subsequent articles and/or questions. And third, the references are not to articles beyond Article 75. In brief, the internal references in Articles 70–75 are silent to what Henry intended for articles beyond Article 75, and this reconfirms the impression that he no longer intended to compose the section *De creaturis*.

There is then in the *Summa* no use of the stock phrase "ut patebit inferius loquendo de creaturis" in Articles 50–75. And, in Articles 70–75 all of the references "infra" can be located within Articles 70–75. It seems clear that this absence is not unintended. But if Henry abandoned his plan to compose the section *De creaturis*, when exactly did he do this? There are two possible explanations. The first is that Henry had abandoned his plan shortly after the composition of Article 49, the last use of his stock phrase "… ut patebit inferius loquendo de creaturis". This, it should be noted, would roughly correspond with the completion of the "first part" of the *Summa* in the second exemplar (although, of course, the second Parisian exemplar was probably written after Henry's death). The second explanation, as will be seen shortly, is that he gave up his grand scheme after he completed Article 61, and this corresponds with the end of the "first part" of his *Summa* in the first exemplar. Which of these two explanations is correct depends on understanding two passages in Article 61. One is in Question 2 and the other is in Question 6.

There is a very intriguing comment that Henry made in a 61, q. 2. In it he wrote: "Quae quidem generationes etiam possunt dici processiones, et hoc praeter illam processionem qua in missione ad aliquem effectum in creaturis, una divinarum personarum temporaliter dicitur procedere ab alia vel ab aliis, de qua processione habendus est sermo inferius in tractatu De providentia Dei et gubernatione creaturarum". There is no known separate tract *De providentia Dei et gubernatione creaturarum* attributed to Henry, and thus one must wonder: to what tract is he referring?

There seem to be two possible explanations of this comment. One explanation would be that it may have been a reference to the unfinished section *De creaturis*, which would have been "inferius". However, there are a number of problems with this explanation. First, unlike Albert the Great, Henry did not subdivide sections of his *Summa* into "tracts". Second, if it were a reference to the *De creaturis*, this would be the only such reference to it in Articles 50 to 75. Third, why would Henry refer to the section *De creaturis* as a tract and not a part? In all the numerous references in the *Summa* to the *De creaturis*, Henry

never referred to it as a "tractatus". And in referring to the finished section *De Deo*, he referred to this only as a "*pars*", never as a "tractatus". Finally, would not a treatment of God's providence be placed better in the section *De Deo*, similar to where Thomas Aquinas placed his analysis of divine providence in his *Summa*, namely under the general category of God's will?[67]

A second explanation is possible, one consistent with the fact that Henry was silent concerning the section *De creaturis* in Articles 50 to 75. Perhaps this is a reference to an independent tract that he intended to write, but did not. Article 61, which contains this reference to a "tractatus", was probably written about the same time as *Quodlibet* XIV, namely around Advent of 1290.[68] Perhaps Henry died before he could compose this tract. But how would one explain the "inferius"? After all the only things that are "inferius" are articles and questions, not tracts. Perhaps a clue to the "inferius" reference can be found in other passages in the *Summa*.

This reference to "inferius" would not have been the only confusion in Henry's *Summa* concerning material described as "inferius" which is not "inferius" at all. One must recall the last lines of *Summa*, a. 36, q. 4, where the manuscripts copied from the *liber magistri* read "… secundum quod inferius habet perscrutari de hoc, V° Quolibet, quaestione 4ª"; whereas the manuscripts

67 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22.

68 In Article 62, Henry made an explicit reference to *Quodlibet* XIV, "… sicut exposuimus in XIV° *Quolibet*, in quaestione de relatione activi ad passivum in voluntate" (Bad., II, fol. 192^{rB}), which indicates that *Quodlibet* XIV was completed by the time he composed Article 62. Henry's *Quodlibet* XIV dates to Advent of 1290. For the dates of the *Quodlibeta*, see P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, pp. 87–95; J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Etudes de philosophie médiévale 25), Paris 1938, p. xv, n. 1; E. Hocedez, "Henri de Gand, Gilles de Lessines et Gilles de Rome, [= Henri et Les Deux Gilles]", appendix 7, in: E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine* (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense: Etudes et Document VII), Louvain 1925, p. 473; O. Lottin, "Le libre arbitre chez Godefried de Fontaines", in: *Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie* 40 (1937), pp. 214–241, p. 217, n. 15; see also id., *Psychologie et morale aux XII^{e} et XIII^{e} siècles*, Gembloux ^{2}1957, Tome I, pp. 307–308, n. 4; A. San Cristóbal-Sebastián, *Controversias acerca de la voluntad desde 1270 a 1300*, Madrid 1958, p. 110; J. Gómez-Caffarena, "Cronologia de la *Suma* de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus *Quodlibetos*", in: *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), pp. 116–133; R. Macken, *Bibliotheca manuscripta*, II, p. xvii; P. Porro, "Doing Theology and Philosophy", pp. 174–179, and G.A. Wilson, "Henry of Ghent's Written Legacy", in: G.A. Wilson (ed.), *A Companion to Henry of Ghent* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 23), Leiden—Boston 2011, pp. 5–6. One can reasonably surmise that Article 61 which makes the reference to the "tractatus" was composed around the time of *Quodlibet* XIV, Advent of 1290.

copied from the exemplars read "… secundum quod inferius habet perscrutari de hoc, V° articulo, quaestione 4ª".[69] Here the text of the *liber magistri* seemed to have been the earlier (and exact)[70] text, but the copyist of the exemplar was probably puzzled by the reference "inferius" to *Quodlibet* V, q. 4—after all, in *Summa*, a. 36, the only things that were "inferius" were articles and questions, not *Quodlibeta*. One has the impression that in this instance Henry, realizing that he was to shortly treat this topic in *Quodlibet* V, was distracted and in haste wrote "inferius", but completed the sentence correctly by making the reference to *Quodlibet* V, q. 4 and that the manuscripts copied from the *liber magistri* picked up these words.[71] So one can wonder: is something similar happening here in Article 61? Could Henry have intended to write a separate *tractatus*, *De providentia Dei et de gubernatione creaturarum*, but never composed it? And is the "inferius" a simple slip, much like it was in *Summa*, a. 36, q. 4?

There is a second passage in Article 61 which might be a possible reference to the *De creaturis*. In Question 6, Henry wrote: "Et ibi similiter accipitur memoria pro habente memoriam sive pro memorante, et intelligentia pro intelligente, qui personaliter est ipsa intelligentia, aut habens in se intelligentiam, sumendo intelligentiam pro actu aut habitu, secundum quod haec omnia debent exponi disputando de creatura intellectuali in generali quomodo creata est ad imaginem et quomodo est imago Creatoris (Bad., II, f. 179^{r}M)". Here the comment by Henry is intriguing because he does not indicate where he intended to dispute about intellectual creatures in general and how they are created in the image of the Creator. Absent is any mention of "infra", which one would expect if this were to be treated subsequently. Furthermore, it is unusual for Henry to describe a subsequent passage in his *Summa* as something which must be "disputed". Typically these subsequent topics are "loquendo" or "exponendo". Certainly the questions in his *Quodlibeta* were "disputed", but if this is a reference to a future *Quodlibet*, the topic is not present in *Quodlibet* XV, and Article 61 was completed after *Quodlibet* XIV. However, this much can be said: if this were a reference to a subsequent discussion that would have appeared subsequently in his *Summa*, i.e. if he were still intending to compose a section *De creaturis*,

69 Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), p. 122,84–85.

70 The reading "quinto articulo, quaestione 4ª" is incorrect. First, the fifth article does not follow Article 36. Second, the discussion which centers on God's creation of the world freely is not treated in Article 5, but it is in *Quodlibet* V, q. 4. Cf. Henrici de Gandavo, *Summa, art. 35–40*, (ed. G.A. Wilson), pp. lii–liii, and J. Gómez-Caffarena, "Cronologia de la 'Summa' de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus 'Quodlibetos'", in: *Gregorianum* XXXVIII (1957), p. 131: "O bien Enrique escribió 'Quodlibet', y 'articulo' es error de copista …".

71 Ibid., pp. lii–liii.

this would have been the last time that Henry would have alluded to it. And, if this were the case, then he probably would have abandoned the section *De creaturis* shortly after he composed Article 61.

Conclusion

An examination of the "parts" of Henry of Ghent's *Summa* has brought to light many factors about this monumental work. The materials of the first Parisian university exemplar were gathered into parts differently than the materials of the second Parisian university exemplar. The complexities of editing the second part of the *Summa* have also been indicated, first because the Borghese manuscript was an exemplar divided into *pecia* only for Articles 58–75 and not for Articles 53–57, and some of these *peciae* may well have been replacement *peciae*. That these *peciae* were so worn and that some needed to be replaced suggest a wide circulation and interest in these later articles of the *Summa*. The division of the *Summa* into parts was placed in the context of an outline of the *Summa*. Finally, the parts *De Deo* and *De creaturis* were examined and it seems that Henry abandoned his grand plan for a section *De creaturis*. This would have occurred around the time he composed Article 50 of his *Summa* or shortly after he composed Article 61.

CHAPTER 12

A Thomist Facing the Challenge of Henry of Ghent. An Edition and Study of Distinction 2 from James of Metz's *Commentary on Book I of the Sentences*

Mikołaj Olszewski

In Christian theology, the problem of the unity *versus* multiplicity in God took mainly the form of an attempt to reconcile the unity of the divine essence with the Trinity. This topic was considered by the most eminent Church Fathers whose teachings were then transmitted to medieval scholastic thought *via* Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.[1] But soon the question of divine unity *versus* plurality took another form, namely that of the problem of the plurality and distinction of divine attributes confronted with God's unity. An important contribution to this discussion was made by Thomas Aquinas, which provoked a critical response. Here I intend to study a reaction to this response produced by a Dominican theologian, namely by James of Metz.[2]

1 Aquinas' Position

Thomas Aquinas' crucial text devoted to plurality of attributes is his *Sentences Commentary* I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.[3] This article consists of two parts: the introduc-

1 Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae*, Grottaferrata 1971, I, d. 2, pp. 61,12–68,18.

2 For the general reviews of the problem in the post-Thomas period cf. L. Hödl, "Die philosophische Gotteslehre des Thomas von Aquin O.P. in der Diskussion der Schulen zu Wende des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts" in: *Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica* 70 (1978), pp. 113–134; R.M. McInerny, *Being and Predication. Thomistic Interpretation*, Washington 1986, pp. 251–278; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought*, Leiden 1993, pp. 35–41; G. Smith, *The Problem of Divine Attributes from Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus*, (Dissertation) Notre Dame 2013.

3 Aquinas' text was originally written as a disputed question and added later (1267–1269) to his *Commentary*; cf. B.-M. Lemaigre, "Perfection de Dieu et multiplicité des attributs divins", in: *Revue Scolastique de Philosophie et Théologie* 50 (1966), pp. 198–227. For recent and detailed presentations cf. G.P. Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology*, Washington 2007, pp. 298–300; G.R. Smith, *The Problem of Divine Attributes*, cit., pp. 36–58.

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tory defining *ratio*, and the principal declaring whether the difference between attributes is grounded in God, or merely in the intellect.

In the first part of the question, based on Aristotle's definition of *ratio* as definition, Aquinas argues that *rationes* are names of secondary imposition (e.g., genus and species) that must not possess their counterparts among really existing things.[4] In the second part, Thomas confronts two contrary opinions. The first one (Avicenna and Moses Maimonides) contends that God is pure existence devoid of essence. Yet, attributes can be ascribed to God as they negate defects and privations in God or as they point to the cause of the properties of creatures. Hence, divine names have no direct counterpart in God because *rationes* are products of operations of the human intellect. The second opinion (pseudo-Dionysius and Anselm of Canterbury) places the emphasis on the eminence of God's perfections in comparison with a creature's. According to this, *rationes* are not merely in our intellect but they have their counterparts in God. Finally, Aquinas says that the contradictory character of these opinions can be removed because they differ only in accents put on different elements of the conception of divine attributes. The first one stresses the things that are the source of meanings for divine names, whereas the second identifies the perfections from which the names follow. Therefore, these two theses do not contradict each other because neither the first opinion removes any perfection from God, nor the second states the existence of subsisting qualities in God.[5]

Finally, Aquinas answers the question of whether the plurality of attributes is due only to cognitive operations of the human intellect or not. First, he says that the plurality of attributes ultimately springs from the imperfect nature of our intellect, which is not able to grasp different modes of divine perfection through one notion because it is accustomed to know creatures whose perfections are multiple. That is why the intellect knows what is one in God as many and it cannot comprehend God in one concept named by one word. Thus, to know God's nature, the human intellect has to use many different concepts referring to one thing but signifying different perfections. Moreover, even the human intellect in *visio beata* could not really comprehend God by means of one name. The plurality of attributes follows from God's nature and it refers to something in God that is not plural *in re*. Thomas comments on the alternative answer, claiming that the plurality of attributes is due exclusively to cognitive operations of the human intellect. This opinion is true insofar as it

4 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *I Sent.*, (ed. P. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, I, d. 2, a. 3, corp., pp. 66–67.

5 Ibid., a. 3, corp., pp. 67–69.

states that the limited capacity of the human intellect is a cause for the plurality of attributes, but it is false when saying that God is good because He created good things, meanwhile, creatures are good secondarily, and God—primarily.[6] From this it follows that God would be good even if He would not have created the world.

Aquinas' solution to the problem of the plurality of divine attributes presented in his other works generally follows that established in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, but he modifies three elements: (1) he considers the question of the plurality of attributes under the heading of the synonymy of the divine names that must be combated; (2) he acknowledges the possibility of seeing God's essence through one attribute expressed by one name by the blessed; and (3) he puts an emphasis more on the causal function of the human intellect in producing the names and attributes of God than on their actual correlates in God.[7]

2 Henry of Ghent's Criticism of Thomas' Position

Aquinas conception was presented and then refuted by Henry of Ghent in his *Quodlibet* V, q. 1.[8] This question has mainly a polemical character, and Henry's own opinion is presented in opposition to that of Aquinas. According to Henry, Aquinas contends that the plurality and distinction of attributes depends on the relation that they bear with their correlatives in creatures. Without such a relation there would exist only one and simple *ratio* of God, expressed by one name. This thesis is supported in the following way. To all *rationes* existing in God corresponds the unity of His essence not only as it is taken in itself but also in its relations to created things, i.e., not only as it is their efficient cause but also as formal cause. Such comprehension of all perfections of all things is possible because of God's maximal perfection, which is able to include all perfections. In Henry's terms, Aquinas states that the plurality of perfections, existing in

6 Ibid., a. 3, corp., pp. 69–71.

7 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Lectura romana* (Studies and Texts 152), (ed. L.E. Boyle and J.F. Boyle), Toronto 2006, d. 2, 2.1.1., corp., pp. 93–94; *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei*, q. 7, a. 6; *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 35; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 4.

8 The question was written in 1280 or 1281; cf. R. Macken, *Introduction* to Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* I, Opera omnia V, p. XVII sq. For the doctrinal contents cf. H. Paulus, *Henri de Gand, Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Études de philosophie médiévale 25), Paris 1938, pp. 243–248. The main elements of the *Quodlibet* V, 1 were repeated by Henry in his *Summa*, a. 51, q. 1, Parisiis 1520, t, 2, ff. 102A–104O.

things *in actu*, is only *in potentia* in God and is not actualized unless known by the intellect. Thus, without intellect there is no actual plurality in God.[9]

Then, Henry gives his own opinion, beginning with the distinction of ways in which different *rationes* are present in God. Some perfections of created things are present in God merely as ideas (donkey, stone), whereas the others are present as genuine attributes (goodness, wisdom). The difference between them consists in that the former does not exist in God as qualities proper to Him, while the latter does. Thus, Henry excludes the thesis that God is a donkey because an idea of the donkey is present in Him. Further, he contends that Aquinas' theory rightly describes the way in which ideas are in God but not attributes. Essential perfections of things, continues Henry, have their counterparts in God but they do not thus become His attributes. By contrast, accidental perfections of things, relative to their *bene esse*, such as goodness and wisdom, are primarily in God and secondarily in creatures, and they are proper to God even before creation.[10] In spite of that, the human intellect conceives the existence of any perfection in God in the same way, i.e. starting from creatures. For example, it conceives God as substance, wise and possessing an idea of the donkey, beginning from created substances, wise persons and donkeys. The identity of the source of knowledge about God causes Thomas to declare that every *ratio* in God depends on its relation to creatures but it is absurd to assert that being a substance pertains to God because of His relation to creatures. Thus, all attributes should be ascribed to God first and then to creatures. Moreover, the same is true of the divine Persons. Men know them only through creatures but this does not mean that they do not exist without creatures. Indeed, says Henry, the plurality of the persons is grounded in the plurality and distinction of attributes. It is so because the Son is generated as a Word conceived in the intellect and the Spirit proceeds as love in the will. The intellect and the will are principal divine attributes, ontically identical with God's essence, but different from one another by a distinction of reason (*ratione*). They come into existence by means of God's self-reflection: He conceives Himself as true and loves Himself as good, being at the same time aware that they are really one thing.[11] Besides, Henry says that Thomas' oversight of the distinction between *ratio idealis* and *attributum* destroys the Augustinian distinction of the *vestigium versus similitudo* in creatures, as vestiges correspond to ideas in the divine mind, while attributes to similitudes.[12]

9 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* V, q. 1, corp., ff. 100^{v}B–101^{r}E.

10 Ibid., corp., f. 101^{r}F–^{v}M.

11 Ibid., corp., f. 102^{r}P.

12 Ibid., corp., f. 102^{r}Q–^{v}Q.

Finally, Henry positively formulates his standpoint and contends that one can speak about God's unity and simplicity in two ways: either referring to it *in se* or *in intellectu*. The divine simplicity *in se* is absolute, devoid of any actual plurality, and in itself inaccessible to the human intellect because it knows God starting from creatures and partially, step by step, conceives God, ascribing to Him attributes. God's simplicity *in intellectu* occurs in two ways: (1) either it is grasped in an act of simple comprehension, which is characteristic of the blessed and thus God's simplicity is conceived with no plurality; (2) or it is the subject of further reflection on what has already been comprehended. Thus, God's simplicity is conceived without relation to creatures, but with the plurality of attributes. In such cognition, God's essence remains one, but it is perceived through many notions that are different from one another *ratione*, with no relation to creatures although assuming many internal relation in God produced in God's act of self-reflection.[13]

3 Godfrey of Fontaines's Response to Henry of Ghent

Henry's position provoked a response by Godfrey of Fontaines in his *Quodlibet* VII, q. 1.[14] Godfrey begins with some preliminary clarifications. He presents two meanings of attributes (existing in God as a source of perfections of created things or a perfection describing an accidental quality as contrasted to an essential one), and clarifies that this question pertains only to attributes in its second meaning, since it is obvious that 'attribute' in the first sense must depend on the knowledge of creatures.[15]

Thus, the question really concerns divine self-knowledge and asks whether God knows His own attributes in relation to creatures. Henry of Ghent answers this question negatively and explains that the plurality of attributes follows from the action of God's intellect apprehending itself, without relation to creatures. Godfrey conceptualizes Henry's considerations in the form of six arguments: (1) The divine essence refers to creatures as their cause, so if God is called 'good' because He causes goodness in things, then He should be also

13 Ibid., corp., f. 102^{v}S.

14 Cf. J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy*, Washington 1981, p. XXVIII (date), and pp. 115–123 (the analysis of the question).

15 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodlibet* VII (Les Philosophes Belges 3), (ed. M. de Wulf et J. Hoffmans), Louvain 1914, q. 1, corp., pp. 265–267.

called a 'stone' since He causes stones. (2) The plurality of the divine Persons does not follow from their relation to creatures, but the plurality of attributes provides the basis for the plurality of the persons, so etc. (3) What is more primarily in God than in creatures cannot be in God because of a relation *ad extra*, but attributes are primarily in God, etc. (4) As wisdom and goodness differ in God *ratione*, so do wisdom and divinity, but, it is untenable that the difference between divinity and wisdom derives from creatures, so similarly the difference between wisdom and goodness should not be grounded in creatures. (5) The distinction of ideas in God is reducible to creatures, but if the distinction between the attributes were produced in the same way, ideas would not be different from attributes. (6) God knows and loves Himself without relation to creatures, but He knows Himself as true and loves Himself as good, assuming the distinction of attributes *ratione*. These arguments make Henry state that the divine attributes are distinct and many thanks to God's operations focused on His own essence. In this way, God actualizes different attributes contained in His essence *in potentia*.[16]

Godfrey says then that notwithstanding these reported arguments he prefers the opposite of Henry's conclusion. Godfrey argues that the ascription of plurality to something that is one in itself without relation *ad extra* assumes a contradiction because unity and plurality would be simultaneously predicated of it. This general statement is instantiated by the divine essence, which is one *in re* as well as *ratione*, hence, it cannot be conceived as containing plurality, unless it is related to something else. Contrary to Henry's opinion, God, while thinking about Himself, understands only one simple thing by means of one notion. He cannot know Himself as conceiving and conceived unless He possesses the notions of conceived and conceiving from somewhere else. Thus, a mere reference to His essence is not able to generate attributes. Moreover, every distinction *ratione* must be based on a distinction *in re*. Thus, divine self-knowledge is not able to discover the plurality of attributes unless they are different and many in their very essence, which is unacceptable. Therefore, there must be something distinct from one another and external to the divine essence, which enable God to know the plurality of His attributes, namely creatures.[17] Finally, Godfrey states that the divine intellect always cognizes His essence as really one, but also as virtually containing all perfections that are imitated in a limited way by all things, i.e., as containing ideas. And the ideas are comprehended by God in relation to things created according to them. In the

16 Ibid., corp., pp. 267–269.

17 Ibid., corp., pp. 270–272.

same way, God cognizes His essence as containing all perfections in an unlimited way, and if He is to distinguish His perfections from one another, He must refer them to creatures.[18]

Godfrey ends with the refutation of six of Henry's arguments. (1) God relates to creatures by means of ideas and attributes, but in a different way: through ideas as the cause of creatures, and through attributes as they exist more eminently in God than in creatures, indeed so eminently that they are conceived in God's self-knowledge as something one and indistinct *in re* as well as *ratione*. (2) Although the intellect and the will are indeed principles of emanation of the divine Persons, they are not insofar as they are understood as pure attributes but rather as the principles of personal emanations. The intellect and the will as attributes and as principles of emanation are merely proportional to each other. Therefore, God conceives the intellect and the will by means of the notion of being the principle of emanation in a way proper to the intellect and the will. From this it follows that the distinction of attributes is not presupposed in the distinction of the divine Persons, but what is presupposed is only the distinction of the principles of emanation. (3) God is indeed wise, good, etc., and all such qualities can be ascribed to God without relation to creatures, but in this way they are conceived through one notion of His essence and consequently they are not distinct from one another. And by contrast, if attributes are to be ascribed to God as they are distinct *ratione*, they must be related to creatures. (4) Godfrey adds to his previous reasoning that the knowledge about attributes as different from one another *ratione* is possible only if they are related to creatures, in which their essence and qualities differ *in re*. (5) Ideas in God's mind do not involve perfect knowledge about God's essence, but only limited. By contrast, the knowledge about attributes does not assume any limitation in God. (6) This argument is invalid on account of the same reason that affects the third argument.[19]

4 Dominican Reaction to the Disagreement between Henry and Godfrey

Before I present James of Metz's attitude towards Henry's position, some remarks about the Dominican authors John Quidort and William of Godino, who preceded him, should be considered. Both of them ask in their *Commentaries*

18 Ibid., corp., p. 272.

19 Ibid., corp., pp. 273–278.

on the Sentences about the plurality and distinction of divine attributes and they both answer that attributes are many, distinct from each other, and that the difference between them is not *in re* but *ratione* and on account of God's relation to creatures. Besides, unlike James of Metz, John and William overlook Henry's and Godfrey's intervention in the discussion.[20]

James's commentary to the Distinction 2 consists of two questions.[21] The first one is a preliminary clarification of terminology combined with a declaration of the plurality of the attributes. The question is divided into four articles.

Article 1 contains the definition of divine attributes. According to James, the term 'attribute' etymologically derives from a tribute to something. Hence, attribute means something ascribed to God that at the same time is true of creatures. Thus—and it seems an original idea of James—some divine names, as the prime being and Creator, are not attributes because they cannot be ascribed to creatures.

Article 2 consists of three arguments modeled on the Dionysian three ways to God, borrowed from corresponding parts of William of Godino's question.[22] The first, based on the way of negation, argues that God cannot be limited to a particular genus because it would be at odds with His full perfection. To be fully perfect, He must possess perfections characteristic of every genus, and consequently, those perfections must be many. The second argument, from the way of eminence, avers that what is essentially (as opposed to through participation) perfect must possess all possible perfections. God is essentially perfect, and therefore, He cannot lack any perfection. The third argument, exploring the way of causality, assumes that any partial perfection in effects must wholly preexist in their cause. So there are many perfections in creatures that must

20 Cf. Ioannes Parisinus (Quidort), *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 2, corp., (ed. J.-P. Muller), Roma 1961, pp. 34–36; Guillelmus Petri de Godino, *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, corp., Ms Pisa, Biblioteca del Seminario Arcivescovile S. Catarina, 44, ff. 3^{vb}–4^{va}. Both questions consist of two parts: (1) preliminaries clarifying the terminology, stating the plurality of the attributes and (2) the principal parts devoted to proving the distinction of the attributes *ratione*, grounded in God's relation to creatures. The crucial paragraphs of William's text are literally borrowed from John's *Commentary*.

21 The final version of James's *Commentary to the Sentences* was written probably in 1301. Cf. M. Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads* (Archa Verbi Subsidia 2), Münster 2010, p. 17. The final version of Distinction 2 repeats the text of the *Additiones* with some minor changes in wording; cf. B. Decker, *Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42/1), Münster 1967, who presents also a summary of the contents with some general historical remarks, pp. 135–143.

22 For all textual filiations, see a historical apparatus to the edition below.

preexist in God. To William's argumentation, James adds a possible objection against the third argument and an answer to it. It can, namely, be argued that perfections in effects do not have to preexist formally in their cause but only virtually, e.g., heat in the Sun. James rejects this objection by pointing out that in the most perfect cause perfections must exist formally, not only virtually, otherwise it would not be fully perfect.

In Article 3, James discusses the key element of the Thomistic conception of the plurality of divine attributes, i.e., the distinction *ratione* as contrasted to *in re*. He begins with the definition of *ratio*. First, *ratio* can be defined as a concept rooted in the intellect that is formed about the conceived thing. In this meaning, *rationes* differ from *res*. But second, something corresponding to a concept in the conceived thing can also be called *ratio*. In such a case, the diversity of *rationes* does not correspond to the diversity of things, but only to *rationes* themselves, insofar as many concepts can be formed about one and the same thing. Furthermore, James says that the greater the degree of unity in a thing, so the greater the diversity of *rationes* in the same thing. Finally, he states that attributes in God are one *in re* but many *ratione*.

In the last Article, James considers how *ratio* is founded in things. First, as a concept in the intellect, *ratio* is surely based in the intellect. Second, *ratio* is based in a thing if there is something in that thing that corresponds to *ratio*. In such a case, *ratio* is called real or true. By contrast, *ratio* is false when there is nothing corresponding to it in things. An example of a real or true *ratio* is 'man' and all remaining concepts of the first intention, or as Aquinas says 'imposition', and a false *ratio* is exemplified by 'chimera' and other empty terms. There exists another possibility of correspondence between *ratio* and things, namely that of names of the second intention. For example, animal corresponds to genus not directly, as do names of the first intention, but indirectly, as it can be multiple in many species. Finally, James states that attributes are names of the first intention. Articles 3 and 4 evince James' ambivalent attitude towards Thomas' doctrinal heritage. On the one hand, James takes over the principal Thomistic thesis, i.e., that the divine attributes differ *ratione* together with its justifications, as do most scholastic theologians. On the other hand, he defines *ratio* and its relations to things in a different manner, which leads him to the contention that the attributes are names of the first intention, whereas Aquinas puts forward that they are names of the second intention.[23]

James' Question 2 begins with two arguments for the possibility of the plurality of attributes without relation to creatures. The first argument points out

23 Cf. above Division 1.

that many things *in re* are related to one *ratione* as one *in re* to many *ratione*. But many *in re* can be known as one *ratione*. Hence one *in re* can be known as many without referring to anything. For example, attributes without a reference to creatures in which they are many. The minor premise is illustrated by an example of Socrates and Plato who agree in the *ratio* of species, but there is nothing real in them that would be one. The second argument, based on Henry, argues that God is able to know Himself and love Himself without any reference to creatures. Then comes a counter-argument based on John of Damascus, borrowed from Aquinas, stating that the only distinction in God is that between begetting and spiration or other processions of the divine Persons.

The *corpus* of the question consists or two articles, identified by James as one in which all doctors agree and another in which they disagree. The former treats the capacities of the human intellect to know the distinction between attributes independently from knowledge about creatures, while the latter explores the possibility of God's knowledge of the distinction of attributes without relation to creatures. In Article 1, James argues that the human intellect cannot acknowledge the distinction of attributes in God without relation to creatures because the knowledge of the distinction presupposes the knowledge about the being of distinct things. And since the human intellect ascribes attributes to God as they have been discovered earlier in creatures, the knowledge about the distinction between them also depends on the knowledge about creatures.

In Article 2 James opposes Henry's opinion that God's intellect is able to know attributes and differences between them without referring to creatures. James presents Henry's opinion, as did Godfrey, in the form of six arguments supporting the thesis that from the fecundity and infinity of God's perfection it follows that He is able to know Himself as good, wise, etc., without relating these qualities to anything external to Him. (1) Everything that can be ascribed to God in relation to creatures is ascribed to Him as He is a cause. But attributes are ascribed to God properly and without limitations, not only as He is a cause. Hence, if God could be named wise because He is the cause of wisdom, He also could be called donkey because He is the cause of donkeys. (2) The divine Persons are in God independently from creatures and the Persons presuppose the distinction of attributes since the Son differs from the Holy Spirit because the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect and the Holy Spirit by the way of the will. Hence, the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit assumes the distinction of the intellect and will, which are attributes. (3) The prior precedes the posterior. But attributes and their distinction are in God primarily and in creatures secondarily and they precede creation. (4) Augustine distinguishes between ideas and attributes, and ideas can be known only in relation

to creatures. Thus, if the attributes also presupposed a relation to creatures, they would be identical with the divine ideas. (5) The difference between God's essence and paternity is no less than that between His wisdom and goodness. But the former can be known without reference to creatures, thus all the more so for the latter. (6) What can cause a major distinction can also cause a minor one. But since the divine essence can cause the distinction of the divine Persons, which is a real distinction, it can also cause the distinction of attributes which differ *ratione*. Arguments 1–4 and 6 have counterparts in Godfrey's question, while Argument 5 does not.[24] And in Argument 3 Godfrey stresses the logical priority of God's qualities, not mentioning the temporal one; Henry, by contrast, considers both.

The second opinion—that of Godfrey and, probably, of the author—is presented in the same manner as the preceding one, namely as six arguments for the thesis arguing that God cannot know the distinction between His attributes without relating them to creatures. James adds that his thesis should not be understood as if God could not know Himself as wise and good. He knows His attributes but he cannot recognize their distinction. (1) If many things are identical in something else, they can be known as distinguished only as (a) related to that something, or (b) as related to each other, or (c) as related to something external. But divine attributes are identical with one another in God's essence. And they neither can be known as distinct as related to essence, nor as related to one another. The first possibility, i.e., the distinction by relation to essence is excluded because they are identical in it *in re* and *ratione*. The second is impossible because relating something to something else presupposes that they are different and does not cause their difference. So, it remains that they are known as distinct in relation to creatures. (2) Any imperfection in God must be caused by relation to creatures. And every absolute (i.e., not personal) distinction involves imperfection because one thing distinct from another must possess a perfection that is not proper to another. (3) Knowledge about God is rooted in knowledge about creatures. And, as Aristotle contends, what is ascribed to one thing *ratione* must follow from ascribing it to another thing *in re*. Thus, we could not know that wisdom and goodness were different in God *ratione* if we did not know before that they differed in creatures *in re*. (4) Ideas and attributes differ because the former are divine perfections to which perfections that are limited to a certain genus correspond in creatures, while the latter are divine perfections to which correspond perfections that are free from any creaturely imperfection. Nonetheless, attributes and ideas share

24 Cf. the historical apparatus to the edition below.

one feature, namely that they are distinguished in God only *ratione*. Therefore, the distinction between ideas and attributes can be known only through relation to creatures. (5) The distinction of attributes is similar to that of genus and specific difference. But the second cannot be known without relating to different things. For example, if we did not know that 'animal' did not only pertain to 'human being', we would not grasp the difference between 'human being' (*species*) and 'animal' (*genus*). Thus, similarly, the difference *ratione* of attributes can be known only in relation to creatures. (6) It is possible to recognize distinction in a thing only if this thing acts on intellect in many different ways. But the divine essence, which is one, acts on God uniformly. James illustrates his reasoning with the example of whiteness and color. If there were only one color, namely white, it could not act on sight differently as color and as whiteness. And, therefore, the intellect could not distinguish between white and color. Similarly, the divine intellect could not distinguish His attributes from His essence, which presents itself to God's intellect in a totally uniform way, unless His attributes are considered in relation to creatures.

Article 3 consists of refutations, again depending on Godfrey, of Henry's six arguments favoring the possibility of God's knowledge of the distinction between attributes without relation to creatures. (1) It is not true that everything that can be ascribed to God is ascribed to Him as He is a cause, whereas, indeed, everything can be ascribed to Him through the way of eminence. (2) The personal processions do not assume the distinction of attributes. We cannot contend that the intellect understood as an attribute distinguishes the Son because the term 'intellect' is taken in two different meanings. (3) Although God's wisdom and goodness are prior to creatures, nonetheless their distinction is posterior to creatures. (4) This argument, based on the necessary distinction between ideas and attributes, has been already solved in the previous article, where James said that limited perfections correspond to ideas, and unlimited perfections to attributes. (5) Although it is true that essence is distinguished from paternity without relation to creatures, because they differ *in re*, it is false that a similar real distinction lies behind the distinction of attributes. In fact, there is no such distinction. (6) That the cause of a major distinction is also the cause of a minor one is true only if the two distinctions belong to one and the same order, which is not true of divine attributes.

At the very end of the question, James answers two arguments formulated at the beginning of the question. The first gives a wrong reason for the unity of Socrates and Plato. It assumes that Socrates and Plato belong to one species because they participate in one species, which constitutes a unity *ratione*, whereas, in fact, they belong to one species because they are really human beings. The answer to the second argument, based on Godfrey, acknowledges

that it rightly points out that God knows Himself as true and loves Himself as good without relation to creatures, but He cannot know the distinction between His verity and goodness without relation to creatures. This thesis seems to repeat the most essential element of James's conception of the difference between divine attributes as known by God.

Concluding Remarks

There are many elements in James' text that provoke a mediocre appraisal. First of all, James is so indebted to Godfrey that one can hardly discover any significant argument in James' questions that does not have its antecedent in Godfrey's work. Furthermore, one would expect, reading a Dominican theologian in the period after Thomas Aquinas, to find some comments on Aquinas' conception or at least a clear statement of his attitude towards the master,[25] but there is nothing like this in James' text.

Nevertheless, James' text should not be underestimated. Its importance does not consist in its originality and inventiveness but in the role it played in the development of the Dominican school. James' text testifies to the beginning of the process of modernization of Thomistic teaching. At the turn of the thirteenth to the fourteenth century, it was no longer possible to enter the intellectual arena armed with conceptions coined three of four decades earlier because many texts were written and many sophisticated and convincing conceptions worked out in the interim. Aquinas' doctrines, though appreciated and inspiring for the Dominicans, became an object of polemic, so to be treated seriously they had to be refined and interpreted to face these challenges. One of the first thinkers who realized the necessity of *aggiornamento* of the Dominican intellectual tradition was James of Metz, and the first to be made was an analysis and assimilation of the conceptions relative to crucial points of the Thomistic teaching from the post-Thomistic period. James was so absorbed by this task that he neglected to put forward his own position and his approach to Thomas' heritage. Nonetheless, it was he who paved the way to classic Thomists of the early 14th century, like Hervaeus Natalis and John of Naples, to name only the most reknown.[26] James' efforts to introduce Henry's and Godfrey's conceptions

25 I disagree with Decker's opinion (*Untersuchungen*, cit., p. 143) that James is a faithful disciple of Aquinas in his considerations about the distinction of divine attributes. His opinion is in accordance with Aquinas' one insofar as Godfrey, criticizing Henry's polemic with Aquinas, defends St. Thomas' main thesis.

26 Cf. e.g. Hervaeus Natalis, *I Sent.*, Venetiis 1505, d. 2, qq. 2–3, ff. 10^{v}–12^{v}; Ioannes de Neapoli,

to the Dominican *milieu* resulted in the up-dating of the Dominican school and thus helped the subsequent generation of thinkers to work out a new Thomistic synthesis.

Editorial Note

The edition is based on 3 following manuscripts:

G Graz, Universitätsbibliothek, 475, ff. 108ra–109^{rb}.
K Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, 1583, ff. 6ra–7^{rb}.
V_1 Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 122, ff. 6ra–7va.

G and K, according to my previous study,[27] preserve the relatively best versions of the text, so their common variants seem to convey a reliable text. In some cases, mostly where G and K contain different readings, I consulted V1. If I introduced to the texts variant external to G, I always noted the text transmitted by G in the critical apparatus. Orthography has been modernized and punctuation, modelled on English, has been introduced to aid the reader.

Quaestiones variae Parisiis disputatae, Neapoli 1618, q. 27, pp. 229–237. Hervaeus quotes several paragraphs from James' text, such as his definition of *ratio*, his account of Henry's position and its criticism, but at the same time he incorporates them into his own conception, independent from his description of the debate between Henry and Godfrey. He framed his own solution to the problem on a more subtle conceptualization of the entire problem. In the same vein, a little later, John departing further than Hervaeus from James' considerations, also adopts some elements of his *Commentary*.

27 Cf. M. Olszewski, *Dominican Theology*, cit., pp. 6–8.

IACOBUS METENSIS

QUAESTIONES IN I LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM
DISTINCTIO 2

G 108ra
K 6ra

Quaestio 1 |

UTRUM PLURALITAS ATTRIBUTORUM SIT IN DEO

Quattuor sunt hic videnda: primo, quid sit attributum, secundo, utrum in Deo sit pluralitas attributorum, tertio, utrum attributa differant solum ratione, quarto, utrum illae rationes fundentur in re.

Articulus 1

Circa primum nota quod attributum est perfectio positiva quae, quia creaturis convenit, dicitur Deo convenire proprie et simpliciter. Ex quo patet primo quod ista quae sic competunt Deo quod non creaturis non dicuntur attributa, sive sint essentialia, sicut esse primum, ens, sive accidentalia, sicut esse creatorem, esse glorificatorem, sive importantia perfectionem tamen modo divino, sicut esse infinitum vel immensum; et hoc ex parte Dei. Similiter ex parte creaturae sunt quaedam perfectiones quae non sunt attributa nec Deo conveniunt, sicut ista quae important perfectionem tamen cum modo imperfecto, sicut esse album, esse corporeum vel esse quantum. Important enim perfectionem imperfectioni admixtam. Sed ista quae perfectionem
G 108rb aliquam important absque omni imperfectione quae simpliciter et | absolute dicuntur de creaturis, et per hoc probantur esse in Deo, dicuntur esse attributa, sicut esse bonum, esse iustum etc. Attributum enim dicitur quasi tributum ex alio, id est, quando aliquid creaturae convenit et ex hoc probatur quod Deo conveniat vel attribui debeat, illud proprie dicitur attributum.

Articulus 2

Secundo est videre utrum in Deo sit plurificatio attributorum, quod probatur tripliciter quod sic.

Primo per viam remotionis. In eo a quo removetur limitatio et contractio ad certum genus est omne illud quod perfectionem importat absolute.

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6 hic] *om.* KV_1 12 $quod_1$] quia G

Sed illud removetur a Deo, ideo etc. Sed ista vocantur perfectiones attributales, ut patet ex primo articulo, ergo etc. Maior patet. Quod enim aliquid habeat perfectionem aliquam et non aliam provenit ex hoc quod contrahitur ad aliquod genus. Unde et excluditur ab aliis, quia si non limitaretur ad aliquod genus, puta substantiae, sed extenderet se ad omnia, qua ratione haberet perfectionem unius praedicamenti, puta substantiae vel alterius, eadem ratione haberet perfectiones omnium praedicamentorum. Minor patet, scilicet quod limitari et contrahi ad aliquod certum genus, removetur a Deo, quia limitatum ad certum genus est solum perfectum secundum quid, quod contradicit perfectioni vel rationi deitatis. De ratione autem Dei est esse summe perfectum. Et istam rationem innuit Commentator V *Metaphysicae* quod Deus est simpliciter et universaliter perfectus, quia perfectiones omnium generum in se concludit.[28]

Secunda ratio procedit per viam eminentiae sic. In eo quod est bonum et perfectum essentialiter non per participationem est omnis perfectio absolute. Deus est huiusmodi, ideo etc. Maior patet. Dato enim quod desit ei aliqua perfectio, ideo non est perfectum essentialiter, quia omne tale essentialiter est tale maxime.[29] Cui autem deest aliqua perfectio illud non est maxime perfectum. Ergo perfectum essentialiter est maxime perfectum et per consequens habet omnem perfectionem. Minor patet, quia Deus est ens primum simpliciter quod nullo modo aliquid particulare. Patet ergo, pluralitas perfectionum est in Deo non solum proprie et realiter, sed etiam supereminenter. Unde dicit Dionysius quod Deus est superbonus et supersapiens etc.[30]

Tertia ratio procedit per viam causalitatis sic. Quidquid perfectionis est in
K 6^{rb} effectu simpliciter totum praeexistit in causa. Sed in creaturis | multa sunt

3 aliquam] absolutam V_1 *del. et corr. in marg.* K 4 aliis] *del. et supers.* alio G 6 perfectionem] perfectionis G

28 Averroes, *In Met.*, II, comm. 21, (ed. Iunctina), Opera omnia 8, Venetiis 1568, f. 131B–C; cf. etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, (ed. J. Hamesse), Louvain-Paris 1974, Philosophes Médiévaux 17, p. 126 (138); Aristoteles, *Met.*, V, 16, 1021b30–1022a1, (ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem), Aristoteles Latinus 25, 3. 2, Turnholti 1995, p. 115, 650–654; cit. apud Thomam de Aquino, *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, sc. 1, ed. P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, pp. 64–65.

29 Aristoteles, *Met.*, II, 1, 993b24–27, Aristoteles Latinus 25, 3. 2, p. 44, 27; cf. etiam *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 118 (41), cit. apud Guillelmum Petri de Godino, *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, f. 4ra.

30 Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita, *De div. nom.*, I, cap. 2, 3, Dionysiaca 1, Paris 1937, pp. 71–72; cit. apud Thomam de Aquino, *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, sc. 2, p. 62.

quae dicunt perfectionem simpliciter, sicut esse sapientem et iustum etc. Ergo talia oportet ponere in Deo quae sunt attributa.[31]

Contra tamen rationem istam obicitur sic, quia quod est in effectu necesse est praeexistere in causa non formaliter, sed virtute tantum, sicut calor in sole. Ergo ostendere attributa esse in Deo, quia sunt in creatura, est ostendere quod sint in Deo virtualiter, non formaliter, ita quod Deus non esset formaliter bonus vel sapiens, quod falsum est. Ideo ratio non concludit.

Sed hoc non valet, quia in causa omnino perfecta et simpliciter—non solum quantum ad perfectiones habitas, sed etiam quantum ad modum habendi—possunt esse omnes perfectiones non solum virtualiter, sed etiam formaliter et simpliciter. Deus est talis, ergo habet omnem perfectionem simpliciter non solum virtute, sed etiam formaliter. Et sic probatio esset vera. Et quod arguitur de sole non valet, quia sol non potest habere calorem omni modo quo natus est haberi, scilicet formaliter, sed virtute tantum.

Articulus 3

Tertium est videre utrum attributa differant solum ratione vel re. Primo videndum est quid sit ratio. Ubi nota quod ratio dicitur dupliciter. Primo, conceptio intellectus quam format de re concepta. Quae etiam conceptio dicitur verbum intellectus. Et hoc modo diversae rationes sunt diversae res, quia sunt diversi actus intelligendi realiter et essentialiter differentes, sicut intelligere hominem esse animal et substantiam separatam. Isti autem actus dicuntur diversae rationes, vel quia sunt res formatae a ratione, vel quia fundamentum eorum est eadem res solum diversimode intellecta, sicut substantia et ens.

Secundo dicitur ratio illud formale quod ex parte rei tali conceptioni respondet, sicut dicitur quod in homine alia est ratio propter quam dicitur esse animal et alia propter quam dicitur esse substantia. Et diversitas rationum sic dictarum non est diversitas plurium rerum, sed diversitas plurium habilitatum, secundum quod eadem essentia re potest movere intellectum ad plures conceptiones vel diversos modos intelligendi. Sicut enim una virtus activa propter suam perfectionem potest in plures effectus, ut virtus solis, ita quod virtus est una re et plures ratione, sic una et eadem res potest diversis modis cognosci et de ipsa possunt diversae conceptiones formari. Et sic

6 esset] erit K est V_1 12 esset] erit K 29 quod] *supers.* G 30 vel] et K

31 Cf. Guillelmus Petri de Godino, *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, Pisa, Bibl. Sem. 44, ff. 3^{vb}–4^{ra}.

quanto est aliquid magis unum re, tanto est plura ratione, id est, plures perfectiones includens. Ergo si rationes attributales dicantur conceptiones quas format intellectus creatus de perfectionibus divinis, sic sunt plura differentia re et ratione: re quidem, quia sunt plures actus intelligendi, ratione autem
G 108ra vel quia sunt | formatae a ratione successive, vel quia habent fundamentum plurificatum ratione.

Si vero rationes attributales vocentur perfectiones illae, prout in Deo sunt, sic sunt unum re, quia in divinis non est pluralitas realis absoluta, faceret enim compositionem, sunt tamen plures ratione, quia res una omnino potest movere rationem ad plures conceptus.

Articulus 4

Quarto est videndum qualiter ratio fundatur in re, ubi nota quod ratio vel res dicitur fundari in re, ubi firmitatem habet. Ratio autem vel conceptus intellectus habet duplicem firmitatem, scilicet firmitatem essendi, quia scilicet est aliquid, et firmitatem signi, conceptio enim aliquid significat vel repraesentat. Modo conceptio habet firmitatem essendi ab intellectu, sicut et quodlibet aliud accidens a suo subiecto. Actus enim intelligendi est in intellectu. Firmitatem autem veritatis vel signi habet ab ipsa re et secundum hoc dicitur ratio realis, non quia sit in re subiective, sed sicut in praestante fundamentum et in correspondente. Et per oppositum ratio falsa sive ficticia est cui nihil respondet ex parte rei, sicut rationi vel conceptioni chimerae. Conceptioni autem potest res exterior respondere dupliciter: primo, simpliciter et absolute, et talis dicitur fundari in re immediate, sicut conceptioni hominis vel albedinis et omnium nominum primae intentionis; secundo,
K 6va respondet conceptioni res non absolute, sed prout circa rem est aliquis | modus intelligendi, sicut conceptioni generis respondet natura animalis non absolute, sed prout intelligitur multiplicabile in plures species. Et talia sunt nomina secundae intentionis. Attributa autem sunt primae intentionis.

8 sic sunt] *in marg.* G *om.* K

Quaestio 2

utrum aliquis intellectus creatus vel increatus possit intelligere distinctionem rationis quae est inter attributa circumscripta omni comparatione dei ad creaturas

Et arguitur quod sic, quia sicut se habent plura secundum rem ad unitatem rationis, sic quae sunt unum secundum rem ad pluralitatem rationis. Sed plura secundum rem possunt intelligi ut unum ratione absque comparatione ad unum secundum rem. Ergo et attributa quae unum sunt secundum rem possunt intelligi plura ratione absque comparatione ad creaturas, ubi differunt secundum rem. Maior patet. Minor probatur, quia Sortes et Plato conveniunt in una ratione speciei, quia participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo nec est aliquod reale unum in quo conveniunt.

Secundo sic: circumscripta omni habitudine ad creaturas Deus potest se intelligere in ratione veri et diligere in ratione boni. Sed istae rationes quae sunt attributales sunt distinctae secundum rationem, ergo etc.[32]

Contra. Damascenus dicit quod in divinis quantum ad divina nulla est distinctio praeter ingenerationem, generationem et spirationem.[33] Sed nullum istorum ad attributa pertinet, ergo etc.

Respondeo.
Duo sunt hic videnda principaliter.

Articulus 1

Primo illud in quo doctores conveniunt. Et est quod intellectus viatoris non potest intelligere in Deo distinctionem attributorum circumscripta omni habitudine ad creaturas. Et ratio est, quia quicumque non potest intelligere attributa esse in Deo sine respectu ad creaturas, non potest intelligere ipsa

6 pluralitatem] pluralitates G 17 spirationem] processionem *in marg.* G 20 hic] *om.* KV_1

32 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl. V*, q. 1, corp., Parisiis 1518, f. 152P; etiam Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp. (ed. M. de Wulf, J. Hoffmans), Philosophes Belges 3, p. 268.

33 Ioannes Damascenus, *De fid. orth.*, I, cap. 2, (ed. E.M. Buytaert), New York 1955, Franciscan Institute Publications 8, p. 14, 23–24; cit. apud Thomam de Aquino, *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 6, p. 64.

aliquo modo distincta sine respectu ad creaturas. Sed intellectus viatoris non potest intelligere attributa esse in Deo nisi per habitudinem ad creaturas nec eorum distinctionem, ergo etc. Maior patet, quia prius est esse aliqua in aliquo quam esse distincta in eo, sicut prius est intelligere album et musicum esse in homine quam intelligere ea distincta in ipso. Distinctio enim aliquorum praesupponit ipsa esse. Probatio minoris, quia attributa dicuntur perfectiones absolutae quas intellectus noster attribuit Deo, quia invenit eas in creaturis. Et ideo intellectus viatoris primo intelligit sapientiam, bonitatem et cetera esse in creaturis quam in Deo, nec potest intelligere esse eas in Deo, nisi quia sunt in creaturis, ergo etc.

Articulus 2

Secundus articulus est videre in quo doctores differunt. Et est utrum intellectus videns essentiam divinam nude—sicut beati vel ipsemet intellectus divinus de quo videtur difficilius—possit intelligere istam distinctionem attributorum circumscripto omni respectu ad creaturas et arctatur quoad intellectum divinum. Et tunc habet articulus iste tres partes: primo, ponitur opinio minus vera, secundo, opinio verior, tertio, respondebitur ad rationes opinionis primae.

Pars 1

Prima ergo opinio dicit quod ex fecunditate et infinitate divinae perfectionis provenit quod Deus potest intelligere se ipsum sub ratione boni, sapientiae etc. circumscripta tamen omni habitudine extrinseca. Et hoc declarant sex rationibus.

Prima est, quia illud quod non convenit Deo nisi in habitudine ad creaturas competit ei tantum in ratione causae, sicut esse | creatorem, esse dominum. Sed rationes attributales conveniunt Deo proprie et simpliciter, non solum sicut causae. Non enim dicitur Deus sapiens vel intelligens, quia est causa sapientiae vel intelligentiae, quia ita diceretur esse asinus, quia est causa asini, sed realiter et simpliciter est bonus, sicut paries est albus, ergo etc.[34]

G 108^{vb}

5 in ipso] *om.* G 9 intelligere esse] *inver. supers.* GK 24 Prima] Opinio Henricus *add. in marg.* GV_1 28 diceretur esse] *corr. in marg. ex* dicitur est G ‖ est] *supers.* G

34 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl. V*, q. 1, corp., f. 151E–F; etiam Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 267.

Secunda ratio est illa. Emanationes divinarum personarum sunt in divinis circumscripta omni creatura existente vel possibile fieri. Sed ipsae supponunt distinctionem attributorum ergo etc. Maior patet, quia dato quod nulla creatura possibilis esset, nihilominus personae divinae essent et earum emanationes. Minor declaratur, quia filius Dei distinguitur a Spiritu Sancto per hoc quod Filius procedit per modum naturae vel intellectus, Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis. Et sic productio Filii et Spiritus Sancti supponit distinctionem intellectus et voluntatis quae sunt attributa.[35]

K 6^{vb} Tertia ratio est, quia prius potest intelligi remoto posteriori, | sed attributa et distinctio attributorum est prius in Deo quam creatura sit vel possit esse, ergo etc. Maior patet, animal enim potest intelligi sine homine. Minor declaratur, quia certum est quod prius est Deum sapientem esse et bonum quam creaturam esse. Ergo circumscripta omni habitudine ad creaturam entem vel possibilem potest bonitas et sapientia Deo convenire, quare etc.[36]

Quarta ratio est, quia secundum Augustinum rationes attributales distinguuntur ab idealibus. Sed hoc non videtur esse, nisi quia rationes ideales non possunt intelligi nisi in habitudine ad creaturas. Idea enim est essentia divina secundum quod imitabilis a creatura quae esse potest, et ita includit relationem ad creaturam. Ergo videtur quod rationes attributales istum respectum non includant, ergo eorum distinctio potest intelligi sine respectu ad creaturam.[37]

Quinta ratio est, quia non minus distinguitur in divinis essentia divina a paternitate quam sapientia a bonitate. Sed distinctio essentiae et paternitatis intelligitur sine omni respectu ad creaturam, ergo etc. Maior patet, quia essentia et paternitas non se compatiuntur in Filio, sed sapientia, essentia, bonitas se compatiuntur in qualibet personarum. Minor etiam patet, quia circumscirpta omni creatura, adhuc esset generatio in divinis et per consequens esset generans et paternitas distincta a filiatione cum qua tamen staret essentia eadem, et sic differret a paternitate.[38]

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2 existente] ente KV_1 ‖ possibile fieri] possibili KV_1 fieri *in marg.* K 13 circumscripta] circumscripto G 21 creaturam] creaturas KV_1

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35 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl. V*, q. 1, corp., f. 152P–Q; etiam Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., pp. 267–268.

36 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl. V*, q. 1, corp., f. 151L; etiam Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 268.

37 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl. V*, q. 1, corp., f. 152Q; Henricus recitat Pseudo-Augustini *De spiritu et anima*, cap. 35 (PL 40, 806); etiam Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 268.

38 Istud argumentum exactum correlatum in Henrici quaestione non habet. Cf. Henricus

Sexta ratio est. Illud quod est sufficiens causa maioris distinctionis est causa sufficiens minoris. Sed essentia divina per se est causa sufficiens maioris distinctionis, scilicet distinctionis realis personarum, ergo multo magis distinctionis rationis quae est minor. Talis est distinctio attributorum, ergo etc.[39]

Pars 2

Alia est opinio contraria quae ponit quod distinctio rationis attributorum non potest intelligi etiam a Deo nisi per comparationem ad creaturas. Nec est intelligendum quod Deus non intelligat se sapientem et bonum sine respectu ad creaturas, sed intelligendum est quod non intelligit ista esse distincta sine respectu ad creaturas. Et haec opinio fulcitur sex rationibus.

Prima talis est. Quando aliqua plura sunt idem in tertio, non possunt intelligi habere distinctionem nisi vel per comparationem ad illud tertium, vel per comparationem ad se invicem, vel per comparationem ad aliquid extrinsecum. Sed attributa sunt idem et conveniunt in essentia divina nec potest intelligi distinctio eorum—nec rei, nec rationis—per comparationem ad essentiam, nec per comparationem ad se invicem, ergo ex comparatione ad extrinseca, scilicet ad creaturas. Maior patet. Probatio minoris. Primo, quia non potest accipi distinctio attributorum per comparationem ad tertium in quo conveniunt quod est essentia divina, quia quandocumque aliqua plura comparantur ad unum re et ratione, ex ista comparatione ad illud unum non oritur distinctio nec re, nec ratione; sicut quae comparantur ad unum re habent unitatem rei, et quae comparantur ad unum ratione habent unitatem rationis. Sed ratio essentiae est una, ergo attributa comparata ad essentiam et sub ratione essentiae non habent distinctionem nec rei, nec rationis, nec distinguuntur ex comparatione ad se invicem, quia comparatio aliquorum supponit distinctionem eorum aliqualem et eam non causat. Idem enim et re et ratione non comparatur ad se ipsum. Comparatio enim est plurium vel secundum rem, vel rationem. Relatio enim identitatis est plu-

7 Alia] Opinio secunda Opinio Godofredi *add. in marg.* GV_1 13 distinctionem] aliquam *add. in marg.* G 23 unum ratione] unitatem rationis G unum *om.* V_1

de Gandavo, *Quodl. V*, q. 1, corp., f. 153x–y; etiam Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 268, ubi uterque dicit solum de sapientia et bonitate nulla mentione facta de paternitate et eius ad essentiam respectu.

39 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl. V*, q. 1, arg. prin., f. 150A; etiam Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, arg. prin., p. 264.

rium secundum rationem, ergo distinctio secundum rationem quae est inter attributa sumitur ex comparatione eorum ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad creaturam.[40]

Secunda ratio est. Nihil imperfectionem includens est in Deo nisi per comparationem ad creaturas, sicut esse dominum ex tempore, esse mortalem, esse ideam. Sed omnis distinctio per absoluta—sive sit rei, sive sit rationis—semper importat aliquam imperfectionem, ergo etc. Maior patet. Minor declaratur, quia si essent aliqua distincta re per absoluta, unum includeret perfectionem quam aliud non haberet. Et sic esset imperfectum, | dato G 109ra enim quod unum esset aeque perfectum sicut aliud alterum superflueret. Ergo alterum est minus perfectum et sic includit imperfectionem. Similiter, si illa distinctio est secundum rationem, ex quo est per absoluta, et dico K 7ra absoluta, quia si distinctio ista esset per relata, non includeret aliquam | imperfectionem, quia relatio secundum quod relatio nullam imperfectionem dicit, alioquin non esset Pater summe perfectus, quia non habet filiationem.

Tertia ratio est, quia in cognitionem Dei consurgimus ex creaturis. Sed ubi ponitur aliquid secundum rem et aliquid secundum rationem, numquam secundum Philosophum competit ei in quo est secundum rationem nisi ex habitudine ad aliud in quo est secundum rem, ut dextrum in columna est per comparationem ad dextrum in animali, et species differt a genere secundum rationem, quia differt ab alia specie secundum rem ita quod semper distinctio rationis supponit distinctionem secundum rem.[41] Cum ergo nihil sciamus de divinis nisi ex creaturis, non cognosceremus distinctionem sapientiae a bonitate in divinis nisi ex distinctione eorum in creaturis.[42]

Quarta ratio est, quia attributa et ideae differunt in hoc quod idea est perfectio divina cui respondet in creaturis perfectio limitata et contracta ad certum genus, ut ideae hominis homo secundum Augustinum, et sic de aliis, sed attributum est perfectio divina secundum quod ei respondet in creaturis perfectio absoluta absque imperfectione inquantum huiusmodi et non limitata secundum modum significandi, sicut sunt sapientia et bonitas, ergo etc.

5–6 mortalem] mortuum K 10 sicut aliud] *in marg.* G 11 est] *om.* K ‖ perfectum] esset *add.* K 12 Ex quo] et *del. et supers.* G et est *del. et supers.* K 14 imperfectionem] perfectionem G 18–19 numquam … rationem] *in marg.* G 29 ei] eis GK

40 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., pp. 270–271.

41 Rectius Thomas de Aquino, *In Phys.*, v, l. 3, n. 667.

42 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 271, sine auctoritate Aristotelis.

Secundo dico quod conveniunt in hoc quod utrumque—et idea, et attributum—distinguuntur in Deo secundum rationem tantum. Ex hoc arguitur sic. Sicut distinctio idearum est secundum rationem, sic distinctio attributorum. Sed distinctio rationis quae est inter ideas non potest intelligi nisi in comparatione ad creaturas quae sunt vel esse possunt, ergo similiter distinctio rationis attributorum non potest intelligi sine respectu ad creaturas.[43]

Quinta ratio est. Sicut distinctio attributorum est secundum rationem, sic distinctio generis et differentiae apud nos. Sed distinctio generis et differentiae non potest accipi nisi per comparationem ad diversas res, alioquin differentia nullo modo differret a genere. Si enim non pateret nobis aliquo modo quod animal non esset nisi in homine, non inveniremus differentiam inter hominem et animal. Sed ex hoc est differentia inter ipsa manifesta, quia potest in plus esse quam differentia, quia stat cum differentia opposita quae differt ab alia secundum rem. Ergo similiter differentia rationis attributorum non potest intelligi nisi respectu ad diversas res, scilicet creaturas.[44]

Sexta ratio est. Impossibile est intelligere distinctionem in obiecto nisi obiectum moveat aliter et aliter vel secundum rem, vel secundum rationem. Sed essentia divina est obiectum unum et eodem modo et re et ratione repraesentat se intellectui divino, ergo etc. Maior patet, quia in obiecto quod eodem modo movet et secundum rem et secundum rationem non est aliqua distinctio, ut si esset sola albedo, nullo alio modo immutaret visum quatenus albedo et quatenus color, et sic visus nullo modo posset ponere distinctionem inter ipsam et colorem. Similiter si in nobis non esset nisi actus intelligendi unus, tunc intelligere et cognoscere non different. Modo enim differunt, quia est aliquod cognoscere in nobis quod non est intelligere. Unde est de ipsis sicut de causa respectu effectus, ut virtus solis est unitissima in se, sed quia sunt plures effectus eius vel esse possunt, ideo sumitur distinctio eius secundum rationem. Modo quantum est ex parte obiecti divini, ita unite repraesentat se essentia divina intellectui divino sicut color visui dato quod non esset nisi albedo. Unde obiectum divinum offert se intellectui divino ut est summe unum et re et ratione, non habito respectu ad creaturas.

21 visum] nisi *add.* G 26 unitissima] unitiva G

43 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 272.

44 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., pp. 271–272.

Pars 3

Ad rationes primae opinionis potest responderi quod est falsum, cum dicitur: 'quod competit Deo per respectum ad creaturas attribuitur Deo sicut causae'. Dico quod non solum ratione causae, sed etiam in ratione praeeminentiae, quia Deus potest cognosci non solum per modum causalitatis, sed etiam per modum praeeminentiae secundum Dionysium.[45] Ad minorem dico quod perfectiones attributales non competunt Deo per respectum ad creaturas, utpote sapientia, bonitas etc., sed distinctio earum. Distinctio enim sapientiae a bonitate non est in Deo nisi ex ratione causae, quia scilicet sapientia potest esse effectus in creatura, et ideo etiam in comparatione ad creaturas est distinctio attributorum.[46]

Ad secundum, quando dicitur in minori: 'quod processiones supponunt distinctionem attributorum', falsum est. Non enim dicimus intellectum et voluntatem ut dicunt perfectiones attributales distinguere processiones personarum, nec hoc potest intelligi nisi valde extorte, ut videbitur inferius.[47]

Ad tertium dicendum quod Deum esse sapientem et bonum prius est
K 7rb creatura, sed sapientiam | esse distinctam a bonitate in Deo non est prius quam creatura sit vel esse possit, quia illud quod ponitur in Deo solum
G109rb secundum rationem non est prius creatura, ut esse dominum. Tunc enim | primo fuit dominus, quando habuit servum.[48]

Ad quartum de ideis iam solutum est. Cum enim dicitur: 'quod ideae differunt ab attributis, quia ideae dicunt habitudinem ad creaturas, attributa autem non', dico quod non, immo differunt, quia ideis respondent in creaturis perfectiones limitatae, attributis autem non, quia sapientia et bonitas in creaturis nihil limitatum dicunt.[49]

Ad quintum, quando dicitur: 'quod essentia distinguitur a paternitate sine respectu ad creaturas', dico quod verum est, quia ista distinctio est per comparationem ad diversas res, scilicet personas, quia paternitas non stat cum filiatione et essentia stat cum utraque. Unde, quia ista distinctio rationis

8 sapientia] *corr. in marg. ex* supra G 17 est] quam *add.* K 18 sit] *om.* G *supers.* K

45 Dionysius Pseudo-Areopagita, *De div. nom.*, I, cap. 2, 3, Dionysiaca 1, pp. 71–72, vide supra, a. 1, 52–53.

46 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., pp. 273–274, sine auctoritate Pseudo-Dionysii.

47 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 274.

48 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., pp. 275–276.

49 Cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, *Quodl. VII*, q. 1, corp., p. 277.

reducitur ad distinctionem realem, ponitur esse in Deo non per comparationem ad creaturas. Sed non invenitur distinctio realis ad quam distinctio attributorum, puta sapientiae et bonitatis, reducatur. Et ideo oportet recurrere ad res creatas in quibus distinguitur realiter.

Ad sextum, 'quod per se est causa maioris distinctionis est causa minoris', verum est, ubi sunt eiusdem ordinis, ita quod una sequitur alteram. Sed ubi distinctio rationis non oritur ex reali, non tenet, sicut si dicatur quod est causa maioris generationis, est causa minoris, homo est causa generationis hominis, quod est maius, ergo asini, quod est minus, non valet.

Ad rationes principales.

Ad primam dico per interemptionem. Tu probas quod Sortes et Plato sunt unum secundum rationem in homine, dico quod hoc est, quia Sortes est idem realiter cum homine et similiter Plato. Unde ista unitas rationis oritur ex unitate reali. Et ideo est ibi unitas rationis. Sed circumscriptis creaturis quae sunt vel esse possunt non invenitur, unde accipiatur distinctio realis attributorum.

Ad secundam dicendum quod Deus intelligit se ut bonum et ut verum nullo habito respectu ad creaturas. Non tamen potest se intelligere ut verum et diligere ut bonum cum hac reduplicatione 'sine respectu ad creaturas', ita scilicet quod ista essent distincta in eo. Nec hoc probat ratio.

6 una sequitur] sequitur alia G 7 tenet] oportet G

CHAPTER 13

James of Metz's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*

*Chris Schabel**

Getting into the back of a taxi cab with Martin Pickavé outside the Köln Hauptbahnhof in May 2002, I had my first personal encounter with Professor Kent Emery, Jr., who was already sitting in the front seat. The very first words I heard from his mouth, as he turned back to address Pickavé, were, "In Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* III …" The present paper aims to honor this scholarly intensity, but the specific topic takes me back to Cologne and the Thomas-Institut, where I first spoke with Professor Emery, because Joseph Koch, founding editor of *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*, who held the first chair of the Thomas-Institut, laid the foundations for the present study with a magisterial article of 1929 in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* entitled "Jakob von Metz, O.P."[1] Investigating James of Metz's questions on the *Sentences* also requires me to emulate Professor Emery's broad approach to medieval thought, for example in his work on Henry of Ghent for understanding a text and its reception, on Denys the Carthusian for investigating a writer's manuscripts and sources, and now on John Duns Scotus for untangling the web of authorial revisions and student interventions. Russell Friedman's recent encyclopedia entry on James of Metz provides the *status quaestionis*:

> James of Metz was a Dominican theologian active around 1300. We know basically nothing about his life: we do not know why he was called 'of

* I am grateful to Jean Céleyrette, Russell Friedman, Maxime Mauriège, Mikołaj Olszewski, Jean-Luc Solère, and Jeff Witt for sending supplies. I thank the libraries themselves, especially the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich and the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris, where I worked *in situ* with support from the University of Cyprus, which also provided funds for the purchase of a microfilm via the HMML in Collegeville, Minnesota. This paper was written at the IRHT in Paris under the aegis of Monica Brinzei's ERC project THESIS, which also purchased reproductions. Since I started this project images of all manuscripts except E and W have been made available online.

1 Cf. J. Koch, "Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 4 (1929–1930), pp. 169–232; reprinted in: id., *Kleine Schriften* (Studi e Testi 127), Rome 1973, Band I, pp. 133–200; I will cite the original.

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> Metz', whether he ever became a master, or even when he died. From the texts of the extant versions of his only surviving work, his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, we can deduce that James lectured on the *Sentences* twice, and on the basis of comparison with roughly contemporary works we can conjecture that the first lecture series took place around 1300–1301, the second around 1302–1303. While it would not have been unusual in this era for the second lecture course to have been held at Paris as part of the requirements for James' becoming a master in theology, we do not know whether James ever was at Paris.[2]

What is worse, Friedman goes on to relate how twelve known manuscripts preserve what look like two or three basic redactions of the text, with one of the redactions surviving in up to five versions.

The issue of the reception of James of Metz is equally problematic, since no one has ever been found citing "James of Metz," and yet he certainly had an impact. Koch himself demonstrated that James influenced his confrère Durand of Saint-Pourçain profoundly, as indicated in the subtitle of his article: "der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P." Koch's findings forced the editors of the current critical edition of Durand's *Sentences* questions, headed by Andreas Speer, to read James in parallel with Durand, as is reflected in their magnificent *apparatus fontium*.[3] Koch also discovered in Le Mans 231 a "double-blind" Thomist *Correctorium* of a set of questions on the *Sentences*, identifying its occasionally anti-Thomist target as James' text and its author as none other than Hervaeus Natalis, based on parallel passages in Hervaeus' own questions.[4] Recently scholars have traced James' own effect on Hervaeus' questions on the *Sentences* and his questions on beatitude, while the anonymous author of the *Sentences* questions in Vat. lat. 985 and 1118 wrote under James' influence as well.[5] Yet James' readership extended beyond his immediate Domini-

2 Cf. R.L. Friedman, "James of Metz", in: H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, Dordrecht 2011, pp. 581a–582b, at p. 581a–b.

3 Cf. *Durandi de Sancto Porciano Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum* (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales—Bibliotheca 10), Leuven 2012–.

4 Cf. Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., pp. 194–207.

5 Cf. M. Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis* (Archa Verbi Subsidia 2), Münster 2010, especially pp. 5, 16–17, 273–275, and 279–339 (*passim*) (with references to earlier studies by Johannes Beumer and Camillo Dumont), and T. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus. *Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt* (*ca. 1293–1320*) (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 104), Leiden 2011, pp. 361–371.

can successors. Recently I was concurrently editing James' question on divine foreknowledge from Book I, for an article in *Przegląd Tomistyczny*, and the corresponding question in the *Sentences* of the Cistercian James of Eltville from lectures delivered at Paris in 1369–1370, in the context of Monica Brinzei's ERC project THESIS on later-medieval questions on the *Sentences*. Because it was fresh in my mind, I recognized that a couple of pages of James of Eltville's question matched a lengthy passage in James of Metz *verbatim*. Specifically, each James had the exact same presentation of Thomas Aquinas' position, although while James of Metz went on to reject the Angelic Doctor's theory explicitly (the only time he does this openly, it turns out), James of Eltville embraced it, even though they had identical starting points.[6]

In this paper I will start over from scratch and approach James of Metz from the beginning, as a CSI operative assigned to reopen a cold case. The CSI analogy is apt, given how James ends Distinction 24 of Book II [II.24.1]:[7] "Someone [once] said that he never experienced a greater pleasure than seeing a monk whom he had killed twist and shake in his own blood".[8] Specifically, I will steer clear of doctrinal questions, such as James' attitude toward Aquinas,[9] in order to deal with the issues of identities, dates, locations, manuscripts, and redactions that have occupied the attention of so many fine German scholars in the past.[10] An appendix provides a complete question and citation list for all ver-

6 Cf. C. Schabel, "Dominican Anti-Thomism: James of Metz's Question on Divine Foreknowledge, with a Rebuttal from the *Correctorium Iacobi Metensis*", in: *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 20 (2014), pp. 35–72, §§15–19 of the edition. Ioana Curut has since found more James of Metz in James of Eltville's book I.

7 The citations in the text will refer to the Latin in the appended question list according to book, distinction, and question.

8 This was in response to the argument: "Item, summum bonum habere vel videre est desideratissimum; sed, secundum Augustinum, voluntati Adae nihil deerat vel desideraret; ergo etc.".

9 When James mentions Aquinas explicitly, it is almost always with approval; otherwise he simply refers to "una opinio," "secunda opinio," "quidam dicunt," "alii dicunt," and so on, although the author of the *Correctorium* understands the referent. James may not name names, but he has strong opinions, often calling other views "impossible." He likes to explain Greek terms and is interested in questions of time and eternity, fond of mathematics and geometry, and prone to giving the examples of an eclipse as seen by an astronomer and a peasant, of astronomical vs. mathematical proofs that the Earth is round, and of the king giving a horse to a knight in a tournament.

10 The main bibliography to be cited below is as follows: M. Grabmann, "Forschungen zur Geschichte der ältesten deutschen Thomistenschule des Dominikanerorderns", in: *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik. 1.*,

sions. My results will revise the *status quaestionis* on the who, when, where, and what of these enigmatic questions on the *Sentences*.[11]

1 Who?

Let us begin by reviewing the evidence about the person of James of Metz in the case log, which is extremely limited, yet surprisingly useful. Koch summarizes much of this information his 1929 study:[12] Heinrich Denifle found that the *Catalogus stamsensis*, a list of Dominican authors made for Saint-Jacques in Paris that is now dated around 1310–1312, records that "James of Metz wrote a *Lectura* on the *Sentences*".[13] Twelve manuscripts would eventually be identified as containing parts of this *Lectura*:

Munich 1926, pp. 392–431; Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit.; R.M. Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIV^e siècle. Textes inédits*, (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Études et documents 10), Louvain 1930; B. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts*, hrsg. R. Haubst (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42.1), Münster 1967 (from Habilitationsschrift of 1955); L. Hödl, *Die Grundfragen der Sakramentenlehre nach Herveus Natalis O.P.* (†*1323*) (Münchener Theologische Studien 2, Systematische Abteilung 10), München 1956; L. Ullrich, *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zu Sentenzenkommentaren aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300* (Erfurter Theologische Studien 20), Leipzig 1966; T.W. Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz, O.P.* (Studia Anselmiana 58), Rome 1971; and the Polish exception, Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, cit.

11 My results are based on the question and citation list, a complete reading of the two most complete and important manuscripts (Troyes 992 and Borghese 122) as well as the partial redaction in Vienna 1321, and about 150 pages of sample editions from all four books and all redactions.

12 Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., pp. 174–178.

13 H. Denifle, "Quellen zur Gelehrtengeschichte des Predigerordens im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert", in: *Archiv für Literatur-und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* 2 (1885), pp. 165–248, at p. 229: "Fr. Iacobus Metensis scripsit lecturam super Sententias". The *Catalogus Stamsensis*, or *Tabula Scriptorum Ordinis Praedicatorum*, has been re-edited by G. Meerssemann in: *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum*, Rome 1936, Vol. 18, the reference on p. 64, number 28.

Manuscript	Book I	II	III	IV
C = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. lat. 247		q. 1		
D = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. lat. 317		×		
E = Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek Ca 2 321				dd. 13.1, 44.1
G = Graz, Universitätsbibliothek 475	×			
K = Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1583	×	×	×	q. 1
L = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Palat. lat. 373	×	×		
M = München, Bayerische Staatsbibl., Clm 3749	×	×		
N = München, Bayerische Staatsbibl., Clm 14383	to mid-d. 37			
P = Paris, Bibl. nationale de France, lat. 12331	×	×		
T = Troyes, Médiathèque Troyenne 992	×+*additiones*	×	×	dd. 1–16
V = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. lat. 122	×	×	×	×
W = Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibl., lat. 1321	to mid-d. 36			

Most are completely anonymous, but Denifle himself found that Munich 3749 contains the colophon "Explicit primus Metensis". Franz Ehrle, Auguste Pelzer, Martin Grabmann, and Franz Pelster later identified five other manuscripts: DNPTV.[14] In the most important and complicated of these codices, Troyes 992, Koch discovered two references to the author as "James", one in the margin within the *tabula quaestionum* for Book I and one in a comment in the "new quire" added to the same Book.[15] Troyes also has a note calling the author a "friar", and Koch points to the explicit to Book II as strongly suggesting that James was a Dominican [II.43.1]: "According to the doctors[16], a Friar Preacher is not held to anything in the rule [simply] because it is put there, but only because a prelate commands it to him". A slightly earlier passage that I have found in the same question leaves no doubt: "Thomas says that nothing in *our*

14 Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., p. 170 and notes. Grabmann's contribution, "Forschungen zur Geschichte der ältesten deutschen Thomistenschule des Dominikanerorderns", cit., deserves to be singled out for its importance regarding James.

15 T 1^{rb}: "Primam opinionem ibi cepi, sed totum residuum in Ber⟨nardo⟩ excepto primo membro quaestionis Iacobi: 'omnia transeunt in divinam substantiam praeter relationem' etc.". The other comment (on f. 31va) is in question 11 of the "new quire": cf. the manuscript description below.

16 The abbreviation is "*doc.*", which Koch reads as "*doctorem*", i.e., Aquinas, but as far as I can tell, whenever James uses the abbreviation "*doc.*" and it is written out in any witnesses, it is *doctores* and not *doctor* or *doctorem*.

rule obliges us to a command except insofar as it falls under the command of a prelate". Finally, a witness identified later, Graz 475, also attributes Book I to "James" in the *tabula quaestionum*,[17] while another, Kraków 1583, has the same colophon for Book I as does Munich 3749: "Explicit primus Metensis". It seems, then, that we are on ever more firm ground in identifying the questions contained in these manuscripts as those of a Dominican named James of Metz who lectured before 1310.

In 1992 Stephen Dumont identified a reference to a certain "James the Fleming" as meaning our James of Metz.[18] In Distinction 29 of Book II of his *Sentences* questions, based on lectures delivered at Paris around 1320, the Carmelite John Baconthorpe related that certain people had an opinion opposed to Article 129 of the Parisian condemnations of 1277:

> These people mean to say that, while there is right reason concerning a particular thing, the will cannot contravene it, because as long as right reason holds in its rectitude, it is necessary for the will to consent, nor can it contravene. And this understanding appears to be wholly that of Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Question 11. And this seems to be the understanding of his greatest disciples, John of Pouilly, Guy, and James the Fleming. The first two I heard and the third I saw in the treatise that he made.[19]

The printed version of Baconthorpe's questions on Book II has not been identified in any manuscripts, but the sole manuscript of the earlier *reportatio* version only differs in the more accurate spelling of Pouilly's last name (*Poyly* rather than *Polx*) and the confusing declaration that Baconthorpe also "heard" (*audivi*) the treatise of James the Fleming.[20]

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17 G 102^{vb}: "Incipiunt tytuli super primum Iacobi".

18 Cf. S.D. Dumont, "Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will in the Late Thirteenth Century", in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 3 (1992), pp. 561–597, at pp. 592–593.

19 Cf. Iohannes Baconthorpe, *Scriptum in II Sententiarum*, d. 29, q. un., a. 2: "Ubi est intelligendum quod isti volunt dicere quod, stante ratione recta in particulari, non potest voluntas contravenire, quia quamdiu stat ratio in sua rectitudine, necesse est voluntatem consentire, nec potest contravenire. Et iste intellectus videtur esse omnino Godofredi, Quodlibeto sexto, quaestione undecima. Et iste videtur intellectus suorum maximorum discipulorum, Ioannis de Polx, Guidonis, et Iacobi Flemingi. Primos duos audivi, et tertium vidi in tractatu quem fecit"; cited in: Dumont, "Time, Contradiction and Freedom of the Will", cit., p. 592, n. 90.

20 Cf. Iohannes Baconthorpe, *Reportatio in II Sententiarum*, d. 29, q. un., a. 2, London, British

It is well known that Pouilly and Guy, obviously Guy Terrena, were followers of Godfrey of Fontaines, and although it has not been emphasized enough, this is also true for James of Metz, and Professor Dumont found a passage that demonstrates this in the context at hand.[21] Indeed, James even adhered to Godfrey's famous and unpopular theory of the succession of forms.[22] Since it was not unusual for a mendicant to profess at a convent far from his home, if James was from Flanders, then the name "James of Metz" surely comes from the Dominican convent where he professed.

Having answered at least some of the "who" question, Koch found a statement at the end of the *tabula quaestionum* in Troyes that the friar lectured a second time on the *Sentences*, from which lectures some *additiones* in the manuscript derived.[23] Koch already knew that James of Metz's *Sentences* questions survived in more than one version, and he identified (a) a "first redaction" contained elsewhere in Troyes, (b) a "second redaction" in the other manuscripts then known (DNPV), and (c) the *additiones* in Troyes.[24] For the

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Library, Royal 11 C VI, f. 259va. I thank Professor Dumont for sending an image of the quotation.

21 On Guy and Godfrey, cf. T. Turley, "Guido Terreni", in: H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, Dordrecht 2011, pp. 446b–448b and the bibliography. For Pouilly and Godfrey, cf. L. Hödl, "The *Quodlibeta* of John of Pouilly († ca. 1328) and Philosophical and Theological Debates at Paris 1307–1312", in: C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 199–229 and the literature cited there. For James and Godfrey, cf., e.g., O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^{e} et XIII^{e} siècles. Tome IV: Problèmes de morale. Troisième partie II*, Leuven 1954, pp. 598–599, who edited a question on the connection of the virtues [III.36.1], but when he found that James merely paraphrased and often copied verbatim Godfrey's text without citing it, adding nothing new, Odon decided it was pointless to publish it!

22 Independently, both the team of Jean Céleyrette and Jean-Luc Solère and myself transcribed the same multiple versions of the same questions and came to the same conclusion (I thank Solère for his expert confirmation of my amateur suspicion), cf. J.-L. Solère, "Dominican debates on the intensification of qualities at the beginning of the 14th century: Harvey Nédellec against James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourçain", in: F. Bonini—A. Colli—A. Speer (eds.), *The Lectura Thomasina in its Context. Philosophical and Theological Issues*, Leuven, forthcoming. This is an important supplement to the impressive collection in S.D. Dumont, "Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century", in: S.F. Brown—T. Dewender—T. Kobusch (eds.), *Philosophical Debates at the University of Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), Leiden 2009, pp. 39–125.

23 T f. 1^{vb}: "Primi sexterni sunt additiones quas frater iste fecit in secunda vice qua legit *Sententias*".

24 Cf. Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., pp. 178–190.

time being, I shall employ Koch's division. Koch's main tasks, then, were to determine exactly when and where James lectured on the *Sentences* and to distinguish the various redactions, connecting them to the stages of James' career.

2 When?

Regarding the first task, unfortunately, James of Metz virtually never cites contemporary theologians, or even those who were active earlier in the thirteenth century, with the exception of Thomas Aquinas, who is mentioned frequently, a couple of citations of Peter of Tarantaise [I.10.1; IV.20.2; IV.28.2; cf. II.2.2], and single references to William of Auxerre [IV.30.1; cf. I.32.W1] and Albertus Magnus [II.14.1; cf. II.15.T2]. For the most part, then, Koch had to detect tacit references to previous theologians, although this evidence depended in turn on the absolute dating of these other scholastics. Moreover, since James does not name his opponents, and contemporaries never name him, Koch had to be sure that he had discovered the relative order between James and earlier and later authors.

The one exception to the no-citation rule demonstrates the instability of the ground on which Koch laid his foundations: Rambert of Primadizzi of Bologna [I.10.1]. In the second redaction, in the context of whether the production of the Son is by intellect and that of the Holy Spirit by will, James writes that "Brother Thomas said this in Paris publicly in the schools, that it was not his understanding that the Son proceeds from the Father by an act of the intellect, as Master Rambert heard from him. Thus in the *Scriptum* Thomas says that the Father begat the Son by nature". The *additiones* version is slightly different: "Whence Master Rambert of Bologna said in *his schools in Paris* that he heard from Brother Thomas that his intention was not that the Son proceeds by an act of the intellect". Since Rambert is called "master" and not "bishop", Koch argued that James was writing before Rambert's appointment as Bishop of Castello in 1302 and after his becoming master of theology, between 1295 and 1300, for which dates Koch relied on Ehrle and Grabmann.[25] Later scholars were quick to note that the 1302 date is rather weak.[26] After all, there is no need to assume that James would have called Rambert "bishop" after 1302, especially since James was referring to something Rambert said while master.

Yet we do not even have a solid 1295–1300 date for a *terminus post quem*. No one seems to have paid attention to what the Benedictine Jean-Pierre Müller

25 Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., pp. 177–178.

26 Starting with Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel*, cit., pp. 188–189.

wrote of his German colleagues in the introduction to his edition of Rambert's main work, the *Apologeticum veritatis contra Corruptorium*, published during the war:

> Basing himself on the order that Rambert occupied in the list of masters of theology according to Bernardo Gui, Franz Ehrle proposed, *with a very prudent reservation*, that he received the *licentia docendi* between 1295 and 1300. This hypothesis has been repeated several times since then without the reservations that nuanced it.[27]

Müller went on to remark that Glorieux then proposed earlier dates, 1290–1295. For his part, Müller, noting that a chronicle relates that Rambert was already bachelor at Paris in 1288, argued more convincingly that Rambert could have become master at any time between mid-1292 and Easter 1299, when he left Paris, because he is first called master of theology later that year while in Bologna. According to the tentative list of Dominican bachelors given below, it is likely that Rambert read the *Sentences* in 1295–1296, but it could conceivably have been before 1291. Since the parallel passage in James' first redaction, from the first lecture series, makes no mention of Rambert in the text itself, although there is a marginal note elsewhere [I.6.T1], the most we can say for certain is that James' second redaction dates from after 1293.

With Rambert somewhat less useful, we have to rely on tacit references, which is controversial in the case of James of Metz, who was not in the habit of quoting his predecessors *verbatim*. After all, the causal connection between loosely parallel passages can be interpreted in either direction, or a common ancestor, extant or hypothetical, can always be posited, even in cases where one scholar refutes a position held by another. Following the lead from a marginal reference in Munich 14383 [I.24.1], containing the second redaction, Koch concluded that James was attacking his confrere John Quidort of Paris.[28] Marginal citations are troublesome, however: for example, it turns out that in the other Munich manuscript, 3749, each of the first three distinctions contains a marginal reference to the Dominican Henry of Lübeck, the latter two to his *Quodlibet* III, the last one stating: "Concerning this question, have a look in the third *quodlibet* of Henry of Lübeck" [I.1.1, 2.2, 3.1]. Yet Henry's three *quodlibeta* were debated at a German *studium* between 1312 and 1325, *after* James'

27 Cf. Rambertus de Primadiciis, *Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptorium* (Studi e testi 108), (ed. J.P. Muller), Vatican City 1943, pp. xv–xvii (my translation and emphasis).

28 Cf. Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., p. 176.

lectures.[29] Marginal references in James of Metz do not necessarily indicate priority and posteriority.

Nevertheless, Koch found further evidence and came to the conclusion that James' first redaction preceded Quidort's *Sentences* lectures and his second redaction followed them. Reasoning that Quidort became master in 1304, Koch employed the statutes, subtracted the four or five required years, and dated Quidort's lectures to 1298–1299 or 1299–1300.[30] Unfortunately for Koch's theory, which Bruno Decker rejected on other grounds as well, the latest estimate suggests that Quidort read the *Sentences* at Paris much earlier, in 1293–1294, although 1294–1295 is more likely.[31] Nor does Decker's presentation of a question on the Holy Spirit's temporal procession from James and Quidort in parallel columns demonstrate the priority of one or the other text. What is worse, as Decker himself mentions, that question is extant in only one James of Metz manuscript of the so-called second redaction, Munich 14383, inserted out of sequence amidst the material on the Holy Spirit's *eternal* procession.[32] In fact, the question immediately succeeds an addition to the previous question that is also unique to this Munich witness [I.10.1 and N2]. Quidort adds no precision to our dating of James of Metz.

More promising, a thorough investigation of Book I convinced Decker that the first and second redactions of James' text succeed in time the *Sentences* questions of another Dominican, William of Peter of Godin. I have transcribed Godin's questions parallel to the questions from James on foreknowledge and the eternity of the world [I.38.1; II.1.1]: there is no doubt that the two texts are closely linked in some way, but exactly how is uncertain. In any case, since Godin first lectured on the *Sentences* at Toulouse in 1296–1298, before doing so at Paris in 1299–1300,[33] Decker's information is less useful than might first

29 For the dates, cf. R.L. Friedman, "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330", in: C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 401–491, at pp. 466–473. Henry's *Quodlibeta* are now being published: Henricus de Lübeck, OP, *Quodlibet primum* (Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi IV/1), (ed. M. Perrone), with a preface by L. Sturlese, Hamburg 2009.

30 Cf. Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., pp. 185–186.

31 Cf. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., pp. 31–44; R. Lambertini, "John of Paris", in: H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy between 500 and 1500*, Dordrecht 2011, pp. 631b–634a, at p. 632a. See below for the 1294–1295 date.

32 Cf. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., pp. 98–101.

33 Id., ibid., pp. 25–29. Andrea Colli and Francesca Bonini are currently editing Godin's questions.

appear. Theodor Köhler reasoned that James could have had access to a *reportatio* from Godin's first lectures, allowing a date before 1300 for James' own first series.[34] As we shall see presently, Hervaeus Natalis apparently employed a *reportatio* of James' first lectures, so such access was not uncommon. In fact, it would have been possible for James to take Godin into consideration as early as 1297–1298.[35]

On the other end, with 1302 as his *terminus ante quem*, weak as it was, Joseph Koch reasoned that James of Metz lectured before Hervaeus Natalis' Parisian lectures and also, logically, those of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, arguing further on the basis of common passages that the so-called *Correctorium* of James' work was authored by Hervaeus himself. These claims have been called into question.

In 1930, immediately after Koch's article was published, Raymond Martin devoted five pages to rejecting Koch's dating entirely. On the basis of his edition of three questions from Book II, Martin instead asserted rather categorically that James was simply a derivative disciple of Durand, his *junior* confrère, lecturing on the *Sentences* around 1308–1309.[36] Aquila Emmen rejected this because of citations of what appeared to be James of Metz's positions in the work of John Duns Scotus in 1302–1303 and also in William of Nottingham, the latter citing a master "Iacobus". Although Decker considered Emmen's arguments to be flawed, in part because Decker dated James' lectures to 1302–1303 and found no evidence that he was ever a Parisian master, he and all later scholars soundly rejected Martin's conclusion, which was in any case based on a narrow selection of texts.[37]

More decisively, Mikołaj Olszewski recently discovered extensive *verbatim* passages common to the Prologues of the first redactions of James and Hervaeus. Accepting Koch's theory of the relative dating of James and Hervaeus, Olszewski concluded that Hervaeus incorporated over 90% of James' text into

34 Cf. Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., p. 27.

35 Cf. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., pp. 105–108 and *passim*, also mentions parallels between Peter of Auvergne's *Quodlibeta* dating from 1296 to 1301, and James' *Sentences* commentary, although I have rejected his contention that the *Quodlibeta* were only redacted later and published all together; rather they were published each year, one by one: C. Schabel, "The *Quodlibeta* of Peter of Auvergne", in: C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Leiden 2007, pp. 81–130, at pp. 85–86.

36 Cf. Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel*, cit., pp. 187–192.

37 Cf. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., pp. 88–92 and 102–104.

his own.[38] (Raymond Martin would perhaps have countered that James abbreviated Hervaeus!) On this basis, Olszewski rejected Koch's identification of Hervaeus with the author of the *Correctorium*, because the *Correctorium* corrects positions defended not only by James, but also by Hervaeus.[39] For Olszewski, then, the *Correctorium* must have been authored by someone who often copied *verbatim* Hervaeus' solutions against James, but who was not Hervaeus, a theory that allows for quite a different chronology for the *Correctorium*. In addition, Olszewski's find refutes Decker's *ex silentio* argument that James' first lectures must have been outside Paris simultaneously with Hervaeus' Parisian lectures, in 1302–1303, based on the erroneous claim that neither seems to have known the other's *Sentences* questions.[40]

In sum, despite the tradition of dating both of James of Metz's lecture series to after 1300,[41] we are free to date the first lectures as early as 1297–1298, even if we accept that they relied on William of Peter of Godin's first lectures. Indeed, we can comfortably state that both sets of James' *Sentences* lectures could have been completed by 1300–1301—which would also explain the absence of hints of clearly Scotistic doctrines.

3 Where?

In his paper in a recent volume on Durand of Saint-Pourçain, William Courtenay points out that there is no evidence for a rule in 1300 that Dominicans were required to read the *Sentences* at a provincial *studium* before doing so at Paris, but this is known to have been the case for several Dominicans around that time.[42] As mentioned, Troyes 992, which contains James' questions on

38 Cf. Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, cit., p. 3.

39 Id., ibid., pp. 314–315.

40 Cf. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., pp. 95–97.

41 E.g., Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., pp. 95–102: 1302–1303 and 1304; Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., pp. 27–28: 1300–1301 and 1302–1303; Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, cit., pp. 17 and 333: 1301–1302 and 1304 (1303 for *additiones*).

42 Cf. W.J. Courtenay, "Durand in His Educational and Intellectual Context", in: A. Speer—F. Retucci—T. Jeschke—G. Guldentops (eds.), *Durandus and His* Sentences *Commentary: Historical, Philosophical and Theological Issues* (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales—Bibliotheca 9), Leuven 2014, pp. 13–34, at pp. 28–29. A. Maierù, "Dominican *studia* in Spain", in: K. Emery, Jr.—W.J. Courtenay—S.M. Metzger (eds.), *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts* (Rencontres de philosophie médiévale 15), Turnhout 2012, pp. 3–31, at pp. 23 and 31, points out that

Books I, II, III, and part of IV, has a note on folio 1 verso at the end of the *tabula quaestionum* for Book I reporting that "the first sexterns are additions that this friar made the second time he read the *Sentences*". Koch also noted the numerous instances of the word *lectio* in the margins of the main section of the manuscript. The simplest way to explain these phenomena, as Koch did, is to state that the main section preserves a *reportatio* of the first lecture series and that the additions come from the second lecture series.

Köhler presents various Gallicisms in both redactions, including an example of the Latin, Greek, and French languages [IV.3.1];[43] I have found numerous passages in the both redactions that refer to the king and his bailli, coinage, assessors, counselors, judges, nuncios, and court in general [I.27.3; II.3.5; III.39.4; IV.4.1 and 9.1; and especially II.9.1]; and Spain is mentioned in a way implying that it is a foreign land [II.17.T3]. In Book III, when asking whether lying is a sin, James gives the example of "my saying that the king is in Paris, where he is not, nor do I believe him to be" [III.39.1]. Thus both lecture series were delivered in the Kingdom of France. Yet there is one key reference in the first redaction in Troyes in a question that is absent in the second redaction. In Book I, Distinction 6, on whether the Father generates the Son by nature, James talks about different forms of necessity with respect to achieving a goal [I.6.T1]: "Either without which one cannot have the *finis congruus* at all, for example, if one wishes to go beyond the sea it is necessary to set sail; or without which one cannot easily [*bene*] have the *finis congruus*, for example, if one wishes to go to Paris, it is necessary to go on horseback". Thus James' first lecture series, preserved in a *reportatio* in Troyes, was delivered at a Dominican *studium* outside Paris but inside France. If James was from Flanders but professed in Metz, in the vicariate of Champagne-Lotharingia of the order's province of France, it is a good guess that James' first lectures on the *Sentences* were delivered in that vicariate's head *studium*, in Reims.[44]

At one point in Book II [II.9.T2], in a discussion of master-disciple relationships common to both redactions, James brings up the separate examples of William and Peter. Unless this is some sort of joking reference to William of Peter of Godin, he may be speaking about his reporters, for at the start of the section containing the first redaction in the Troyes manuscript [I.3.TW1] we

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by the 1330s studying theology at Paris was (normally) a requirement for reading the *Sentences* at the Dominican *studium generale* of Barcelona.

43 Cf. Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., p. 30 and n. 62.

44 The neighboring vicariates had their main *studia* in Amiens (Picardy), Rouen (Normandy), and Lyon (Burgundy).

find a note that "I got this from the quire of William the Jacobite of Besançon". Besançon is not that far from Reims, although it is somewhat closer to the Dominican *studium* in Lyon, and it is possible that William was the reporter that produced the text of first redaction in the Troyes manuscript.

Could James of Metz's second lecture series have been delivered at Paris? Before looking at the evidence, it is necessary to reconstruct the catalogue of Dominican *sententiarii* at Paris in these years in order to determine when this could have occurred. Courtenay updated the list for the period after 1300 in his Durand paper, in which he reminds us that the Dominicans alternated bachelors from the province of France and from the other provinces; William Duba and I have found evidence for the late 1290s, which also demonstrates that *sententiarii* at Paris in this era lectured for only one year, not two; and Maxime Mauriège has filled in some gaps for the early 1290s. Keeping in mind that James would have been from the province of France, here is a table of the lecture dates of the Parisian bachelors of the *Sentences* from the Friars Preacher:

1291–1292: William of Macclesfield (province of England)
1292–1293: unknown (province of France)
1293–1294: Eckhart of Hochheim (Meister Eckhart) (province of Germany)
1294–1295: John Quidort (of Paris) (vicariate of Île-de-France)
1295–1296: Rambert of Primadizzi of Bologna (province of Lombardy)
1296–1297: unknown (province of France)
1297–1298: Remigio dei Girolami (province of Rome)
1298–1299: Bernard of Auvergne (vicariate of Burgundy)
1299–1300: William of Peter of Godin (province of Provence)
1300–1301: James of Metz or Arnald of Liège (*vicariate of Champagne-Lotharingia*)
1301–1302: Romeus of Bruguera (province of Spain)
1302–1303: Hervaeus Natalis (vicariate of Brittany)
1303–1304: Berengar of Landorre (province of Toulouse) (probable date)
1304–1305: Laurence of Nantes (vicariate of Brittany) (or 1306–1307)
1305–1306: John Picard of Lucemberg (province of Germany) (probable date)
1306–1307: Yves of Caen (vicariate of Normandy) (or 1304–1306)
1307–1308: John of Parma (province of Lombardy)
1308–1309: Durand of Saint-Pourçain (vicariate of Burgundy)
1309–1310: John (of Regina) of Naples (province of Sicily) (probable date)
1310–1311: Peter of Palude (vicariate of Burgundy)
1311–1312: Theodoric of Saxony (province of Saxony)
1312–1313: John of Pré (vicariate of Normandy)
1313–1314: William of Laudun (province of Provence)

1314–1315: James of Lausanne (vicariate of Burgundy)
1315–1316: Matthew Orsini (province of Rome)[45]

If James ever read the *Sentences* at Paris, it seems that it could only have been in 1300–1301, right after William of Peter of Godin. Koch hypothesized that James' second lectures were given at Paris, but Decker thought that both series were delivered elsewhere, first because he wrongly believed that Hervaeus was ignorant of James' work during the former's *Sentences* lectures at Paris, and on the negative grounds that James is never mentioned as master at Paris, or bachelor, for that matter.[46] We have so little data for Paris in this era, however, that the latter negative argument is weak. The most important information about Parisian Dominicans at the time comes from the letters of adhesion to the king during the stuggle between Philip the Fair and Pope Boniface VIII, dated early

45 Compiled from Courtenay, "Durand in His Educational and Intellectual Context", cit., pp. 21–22; W.O. Duba and C. Schabel, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 84 (2017), pp. 143–179, and personal communication with Maxime Mauriège. For the continuation of this list, cf. W.O. Duba and C. Schabel, "Ni chose, ni non-chose. The *Sentences*-Commentary of Himbertus de Garda, OFM", in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 53 (2011), pp. 149–232, at p. 189, n. 71: 1316–1317: unknown (France); 1317–1318: Raymond Bequini (Toulouse); 1318–1319: Michael of Four (France); 1319–1320: Benedict of Assignano (Upper Lombardy); 1320–1321: Hugh of Vaucemain (France); 1321–1322: Hugh of Marciano (Toulouse); 1322–1323: Peter of la Palme (France); 1323–1324: John of Forte (Aragon). To which Duba and I add the following: 1324–1325: William of Costa (France); 1325–1326: Peter of Pireto (Toulouse); 1326–1327: William of Châteaurenaud (France); 1327–1328: Bernard Lombardi (Provence); 1328–1329: Garinus/Guerinus de Giaco (France); 1329–1330: Arnald of Saint-Michel (Toulouse); 1330–1331: Durand of Aurillac (France); [1331 summer (?): Lupus Alphonsi (Spain)]; 1331–1332: Peregrinus (de Mercatore?) (Toulouse); 1332–1333: Alan of Étain (France); [1333 summer: William of la Palme (France)]; 1333–1334: John Porcari of Rome (Rome); 1334–1335: John of Louvain (France); 1335–1336: John of Melemberc (Saxony); 1336–1337: Herbert of Sens (France); 1337–1338: Paris (Provence); 1338–1339: P. Gotas (Goltas) (France); 1339–1340: Peter Strozzi (Rome); 1340–1341: Peter of La Charité (France); 1341–1342: Gerard of Dommiers (Toulouse); 1342–1343: Simon of Langres (France); 1343–1344: Francis of Belluno (Treviso) (Lower Lombardy); 1344–1345: William Musnier, but Geoffrey of Serans was substituted for him, although Geoffrey didn't read until 1346; 1345–1346: Peter of Salignac (Toulouse); 1346–1347: Geoffrey of Serans (France); 1347–1348: Grimerius Boniface de Pignena (Rome); 1348–1349: Bartholomew of Ansiacho/Anisyac (France); 1349–1350: William Subdre (Toulouse); 1350–1351: John of Siaco/Syaco (France); 1351–1352: Bartholomew of Bolsenheim (Germany).

46 Cf. Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., pp. 177–178; Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., pp. 96–97.

summer 1303, in which James of Metz's name does not appear alongside those of John Quidort, Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of Saint-Pourçain, and James of Lausanne. Contrary to what was once thought, however, these documents contain only the names of the Dominicans who supported the king, mainly from the province of France. Most of the Dominicans from areas that were not allied to the king did not sign and left Paris.[47] Even though James of Metz was from the Dominican province of France, if he was Flemish he had good reason to refuse to sign and to depart from the capital, the Franco-Flemish war being one of the factors that led to the royal-papal quarrel. In any case, since James could have died before becoming master, Lothar Ullrich and Köhler countered that a Parisian venue was still possible, although Ullrich thought it unlikely and Köhler estimated the date as 1302–1303, which conflicts with Hervaeus' Paris lectures.[48]

There is circumstantial evidence in favor of Paris. In Troyes, after a "new quire" of disputed authorship (see the manuscript description below), on the first six and a half columns of a quire otherwise containing the first redaction, there are three questions that Koch identified as "disputed questions" without further discussion,[49] and these questions appear to have been completely ignored in the literature:

(1) Utrum species conservetur ⟨in⟩ intellectu postquam actu intelligere desinit [desivit *Koch*]. (non)—obiective sed non formaliter. [T 32ra–33ra]
(2) Utrum obiectum increatum moveat intellectum ad actum beatificae visionis absque impressione alicuius formae. (non)—non ut movens. [T 33ra–34^{rb}]
(3) Utrum intellectus beatus possit videre nude et aperte Deum per essentiam ex propriis naturalibus. Respondeo. Ad evidentiam quaestionis declaranda sunt quattuor … albus sine forma albedinis. [T 34$^{rb–va}$]

The third question ends abruptly and prematurely, and the manuscript immediately moves on to the *Sentences* questions. The structure of the "disputed questions" is different from those on the *Sentences*. The first question contains responses to eighteen arguments, but these eighteen arguments are not present in the question, nor are the dozen arguments refuted in the second question,

47 Cf. W.J. Courtenay, "Between Pope and King: The Parisian Letters of Adhesion of 1303", in: *Speculum* 71 (1996), pp. 577–605, especially pp. 596–599.

48 Cf. Ullrich, *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz*, cit., p. 9; Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., pp. 18–19 and 27–31.

49 Cf. Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., pp. 171–172.

and this would probably have been the case for the third question, were it complete. The second question contains three explicit references to the *respondens* and one to the *opponens*, using the imperfect for what each *dicebat*. The questions, moreover, are closely related, having to do with the created intellect and the mechanics of understanding, leading to the beatific vision. What we may very well have here are the *resumptiones* from the inception procedure of a Parisian bachelor of theology, in which the masters proposed four questions to the candidate, two at the vesperies and two the following morning in the bishop's *aula*. We would have the two vesperies responses and only part of the first of the two *aula* responses.[50] Without an alternative attribution, why not assign these questions to James of Metz's inception ceremony? If so, it would be further evidence for placing the second series at Paris—and we could reexamine William of Nottingham's possible citation of our James as master.

For the first redaction, our strongest evidence for a non-Parisian French Dominican *studium* is the passage in Troyes refering to the relative necessity of going to Paris on horseback. The only other manuscript containing this question, Vienna 1321, is a mixture of the text in Troyes and the *additiones*, contemporary with or posterior to the second lectures. Vienna 1321 preserves the phrase about the need to sail overseas, but omits the words about Paris [I.6.W1], negative evidence that in this spot the Vienna manuscript derives from lectures given at Paris. On the contrary, the reference to what Master Rambert of Bologna said in his schools in Paris, or heard Thomas Aquinas say in his schools in Paris, is absent in the first redaction, so perhaps James picked up this information in Paris while preparing for his lectures there. The item concerning James of Metz's *Lectura* in a catalogue composed for Saint-Jacques also suggests that he taught at Paris, and a later note in a manuscript of the Dominican James of Lausanne calls his questions of 1314–1315 a compilation of "Tho⟨m⟩e, Hervey, Ia⟨cobi⟩, P⟨etri⟩ de Palude, et Durandi", again suggesting that James was among the most important Parisian Dominicans of the era.[51]

Köhler found this passage in the second redaction of Book IV [IV.18.3]: "An ordinary prelate can commit to a novice or *conversus* the task of absolving another friar from the chains of a lesser excommunication, as the prior of Paris did". Valens Heynck identified the prior as Raymond Romanis, who held the

50 For a contemporary parallel in John of Pouilly, cf. L. Hödl, "Die Aulien des Magisters Johannes von Pouilly und der scholastische Streit über die Begründung der menschlichen Willensfreiheit", in: *Scholastik* 35 (1960), pp. 57–75; C. Schabel, "John of Pouilly's *Quaestiones ordinariae de scientia Dei*", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 81 (2014), pp. 213–248, at pp. 236–239.

51 Cf. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*, cit., p. 15, n. 7.

post in 1298–1301.[52] If this episode was famous, however, James might have mentioned it outside Paris. But I have found a more telling passage in the second redaction of Book IV. In an informative question on indulgences, James writes [IV.20.2]: "But concerning those who come to a church for an indulgence, it should be said that, if it is a perennial indulgence, as it is for the Blessed Virgin [Notre-Dame] of Paris, each time one comes for this, one has the indulgence". Perennial indulgences were not uncommon in 1300,[53] and it is hard to imagine that someone lecturing in Reims, for example, would single out Notre-Dame of Paris, just when the roofing of Notre-Dame of Reims was being completed. The best hypothesis is that James the Fleming professed at Metz, then lectured at Reims in 1298–1299 and again at Paris in 1300–1301, which leaves a year for him to absorb William of Peter of Godin's teachings and a year of preparation at Paris. Finally, Durand was probably in Paris and perhaps in the audience when James lectured.[54]

4 What?

Assuming that Troyes 992 does contain a *reportatio* from a first lecture series delivered at Reims as well as *additiones* made in a second lecture series at Paris, let us try to make sense of the confusing remnants in the other witnesses. When faced with multiple redactions of questions on the *Sentences*, it is best to keep an open mind.

4.1 *Book IV*

Let us proceed book by book in reverse order, from easiest to hardest. Book IV survives complete in only one witness, Borghese 122 (V), but Troyes (T) contains the first sixteen distinctions and there are two questions in the Erfurt fragment and one in the Kraków manuscript that contains Books I–III. As expected, Troyes carries one redaction—presumably the first, as in Book I, from Reims—and Borghese 122 and the fragments contain another that is linked to Paris. For the first sixteen distinctions, Borghese 122 and Troyes have 27 parallel questions and Borghese 122 preserves three that are absent in Troyes. Of the 27 parallel

52 Cf. Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., pp. 30–31.

53 I have edited a number of similar indulgences for churches in Cyprus in these years; cf. the index of C. Schabel, *Bullarium Cyprium II: Papal Letters Involving Cyprus 1261–1314* (Texts and Studies in the History of Cyprus LXIV.2), Nicosia 2010.

54 On Durand's early studies at Paris, cf. Courtenay, "Durand in His Educational and Intellectual Context", cit., pp. 23–27.

questions, only eight have incipits that match *verbatim* and there are no identical explicits at all. An edition of two and a half questions in parallel columns revealed differences significant enough that these cannot be two *reportationes* of the same lectures. In both versions of the question on the baptismal formula [IV.3.1], the Greek formula is upheld as valid and re-baptism of Greeks coming to the Latin rite is rejected as unnecessary, and while a Latin would sin gravely in employing the Greek formula, James asserts that the person would still be baptized, contrary to what some people say. Yet there is almost no *verbatim* overlap. More clearly, in inquiring about the forced baptism of Jewish children [IV.4.2], in Troyes three opinions are presented: (1) it is licit, meritorious, and valid for lay lords to do so; (2) one ought not do it, and the sacrament is thereby invalid; (3) one ought not do it, but the children are truly baptized. James' own opinion is unclear, although one would expect that he supports the last opinion given. In Borghese 122, while three opinions are announced, only one is presented as such, the first one, and this time the opinion holds that a Jewish child should be seized and baptized (*debet*), although the arguments are basically the same. James counters that the doctors reject this, although they accept that such a child is truly baptized. Yet after these arguments, James interjects that "it does not seem to me that a child can be truly baptized" against the will of a Jewish father, and indeed James argues against a Christian child's being truly baptized against the parents' wishes. It seems that all three opinions were circulating and should not be associated with any individual in particular, such as Scotus, Aquinas, and Durand, so it is difficult to draw any chronological conclusions about these discussions. The Borghese 122 treatment does not look polished, but rather like a *reportatio* of James' second lecture series. In the next question [IV.4.3], on whether someone baptized under her own false pretenses has grace afterwards if she abandons those pretenses, the Borghese 122 version is again rather rough, foregoing the opening arguments entirely.[55]

In parts of Book I, the *Correctorium* sometimes responds to material that is extant only in the *additiones*, from the second lecture series. In Book IV, the *Correctorium* responds to six of the 27 questions common to Troyes and Borgh-

55 Cf. L. Ott, *Die Lehre des Durandus de S. Porciano OP vom Weihesakrament: dargestellt nach den verschiedenen Redaktionen seines* Sentenzenkommentars *und nach der Diskussion der Dominikanertheologie des beginnenden 14. Jahrhunderts* (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie, Neue Folge 17), München 1972, contains an edition of IV.7.2 on pp. 149–152, but only from T. See also a discussion of IV.11.1 with quotation from T in Paul J.J.M. Bakker, *La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques* (*c. 1250–c. 1400*). *Contribution à l'étude des rapports entre philosophie et théologie*, 2 Vols., PhD Thesis, Nijmegen 1999, Vol. 1, pp. 102–104.

ese 122, five times as the title is formulated in Borghese 122, the sixth being neutral. I have edited two of the longer presentations of the *opinio Thomae* in the Le Mans manuscript in parallel columns with Troyes and Borghese 122, and the *Correctorium* matches the Borghese 122 wording *verbatim*. In another case [IV.9.3], on the formula "This is the chalice", in Troyes the reader is merely directed to Aquinas' *Scriptum* for the response, but in Borghese 122 James apparently changes his mind and the *Correctorium* attacks him on that. The *Correctorium* also targets the Borghese 122 version of the opening question on the causal power of the sacraments [IV.1.1.], the version that Kraków also carries. This confirms that for Book IV Borghese 122 reflects the second lecture series.

Of the two questions in the Erfurt fragment, the *incipit* and *explicit* of one match the text of Borghese 122 and not Troyes [IV.13.1]. Theodor Köhler edited the second in 1971 [IV.44.1], on whether, if Peter's soul took over Paul's body at the resurrection, it would still be the same Peter in number, from the section not contained in Troyes.[56] Köhler published the brief texts in V and E separately, considering them two versions of the second redaction. I have collated the two transcriptions, however, and almost all the variants are of the sort one would expect from two mediocre independent witnesses of the same text. In three or four cases, however, the variants are more significant. Yet one of them could be a large omission *per homoeoteleuton* in Erfurt, which a scribe attempted to correct as best he could, and something similar might be said for the others. After all, Borghese 122 has omissions *per homoeoteleuton* of 9, 8, and 5 words, and if a scribe somewhere along the path of transmission were paying attention, perhaps conjectures would have been made there, too. In short, this seems to be one text that could have been edited from the two witnesses.

Unfortunately, for the bulk of Book IV, missing in Troyes, we shall never know whether James of Metz's thought developed over time, for example, whether his contention that men must pay the marriage debt whether their wives want it or not, in order to keep them out of trouble, was something James held in the province or whether he learned it while among the enticements of the capital. Did James learn from experience that, when a woman does not ask for it, one should read her inner signs [IV.32.1]? Or that a man does not have to marry

56 Cf. Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., pp. 523–527 (V) and 528–531 (E). Actually, Hermann Weber published a transcription two years later, but from Borghese 122 alone: H.J. Weber, *Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten in den Haupttraktaten der scholastischen Theologie von Alexander von Hales zu Duns Skotus* (Freiburger Theologische Studien 91), Freiburg 1973, pp. 385–387.

a woman he has deflowered if she is of a much lower social status, because obviously he only made promises in order to "extort carnal union", although he would have had to marry her had she been a noble [IV.28.3]?

4.2 *Book III*

Book III survives in three complete witnesses, Troyes, Borghese 122, and Kraków. Odon Lottin transcribed two brief questions on the virtues from the near the end of Book III using Troyes and Borghese 122, but since the one on the connection of the moral virtues [III.36.1] is basically taken from Godfrey of Fontaines, Lottin only printed (most of) the question *Utrum dona sint virtutes* [III.34.1].[57] In both cases, although without any *apparatus* for what he printed, Lottin found that the two manuscripts carried "exactly" or "absolutely" identical texts, which suggested to him that James did not care enough about the topic to rethink his first treatment. In fact, at one point in the previous distinction the three manuscripts have the same reference to "the things said in the last lecture" [III.33.4]. I have transcribed three questions from Troyes and Borghese 122. In the question whether an oath is obligatory [III.39.4], again near the end of book III, the differences are minor and the text should be edited as one. Toward the beginning, however, in the question whether the blessed Virgin did anything effectively in the conception of the Son of God [III.3.3], while there is a good deal of *verbatim* overlap, four opinions are presented in each case, and in the end James defers each time to Aquinas in the *Scriptum*, in some places the text has been reworked. Thus the argument that the child sometimes takes after the mother, used to show that the mother plays a role in reproduction, is refuted both times with the claim that this is because of a strong imagination, just as when a beautiful woman gives birth to an ugly child because she had an ugly image in her head during intercourse. Finally, the question whether Christ was older than John the Baptist [III.3.2] is question 9 in Troyes, but number 4 in Borghese 122, where it is twice as long as well. In Troyes, James seems to accept that the rational soul arrives in the beginning of the sixth month of pregnancy, but in the Borghese 122 version he relates that this must occur long before, "otherwise someone who has an abortion before the sixth month would not be considered a murderer, which is false, unless one

57 Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, cit., pp. 598–599 [III.36.1] and 675–679 [III.34.1]. See also the discussion in T. Jeschke, "Über natürliche und übernatürliche Gottesliebe. Durandus und einige Dominikaner gegen Jakob von Viterbo (mit einer Textedition von *In III Sententiarum*, D. 29, Q. 2 des Petrus de Palude)", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévale* 76 (2009), pp. 111–198, at pp. 162–166 [III.29.1, using T].

says that this is because of the *habitudo* toward the rational soul that the vegetative and sensitive souls have, which does not seem to be sufficient".[58]

Judging from the above and the incipits and explicits, the first three distinctions show evidence of revision from Troyes to Borghese 122, Borghese 122 preserves no questions at all in Distinctions 4–9, and starting from Distinction 10 the two witnesses more or less contain the same text. Not surprisingly, if the incipits and explicits are any indication, Kraków agrees with both for Distinction 10 until the end of the book, but for the earlier section Kraków sometimes agrees with Borghese 122, sometimes with Troyes 992, as in the following chart:

T = Troyes 992	**K = Kraków**	**V = Borghese 122**
1. Utrum incarnatio sit possibilis.	1. Utrum incarnatio sit possibilis. [V]	1. Utrum incarnatio sit possibilis.
2. Utrum et creaturam naturalem potuerit assumere.	2. Utrum ⟨divina⟩ persona possit assumere naturam irrationalem. [V]	2. Utrum \divina/ persona possit assumere naturam irrationalem.
3. Utrum natura divina assumpserit carnem mediante anima.	3. Utrum beata virgo potuerit eodem instanti esse sub peccato originali et sub gratia. [V]	3. Utrum ⟨beata⟩ virgo in instanti potuerit esse sub peccato originali et sub gratia.
4. Utrum beata Virgo pro eodem instanti potuerit esse sub culpa et gratia.	4. Utrum beata Virgo aliquid egerit effective in conceptione Filii Dei. [T]	4. Utrum Christus sit antiquior Iohanne.
5. Utrum beata Virgo aliquid effective egerit in confessione (!) Filii Dei.	5. Utrum corpus Christi fuerit formatum in instanti. [T]	5. Utrum beata Virgo aliquid effective egerit in conceptione Filii Dei.
6. Utrum corpus Christi fuerit formatum in instanti.	6. Utrum Christus possit dici Filius Trinitatis. [T]	6. Utrum Christus in quantum homo sit Deus.
7. Utrum Christus possit dici Filius Trinitatis.	7. Utrum unio facta fuerit in natura. [T]	
8. Utrum unio facta fuerit in natura.	8. Utrum in Christo sint plura supposita. [*explicit* ≠ T]	
9. Utrum Christus fuerit antiquior Iohanne.	9. Utrum ista sit vera absolute: 'Christus est duo vel plura'. [≠ T]	

58 V 76ra: "… alioquin non reputaretur homicida qui pararet abortium ante VI mensem, quod falsum est, nisi dicas quod hoc propter habitudinem ad animam rationalem quam habet vegetativa et sensitiva, quod tamen non videtur sufficere".

(cont.)

T = Troyes 992	K = Kraków	V = Borghese 122
10. Utrum in Christo sint plura supposita.	10. Utrum Christus sit antiquior Iohanne. [V4!]	
11. Utrum Christus sit duo.	11. Utrum in Christo sit plura esse. [≠ T]	
12. Utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse vel duo.	12. Utrum in Christo sint plures filiationes. [T]	
13. Utrum in Christo sint plures filiationes.	13. Utrum latria sit virtus generalis. [T]	
14. Utrum latria sit virtus generalis.	14. Utrum Christus in quantum homo sit Deus. [TV]	
15. Utrum Christus in quantum homo sit Deus.		

For the first three questions, Kraków reads with Borghese 122, skipping Troyes' Question 3. For the question on the relative age of Christ and John the Baptist, Kraków does not have it in the sequence of Borghese 122, but neither is it in the same place as in Troyes, and the text follows that in Borghese 122. For the following question, however, on the Virgin's contribution to the conception of Christ, Kraków is closer to the text of Troyes. In Distinctions 4–9, absent in Borghese 122, Kraków sometimes agrees with Troyes in the questions asked and in their incipits and explicits, but sometimes it does not. This suggests that the missing questions in Borghese 122 are due to the loss of a bifolio in its exemplar, which may also explain the different sequence of the age of Christ and the Baptist question. Kraków probably continues alternating between the two redactions until Distinction 10, when the three witnesses begin to contain a single basic text. As we shall see, Kraków's behavior here is parallel to what it does in Book II.

The *Correctorium* does not criticize any question from Book III, probably because James relies heavily on Aquinas here, even ending nearly half of the questions with something like "see the *Scriptum*". If Troyes and Borghese 122 each contain a single redaction throughout, however, then for Book III Troyes has the first redaction from Reims and Borghese 122 the second from James' time in Paris, with Kraków mixing the two, although from Distinction 10 the two redactions are roughly the same.

4.3 *Book II*

The relationship between the three witnesses of Book III is reflected and clarified by an examination of Book II, which survives in seven complete witnesses (Borghese 317, D, actually contains the whole book[59]) and a small fragment with most of the first question (Borghese 247, C). In 1966 Lothar Ullrich studied the entire Book II, but focussed on II.12.1 and II.17.2–3, concluding that Troyes + D (DT), Kraków + Paris 12331 (KP), and Borghese 122 + Munich 3749 (MV, to which Palat. lat. 373, or L, can be added) are separate groups, with M abbreviating.[60] Ullrich described DT as the "first redaction", LMV the "second redaction" (traces of which are in T's margins), and KP a "compilation" of the two redactions, either a "copy" from both or a "mixed text" of both, which often results in a clearer text. In Ullrich's examples, almost all of KP is also found in either DT or MV, although an occasional argument is added.[61] Ullrich provided a quaestion list with foliation from T, V, P, and the *Correctorium*, and summarized his results thus:[62]

> II.1.1–3: there are only minor differences between the redactions, but KP form a textual group (Ullrich places C with LMV) [ed. Schabel, II.1.1]
> II.1.4–3.5: there are two redactions, KP mostly agreeing with the first (DT), but sharing bits with the second (LMV) [ed. Köhler, II.3.2]
> II.4.1: there are two redactions, KP having a mixed text of the two redactions
> II.4.2–18.1: there are two redactions, KP generally agreeing with the second redaction (LMV), with some elements added from the first (DT) of varying extent
> II.18.2–43.1: (the end): there are only minor differences between the redactions [ed. Martin: II.31.2, 32.1, 33.1]

The question list below generally conforms to Ullrich's findings, although for the sections with two redactions the situation is probably both simpler and more complex, simpler because there are often matching explicits that indicate that the two redactions are still close [II.3.5, 10.1, 12.1–2, 13.2, 17.1], more complex in that individual witnesses, especially D, K, and P, are less consistent

59 There seems to be an omission *per homoeoteleuton* in Koch, "Jakob von Metz", cit., p. 173: instead of writing that dd. 1–44 are on ff. 1–26, he simply puts that the codex contains dd. 1–26. This led Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel*, cit., p. 193, astray.

60 Cf. Ullrich, *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre*, cit., pp. 51–52 and 367–374.

61 Id., ibid., pp. 26, 30, 370–371, and 376–377.

62 Ibid., pp. 17–19 (summary) and 360–365 (question list).

than Ullrich's scheme indicates. The editions from Book II also agree with Ullrich's results. In 1930, Raymond Martin had published three small questions on original sin [II.31.2, 32.1, 33.1] from the latter part of the book, using four of the seven witnesses for that section, MPTV,[63] against which I have collated the remaining three, DKL. The seven witnesses do carry one basic text, and KP constitute a distinct group, although they appear to agree with LM against DTV. In 1971, Theodor Köhler used all seven manuscripts carrying the text to edit separately two versions of a small question on the distinction of angels according to species [II.3.2] in the earlier section, one with DKPT ("first redaction") and the other with LMV ("second redaction"),[64] and his *apparatus criticus* again shows that KP form a subgroup. Collations of fragments further confirm Ullrich's picture: in II.3.5, on angelic cognition of future contingents, there are two redactions; in II.27.1, on merit, there appears to be a single redaction (a fragment on falling bodies from II.15.1, however, seems to be one text).

I have edited the somewhat larger first question from Book II, included in the fragment in C.[65] While the question survives in one basic redaction, as Ullrich states, the numerous variants follow the results just outlined. A structural difference makes CLV appear as a revision of DKPT, with M failing to implement the revision correctly. On the other hand, KLMPV share an omission *per homoeoteleuton* against CD, corrected in the margin of T. Overall, C is close to DT on the way to V. (That V is elsewhere closer to DT than the other witnesses is suggested by the common omission of II.23.2 in DTV, and by the *stemma* for Book I.) Otherwise, DT carry the first version, although D has many individual variants. LMV contain the second redaction, despite the contamination in the late witness L, while LM have shared variants against the rest and have numerous singular readings. KP are very closely connected, share a large number of variants against the others, and generally agree with DT. T and V (which refers to its exemplar in the margin of II.6.1) are good witnesses to their respective redactions, with only about 50 singular variants each.

A glance at the few places where Durand (in redaction A; redaction B only follows Metz where it matches redaction A) borrows a few words verbatim from James of Metz suggests that he used KP. The author of the *Correctorium* does not appear to have had either of the two redactions or the mixed text before him: in the question Köhler edited the *Correctorium* is closer to DKPT, but in the question on angelic foreknowledge [II.3.5] the *Correctorium*'s wording is

63 Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel*, cit., pp. 192–208.

64 Cf. Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., 515–518 (DKPT) and 519–522 (LMV).

65 In: J.F. Peck and C. Schabel, "James of Metz, O.P., on the Eternity of the World", in: *Medioevo* 40 (2015), pp. 265–330, with additional remarks on Book II.

closer to LMV. In each case, however, the amount that matches verbatim is less than one would expect, which does not contradict Ullrich's finding that the *Correctorium* targeted a *reportatio* of Book II and not the redaction that has come down to us.[66]

Thus for Books II–IV the situation does not seem that complicated:

(1) For much of Book II and most of Book III, there is only one basic text, so presumably the Reims redaction was not revised at Paris.
(2) For much of Book II, some of Book III, and the portion of Book IV where Troyes has text, there are two different redactions in Troyes and Borghese 122, presumably from Reims and Paris; Kraków (and Paris 12331) sometimes agrees with one, sometimes the other, and sometimes mixes the two, taking liberties.
(3) For the portion of Book IV where Troyes has no text, there is only one redaction, presumably a Paris revision, given the differences earlier in Book IV.
(4) The *Correctorium* may indicate that a Parisian *reportatio* of Book II is no longer extant, but for Book IV it appears to refute the Borghese 122 version.

4.4 *Book I*

Most of the confusion surrounding James of Metz's questions on the *Sentences* involves Book I, which survives in Graz 475 (G), six of the seven complete witnesses of Book II (KLMPTV), plus three idiosyncratic partial witnesses: Munich 14383 (N, to the middle of d. 37), Vienna 1321 (W, to the middle of d. 36, wrongly labelled "d. 38"), and the *additiones* in Troyes. It should be noted that the *additiones* usually do not preserve a complete question, but just passages with instructions on where to add them to the text *in alio quaterno*. That this "other quire" refers to the main Troyes text is suggested by the *additiones* procedure for I.41.1, "whether merits are the cause of predestination": this question is absent in Troyes, so the *additiones* version is complete. Moreover, the other witnesses of this question preserve a text that is closely parallel to that in the *additiones*, perhaps stemming independently from the same lectures. On the other hand, the Troyes text itself refers to the "other quire" [I.30.1], presumably the *additiones*.

In I.38.1, however, which I have edited,[67] all complete witnesses contain the same question, including Troyes, with minor differences, but here the *addi-*

66 Cf. Ullrich, *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre*, cit., p. 67.

67 Cf. Schabel, "Dominican Anti-Thomism", cit.

tiones are just that, substantial additions to the other text, which is merely indicated with the instructions. Here is a possible *stemma* for this question (excluding L's contamination and later corrections in other witnesses):



T probably stems from a *reportatio* of the Reims lectures and α most likely comes from a slightly revised text, as suggested by an alternate question title and a few slightly abbreviated or expanded passages. The *additiones* show that something like T and α were available to James of Metz when he delivered his Parisian lectures. For this question the common text in T/α circulated much more than the "complete" *additiones* version, which only survives in the added text, although the anonymous author of the *Correctorium* must have had the complete *additiones* version.

Aside from dd. 36–37 in the Vienna manuscript, for Distinctions 35–48 there seems to be basically one redaction plus the *additiones*, except in Distinction 41, which is even simpler.[68] For earlier distinctions, however, it is more complicated: for the most part Troyes contains a different redaction before Distinction 35, and Vienna seems to have a mix of the Troyes and *additiones* versions, which is why Köhler edited separately the redactions of Distinction 24 in Troyes and the *additiones* and used the Vienna witness to correct each text. He noted, but did not edit, the redaction contained in the other witnesses.[69] For Distinction 17, on the intensification of forms, transcribed by Céleyrette–Solère and, partially, myself, we have the same divisions as in Distinction 24—Troyes, most of the other manuscripts, the *additiones*, and Vienna—except that Munich 14383 has the Troyes text for two small questions missing in the main redaction. Moreover, Céleyrette–Solère have found that the *Correctorium* again responds to a redaction that is not preserved, addressing some arguments found only in the *additiones*. Since we do not have *additiones* for every question, Vienna cannot

68 Cf. Ullrich, *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre*, cit., p. 22, noting that the first redaction in Troyes and the text of the remaining manuscripts (aside from Vienna) are "almost identical" for dd. 35–48.

69 Cf. Köhler, *Der Begriff der Einheit*, cit., pp. 497–502 (T) and 503–514.

be ignored, because at times the *Correctorium* appears to be directed at a redaction whose structure is closer to that in the Vienna codex. Indeed, the "new quire" in Troyes (see manuscript description), probably from Paris, seems to refer to the Vienna text at times, so Vienna could be a *reportatio* from the Paris lectures, as suggested above.

Besides Olszewski's edition of the Prologue, discussed below, the only other sections of Book I that have been edited are of the main redaction without employing all the manuscripts: Olszewski's edition in this volume of I.2.1–2 from Graz, Kraków, and Borghese 122, Marianus Bicz's edition of I.8.1 from Paris and Kraków, and Ludwig Hödl's edition of I.11.1, without *apparatus criticus*, presenting mostly the Paris and Borghese 122 text, but discussing the redaction issue and reporting some variants in Troyes and the *additiones*.[70]

To get a clearer picture, for future publication[71] I have edited in parallel columns all redactions of the questions concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit in Distinctions 10–13, as well the closely related question for Distinction 6 on "whether the Father begat the Son by nature", to which the *additiones* refer in I.10.1: "Et nota quod ista quaestio est eadem cum illa quae quaeritur supra, VI distinctione, utrum Filius procedat per modum naturae". I chose this section for my own doctrinal interests, but these questions also contain the references to Rambert, the passage about riding to Paris on horseback, and additional material in Munich 14383 (N). The first result is as expected: Troyes, the *additiones*, and Vienna preserve versions different from that of the remaining witnesses, i.e., GKLMNPV. For Distinctions 10–11, I collated all witnesses of the GKLMNPV redaction. Unfortunately for my purposes, compared to Distinction 38 and the first question of Book II, these seven manuscripts present a very unified text here. There are no large shared omissions, although M has four large singular omissions (one of 18 words), L two of them (one of which is corrected in the margin of M), V one (of 19 words), and the others none. The groupings are less

70 Cf. M. Olszewski, "A Thomist Facing the Challenge of Henry of Ghent. An Edition and Study of Distinction 2 from James of Metz's *Commentary on Book I of the Sentences*", in this volume, pp. 316–341; L. Hödl, "Das trinitätstheologische Fundamentalprinzip des Anselm von Canterbury. Ursprung und Geschichte", in: *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévales* 69 (2002), pp. 172–215, at pp. 205–214; M. Bicz's contribution in: W. Seńko, *Tomasza z Akwinu Opuskulum "De ente et essentia". Na podstawie edycji R. Gosselina wydał, przełożył i słownikiem pojęć opatrzył* (Opera Philosophorum Medii Aevi 2), Warsaw 1978, pp. 135–145.

71 Cf. C. Schabel, "James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin on the Procession of the Holy Spirit (and the Generation of the Son)", in: F. Bonini—A. Colli—A. Speer (eds.), *The Lectura Thomasina in its Context. Philosophical and Theological Issues*, Leuven, forthcoming.

pronounced than elsewhere, but they do not contradict the above *stemma*, with the additional witness N (Munich 14383) being close to Borghese 122: besides GKP and KP, NV have 13 minor shared variants and LM have 9.

T and W are the only witnesses containing I.6.1, I.10.2, I.11.2, I.12.2, and I.13.2. For I.6.1, W matches T with minor variations, except for a couple of abbreviated passages, although W lacks the marginal comment about Rambert and, notably, the reference to riding to Paris. In the brief I.10.2, the text is roughly the same, except that much of it is in the margin of T, T lacks an argument, and elsewhere T contained a different argument before the text in the margin was added. In the extremely brief I.11.2, T and W match except that each contains a phrase missing in the other. In the short I.13.2, T and W again have roughly the same text, but each has a brief citation that the other lacks. Finally, in the somewhat longer I.12.2, T and W are more or less the same, except that W abbreviates two passages. In sum, for these five questions totalling only about ten pages of text, T and W read like two independent witnesses to the same lectures. W is not a copy of T, although it could be a modified version of T, and indeed one suspects that the reference to riding to Paris was removed on purpose in W.

In I.10.1, I.11.1, and I.13.1, however, where GKLMNPV and the *additiones* have text, the relationship between T and W is not nearly as close. In all three questions, the sequence of arguments and the general structure are almost identical in the four versions. Among the four, the text in T and the *additiones* are the farthest apart. W sometimes contains text close to T's and at other times W agrees instead with the *additiones*, both in places where T has a different version of the same argument and where the *additiones* have simply added text absent in T. Moreover, W never has text that is not parallel to what is contained either in T or the *additiones* or both. Occasionally, where the *additiones* have a note referring to the other quire, and both T and GKLMNPV contain the same text, W lacks this material. At other times, however, W has a bit more text than the others, and one wonders whether this derives from the "complete" *additiones* redaction.

GKLMNPV seem to contain text that matches the *additiones*, except that not all of what is in the *additiones* is in GKLMNPV and, of course, where the *additiones* have a note to fill in the text from the other quire, there is no guarantee that the text in T is precisely what would have been in the "complete" *additiones* text rather than the parallel text in GKLMNPV or in W.

To add to the complexity, N (Munich 14383), another incomplete witness, continues I.10.1 with several more pages of text, rejecting at length James' position point by point and presenting a more acceptable position backed by citations of Aquinas and Peter of Tarantaise. N then adds a question on the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit [I.10.N2], completely out of context. N exhibits

other idiosyncracies elsewhere, adding text in I.1.1 and, as mentioned above for the intension and remission of forms, when the main redaction does not have questions, sometimes N adds text found in T [I.17.4–5, 26.3, 29.1; cf. I.33.1]. Thus, to a lesser degree than W, N contains a mixed text.

We do not have all the pieces to the puzzle, assuming that the "complete" *additiones* redaction once existed. What we can say is that, generally speaking, we have (1) the first redaction in Troyes, (2) Parisian *additiones* in the same codex that are sometimes complete questions, sometimes mere fragments with numerous instructions on how to complete the text with "the other quire," and (3) two other versions of the text. W seems to be a mix of Troyes and the *additiones*, and one wonders whether in the small questions extant only in T and W the Vienna witness preserves the Paris version, a suggestion supported by the absence of the reference to riding to Paris. It is understandable that such brief questions would drop out of a written version, as they have in GKLMNPV. This version is closer to the *additiones*, and yet not everything in the *additiones* is included in GKLMNPV, especially after Distinction 35, when T and GKLMNPV are substantially the same.

T and GKLMNPV are also substantially the same in the Prologue, critically edited in Olszewski's book on the Prologues of James and Hervaeus (except for the Vienna version).[72] The first five questions in Troyes match the first five questions of the Prologue in GKLMNPV, and so Olszewski was able to print them together as one redaction with a full *apparatus criticus* [Pro.1–5], as I did for Distinction 38. Only the sixth question in Troyes (Olszewski labels it "⟨Quaestio 5⟩") differs from the parallel (sixth and final) question of the GKLMNPV Prologue, so Olszewski prints it separately [Pro.T6]. The question ends in the middle of f. 6^{vb}, and the scribe uses the empty space for a note on Godfrey of Fontaines' opinion just after adding the following: "For the first distinction, look in the other quire, namely on fruition and use", and the text is indeed found among the *additiones* on f. 11^{rb} and in the second redaction. Thus after the *tabula quaestionum* on the current f. 1, ff. 2ra–6^{vb} in Troyes contain six questions of the Prologue, the first five of which match the GKLMNPV redaction.

The proper continuation of material in Troyes begins on the top of f. 9ra, where we find *additiones* versions of four of the Prologue questions in the

72 Olszewski's description, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, cit., p. 17, is somewhat confusing: "My edition of James' Prologue presents the whole of the final redaction (*B*), selections from the first redaction (*A*), and the *Additiones*. From the last two versions, I edit only questions that are not incorporated in B. By this, I avoid repeating text. I also dismiss the compilation in W which does not contribute to a better understanding of James' doctrine or the history of the text". The edition is on pp. 22–81; cf. the question list below for details.

sequence 1, 2, 6, and 5, and since the Question 6 matches that in GKLMNPV, Olszewski prints separately the other three and records the *additiones* variants in the Troyes manuscript in the *apparatus criticus* of the sixth. Olszewski corrects earlier codicological analyses in noting that bifolio 9–10 was not bound in the manuscript as normal but inserted later. But there are further anomalies: after the last (q. 5) Prologue question ends on f. 11^{rb}, the *additiones* version continues directly with Distinction 1 with questions parallel to the GKLMNPV redaction down to I.3.1, leaves half of f. 12^{vb} blank, continues on f. 13^{ra} with I.3.2, then finally I.7.1 on f. $13^{rb–vb}$. Originally, I.7.1 concluded on the top of what is now f. 7^{ra}, but then someone crossed out this conclusion and copied it at the bottom of f. 13^{vb}, adding a note: "Concerning Distinction 8 it is asked *Utrum esse et essentia sint idem vel non*, above on folio 6 [now 7]. Again, *Utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte*". On f. 7^{ra} below the crossed out text from I.7.1 we therefore find I.8.A1 and then I.8.2, which does not end at the bottom of f. 8^{vb}, but has a note there: "*Punctum*: look in the beginning of the next quire, which begins '*punctum*'," and indeed the next quire, on f. 14^{ra}, begins "*punctum*", and the question ends there,[73] with the next *additiones* coming afterwards in I.10.1 and continuing in sequence.

I have not done my own codicological analysis *in situ*, so I do not know whether the sequence of the actual text in the first quire in Troyes, ff. 2–6, 9–13, 7–8, reflects further complexity in the binding beyond what Olszewski has noted. But the contents themselves provoke the question: are we certain that Troyes contains the first redaction of the Prologue? Recall the note at the end of the *tabula quaestionum* in Troyes (f. 1^{vb}): "Primi sexterni sunt additiones quas frater iste fecit in secunda vice qua legit *Sententias*". If we take this at face value, this means that folios 2–25 contain nothing of the first lectures, but only material from the second lectures. After a "new quire" inserted later, the first redaction propter begins in Distinction 2 in the following quire on f. 34^{va} after the three disputed questions. Before that, all we apparently have of the first redaction is Question 5 of Prologue. Otherwise, all we have on ff. 2–25 are either *additiones* or something that matches GKLMNPV. Given that only one of the questions of the Prologue supposedly from the first redaction is not also in the second redaction, perhaps we really do not have the first redaction until Distinction 2. We will return to this issue shortly when attempting an explanation.

Olszewski's analysis of the manuscript tradition of the main version demonstrates that GKP read against LMNTV 18 times (at least, three of the variants

73 The above adjusts in minor ways Olszewski's correction in *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, cit., pp. 4–5. In addition, where Olszewski reads *Utrum anima formaliter* it should be *Utrum anima rationalis*.

being significant) and that KP form a subgroup (with at least 14 shared readings against the others). Olszewski found a "slight affinity" between L and V, including a shared omission *per homoeoteleuton* of fourteen words and 13 other shared variants. On the basis of L's inferiority to V and P's inferiority to K, Olszewski excluded LP from the *apparatus criticus*, which reproduces mostly shared variants. At one point GKMNV share vs. T an omission *per homoeoteleuton* of 13 words, suggesting a common exemplar. Presumably, then, it is on the basis of minor shared errors that Olszewski constructed the following *stemma* for witnesses other than T, although such errors are not analyzed:[74]



An analysis of Olszewski's *apparatus criticus* (where LP are absent), however, complicates this. First, Olszewski reports that MN read against the rest on 75 occasions, which certainly suggests a common exemplar independent from the other witnesses. Second, TV share readings against the rest 47 times, which may indicate that V is much higher on the *stemma*, as seems to be the case elsewhere. Furthermore, 18 shared readings of MNV do support γ, but the 17 shared readings of MNV with T are a hint that β does not derive directly from α. All other combinations occur fewer than ten times. Given L's evident contamination elsewhere, one could argue for an alternative *stemma*, a modified version of what was given above for Distinction 38. In support, as Olszewski noted,[75] Köhler saw an affinity between L and M and between N and V, which accords well with my results for Distinctions 10–11 and 38.

5 Saving the Phenomena

Now, the problem lies in accounting for everything. Were it not for the *additiones*, we would probably simply say that Troyes carries the first redaction from Reims and GKLMNPV contain the second redaction from Paris (which is more

74 Cf. Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, cit., pp. 6–8 for analysis of the text and *stemma*, pp. 17–18 for the *ratio edendi* (presumably his second V_1 [= V] on p. 18, l. 10, is a typographical error for V_4 [= L]) and p. 57, ll. 236–237 for the major omission in GKMNV.

75 Ibid., p. 3.

unified than in Books II–III), and that in most of the Prologue, the last fourteen distinctions of Book I, and much of Books II and III the Reims text was not revised at all at Paris. The existence of the *additiones*, as well as the mixed text in Vienna, complicates matters, since the *additiones* appear to be from a *reportatio* of the second lectures. In places like Distinction 38, where the text of the first redaction in Troyes does not differ in any substantial way from the text in GKLMPV, it is difficult to claim that these manuscripts reflect the Paris lectures, which were simply unrevised, when both the *additiones* and the *Correctorium* that attacks them tell us otherwise. The *additiones* also provoke other questions: is the redaction in Borghese 122 the same for all books, or is Book I (at least) different? Were there *additiones* for the other books that do not survive?

Olszewski summarizes previous theories for the nature of GKLMNPV, which concentrate on Book I:[76] for Koch (and Hödl), this is a compilation of the first redaction and the *additiones*, probably by a disciple of James of Metz, so we should focus on the first redaction and the *additiones*. Decker countered that GKLMNPV was received by James' contemporaries as the official version, and this constitutes an *ordinatio*, probably by James using two *reportationes* of the second lecture series, one like the *additiones* and one different. Köhler thought that two scribes took down *reportationes* of the second lectures, and one was used by the *additiones* and parts of W, the other by GKLMNPV. For his part, while admitting that nothing can be proven, Olszewski leans toward Decker's basic theory, but asserts that GKP have been further improved for clarification, by James or someone else, and this is Olszewski's preserved text.

Given that the version of Book I in GKLMNPV is attributed explicitly to "James" or "Metz" in GKM, it does seem odd to assert that someone else is behind the redaction. At the very least, the arguments, sequence, and almost all the words in GKLMNPV are James' anyway. Nevertheless, there are other possibilities, for example that for Book I GKLMNPV is a revision of the first redaction made in Paris in preparation for the lectures, which only got as far as Distinction 34, and the *additiones* represent final adjustments in the lectures themselves. At that time, moreover, it was normal to lecture at Paris in the sequence I-IV-II-III, and after the *additiones* in I, Book IV does betray the most revision and Book III the least, with the ends of both Book II and III, like Book I, carrying only one text. Olszewski's explanation for the Prologue is worth quoting here (with my emphasis):[77]

76 Ibid., pp. 2–7.

77 Ibid., p. 5.

> The Prologue (ff. 2^{ra}–6^{vb}) and the *Additiones* testify to two stages of elaborating a *new redaction* of the *Commentary*. The Prologue is its first stage, while the *Additiones* are its completion and emendation. James probably started a *new version* of the *Commentary* with the Prologue (ff. 2^{r}–6^{v}). At some point his work was interrupted. When he resumed the *Commentary*, he was dissatisfied with the first [i.e., new] version of the Prologue and decided to correct it: partially completing the older [i.e., new] version (as in the case of Question 1) and partially revising or rewriting the text—this was done in the *Additiones*.

For Olszewski, then, when the Troyes text matches GKLMNPV it is already a new version, and the *additiones* are a further revision. Since the note on f. 1^{vb} of Troyes asserts that these *additiones* come from the second lectures on the *Sentences*, we can extrapolate from Olszewski's remark to assert that, after James of Metz had finished his first lectures, probably at Reims, he came to Paris and began his revisions, continuing them while he actually lectured. The parallel case of Peter Auriol is informative:[78] his *Scriptum* on *I Sentences* was begun after he had lectured on the *Sentences* outside Paris, at Bologna and/or Toulouse, whence we also seem to have a fragmentary *reportatio*, but he completed the *Scriptum* in Paris before lecturing on *I Sentences*. The mainly pre-Paris *Scriptum* version eventually circulated the most widely, while Parisian *reportationes* of Book I (and/or the lectures themselves) had an early impact, but survive in few witnesses in a more confused state. The latter part of one Parisian *reportatio* (in Borghese 123) reflects the end of the *Scriptum*, probably because they were produced around the same time.

There should be no doubt, of course, about the James of Metz's authorship of the many sections of Books I–IV in Borghese 122 where the text matches that in Troyes. Given that James lectured twice, that in Book I this same Borghese 122 often reflects the *additiones* from these Paris lectures, that in Book IV Borghese has a reference that indicates Paris as the venue, and that three other witnesses to the same Book I text as in Borghese attribute the work to James, it seems unreasonable to doubt that James of Metz is the author of the questions on all four books in Borghese 122.

78 Cf. L.O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol's Way with Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the *Sentences*", in: G.R. Evans (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard*, Leiden 2002, Vol. 1, pp. 149–219, as modified in Duba and Schabel, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus", pp. 159–165.

What about GKP? For Book I, where the differences between GKP and LMN(T)V are relatively small, Olszewski suggests as follows:[79] "It seems as if a careful reader—its author or a later editor—of the Prologue as preserved in the remaining manuscripts [GKLMNPTV] decided to make the structure of the text more explicit. Thus, G, K, and P contain the last, slightly ameliorated version of the text".[80] For the first question in Book II, however, the more numerous variants and corrections suggest that the scribe of the exemplar of KP had before him a very faulty witness of the second redaction, low on the *stemma*, but when he appealed to another witness to correct his text, that witness contained the first redaction. He therefore used both redactions freely, and again took the liberty to make clarifications, sometimes in an effort to correct the text. The liberties this person took were sometimes extensive, as is indicated by KP repeating an entire question from Book I [I.47.1] in Book II [II.12]. Nevertheless, the product was still very defective, and K and P required extensive further correction in the margins. K's behavior in Book III could be related to this: by this time, the scribe of the exemplar was doing whatever he wished with his two models. In Books II and III KP and K would still be James of Metz, but an accidental "edition" by a follower.

Conclusion

Thus we seem to have a *reportatio* of lectures probably given at Reims around 1298–1299 and a more complicated group of texts created in preparation for or stemming from a second series of lectures delivered at Paris in 1300–1301. More critical editing is needed to clarify matters further. The most complete witness, Borghese 122, contains only 114 folios, perhaps 900 pages of text. Although parts of Book I survive in multiple redactions, most of the individual arguments are extant in only two versions, while for large sections of Books II, III, and IV and a few questions at the end of Book I absent in the *additiones* there is only one basic redaction. Since the 1929 publication of Koch's 60-page article on James of Metz, Decker, Ullrich, Köhler, and Olsewski have published books on the obscure Dominican, almost 2.000 pages in just these five works, more than all redactions of James' smallish sets of questions combined would require. Yet

79 Cf. Olszewski, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, cit., p. 7.

80 Quite so, and this decision of the "careful reader" would be even more understandable if we place Olszewski's β slightly lower down on his *stemma*, so that the "careful reader" appealed to another witness and at the same time smoothed out the text in minor ways.

James' questions have never been published, and only a few fragments are available in critical editions. Surely it is time to rectify this, and once the Durand of Saint-Pourçain edition is finished, with parallel columns for the different redactions, let us hope that the Thomas-Institut can continue with the *Lehrer des Durandus*.

Notes on the Manuscripts

The manuscripts of James of Metz are interesting for their other contents from contemporaries: C and P contain Durand's Book IV; D has Scotus' Book IV; E preserves Bernard of Auvergne's correction of James of Viterbo's *Quodlibeta*; G has some notes assigned to Hervaeus that concern James' questions, as well as William of Peter of Godin's questions on all four books; K contains part of Book IV of John Picard of Lucemberg; N has a text of Hervaeus against Durand and some of Hervaeus' quodlibetal questions; P preserves the Dominican John Sterngassen's Book IV; V has a treatise by John Quidort (and abbreviations of questions from Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines for which James may be the abbreviator; see below); and the Le Mans codex of the *Correctorium* also contains the *Evidentia contra Durandum* (probably by Durand of Aurillac after all, and not by Nicholas Medensis[81]), erroneous articles of Durand, and Benedict of Assignano's concordance of at least apparent contradictions in Aquinas' works. It is possible that, in looking more closely at these and other Dominican writings from 1290–1320, we may be able to assign various anonymous commentaries (such as that in Brugges 491) to known Dominican bachelors of the *Sentences* at Paris.

C = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. lat. 247: ca. 1315, parchment, 247 folios, varying sizes, but ff. 224–247 measure 305 × 210 mm, 1–2 coll. Manuscript of Pierre Roger, OSB (Pope Clement VI), with a broad collection of texts, notably Durandi Sancto Porciano *In IV Sententiarum*, ff. 25^{r}–48^{v}, with the final item, number 74, on ff. $247^{r–v}$: Iacobi Metensis *II Sententiarum*, q. 1, fragment. See A. Maier, *Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae* (Studi

81 In his book on William of Brienne, *The Forge of Doctrine: The Academic Year 1330–1331 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris* (Studia Sententiarum 2), Turnhout 2017, William Duba shows that, on Brienne's testimony, Durand of Aurillac composed the *Evidentiae contra Durandum*, that he likely did so prior to lecturing on the *Sentences*, and that Brienne used both Aurillac's *Principia* and the *Evidentiae* in criticizing his view.

et Testi 170), Vatican City 1952, p. 300. Images online: http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Borgh.317.

D = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. lat. 317: 14th, parchment, 141 folios, 325×232 mm, 2 coll., 62 lines for Metz section. 1^{ra}–26^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *II Sententiarum*; 27^{ra}–141^{rb}: Iohannis Duns Scoti *IV Sententiarum* (*Reportatio Parisiensis*); 141^{v}: blank. See Maier, *Codices Burghesiani*, p. 362. Images online: http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Borgh.247.

E = Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 2° 321: 14th, parchment, 108 folios, 320×220 mm (ff. 1–62) and 260×185 mm (ff. 63–108), 2 coll. 1^{ra}–62^{va}: Thomae de Aquino *In libros Metaphysicorum*; 63^{ra}–92^{ra}: Bernardi de Alvernia *Frater Iacobus quaerit*; 92^{va}–96^{vb}: *collationes in libros Sententiarum* (e.g., Meister Eckhart); 97^{ra}: Iacobi Metensis *IV Sententiarum*, d. 13, q. 1; 97^{rb}: Iacobi Metensis *IV Sententiarum*, d. 44, q. 1; 97^{va}–98^{vb}: *collationes in libros Sententiarum*; 99^{rb}–108^{vb}: *quaestiones in Sententias*. See online catalogue: http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-24017/CA_0008_12.pdf.

G = Graz, Universitätsbibliothek 475: mid-14th, parchment, 138 folios, 300×220 mm, 2 coll., 60 lines for Metz section; quires: 104–115, 116–123, 124–131, 132–138 (139 cut out). 1^{ra}–99^{rb} et 99^{rb}–102^{va}: Guillelmi Petri de Godino *In IV libros Sententiarum* et *Tabula quaestionum*; 102^{vb}–103^{rb}: *Articuli in quibus fr. Thomas melius dicit in Summa quam in Scripto*; 104^{ra}–137^{ra}: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*; 137^{rb}: blank; 137^{va}–138^{rb} (and also bottom of 137^{ra}?): Notes attached to James of Metz's text, mostly dd. 35–48, via a series of letters (a, b, c …), assigned to Hervaeus Natalis (e've[9]) on top of 137^{va}; 138^{v}: blank. See also A. Kern, *Die Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Graz* (Handschriftenverzeichnisse österreichischer Bibliotheken. Steiermark 1–3), Leipzig—Wien 1942–1967 (3 Bände), Band 1, p. 275. Images online: http://143.50.26.142/digbib/handschriften/Ms.0400-0599/Ms.0475/.

K = Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 1583: 14th, parchment (1–142, 153, iv) and paper (143–152, i–iii), 153 + iv folios, 285×200 mm, for Metz section 2 coll., 52 lines; quires: 1×12 (1–12), 1×10 (13–22), 10×12 (23–142). I^{va}–III^{rb}: *Tabula quaestionum*; IV^{va}, IV^{rb}: Guillelmi Petri de Godino *I Sententiarum*, dd. 6–7; 1^{ra}–44^{ra}: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*; 44^{ra}–93^{rb}: Iacobi Metensis *II Sententiarum*; 93^{rb}–116^{va}: Iacobi Metensis *III Sententiarum*; 116^{va}–117^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *IV Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 1; 118^{ra}–142^{vb}: Iohannis Picardi de Lichtenberg *IV Sententiarum*, dd. 1–18 (*ending with reclamans* "et hominem"); 143^{r}–151^{r}: blank; 151^{v}: Utrum anima a corpore separata possit pati ab igne corporeo; 152: blank;

153$^{ra–vb}$: fragment, upside down; 154: inserted partial sheet with notes. Images online via: http://jbc.bj.uj.edu.pl/dlibra/collectiondescription?dirids=180.

L = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Palat. lat. 373: 15th, paper, 272×210 mm, ii + 423 folios (including 340bis) + ii, 2 coll., writing space for Metz section 224×132 mm, 44–52 lines; quires: 14×12 (1–168), 1×10 (169–178), 7×12 (179–262), 12×12 (263–405, including 340bis); 1×14 (406–419), 1×5 (420–422 + ii). 1ra–262ra: Petri Plaoul de Palma *In quattuor libros Sententiarum*; 262$^{rb–v}$: blank; 263ra–347^{rb}: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*; 347va–422ra: Iacobi Metensis *II Sententiarum*; 422$^{rb–v}$ (+ ii): blank. H. Stevenson, with I.B. Rossi, *Codices Palatini Latini Bibliothecae Vaticanae descripti*, Rome 1886, Tomus I, p. 104. Images online: http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/bav_pal_lat_373.

M = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 3749: 14th (post 1323: "beatus Thomas" in text) [catalogue: second half 13th], parchment, 86 folios (inc. 71bis) + iii, 265×190 mm (writing space 200×120), 2 coll., 51–54 lines; quires: 1–10, 11–20, 21–28, 29–38 [this quire forgotten in catalogue entry], 39–50, 51–62, 63–74, 75–86. 1ra–44ra: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*; 44^{rb}–86ra: Iacobi Metensis *II Sententiarum*; 86$^{rb–v}$: blank. 44ra: Explicit primus (.1^{9}.) Metensis; 86ra: Finis libri secundi, Deo gratias. See *Katalog der lateinischen Handschriften der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München. Die Handschriften aus Augsburger Bibliotheken. Band 2. Dominikanerkloster Clm 3680–3686 und Domstift Clm 3701–3830*, hrsg. H. Hauke und A. Freckmann, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 170–171. Images online: http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/0009/bsb00091107/images/index.html?seite=00001&l=en.

N = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14383: 14th, parchment, 102 folios + i, 275×195 mm. Metz section: first quarter 14th, writing space 22.5×15.5 cm, 2 coll., 60 lines; quires: 40–51, 52–63. 1ra–11^{vb}: *Secretum secretorum*; 12ra–39^{vb}: Hervaei Natalis *Quodlibeta magna I*, qq. 1–8; 40ra–63^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*, dd. 1–37 (explicit: … Solvitur autem ad hoc sit aliquid enim [reclamans]); 64ra–72^{vb}: Thomae de Aquino *Quodlibet III*; 73^{r}–77^{r}: Medicine fragments; 77ra–80^{vb}: Richardi Anglici *Signa prognostica*; 81ra–86ra: Andreae de Cornubia *QQ. super librum de sex principiis*; 86^{rb}–92va: Andreae de Cornubia *QQ. super librum Porphyrii*; 93ra–102ra: Hervaei Natalis *De articulis pertinentibus ad librum I Sententiarum Durandi* (aa. 1–16). See *Katalog der lateinischen Handschriften der Bayerischen Staastbibliothek München. Die Handschriften aus St. Emmeram in Regensburg. Band 3. Clm 14261–14400*, hrsg. F. Helmer mit H. Hauke und E. Wunderle, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 397–402. Images online: http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/~db/0004/bsb00046520/images/index.html?seite=00001&l=en.

P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 12331: 2nd half 14th, parchment, 181 folios (inc. 87bis), 275×203 mm, Metz section 2 coll., 45–50 lines, writing space ca. 195–200×130 mm; i = rules of Bologna OP General Chapter of 1347; quires: 1–12, 13–24, 25–36 (misbound), 37–48 (no reclamans), 49–60, 61–72, 73–83 (82bis has been cut out); then next quire has different (more precise) writing space: 218/216×157/153 mm: quires: 84–94 (including 87bis), 95–106, 107–118, 119–130, 131–141 (including 141bis), 142–150 (then three cut out); then next quire has different writing space: 230×170 mm: 151–161 (156bis has been cut out); 162–173, 174–180 + i (see Gallica). 1^{ra}–41^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*; 42^{ra}–82^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *II Sententiarum*; 83: blank; 84^{ra}–150^{rb}: Durandi de Sancto Porciano *IV Sententiarum*; 150^{v}: blank; 151^{ra}–173^{vb}: Iohannis Sterngacii *IV Sententiarum*; 174^{ra}–180^{vb}: *Quaestiones medicinales*. See also *Durandi de Sancto Porciano Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum. Distinctiones 43–50 libri Quarti* (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales—Bibliotheca 10.4.4), (ed. T. Jeschke), Leuven 2012, pp. 27*–28*. Images online: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90667237.r=12331?rk=21459;2.

T = Troyes, Médiathèque de l'Agglomération Troyenne 992 (and A for *additiones*): early 14th, parchment, 134 folios (inc. 122bis), 287×110 mm, 2 coll., mainly 48–50 lines, but varying; quires: 1, 2–13, 14–25, 26–31, 32–43, 44–55, 56–67, 68–79, 80–91, 92–99, 100–105, 106–117, 118–122bis, 123–133. $1^{ra–vb}$: *Tabula quaestionum* for Book I, with foliation starting with current f. 2 and f. 1, prior to the insertion of the "new quire" plus separate foliation for "new quire" (ff. 26–31); 2^{ra}–6^{vb}: *Prologus*; 7^{ra}–25^{vb}: *Additiones in I Sententiarum*; 26^{ra}–31^{vb}: *Novus quaternus* (see below); 32^{ra}–34^{va}: *quaestiones disputatae* (see above); 34^{va}–68^{rb}: *I Sententiarum*; 68^{rb}–105^{vb}: *II Sententiarum*; 106^{ra}–122^{vb}: *III Sententiarum*; 122bis r: blank; 122bis v: notes; 123^{ra}–133^{vb}: *IV Sententiarum*, dd. 1–16. See also *La bibliothèque de l'abbaye de Clairvaux du XII^e^ au XVIII^e^ siècle*, (ed. J.-P. Bouhot et J.-F. Genest), Paris 1997, Vol. 2, pp. 663–664. Images online: https://portail.mediatheque.grand-troyes.fr/iguana/www.main.cls?p=*&v=c97386a2-914a-40c2-bd8d-df4c273175e6&t=1488289876885&rtisearch=1&searchProfile=Manuscrits#?asi=0&ai=0.

Koch attributed the "new quire" on ff. 26–31, inserted after the *tabula quaestionum* was compiled, to someone other than James of Metz, in part because it contains material from Hervaeus Natalis. Given the common passages in James and Hervaeus, we can no longer exclude the possibility that the new quire in the Troyes manuscript preserves material from James that Hervaeus later absorbed, that the quire somehow reflects what Hervaeus liked about James' lectures. For example, in the context mentioned above concerning the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the new quire does have much text in common

with Hervaeus' question, but the distinctive reference to Rambert of Primadizzi (here *Ymbertus*) is absent in Hervaeus but present in the new quire, and there are other differences.

In a question in the new quire pertaining to Distinction 9, we are told to "see other questions in the *reportationes*," and for the question "whether the Son is called 'other than the Father'" we are directed to the *reportatio*. The second redaction contains no question at all for Distinction 9, but Troyes 992 and the Vienna manuscript have three questions, including "whether the Son is other than the Father." For Distinction 10 the new quire again refers the reader twice to the *reportationes*, once as follows: "Speak as you have it in the *reportationes*, because it is done well, and add that this is the way of Brother Thomas, as Brother Rambert (Ymbertus) the master recited in Paris that he heard Brother Thomas saying," and so on. Since the manuscripts of the second redaction contain the reference, it is possible that the scribe is referring to the *reportatio* in the Vienna manuscript. At the end of the question for Distinction 26, we are told that "you have elsewhere in the aforesaid *Lectura* the question 'whether a relation makes a composition in the foundation'," the "aforesaid" referring to the earlier citation "with respect to the third and fourth article, speak as you have it in the *Lectura* of James," and the question is found only in N, T, and W. Perhaps Vienna is indeed a *reportatio* of the Paris lectures.

The questions of the new quire, on dd. 4–13 and 26 of Book I, have been added to the *tabula quaestionum*, sometimes with some notes that the new material is *optime*: [1ra] Distinctio VII … Utrum potentia generandi dicat quid vel ad aliquid. Folio XXIX^{o} et eadem est optime in quaterno novo, folio II^{o} … [1^{rb}] Distinctio XI … Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat ab utroque. In quaterno novo. Folio 4^{o}. Optime est ibi … Distinctio XIII … Utrum sint plures realiter distinctae. Optime quaterno novo. Folio V^{o} … [1va] Distinctio XXV^{a} … Utrum relationes distinguant hypostases. In quaterno novo. Folio ultimo. De manu mea. Optima est et continet quattuor quaestiones.

Here is a list, with some of the curious elements: **(1)** Circa 4 distinctionem, utrum generatio sit in divinis. *In fine adde quod non* … [T 26ra]; **(2)** Utrum in divinis differant suppositum et natura ut Deus et deitas … *Tertiam opinionem veram quaere in secundo, distinctione tertia, ubi perfecte habet istam quaestionem et illam opinionem reprobatam et veritatem postea determinatam*. Et dicunt hoc esse de intentione fratris Thomae … Quod dicunt fratrem Thomam hoc sensisse non videtur verum. Non secundo *Quolibet*, q. 4, ubi quaeritur utrum angelus sit idem suppositum et natura, dicit quod non … [T 26ra]; **(3)** Circa 5 distinctionem quaeritur secundo utrum essentia sit terminus generationis … (*This contains two versions, the second rearranged*): Postea probandum est quod essentia non generatur, et praemittenda sunt notabilia ut supra [cf. 27^{vb}**!**],

et hic est primus articulus. Secundus articulus, utrum terminus generationis, circa quod IIII. Primo ponitur quae incipit ibi: 'quidam dicunt quod generatio in creaturis' [cf. 26ra]. Secundo impugnanda est ut ibi: 'propter secundum principale sciendum' [cf. 26va]. Tertio ponendae rationes IIII quae sic incipiunt: 'aliqui contra hoc arguunt quadrupliciter' [cf. 26^{rb}], et possunt dimitti prima et tertia. Quarto solvendae ut ponitur ibi: 'tertio ad rationes illas 4' [cf. 27$^{va–b}$]. *Iste processus quaestionis est magis artificialis*. Ad rationes ergo in oppositum, ad primam … [T 26ra–27ra]; **(4)** Circa VII distinctionem quaeritur utrum potentia generandi in divinis dicat quid vel ad aliquid, substantiam vel relationem … ut supponitur illa quaestione praehabita utrum sint plures personae in divinis || Unde ille qui in *Scripto* primo dixera[n]t potentiam esse essentiam postea correxit se in quaestionibus *De potentia*, dicens isto modo … [T 27ra–28ra]; **(5)** Circa distinctionem 8 quaeritur utrum esse sit proprium Dei … ut patebit distinctione XXII … ut infra distinctione 22 [T 28$^{ra–va}$]; **(6)** Circa distinctionem IX quaeritur utrum Filius in divinis semper generetur … *Alias quaestiones vide in reportationibus … Vide alibi habet de hoc* … Tertius articulus posset esse utrum secundum istam generationem Filius dicatur alius \a/ Patre: *vide reportationem*. [T 28$^{va–b}$]; **(7)** Circa 10 distinctionem quaeritur utrum Filius procedat per modum intellectus et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis … *Postea solve argumenta ut habes in reportationibus … Dic eam sic⟨ut⟩ habes in reportationibus, quia bene est, et adde quod ista est via fratris Thomae, sicut frater Ymbertus magister recitavit Parisius quod audivit ab ipso fratre Thoma* … Videbitur magis in sequenti distinctione. [T 28^{vb}–29^{vb}]; **(8)** Circa XI distinctionem quaeritur utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio … [T 29^{vb}–30^{rb}]; **(9)** ⟨D. 12⟩ Utrum Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum in quantum unum. Vide in Romano … Vide in *Scripto* Romani. [T 30$^{rb–va}$]; **(10)** Circa XIII distinctionem quaeritur in divinis utrum sint plures processiones realiter distinctae, scilicet generatio et spiratio … (*question in a confused state*) [T 30va–31ra]; **(11)** Circa distinctionem XXVI, utrum relationes distinguant hypostases sive personas … *Vide de hoc clarius in quaterno de formis … Quantum ad tertium et quartum articulum dic sicut habes alibi in lectura Iacobi* … ut visum est prius. Utrum relatio faciat compositionem in fundamento *alibi habes in lectura praedicta*. [T 31$^{rb–va}$, *then remainder of folio* (*1.3 coll.*) *blank*]. D. 11 is edited in Schabel, "James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin".

V = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. lat. 122: early 14th, parchment, 175 folios, 297 × 224 mm, writing space 235 × 165 mm, 2 coll., 54 lines; quires: 1–12, 13–24, 25–36, 37–48, 49–60, 61–72, 73–84, 85–96, 97–108; 109–114 || 115–126; 127–138; 139–144 || 145–152, 153–164, 165–176. 1ra–39^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*; 39^{vb}–74^{rb}: Iacobi Metensis *II Sententiarum*; 74^{rb}–90ra: Iacobi

Metensis *III Sententiarum*; 90ra–114^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *IV Sententiarum*; 115ra–144^{vb}: Aegidii Romani *Quodlibeta* (*abbreviatio*); 145ra–148^{rb} (147ra–148ra, 145ra–146^{vb}, 148$^{ra–b}$): Aegidii Romani *Quaestio de esse et essentia II* (*but see explicit*: et ideo non valet, *which is not the explicit of any of the previous Giles questions, of which there are many, but it is found some 17 times in James of Metz, mostly in Book IV, in addition to 5 in Book I in W*); 148$^{rb–vb}$: Iohannis Quidort (?) *Tractatus de formis*, incipit (see A. Pelzer, "Ein anonymer Traktat des Iohannes von Paris O.P. über das Formenproblem …", in: *Divus Thomas* 24 [1946], pp. 3–28); 148^{vb}–151va: Utrum anima sit tota in toto corpore et in qualibet parte … ideo non valet et sic finitur quaestio; 151va–152^{vb}: Anonymi *Principia in Sententias* (*the first ends on 152va with* Explicit principium fratris [*one line erased, but the use of a wood lamp suggested that it may start with* Ludovici] super primum librum; *the fourth ends in mid-sentence at the bottom of 152^{vb}, then the* reclamans *do not match 153ra, and a note in a different hand below the reclamans writes*: "ista clavis est supra XL^{o} folio in principio eius," *but this must be missing*); 153ra–173ra: Twenty philosophical and theological questions, some abbreviated from Godfrey of Fontaines' disputed questions (see Quaestio 7, 159^{rb}–160^{vb}: Septimo de intensione virtutis); 173^{rb}–175^{rb}: incomplete *tabula quaestionum* for entire ms; 175$^{va–b}$: Quaeritur utrum potestas clavium possit habere effectum suum respectu cuiuslibet peccatoris seu etiam peccati. Videtur quod sic … subicitur ordinem suscipienti. Ad secundum. See also A. Pelzer, *Études sur les manuscrits des Quodlibets ⟨de Godefroid de Fontaines⟩* (Les philosophes belges 14), Louvain 1937, pp. 279–289; Maier, *Codices Burghesiani*, pp. 159–160; B. Faes de Mottoni et C. Luna, *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia I. Catalogo del manoscritti* (*1–95*). *1/1 Città del Vaticano* (Corpus philosophorum medii aevi, Testi e studi V), Florence 1987, pp. 15–19. Images online: http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Borgh.122.

W = Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1321: 12–14th, parchment, 160 folios, Metz section: 215×140 mm, 2 colls., 35 lines. 1ra–54^{vb}: Iacobi Metensis *I Sententiarum*, dd. 1–36; 54^{vb}–55^{rb}: *Tabula quaestionum*; 55^{v}–56: blank; 57^{r}–160^{v}: Assorted non-theological texts. See *Tabulae Codicum Manu Scriptorum praeter Graecos et Orientales in Bibliotheca Palatina Vindobonensi asservatorum*, *Cod. 1–2000*, Vienna 1864, Tomus I, p. 218.

Correctorium = Le Mans, Bibliothèque municipale 231: 1436, paper, 207 folios, 292×205 mm, 2 coll., 45–49 lines for Metz section. 1ra–146^{rb}: Durandelli *Evidentia contra Durandum*; 146va–149^{vb}: Petri de Palude et Iohannis de Neapoli *Articuli 93 erronei extracti ex Durando*; 150ra–175^{rb}: Anonymi *Correctorium ⟨contra Iacobum Metensem⟩*; 176: blank; 177ra–207ra: Benedicti de Assignano *Concordantia dictorum Thomae Aquinatis*. See *Nicolai Medensis* (*Durandelli*) *Evidentia*

contra (Corpus philosophorum medii aevi, Opera philosophica mediae aetatis selecta 3), (ed. P.T. Stella), Tübingen 2003, pp. 44*–45*.

A Note on the Question List

The question list is designed to support the article, encourage further research, and facilitate the critical edition of the text, either as a whole or in parts. The individual questions are numbered according to distinction (as much as possible according to the manuscripts, although this is often from conflicting *marginalia*) and number within each distinction, except on occasion (as noted) when they are placed out of sequence if their relative position varies according to the different redactions. The rebuttals in the *Correctorium* are placed following the questions they criticize and are numbered sequentially. The main version, represented by V, has a simple number, e.g. [2], but T and W and sometimes N are numbered separately where their text differs, e.g. [T2]. The question title is given, then the beginning of the response—(sic), (non), or something else—then the explicit of each question after "–". Where both the title and *explicit* match, I have listed all manuscripts together, to save space, but this does not necessarily mean that there is only one redaction (certainly not for the *additiones*); TW have been combined more often, even when only the incipits match. Foliation for each manuscript is given for every question (the *additiones* as **A** and in bold), and the approximately length of each question in terms of columns is provided for the most complete and uniform witness, V. Then any citations of university theologians, condemned articles, other books in the commentary, and important information within the text is given, each item separated by ||. Significant marginal references are included as well, but due to space limitations the frequent ones to Aquinas are omitted, as are T's "lectio" and "questio" in the margins and the many instructions in the *additiones* concerning links to the "other quire". The same space limitations have restricted the amount of variants recorded in the titles and, especially, the explicits: all of T's individual variants, all shared variants, and all important variants in the titles except for L's are generally reported. Unless noted, the variants in [square brackets] refer to the previous word or, in the case of inversions, two words. Words in \these brackets/ are in the margins or above the line; ^{2} = second hand; * = *lectio incerta*.

Tabula Quaestionum

Prologus

[1] Utrum theologia sit scientia. (non) [Respondeo T]—esse scientiam et subalternam. [**A 9ra**; G 104ra–105ra; K 1ra–2^{rb}; L 263ra–265^{vb}; M 1ra–2^{rb}; N 40$^{ra–vb}$; P 1ra–2^{rb}; T 2ra–3ra; V 1ra–2^{rb}: 5.2 coll.] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 34–35 (**Additiones**) and 50–58] Ista est opinio in summa (*cf. supra "Ista opinio summatim constat ex tribus"*) [A: In secunda opinione, quae est Thomae || Vel solve sicut in prima parte. Ad secundum patet solutio ibidem vel in *Scripto*.]

[W1] Utrum theologia sit scientia. (non)—et sic in summa sunt quattuor opiniones. [W 1ra–3ra] illa est opinio in summa || Et hoc intellexit Thomas—nunquam intellexit quod esset scientia proprie dicta || et est positio T⟨homae⟩ || Ad aliud solve sicut in *Summa*.

[2] Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia sub aliqua ratione speciali [s.a.r.s. *om*. A; *inv*. T]. (sic)—theologiae vero Deus inquantum Deus, ut dictum est. [**A 9$^{ra–vb}$**; G 105ra–106ra; K 2^{rb}–3va; L 265^{vb}–268va; M 2^{rb}–3va; N 40^{vb}–41va; P 2^{rb}–3va; T 3ra–4^{rb}; V 2^{rb}–3va: 5.2 coll.] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 36–42 (**Additiones**) and 58–66] [A: Ad rationes solve sicut in *Scripto* vel in *Summa* || *exp*.: ratio formalis subiectum, ideo etc.]

[W2] Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia. (non)—Rationes solvendae sunt ut in *Summa* vel *Scripto*. [W 3ra–4^{vb}] in *Summa* est.

[3] Utrum subalternetur alicui scientiae. (sic)—finis freni quod est subiectum frenefactivae. [G 106$^{ra–va}$; K 3va–4ra; L 268va–269^{vb}; M 3va–4ra; N 41va–42ra; P 3va–4^{rb}; T 4$^{rb–vb}$; V 3va–4ra: 2.2 coll.] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 67–70]

[W3] Utrum theologiae subalternetur alicui scientiae. (sic)—Ideo non valet, ideo etc. [W 4^{vb}–6^{rb}]

[4] Utrum subalternetur alicui scientiae humanae. (non)—scientia humana dicit propter quid. [G 106va; L 269^{vb}–270ra; K 4$^{ra–b}$; M 4$^{ra–b}$; N 42ra; P 4^{rb}; T 4^{vb}; V 4$^{ra–b}$: 0.5 col.] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 70–71]

[5] [T^{a} quaestio est T] Utrum theologia subalternet sibi alias. (sic)—sine adiutorio subalternantis habet quia. [G 106va–107ra; K 4$^{rb–va}$; L 270ra–271ra; M 4$^{rb–va}$; N 42$^{ra–va}$; P 4$^{rb–vb}$; T 4^{vb}–5^{rb} (*unmarked*); V 4$^{rb–vb}$: 1.8 coll.] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 72–74]

[**A5**] Utrum subalternet sibi alias scientias. (sic)—solutae sunt per praedicta. [**A 10va–11^{rb}**] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 42–48]

[6] Utrum theologia [*om*. N] sit practica vel speculativa. (practica)—licet sit nobilissima quantum ad subiectum. [**A 9^{vb}–10va**; G 107$^{ra–vb}$; K 4va–5va; L 271ra–273^{rb}; M 4va–5va; N 42va–43ra; P 4^{vb}–5^{vb}; V 4^{vb}–5^{vb}: 4.0 coll.] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 74–81]

[T6] Utrum theologia sit practica vel speculativa. Respondeo—quando scien-

tia considerat principium. [T 5^{rb}–6^{vb} (*with note at end*: De prima distinctione quaere in alio quaterno, scilicet de frui et uti etc.)] [ed. Olszewski, pp. 22–32] *mg.*: Godefridus.

[W4] Utrum theologia sit practica vel speculativa. (practica)—nobilior quantum ad subiectum. [W 6^{rb}–8ra] Nota Godefridum in hoc passu.

Correctorium 1: Prima distinctione, quaestione quarta, articulo secundo, dicit quod theologia debet nominari practica vel speculativa a fine viae et non a fine patriae … [150ra] [Cf. W4, a. 3.]

Liber Primus

Distinctio 1 [1] Cuius potentiae sit frui? Videnda sunt duo [quattuor N]: primo quid nomine fruitionis importetur et quot [quod LNP] ad eam requiruntur, et secundo proposita [propositum GLMNP; 3 cuius obiecti, 4 cuius subiecti *add.* N]. Circa primum—sed nullo modo cognitione carentia. [N *adds 22 lines*: Hic nota de uti: quattuor sunt videnda—ab homine in finem ultimum, quare etc.] [**A 11$^{rb–va}$**; G 107^{vb}–108ra; K 5va–6ra; L 273^{rb}–274ra; M 5^{vb}–6ra; N 43$^{ra–va}$; P 5^{vb}–6^{rb}; T 6^{vb}; V 5^{vb}–6ra: 1.7 coll.] [see Jeschke, pp. 363–366, using AV] M 5^{vb} *mg. supra*^{2}: … H. de Lubecke.

[W1] Utrum frui sit actus voluntatis vel intellectus. (intellectus)—sequitur intellectum, scilicet voluntatis etc. [W 8$^{ra–vb}$]

[W2] Utrum uti sit voluntatis. (non)—et hoc est uti simpliciter. [W 8^{vb}–9ra]

Distinctio 2 [1] [Circa 2 distinctionem, nota de attributis A] Utrum pluralitas attributorum sit in Deo. Quattuor sunt hic videnda—attributa autem sunt primae intentionis. [**A 11va–12ra**; G 108$^{ra–va}$; K 6$^{ra–va}$; L 274ra–275ra; M 6$^{ra–va}$; N 43$^{va–b}$; P 6$^{rb–vb}$; V 6$^{ra–va}$: 1.9 coll.] [ed. Olszewski, this volume, from GKV]

[T1] Utrum in Deo sit pluralitas attributorum. Respondeo—nec sic autem rationes attributales. [T 34$^{va–b}$] Vide in primo Thomae || vide in *Scripta* (!) Thomae, 2 d. primi; reproba opiniones sicut Thomae, XIII q. in prima parte, a. 2. Quarto vide in Thoma, 2 d. primi || *mg*: .H.

[W1] Utrum in Deo sit pluralitas attributorum. (non)—nec ratio probat hoc. [W 9ra–10^{vb}] in Thoma in *Summa* sive in *Scripto*.

[2] [Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus vel increatus possit intelligere distinctionem rationis quae est inter attributa, circumscripta omni comparatione Dei ad creaturas. (sic)—nec hoc probat ratio. [**A 12$^{ra–va}$**; G 108va–109^{rb}; K 6va–7^{rb}; L 275^{rb}–277^{rb}; M 6va–7va; N 43^{vb}–44va; P 6^{vb}–7va; V 6va–7va: 3.9 coll.] [ed. Olszewski, this volume, from GKV] M *mg. infra*^{2}: Utrum praeter distinctionem realem et rationis sit dare distinctionem mediam, scilicet intellectionis,* in tertio *Quolibet* H. de Lubecke et in *Quolibet* H. de Gandavo qui fuit huius differentiae inventor primus. || M *mg.*: opinio Henrici || M *mg.*: opinio Godofredi.

Distinctio 3 [TW1] Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas. (non)—magis producit vermen [non valet *add.* W]. [T 34^{vb}–35ra; W 10^{vb}–11^{rb}] T 34^{v} *mg. infra*: *Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas. Dicunt quidam quod non, quia principium demonstrationis oportet supponere quid significatur per nomen, primo Posteriorum* … [cf. q. 3] at least 12 lines, but the last one cut off on bottom edge. To the left is a note: *Haec accepi de quaterno Guillelmi Iacobitae de Bisuntio*. To the right more marginalia, including: *Lectio hic habebit duas quaestiones. Prima utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas. Hic primo. Secundo utrum Deum esse ⟨sit⟩ per se notum. Iuxta hoc sine argumentis* …

[TW2] Utrum Deus esse sit per se notum. Dicendum—omnia haec [alia W] satis patent volenti deducere. [T 35ra; W 11va]

[TW3] Utrum in omnibus creaturis veniatur vestigium Trinitatis. Videnda sunt tria—T: pondus, numerus, et mensura, ergo etc. || W: applica sicut in *Scripto* et *Summa*. [T 35$^{ra–b}$; W 11$^{va–b}$] T 35^{r} *mg. infra*: *In hac quaestione ostenduntur tria, videlicet primo quid est vestigium, satis bene est hic, sed tamen quod dicitur in hoc primo membro exponitur in primo membro Bernardi. Secundo penes quid sumatur, melius Bernardus articulo secundo. Tertio utrum in omni creatura reperiatur, quasi idem Bernardus, sed tamen assignationem Aegidii reprobat, et bene ipsum recita*.

[TW4] Utrum imago Trinitatis reperiatur in homine. Ad evidentiam—T: in diversis organis || W: hominis reperitur imago. [T 35^{rb}; W 11^{vb}–12^{rb}]

[1] Utrum potentiae animae differant ab anima vel sint idem cum essentia animae, ita quod anima sit immediatum principium suarum operationum. (non differant)—in eodem genere per reductionem. [A: Adde ad quaestionem utrum potentiae animae differant ab ipsa anima—principium istarum operationum.] [**A 12$^{va–b}$** (*then blank half col.*); G 109^{rb}–110ra; K 7^{rb}–8ra; L 277^{rb}–279ra; M 7va–8va; N 44va–45ra; P 7va–8va; V 7va–8va: 3.6 coll.] M 7va *mg.*^{2}: De ista quaestione videas in tertio *Quolibet* H. de Lubecke.

[T5] Utrum potentia animae sit idem quod essentia. (sic)—praedicantur et in quod fundantur. [T 35^{rb}–36ra] 35va *mg.*^{2}: Opinio H. *Quolibet*.

[W5] Utrum potentiae animae sint idem quod essentia animae. (sic)—ideo non valuit. [W 12^{rb}–13va]

Correctorium 2: Tertia distinctione, quaestione quinta, articulo tertio, ponit rationem cuiusdam doctoris ad probandum quod potentiae animae differunt ab anima … [150$^{ra–b}$] [Cf. T5 and W5]

[2] [Circa 3 distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum potentiae animae originentur ab anima [ipsa essentia animae A] effective, ita quod ipsa sit causa efficiens [sufficiens et subiectiva A] suarum potentiarum sicut etiam subiectiva [s.e.s. *om.* A]. (sic)—sunt relationes oppositae, quare etc. [**A 13$^{ra–b}$**; G 110$^{ra–b}$;

K 8$^{ra–va}$; L 279$^{ra–vb}$; M 8va–9ra; N 45$^{ra–b}$; P 8$^{va–b}$; T *deest*; V 8$^{va–b}$: 1.5 coll.] [A: Et hoc videtur sensisse frater Thomas || *exp.*: quod est inconveniens, ergo etc.]

[W6] Utrum potentiae originantur ab anima effective. Ad hoc dicunt quidam—subiectum potentiarum, ergo etc. [13va–14ra] Et hoc videtur sentire frater Thomas.

Distinctio 4 [1] Utrum in divinis sit generatio. (non)—quod non est ibi actio. [G 110$^{rb–vb}$; K 8va–9ra; L 279^{vb}–281ra; M 9$^{ra–va}$; N 45$^{rb–vb}$; P 8^{vb}–9^{rb}; V 8^{vb}–9^{vb}: 2.4 coll.] N 45va *mg.*: Durant.

[TW1] Utrum generatio sit in divinis. (non)—originis unius ad alterum [ideo non valet *add.* W]. [T 36$^{ra–b}$; W 14$^{ra–va}$]

Distinctio 5 [1] Utrum ista sit vera: 'essentia generat vel generatur'. (sic)—personae, ideo ratio [*om.* KLP; unde MN] non concludit. [G 110^{vb}–111^{rb}; K 9$^{ra–va}$; L 281ra–282^{rb}; M 9va–10ra; N 45^{vb}–46ra; P 9$^{rb–vb}$; V 9^{vb}–10ra: 2.1 coll.]

[TW1] Utrum essentia generet vel generetur. (sic)—T: sit communis tribus personis || W: sed alium modum essendi. [T 36^{rb}; W 14va–15ra]

Distinctio 6 [T1] Utrum Pater genu⟨er⟩it Filium natura. (non)—Per haec patet solutio ad obiecta. [T 36$^{va–b}$] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.] Finis congrui dupliciter, vel sine quo nullo modo potest haberi finis congruus, ut si vult homo ire ultra mare necesse est eum navigare; vel sine quo non potest bene haberi finis congruus, ut si vult aliquis ire Parisius, necesse est eum equitare || *mg.*: Nec est de intentione Thomae ut ab ipsomet audivit frater Rembertus magister in theologia.

[W1] Utrum Pater genuerit Filium natura. (non)—in Deo respectu creaturarum. [W 15$^{ra–vb}$] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.] Quaedam ex suppositione finis, et hoc dupliciter, scilicet finis simpliciter, ut hominem necesse est comedere si vult vivere; vel finis congrui, sine quo finis non potest haberi congrue, ut si vult ire ultra mare oportet quod naviget.

Distinctio 7 [1] [Circa VII distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum potentia generandi [generativa A] in divinis dicat quid vel ad aliquid, id est, utrum dicat [aliquid *add.* A] absolutum vel relativum [relationem AGKL]. (relativum [relationem AGKLP])—et ideo ratio [i.r.: primo ideo N] non valet. [**A 13$^{rb–vb}$** (*explicit copied below of 13^{vb} after crossed out at top of 7ra, then adds this note*: Circa VIII distinctionem quaeritur utrum esse et essentia sint idem vel non: supra in 6 [*now 7*] folio. Item, utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte); G 111^{rb}–112ra; K 9va–10va; L 282^{rb}–284va; M 10ra–11ra; N 46$^{ra–va}$; P 9^{vb}–10^{vb}; V 10ra–11ra: 3.9 coll.] ut videbitur postea in secundo. [A: ut patet in secundo, quaestione utrum in angelis differat natura et suppositum || sicut dictum fuit in quaestione qua quaerebatur utrum attributa distingui possint in Deo a quocumque intellectu circumscripto respectu ad creaturas || exp.: et primo, ideo non valet.]

[T1] Utrum potentia generandi in divinis dicat quid vel ad aliquid, essentiam vel relationem. (relationem)—alia ratio est soluta. [T 36^{vb}–37ra] *mg.*: Opinio Hen.

[W1] Utrum potentia generandi dicat essentiam vel relationem. (relationem)—primo, ideo non valet. [W 15^{vb}–17^{rb}]

Distinctio 8 [1] Utrum in solo Deo esse et essentia non differant, sed sint idem. (sic *add.* KNP) (differant in creaturis)—sed identitatem, ad id sic. [s.i.a.i.s.: per identitatem, sic ad illud GKLP; per identitatem N] [G 112ra–113^{rb}; K 10va–12ra; L 284va–287^{vb}; M 11^{rb}–12^{vb}; N 46^{vb}–47^{vb}; P 10^{vb}–12va; V 11ra–12va: 6.2 coll.] [ed. Bicz, pp. 134–143, from KP] etiam secundum Thomam || Respondet Aegidius || Dicit enim Aegidius.

[A1] Circa VIII distinctionem quaeritur utrum in solo Deo esse et essentia sint idem. (in creaturis differunt)—ad substantiam sicut denominans ipsam. [**A 7$^{ra–vb}$** (*following crossed out ending of question ending on 13^{vb}; half column blank after*)] secundum Thomam* || Respondet Aegidius.

[T1] Utrum esse et essentia in creaturis differant realiter. (sic)—Ratio in oppositum secundum aliam opinionem est soluta. [T 37^{rb}–38ra] ut declaratum fuit superius in quaestione illa utrum essentia generet.

[W1] Utrum esse et essentia in creaturis differant realiter. (sic)—aliam opinionem. [W 17va–19ra] Solvas prout poteris, vel quaere solutionem in quarto || declaratum est in alia quaestione praecedente.

[TW2] Utrum aeternitas sit in Deo. (non)—nunc fluens quod causat tempus. [T 38$^{ra–b}$; W 19$^{ra–va}$]

[2] Utrum anima rationalis sit tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte eius [corporis *add.* A]. (non)—operationem suam quae est intelligere. [**A 8$^{ra–vb}$** (*mg. infra*: punctum: quere in principio sequentis quaterni, qui incipit "punctum"), **14ra**; G 113^{rb}–114va; K 12ra–13va; L 288ra–291^{rb}; M 12^{vb}–14^{rb}; N 47^{vb}–48^{vb}; P 12va–13^{vb}; V 12va–14ra: 5.2 coll.] [A *exp.*: est ibi frustra ut obiciebatur.]

[TW5] Utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte [corporis *add.* W]. (non)—T: ideo non est ubique frustra || W: intelligit, ideo non valuit. [T 38va–39^{rb}; W 20ra–22ra]

Correctorium 3: Octava distinctione, quaestione quinta, articulo secundo, dicit quod omnis forma educta de potentia materiae est quanta et extensa, saltem per accidens, praeter quam anima intellectiva … [15o$^{rb–va}$] [Cf. TW5]

[3] Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma. [Hic *add.* G; In hac quaestione *add.* P] Dicenda sunt tria—neutra in essentia divina. [G 114$^{va–b}$; K 13va; L 291$^{rb–va}$; M 14$^{rb–va}$; N 48^{vb}; P 13^{vb}–14ra; V *deest*]

[TW4] Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma. Dicenda sunt tria—T: sed neutra in essentia divina || W: nulla in Deo. [T 38$^{rb–va}$; W 19^{vb}–20ra]

[4/T3] Utrum Deus sit compositus. [Hic *add.* G] Dicenda sunt tria—perfectio-

nes omnium generum, ideo [ergo NT] etc. [G 114^{vb}; K 13^{vb}; L 291^{vb}–292ra; M 14$^{va–b}$; N 48^{vb}–49ra; P 14$^{ra–b}$; T 38^{rb}; V *deest*]

[W3] Utrum sit Deus compositus. Tria sunt dicenda—ergo non est compositus. [W 19$^{va–b}$]

Distinctio 9 [TW1] Utrum Filius sit alius a Patre. (non)—dissimilitudinem et inaequalitatem in divinis [i.d. *om.* W]. [T 39$^{rb–va}$; W 22$^{ra–b}$] T: Tertio videndum quae nomina recipiuntur in divinis et quae non: quaere prima parte, XXXI q., a. secundo; perfecte est ibi totum tertium membrum.

[TW2] Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sint tres aeterni. (non)—unus aeternus Deus. Argumenta patent. [T 39va; W 22^{rb}]

[TW3] Utrum Pater sit prior Filio. Dicenda [Videnda W] sunt duo—unum numero habet [u.n.h.: h.u. numerum T] esse cum Patre, ergo etc. [e.e. *om.* W] [T 39$^{va–b}$; W 22$^{rb–va}$]

Distinctio 10 [1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio per modum voluntatis. (sic)—tamen modus non [est *add.* KLP] naturalis. [N *adds much, with exp.*: et aliter de Filio respectu Verbi] [**A 14$^{ra–b}$**; G 114^{vb}–115va; K 13^{vb}–14va; L 292ra–293^{vb}; M 14^{vb}–15va; N 49ra–50^{rb}; P 14^{rb}–15ra; V 14$^{ra–vb}$: 3.0 coll.] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.] Et hoc dixit frater Thomas Parisius in scolis publice, dicens quod non intelligebat Filium procedere a Patre per actum intellectus, sicut audivit magister Raymbertus [Rambertus G; Albertus M; Tambertus N] ab eo. Unde dicit Thomas in *Scripto* quod Pater genuit Filium natura. [A: Contra, sicut in alio quaterno. Respondeo. Ad quaestionem istam sunt duo articuli, et in primo sunt duae suppositiones. Et nota quod ista quaestio est eadem cum illa quae quaeritur supra, VI distinctione, utrum Filius procedat per modum naturae || Et verum est quod Thomas dicit || Modo addo ad dictum Thomae quod || Unde dicit magister Raymbertus Bononiensis Parisius in scolis suis quod audivit a fratre Thoma quod intentio eius non erat Filium procedere per actum intellectus, ita quod Pater intelligendo se formaret Verbum, circumscripto omni per intellectum quod non haberet attributum quod est esse intellectum, adhuc posset in quantum natura communicaret essentiam suam Filio et communicaret et eodem modo de Spiritui Sancto. Unde dicit Thomas in *Scripto* quod Pater genuit Filium natura. Et adde illud de Hugone quod est in alio quaterno in fine quartae rationis. || Nec umquam dixit Thomas quod Filius procedat per actum intellectus, sed per modum intellectus || *exp.*: Vide articulum hunc in alio quaterno; rationes solve sicut ibi.] [N *additional section*: Et ideo ponit Thomas in *Scripto*, VI distinctione || Unde Petrus dicit, VI distinctione.]

[T1] Circa X distinctionem quaeritur utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat per modum naturae vel per modum voluntatis. (non naturae)—genitus alicuius eorum proprie. [T 39^{vb}–40^{rb}]

[W1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque procedat per modum voluntatis vel naturae. (non per modum naturae)—ad productionem Filii. [W 22va–23va] Unde Thomas in *Scripto* dicit quod Pater genuit Filium natura.

[T2] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus sit proprium nomen personae in divinis. Quadruplex ratio assignatur—bonitas sibi appropriatur. [T 40^{rb}] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.]

[W2] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus sit nomen personae in divinis. (sic)—bonitas sibi applicatur. [W 23va] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.]

[N2] Utrum per processionem Spiritus Sancti temporalem in mentem, scilicet per donum gratiae, mens elevetur supra mundum, ita quod verius sit in caelo quam ubi animat. (sic)—et in eodem modo et a materia. [N 50^{rb}]

Distinctio 11 [1] [Circa distinctionem XI quaeritur A] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio dato quod non procederet ab eo. (sic)—inspirabilitas nisi quia spirat. [**A 14va–15^{rb}**; G 115va–116va; K 14va–15^{vb}; L 293^{vb}–296ra; M 15va–16^{vb}; N 50va–51^{rb}; P 15ra–16ra; V 14^{vb}–15^{vb}: 4.5 coll.] [ed. Hödl, pp. 205–214, from ALTV; ed. Schabel, forthcoming.] V 15va *mg*.: Godo. || G *mg*.: Contra Erveus [A *exp*.: esse et distingui verum est.]

[TW1] [Circa XI distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab eo. (sic)—inspirabilitas nisi quia spirat. [T 40^{rb}–41ra; W 23va–24^{vb}] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.]

[T2] Utrum Pater et Filius sint duo spiratores. Respondeo. Illa quae important actus in divinis sive verba quae participia sive nomina verbalia plurificantur in divinis per plurificationem suppositorum, quia actus sunt suppositorum, ideo Pater et Filius sunt duo spiratores. [T 41ra] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.]

[W2] Utrum Pater et Filius possint dici duo spiratores. Dicendum—sic sunt unum. [W 24^{vb}] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.]

Distinctio 12 [T1] Circa XII distinctionem quaeritur utrum generatio sit prius in divinis quam processio. (sic)—ideo est ibi realiter prius et posterius. [T 41$^{ra–va}$] [Ed Schabel, forthcoming.]

[W1] Utrum generatio in divinis sit prior quam processione. (sic)—perfecta Trinitatis. [24^{vb}–25va] [Ed Schabel, forthcoming.]

[T2] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus per prius et perfectius procedat a Patre quam a Filio. (sic)—secunda ratio est soluta. [T 41$^{va–b}$] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.]

[W2] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus prius procedat et perfectius a Filio quam a Patre. (a Patre)—ratio soluta est. [25$^{va–b}$] [Ed. Schabel, forthcoming.]

Distinctio 13 [1] [Circa XIII distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum sint plures processiones in divinis. (non)—a duobus, ut supra dictum est. [**A 15$^{rb–va}$**; G 116va–117ra; K 15^{vb}–16va; L 296ra–297va; M 16^{vb}–17va; N 51$^{rb–vb}$; P 16$^{ra–vb}$; V 15^{vb}–16va: 2.9 coll.] [A *exp*.: imaginamur Patrem quam generet.]

[TW1] [Circa XIII distinctionem quaeritur T] utrum sint plures processiones in divinis. (non)—procederet, ut superius est visum [s.e.v.: v.e. supra W]. [T 41^{vb}–42^{rb}; W 25^{vb}–27ra]

Correctorium 4: Tertiadecima distinctione, quaestione prima, articulo tertio, ⟨dicit⟩ quod generare et generari et spirare realiter distinguuntur … [150va–151^{rb}]

[TW2] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus possit dici ingenitus. (sic)—T: Ad argumenta patet solutio || W: Argumenta patent. [T 42^{rb}; W 27ra]

Distinctio 14 [1] [Circa XIIII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat temporaliter. (non)—Ad secundum patet per dicta. [G 117$^{ra–va}$; K 16$^{va–b}$; L 297va–298^{rb}; M 17va–18ra; N 51^{vb}–52ra; P 16^{vb}–17^{rb}; T 42$^{rb–vb}$; V 16va–17ra: 3.1 coll.]

[W1] Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat temporaliter. (non)—novum effectum producere. [27$^{ra–vb}$]

Distinctio 15 [1] [Circa XV distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum in divinis sit missio [m.s.i.d. A]. (non)—a mittente et hoc conceditur. [**A 15$^{va–b}$**; G 117$^{va–b}$; K 16^{vb}–17^{rb}; L 298^{rb}–299ra; M 18$^{ra–va}$; N 52$^{ra–b}$; P 17$^{rb–va}$; V 17$^{ra–b}$: 1.4] [A *exp.*: et ista est in divinis, non alia.]

[T1] Circa XV distinctionem quaeritur utrum missio significet essentiam vel notionem. Videtur \quod/ Beda—Argumenta procedunt suis viis. [T 42^{vb}–43ra]

[W1] Utrum Spiritus Sancti missio significet essentiam vel notionem. (notionem)—fit datio. Argumenta patent. [W 27^{vb}–28ra]

Correctorium 5: Quintadecima distinctione, quaestione de missione, articulo tertio, primo ponit rationem Thomae probantem quod persona divina se ipsam mittere potest … [H 151$^{rb–vb}$]

Distinctio 16 [1] Utrum missio visibilis conveniat Spiritui Sancto. (non)—plenitudo temporis gratiae [et Spiritus Sancti *add.* GKP]. [G 117^{vb}–118ra; K 17$^{rb–va}$; L 299$^{ra–vb}$; M 18va–19ra; N 52$^{rb–va}$; P 17va–18ra; V 17$^{rb–va}$: 1.2 coll.]

[TW1] Circa XVI distinctionem quaeritur utrum missio visibilis conveniat Spiritui Sancto. (non)—aliquo signo visibili. Ad aliud patet. [T 43$^{ra–va}$; W 28$^{ra–va}$]

Distinctio 17 [T1] Circa XVII distinctionem quaeritur utrum ad eliciendum actum dilectionis meritorium requiratur in voluntate habitus qui est caritas. (non)—lumen gloriae vel diligendo ut caritas. [T 43va–44ra]

[W1] Utrum ad actum meritorium dilectionis requiratur caritas in voluntate. (non)—lumen gloriae vel diligendo ut caritas. [W 28va–29ra]

[1] [Circa XVII distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum caritas possit augeri. (non)—prima quae est abiectio formae. [**A 15^{vb}–16ra**; G 118$^{ra–vb}$; K 17va–18^{rb}; L 299^{vb}–301va; M 19$^{ra–vb}$; N 52va–53ra; P 18$^{ra–vb}$; V 17va–18^{rb}: 2.9 coll.] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming] [A: Et haec videtur fuisse intentio Thomae, ut quidam

dicunt, quod probant per textum litterae eius in secunda secundae, q. 24, a. 4, quo quaeritur utrum caritas augeatur, in solutione ultimi argumenti, dicit sic: Quidam dixerunt caritatem augeri per suam essentiam … || exp.: Ad argumenta solve sicut in alio quaterno.]

[T2] Utrum caritas possit augeri. (non)—prima quae est abiectio formae sive contrarii. [T 44$^{ra–vb}$] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming]

[W2] Utrum caritas possit augeri. (non)—dignus sit vel odio. [W 29ra–30va] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming] Nam dicit in secunda secundae, q. 24, a. 4, utrum caritas augetur, dicit in solutione ultimi argumenti quod quidam dixerunt || Et hoc concedit frater Thomas et omnes doctores.

Correctorium 6: Decima septima distinctione, articulo secundo, recitat opinionem Thomae de augmento formarum … [151^{vb}–152^{rb}] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming] [Cf. 1 and W2]

[2] [Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem. (sic)—aliquam modo [*om.* GLMP] contrarietatem ad primam. [**A 16$^{rb–va}$**; G 118^{vb}–119va; K 18^{rb}–19^{rb}; L 301va–303^{rb}; M 19^{vb}–20^{vb}; N 53$^{ra–va}$; P 18^{vb}–19^{vb}; V 18^{rb}–19ra: 3.2 coll.] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming] [A *exp.*: Ad rationes quaestionis. (*then short blank space*)]

[TW3] Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem. (sic)—aliquo modo contrarietatem. [T 44^{vb}–45va; W 30^{vb}–31^{vb}] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming]

Correctorium 7: Eadem distinctione, quaestione quarta (!), articulo tertio, ponit opinionem quandam de augmento caritatis quantum ad modum et illam finaliter tenet … [152$^{rb–vb}$] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming]

[NTW4] Utrum caritas possit augeri in infinitum. (non)—NT: posset facere maiorem vel infinitam || W: posset infinita facere. [N 53va–54ra; T 45^{vb}–46^{rb}; W 31^{vb}–32^{rb}] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming]

[NTW5] Utrum caritas possit minui. (sic)—ei malum [e.m.: malis W] paenae temporalis. [N 54$^{ra–va}$; T 46^{rb}–47ra; W 32^{rb}–33^{rb}] [ed. Céleyrette–Solère, forthcoming]

[3] [Quaeritur sine argumentis A] Utrum habens caritatem possit scire se habere caritatem. Omnes dicunt quod non … verum est, et sic ad illud. [A: Utrum aliquis possit scire se habere caritatem. (non)—se habere caritatem sciret.] [**A 16$^{ra–b}$**; G 119va; K 19^{rb}; L 303va; M 20^{vb}–21ra; N 54va; P 19^{vb}; V 19$^{ra–b}$: 0.5 col.] Hoc idem dicit Thomas.

Distinctio 18 [TW1] [Circa XVIII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum donum sit proprium Spiritui Sancto. (non)—potest dici donata, ut dictum est [u.d.e *om.* W]. [T 47$^{ra–b}$; W 33$^{rb–va}$]

Distinctio 19 [1] Utrum aequalitas sit in divinis. (non)—vel absoluta sicut in creaturis. [G 119va–120ra; K 19$^{rb–vb}$; L 303va–304va; M 21$^{ra–va}$; N 54$^{va–b}$; P 19^{vb}–20^{rb}; V 19$^{rb–vb}$: 1.8 coll.]

[TW1] [Circa XIX distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum aequalitas sit in divinis. (non)—unum non excedit alterum. [T 47$^{rb–va}$; W 33$^{va–b}$]

[2] [Circa XIX distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum nunc aeternitatis differat ab aeternitate realiter. (sic)—sed solum secundum modum [s.s.m.: in modo A] essendi. [**A 16^{vb}–17ra**; G 120$^{ra–vb}$; K 19^{vb}–20va; L 304va–306^{rb}; M 21va–22^{rb}; N 54^{vb}–55va; P 20^{rb}–21ra; V 19^{vb}–20va: 3.0 coll.]

[T2] Utrum nunc aeternitatis, aevi, et temporis differant realiter. Videtur quod saltem nunc aevi et temporis non differant realiter—mensuratur per nunc aevi. [T 47va–48ra] ut visum est 8 distinctione quaestione utrum in Deo sit aeternitas, 2 a.

[W2] Utrum nunc aeternitatis et aevi et temporis differant realiter. Videtur quod nunc aevi et nunc temporis non differant—arguit ea differre. [W 33^{vb}–34^{vb}]

Correctorium 8: Decima nona distinctione, quaestione de nunc aeternitatis, dicit iste quod nunc temporis est idem essentialiter cum tempore … [153$^{ra–vb}$]

Distinctio 20 [1] [Circa XX distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum Filius sit omnipotens. (non)—non desit relatio paternitatis [ut visum est supra *add.* GK]. [**A 17$^{ra–va}$**; G 120^{vb}–121^{rb}; K 20va–21^{rb}; L 306^{rb}–307va; M 22^{rb}–23ra; N 55$^{va–b}$; P 21$^{ra–vb}$; V 20va–21ra: 2.2 coll.] [A *exp.*: Et vide totum residuum quaestionis in alio quaterno.]

[TW1] Circa XX distinctionem quaeritur utrum Filius sit omnipotens. (non)—T: Ad argumenta patet solutio || W: Argumenta sunt soluta. [T 48$^{ra–va}$; W 34^{vb}–35^{vb}]

Distinctio 21 [1] Utrum haec sit vera: 'solus Pater est Deus'. (sic)—a Patre ut visum est. [G 121$^{rb–va}$; K 21$^{rb–va}$; L 307va–308va; M 23$^{ra–va}$; N 55^{vb}–56ra; P 21^{vb}–22^{rb}; V 21$^{ra–b}$: 1.5 coll.]

[TW1] [Circa XXI distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum haec sit vera: 'solus Pater est Deus'. (sic)—T: unum relativum est de intellectu alterius. || W: ad modum significandi, ut dictum est. [T 48va–49ra; W 35^{vb}–37ra]

Distinctio 22 [1] [Circa distinctionem 22 quaeritur A] Utrum aliquod nomen dicatur proprie in divinis. (non)—bene dicitur de Deo. [A: Utrum aliquod nomen proprie dicitur de divinis vel de Deo (non)—Ad alia sicut in alio quaterno.] [**A 17$^{va–b}$**; G 121va–122ra; K 21va–22ra; L 308va–309va; M 23va–24ra; N 56$^{ra–va}$; P. 22$^{rb–vb}$; V 21$^{rb–vb}$: 1.9 coll.]

[T1] Circa XXII distinctionem quaeritur utrum aliquod nomen dicatur proprie de Deo. (non)—ad modum significandi, ut dictum est. [T 49$^{ra–va}$]

Distinctio 23 [1] [Circa distinctionem 24 quaeritur A] Utrum persona significet substantiam [essentiam A] vel relationem. (relationem)—quae provenit ex penuria nominum. [**A 17^{vb}**; G 122$^{ra–va}$; K 22$^{ra–va}$; L 309va–310va; M 24$^{ra–va}$;

N 56$^{va–b}$; P 22^{vb}–23^{rb}; V 21^{vb}–22^{rb}: 1.7 coll.] Si autem inveniatur Thomam dixisse [A *exp.*: quae sit ex penuria nominum.]

[T1] Circa XXIII distinctionem quaeritur utrum persona significet essentiam vel relationem. (non essentiam sive substantiam)—Ad argumenta patet solutio per dicta. [T 49va–50ra]

[W1] Utrum persona significet essentiam vel relationem. Dicit Boethius—propter penuriam nominum. [37$^{ra–vb}$] Si inveniatur Thomas dicere.

Correctorium 9: Vicesima tertia distinctione, quaestione de significatione personae, articulo secundo, dicit quod persona solam substantiam significat … [153^{vb}–155^{rb} (154 *deest*)]

Distinctio 24 [1] [Circa distinction XX4 quaeritur A] Utrum termini numerales ponant aliquid in divinis. (sic)—ponat ibi numerum formaliter. [**A 18$^{ra–va}$**; G 122va–123^{rb}; K 22va–23va; L 310va–312^{vb}; M 24va–25va; N 56^{vb}–57va; P 23^{rb}–24ra; V 22^{rb}–23^{rb}: 3.7 coll.] [ed. Köhler, pp. 503–514 (**Additiones**, also using W)] N 57ra *mg.* (at "Ideo secunda opinio"): Io. Parisius [A *exp.*: formaliter ponant aliquid in divinis.]

[T1] Circa XXIIII distinctionem quaeritur utrum termini numerales in divinis aliquid ponant secundum unum, multa, et talia. (unitas aliquid ponat)—materialiter sumuntur, et hoc sufficit. [T 50$^{ra–vb}$] [ed. Köhler, pp. 497–503, also using W]

[W1] Utrum termini numerales aliquid ponant in divinis sicut unum et multa. (sic)—aliquid ponant in divinis. [W 37^{vb}–39ra]

Distinctio 25 [T1] Circa XXV distinctionem quaeritur utrum nomen personae sit nomen primae vel secundae intentionis. (secundae)—individuum autem ad intentionem secundam pertinet. [T 50^{vb}–51^{rb}]

[W1] Utrum persona[e] sit nomen primae impositionis vel secundae. (secundae)—ad secundam intentionem. [W 39$^{ra–vb}$]

Distinctio 26 [1] [Circa 26 distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum, abstractis per intellectum proprietatibus relativis, remaneant hypostases distinctae in divinis [i.d. *om.* MV]. (sic)—intelligimus personam sine relatione. [A: Utrum abstractis sive circumscriptis per intellectum proprietatibus relativis distinguantur hypostases in divinis (sic)—intelligendo rationem bonitatis etc.] [**A 18$^{va–b}$**; G 123^{rb}–124ra; K 23va–24^{vb}; L 312^{vb}–314^{vb}; M 25va–26^{vb}; N 57va–58ra; P 24^{rb}–25^{rb}; V 23^{rb}–24ra: 3.7 coll.] Vult ergo Thomas dicere || Primo, quia in *Scripto*.

[T1] Circa XXVI distinctionem quaeritur utrum, abstractis vel circumscriptis per intellectum proprietatibus relativis, distinguantur hypostases in divinis. (sic)—non intelligitur persona sine relatione. [T 51^{rb}–52ra] vide prima parte, q. XL, a. 3. || 51^{rb} *mg. infra*: utrum relatio faciat compositionem cum suo fundamento. Hic habet locum. Quaere post, folio quarto, ad hoc signum §. [*See NTW2 just below*]

[W1] Utrum, circumscriptis per intellectum proprietatibus relativis, distinguantur hypostases in divinis. (sic)—propter nostrum modum intelligendi. [W 39^{vb}–41ra]

[2] [Quaeritur T] De numero relationum, notionum [notionalium (a.c. G) GKP, *a.c.* G; *inv.* TV (notionum s.l. V)], etc. Respondeo. [Dicendum quod T]. In divinis sunt—in cognitionem personae [*om.* LM] patris. [G 124$^{ra–b}$; K 24^{vb}; L 314^{vb}–315ra; M 26$^{va–b}$; N 58ra; P 25^{rb}; T 52$^{ra–b}$; V 24^{rb} (0.6 col., *with a marginal note at end partially cut off:* Hic bene cadit illa quaestio econ … utrum relatio faciat compositionem … suo fundamento, quam habes …)]

[W2] De numero notionum, relationum, etc. quaeritur. Dicendum quod in divinis—in cognitionem eius. [W 41$^{ra–b}$]

[NTW3] \§/ Quaeritur de quodam omissio circa XXVI distinctionem, utrum relatio faciat compositionem cum suo fundamento. (sic)—cum fundamento, ut dictum est. [N 58$^{ra–va}$; T 54va–55^{rb}; W 43^{rb}–44^{rb}] [*Placed here as in N and following the instructions above in T1, although in TW the question is in d. 28*]

Distinctio 27 [1] [Circa distinctionem 27 quaeritur A] Utrum quattuor relationes in divinis [i.d. *om.* A] sint quattuor res. (non)—habere relationem non est habere [*om.* A; *inv.* N] rem [*om.* A] in sed ad. [**A 18^{vb}–19^{rb}** (*plus marginalia*); G 124$^{rb–vb}$; K 24^{vb}–25va; L 315ra–316^{rb}; M 26^{vb}–27va; N 58va–59ra; P 25$^{rb–vb}$, 31ra (*misbound*); V 24$^{rb–vb}$: 2.2 coll.]

[T1] Circa XXVII distinctionem quaeritur utrum quattuor relationes sint quattuor res. (non)—numerum terminorum, ut dictum est. [T 52$^{rb–vb}$]

[W1] Utrum quattuor relationes sint quattuor res. (non)—non ponit in, sed ad. [W 41^{rb}–42^{rb}]

Correctorium 10: Vicesima septima distinctione, quaestione prima, recitat rationem Thomae per quam probatur quod quattuor relationes in divinis non sunt quattuor res, sed tantum tres … [155^{rb}–156ra]

[2] [Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur A] AGKLN: Utrum relatio praecedat actum notionalem, scilicet utrum (*om.* A) paternitas praecedat (*om.* AN) ipsum generare. || MV: Utrum relatio ut paternitas praecedat actum notionalem, scilicet ipsum generare. || P: Utrum paternitas procedat (!) ipsum generare. Respondeo. Ad evidentiam [quaestionem A]—producentis non ut relatio, et hoc est verum. [**A 19$^{rb–va}$**; G 124^{vb}–125^{rb}; K 25va–26^{rb}; L 316va–317^{vb}; M 27va–28^{rb}; N 59$^{ra–b}$; P 31$^{ra–vb}$; V 24^{vb}–25va: 2.7 coll.] [A *exp.*: in quantum significatur nomine actionis.]

[T2] Quaeritur utrum relatio producentis in quantum talis relatio praecedat productionem, ut utrum paternitas praecedat generare. Respondeo. Ad evidentiam—producentis non ut relatio, et hoc verum est. [T 52^{vb}–53^{rb}]

[W2] Utrum relatio praecedat actum notionalem, puta paternitas generare. Respondeo—et hoc est verum. [W 42^{rb}–43^{rb}]

[W3] Utrum actus notionales praecedat proprietates personales, et hoc est quaerere utrum Pater sit Pater \quia/ generat vel e converso utrum quia generat sit Pater. (Pater ⟨quia⟩ generat)—non supposita generari. [W 44$^{rb–vb}$]

[3] [Quaestio est A] Utrum Verbum teneatur vel dicatur [*inv.* G] [in divinis *add.* GNP] essentialiter vel personaliter. (essentialiter)—solum in divinus, ut probat ratio in oppositum. [A: Utrum Verbum teneatur in divinis essentialiter vel personaliter. (essentialiter)—vide in alio quaterno; totum aliud in quaterno.] [**A 19va–20ra**; G 125$^{rb–vb}$; K 26^{rb}–27ra; L 317^{vb}–319^{rb}; M 28^{rb}–29ra; N 59$^{rb–vb}$; P 31^{vb}–32va; V 25va–26^{rb}: 2.8 coll.] sic dicimus quod baiolus facit verbum regni.

[T3] Quaeritur utrum Verbum in divinis dicatur essentialiter vel personaliter. (essentialiter)—solum in divinis, ut probat ratio in oppositum. [T 53^{rb}–54ra] ut dicimus quod ballivus facit verbum regis.

Correctorium 11: Eadem distinctione, quaestione tertia, articulo secundo, tenet opinionem quae dicit quod Verbum non est aliquid formaliter per [156^{rb}] intellectum differens ab actu intelligendi … [156$^{ra–vb}$] [Cf. 3 and T3?]

[W5] Utrum Verbum sit in divinis. (non)—nisi intelligendo se etc. [W 44^{vb}–45va]

[W6] Utrum Verbum importet respectum ad creaturas. (non)—creaturam repraesentandam. [W 45va–46^{rb}]

[W7] Utrum innascibilitas constituat personam Patris. (sic)—dignior et qui est positiva. [W 46$^{rb–vb}$]

[4] Utrum res verius sint [sit KP] in Deo quam in se ipsis [*om.* GP]. (in se ipsis)—sequitur modum essendi formalem, non causalem. [G 125^{vb}–126ra; K 27$^{ra–va}$; L 319$^{rb–vb}$; M 29$^{ra–b}$; N 59^{vb}–60ra; P 32$^{va–b}$; V 26$^{rb–va}$: 1.2 coll.]

[T4] Quaeritur utrum \res/ verius sint in Deo quam in se ipsis. (in se ipsis)—formalem non causalem, ideo non valet. [T 54$^{ra–va}$]

Distinctio 28 [T1] Circa XXVIII distinctionem quaeritur utrum imago dicatur essentialiter in divinis vel personaliter. (essentialiter)—species ad relationem pertinet. [T 55$^{rb–va}$]

[W1] Utrum in divinis sit imago essentialiter vel personaliter. (essentialiter)—tale ad relationem pertinet. [W 46^{vb}–47ra]

Distinctio 29 [T1] [Circa XXIX distinctionem T] Utrum nomen principii dicatur univoce in divinis et in creaturis. (sic)—analoga sicut et nomen principii. [N 61$^{rb–va}$; T 55$^{va–b}$]

[W1] Utrum nomem principii dicatur de Deo et de creaturis. (sic)—sicut principium, ideo non valet. [W 47$^{ra–vb}$]

Distinctio 30 [1] [Circa XXX (29 A) distinctionem quaeritur AT] Utrum ista quae dicuntur de [*om.* T] Deo ex tempore ponant in Deo aliquam relationem realem. (sic)—sic nec caelum sine generabilibus et corruptibilibus. [T *exp.*:

illa sunt ad invicem (*then blank space 3/4 column; the last 3/4 of column added in different hand; note mg. infra* 57ra: In alio quaterno est istud)] [A: Utrum relationes temporales sint in Deo realiter ut esse Dominum, esse creatorem (sic)—Tertium est videre utrum relationes temporales sint in Deo realiter: totum residuum in alio quaterno.] [G 126ra–127ra; K 27va–29ra; L 319^{vb}–322^{rb}; M 29^{rb}–30^{vb}; N 60$^{ra–vb}$; **A 20$^{ra–b}$** (then blank space); P 32^{vb}–34ra; T 55^{vb}–57^{rb}; V 26^{vb}–27^{vb}: 4.5 coll.]

[W1] Utrum relationes quae conveniunt Deo ex tempore sint reales. (sic)—sine generabilibus et corruptibilibus. [W 47^{vb}–49ra]

Distinctio 31 [1] Utrum in divinis aequalitas sit relatio realis, et idem intelligatur de similitudine. (sic)—essentiam ut eandem non tamen sunt relationes reales. [G 127$^{ra–va}$; K 29$^{ra–vb}$; L 322^{rb}–323^{rb}; M 30^{vb}–31^{rb}; N 60^{vb}–61^{rb}; P 34$^{ra–vb}$; T *deest*; V 27^{vb}–28^{rb}: 3.2 coll.]

[W1] Utrum aequalitas in divinis sit relatio realis. (sic)—appropriatur bonitas. [W 49ra–50ra]

Distinctio 32 [1] [Circa 32 distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto. (non)—appropriatur alicui personae, [*om.* N] ideo non est simile. [**A 20$^{va–b}$**; G 127$^{va–b}$; K 29^{vb}–30^{rb}; L 323^{rb}–324^{rb}; M 31$^{rb–vb}$; N 61$^{va–b}$; P 34^{vb}–35^{rb}; T *deest*; V 28$^{rb–va}$: 1.6 coll.]

[W1] Utrum Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto. (non)—sed solum effective. [50$^{ra–va}$] Ideo Guillelmus Altissiodorensis in *Summa* sua.

Correctorium 12: Tricesima secunda distinctione, quaestione qua quaeritur *utrum Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto* … [156^{vb}–157^{rb}]

Distinctio 33 [1] [Circa XXXIII distinctionem (*inv.* A) quaeritur AT] Utrum proprietas in divinis vel relatio realis [in divinis *hic* N] sit idem quod essentia realis (!) [realiter GLN] [A: Utrum proprietas sive relatio realis sit idem quod essentia || T: Utrum proprietas vel relatio realis in divinis sit idem quod essentia vel differat realiter. (differunt re)]. (non)—in his quae differunt; eodem modo dicendum est de secundo [d.e.d.s: ad secundum NT].[2)] [**A 20^{vb}–21^{rb}**; G 127^{vb}–128^{vb}; K 30^{rb}–31va; L 324^{rb}–326^{rb}; M 31^{vb}–32^{vb}; N 61^{vb}–62^{rb}; P 35$^{rb–vb}$, 26$^{ra–b}$ (misbound); T 57va–58ra; V 28va–29va: 4.2 coll.] [A *exp.*: totum residuum sicut in alio quaterno]

[W1] Utrum proprietas relativa sit idem quod essentia divina. (non)—secundum modum significandi. [W 50va–51^{vb}]

[W2] Utrum proprietas et essentia sint idem. (non)—sequitur opinari contrarie. [W 51^{vb}]

Distinctio 34 [T1]: Circa XXXIIII distinctionem quaeritur utrum in divinis recipiantur istae: 'Tres personae unius essentiae', vel similes propositiones. (non)—cum expressione unitatis. [T 58$^{ra–b}$]

[W1] Utrum illa sit vera: 'Tres personae unius essentiae sunt confiteres'. (non)—reddendi locutionem congruam. [W 51^{vb}–52ra]

[TW2] Quaeritur utrum aliqua dicantur translative [transubstantive W] de Deo. (non)—imitationis. Ad secundum solutum est. [T 58$^{rb–va}$; W 52^{rb}]

Distinctio 35 [1] [Circa XXXV distinctionem (*inv.* A) quaeritur AT] Utrum scientia dicatur univoce de scientia Dei et creaturarum [scientia nostra A]. (sic)—magis perfectam scientiam quam creatura, ideo non valet. [G 128^{vb}–129ra; K 31va–32ra; L 326^{rb}–327^{rb}; M 32^{vb}–33va; N 62$^{rb–vb}$; **A 21^{rb}**; P 26$^{rb–vb}$; T 58va–59ra; V 29^{vb}–30^{rb}: 2.1 coll.] [A *exp.*: sicut patet in alio quaterno, ubi est totum residdum quaestionis.]

[W1] Utrum scientia univoce dicatur de scientia Dei et creaturae. (sic)—a scientia nostra. [W 52^{rb}–53^{rb}] secundum Thomam.

[2] [Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur A; Quaeritur T] Utrum Deus habeat distinctam et perfectam [d.e.p.: certam et distinctam A; distinctam et certam T] cognitionem de aliis a se [et certam *add.* N]. (non)—producere bene ducit in cognitionem effectus. [**A 21$^{rb–va}$**; G 129$^{ra–va}$; K 32$^{ra–vb}$; L 327va–328va; M 33va–34ra; N 62^{vb}–63ra; P 26^{vb}–27^{rb}; T 59$^{ra–va}$; V 30$^{rb–vb}$: 2.0 coll.] [A: ut dicebatur 2 d. quaestione qua quaerebatur utrum circumscripto respectu ad creaturas esset distinctio attributorum in Deo || exp.: per essentiam suam cognoscuntur a Deo.]

[W2] Utrum Deus habeat distinctam cognitionem rerum. (non)—talis est Dominus etc. [W 53^{rb}–54^{rb}]

Distinctio 36 [1] [Circa XXXVI distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum in Deo sint aliquae ideae. (non)—ut est id in quo alia cognoscuntur. [G 129va–130ra; K 32^{vb}–33^{rb}; L 328va–329va; M 34$^{ra–va}$; N 63$^{ra–b}$; P 27va–28ra; T 59^{vb}–60ra; V 30^{vb}–31ra: 1.9 coll.]

[2] Utrum pluralitas idearum sit in Deo. (non)—sunt plures secundum rationem, ut visum est. [G 130$^{ra–b}$; K 33$^{rb–vb}$; L 329va–330^{rb}; M 34$^{va–b}$; N 63$^{rb–va}$; P 28$^{ra–b}$; T 60$^{ra–va}$; V 31$^{ra–va}$: 1.3 coll.]

[W2] Utrum plures ideae sint in Deo. (non)—ex parte Dei per rationem autem. [W 54$^{ra–vb}$]

Distinctio 37 [1] [Circa XXXVII distinctionem (*inv.* A) quaeritur AT] Utrum angelus sit in loco [*Utrum angelus habeat esse in loco* A]. (non)—in conclusione [corpore T] quaestionis, opinione quarta, quae verior creditur [q.v.c. *om.* T]. [**A 21va–22^{vb}**; G 130^{rb}–131^{rb}; K 33^{vb}–35va; L 330^{rb}–333ra; M 34^{vb}–36^{rb}; N 63$^{va–b}$ (*cessat*); P 28^{rb}–29^{vb}; T 60va–61^{vb}; V 31va–32^{vb}: 5.3 coll.] Item, archiepiscopus (!) Parisiensis dicit sic [*no. 204*]: qui dicit angelum esse in loco non nisi per operationem error est (T: Item, probant per articulum dicentem: qui dicit angelum esse in loco non nisi per operationem, error est) || Articulus etiam non cogit, quia unus alius articulus oppositus primo dicit quod dicere angelum in loco et non per operationem error est, et sic annihilatur prima opinio (T: Articulus etiam non cogit, quia est articulus alius huic oppositus

qui dicit quod dicere angelum esse in loco et non per operationem error est) [A exp.: sed obiective tantum, ut visum est.]

Correctorium 13: Tricesima septima distinctione, quaestione de loco angeli, articulo secundo … [157$^{rb–va}$]

Distinctio 38 [1] [Circa distinctionem 38 quaeritur AT] Utrum omnia de necessitate eveniant. [vel titulus quaestionis utrum Deus habeat scientiam de futuris contingentibus *add.* A] [Utrum Deus habeat scientiam de futuris contingentibus T] (sic)—non tamen necessitate absoluta, sed conditionata, ut patet [u.p. *om.* T]. [G 131^{rb}–132^{rb}; K 35va–36^{vb}; L 333ra–335va; M 36va–37va; V 32^{vb}–34ra; **A 23$^{ra–va}$**; P 29^{vb}–30^{vb}, 36ra (*misbound*); T 61^{vb}–63ra; V 32^{vb}–34ra: 4.6 coll.] [ed Schabel, "Dominican Anti-Thomism", pp. 52–68] Sed non videtur quod haec fuerit eius intentio, sicut habetur in *Summa contra gentiles*, libro primo, capitulo 66 (A: Et ideo qui tenent opinionem contrariam glosant quod voluit Thomas dicere … Sed utrum fuerit haec intentio sua, non videntur sonare verba sua). [A: Unde dicit Frater Thomas || exp.: Deducas articulum sicut in alio quaterno]

Correctorium 14: Tricesima octava distinctione, quaestione de cognitione futurorum contingentium, articulo secundo … [157va–158^{rb}] [ed. Schabel, "Dominican Anti-Thomism", pp. 69–72]

Distinctio 39 [1] [Circa distinctione 39 quaeritur AT] Utrum Deus sciat infinita. (non)—per consequens sciri modo supradicto [quo supra T]. [**A 23$^{va–b}$**; G 132$^{rb–va}$; K 36^{vb}–37^{rb}; L 335^{vb}–336va; M 37va–38ra; P 36$^{ra–b}$; T 63$^{ra–va}$; V 34$^{ra–b}$: 1.7 coll.] [A: Ideo credo quod Thomas || *exp.*: Totum residuum sicut in alio quaterno.]

Correctorium 15: Tricesima nona distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum Deus sciat infinita* … [158$^{rb–va}$]

[2] [Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur AT] Utrum Deus habeat providentiam de omnibus. (non)—elicere sicut Deus facit [facere potest et facti G; *inv.* T]. [**A 23^{vb}–24ra**; G 132$^{va–b}$; K 37$^{rb–vb}$; L 336va–337^{rb}; M 38$^{ra–va}$; P 36$^{rb–vb}$; T 63$^{va–b}$; V 34$^{rb–vb}$: 1.3 coll.] [A: *exp.*: Totum residuum habes in alio quaterno.] [L *exp.*: est ille de omnibus qui omnes creavit. (*additional paragraph*)]

Distinctio 40 [1] [Circa distinctionem XL (*inv.* A) quaeritur AT] Utrum praedestinatio ponat aliquid in praedestinato. (sic)—sequitur positive gratia et gloria et sic patet [d.e.g.e.s.p.: aliquid, quia gratia in praesenti et gloria in futuro quam nobis concedat etc. T]. [**A 24$^{ra–b}$**; G 132^{vb}–133^{rb}; K 37^{vb}–38ra; L 337^{rb}–338ra; M 38$^{va–b}$; P 36^{vb}–37ra; T 63^{vb}–64^{rb}; V 34^{vb}–35ra: 1.3 coll.] [A *exp.*: ad tempus ut praedestinatio.]

Distinctio 41 [1] [Circa XLI distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum merita sint causa praedestinationis. (sic)—de praeparatione ad gratiam et collatione gratiae et gloriae. [**A 24$^{rb–vb}$**; G 133$^{rb–va}$; K 38$^{ra–vb}$; L 338ra–339ra; M 38^{vb}–39^{rb}; P 37$^{ra–va}$; T *deest*; V 35$^{ra–va}$: 1.9 coll.] [A: exp.: et praeparatione, et istius nulla causa est.]

Distinctio 42 [1] [Circa XLII distinctionem (*inv*. A) quaeritur AT] Utrum Deus possit impossibilia naturae. (non)—facere quod materia non obediat sibi agendo. [**A 24^{vb}**; G 133va–134ra; K 38^{vb}–39va; L 339ra–340^{rb}; M 39^{rb}–40ra; P 37va–38^{rb}; T 64$^{rb–vb}$; V 35va–36ra: 2.4 coll.] [A: exp.: quae tamen sunt naturae impossibilia.]

Distinctio 43 [1] [Circa XLIII distinctionem (*inv*. A) quaeritur AT] Utrum potentia Dei sit infinita. (non)—si essent possibiles [possibilia T] [esset possibile GKLP; facere *add* L] fieri ex parte naturae [creaturae T]. [**A 24^{vb}**; G 134$^{ra–b}$; K 39$^{va–b}$; L 340^{rb}–340bis ra; M 40$^{ra–b}$; P 38$^{rb–va}$; T 64^{vb}–65ra; V 36$^{rb–va}$: 1.3 coll.] Ad secundum argumentum dico quod secundum Thomam effectus possunt dici infiniti dupliciter (T: Ad secundum dico quod secundum Thomam, quaestione de potentia prima, a. 3, effectus possunt esse vel dici infiniti dupliciter) [A *exp*.: potest esse in magnitudine finita.]

[2] [Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur A] Utrum Deus possit facere infinitum [infinita A]. (sic)—eo modo quo sunt et [sed GKL] non creatura, et sic patet. [P *exp*.: cum dicat essentiam determinati* generis* P || T *exp*.: infinita. Ad secundam eodem modo.] [**A 24^{vb}–25ra**; G 134^{rb}–135^{rb}; K 39^{vb}–41ra; L 340bis ra–342ra; M 40va–41va; P 38va–39va; T 65ra–66ra; V 36va–37va: 3.9 coll.] locum habet (*inv*. T) in secundo || Hoc enim relinquitur sub dubio a Thoma in quaestionibus De veritate (T: Unde hanc relinquit dubio Thomas, quaestionibus de veritate) [A: sicut ponit frater Thomas || exp.: Reliqua pertinentia ad quaestionem hanc vide in alio quaterno.]

Correctorium 16: Quadragesima tertia distinctione, quaestione secunda, recitat opinionem Thomae de infinito utrum possit fieri a Deo, et primo utrum Deus potest facere multitudinem infinitam in his quae sunt ordinanda per accidens … [158va–159^{vb}]

Distinctio 44 [1] [Circa XLIIII distinctionem (d. 40 A) quaeritur AT] Utrum Deus possit [posset AT] facere melius universum. [*inv*. A] [T: Utrum posset universum melius facere. Quaestio ista potest quadrupliciter intelligi] (non)—nullum inconveniens sequeretur, ideo non valet [n.i.s.i.n.v.: nullum esset inconveniens A; non autem \quantum/ ad substantialia T]. [**A 25$^{ra–va}$**: *utrum posset facere universum melius*; G 135$^{rb–va}$; K 41$^{ra–va}$; L 342$^{rb–vb}$; M 41$^{va–b}$; P 39$^{va–b}$; T 66$^{ra–b}$; V 37$^{va–b}$: 1.2 coll.]

Distinctio 45 [1] [Circa XLV distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. (non)—principium rerum per voluntatem, ut dictum est, ideo etc. [i.e. *om*. T] [G 135$^{va–b}$; K 41$^{va–b}$; L 342^{vb}–343va; M 41^{vb}–42^{rb}; P 39^{vb}–40ra; T 66$^{rb–va}$; V 37^{vb}–38ra: 1.3 coll.].

Distinctio 46 [1] [Circa XLVI distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum Deus velit omnes homines salvos fieri. (sic)—malum videre autem nihil ad hoc facit. [G 135^{vb}–136ra; K 41^{vb}–42^{rb}; L 343va–344^{rb}; M 42$^{rb–vb}$; P 40$^{ra–va}$; T 66$^{va–b}$; V 38$^{ra–va}$: 1.6 coll.].

[2] [Circa distinctionem XLVI ubi quaeritur A; Quaeritur T] Utrum Deus velit mala [malum A] fieri. (sic)—quibus tamen non consentit nec vult ea. [T *exp.*: sed non consentit eis nec vult] [**A 25$^{va–b}$**; G 136$^{ra–b}$; K 42$^{rb–vb}$; L 344^{rb}–345ra; M 42^{vb}–43ra; P 40$^{va–b}$; T 66^{vb}–67^{rb}; V 38$^{va–b}$: 1.3 coll.] [A *exp.*: ideo si cadat in peccatum habeat sibi.]

Distinctio 47 [1] [Circa XLVII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum aliquid fiat contra voluntatem [Dei vel *add.* K^{2}P^{2}] divinam [*inv.* L; Dei T]. (non)—contra prohibitionem divinam malum [male KP; mala T] facere [*inv.* G]. [G 136$^{rb–va}$; K 42^{vb}–43^{rb}; K^{2} 68^{rb}–69^{vb}; L 345ra–346ra; M 43$^{ra–va}$; P 40^{vb}–41^{rb}; P^{2} 61ra–61va; T 67$^{rb–va}$; V 38^{vb}–39^{rb}: 1.6 coll.]

Distinctio 48 [1] [Circa XLVIII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum teneamur [tenatur T] voluntatem nostram conformare [c.v.n. GKLP] voluntati divinae. (non)—divino intellectui [*inv.* GLPT] ut tandem cognoscamus eum Deum verum, Qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen. [G 136^{vb}–137ra; K 43^{rb}–44ra; L 346ra–347^{rb}; M 43va–44ra; P 41$^{rb–vb}$; T 67va–68^{rb}; V 39$^{rb–vb}$: 2.3 coll.]

Explicits: G: *deest* || K: Explicit primus Metensis. || L: *deest* || M: Explicit i^{9} Metensis. || P: Explicit primus. || T: Explicit primus liber. || V: Explicit primus liber, incipit secundus.

Liber Secundus

Distinctio 1 [1] Circa principium secundi libri quaeritur utrum creatura potuerit esse ab aeterno. (non)—quod habeat principium effectivum. [C 247$^{r–v}$ (*first 80%, mutilated*); D 1ra–2ra; K 44ra–45va; L 347ra–350va; M 44^{rb}–45^{vb}; P 42ra–43^{rb}; T 68^{rb}–69va; V 39^{vb}–41ra: 5.5 coll.] [ed. Schabel in: Peck-Schabel, "James of Metz", pp. 298–320] KMP: ut dictum est in primo || KLP: ut in primo dictum est.

[2] Utrum esse creaturae sit [e.c.s: creaturae sint K; creatura sit P] in continuo fieri. (sic)—suae causae conservantis primum esse. [D 2$^{ra–va}$; K 45va–46va; L 350va–352^{rb}; M 45^{vb}–46va; P 43^{rb}–44ra; T 69va–70^{rb}; V 41$^{rb–vb}$: 2.8 coll.] Item, sicut apparebit in tertio.

[3] Utrum idem sit creatio et conservatio. Respondeo. Quidam dicunt quod non—vertibile est in non-esse [vel (et KP) de se tendit in non-esse *add.* KMPT (ad argumenta primum solutio *add.* KP; ad argumenta patet *add.* M)]. [D 2va; K 46$^{va–b}$ (*unmarked*); L 352$^{rb–va}$; M 46$^{va–b}$; P 44$^{ra–b}$ (*unmarked*); T 70$^{rb–va}$; V 41^{vb}–42ra: 0.6 col.]

[4] Utrum creatura possit creare. (sic)—non tamen ad productionem. [D 2va–3^{vb}; K 46^{vb}–48va; L 353va–355^{rb}; M 46^{vb}–48^{rb}; P 44^{rb}–45^{vb}; V 42ra–43^{rb}: 4.7 coll.] ut visum est in primo.

[T4] Utrum creatura possit creare. (sic)—supponit creaturam non creatio. [T 70va–71^{vb}]

Distinctio 2 [1] Utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum. (non)—in naturalibus, non in gratuitis. [D 3^{vb}–4va; K 48va–49va; L 355^{rb}–357ra; M 48^{rb}–49^{rb}; P 45^{vb}–46^{vb}; V 43^{rb}–44ra: 3.4 coll.]

[T1] Circa distinctionem 2 secundi quaeritur utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum. (non)—creditur beatificata vel humanitati Christi, quod non ponitur, ergo etc. Utrum creatura spiritualis et corporalis simul creatae fuerint. Prima parte, quaestione 61, articulo 3. [T 71^{vb}–72va]

[2] Utrum caelum empyreum habeat influentiam in hic [haec DK] inferiora. (non)—in caelum empyreum, ideo non valet. [D 4va–5^{a}; K 49^{vb}–50^{vb}; L 357ra–358^{vb}; M 49^{rb}–50^{rb}; P 46^{vb}–47va; V 44$^{ra–vb}$: 2.9 coll.] opinio Thomae || Unde Thomas videtur opposita dixisse in hac materia || Raby Moy dicit || Et hoc dicit Thomas in *Scripto*. Contrarium autem videtur dicere in *Summa* || M 49^{rb} *mg. infra*: et est opinio Petri de Tharantasia.

[T2] Quaeritur utrum caelum empyreum habeat influentiam super corpora inferiora. (non)—ordo causalitatis, sed solum perfectionis. [T 72va–73^{rb}] Item, Rabi Moyses || Et in hoc magis concordat Thomas, prima parte, q. LXVI, a. 3, in solutione 1 argumenti, quamvis dicat oppositum in *Scripto* || Auctoritas Raby Moyses non cogit.

Distinctio 3 [1] Utrum in angelis differant [differat KP] re suppositum et natura. (sic)—nec tu probas oppositum. [L 358^{vb}–360va; M 50^{rb}–51ra; V 44^{vb}–45va: 3.5 coll.] Et hoc dicit Thomas in suo libello *De ente et essentia*.

[T1] Circa tertiam distinctionem quaeritur [*usque hic om.* K] utrum in angelis differant re suppositum et natura. (sic)—significat per modum partis. [D 5$^{ra–vb}$; K 50^{vb}–51^{vb}; P 47va–48va; T 73^{rb}–74ra]

[2] Utrum possint esse plures angeli in una specie. Respondeo—in angelis, non primo modo, et ideo non valet [et in hoc terminatur haec quaestio *add.* M]. [L 360va–361^{rb}; M 51$^{ra–b}$; V 45$^{va–b}$: 1.0 col.] [ed. Köhler, pp. 519–522, from LMV]

[T2] Utrum angeli distinguantur [numero et non specie *add.* KP]. Quidam dicunt—nulli inest non habenti quantitatem [n.h.q.: nisi per quantitatem D; n.h.q.: nisi quantitatem habenti KP]. [D 5^{vb}; K 51^{vb}–52ra; P 48$^{va–b}$; T 74$^{ra–b}$] [ed. Köhler, pp. 515–518, from DKPT]

Correctorium 17: Tertia distinctione, secundo libro, quaestione de multitudine angelorum, recitat iste opinionem ponentium quod non possunt esse plures angeli unius speciei … [159^{vb}–160ra]

[3] Utrum angelus alia a se intelligat per essentiam suam vel per speciem. (per essentiam)—videat omnia sine specie media. [L 361^{rb}–362va; M 51^{rb}–52ra; V 45^{vb}–46ra: 2.5 coll.]

[T3] Circa eandem distinctionem [*inv.* KP] quaeritur [*usque hic om.* D] utrum angelus alia a se intelligat per species [speciem K] vel per essentiam suam.

(per essentiam)—quid sit verius [*inv*. KP] ignoratur. [D 5^{vb}–6^{rb}; K 52ra–53ra; P 48^{vb}–49^{rb}; T 74$^{rb–vb}$]

Correctorium 18: Eadem distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum angelus intelligat alia a se per speciem ⟨vel⟩ per essentiam* … [160$^{ra–va}$]

[4] Utrum angeli superiores intelligant per species magis universales quam inferiores. (non)—omnes habitudines [species, id est, habitudines rerum vel LM] cuiuslibet rei. [L 362va–364va; M 52$^{ra–vb}$; V 46va–47^{rb}: 3.3 coll.]

[T4] [Quaeritur T] Utrum angeli superiores intelligant per species magis universales. (non)—Per hoc patet solutio ad argumenta [principalia *add*. KP]. [D 6$^{rb–vb}$; K 53ra–54ra; P 49^{rb}–50ra; T 74^{vb}–75va]

Correctorium 19: Eadem distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum angeli superiores intelligant per species universaliores*, articulo secundo … [160va–160bis rb]

[5] Utrum angeli cognoscant futura contingentia vel singularia futura. (non)—in cognitionem futuri contingentis. [L 364va–365^{vb}; M 53$^{ra–va}$; V 47^{rb}–48ra: 2.7 coll.] *Example of king on coin.*

[T5] Quaeritur [*om*. D] utrum angeli possint [a.p.: angelus possit K] intelligere singularia futura [*inv*. D]. (non)—in cognitionem futuri [contingentis *add*. KP]. [D 6^{vb}–7^{rb}; K 54$^{ra–vb}$; P 50$^{ra–va}$; T 75va–76ra] *Example of king on coin*.

Correctorium 20: Eadem distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum angeli cognoscant futura contingentia*, articulo secundo … [160bis rb-va]

Distinctio 4 [1] [Supra quartam distinctionem quaesitum fuit T] Utrum in angelo possit [i.a.p.: possit in angelo D] esse peccatum. (non)—sicut obiectum beatificans. [D 7$^{rb–va}$; K 54^{vb}–55^{rb}; L 365^{vb}–366^{vb}; M 53va–54ra; P 50va–51ra; T 76$^{ra–b}$; V 48$^{ra–b}$: 1.7 coll.]

Distinctio 5 [1] Utrum angelus primus peccaverit peccato superbiae. (non)—ut videtur, nec peccassent. [L 366^{vb}–367^{rb}; M 54$^{ra–b}$; V 48$^{rb–va}$: 1.1 coll.]

[T1] [Circa V distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum angelus primo peccaverit [*inv*. KP] peccato superbiae. (non)—quia praeceptum eis fuisset. [D *exp*.: quod fuisset ei praeceptum.] [KP *exp*. (= V): ut videtur, nec peccassent.] [D 8ra; K 56$^{rb–vb}$; P 51^{vb}–52ra; T 77$^{ra–b}$] *This question in DKPT follows II.5.2*.

[2] [Quaeritur T] Utrum angelus potuerit peccare et esse malus [p.e.e.m.: esse malus et peccare D; in *add*. PV] primo instanti suae creationis. (sic)—solutio videtur melior [Utrum fuerint creati in gratia postea *add*. T]. [D 7va–8ra; K 55^{rb}–56^{rb}; L 367^{rb}–368^{vb}; M 54^{rb}–55ra; P 51$^{ra–vb}$; T 76^{rb}–77ra; V 48va–49^{rb}: 2.6 coll.] Haec solutio impugnatur in *Scripto* … Ideo aliter ibidem dicitur … Ista solutio est dubia, quia impugnatio primae solutionis non videtur sufficiens.

Correctorium 21: Eadem (!) distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum angelus potuerit peccare primo instanti suae creationis* … [160bis va]

[3] Utrum angelus malus appetierit aequalitatem divinam [*inv*. KP] et sic

peccaverit. (non)—non cadit sub apprehensione. [Item, quaerendum hoc prima parte, quaestione LXIII, articulo primo. Totum est ibi *add.* KP] [L 368^{vb}–369ra; K 56^{rb}–57ra; M 55$^{ra–b}$; P 52$^{ra–b}$; V 49$^{rb–va}$: 0.7 col.] Verum est quod Thomas.

[T3] Quaeritur utrum angelus appetierit aequalitatem divinam. Videtur quod non. Duo argumenta sunt duo prima in *Scripto*. Contra sicut in *Scripto*. Respondeo directe sicut prima parte, quaestione LXIII, articulo 3. Totum est ibi. [T 77^{rb}]

[D3] Utrum appetierit aequalitatem divinam in [8^{rb}] *Summa*, ergo vale bene in scripta argumenta. [D 8$^{ra–b}$]

[4] Utrum angeli beati [*om.* V] beatitudinem suam [*inv.* KP] meruerint. Respondeo—eo modo quo expositum est supra quaestione utrum angelus potuerit peccare primo instanti etc. [L 369$^{ra–vb}$; K 57$^{ra–va}$ (*exp.* = T); M 55$^{rb–va}$; P 52$^{rb–va}$ (*exp.* = T); V 49$^{va–b}$: 1.1 coll.] Exemplum de rege qui dat militi equum non quia meruit.

[T4] [Quaeritur T] Utrum angeli suam beatitudinem meruerint. Respondeo [Responsio D] tenendo—eo modo quo exponebatur in quaestione illa [prima D; *om.* KP] utrum angelus [angeli KP] potuerit [possit D; potuerint KP] peccare \in/ [*om.* KP] ultimo argumento [articulo KP; *inv.* P]. [D 8^{rb}; T 77$^{rb–va}$] ut etiam patet prima parte, q. LXII, a. 4.

Distinctio 6 [1] Circa 6 distinctionem [*inv.* M], quia quaestiones de X^{o} [d.x. *om.* KP] sunt faciles, potest quaeri ratione praecedentium utrum duo instantia temporis angelici possint coexistere uni instanti temporis nostri. (sic)—toti aevo coexistit aeternitas. [M *exp.*: sed toti aevo, non sic cum soli.] [KP *exp.*: nunc aevi, sed toti aevo.] [K 57va–58^{vb}; L 369^{vb}–371^{rb}; M 55va–56va; P 52va–53va; V 49^{vb}–50va: 3.1 coll. (V 50ra *mg.*: finis V sexterni)]

[T1] Supra VI distinctionem [*inv.* D], quia quaestiones de *Scripto* [d.s. *om.* D] sunt faciles, quaestio potest fieri [quaeri D] ratione praecedentium utrum duo instantia temporis angelici possint coexistere cum uno \vel uni/ [*om.* D] instanti temporis nostri. (sic)—Unde licet coexistat uni, sed [*om.* D] tamen non [*om.* D] soli, sed uni nunc aevi et toti aevo coexistit aeternitas. [D 8^{rb}–9ra; T 77va–78^{rb}]

Distinctio 7 [1] [Circa VII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum angeli boni [*inv.* MT] possint malum facere [*inv.* KP]. (sic)—ideo [*om.* P] non potest peccare. [D 9$^{ra–b}$; K 58^{vb}–59ra; L 371^{rb}–372ra; M 56va–57ra; P 53$^{va–b}$; T 78$^{rb–va}$; V 50$^{va–b}$: 1.3 coll.]

Correctorium 22: Septima distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum boni angeli possint malum facere* … [160bis va-b]

[2] Utrum angeli damnati [mali M] possint bene facere vel possint converti a sua obstinatione [a.s.o.c.p. KP]. (sic)—propter dolorem quem infert eis.

[L 372ra–373^{rb}; K 59ra–60ra; M 57$^{ra–vb}$; P 53^{vb}–54va; V 50^{vb}–51^{rb}: 2.3 coll.] sicut dicit Thomas, prima parte, q. LXIII || Assignatur autem ratio in *Scripto*.

[T2] [Quaeritur T] Utrum angeli [*om.* D] damnati possint bonum facere. (sic)—potest esse bona, ut dictum est. [D 9$^{rb–va}$; T 78va–79ra] secundum quod dicit Thomas, prima parte, q. LXIIII || Alia ratio redditur ab eodem in *Scripto* || Aliae causae assignantur in *Scriptis* et parum valent, ut patet ibidem.

[3] Utrum creatura corporalis obediat angelo quantum ad motum. (non)—corpus est contactus virtutis. [K 60ra–61ra; L 373^{rb}–375ra; M 57^{vb}–58^{vb}; P 54va–55^{rb}; V 51^{rb}–52^{rb}: 3.2 coll.] Alia est opinio Thomae in quaestionibus disputatis || dicit Thomas in *Summa contra gentiles*, libro 6 (!), 3 capitulo || Et ideo dicit Thomas.

[T3] [Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum creatura corporalis obediat angelo quantum ad motum. (non)—ad perfectiorem terminum. Ad secundum. [D 9va–10^{rb}; T 79$^{rb–vb}$] Illud etiam quod adducitur de anima solvitur in *Summa contra gentiles*, libro 3, ⟨?⟩ capitulo || Et hoc vult Thomas, *Contra gentiles*, libro 3, C capitulo.

[4] Utrum angelus moveat corpora solum per intellectum et voluntatem vel utrum requiratur in eo [angelis KP] aliqua potentia motiva [p.m.alia.a. KP] praeter istas. Respondeo. Quidam dicunt—expositus est verus esse. [e.e.v.e.: expositum est verus (verius M) est LM; proportio voluntatis ad mobile KP] [K 61$^{ra–vb}$; L 375$^{ra–vb}$; M 58^{vb}–59^{rb}; P 55$^{rb–vb}$; V 52$^{rb–va}$: 1.5 coll.] Et quia per hoc est articulus Parisius condemnatus, qui dicit angelum movere per solam voluntatem error est || Ideo credo quod haec opinio, quae est Thomae, est vera.

[T4] [Quaeritur T] Utrum angelus moveat corpora solum [*om.* D] per intellectum et voluntatem vel requiratur in eo [*om.* D] ad movendum alia potentia [a.p.a.m. D]. Quidam dicunt—quod est falsum [*inv.* D], ut visum est. [D 10$^{rb–va}$; T 79^{vb}–80^{rb}] Item, hoc dicit articulus Parisius condemnatus.

Distinctio 8 [1] Utrum angelo competat corpus assumere—nec facio differentiam quantum ad propositum [q.a.p. *om.* KP] inter angelum bonum vel [et KLP] malum. (non)—vide quaestionem illam [in *add.* K] 1 parte, q. 51. [K 61^{vb}–62^{rb}; L 375^{vb}–376va; M 59$^{rb–va}$; P 55^{vb}–56^{rb}; V 52va–53ra: 1.5 coll.] ut habet videri in tertio || Ex his ad quaestionem 'potestne angelus assumere corpus?' Raby Moyses dicit.

[T1] [Circa VIII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum competat angelo corpus assumere—et non distinguitur modo inter bonum et malum, quia quantum ad propositum idem iudicium est [*inv.* D]. (non)—vide quaestionem hanc, prima parte, 51 quaestione [ibi totum bene ponitur *add.* D]. [D 10$^{va–b}$; T 80$^{rb–va}$] ut habet videri in tertio libro || Ex his ad quaestionem Rabi Moyses voluit.

[2] Utrum angeli in assumptis corporibus exerceant opera vitae. (sic)—conver-

sio non fuit ibi necessaria [f.i.n.: fuerit ibi LM]. [L 376va–377^{rb}; M 59^{vb}–60^{rb}; V 53$^{ra–b}$: 1.7 coll.]

[T2] [Quaeritur T] Utrum angeli in assumptis corporibus [*inv*. KP] exerceant opera vitae [e.o.v.i.c.a. D]. (sic)—De generatione vero [*om*. D] vide prima parte, quaestione LI, [*cessat* D] a. 3, et iam dictum est in parte [+ *mg*.]. [D 10^{vb}–11ra; K 62$^{rb–vb}$; P 56$^{rb–vb}$; T 80$^{va–b}$]

[3] Utrum illa corpora assumpta ab angelis sint vera corpora [*inv*. V]. Respondeo—ut dictum fuit [est iam KP] supra. [K 62^{vb}; L 377$^{rb–va}$; M 60^{rb}; P 56^{vb}; V 53$^{rb–va}$: 0.3 col.] Et ideo secundum Thomam.

[T3] Utrum assumant vera corpora. Dicendum breviter sicut in *Scripto*—de aere condensato. [D 11ra (*unmarked*); T 80^{vb}]

Distinctio 9 [1] Utrum sit una tantum hierarchia angelorum. (sic)—diversos modos generales illuminationum. [K 62^{vb}–63va; L 377va–378va; M 60^{rb}–61ra; P 56^{vb}–57va; V 53va–54ra: 2.1 coll.] *Examples of king's assessors, counselors, judges, bailli, and nuncios.*

[T1] [Circa IX distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum in [*om*. D] angelis sit una tantum [*inv*. D] hierarchia. (sic)—perfecte illuminari, ut visum est. [D 11$^{ra–b}$; T 80^{vb}–81^{rb}] *Examples of king's assessors, counselors, judges, bailli, nuncios, other officials, and court.*

[2] Utrum unus angelus illuminet alium [*inv*. KP], puta utrum angeli superiores [-is K] [superiorum M] hierarchiae illuminent illos qui sunt de media [hierarchiae *add*. P; hierarchia K] vel [de *add*. P] infima. (non)—novum lumen. Per idem [respondetur *add*. KP] ad secundum. [K 63va–64^{vb}; L 378va–380ra; M 61ra–62ra; P 57va–58^{rb}; V 54$^{ra–vb}$: 3.4 coll.]

[T2] [Quaeritur T] Utrum angeli superioris [superiores D] hierarchiae illuminent [illuminant D] angelos inferioris [inferiores D] ⟨hierarchiae⟩. (non)—species eo modo quo dictum est. [D 11$^{rb–vb}$; T 81^{rb}–82ra] Talis magister dicitur illuminare discipulum … puta ad hoc quod videat salutem Guillelmi … Sed non possum videre Petrum …

Correctorium 23: Nona distinctione, quaestione de illuminationibus angelorum, articulo secundo, recitat modum ponendi fratris Thomae, qui dicit quod unus angelus alium illuminat confortando lumen ipsius ex aliqua coniunctione vel applicatione sui ad illum … [160bis vb–161^{vb}]

Distinctio 10:

[T1] Circa X distinctionem [*inv*. D] quaeritur [*om*. D] utrum omnes angeli mittantur. Quaere in *Scripto* et [q.i.s.e. *om*. D] prima parte, quaestione CXII. Item, circa XI [i.c.x. *om*. D]

[KP1] Utrum omnes angeli mittantur. Quaere in *Scripto* et prima parte [*om*. K], quaestione capitulo (!) XXII. Item, utrum angeli deputentur omnibus hominibus ad custodiam. Item,

ad [ad hominum D] custodiam. Utrum doleant [D 12ra] de damnatione custoditorum. Utrum inter eos sit pugna. Omnes [*om.* D] parte prima, quaestione CXIII, et implicavit quasi omnes articulos illius quaestionis [et … q.: ibi bene ponitur D] utrum angeli deputentur hominibus utrum doleant de damnatione custoditorum. Item, utrum sit pugna inter eos. Omnes istas quaestiones [quaeras *add.* K] prima parte, quaestione capitulo (!) XLII [XIII K].

[1] Utrum unus angelus [*inv.* KP] cognoscat cogitationes alterius angeli vel nostras, quia [*om.* KP] idem videtur esse iudicium [v.e.i.: ipsum* deum esse V]. (sic)—sequitur cogitationes [-em KMP] ut finis. [K 64vb–66rb; L 380ra–382ra; M 62ra–63rb; P 58rb–59va; V 54vb–55vb: 3.9 coll.] Et hoc est forte quod voluit dicere Thomas.

[T2] Circa eandem distinctionem quaesitum fuit de quodam omisso in quadam distinctione praecedente, [i.q.d.p. *om.* D] scilicet in octava [distinctione *add.* D], utrum [unus *add.* D] angelus cognoscat cogitationes alterius angeli vel nostras, quia idem iudicium est [*inv.* D]. (sic)—sequitur cogitationem ut finis. [D 12ra–va; T 82ra–vb] Ratio quam ponit Thomas [*lacuna*] || T 82ra *mg. infra*2: Opinio Aegidii, quaestione ultima de cognitione angelorum est talis.

Correctorium 24: Undecima (!) distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum unus angelus cognoscat cogitationes alterius vel nostras*, articulo secundo … [161vb–162vb]

Distinctio 11 [1] Utrum in angelis sit locutio. (non)—notus, ut dictum est supra. [KP *exp.*: ut dictum est supra in quaestione immediate praecedente.] [K 66rb–vb; L 382ra–383ra; M 63rb–vb; P 59va–60ra; V 55vb–56rb: 1.7 coll.] propter hoc non potest loqui Gallicus cum Teuthonico || ut visum est in primo || ut visum est in praecedenti quaestione.

[T1] [Quaeritur T] Utrum in angelis sit locutio. (non)—ut supra visum est in quaestione immediate praecedente. [D 12va–b; T 82vb–83ra] sicut non loquitur Gallicus cum Theotonico || Vide has differentias in *Scripto* et vide prima parte, q. CVII, a. 2 || ut visum est in primo.

Distinctio 12 [1] Utrum sit una materia corporum [*om.* KP] superiorum et inferiorum [i.e.s. KV]. (sic)—in genere logico, ideo non valet. [K 66vb–68rb; L 383ra–385ra; M 63vb–65ra; P 60ra–61ra; V 56rb–57rb: 3.9 coll.]

[T1] [Circa XII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum sit una materia omnium [*om.* D] corporum superiorum et [*om.* D] inferiorum. (sic)—in uno genere logico non reali. [D 12vb–13va; T 83ra–vb]

Correctorium 25: Duodecima distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum omnium corporum sit una materia*, articulo secundo … [162vb–163rb]

KP insert here another copy of book 1, distinctio 47, q. 1: see above.

[2] Utrum materia primo fuerit [*inv.* V] producta [p.f.p.m. KP] in formis. (sic)—sub formis omnium elementorum [non sub forma unius elementi tantum *add.* M] [et per hoc patet responsio (*om.* M) ad secundum *add.* KMP]. [K 68^{vb}–69^{vb}; L 385ra–386va; M 65ra–66ra; P 61va–62^{rb}; V 57^{rb}–58ra: 3.2 coll.] est Thomae || Aliter solvit Thomas || Ideo quando dicit Thomas.

[T2] Circa eandem distinctionem quaeritur [*usque hic om.* D] utrum materia fuerit producta in formis. (sic)—sub distinctis formis elementorum, ut patet in *Scripto*. [D 13va–14ra; T 83^{rb}–84^{rb}] Vide eas et si vis prima parte, q. LVI, a. 1. Dicit tamen sicut in *Scripto*.

[3] Utrum res [tres P] simul fuerint productae et distinctae per species. (sic)—Vide tamen Thomam in ista quaestione ad maiorem [dictorum *add.* LM] securitatem [quia minus diligenter fuit correpta *add.* V]. [K 69^{vb}–70^{rb}; L 386^{vb}–387ra; M 66$^{ra–b}$; P 62$^{rb–va}$; V 58$^{ra–b}$: 1.0 col.]

[T3] Utrum res fuerint simul productae secundum distinctas species—*in alio quaterno*.[2] [T 84^{rb}]

Distinctio 13 [1] Utrum lumen habeat esse reale in medio. (non)—intellectum, quia informat ipsum. [K 70^{rb}–71ra; L 387ra–388va; M 66^{rb}–67ra; P 62va–63^{rb}; V 58^{rb}–59ra: 3.2 coll.]

[T1] Circa XIII distinctionem quaeritur [*usque hic om.* D] utrum lumen in medio habeat esse reale. (non)—si haberet proprium nomen. [D *exp.*: ideo denominat aerem.] [D 14$^{ra–va}$; T 84^{rb}–85ra]

[2] Utrum in eadem parte medii possint esse duo lumina differentia solo numero [s.n. *om.* V]. (sic)—duo distinctive [distincte KLM], sed unum. [K 71$^{ra–vb}$; L 388va–389^{rb}; M 67$^{ra–va}$; P 63^{rb}–64ra; V 59$^{ra–va}$: 1.9 coll.]

[T2] [Quaeritur T] Utrum in eadem parte medii [sint vel *add.* D] possint esse duo lumina solo numero distincta. (sic)—duo distinctive, sed unum. [D *exp.*: ideo non distinguuntur.] [D 14$^{va–b}$; T 85$^{ra–va}$]

Distinctio 14 [1] Utrum caelum sit [c.s.: corpora caelestia sint KP] causa generationis et corruptionis [c.e.g. LM] in istis inferioribus. (non)—dependent a caelo, ideo ratio non valet. [K 71^{vb}–73^{rb}; L 389^{rb}–391va; M 67^{vb}–69ra; P 64ra–65^{rb}; V 59va–60^{vb}: 4.5 coll.] secundum astronomos et Albertum.

[T1] *Vacat*: Utrum caelum sit causa generationis et corruptionis in istis inferioribus. Arguitur quod non, quia ad eundem effectum non concurrunt plura agentia quando alterum sufficit; sed in multis actionibus sufficiunt agentia inferiora, ut ignis sufficit ad generandum ignem; ergo etc. Praeterea, nihil agit ultra suam speciem; sed caelum, cum sit inanimatum, est in [T 85va]

Distinctio 15 [1] Utrum realiter sint aquae [*inv.* KP] super firmamentum vel super caelum [v.s.c. *om.* D]. Respondeo—propter splendorem, non propter calorem [ardorem D]. [D 14^{vb}–15ra; K 73$^{rb–va}$; L 391va–392ra; M 69$^{ra–b}$; P 65$^{rb–va}$; T 85^{vb}–86ra (*then blank 1.8 coll.*); V 60^{vb}–61ra: 1.0 col.] secundum Thomam.

[T2] [Circa XV distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum corpora caelestia sint causa transmutationis et [*om.* D] generationis [et corruptionis *add.* D] naturalis in inferioribus. (non)—saltem formae et dispositiones materiae, ideo [*om.* D] non valet ratio. [D 15$^{ra–vb}$; T 86va–87va] secundum Albertum.

Distinctio 16 [T1] [Item T] circa XVI distinctionem quaeritur [d. XVI D] de imagine qui vult. [D 15^{vb}; T 87va]

Distinctio 17 [1] Utrum ad intelligere nostrum requiratur species aliqua [*inv.* KP; aut species M] de [ex KP] necessitate. (non)—secundum Augustinum, specierum, id est, actuum. [K 73va–74^{vb}; L 392ra–394ra; M 69^{rb}–70^{rb}; P 65va–66va; V 61ra–62ra: 4.1 coll.]

[T1] Circa XVII distinctionem quaeritur [*usque hic om.* D] utrum ad intelligere nostrum [*inv.* D] sit necessaria species intelligibilis. (non)—secundum Augustinum specierum, id est, actuum. [D 15^{vb}–16^{rb}; T 87va–88^{vb} (*then blank 2/3 col. + 89^{r}*)]

Correctorium 26: Decima septima distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum ad intelligere nostrum requiratur species*, articulo primo … [163^{rb}–164ra]

[2] Utrum phantasma possit [p.p.: phantasmata possint KP] movere intellectum possibilem absque hoc quod intellectus agens aliquid imprimat in phantasmate. (non)—autem movens est phantasma, ideo [ergo KP] etc. [K 74^{vb}–76^{rb}; L 394ra–396^{rb}; M 70^{rb}–71va; P 66va–67^{vb}; V 62ra–63ra: 4.0 coll.]

[T2] Utrum ad hoc quod phantasma moveat intellectum possibilem ad actum intelligendi influat in ipsum intellectus agens, ita quod illud [quod *add.* D] influxus sit aliqua virtus realis. (sic)—distinguendae, quia sunt duplices. [D 16^{rb}–17ra; T 89va–90^{vb}]

Correctorium 27: Eadem distinctione, quaestione de actione intellectus agentis in phantasma, articulo secundo, recitat opinionem Thomae, qui dicit quod intellectus agens [164^{rb}] imprimit fantasmati virtutem mediante qua potest movere intellectum possibilem ad intelligendum … [164$^{ra–vb}$]

[3] Utrum paradisus sit locus habitabilis. (non)—propter nobilitatem suae complexionis [et sic ratio non concludit *add.* KP]. [K 76$^{rb–vb}$; L 396^{rb}–397ra; M 71$^{va–b}$; P 67^{vb}–68^{rb}; V 63$^{ra–b}$: 1.2 coll.]

[T3] Quaeritur [*om.* D] utrum paradisus sit locus habitabilis homini. (non)—non habet per omnia veritatem. [D 17$^{ra–va}$; T 90^{vb}–91^{rb}] semper apud eos umbra apparet ad septentrionem, et tamen sunt distemperatae nimis, sicut Ethiopia, Hyspania, etc.

Distinctio 18 [1] Utrum corpus mulieris fuerit formatum de costa viri. (non)—a Deo facta et [a.d.f.e.: f.a.d. KP] miraculose. [K 76^{vb}–78ra; L 397ra–398^{vb}; M 71^{vb}–72^{vb}; P 68^{rb}–69^{rb}; V 63^{rb}–64ra: 3.2 coll.] Et dicit Thomas, prima parte *Summae*.

[T1] [Circa XVIII distinctionem quaeritur T] Utrum de costa Adae mulier facta

fuerit. (non)—a Deo facta et miraculose. [D *exp.*: formavit Evam supra viam naturae.] [D 17va–18^{rb}; T 91^{rb}–92va] Et dicit Thomas, prima parte *Summae*.

Correctorium 28: Decima octava distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum de costa Adae potuerit formari mulier sine additione materiae*, articulo secundo … [164^{vb}–166^{rb}]

[2] Utrum in materia corporali sit ponere rationes seminales. (non)—seminales sicut et [*om.* K] active aliqualiter. [D *exp.*: possunt dici seminales active.] [D 18^{rb}–19ra; K 78ra–79va; L 398^{vb}–401ra; M 72^{vb}–74ra; P 69^{rb}–70va; T 92va–93va; V 64ra–65ra: 3.7 coll.]

Distinctio 19 [1] Utrum impassibilitas [passibilitas KP] quam habuit Adam [antequam peccasset *add.* KP] in statu innocentiae, vel habuisset si non peccasset, [s.n.p.: sed quod si stetisset sine peccato D; s.n.p.: fuerat naturalis vel P] fuisset naturalis. (sic)—ideo non fuisset [suffecisset KLMP] omnino naturalis [virtus *add.* KMP]. [D 19$^{ra–b}$; K 79va–80ra; L 401ra–402ra; M 74$^{ra–va}$; P 70va–71ra; T 93va–94ra; V 65$^{ra–b}$: 1.5 coll.] Item, ex parte agentis: vide in secundo Thomae in positione quaestionis utrum Adam in statu innocentiae habuerit necessitatem moriendi || tamen Thomas ad hoc addit.

Distinctio 20 [1] Utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio modo quo nunc est [om. D]. (non)—deordinatio [ordinatio LV] non fuisset ibi. [D 19$^{rb–va}$; K 80$^{ra–b}$; L 402$^{ra–b}$; M 74va; P 71$^{ra–b}$; T 94$^{ra–b}$; V 65$^{rb–va}$: 1.1 coll.] sicut dicit Thomas.

Distinctio 21 [1] Utrum temptatio sit appetenda. (sic)—per [pro DMT; *om.* KP] tunc quando incumbit. [D 19va; K 80$^{rb–va}$; L 402$^{rb–va}$; M 74^{vb}; P 71$^{rb–va}$; T 94$^{rb–va}$; V 65va: 0.5 col.] Primum vide in secunda secundae [not in T].

Distinctio 22 [1] Utrum ignorantia excuset peccatum [*inv.* KP]. (non)—ideo ratio non concludit [valuit D; convenit L] [D 19va–20ra; K 80va–81^{rb}; L 402va–403^{rb}; M 74^{vb}–75^{rb}; P 71va–72ra; T 94va–95ra; V 65va–66ra: 1.7 coll.]

[2] Utrum gravius peccaverit Eva quam Adam. (non)—ideo [propter quod KLMP] ratio non valet. [D 20ra; K 81$^{rb–va}$; L 403$^{va–b}$; M 75$^{rb–va}$; P 72ra; T 95$^{ra–b}$; V 66$^{ra–b}$: 0.8 col.]

Distinctio 23 [1] Utrum Adam in statu innocentiae viderit Deum per essentiam. (sic)—ideo hoc non appetebat. [D 20$^{ra–b}$; K 81$^{va–b}$; L 403^{vb}–404^{rb}; M 75$^{va–b}$; P 72$^{ra–b}$; T 95$^{rb–va}$; V 66^{rb}: 0.8 col.]

[2] De [*om.* KLP] occasione huius quaeratur utrum intellectus creatus videat divinam essentiam [d.e.: Deum per essentiam K] immediate. (non)—differentia est [d.e.: patet differentia M] inter ista. [D *deest*; K 81^{vb}–82^{rb}; L 404^{rb}–405ra; M 75^{vb}–76^{rb}; P 72$^{va–b}$; T *deest*; V *deest*] secundum Thomam in prima parte, q. 12, articulo 2 || Thomas, *Contra gentiles*, libro 3, q. LVII.

Distinctio 24 [1] Utrum morosa delectatio [delectio KPV] quando [si D] attingit rationem superiorem sit peccatum mortale. (non)—Dixit enim quidam

quod numquam expertus est maiorem delectationem quam videndo monachum quem occiderat in suo sanquine volutari vel palpitare. Sic [dicendum est *add.* KLP] ad illud. [D 20$^{rb–va}$; K 82$^{rb–vb}$; L 405ra–406ra; M 76$^{rb–vb}$; P 72^{vb}–73^{rb}; T 95va–96ra; V 66$^{va–b}$: 1.7 coll.]

Distinctio 25 [1] Utrum liberum arbitrium possit cogi [*inv.* KP; et *add.* P]. (sic)—quia respicit intrinsecum. [KP *exp.*: qui dependet a potentiis sensitivis.] [D 20$^{va–b}$; K 82^{vb}–83^{rb}; L 406$^{ra–va}$; M 76^{vb}–77ra; P 73$^{rb–vb}$; T 96$^{ra–b}$; V 66^{vb}–67ra: 1.2 coll.]

Distinctio 26 [1] Utrum gratia et virtus sint idem per essentiam. (sic)—idem essentialiter cum virtute. [KMP *then have refutation*: Ad argumentum in oppositum … fides illa est gratis data.] [D 20^{vb}–21va; K 83^{rb}–84^{rb}; L 406va–408ra; M 77ra–78ra; P 73^{vb}–74^{vb}; T 96va–97^{rb}; V 67$^{ra–vb}$: 2.8 coll.] sicut dicit Thomas in prima secundae.

Correctorium 29: Vicesima sexta distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum gratia et virtus sint idem per essentiam* … [166$^{rb–va}$]

Distinctio 27 [1] Utrum actus gratia informatus mereatur beatitudinem. Respondeo—praemio, cum gratis sit [fit T; fuit V] totum. [KP *exp.*: praemio gratis, utrumque autem de congruo. Unde nota quod homo potest omnia praecepta implere.] [D 21va; K 84$^{rb–vb}$; L 408$^{ra–va}$; M 78$^{ra–b}$; P 74^{vb}–75ra; T 97$^{rb–va}$; V 67^{vb}–68ra: 1.0 col.] *Examples with king*.

Distinctio 30 [1] [Quaeritur K] Utrum alimentum transeat in veritatem humanae naturae. (non)—ex ordine dispositionum similium [et sic patet responsio ad praedicta *add.* M]. [D 21va–22ra; K 84^{vb}–85va; L 408va–409^{vb}; M 78^{rb}–79ra; P 75$^{ra–vb}$; T 97va–98va; V 68$^{ra–va}$: 2.3 coll.] Respondet Thomas.

Distinctio 31 [1] Utrum homo possit diu [*inv.* V] stare in uno peccato mortali quin cadat in aliud mortale. (sic)—sed non pertrahit vel necessitat [D *exp.*: id est, inclinat, non necessitat]. [D 22$^{ra–b}$; K 85$^{va–b}$; L 409^{vb}–410^{rb}; M 79$^{ra–b}$; P 75^{vb}–76ra; T 98$^{va–b}$; V 68va–69ra: 1.1 coll.]

[2] Utrum peccatum originale traducatur a parente in prolem. (non)—quae erat [vitiata sive *add.* KP; vitiata vel *add.* M] obnoxia peccato. [D 22$^{rb–vb}$; K 85^{vb}–86^{vb}; L 410^{rb}–411va; M 79^{rb}–80ra; P 76ra–77ra; T 98^{vb}–99va; V 69$^{ra–va}$: 2.7 coll.] [ed. Martin, pp. 194–203, from NPTV]

Distinctio 32 [1] Utrum per baptismum tollatur paena peccati originalis. Respondeo—quidam [per accidens *add.* DP; quaedam LM] minuuntur, quidam [autem *add.* KP; quaedam LM] non. [D 22^{vb}–23ra; K 86^{vb}–87ra; L 411^{vb}–412ra; M 80$^{ra–b}$; P 77ra; T 99$^{va–b}$; V 69$^{va–b}$: 0.7 col.] [ed. Martin, pp. 203–205, from NPTV]

[2] Utrum parvuli decedentes sine baptismo puniantur [paenitentiantur D] paena vel dolore sensibili. (sic)—non noverunt [nesciunt D; meruerunt M] quid [quod DM] amiserunt. [D 23$^{ra–b}$; K 87$^{ra–va}$; L 412ra–413ra; M 80^{rb}–81ra;

P 77$^{ra–vb}$; T 99^{vb}–100^{rb}; V 69^{vb}–70^{rb}: 1.9 coll.] dicit [beatus *add.* M] Thomas in *Scripto* || sicut dicit Thomas in quaestionibus disputatis ⟨*De malo*, q. 5, a. 3⟩, parvuli non dolent. || P: Ideo opinio quarta est Thomae. Unde dicit ipse in quaestionibus disputatus quod parvuli non dolent.

Distinctio 33 [1] Utrum peccata [peccatum KP] proximorum parentium transfundantur [diffundatur KP] in filios. (sic)—nisi concurrat ibi peccatum [proprium *add.* KMP] parvuli [populi KLMPT]. [D 23^{rb}; K 87$^{va–b}$; L 413$^{ra–b}$; M 81ra; P 77^{vb}–78ra; V 70^{rb}: 0.6 col.] [ed. Martin, pp. 205–208, from NPTV]

Distinctio 34 [1] Utrum omne peccatum consistat in aliquo actu. (sic)—si obmittit vituperandus est. [D 23$^{rb–vb}$; K 87^{vb}–88^{rb}; L 413^{rb}–414ra; M 81$^{ra–va}$; P 78$^{ra–va}$; T 100va–101ra; V 70$^{rb–vb}$: 1.2 coll.] Unde Thomas dicit.

Distinctio 35 [1] Utrum bonitas vel malitia actus moralis [a.mo.v.ma. KP] principaliter consistat in actu interiori vel exteriori. (in exteriori)—exteriori per actum interiorem voluntatis. [D 23^{vb}–24ra; K 88$^{rb–vb}$; L 414$^{ra–vb}$; M 81va–82ra; P 78$^{va–b}$; T 101$^{ra–va}$; V 70^{vb}–71ra: 1.5 coll.] Respondeo secundum Thomam in quaestionibus disputatis ⟨*De veritate*, qq. 22–23?⟩ || Modo dicit Thomas || Sed sciendum est quod dicit Thomas.

Distinctio 36 [1] Utrum voluntas eodem actu feratur [f.e.a. KP] in finem et in ea quae sunt ad finem. (non)—ideo ratio non valet. [D 24$^{ra–b}$; K 88^{vb}–89va; L 414^{vb}–416ra; M 82$^{ra–va}$; P 78^{vb}–79va; T 101va–102ra; V 71$^{ra–va}$: 2.1 coll.]

Distinctio 37 [1] Utrum intentio sit actus voluntatis. (non)—sed a superiori agente. [D 24$^{rb–va}$; K 89$^{va–b}$; L 416$^{ra–va}$; M 82^{vb}–83ra; P 79$^{va–b}$; T 102$^{ra–b}$; V 71$^{va–b}$: 0.8 col.]

[2] Utrum conscientia erronea liget. (non)—simpliciter, sed [sic DMT, ita K] ad illud. [D 24va–25ra; K 89^{vb}–90^{vb}; L 416va–417^{vb}; M 83$^{ra–vb}$; P 79^{vb}–80va; T 102^{rb}–103^{rb}; V 71^{vb}–72va: 2.6 coll.]

Distinctio 38 [1] Utrum sit aliquis actus [al.ac.s. KP; s.sl.sc. DT] indifferens. (sic)—gratia, ideo non valet. [D 25$^{ra–b}$; K 90^{vb}–91ra; L 418$^{ra–va}$; M 83^{vb}–84ra; P 80$^{va–b}$; T 103$^{rb–va}$; V 72$^{va–b}$: 1.1 coll.] sicut secundum Thomam.

Distinctio 40 [1] Utrum omnia peccata sint aequalia. (sic)—Et sic per hoc poterunt distingui [Ideo ratio non valet *add.* KP]. [D 25$^{rb–va}$; K 91$^{ra–vb}$; L 418va–419va; M 84$^{ra–va}$; P 80^{vb}–81^{rb}; T 103va–104ra; V 72^{vb}–73ra: 1.4 coll.]

Distinctio 41 [1] Utrum vitia capitalia sint septem. (non)—plura vitia quam virtutes. [D 25$^{va–b}$; K 91^{vb}–92ra; L 419va–420^{rb}; M 84va–85ra; P 81$^{rb–vb}$; T 104$^{ra–va}$; V 73$^{ra–b}$: 1.0 col.]

Distinctio 42 [1] Utrum peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum sit remissibile. (sic)—contra fidem articulorum directe. [D 25^{vb}–26ra; K 92$^{ra–vb}$; L 420^{rb}–421^{rb}; M 85$^{ra–va}$; P 81^{vb}–82^{rb}; T 104va–105^{rb}; V 73$^{rb–vb}$: 1.8 coll.]

Distinctio 43 [1] Utrum religiosus vel subditus teneatur praelato [suo *add.* KP] in omnibus obedire. [ob.p.i.om. D; i.om.p.ob. L] (sic)—Unde nota quod,

secundum doctores, frater Praedicator non tenetur ad aliquid quod sit in regula quia ibi ponitur, sed solum quia sibi praecipitur a praelato. Et hoc dicit de forma professionis quae est secundum regulam. [D 26$^{ra–b}$; K 92^{vb}–93^{rb}; L 421^{rb}–422ra; M 85va–86ra; P 82$^{rb–vb}$; T 105$^{rb–vb}$; V 73^{vb}–74^{rb}: 1.4 coll.] sed secundum Thomam || Ideo dicit Thomas quod nihil in regula nostra obligat nos ad praeceptum nisi secundum quod cadit sub praecepto praelati, secundum quod volunt quod nos servemus illud.

Explicits: D: Explicit secundus liber || K: Explicit secundus liber. Incipit tertius. || L: Et sic est finis. Deo gratias || M: Finis libri secundi. Deo gratias || P: Explicit secundus liber. Incipiet tercius *manus*^{2} || qui non est hic; sequitur quartus liber *manus*^{3} [f. 83 *blank*] || T: *nothing*. || V: Explicit liber secundus, incipit tertius.

Liber Tertius

Distinctio 1 [1] Utrum incarnatio sit possibilis. (non)—esse virtutem in corpore. [K 93^{rb}–94ra; V 74$^{rb–vb}$: 2.1 coll.]

[T1] Utrum incarnatio sit possibilis. (non)—natura divina subiectum. [T 106ra]

Distinctio 2 [1] Utrum \divina/ [*om.* K] persona possit assumere naturam irrationalem. [V: Tria sunt videnda] [K: videtur quod sic]—personalitatem suppositi divini [divini: per hoc patet solutio ad argumenta K]. [K 94$^{ra–va}$; V 74^{vb}–75ra: 1.4 coll.] Ita dicit Thomas.

[T1] Utrum et creaturam naturalem potuerit assumere. (sic)—Argumenta procedunt de potentia absoluta. [T 106$^{ra–b}$] Unde et Thomas dicit.

[T2] Utrum natura divina assumpserit carnem mediante anima. Distingue—in ordine ad finem. [T 106^{rb}]

Distinctio 3 [1] Utrum beata [*om.* V] virgo in instanti potuerit [p. eodem i. K] esse sub peccato originali et sub gratia. (sic)—esse, sic [dico *add.* K] de bono [De sanctificatione virginis vide Thomam in tertio *add.* K]. [K 94va–95va; V 75$^{ra–vb}$: 2.8 coll.]

[T1] Utrum beata Virgo pro eodem instanti potuerit esse sub culpa et gratia. (sic)—De sanctificatione beatae Virginis et modo, vide positionem Thomae per totum in suo tertio. [T 106$^{rb–vb}$]

[2] Utrum Christus sit antiquior Iohanne. (sic)—quae respicit suppositum. [K 97ra (*different sequence, as q. 10*); V 75^{vb}–76ra (*here, as q. 4*): 0.7 col.]

[T2] Utrum Christus fuerit antiquior Iohanne, sine argumentis. Ponunt quidam—videtur dicere contarium. (Then: \Lectio, d. 6/ De opinionibus … Et hoc totum trahes de *Scripto*, d. 6.) [T 107va (*different sequence, as q. 9*)]

[3] Utrum beata Virgo aliquid effective egerit [*inv.* K] in conceptione [confessione T] Filii Dei. (sic)—Ad argumenta vide solutionem in *Scripto* [per totum *add.* KT]. [K 95va–96ra; T 106^{vb}–107ra; V 76$^{ra–b}$: 1.5 coll.] KT: sicut in

Scripto || KT: et vide *Scriptum* [Thomam K] in quaestione hac pro hac opinione || KT: et vide in hoc *Scriptum* in quaestione ista. Quinto etiam utrum sit naturalis, vide *Scriptum*, d. 3 [illa K], q. 3 [2 K], a. 2 (V: Et vide *Scriptum* in quaestione ista d. 2, q. 2, utrum sit naturalis. Vide *Scriptum* dicunt (!) 2 quaestionem (!), secundo articulo secundo*).

[T4] Utrum corpus Christi fuerit formatum in instanti. (non)—et vide *Scriptum*, d. 3, q. 5, a. 2 [*om*. K]. [K 96ra; T 107ra] et vide in *Scripto* cum solutione sua || et vide in *Scripto*, d. 3, q. 5, a. 2.

Distinctio 4 [T1] Utrum Christus possit dici Filius Trinitatis. (sic)—univoca, sed analogia etc. [K 96$^{ra–b}$; T 107$^{ra–b}$] sicut in *Scripto*, d. 4, q. 2, a. 2 || sicut in *Scripto* ubi supra || vide in *Scripto*, quaestione supradicta || et trahitur de *Scripto* || vide rationem in *Scripto*, quaestione ubi supra.

Distinctio 5 [T1] Utrum unio facta fuerit in natura. Et vide 2 prima argumenta istius quaestionis in *Scripto* et in oppositum. In quaestione ista hic duo videnda quae etiam trahuntur de *Scripto*—In hoc tamen vide *Scriptum* et in solutione argumentorum. [K 96^{rb}; T 107$^{rb–va}$]

Distinctio 6: *see d. 3, q. 2, above*

Distinctio 7 [T1] Utrum in Christo sint plura supposita. (sic)—[T: unus calefacit et illuminat] [K: quae dicunt terminum quo]. [K 96$^{rb–va}$; T 107$^{va–b}$]

[T2] Utrum Christus sit duo. (sic)—pluralitas simpliciter, sed secundum quid. [T 107^{vb}–108ra]

[K2] Utrum ista sit vera absolute: 'Christus est duo vel plura'. (sic)—propter alietatem naturae. [K 96va–97ra]

[T3] Utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse vel duo. (duo)—secundum fidem nostram. [T 108$^{ra–b}$]

[K3] Utrum in Christo sit plura esse. (sic)—verum est essentiae. [K 97ra–98ra]

Distinctio 8 [T1] Utrum in Christo sint plures filiationes. (sic)—maius quam relatio. Ad argumenta [in contrarium solutio patet per iam dicta *add*. K]. [K 98$^{ra–va}$; T 108$^{rb–vb}$]

[T2] Utrum latria sit virtus generalis. (sic)—una est specialis, ut dictum est. [u.d.e. *om*. K] [K 98va–99ra; T 108^{vb}–109^{rb}]

Distinctio 10 [1] Utrum Christus in quantum homo sit Deus. (sic)—Ad argumenta sicut in *Scripto* [tertio Thomae K]. [K 99$^{ra–b}$; T 109^{rb}; V 76$^{rb–va}$: 0.8 col.]

Distinctio 11 [1] Utrum proprietas [proprietates T] humanae naturae praedicetur [praedicentur T] de Christo. (non)—sicut de homine in absoluto [abstracto K; ab^{to} V]. [K 99$^{rb–vb}$; T 109$^{rb–vb}$; V 76$^{va–b}$: 1.2 coll.] ut dictum est in primo.

⟨Distinctio 12⟩ [1] Utrum Christus ratione naturae humanae [*om*. K] fuerit nobilior quam Adam. Sine argumentis—Spiritus Sanctus totum supplere potuerit. [K 99^{vb}–100ra; T 109^{vb}; V 76^{vb}–77ra: 0.7 col.] hoc ponit articulus epis-

copi [*no. 187*] dicens "ponere quod nos intelligamus prius vel melius propter variationem intellectus passivi et potentiae sensitivae fantasticae [solum et non propter variationem intellectus agentis *add.* V] error est …" || hoc ponit articulus dicens "ponere quosdam intellectus substantialiter nobiliores aliis in hominibus error est …"

Distinctio ⟨13⟩ [1] Utrum illa sit vera: 'Ille homo incepit esse'. (sic)—Ad argumenta sicut in *Scripto*. [K 100ra; T 109^{vb}–110ra; V 77ra: 0.5 col.]

[2] Utrum gratia Christi fuerit infinita. (sic)—Ad primum [TV: solutiones utriusque vide in *Scripto*] [K: Ad argumenta, in *Scripto*]. [K 100$^{ra–va}$; T 110$^{ra–b}$; V 77$^{ra–b}$: 1.0 col.]

[3] Utrum Christus sit caput Ecclesiae secundum quod homo. (non)—omnes homines vel esse minus. [K 100$^{va–b}$; T 110$^{rb–va}$; V 77$^{rb–va}$: 0.7 col.]

Distinctio 14 [1] Utrum anima Christi videndo essentiam divinam cognoscat quaecumque relucent in ea. (non)—rerum novit quam anima Christi. [K 100^{vb}–101va; T 110va–111ra; V 77va–78^{rb}: 2.5 coll.] ut dicebatur in 2 [primo V].

Distinctio 15 [1] Utrum dolor Christi fuerit maximus. (non)—Ad argumenta. Ad primum et secundum in *Scripto*, quaestione ista, solutione 3 et 7, et vide per totum [q … t. *om.* K]. [K 101va–102ra; T 111$^{ra–va}$; V 78$^{rb–vb}$: 2.1 coll.]

Distinctio 16 [1] Utrum claritas [Christi *add.* K] quam habuit Christus [*om.* K] in transfiguratione fuerit gloriosa. (non)—in colorato et in medio. [K 102$^{ra–va}$; T 111$^{va–b}$; V 78^{vb}–79ra: 1.1 coll.] ut dicetur in quarto || in hoc sistit [consistit V] Thomas in *Scripto*.

Distinctio 17 [1] Utrum voluntas Christi secundum quod homo semper fuerit [*inv.* K] conformis voluntati divinae. (sic)—Ad rationes per dicta [distinctionem KV] et vide in *Scripto*, 1 et 2 argumento. [K 102va–103ra; T 111^{vb}–112^{rb}; V 79$^{ra–b}$: 1.6 coll.]

Distinctio 18 [1] Utrum in Christo fuerit tantum una actio. (sic)—hoc fecisset [posset T] verum concluderet [concludere T]. [K 103$^{ra–vb}$; T 112$^{rb–vb}$; V 79$^{rb–vb}$: 1.6 coll.]

[2] Utrum [Christus *add.* K] ab instanti suae conceptionis potuerit mereri. (non)—nunc potuit incipere mereri. [K 103^{vb}–104ra; T 112^{vb}–113ra; V 79^{vb}–80^{rb}: 1.5 coll.] ut dictum fuit in 2.

[3] Utrum fuerit necessarium humanam naturam reparari per passionem Christi. (non)—sed non de necessitate tertio modo. [K 104$^{ra–b}$; T 113$^{ra–b}$; V 80^{rb}: 0.8 col.]

Distinctio 21 [1] Utrum Christus resurrexerit tertia die [*inv.* K]. (non)—quantum ad corpus solare. [K 104va–105ra; T 113$^{rb–vb}$; V 80$^{rb–vb}$: 1.7 coll.]

[2] Utrum Christus resurrectionem suam argumentis probare [*inv.* K] debuerit [sine argumentis *add.* K]. Respondeo. Videnda sunt tria—quam iuste puni-

antur ostendat. [K 105$^{ra–b}$; T 113^{vb}–114ra; V 80^{vb}–81ra: 0.9 col.] ut dictum fuit in secundo.

[3] Utrum idem corpus Christi numero [*om.* K] fuerit vivum et mortuum [m.e.v. K]. (non)—remanerent divisa in morte. [K 105^{rb}–106va; T 114$^{ra–vb}$; V 81ra–82ra: 3.6 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 25**⟩ [1] Utrum omnes teneantur habere fidem explicitam de articulis fidei. (sic)—et quaere hoc, si vis [s.v.: de hoc K], in secunda secundae. [K 106va–107^{rb}; T 114^{vb}–115va; V 82$^{ra–va}$: 2.5 coll.] Ponit Raby Mo 5 rationes || Ad argumenta. Ad primum sicut in *Scripto*, q. 25, a. 4.

[2] Utrum sufficienter assignentur articuli. (non)—vide in *Scripto*. Ad argumenta sicut in *Scripto*, q. 25, solutione 4 et 5 [et 5 *om.* V]. [K 107$^{rb–vb}$; T 115$^{va–b}$; V 82va–83ra: 1.5 coll.]

Distinctio ⟨26⟩ [1] Utrum spes prout est virtus naturalis sit distincta ab aliis passionibus. (non)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, q. ista, 3 et 5 argumento et solutionibus eorum. [K 107^{vb}–108va; T 115^{vb}–116^{rb}; V 83$^{ra–va}$: 2.2 coll.]

Distinctio 27 [1] Utrum caritas sit forma aliarum virtutum. (non)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum* in quaestione ista, quae non est principalis, solutione 1 et 4 argumenti. [K 108$^{va–b}$; T 116$^{rb–va}$; V 83$^{va–b}$: 0.9 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 28**⟩ [1] Utrum teneamur diligere creaturas irrationales [rationes V] ex caritate. (sic)—Vide *Scriptum*, si volueris [s.v. *om.* K], quaestione ista, solutione 1 et 2 argumenti. [K 108^{vb}–109ra; T 116$^{va–b}$; V 83^{vb}–84ra: 1.2 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 29**⟩ [1] Utrum homo diligat sive diligere possit magis Deum [*inv.* K] quam se. (non)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, q. 29 [19 K]: utrum Deus sit super omnia diligendus, solutione 2 et 3 argumenti [s.2.3.a. *om.* K]. [K 109$^{rb–vb}$; T 116^{vb}–117va; V 84$^{ra–va}$: 2.2 coll.]

Distinctio 30 [1] Utrum magis [teneamur vel *add.* K] mereamur diligendo inimicos quam amicos. (sic)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, d. 30 [xix K], a. 3, solutione 3 et 4 argumenti. [K 109^{vb}–110va; T 117va–118ra; V 84va–85^{rb}: 2.4 coll.]

Distinctio 32 [1] Utrum in beatis evacuetur scientia quam habuerunt dum essent hic. (sic)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, quaestione ista, d. 31, solutione 3 et 4 argumenti. [K 110$^{va–b}$; T 118$^{ra–b}$; V 85^{rb}: 0.7 col.]

Distinctio 33 [1] Utrum virtus humana sit habitus operativus. (non)—in illo genere quod [i.g.q.: genere et illud T] est operatio. [K 110^{vb}–111^{rb}; T 118$^{rb–va}$; V 85$^{rb–vb}$: 1.5 coll.]

[2] Utrum omnes virtutes morales sint una virtus specifica. (sic)—in fine propinquo non communi fine [sive K] remoto. [K 111$^{rb–vb}$; T 118$^{va–b}$; V 85^{vb}–86ra: 1.4 coll.] Ad argumenta. Ad primum, vide in *Scripto*, quaestione ista, a. 1, in solutione argumenti 3.

[3] Utrum virtutes insint nobis a natura. Quaestio potest intelligi dupliciter—secundum virtutes naturales alias. [K 111^{vb}; T 118^{vb}–119ra; V 86$^{ra–b}$: 0.6 col.]

[4] Utrum virtutes generentur ex actibus. (non)—sicut expositum est supra, patet responsio. [K 111^{vb}–112va; T 119$^{ra–va}$; V 86$^{rb–vb}$: 2.1 coll.] Minor patet ex dictis lectione praecedenti.

[5] Utrum virtus consistat in medio. (non)—Ad argumenta. Ad primum, vide *Scriptum*, quaestione ista, solutione 4 argumenti. Et per idem solves ad 2. [K 112$^{va–b}$; T 119$^{va–b}$; V 86^{vb}–87ra: 0.7 col.]

[6] Utrum aliquis habitus sit in voluntate. Respondeo—ut voluntas possit illud appetere. [K 112^{vb} (*no blank*); T 119^{vb} (*then blank space 3/4 column*); V 87ra: 0.3 col. (*then blank space 3/4 column*)]

[7] Utrum sint [*om.* V] quattuor virtutes cardinales. (non)—et sic temptatori acquiescat [et sic fuit in apostolo Paulo etc. *add.* T] [K 112^{vb}–113^{rb}; T 120$^{ra–b}$; V 87$^{rb–va}$: 1.1 coll.] Vide in [+ *lacuna* T] secundo.

Distinctio 34 [1] Utrum dona sint virtutes. (sic)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, q. 34, a. 1, solutione 1 et 5 argumenti. [K 113$^{rb–vb}$; T 120$^{rb–va}$; V 87$^{va–b}$: 1.6 coll.] [ed. Lottin, pp. 676–679].

Distinctio 36 [1] Utrum virtutes morales sint connexae. (non)—bene potest se habere aliquis. [K 113^{vb}–114va; T 120va–121ra; V 87^{vb}–88^{rb}: 2.1 coll.] Ad primum, sicut in *Scripto*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, solutione 1 [s. 1 *om.* V] argumenti. Et ad 2, si vis, sicut in *Scripto*.

[2] Utrum virtutes sint aequales. (non) [sic T]—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 4, solutione 3, 4, et 5 argumenti. [K 114$^{va–b}$; T 121$^{ra–b}$; V 88$^{rb–va}$: 0.6 col.]

Distinctio 38 [1] Utrum praecepta sufficienter comprehendantur sub numero denario vel sint decem. (non)—sic autem [etiam V] aliae solemnitates. [K 114^{vb}–115^{rb}; T 121$^{rb–va}$; V 88$^{va–b}$: 1.5 coll.]

Distinctio 39 [1] Utrum omne mendacium sit peccatum. (non)—eveniant bona, ut dicit Apostolus [*om.* T]. [K 115$^{rb–va}$; T 121$^{va–b}$; V 88^{vb}–89ra: 0.8 col.] ut dico regem esse Parisius, ubi non est nec credo ipsum esse.

[2] Tertia [*om.* K] utrum omne mendacium [*inv.* T] in viris perfectis [i.v.p.o.m. K] sit peccatum [mortale *add. mg.* K]. (sic)—prohibetur ut peccatum mortale. [K 115$^{va–b}$; T 121^{vb}–122ra; V 89$^{ra–b}$ (*unmarked*): 0.7 col.]

[3] Utrum iuramentum sit licitum. (non)—qui iuramentum exigit, secunda secundae. [K 115^{vb}–116ra; T 122$^{ra–b}$; V 89$^{rb–va}$: 1.0 col.]

[4] Utrum omne [*om.* V] iuramentum sit obligatorium. (non)—vide solutiones amborum argumentorum in secunda secundae, q. 89, a. 7. [K 116$^{ra–b}$; T 122$^{rb–va}$; V 89$^{va–b}$: 1.1 coll.] quinque denarios … promittit fodienti V, sine dolo intendens quod essent Turonenses.

[5] Utrum omne periurium sit peccatum mortale. (non)—Et vide in secunda secundae et solutionem alterius argumenti, quaestione hac, in fine libri. [K 116$^{rb–va}$; T 122$^{va–b}$ (*then 3/4 column + f. 123 blank*); V 89^{vb}–90ra: 0.8 col.]

Explicits: K: *none* || T: *none* || V: Explicit liber tertius. Incipit quartus.

Liber Quartus

Distinctio 1 [1] Utrum sacramenta novae legis sint causa gratiae. (non)—principali, non de instrumento. [K 116va–117^{vb}; V 90$^{ra–vb}$: 3.7 coll.]

[T1] Circa 4 quaeritur, et primo circa distinctionem primam, utrum sacramenta novae legis causent gratiam. (non)—et per hoc solvitur dubium. [T 123$^{ra–vb}$] Ad argumenta in oppositum solve sicut in *Scripto*, quaestione de hac materia.

Correctorium 30: In principio quarti libri, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum sacramenta novae legis sint causa gratiae* … [166va–170^{vb} (167–169 *desunt*)]

[2] Utrum sacramenta sint necessaria ad salutem. (non)—et hoc est ex ordinatione divina. [V 90^{vb}–91^{rb}: 1.4 coll.]

[T2] Utrum sacramenta sint necessaria ad salutem. (non)—Ad argumenta sicut in *Scripto*, quaestione de hac materia. [T 123^{vb}–124^{rb}]

[3] Utrum sacramenta veteris legis conferrent gratiam \ministranti/. (sic)—in parvulo quam circumciso. [V 91^{rb}: 0.7 col.]

[T3] Utrum sacramenta veteris legis conferrent gratiam. (sic)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, quaestione de materia ista. [T 124^{rb}]

[4] Utrum sic sufficeret antiquitus parvulis ad salutem devotio parentis interior. (non)—habetur ex institutione divina. [V 91$^{rb–va}$: 1.0 col.] Thomas quando dicit || Ideo dicit Thomas in *Summa*.

[T4] Utrum parvulis sufficeret fides parentum ad salutem sine signo exteriori. (non)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*. [T 124$^{rb–va}$] Ipse tamen videtur hic corrigere, ultima parte, quaestione ⟨LXX⟩ [LCX], articulo ultimo, in solutione secundi argumenti.

Distinctio 2 [1] Utrum sint tantum septem sacramenta. (non)—institui alia sacramenta. [V 91va–92ra: 1.9 coll.]

[T1] Circa distinctionem 2 quaeritur de numero et sufficientia sacramentorum, et quaeritur utrum sint tantum septem. (non)—Vide *Scriptum* pro solutionibus. [T 124va–125ra]

[2] Utrum baptismus Iohannis conferret gratiam. (sic)—verum est dispositive. [V 92$^{ra–b}$: 0.6 col.]

[T2] Utrum in baptismo Iohannis conferretur gratia. (sic)—disponebat ad gratiam. [T 125$^{ra–b}$]

Distinctio 3 [1] Utrum forma baptismi sit conveniens. (non)—ex devotione communi Ecclesiae. [V 92$^{rb–va}$: 1.3 coll.] ut si dicatur in Gallico vel Latino.

[T1] Circa 3 distinctionem quaeritur utrum forma quam observamus in baptizando sit sufficiens. (non)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*, quaestione ista. [T 125$^{rb–va}$] Potest enim aliquis baptizando verba proferre in Latino vel Gallico vel Graeco.

Distinctio 4 [1] Utrum character sit aliquid in anima. (non)—non proprie et

stricte. [V 92va–93ra: 2.0 coll.] rex instituit quod denarius regis valeat x Turonenses.

[T1] Circa 4 distinctionem quaeritur utrum character ⟨sit⟩ [fit] aliquid in anima. (non)—cum sit ens rationis. [T 125va–126^{rb}] omnes doctores moderni || ut dictum fuit in prima quaestione || sicut dictum fuit in 2 et in 7.

Correctorium 31: Quarta distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum character sit aliquid* creatum *in anima* … [171$^{ra–va}$]

[2] Utrum parvuli Iudaeorum debeant baptizari invitis parentibus. (sic)—secundum corpus et secundum animam. [V 93$^{ra–b}$: 1.0 col.]

[T2] Utrum lice⟨a⟩t baptizare parvulos Iudaeorum invitis parentibus. (sic)—qui habeat ius in ipso. [T 126$^{rb–va}$]

[3] Utrum accedens ficte ad aliquod sacramentum, ut ad baptismum, recedente fictione habeat gratiam. Tria sunt videnda—bene recolit de ipsis. [V 93$^{rb–va}$: 0.9 col.]

[T3] Adhuc circa 4 distinctionem quaeritur utrum in eo qui fictus recipit sacramentum baptismi, recedente fictione, redeat res sacramenti, quae est gratia. (non)—tenentibus hanc opinionem, sed concedantur. [T 126va–127ra] sicut patebit infra cum quaeretur utrum confitens et non contritus sit absolutus a praecepto Ecclesiae quo praecipitur quod quilibet confiteatur semel in anno. [*Perhaps the missing question parallel to q. 32 in* V]

Correctorium 32: Eadem distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum accedens ficte ad aliquod sacramentum, puta ad baptismum, recedente fictione habeat gratiam* … [171va–172^{vb}]

Distinctio 5 [1] Utrum recipiens baptismum a malo ministro peccet mortaliter. (sic)—qui communicat excommunicato. [V 93va–94ra: 1.8 coll.] Et hoc dixit H. de Sansero cuidam papae a quo petebatur confirmatio conventus Camer⟨i⟩censis, et ipse respondit quod non plus valerent sibi missae fratrum quam aliorum hominum, cum* H. dixit quod falsum erat.

[T1] Circa 5 distinctionem quaeritur utrum recipiens sacramentum a malo ministro peccet mortaliter. (sic)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*. [T 127$^{ra–b}$]

Distinctio 6 [1] Utrum ad baptismum requiratur intentio baptizantis. (non)—dum est sedatus. [V 94$^{ra–b}$: 0.9 col.] si rex facit Iudaeum invitum baptizari.

[T1] Circa 6 distinctionem quaeritur utrum in conferendo sacramenta semper requiratur intentio ministrantis. (non)—et in illo potest baptizare. [T 127$^{rb–vb}$]

[2] Utrum in baptismo debeat expectari nativitas ex utero. (non)—Et ideo baptizatus simpliciter. [V 94$^{rb–va}$: 0.8 col.]

[T *deest*]

Distinctio 7 [1] Utrum sacramentum confirmationis sit nobilius baptismo. (non)—originis, ideo non valet. [V 94$^{va–b}$: 1.3 coll.]

[T1] Circa 7 distinctionem quaeritur utrum confirmatio sit sacramentum nobilius baptismo. (non)—ad tollendum peccatum originale. [T 127^{vb}–128ra]

[2] Utrum simplex sacerdos possit confirmare. (sic)—ad essentiam, ideo non valet. [V 94^{vb}–95^{rb}: 1.9 coll.]

[T2] Utrum sacerdos possit conferre sacramentum confirmationis. (sic)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*. [T 128$^{ra–va}$] [ed. Ott, pp. 149–152]

[3] Utrum sacramentum confirmationis habeat aliquam formam. (non)—ad essentiam, ideo non valet. [V 95^{rb}: 0.4 col.]

[T *deest*]

Distinctio 9 [1] Utrum sumptio alicuius cibi impediat sacramentum communion⟨is⟩[em] extra casum necessitatis. (non)—non alicuius, ideo non valet. [V 95$^{rb–vb}$: 1.4 coll.] transgressor praecepti regis || contra praeceptum regis || secundum Thomam.

[T1] Circa 9 distinctionem quaeritur utrum sumptio alicuius cibi impediat communionem sacramenti. (non)—Ad argumenta patet et vide *Scriptum*. [T 128va–129ra]

[2] Utrum forma sacramenti eucharistae sit 'Hic est corpus meum'. (non)—verba 'Hic est corpus meum'. [V 95^{vb}–96^{rb}: 1.6 coll.] secundum Thomam.

[T2] Utrum in hoc sacramento sit forma conveniens qua dicitur 'Hoc est corpus meum'. (non)—Ad argumenta, de primo est diversus modus dicendi, et vide in *Scripto*. Et ad 2 similiter. [T 129$^{ra–va}$]

[3] Utrum forma consecrationis sanguinis sit 'Hic est calix' etc. Aliqui dicunt—vel 'Hic est sanguis'. [V 96^{rb}: 0.3 col.]

[T3] Utrum forma sanguinis qua[e] dicitur 'Hic est calix' etc., sine argumentis, et vide *Scriptum*. [T 129va]

Correctorium 33: Octava (!) distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum sit* conveniens *forma consecrationis sanguinis, 'Hic est calix'* etc … [172^{vb}–173ra]

Distinctio 10 [1] Utrum immunditia vel pullulatio corporalis impediat sacramentum communion⟨is⟩[em]. (non)—necessitas quae non habet legem. [V 96$^{rb–vb}$: 2.3 coll.]

[T1] Circa 10 distinctionem quaeritur utrum propter pollutionem nocturnam debeat homo abstinere a sacra communione. (non)—Ad argumenta, vide *Scriptum* … aliae immunditiae impedirent. [T 129va–130ra]

Distinctio 11 [1] Utrum corpus Christi sit vere in sacramento altaris. (non)—localiter sed sacramentaliter. [V 96^{vb}–97^{rb}: 1.8 coll.]

[T1] Circa XI distinctionem quaeritur utrum corpus Christi vere sit in sacramento altaris. (non)—ut visum fuit in 2 articulo. [T 130$^{ra–va}$] sicut dictum fuit in primo libro.

Distinctio 12 [1] Utrum propter rarefactionem et condensationem quae est in speciebus sacramentalibus oporteat imponere duplicem quantitatem,

unam terminatam, aliam interminatam. (sic)—alias non, ut visum est. [V 97^{rb}–98ra: 2.7 coll.]

[T1] Circa 12 distinctionem quaeritur utrum in speciebus in sacramento altaris, puta quia rarefieri possunt, oporteat ponere dimensiones terminatas et interminatas. (sic)—impossible, ut visum fuit. [T 130va–131^{rb}]

[1] Utrum panis convertatur in corpus Christi, et ampliemus quaestionem utrum quodlibet possit converti in quodlibet, et secundo a quo possit esse ista conversio. Respondeo. Sciendum quod—sed solum cum successione, ideo etc. [V 98$^{ra–b}$: 1.5 coll.]

[T *deest*]

Correctorium 34: Undecima (!) distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum panis convertatur in corpus Christi* … [173$^{ra–vb}$]

Distinctio 13 [1] Utrum Deus possit facere accidens sine subiecto. (non)—ad agens naturale, non ad Deum. [E 97ra; V 98$^{rb–vb}$: 1.2 coll.]

[T1] Circa 13 distinctionem quaeritur utrum Deus possit facere accidens esse sine subiecto. (non)—productum ante producitur in alia. [T 131$^{rb–va}$]

[2] Utrum ex speciebus quae sunt in altari possit aliquid generari. (non)—ad rationem activi et passivi. [V 98^{vb}–99ra: 1.6 coll.]

[T2] Utrum ex speciebus existentibus in sacramento altaris possit aliquid generari. (non)—sicut patet de ovo etc. [T 131va–132ra]

Correctorium: Duodecima (!) distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum ex speciebus quae sunt in altari possit aliquid generari* … [173^{vb}]

[3] Utrum per ammixtionem alicuius liquoris desinat corpus Christi ⟨esse⟩ [vero] sub illis speciebus vini. Duae sunt opiniones—corpus Christi, sic ad istam quaestionem. [V 99$^{ra–b}$: 0.8 coll.]

[T3] Quaeritur sine argumentis utrum, si admisceatur aliquid corpori aut sanguini, desinat ibi esse corpus Christi vel sanguis. Respondeo—ad omnem partem propter humiditatem. [T 132$^{ra–b}$]

Distinctio 14 [1] Utrum eleemosyna spiritualis sit melior corporali. (non)—ex corruptione appetitus. [V 99$^{rb–va}$: 1.0 col.]

[T1] Circa 14 distinctionem quaeritur utrum eleemosyna spiritualis sit melior corporali. (non)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum* pro utroque. [T 132$^{rb–va}$]

[2] Utrum dare eleemosynam cadat sub praecepto. (non)—si non succurreret proximo. [V 99$^{va–b}$: 1.0 col.] secundum Thomam.

[T2] Utrum dare eleemosynam sit praeceptum. (non)—Ad argumenta vide *Scriptum*. [T 132va–133ra]

⟨Distinctio 15⟩ [1] Utrum attentio sit de necessitate orationis. Respondeo—ad necessitatem orationis absolute. [V 99^{vb}–100ra: 0.6 col.]

[T1] Utrum quando aliquis orat requiratur attentio. (sic)—et vide *Scriptum* vel* *Summam*.* [T 133$^{ra–b}$]

Distinctio 16 [1] Utrum omnis circumstantia mutet peccatum in aliud genus peccati. (non)—rationis, ideo non valet. [V 100$^{ra–b}$: 1.5 coll.]

[T1] Circa 16 distinctionem quaeritur utrum circumstantia mutet in aliud genus peccatum. (non)—Tunc intendit dicere quod in adulterio vel in furto in Ecclesia sunt duo peccata realiter. [T 133$^{rb–vb}$ (*ending prematurely, leaving 2/3 col. blank*)]

⟨**Distinctio 17**⟩ [1] Utrum dolor de peccato debeat esse maximus. (non)—intellectuali, ideo non valet. [V 100$^{rb–va}$: 0.9 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 18**⟩ [1] Utrum peccator teneatur confiteri statim cum peccaverit. Respondeo—obligationem praecepti Ecclesiae. [V 100$^{va–b}$: 1.5 coll.]

[2] Utrum participans cum excommunicato in casibus non concessis peccet mortaliter. (sic)—contumatia est mortale. [V 100^{vb}–101ra: 0.9 col.]

[3] Utrum quilibet sacerdos possit absolvere ab excommunicatione. (sic)—locum in sacramento paenitentiae. [V 101$^{ra–b}$: 1.0 col.] praelatus ordinarius potest committere novicio vel converso quod absolvat a vinculo minoris excommunicationis alium fratrem, sicut fecit prior Parisius.

⟨**Distinctio 19**⟩ [1] Utrum correctio fraterna cadet sub praecepto. Dico duo—audacius desperatus peccet. [V 101$^{rb–va}$: 0.9 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 20**⟩ [1] Utrum collator indulgentiarum implendo causam pro qua dantur indulgentiae lucretur indulgentiam. (non)—potest circa se exercere. [V 101va–102ra: 2.1 coll.]

[2] Utrum indulgentiae tantum valeant quantum sonant. (non)—omnes sunt aequales. [V 102$^{ra–b}$: 1.0 col.] Unde Petrus dicit || Sed Thomas dicit || De illis autem qui veniunt ad ecclesiam pro indulgentia, dicendum quod si est indulgentia perennis, sicut est Parisius ad beatam Virginem, quacumque vice venit propter hoc habet.

⟨**Distinctio 22**⟩ [1] Utrum propter ingratitudinem peccata prius dimissa redeant. (sic)—sed solum in suo simili. [V 102$^{rb–vb}$: 1.7 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 23**⟩ [1] Utrum extrema unctio sit unum sacramentum. (non)—sufficit unus presbyter. [V 102^{vb}–103ra: 0.7 col.]

[2] Utrum effectus extremae unctionis sit deletio peccati. (non)—spirituales, non corporales. [V 103ra: 0.6 col.] Vide in *Scripto*.

⟨**Distinctio 24**⟩ [1] Utrum sint tantum septem ordines. (non)—sacramenta, ideo non est simile. [V 103$^{ra–va}$: 1.2 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 25**⟩ [1] Utrum simonia commitatur tripliciter, scilicet propter munus a manu, a lingua, ab officio. (non)—est ibi loco muneris. [V 103$^{va–b}$: 1.0 col.] Dicit Thomas.

[2] Utrum semper sit simonia quando datur temporale pro spirituali. (non)—est quod potest concedi. [V 103^{vb}: 0.8 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 26**⟩ [1] Utrum matrimonium sit ⟨sacra⟩mentum. (non)—ad coniunctionem Christi et Ecclesiae. [V 103^{vb}–104^{rb}: 1.2 coll.]

Correctorium 35: Vicesima sexta distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum matrimonium sit sacramentum* … [173^{vb}–174ra]

⟨**Distinctio 28**⟩ [1] Utrum ad matrimonium requiratur consensus expressus quem significant verba de praesenti. (non)—sufficit quod non contradicat. [V 104^{rb}: 0.7 col.]

[2] Utrum ante finem primi septenii possunt (!) sponsalia contrahi. (sic)—reddere potest tenetur. [V 104$^{rb–vb}$: 1.4 coll.] sed Thomas dicit || sed Thomas dicit || sed Petrus non vult quod || V 104va *mg*.: Opinio Petri.

[3] Utrum carnalis copula sequens matrimonium per verba de futuro faciat ipsum verum matrimonium. (sic)—esset tamen nobilitatis condicionis. [V 104^{vb}: 0.7 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 29**⟩ [1] Utrum coactio impediat matrimonium. (non)—impedit matrimonium sic et causam eius. [V 104^{vb}–105^{rb}: 1.2 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 30**⟩ [1] Utrum error impediat matrimonium. (non)—habuit revelationem de hoc. [V 105^{rb}: 0.7 col.] dicit Guillelmus Antissiodorensis.

⟨**Distinctio 31**⟩ [1] Utrum matrimonium debeat habere aliqua bona excusantia ipsum. (non)—sed intrinsece, ideo non valet. [V 105$^{rb–vb}$: 1.6 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 32**⟩ [1] Utrum vir teneatur reddere debitum uxori non petenti. (non)—dominus hoc sibi non dicat. [V 105^{vb}: 0.5 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 33**⟩ [1] Utrum alter coniugum possit vovere castitatem sine licentia alterius. (sic)—onerosum, quod est inconveniens. [V 105^{vb}–106ra: 0.9 col.]

[2] Utrum virginitas sit virtus. (non)—licet non sit nisi ex omnibus. [V 106$^{ra–va}$: 1.2 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 34**⟩ [1] Utrum matrimonium debeat habere aliqua impedimenta. (non)—non sunt materia matrimonii. [V 106$^{va–b}$: 1.8 coll.]

[2] Utrum habere plures uxores sit contra legem naturae. (non)—esset contra statutum eius. [V 106^{vb}–107ra: 0.3 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 35**⟩ [1] Utrum vir causa fornicationis vel adulterii possit uxorem dimittere proprio iudicio sine iudicio Ecclesiae. (sic)—tales antiquitus lapidabantur. [V 107$^{ra–b}$: 1.1 coll.]

[2] Utrum in ista dimissione vir et uxor sint pares. (non)—plus peccet quo ad Deum. [V 107^{rb}: 0.5 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 36**⟩ [1] Utrum servitus impediat matrimonium. (sic)—sunt necessariae ad bonum matrimonii. [V 107$^{rb–va}$: 0.6 col.]

[2] Utrum partus quantum ad condicionem servitutis sequatur patrem vel matrem. (sequitur patrem)—sine periurio. [V 107va: 0.3 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 38**⟩ [1] Utrum papa possit dispensare in voto sollemni continentiae. (non)—non tenetur ad votum. [V 107va–108^{rb}: 2.9 coll.] ideo dicit Thomas.

[2] Utrum qui vovet intrare religionem et intrat cum proposito exeundi impleat votum sufficienter. (sic)—quod experiatur vires suas. [V 108$^{rb–va}$: 1.4 coll.]

verbi gratia, iste vovet ire ad Sanctum Iacobum || solum accipiendo habitum, sicut facit goliardus.

⟨**Distinctio 39**⟩ [1] Utrum inter infideles possit esse verum matrimonium. (non)—matrimonium, ideo potest solvi. [V 108$^{va–b}$: 1.0 col.]

[2] Utrum vir possit uxorem dimittere propter infidelitatem. (sic)—unica est unius, ideo etc. [V 108^{vb}–109ra: 0.8 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 40**⟩ [1] Utrum consanguinitas impediat matrimonium. (non)—simul coire, ideo non valet. [V 109$^{ra–va}$: 1.7 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 41**⟩ [1] Utrum affinitas impediat matrimonium. (non)—cuius est effectus, sed aliud. [V 109$^{va–b}$: 1.5 coll.]

[2] Utrum aliqua proles debeat dici illegitima. (non)—non imputetur ei ad culpam. [V 109^{vb}–110ra: 1.0 col.] Et idem iudicium est secundum *Summam* de casibus de rege Franciae in regno suo, quia tantam iurisdictionem habet rex in regno suo quantam imperator in imperio suo. [*context calls for emperor, so probably modified for France*]

⟨**Distinctio 42**⟩ [1] Utrum cognatio spiritualis impediat matrimonium. (non)—baptismum, ideo non est simile. [V 110$^{ra–b}$: 1.1 coll.]

[2] Utrum adoptio impediat matrimonium. (non)—mutuam cohabitationem nec aliquam cognationem. [V 110^{rb}: 0.6 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 43**⟩ [1] Utrum Deus possit corruptas eandem numero reparare, id est, utrum resurrectio sit possibilis. (sic)—conservatio rei in esse vel contractio. [V 110$^{rb–vb}$: 1.6 col.]

Distinctio 44 [1] Utrum, si anima Petri [a.p.: petrus E] in resurrectione acciperet corpus Pauli, esset idem Petrus numero. (non)—eandem formam est eadem numero. [E 97^{rb}; V 110^{vb}–111ra: 1.2 coll.] [ed. Köhler, pp. 523–527 (V); ed. Köhler, pp. 528–531 (E); ed. Weber, pp. 385–387 (V)]

Correctorium 36: Quadragesima quarta distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum, si anima Petri in resurrectione acciperet corpus Pauli, esset idem corpus numero* … [174$^{ra–va}$]

[2] Utrum spiritus incorporeus—ut daemon vel anima—affligatur ab igne corporeo. (non)—tamen non apprehendimus. [V 111$^{ra–vb}$: 3.1 coll.]

Correctorium 37: Eadem distinctione, quaestione qua quaerit *utrum spiritus incorporeus affligatur ab igne corporeo* … [174va–175^{rb}]

[3] Utrum per dotem subtilitatis corpus gloriosum possit esse in eodem loco cum alio corpore glorioso vel non glorioso. (sic)—potest fieri virtute divina. [V 111^{vb}–112^{rb}: 1.6 coll.]

[4] Utrum corpus gloriosum ratione suae claritatis sit visibile ab oculo nostro corporali. (non)—non videri sicut vult. [V 112$^{rb–va}$: 0.8 col.]

⟨**Distinctio 45**⟩ [1] Utrum sancti cognoscant cogitationes nostras. (non)—naturali, non de beatifica. [V 112va–113^{rb}: 2.3 coll.]

⟨**Distinctio 49**⟩ [1] Utrum beatitudo sit aliquid creatum. (non)—praesente in ratione obiecti. [V 113$^{rb–vb}$: 1.7 coll.] [see Jeschke, pp. 366–371]
[2] Utrum anima fit beatior post resurrectionem quam sit modo. (non)—partis tunc per modum totius [V 113^{vb}–114ra: 1.3 coll.]
[3] Utrum aureola sit aliquod additum super essentiale praemium. (non)—praemium quod est de bene esse. [V 114$^{ra–b}$: 0.7 col.]
[4] Utrum beatitudo consistat in actu intellectus vel in actu voluntatis. (in actu voluntatis)—vel annexus viventuti. [V 114$^{rb–vb}$: 2.7 coll.]
V: Explicit lectura super *Sententias*.

CHAPTER 14

Peter Aureoli's Various Uses of Averroes to Illustrate the Sapiential Character of Declarative Theology

Stephen F. Brown

Introduction

Durandus of Saint-Pourçain in the Prologue to his first *Commentary on the Sentences* (1307–1308) speaks of three meanings for the word 'theology'. In one sense, 'theology' signifies "a lasting quality in the soul by which we know the things handed down in Sacred Scripture and in the way that they are handed down to us, and this reasonably".[1] Essentially, the readings and expositions of the texts of Sacred Scripture are 'theology'. A second type of theology in Durandus's listing is at times called by him 'defensive theology', at others 'persuasive theology', and more formally at another time a "habitus declarativus articulorum et defensivus fidei" (a habit which brings understanding of the articles of the faith and defends them against error). Whatever the title, he defines it as "a lasting quality of the soul by means of which the faith and those things handed down in Sacred Scripture are defended and clarified by using sources that we know better".[2] In Durandus's judgment, this second form of theology, if not initiated by, at least was justified by St. Augustine in Book XIV of the *De Trinitate*:[3]

1 Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Commentarium in I Sententiarum* (redactio prima), Prol., q. 1, cod. Paris, Nat. lat. 14, 454, f. 31ra: "Videtur autem theologia secundum suum nomen accipi tripliciter: uno modo prout dicit habitum quo cognoscimus ea quae in sacra doctrina traduntur et ut in ea traduntur, et hoc rationabiliter".

2 Id., ibid.: "Secundo modo accipitur theologia pro habitu quo fides et ea quae in Scriptura traduntur defenduntur et declarantur ex quibusdam principiis nobis notioribus".

3 Ibid.: "Et sic accipit eam Augustinus, libro XIV *De Trinitate*, dicens quod 'huic scientiae illud tantummodo tribuitur quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur'. Et subdit immediate: 'Qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant fide plurimum: aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat, aliud autem scire quomodo hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur—quam proprio vocabulo Apostolus scientia appellare videtur' ". Cf. Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 1037).

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> To this science is attributed only those things by which that most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; and in this knowledge most of the faithful are not strong, however exceedingly strong in the faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what man ought to believe in order to attain a blessed life, which must needs be an eternal one; but another to know in what way this belief itself may both help the pious, and be defended against the impious, which last the Apostle seems to call by the special name of science [*scientia*].

'Theology' for Durandus has yet a third meaning. He describes it as "a lasting quality of the soul by means of which it deduces further things from the articles of the faith and the sayings of Sacred Scripture in the way that conclusions are deduced from principles".[4] He names this third form of theology 'deductive theology' and notes that it is the more common type of theology in his day.

Here we will focus on the second form of theology and for simplicity's sake we will call it 'declarative theology' (*habitus declarativus articulorum*). The Latin expression in this case adds a detail that is important: declarative theology differs from deductive theology especially insofar as it centers our attention on gaining a better understanding of the *articuli fidei* or articles of the faith. Declarative theology concentrates on the basic truths of the Christian faith. If you ask in regard to declarative theology "is theology science?" you are essentially asking, in Durandus's perpective, whether the articles of the Creed can be demonstrated? In short, are articles of the Christian faith—such as the Trinity and the Incarnation—accepted on faith or on evidence. If 'science' has the meaning 'accepted as true because of evidence that forces our assent', then declarative theology is not science. Such fundamental truths of the Christian faith are certainly not demonstrable to someone in the present life by using natural things that are more familiar to us and treating them as aides or analogies to tell us something about the Trinity or the Incarnation. To establish this point, Durandus presents three theses: (1) we cannot demonstrate, that is, show with the type of evidence that would force our assent, such articles of faith as the Trinity or the Incarnation; (2) we cannot demonstrate or argue with convincing evidence that such truths of the faith do not include impossibilities; and (3) we

4 Durandus de Sancto Porciano, cit., f. 31^{rb}: "Tertio modo accipitur theologia communius—nescio tamen si verius—pro habitu eorum quae deducuntur ex articulis fidei et ex dictis sacrae Scripturae sicut conclusiones ex principiis, et hic modus vertitur communiter nunc in ore loquentium".

cannot establish demonstratively, that is, based on assent-producing evidence, that arguments against the Trinity and the Incarnation can be refuted.[5]

1 Peter Aureoli on the Nature of Declarative Theology

The first Carmelite Master at Paris, Gerard of Bologna, evaluated the position of Durandus concerning the second member of his division of theology, namely, defensive or declarative theology, in the first question of his *Summa*.[6] If Durandus contends, as he does, that faith and theology deal with or are about the same objects, and also holds that objects about which there is faith cannot be something known in an evident way by the wayfarer, as Durandus also holds, then he cannot call theology "a science that defends the faith", since it is not the type of science which is based on evidence. At the end of this and similar evaluations, Gerard concludes quite simply: "It is clear then that the second member of the aforesaid distinction is presented in an obscure and dubious way, unless it would be restated in a different fashion, which could be done at another time".[7] The Franciscan Peter Aureoli, who knew the works of Gerard of Bologna, accepted the invitation: he restated the question concerning declarative theology in a different way. Aureoli notes that many different procedures take place in the study of theology. However, he claims that the procedure that is the most properly theological is the practice of declarative theology. How does he restate its nature? Declarative theology takes place "when you start with some proposition about which it has been determined what has to believed and held by faith, and then reasons for believing it are brought forth, and then doubts concerning it are dissolved, and terms expressing it are explained. When a theologian has

5 Id., ibid., f. 31^{vb}: "Si autem accipiatur fides secundum aliqualem materiam de qua est, utpote fides articulorum de qua loquuntur theologi, sic dicendum est primo quod puri viatores de talibus sic habent fidem quod de eis non possunt habere scientiam proprie dictam, non propter formalem rationem fidei sed propter conclusionem quae modo non est demonstrabilis aut simpliciter aut huic, scilicet, viatori, et hoc ex naturalibus, supposita etiam fide. Secundo ostendetur quod nullus viator potest de talibus habere scientiam etiam naturalem. Quantum autem ad primum ostenduntur tria. Primum est quod non potest demonstrari quod sic sit sicut dicit articulus. Secundum est quod non potest demonstrari quod articulus nihil impossibile includat. Tertium est quod rationes adductae contra articulum non possunt solvi sic quod scientifice constet de eorum solutione".

6 Gerardus Bononiensis, *Summa*, q. 1, a. 1, in: P. de Vooght (ed.), *Les Sources de la Doctrine Chrétienne*, Bruges 1954, pp. 270–275.

7 Id., ibid., p. 271: "Patet ergo quod obscure et dubie positum est secundum membrum distinctionis praedictae, nisi aliter declareretur, quod alias fieri poterit".

performed these tasks, then he has a habit that is properly theological".[8] Now such a habit is not a habit of science, for it does not cause our assent; nor is it a habit of faith, since faith was already present; nor is it a habit of opinion, for opinion is a weak form of knowledge which is incompatible with faith.[9] "Therefore, a habit developed by the performance of these tasks should properly be called a theological habit, since to the attainment of this ⟨declarative⟩ habit the conclusions of the doctors of theology are directed, as well as the *Book of the Sentences*, and the original writings of the Fathers, and the reading and explaining of the Scriptures".[10]

Peter reformulates this statement in four propositions which attempt to make his position more precise.[11] First of all, from a study where, concerning the things that we believe, probable arguments are taken from other sciences and brought in as supports, and where all doubts concerning declarations of faith are resolved, and all terms used to express truths of the faith are clarified, and where the Scriptures are explained, another habit is acquired beyond the habit of faith. Aureoli argues for this habit which is distinct from the habit itself of faith by contending that whoever possesses an intellectual habit that is distinct from the habit by which he assents to a believed truth has a habit distinct from the faith that he has concerning that truth.[12] So, a believer who has arguments of the kind we have spoken about, solutions to doubts concerning Christian beliefs and all the other things mentioned in this regard, has a habit in relation to the things which he believes that is distinct from the assent that he gives, for such a habit is said in some way to be one by which he understands what he believes, and gives a justifying reason for those things that are in him by faith, and knows how the faith is to be defended against those who attack

8 Peter Aureoli, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum*, prooem., a. 2, n. 91, (ed. E.M. Buytaert), I, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1950, p. 159: "In tertio autem processu, dum scilicet procedit ur ad propositionem aliquam, de qua determinatum est quid est credendum et tenendum per fidem, et tamen cum hoc inducuntur rationes ad illam, solvuntur dubia et termini explicantur, acquiritur habitus proprie theologicus".

9 Id., ibid.: "[…] acqiritur habitus proprie theologicus, qui nec est scientia, nec fides quae ante habebantur, sed nec opinio […]".

10 Ibid.: "[…] sed ille habitus, qui proprie theologicus dici debet, quoniam ad acquisitionem istius conclusiones doctorum, liber *Sententiarum* et Sanctorum originalia et Scripturarum lectura ac expositio ordinantur".

11 Ibid., n. 92: "Nunc ergo tertio dicendum est quod videtur, sub propositionibus quatuor".

12 Ibid.: "Prima quidem quod ex huiusmodi studio theologico, quo videlicet ea quae credimus, rationibus probabilibus sumptis ex aliis scientiis *deducuntur, et dissolvuntur omnia dubia, declarantur termini et explicatur Scriptura*. Ex hoc siquidem studio, quod est proprie theologicum, aliquis alius habitus acquiritur ultra patet".

it, and how it is to be strengthened in the minds of pious believers, following the authoritative statement of Augustine.[13] Such a person knows how "to speak wisdom among those that are perfect",[14] as the Apostle boasts, and he is well practiced in distinguishing what is good from what is evil. He also enjoys many other acts that are not found in those who are people of simple faith, insofar as they are people of simple faith. Therefore, such a believer has some other habit that is distinct from faith, by means of which he can with facility carry out these acts catalogued by Augustine.[15]

Peter Aureoli offers us a second proposition concerning declarative theology that distinguishes it from faith itself. For Aureoli declarative theology is a theological habit that does not make one cling to the faith, nor does it cause any assent in the intellect to the truths that are believed. If a theological habit were related to causing assent and if it were a habit that would make us adhere to something, then it would through the probable supporting arguments it employs only be at the level of opinion. Now this is completely impossible to admit, both because then a theological habit would be an especially unworthy one, and also because opinion includes within its nature the fear that one could be wrong. A theological habit then would make a believer who develops it have some concern in regard to the truths he believes, whereas a simple believer would not have such a doubt. It would be foolish to add to faith such a habit, one attained through study, since it would not support the faith but would weaken it or make it less perfect. Peter rather concludes that the theological habit which is developed by supporting faith with probable arguments and confirmations and by providing explanations of terms and similar helps

13 Cf. Augustinus, ibid, note 3, above.

14 Cf. I Petri, 3, 15: "Dominum autem Christum sanctificate in cordibus vestris parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est spe".

15 Peter Aureoli, cit., nn. 93–95, pp. 159–160. Among the clarifications Aureoli presents here is a hint about the parallel he sees between declarative theology and some of the philosophical endeavors carried out by Averroes. Cf. n. 93, pp. 159–160: "Positis namque causis sufficientibus ad productionem alicuius effectus producitur ille effectus; sed in fideli, qui habet propositiones probabiles et expositiones terminorum et cetera quae sunt dicta respectu credibilium veritatum, concurrunt quidem causae sufficientes ad causandum aliquem habitum intellectualem, cum lumen intellectus naturale sit agens principale, et propositiones ut instrumenta ad acquirendum intellectualem habitum, secundum Commentatorem in III *De anima*; ergo ex istis causabitur aliquis habitus in intellectu fidelis. Sed manifestum est quod non fides, quia prius de illa veritate fidem habebat; igitur aliquis alius". Cf. Averroes, *In Aristotelis De anima librum tertium*, tc. 36, (ed. F.S. Crawford), Cambridge, MA 1953, pp. 479–502.

is not a habit that makes someone cling to the truths of the faith or a habit causing assent in the intellect of a believer.[16]

Since declarative theology employs, along with analogies and precisely defined terms, probable arguments, and probable arguments on their own beget opinion, and opinion is often associated with concern that one's opinion might be incorrect, Aureoli here notes that in declarative theology probable arguments do not cause consent. They are supporting arguments which confirm the consent based solely on faith. Faith is assent-producing. Declarative theology's arguments bring understanding to the truths accepted on faith. Believers, however, do not always clearly understand or grasp the truths which they most firmly believe are true. The kind of doubt which is based on a lack of clear understanding is not a doubt concerning the truths of the faith which are firmly believed. It may rather be a fruitful form of doubt which leads a believer to clearer understanding. Such doubts might be due to many reasons: believers might not grasp the meaning of terms like 'eternal', 'immutable' or 'maker of heaven and earth' in statements affirming such terms of God. They might encounter arguments related to their faith which distort its understanding and confuse them; or they might lack analogies or examples which might better lead them to grasp the mysteries of the faith. Declarative theology aims at overcoming through better understanding doubts of this kind.[17]

The third proposition that Aureoli presents argues that the most proper habit that is developed by the study of theology is *only* declarative.[18] In stressing the declarative character of theology Peter has already called upon Augustine, the *quaestiones* of the doctors of theology, the *Book of the Sentences*, the original writings of the Fathers and the *lectiones* and *expositiones* of the Scriptures.[19]

Aureoli's fourth proposition is "that the habit we speak of [when we ask whether from the study of theology and using one's natural talents any habit

16 Peter Aureoli, cit., n. 96, pp. 160–161: "Secunda propositio est quod huiusmodi habitus non est adhaesivus, nec aliquem assensum causans in intellectu respectu credibilium veritatum. Si enim aliquem assensum causaret, et esset habitus adhaesivus, esset opinio, quod omnino dici non potest, tum quia nimis esset indignus habitus theologicus, tum quia opinio includit essentialiter formidinem et sic sequeretur quod habitus theologicus fidelem faceret formidare circa veritates, de quibus fidelis simplex nullatenus formidat. Stultum etiam esset talem habitum per studium comparare, cum non perficeret fidem, sed magis imperficeret. Et ideo dicendum est quod talis habitus nullum assensum causat […]".

17 Id., ibid., nn. 97–111, pp. 161–164.

18 Ibid., n. 112, p. 164: "Tertia propositio est quod huiusmodi habitus est tantummodo declarativus".

19 Cf. note 10, above.

distinct from the habit of faith is acquired?] has the character of the intellectual virtue of wisdom, which is dealt with in Book VI of the *Ethics*".[20] For Aureoli, this is also what the Saints had in mind when they spoke of the 'light' and 'intelligence' they aimed at in their disputations and through the treatises they composed. Here where he describes the main practice of theologians down through the ages, he is really adding a further claim: it is not only the Saints who pursued such wisdom. Aristotle and Averroes at times were pursuing the same end.

2 Aristotle and Averroes as Supporters of Declarative Argumentation

When fourteenth-century medieval theologians asked whether theology was a science, they might, like Durandus, say: before we answer this question, we have to ask "what is 'theology'?" Generally, however, they no longer had to ask "what is 'science'?" They presumed that 'science' in its strict sense is what Aristotle said it was in the *Posterior Analytics*. Without all the details, it is "sure knowledge assented to because of evidence". It was within this context that Durandus could firmly state that declarative theology is not science. Nonetheless, without ever claiming that he was achieving 'science' in this strictest of senses, Aristotle also at times practiced "declarative philosophy". Aureoli claims that Averroes tells us so:

> Every habit that makes something to be imagined better by the intellect without causing assent is a declarative habit. We have added the phrase 'to be imagined better by the intellect' so that our statement might agree with the way of speaking that is used by the Commentator in Book XII of the *Metaphysics* and in *On the Soul*. He uses the phrase 'to imagine through the intellect' in contrast to the kind of imagination that takes place in an interior sense. We have also added the phrase 'makes something to be imagined without causing assent', so that it might be clear that the theological habit is only a declarative one and in no way causes assent. Now, a habit generated by theological study of the kind we have indicated does what was stated. For, the reason why a man may not clearly grasp or imagine something to be true which he believes most firmly can arise from four

20 Peter Aureoli, cit., n. 117, p. 166: "Quarta vero propositio ista est quod habitus, de quo loquimur, habet vere rationem sapientiae virtutis intellectualis, de qua tractatur in VI *Ethicorum*, et illud lumen et intelligentia, de qua sancti faciunt mentionem, et ad quam conantur pervenire suis disputationibus et tractatibus quos componunt".

sources. First, because he does not grasp the meaning of the terms. Secondly, because there are arguments against what he believes and these arguments confuse his intellect and prevent him from stating what he believes. Thirdly, because he lacks examples, or confirming arguments, or analogies related to what he believes. For, such things help someone to imagine well the things he holds, as the Commentator declares in Book IV of the *Physics*: that it was the custom of Aristotle to use rhetorical examples in cases where it was hard to imagine the realities that he was speaking about. Fourthly, when the believer does not have probable reasons for what he believes. For, although he believes something to be true by a command of the will, nonetheless, he does not have any help from the intellect, and so he does not grasp or conceive well what he believes if he does not have probable arguments. On the other hand, that theological habit, in regard to what he believes to be true, that brings forth an explanation of terms, and reasons that overcome objections, and examples, and confirming arguments that are probable, and helpful analogies—such a habit will be one that makes the believer imagine in a better and clearer way the things he believes, and yet it will not be what makes him believe, since he most firmly would already hold these things by faith. Therefore, such a habit is only declarative.[21]

21 Id., ibid., nn. 112–113, pp. 164–165: "Omnis enim habitus, qui facit aliquid imaginari melius per intellectum absque omni adhaesione, est habitus declarativus. Additur autem hic 'imaginari per intellectum', ut sit conformis loquendi modus modo Commentatoris, XII *Metaphysicae* et in *De anima*, qui dicit imaginationem per intellectum ad differentiam imaginationis quae est sensus interior. Additur quoque quod absque omni adhaesione faciat imaginari melius, ut appareat quod est tantum declarativus talis habitus et nullo modo adhaesivus. Sed habitus generatus ex huiusmodi theologico studio facit quod dictum est; quod enim homo aliquam propositionem non clare imaginetur aut capiat, quam tamen credit firmissime esse veram, oriri potest ex quatuor. *Primo* quidem quia termini non capiuntur. *Secundo* vero quoque quia in oppositum sunt rationes, intellectum involventes et impedientes non possit componere quod credit. *Tertio* quoque quia non sunt exempla, manuductiones et similitudines ad illud quod creditur; talia enim faciunt bene imaginari, ut Commentator testatur IV *Physicorum* quod mos erat Aristotelis uti exemplis rhetoricis in locis difficilis imaginationis. *Quarto* vero, cum non sunt probabiles rationes ad illud; licet enim illud credatur esse verum ex imperio voluntatis, non tamen bene capitur aut concipitur ductu intellectus, si deficiunt probabiles rationes. Per oppositum igitur habitus ille, qui ad propositionem quae vera esse creditur, adducit terminorum explicationem, rationem involventium dissolutionem et exempla, et manuductiones rationum probabilium, adminicula et inductiones, talis inquam erit melius et clarius cred-

Aureoli picks up on Averroes's expression in the Latin form 'imaginari per intellectum', an expression the Commentator uses in his reflections on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *De anima*. Its use in an early chapter of Book I of the *De anima* provides limited understanding of how this expression is connected to the discussion of 'declarative theology'. The exact Latin expression in Averroes's text is "ut in imaginatione per intellectum" which corresponds to the Arabic text which is translated literally by Richard Taylor as "representation (or image forming) by the intellect", but since Averroes employs this expression when talking about 'passiones animae', not in the sense of affections of the soul that might be attributed to the concupiscible powers, but rather to affections that belong to the soul alone, it really has the meaning of 'conceptualizing' or 'conceptualization'.[22]

Now let's try to tie the Averroistic expression 'imaginari per intellectum' to a 'declarative exercise' in contrast to a 'demonstrative activity'. The Commentator provides this link in his *Commentary on Book XII of the Metaphysics*, where he deals with the Prime Mover as the cause of the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars. The principle or cause is "imagined by intellectual representation, not sense perception or imagination".[23]

Averroes confirms, supports, gives understanding—declares—his position by two examples which he adduces to illustrate it. The world is like a well-ordered state in which everybody obeys and imitates the king and in which individual leaderships, such as that of the head of a family over his family, are subordinated to the king's universal authority. The immanent perfection of the cosmos depends on the analogy of a transcendent ruler in the same way as the order of a state depends on the presence of a good king.[24] A parallel example

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ita faciens imaginari, et tamen absque hoc quod faciat adhaerere, cum prius per fidem firmissime tenerentur. Ergo talis habitus erit mere declarativus".

22 *Averroes* (*Ibn Rushd*) *of Cordoba: Long Commentary on the 'De anima' of Aristotle*, trans. R.C. Taylor, Yale University Press, 2009, p. 4, n. 14. Cf. also p. 292, n. 4.

23 Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, XII, t. 37, (ed. Iuntina [1562–1574]), VIII, f. 319va: "Et dicit hoc ad demonstrandum quod principium istius motus non est phantasia neque sensus, sed imaginatio per intellectum et desiderium, et quod hoc corpus movet in loco est ab imaginatione in actu. Et quia imaginatio per intellectum quae est actio intellectus est ipse intellectus: intellectus autem est ipsum intellectum, ut dictum est in libro *De anima*, deinde dicit: Intellectus vero est ex intellecto, id est, essentia autem et substantia intellectus est ex intellecto. Et quia intellecta sunt plurium rerum, incoepit demonstrare quod intellectum est illud intellectum quod movet totum coelum motu diurno qui est maximus et velocissimus motuum". Cf. *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, trans. C. Genequand, Leiden 1984, t. 37, p. 151.

24 Id., ibid., f. 320$^{ra–vb}$. Cf. also ibid., t. 44, ff. 327^{rb}–328ra. Cf. *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, t. 44, p. 173.

given by Averroes is that of the various techniques subordinated to a particular aim, for instance horse-riding; it is necessary to have a clear view of that aim in order to know how to make bridles, saddles, and so forth. The intended result, horse-riding, is one, but the techniques employed to achieve that end are multiple because each one of them apprehends a different aspect of it.[25] (One might notice that this is an example of the subordination of a science Aristotle employed at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*[26] as an alternative to the more strict scientific examples he uses in the *Posterior Analytics*[27]).

3 Aureoli's Portrait of Wisdom according to Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'

Peter Aureoli, however, goes well beyond gathering examples of fruitful non-demonstrative argumentation in the texts of Averroes and the Commentator's understanding of Aristotle. He provides a list of the *seven acts of wisdom* we can find when we read the text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. When we first read this list of the seven acts of wisdom, we might gain the impression that Aureoli has gathered the seven items quite arbitrarily. However, he quickly informs us that Aristotle's text of the *Metaphysics* has seven parts parallel to the seven acts of wisdom.

The first act of wisdom is to show when someone is mistaken. This is what Aristotle does in Book I of the *Metaphysics*, where the Philosopher criticizes the errors of the philosophers, first in a general way and then taking them one by one. In no other work than the *Metaphysics* are all the separate errors criticized in one book. And he explicitly tells us that seeing why someone is wrong in this general way is a principal part of wisdom.[28]

The second act of wisdom is finding a general method for arriving at truth. This is unlike the particular sciences where each science provides a method for arriving at its proper truths or has its own proper logic. Philosophy, taken in the more proper sense where it is universal, as metaphysics is, should hand down its general method of arriving at truth as such. This is what the Philosopher does in Book II of the *Metaphysics*, and that is why Averroes begins his

25 Ibid., f. 328r. Cf. *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics*, t. 44, pp. 173–174.

26 Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora* I 13 (78b35–79a2).

27 Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* I 1 (1094a16–19).

28 Peter Aureoli, cit., n. 119, p. 167: "*Primus* quidem est manifestare mentientem, et hunc assumit Philosophus in I *Metaphysicae* ubi reprobat errores philosophorum insimul et coniunctim, cum tamen in nulla alia scientia omnes errores seorsum in uno libro reprobentur; cuius ratio est quia manifestare mentientem est una pars principalis sapientiae".

commentary on Book II by pointing out that "since this science pursues truth in an unqualified sense, it begins by pointing out the character that the general method of arriving at truth in this unqualified sense must have".[29]

The third act of wisdom is to debate difficult questions and give the *pro* and *contra* arguments for each side. This is the proper quality of a wise man and a dialectician, as the Commentator says at the beginning of Book III of the *Metaphysics*.[30] This is also the book where Aristotle gathers all the *aporiae*, i.e., the puzzles a metaphysician must face, including, for example, the question "How can there be one science of all things?" "What would be the subject dealt with by such a science?" If 'being' were the one subject matter or the *genus* of this science, then what could be the reason for different things to be different? Would the specific difference be 'non-being'?[31]

The fourth act of wisdom is to defend basic principles against those who deny them. As is clear in Book IV of the *Metaphysics*, this act pertains in a special way to metaphysics, since metaphysics deals with basic principles which are assumed by all the particular sciences.[32]

The fifth act of wisdom is to explain the general and multiple meanings designated by the same terms and to trace them back to the first meaning, i.e., when the term was first applied which serves as the basis for the other meanings. This is one of the principal parts of wisdom, as the Commentator says in Book V of the *Metaphysics*, since a consideration of such meanings is one way of explaining the connections of the various subjects one is treating in any science, as the Commentator says in the same place.[33]

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29 Id., ibid., n. 120, p. 167: "*Secundus* vero actus est modum tradere generalem perveniendi ad veritatem. Sicut enim quaelibet particularis scientia modum tradit perveniendi ad suas proprias veritates, ut patet II *Physicorum* ubi Aristoteles venatur modum procedendi philosophi naturalis, et universaliter quaelibet particularis scientia habet suam propriam logicam, ut dicit Commentator, II *Metaphysicae*, sic philosophia simpliciter et universalis, qualis est metaphysica, debet tradere modum perveniendi ad veritatem simpliciter […]".

30 Ibid., n. 121, p. 167: "*Tertius* autem actus est disputare de difficilibus quaestionibus et arguere pro et contra. Hoc enim est proprium sapientis sicut et dialectici, ut Commentator dicit in principio III *Metaphysicae*, in quo libro Aristoteles assumit istum actum".

31 Aristotle, *Metaphysica* III 5 (998b22–23).

32 Peter Aureoli, cit., n. 122, p. 167: "*Quartus* vero est defendere principia contra negantes ea; hoc enim maxime pertinet ad primum philosophum, ut patet in IV *Metaphysicae* in quo quidem libro Aristoteles assumit illum actum".

33 Id., ibid., n. 123, p. 167: "*Quintus* vero est explicare intentiones generales nominibus eisdem designatas et reducere illas ad unam primam cui attribuitur primo ratio nominis. Haec est enim una pars per se sapientiae, ut dicit Commentator in V *Metaphysicae*, pro eo

The sixth act of wisdom is to demonstrate the most common and most general truths that are demonstrable. To have scientific knowledge of the most universal realities is in a special way the chief characteristic of a wise man, as is said in Book I of the *Metaphysics*. So, in Book VI, where Aristotle begins the demonstrative part of his *Metaphysics* he introduces his first division of being. In Books VII and VIII he deals with being which is divided by the ten predicamental modes of being, dealing principally with substance and distinguishing second substance from first substance. In Book IX he goes on to treat of being as divided into act and potency and in Book X he treats being as divided into the one and the many. These five books (*Metaphysics* VI–X) form the sixth part of the *Metaphysics* and this part of the work is the first part to deal with wisdom as science.[34]

The seventh act of wisdom treats spiritual beings, such as God and the separated intelligences. In Book XII he deals with the First Principle and with the separated intelligences according to his own view. In Books XIII and XIV he criticizes the errors of other philosophers, for instance, those who, like Pythagoras, admit the existence of subsistent numbers and, like Plato, posit the Ideas as separated substances. And in this way the whole metaphysical habit is completed in terms of the seven acts of the wise man.[35]

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quod consideratio de talibus intentionibus est unus modus quo declarat sua subiecta, ut dicitur *ibidem*. Et ideo istum actum assumit Aristoteles libro quinto".

34 Ibid., n. 124, p. 168: "*Sextus* vero est veritates communissimas et generalissimas quae demonstrabiles sunt demonstrare. Scire enim universalissima est maxime proprium sapientis, ut dicitur I *Metaphysicae*. Et ideo in VI, ubi Aristoteles incipit partem demonstrativam *Metaphysicae*, agit de duobus modis entis, videlicet de ente per accidens et ente in anima quod est verum. In VII vero et in VIII de ente diviso per decem modos essendi praedicamentales. Sed quia substantia est principale ens et ea notificata notificatur accidens, ut dicitur in principio VII, idcirco in VII et VIII principaliter agit de substantia. Secunda quidem, quae est quod quod est et eius partes in VII; prima vero, cuius partes sunt forma et materia, et ipsa tertia resultans ex his in VIII. In IX autem agit de ente diviso per actum, et in X de uno et multo, quae sunt aequalis ambitus cum ente. Et sic completur in his quinque libris pars sexta *Metaphysicae*, quae tractat de communissimis et universalissimis veritatibus".

35 Ibid., n. 125, p. 168: "*Septimus* autem actus est de entibus spiritualibus pertractare, illis dumtaxat quae sunt penitus a materia liberata, quales sunt Deus et intelligentiae abstractae. Et quia haec pars est nobilior sapientiae, idcirco in XI Aristoteles resumit ea quae dicta sunt in praecedentibus libris et in libro accomodata ad istam perscrutationem. In XII autem tractat de primo principio et intelligentiis abstractis secundum suam opinionem. In XIII autem et in XIV errores aliorum reprobat circa substantias abstractas, eorum qui posuerunt numeros subsistentes et ideas substantias separatas. Et sic completur totus habitus metaphysicae secundum septem actus sapientis".

The seven acts of wisdom correspond to the seven parts of the *Metaphysics*. The study we call metaphysics is considered both by Aristotle and Averroes as wisdom. Now Aristotle, in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, portrays wisdom as a combination of two intellectual virtues: the virtue of science (or demonstrative knowledge) and the virtue of understanding. As Books VI–XIV are demonstrative treatises or science, (in fact Aureoli treats Book VI as the place where Aristotle begins the demonstrative part of his *Metaphysics*), the earlier books must be wisdom in the sense of understanding. Aureoli does not make the explicit claim that all the first five books are understanding forms of wisdom. Neither does he cite challenges to it. He simply states:[36]

> The habit of metaphysics in two of its parts, namely, in Book IV where it defends first principles and in Book V where it explains the meanings of terms, can doubtlessly make the claim for being wisdom, and yet in these parts it is only declarative and not at all a habit by which one assents to the principles, because this is common to the other sciences, that is, to have a habit causing assent. For it is certain that first principles are not proved, except by refutation or by a dialectical argument [...]. This habit is science when it demonstrates and understanding when it clarifies or defends principles and explains the meaning of terms. It is not called 'understanding' in so far as it assents to principles. Rather it is called 'understanding' in so far as it defends, clarifies, provides arguments, explains and supports the first principles. It is this that is characteristic of a wise man [...].

Aureoli might describe the wisdom-character of the earlier books of the *Metaphysics* as declarative philosophy. At times Aristotle and Averroes are not pursuing wisdom or science in the strict sense of the term. They are at times attempting to come to a better understanding of the realities which they cannot demonstrate.[37] In their philosophical context they at times follow what Augus-

36 Ibid., n. 126, pp. 168–169: "Habitus itaque metaphysicus in duabus suis partibus, in IV videlicet ubi defendit principia, et in V ubi exponit terminos, non dubium quod habet rationem sapientiae, et tamen ibi est tantummodo declarativus et nullatenus adhaesivus. Certum est enim quod principia non probantur, nisi elenchice et dialectice [...]. Est quidem scientia ubi demonstrat, intellectus autem ubi declarat principia et defendit, ac terminos exponit; non enim dicitur intellectus inquantum adhaeret principiis, quia hoc est commune aliis scientiis habere habitum adhaesivum respectu principiorum, sed inquantum principia defendit, declarat, probat, explicat, manuducit; quod est proprium sapientis [...]".

37 For a modern portrait of Averroes which seems compatible with Aureoli's interpreta-

tine did in his theological context—in his declarative theology. In chapter 1 of Book IX of his treatise *On the Trinity* Augustine says:

> We certainly seek the Trinity [...]. And no one justly finds fault with such a search, if at least he who seeks is steadfast in the faith [...]. For he that seeks has the safest purpose when he seeks until that is taken hold of whither we are tending [...]. For a certain faith is in some way the starting point of knowledge, but a certain knowledge will not be made perfect, except after this life.[38]

Concluding Remarks

Aureoli claims to walk in Augustine's footsteps in the way that Richard of Saint-Victor did. Richard in the fourth chapter of Book I of his treatise *On the Trinity* says: "With full zeal and with the highest diligence we must persist in our efforts to come to an understanding of those things we hold by faith. Let us strive to make progress by daily gains". Recalling the words of Augustine, he finishes with the promise: "The full and perfect understanding of these realities will come with eternal life".[39]

If Aureoli wrote a new chapter on the sapiential character of theology, it was to recast the declarative theology of Augustine and Richard within the philosophical context of Aristotle and Averroes. Because of the *Posterior Analytics* we might tend to think of Aristotle and his Commentator as men primarily focused on demonstrative knowledge.

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tion of his "declarative philosophy", see R.C. Taylor, "Averroes: God and the Noble Lie", in: R.E. Houser (ed.), *Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB*, University of Notre Dame Press, 2007, pp. 38–59.

38 Peter Aureoli, cit., n. 127, p. 169: "[...] Apparet quidem primo ex dictis Augustini, qui ait IX *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, quod 'Trinitatem quaerimus, et talia quaerentem nemo iuste reprehendit, si tamen in fide firmissimus quaerat' illud. Et infra: 'Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio, donec apprehendatur illud quo tendimus'; 'certa enim fides utique inchoat cognitionem; cognitio vero certa non perficietur nisi post hanc vitam'". Cf. Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, IX, c. 1 (PL 42, 959).

39 Ibid., p. 170: "Et infra, capitulo 4: 'Omni studio et summa diligentia debemus insistere, ut ad eorum intelligentiam, quae fidem tenemus, quotidianis incrementis proficere valeamus; in quorum plena et perfecta intelligentia vita obtinetur aeterna'". Cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De Trinitate*, I, c. 4 (PL 196, 892).

PART 4

The First Known

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CHAPTER 15

Primum cognitum at the End of the 13th Century: Raymundus Rigaldus and Duns Scotus

Timothy B. Noone

Introduction

One of the most difficult tasks to master in our effort to understand philosophical and theological thought from an earlier period is to check an inveterate habit of the human mind: we tend to interpret everything, whether sights, sounds, or written texts, according to the familiar, that is, the familiar to us. What is familiar to us may arise from our intellectual formation and the reading of standard secondary sources that propose certain issues as fundamental for a period or figure within the history of thought, or the familiar may come from reading 'revisionist' secondary sources that question deeply the interpretation suggested by the standard secondary sources. But whatever the source for our disposition to read the familiar into the objects of study, there is, in principle, a corrective to this tendency, if we consciously apply ourselves: namely, the surviving primary texts and the painstaking reconstruction of their historical context. We may, of course, fail to avail ourselves of this corrective, or not sufficiently check our wayward tendencies. But, by and large, a reading or rereading of the primary texts brings our footsteps back on the track towards historical and systematic truth.

These observations are especially pertinent for our approach to the present essay. A great deal of writing and study has been devoted to the theory of cognition and epistemology of John Duns Scotus, but much of it appears to take only parts of his total theory and, by neglecting the balance, make of that part the whole; accordingly, there are studies of intelligible species, accounts of intelligible objects, and examinations of the rejection of divine illumination within Scotus's thought.[1] While such particular studies are invaluable and necessary

1 Besides my own (and I hereby freely acknowledge that I am as guilty as anyone of parceling out Scotus's cognitive theory into digestible, or perhaps indigestible, bits) essays—"Scotus on Mind and Being: Transcendental and Developmental Psychology", in: *Acta philosophica* 18:2 (2009), pp. 249–282, "Scotus on Intellect, Intelligible Species, and Imagination and Scotus's *Quaestiones super libros De Anima*: A Comparison with his Oxford Theological Commen-

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to bring out some of the key details, they necessarily detract from other items in Scotus's overall theory and render more difficult the task of understanding of how human, and more generally finite, minds work in Scotus's view.

The present essay is an effort to redirect our attention to the more general features of Scotus's theory by way of an unpublished work by a little known author, but one whose thought seems to give a fuller sense of where Scotus's account of the human mind in the *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 takes its point of departure. The author in question is Raymundus Rigaldus, OFM and the work is a series of disputations held by Raymundus probably (though not certainly) at the Franciscan house of studies in Paris sometime around 1287.

The essay is divided into three unequal segments. First, we shall give a brief overview of the little we know about the life and writings of Raymundus Rigaldus, the features of the manuscript in which the edited work is found, Todi, Biblioteca communale, ms. 98, and nature of the transmission of the work insofar as the single known manuscript reveals it. Second, and this is the largest of the three segments, we shall give a doctrinal analysis of Raymundus's teaching on the first three questions of his disputed questions, exploring to some extent their sources and locating Raymundus's teaching in reference to those sources. Third, we shall quite briefly indicate what a text such as Raymundus's disputed questions tells us about the doctrinal background to Scotus's treatment of the *primum cognitum* within his own theory of human intellectual cognition.

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taries", in: *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na Filosofia Medieval*, Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.). Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, Turnhout 2006, pp. 1493–1506—, see, for example, Peter King, "Scotus on Mental Content", in: O. Boulnois—E. Karger—J.-L. Solère—G. Sondag (eds.), *Duns Scot à Paris, 1302–2002* (Collection Textes et Etudes du Moyen Âge 26), Turnhout 2004, pp. 65–88, Richard Cross, "Philosophy of Mind", in: Thomas Williams (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, Cambridge 2003, pp. 263–284, Richard Cross, "The Mental Word in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries", in: T. Shimizu and C. Burnett (eds.), *The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology and Psychology* (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 14), Turnhout 2009, pp. 301–342, and Giorgio Pini, "Can God Create My Thoughts? Scotus's Case against the Causal Account of Intentionality", in: *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49 (2011), pp. 39–63.

1 The Life and Writings of Raymundus Rigaldus and the Text of His *Quaestiones disputatae* qq. 1–3

The little we know of Raymundus's life may be summarized quite briefly. We are told that he was elected provincial minister of Aquitaine on November 30, 1279 during the minister generalship of Bonagratia of Bologna, serving for at least a year, though how much longer is not known. He would, in any event, not still have been provincial minister at the time of the general chapters of Milan and Montpellier (1285 and 1287, respectively) when William of Falgar functioned as provinicial minister of Aquitaine.[2] Raymundus served once more as provincial minister of Aquitaine in 1295, stepping in at the departure of the then provincial minister Amanaeus de Mota for the role of procurator of the entire Order in the Roman curia.[3] This second provincial ministership of Raymundus was short-lived; he died the next year, 1296, on 29 November immediately after the provincial chapter in Figeac, under the minister generalship of John of Murro.[4]

As Fr. Ferdinand Delorme, OFM pointed out,[5] these dates for Raymundus's two periods of service as provincial minister for Aquitaine give the temporal terms within which, in all likelihood, his academic career is to be placed. The fact that he is only referred to as *magister theologiae* and *magister Parisiensis* in the later entries of *Chronicle of Twenty-Four Masters* probably is a hint that he took his degree and taught in Paris during the interval between 1279 and 1295. But we can probably be a little more precise than that. As we shall see below, there is clear dependency of Raymundus's thought upon Henry of Ghent's *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* Articles 21–24 and Matthew of Aquasparta's

2 See *Chronicon XXIV Generalium* in: *Analecta Francescana*, Quaracchi (Apud Claras Aquas) 1897, III, p. 373: "Obiit sub isto Generali Pater venerabilis frater Vitalis de Podio, Minister Aquitaniae, anno Domini 1279 post capitulum provinciale Albiae celebratum. Et eodem anno in capitulo Agenni fuit electus Minister Aquitaniae in festo sancti Andreae frater Raymundus Rigaldi".

3 See *Chronicon XXIV Generalium* in: *Analecta Francescana*, III, p. 432: "Et anno praefato 1295 frater Amaneus de Mola, Minister Aquitaniae, absolutus a ministerio factus fuit in Romana curia Ordinis procurator et fuit electus in capitulo Briviae Minister Aquilaniae frater Raymundus Rigaldi, sacrae theologiae magister".

4 See *Chronicon XXIV Generalium* in: *Analecta Francescana*, III, p. 432: "Et eodem anno decessit vir eximius frater Raymundus Rigaldi, magister Parisiensis et minister Aquitaniae in festo sancti Saturnini post capitulum provinciale Figiaci in nativitate Beatae Virginis celebratum …".

5 See Ferdinand Delorme, OFM, "Quodlibets et Questions disputées de Raymond Rigaut, maître franciscain de Paris, d'après le Ms. 98 de la Bibl. Comm. de Todi", in: *BGPTM*, suppl. iii.2, *Aus der Geisteswelt Mittelalters*, Münster 1935, pp. 826–841.

Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione in addition to the references to the condemned propositions and the papal bull 'Exiit qui seminat' of 1279. These literary clues when combined with other information on the sequence of Franciscan masters at Paris make it likely that Raymundus's teaching should be placed in the period of 1285–1287. For one thing there is the tax roll for Paris published in the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* from April 10, 1287.[6] Here Raymundus is listed as 'frater', but this should not necessarily be understood in such a way as to conclude that he was not yet a 'magister'; the previous entry dated to the previous spring lists 'frater Egidius', referring to Giles of Rome, the distinguished Augustinian, who was probably already a master of theology at that time.[7] Indeed, in the case of the latter entry, even the grammar of the Latin requires that Giles be a magister inasmuch as the plural 'magistri theologiae' would not be plural without his being a magister since only one other master of theology is listed.

The scholastic works of Raymundus are found in only two manuscripts, so far as we know: the one that contains the text that is presented here as well as the *Quodlibeta* of Raymundus, Todi, Biblioteca communale, Ms. 98; and the other Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, Ms. 426, discovered and analyzed by Fr. Victorinus Doucet and preserving solely the *Quodlibeta*.[8] In addition to these known scholastic writings, there are a number of sermons on Biblical texts and doctrinal themes.

The text of Raymundus presented here is an edition of the first three questions of his disputed questions. The list of disputed questions is quite long, comprising 25 questions. The vast majority of them deal with divine ideas, divine knowledge, and the relationship between knowledge of God and the gift of rapture.[9] That fact alone makes our three opening questions thematically distinctive, though also striking. For all three of our questions deal with the relationship between being and human knowledge in general: q. 1, whether the concept of being first known by the intellect is a concept of Uncreated being or of a concept of being common to created and Uncreated being; q. 2, whether

6 See *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, (ed. H. Denifle, O.P. et A. Chatelain), Paris 1891, II, p. 30: "Anno Domini MCC octimagesimo septimo taxaverunt magistri in theologia, magister Ernuplus de Brusella, et frater Remondus Rigaldi et quatuor magistri in artibus et duo burgenses".

7 See *CUP*, II, p. 28: "Anno Domini MCC octuagesimo sexto, taxaverunt magistri in theologia frater Egidius et magister Jacobus Dalos, et quattuor magistri in artibus et duo burgenses".

8 See V. Doucet, "Les neuf Quodlibets de Raymond Rigauld d'après le ms Padoue Anton. 426", in: *La France Franciscaine* 19 (1936), pp. 226–239.

9 See the list in Delorme, "Quodlibets et Questions disputées de Raymond Rigaut", pp. 838–840.

created being can be understood without understanding Uncreated being; and q. 3, whether a concept involving understanding can be formed with reference to non-being. In answering each of these questions, Raymundus shows himself to be someone entirely conversant with the views of Henry of Ghent on the topic of the *primum cognitum*, though also someone acquainted with rival and challenging views. What emerges is a snapshot, so to speak, of the Parisian discussion of the *primum cognitum* at the end of the 1280s, just before (or perhaps when) a young Duns Scotus took his lectorate course in Paris and went on to develop his own quite novel understanding of the *primum cognitum* in his *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima* q. 16 and the corresponding sections of the *Lectura*, *Ordinatio*, and *Reportatio parisiensis examinata*.

The manuscript that contains our question is manuscript 98 of the Biblioteca communale of Todi. The manuscript has recently been described in the catalogue published in 2009.[10] The manuscript is certainly late thirteenth century, written in some ten different hands. In addition to the *Quodlibeta* and *Disputed questions* of Raymundus Rigaldus, the manuscript has some of disputed questions by Vital du Four and a question on brotherly correction by Henry of Ghent. The start of Vital's teaching career occurred towards the end of Raymundus's life; in all probability, Vital studied with both James of Quesnoy and Raymundus at Paris from 1288 until 1292 so his works being conserved with one of his master's writings is not so surprising.[11] For doctrinal purposes what this means is that the Raymundus's thought may well have influenced Vital's, but influence in the reverse direction is unlikely.

The quality of the text in the manuscript is fairly obvious. The text is a copy of the disputations of Raymundus and is, in all probably, a copy of a fair-hand copy or apograph of a report of Raymundus's actual disputations. The evidence for this conclusion may be gathered from the *apparatus criticus* of the edition; there are numerous copying errors, self-corrections, and mistarts that show the Todi manuscript's copyist is copying from a written copy, confusing letter forms, committing homeotelueutic errors, and otherwise engaged in a pattern

10 See *I manoscritti medievali della biblioteca comunale 'L. Leoni' di Todi*, Catalogo a cura di Enrico Menestò e di Laura Andreani, Massimiliano Bassetti, Antonio Ciaralli, Emore Paoli, e Letizia Pellegrin, Spoleto 2009. I would like to thank Dr. Garrett Smith for his assistance in helping me to access this manuscript catalogue.

11 See Sylvain Piron, "Franciscan *Quodlibeta* in Southern *Studia* and at Paris: 1280–1300", in: Christopher Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibets in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, Leiden—Boston 2006, pp. 423–424; Andrew G. Traver, "Vital du Four", in: Jorge Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 2003, pp. 670–671.

of activities that are only explicable by his making mistakes in reproducing a written model. On the other hand, there are elements of orality in the text being copied, including mixing of genders in the ordinal numbers assigned to arguments and taking a series of points out of the original order in which they are listed. The latter practices are clearly ones associated with an oral performance and its literary by-product, a *reportatio*. Consequently, the best explanation of the character of the text as we have it is that it is a copy, however imperfect, of a *reportatio* that was only slightly edited prior to the creation of the fair-hand copy.

2 Doctrinal Analysis of Raymundus's First Three Questions

The first question of Raymundus deals in many ways with an issue that will also be faced by Scotus in his philosophical and theological writings and, in a certain sense, Raymundus's text presages the dialogue that eventually emerged between Scotus and his early critics. The question is whether our first concept of being, the one that Avicenna describes along with 'thing' as the first impression of our intellect, is one of Uncreated Being or of being as common to God and creature. The first set of arguments given in the text aims to establish that the latter option is untenable; that is, a notion of being common to God and creature is unavailable to the human mind. Altogether eight arguments are advanced to compel this conclusion and although they are not all worthy of remark, certain ones show the extent to which the discussion is framed in logical, epistemological, and metaphysical terms. One argument, given *per locum a maiori negando*, claims that if we cannot form a notion common to the genera that divide created being, all the more are we incapable of forming a notion common to created and Uncreated being (1.2). Another argument has it that, were such a notion available and operative in human thinking, the notion of being involved would have to divide into created and Uncreated being as into subjective parts, yet the Uncreated Being by its very nature escapes the limitations associated with part (1.4). A final logical consideration is that, if 'created' and 'Uncreated' are related to each other as contradictories, no common notion can be formed of them inasmuch as nothing is common to contradictories (1.6). The discussion of how the notion of God is necessarily a compound one, forwarded by Scotus from the *QQ. super secundum et tertium De anima* to the end of his career,[12] clearly relates to the second of these points inasmuch as once

12 See B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima*, q. 21, n. 23, (ed.

the notion of God is compound, the objection that God has to be one of the subjective parts of being ceases to be relevant. Furthermore, both the first and the third of these objections would also lose their force, if 'univocal' were reduced to the refined and precise sense that it will eventually be given by Scotus in his writings.

In spite of what one might expect, the next set of arguments does not deal with the opposing view, but rather the claim that, even if there were such a notion of being common to created and Uncreated being, it would not allow us to know created being. Once again epistemological and metaphysical issues are to the fore in the discussion. The twofold indetermination found in the concept of being, putatively common to created and Uncreated being, would never yield out the determinate notion of creaturely being (1.9). Presumably, what Rigaldus has in mind is Henry of Ghent's distinction between being as privatively indeterminate and being as negatively indeterminate. If so the objection would still trade upon the view that the concept of being yielded out a notion of God as a simple concept, since otherwise the objection would not be applicable. Another pair of arguments explore whether the view that being is common to created and Uncreated being would be consistent with the general approach that First Truth and the First Being are directly and immediately present to the mind; epistemic access to First Truth and First Being seem impossible by garnering a notion from creatures inasmuch as the latter are effects that fall woefully short of the Nature that is their cause (1.12–13). Another point to notice about these arguments is that the failure of the notion of being to yield out the entire range of humanly knowable objects is only to be deemed a failure against the background provided by the principal sources for the problem, familiar to thirteenth century theologians and philosophers, of the *primum cognitum*: chiefly Avicenna, Guibert de Tournai, and Henry of Ghent.

The arguments to the contrary read like anticipations of Scotus's subsequent discussion in the *Lectura* and the *Ordinatio*. But at least one of them is reminiscent of the views of Richard of Mediavilla on the knowability of substance.[13]

C. Bazán—K. Emery—R. Green—T. Noone—R. Plevano—A. Traver), Opera philosophica v, Washington, D.C.—St. Bonaventure, NY 2006, p. 23 (hereafter cited 'Oph' with volume number and page): "Item, nullus conceptus creaturae facit conceptum propium Dei; sed facit conceptum entis; igitur conceptus entis non est conceptus propius Dei". Cf. *Lectura* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq 1–2, nn. 44–56, (ed. Vaticana), Vol. XVI, pp. 241–246.

13 See Richardus de Mediavilla, *In IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* II, d. 24, p. 3 q. 1, (ed. Venice), 1509, f. 99va–b and my article "The Problem of the Knowability of Substance: The Discussion from Eustachius of Arras to Vital du Four", in: K. Emery—R. Friedman—A. Speer (eds.), *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages*, Leiden—Boston 2011, pp. 76–78.

That argument runs: being *in se* and being *in alio* can be grasped by a common concept despite the differences between them entitatively, namely, they are concretely speaking substance and accident. By analogy, being from itself (*ens a se*) and being from another (*ens ab alio*) can also be grasped by a common concept, and so too, can 'idea' and 'ideated', a point quite relevant to later questions disputed in the series (1.15). A Bonaventurean inspiration, on the other hand, may be behind another of the arguments, which proceeds on the notion of likeness. The Uncreated Being produces a likeness of itself in created being, but the human mind can, knowing that likeness, form a notion of what the likeness is like; hence, the human mind can come to know Uncreated Being through creaturely being (1.14).

Raymond's solution to the first question divides into four parts. In the first part he tries to show how there is an order in the manifestation of beings, following the division of being given by Henry of Ghent in his *Summa* a. 26, q. 1; the five degrees are given in increasing order of detemination: *esse simplex*, *hoc esse determinatum*, *esse aliquid determatum forma specifica*, *hoc aliquid signatum in supposito ultima determinatione essentiae*, and *hoc aliquid in actu*. The idea is that there is an indeterminate notion of being simply knowing being as open to any of the categories, a more deterrminate one knowing being as confined to a given category, a still more determinate one knowing being as determined to a given species, and still more determinate one knowing being as determined to a given individual, even though it might not yet or no longer exists, and finally the most determinate manner of knowing being as this existing essence and subject (1.22–27). These five different determinations of the grades of being are claimed to differ really and in intention by Raymundus. Outside this whole order of determinations of being belonging to the created order is the Divine Being, that is indifferently related to everything else and not subject to being in a category.

Against this background of the five grades of being, Raymundus explains how the human mind knows. It proceeds by resolution of compounds into simples, making inferences, or analyzing the presuppositions for its acts of simple apprehension. To take the case of making inferences, we can reason from something being an existing 'hoc aliquid' to inferring being of ever greater indetermination until we reach the notion of being unlimited in its extension though limitable. This notion of being is the most refined one we can gain from creatures. But this notion is not the final point of our inferences. Because such a notion of indefinite being bespeaks being from another, we may and should infer, beyond the five grades of being through which we have rapidly passed, a Being unlimited and illimitable (1.30). Something similar is claimed to happen in resolving compounds into simples and analyzing our simple apprehensions;

we reach Uncreated Being each time and, as Raymundus tells us in regard to case of analyzing simple apprehensions, we reach *purum esse*, a phrase reminiscent of the third chapter of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*.[14]

The concept of being as it is known by us through creatures may be grounded merely in a community of intentions, such as when the concept genus is applied to a genus, or a community of realities, as when something is understood in or through an intention. The latter may happen in two ways: when second intentions are applied to first, such as when man is called a species, or features such as rational or irrational are called differences; or when being is predicated of items of first intention, as animal of man. In this final case, the terms predicated may be predicated either univocally, as in the example just mentioned of animal being predicated of man, or analogically, as when the ten categories themselves are said to be ways of being. The case of a univocal, for Raymundus, involves a situation wherein *idem est nomen et ratio*, but also a sameness of nature, whereas there is only a proportional sameness and no parity in reality and formula in the case of the categories (1.33).

What this means is for Raymundus is that a concept of being common to created and Uncreated being cannot be formed in any proper sense; the notion of Absolute and Necessary Being cannot be lodged in any way under the notion of being that is characterized by the five degrees described above (1.34).

Yet this position leaves much to be desired, for if matters stand precisely as described in the last paragraph, we would seem to be driven to the position that no knowledge of God is possible at all through creatures. To remedy this shortcoming, Raymundus appeals, in a Bonventurean fashion, to the role of creatures as cognitive intermediaries for the human mind. Each creature is

14 See Bonaventura, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* c. 3, (ed. Quaracchi), v, p. 304a: "Sed definitio habet fieri per superiora, et illa per superiora definiri habent, usquequo veniatur ad suprema et generalissima, quibus ignoratis, non possunt intelligi definitive inferiora. Nisi igitur cognoscatur quid est ens per se, non potest plene sciri definitio alicuius specialis substantiae. Nec ens per se cognosci potest, nisi cognoscatur cum suis conditionibus, quae sunt; unum, verum, bonum. Ens autem, cum possit cogitari ut diminutum et completum, ut imperfectum et ut perfectum, ut ens in potentia et ut ens in actu, ut ens secundum quid et ut ens simpliciter, ut ens in parte et ut ens totaliter, ut ens transiens et ut ens manens, ut ens per aliud et ut ens per se, ut ens permixtum non-enti et ut ens purum, ut ens dependens et ut ens absolutum, ut ens posterius et ut ens prius, ut ens mutabile et ut ens immutabile, ut ens simplex et ut ens compositum, cum "privationes et defectus nullatenus possint cognosci nisi per positiones", non venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicuius entium creatorum, nisi iuvetur ab intellectu entis purissimi, actualissimi, completissimi et absoluti; quod est ens simpliciter et aeternum, in quo sunt rationes omnium in sua puritate".

an expressed and expressive likeness of God, being grounded in the very understanding of God of Himself as Truth. The analogical likeness of a creature allows the human mind to form a notion of what the creaturely likeness is akin to or like but one that must be said to be extremely attentuated; it is only common in the mind's thought (1.35).

While Raymundus allows for something like a common notion under these rather severe qualifications, he lets us know that he is devoted to the Henrician thesis that being as first known is the subject of metaphysics and being as first known allows for some awareness of Absolute Being as prior to any of our other thoughts because implicit in them (1.36). He reports an alternative account that does not allow for our awareness of absolute being as chronologically or developmentally prior to our thinking of particular creatures but rather as something abstracted or reached out of our thinking about creatures (1.37); this position Raymundus straightforwardly rejects on the grounds that such thinkers have confused the most fundamental object of the intellect with the product of an operation of the mind (1.38–39). The position that Raymundus takes is the first one described and its main outlines are shared by him, Henry of Ghent, and possibly Richard of Mediavilla. The alternative position is not described in enough detail to be able to identify any group of thinkers, but someone whose thought seems to have been tending in this same direction is the Oxford secular theologian and former arts master Richard Clive, whose interpretation of the first known in his *Physics* commentary hints at this possibility.[15]

15 See Richard Clive, *Quaestiones super Physicam* 1, q. 19a ('Utrum magis universale sit prius minus universali'), Worcester, Worcester Cathedral Library, q. 13, f. 82va: "His suppositis, respondendum est quaestioni. Nota etiam quarto quod singulare dicitur duobus modis: proprie et improprie. Proprie nominat quid signatum, improprie speciem specialissimam, 1 Physicorum. Accipendo universale proprie et singulare proprie, prius est singulare cognitioni nostrae absolute … Cognitionem absolute voco quae est communis cognitioni sensitivae et intellectivae; sic loquitur Aristoteles de universali libro De anima—a singulari enim fit abstractio universalis. Si universale et particulare improprie accipiantur (accipitur [universale] improprie pro eo quod est quid rei), sic non habent comparationem respectu nostrae cognitionis, quia sic universale non sentitur nec intelligitur, quia circumscribit operationem intellectus—et hoc loquendo de universali de genere substantiae. In genere tamen accidentium habent comparationem ad intellectivam, ad sensitivam vero non, quia sic singulare sumptum improprie est proprie universale. Sic comparando universale et singulare improprie dicta ad intellectum, sic prius intelligit singulare. Prius enim intelligit hominem quam hoc animal, quia hoc animal non intelligit nisi per reflexionem".

The second question in the text edited below is one that is the corollary to the first question: if we cannot understand the Uncreated Being through a concept common to created and Uncreated being, yet understanding of Uncreated or Absolute Being is at the outset of all our acts of understanding, do we not have to address the issue of whether created being is even intelligible without understanding Uncreated Being?

Here there are six arguments that claim any effort to understand created being without understanding Uncreated Being is impossible. The first two arguments offer obvious considerations arising from the nature of correlatives: the first reasons that creatures as *entia ab alio* require as grasped under that formula some understanding of *ens a quo* they arise; and the second claims that creaturely being requires the Creator because they are mutual implicative terms just as cause and effect are (2.1–2). The third argument is, strictly speaking, one reasoning from exemplary causality: if Uncreated Being moves as efficient cause as Principle, but moves *obiective* under the formula of the true and any secondary motion presupposes the first principle of motion, the movement of any secondary or created truth presupposes the Uncreated functioning as first mover precisely as true (2.3). The fourth argument, clearly appropriating a line of reasoning found in Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* c. 3 and c. 5,[16] runs as follows: if even we understand no creature to exist,

16 See Bonaventura, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* c. 3, (ed. Quaracchi), V, p. 304b: "Intellectum vero illationis tunc veraciter percipit noster intellectus, quando videt, quod conclusio necessario sequitur ex praemissis; quod non solum videt in terminis necessariis, verum etiam in contingentibus, ut: si homo currit, homo movetur. Hanc autem necessariam habitudinem percipit non solum in rebus entibus, verum etiam in non entibus. Sicut enim, homine existente, sequitur: si homo currit, homo movetur; sic etiam, non existente. Huiusmodi igitur illationis necessitas non venit ab existentia rei in materia, quia est contingens, nec ab existentia rei in anima, quia tunc esset fictio, si non esset in re: venit igitur ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna, secundum quam res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem secundum illius aeternae artis repraesentationem"; Idem, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* c. 5, (ed. Quaracchi), V, pp. 308b–309a: "Sicut igitur omnino *nihil* habet de *esse* nec de eius conditionibus; sic econtra ipsum *esse* nihil habet de *non-esse*, nec actu nec potentia, nec secundum veritatem rei nec secundum aestimationem nostram. Cum autem *non-esse* privatio sit essendi, non cadit in intellectum nisi per *esse*; *esse* autem non cadit per aliud, quia omne, quod intelligitur, aut intelligitur ut *non ens*, aut ut *ens in potentia*, aut ut *ens in actu*. Si igitur *non-ens* non potest intelligi nisi per *ens*, et *ens in potentia* non nisi per *ens in actu*; et *esse* nominat ipsum purum actum entis: *esse* igitur est quod primo cadit in intellectu, et illud *esse* est quod est actus purus. Sed hoc non est *esse* particulare, quod est *esse* analogum, quia minime habet de actu, eo quod minime est. Restat igitur, quod illud esse est esse divinum".

we understand Uncreated Being to exist, then all the more do we understand Uncreated Being to exist from the existence of any created being, but we do understand the existence of Uncreated Being from the non-existence of the creature since we know some truths hold even when we suppose that no creatures are (2.4). An example of the sort that Raymundus in mind and that fits the *locus a minore affirmando* logical rule to which he is making an implicit appeal may be found in Bonaventure: if a man runs, a man moves. Though the truth of such a proposition is contingent, the connection of antecedent with the consequent does not depend upon there being any humans or any humans running; consequently, we have an example of a necessary truth that holds even when we suppose that created things are not. The thrust of the argument is that if the non-being of creatures can point to the Divine Being, all the more do existing creatures give warrant to our understanding, without explicitly consciously being aware of, the Divine Being. The final two arguments for the affirmative side are really just variations on the commonplace claim that being and its transcendental properties are the first items known by the human mind: Avicenna has it that *esse* is first thing grasped by the human mind, but this is the *esse* in terms of proximate sources of cognition of created things and such a grasp of qualified *esse* requires a prior grasp of Absolute Being (2.5); the human mind grasps everything under the true and the created true is true to the extent it is like the First Truth, yet that would mean that the human mind has a primitive awareness of First Truth (2.6).

The five arguments on the other side mainly point to the seeming inconsequences of allowing that understanding God is a pre-condition for our ordinary thought as well as the implausibility of holding that God, whose Nature is wholly other than our own, can be epistemically accessed at the outset of our thinking. The second (2.8) and the fourth (2.10) arguments tend toward the latter view: God is infinitely more distant from any creature than black is from white yet either extreme of the latter relation may be known without the other; and the judgment of truth requires some kind of equating between the truth of what is known and the human mind, yet God cannot be rendered equal inasmuch as He is infinitely separate from creatures. The final two arguments (2.11–12) emphasize the former feature: our wills can certainly sin without our willing God and there seems to be no good reason why our minds cannot attain the truth of created things without understanding God; the notion of thing or being that Avicenna claims is behind all of our thinking arises from creaturely being, yet God is not under the concept of being or thing taken in this sense, so grasping being as arising from creatures does not have as one of its concomitants an awareness of Uncreated Being.

Raymundus's reply to the question is based upon two preliminary distinctions. First, we should distinguish between answering the question from the standpoint of the intelligible object or from the standpoint of our understanding. Second, we should distinguish between the case of apprehending simples from that of understanding complexes or propositions (2.13).

If we take the question to pertain to the intelligible, there is a further refinement needed. In one sense, any given creature may be understood precisely as creature and in that sense 'creature' is a mutual relative of 'Creator'; in this precise logical sense the two extremes come or go together, just as do 'cause' and 'effect' (2.14). If we take the created and Uncreated in their proper notions (*in materiis propriis*), however, then created being inasmuch as it depends upon Uncreated Being in every positive feature—existence, truth, and intelligibility—necessarily contains Uncreated Being in its notion and hence the two are not concomitant equally (like standard correlatives), but the one, namely, created being implies the other and hence the Uncreated is understood once created being is grasped, though a person understanding in this fashion does not judge that matters are so (2.15). This concession by Raymundus (*licet intelligens non discernat cointelligendo*) is directly parallel with a set of texts on the problem of the first known going back to Guibert of Tournai and Henry of Ghent, each of whom emphasized that awareness of God as First Known did not mean that the person judged or noticed that they were aware of God distinctly.[17] Reviewing the order of the concepts of created and Uncreated being and their relations, Raymundus argues that any concept of a creature is mediated by the transcendental notions of being, truth, and goodness and since every creature is a being only in qualified sense, created being, as something formed according to First Truth, requires the concept of Uncreated Being. He cites both St. Anselm and Pseudo-Dionysius as supporting authorities for his position, appealing to Anselm's claim that there is only one Truth and Dionysius's position that there is one Being of all beings, understood not simply as an Efficient but also and more importantly as an Exemplary Cause (2.16).

17 See Camille Berubé et Servus Gieben, "Guibert de Tournai et Robert Grosseteste: Sources inconnues de la doctrine de l'illumination suivi de l'édition critique de trois chapîtres du Rudimentum doctrinae de Guibert de Tournai", in: *S. Bonaventura: 1274–1974*, Grottaferrata (Roma) 1973, pp. 647–649; Henry of Ghent, *SOQ*, a. 24, q. 7, ad. 2, (ed. Badius), 144^{v}K: "In omnibus ergo generalibus intentionibus rerum cum aliquam illarum intelligis simpliciter, ut ens, verum, bonum, primo Deum intelligis, etsi non advertis, et quantum steteris in illo simplici intellectu, tantum stas in intellectu Dei. Si autern modo aliquo quod simpliciter conceptum est determines, statim in intellectu creaturae cadis …".

Raymundus now takes the question as bearing upon the human process of understanding. Grounding his reply on Aristotle's distinction between universal and particular knowledge as well as the Stagirite's distinction between determinate and confused knowledge, he argues that the created intellect understands the First Truth whenever it understands any true things, but nonetheless it understands the First Truth in a confused and indeterminate manner; both Boethius's and Damascene's claims about knowledge of God being innate within us should be understood along these lines (2.17). Indeed, Raymundus thinks that even if we took the position opposed to the one that he takes on the first question, namely, even if we endorsed the claim that there is common concept to created and Uncreated Being, we would have to hold that, epistemically speaking, the First Being, Truth, and Good is the First Mover, touching the intellect in its initial act of understanding (2.18). So too he holds that both Augustine's famous text from VIII *De trinitate* claiming that there is a passage from knowing the particular good to knowing goodness itself and Avicenna's insistence that there is a knowledge of God naturally available by way of universal propositions are based upon this primitive awareness of being and our concomitant, though unconscious, awareness of God (2.19–20).

The final question included in the edition below is one that clearly parallels Matthew of Aquasparta's first question in his *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione* and asks about whether we can understand non-being. Raymundus's discussion of the question is based upon Matthew's and draws from it in many ways. Yet there are distinctive features. Raymundus appeals to Averroes's terminology of propositional knowledge as 'fides' and the grasping of simple concepts as 'informatio' (3.27). It is along the lines of distinguishing between propositional knowledge and pre-propositional knowledge that Raymundus proposes his own solution. Propositional knowlege cannot be garnered without appealing to past, present, or future and this registry of time within the proposition means that, in knowing a proposition, the existence of the things known must be involved in the understanding or knowledge (3.29). Regarding pre-propositional knowledge, matters stand otherwise. Here, if we distinguish at least between actual being and quidditative being, we can hold that the intellect may know things that are non-beings in the sense of knowing the quiddities of things that no longer exist. The justification for this type of knowledge is that the quiddity of a thing prescinds from time and place and such knowledge bears the same indifference to time (3.29. 3.31). If, however, we mean by knowing non-being, knowledge of a being that has no entitative status whatsoever either in created reality or the Divine Mind, non-being in this sense cannot be known at all (3.30).

Concluding Remarks: Hints of Scotus's Approach

What characterizes Scotus's treatment of the *primum cognitum* in his writings, especially the *Lectura* and *Ordinatio*, is his integrating the discussion of that theme into other distinct but related epistemological problems, such as the theory of divine illumination and the account of the activity of abstraction and the related issue of intelligible species. The text of Raymundus does not range anywhere nearly as broadly as the texts in Scotus do, but, in treating these first three questions, Raymundus advances arguments and makes concessions that pertain not simply to the *primum cognitum*, but the entirety of the theory of knowledge. In that sense, Scotus must have been acquainted with the some of the arguments of Raymundus that clearly try to amplify some of the views of Henry of Ghent, while locating many of the ideas of Henry within the older tradition of Bonaventure. If Raymundus's name is little known to scholars nowadays, his questions and doctrinal refinements of Henry's teaching seem to indicate that Scotus's approach to evaluating the teaching of the Ghentian master had at least one Franciscan forerunner. Raymundus's opponents, those positing that there is a notion of being common to created and Uncreated Being, will have a supporter in the teaching of the Subtle Doctor, though whether they would welcome the cardinal feature of the doctrine of the univocity of being is another matter.

Raymundus Rigaldus, *Quaestiones disputatae* qq. 1–3 (Ex codice Todi, Bibl. commun., Ms. 98, f. 51^{rb} et seq. = T)

Quaestio prima

Quaeritur utrum primus conceptus entis sit entis increati vel entis communiter dicti ad ens creatum et increatum.

1.1 Et ostenditur primo quod talis conceptus communis non est formabilis ab intellectu. Omnis enim conceptus nec in re nec in ratione fundatus vanus et nullus. Sed entis increati nec res nec ratio potest esse communis. Ergo nec aliquis conceptus communis utrique est ab intellectu formabilis; quare, etc.

1.2 Item diversorum generum non potest esse unus generalis conceptus, immo non generalissimus unus. Ergo multo minus rerum in genere rei et extra genus poterit formari unus communis conceptus, quantumcumque generalissimus; quare, etc.

1.3 Item quanto aliquid communius et universalius, tanto simplicius et absolutius. Talis ergo conceptus communis tanto esset simplicior et absolutior conceptu primi entis, quanto communior et universalior. Erat igitur dare ens conceptum simplicius ente primo. Hoc autem inconveniens et impossibile; quare, etc.

1.4 Item conceptus communis utrique enti esset totum conceptibus utrisque, cum de illis, tamquam de conceptibus particularibus, praedicaretur. Sed ens divinum refugit naturam partis et particularis, cum omnis pars, in quantum huiusmodi, sit imperfectior suo toto; quare, etc.

1.5 Item omnis conceptus communis aliquibus communiter participatur ab illis, ut patet in generibus et speciebus et individuis. Sed ente increato nihil esset conparticipabile, repugnante summa Primi simplicitate; quare, etc.

1.6 Item impossibile est contradictoriorum unum conceptum, rei vel rationis, esse communem, cum contradictionis nullum sit medium. Sed creatum et increatum implicant contradictionem, quia ad 'A esse creatum', sequitur 'A non esse increatum'; et econverso; quare, etc.

1.7 Item quando aliqua duo determinant aliquod tertium, illud determinatum reperitur unum in determinantibus, ut patet in genere et specie et individuis. Sed nihil unum potest repperi commune istis; quare, etc.

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4 utrum] *add. sed del.* agens increatum T 9 utrique] *add. sed del.* in T 13 generalissimus] generalissimum T 14 aliquid] *add. sed del.* comminus et scilicet T 16 quanto] quantum T 19 enti] *corr. ex* entis T 21 in] *om.* T 25 conparticipabile] cum participabile T

1.8 Item causa prima superior est omni narratione, sexta propositione *De causis*: est ens supra omnem sensum, imaginationem, et intelligentiam secundum commentum ibidem.[18] Ergo nec sensu nec imaginatione nec intelligentia potest formari conceptus superior eo; ergo neque communior neque universalior; quare, etc.

1.9 Postea arguebatur quod tali conceptu communi ens creatum non potest cognosci, quia nullus conceptus duplicus indeterminatus potest ducere determinate in alterum; alioquin determinatum esset indeterminatum, quod est contradictio. Sed talis conceptus communis esset tam enti creato quam increato indeterminatus duplicus. Ergo non duceret in apprehensionem alicuius; quare, etc.

1.10 Item secundum Damascenum 'qui est' est proprium nomen Dei; ergo esse est proprium per se Dei.[19] Sed nihil proprium et incommunicabile sibi est cognoscibile per aliquid commune sibi vel alteri; quare, etc.

1.11 Item intellectus noster primo et immediate prima veritate formatur, secundum Augustinum;[20] non ergo mediante communi conceptu entis, cum impossibile sit communem conceptum immediatum fieri nisi immedietur per proprium; quare, etc.

1.12 Item sicut prima veritas praecedit in veritate et entitate omne imaginativum, sic et intelligibilitate. Ergo a simili: conceptus primae unitatis omne conceptum cuiuslibet dualitatis. Sicut ergo dualitas non est prima ratio cognoscendi unitatem, sic nec conceptus communis entis creati et increati potest esse prima apprehensio entis increati; quare, etc.

1.13 Item quod nullo conceptu entis ens primum possit cognosci: quia nullus effectus potest transcendere causas suae causae. Cum igitur secundum

7 duplicus] duobus *ante correctionem* T 9 tam] *om.* T 10 duplicus] *om.* T 12 est] *om.* T 15 Item] nullus *add. sed exp.* T 20 unitatis] veritatis T 22 unitatem] veritatem T

18 Cf. Anonymus, *Liber de causis* v (vi) n. 57, (ed. A. Pattin), p. 59: "Causa superior est omni narratione"; ibid., p. 60: "Causa autem prima est supra res omnes, quoniam est causa eis; propter illud ergo fit quod ipsa non cadit sub sensu et meditatione et cogitatione et intelligentia et loquela; non est ergo narrabilis".

19 Cf. Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* i, c. 9, (ed. Buytaert), pp. 48–49.

20 Cf. Augustinus, *De vera religione* c. 55, n. 113, (PL 32), p. 876: "… religet ergo nos religio uni omnipotenti Deo, quia inter mentem nostram, qua illum intelligimus Patrem et veritatem, id est lucem interiorem per quam illum intelligimus, nulla interposita creatura est"; id., *De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus* q. 51, (CCSL 44A), p. 75: "Sed ad imaginem mentem factam volunt, quae nulla interposita substantia ab ipsa veritate formatur, qui etiam spiritus dicitur—non ille Spiritus Sanctus qui est eiusdem substantiae cuius Pater et Filius, sed spiritus hominis".

Philosophum omnis cognitio nostra oriatur a sensibus, nulla cognitio nostra causata a sensibus transcendit terminos sensitivae cognitionis.[21] Nulla ergo nostra cognitio formare poterit conceptum intelligibilem primi entis; quare, etc.

1.14 Ad oppositum arguebatur primo quod conceptus communis utrique enti possit formari ab intellectu; quia ens increatum, ens creatum producendo, ipsum sibi assimilat in creando. Sed quorumcumque assimilativum et assimilatorum, ac per hoc relative similium, formare potest intellectus communem conceptum similitudinis; quare, etc.

1.15 Item ens in se et ens in alio sub communi conceptu entis concipiuntur, non repugnante diversitate essentiae. Ergo a simili: ens a se et ens ab alio, 51va cuiusmodi sunt ens | increatum et creatum, sub communi conceptu generis non repugnante concipiuntur. Ergo multo fortius ideans et ideatum sub communi conceptu ideabilitatis poterunt concipi; quare, etc.

1.16 Item secundum Commentatorem IV *Metaphysicae*: Primum est mensura omnium substantiarum. Sed mensura et mensurans est unigenea secundum Philosophum IV *Metaphysicae*.[22] Quaecumque autem unigenea unius generis sunt, communi conceptu concipiuntur; quare, etc.

1.17 Item quandocumque aliqua passio inest aliquibus duobus semper inest eis per aliquod commune primo, et secundo in posterioribus. Sed esse et intelligi convenit enti creato et increato. Ergo per aliquod commune. Sed non est dare illud nisi conceptum communem entis; quare, etc.

1.18 Item sequitur: est creatum, ergo est; est increatum, ergo est. Esse ergo commune utrique, quia sequitur ad utrumque. Quanto ergo communius, tanto prius. Ergo primus conceptus intellectus est conceptus entis communiter dicti; quare, etc.

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21 Cf. Aristoteles, *Anal. post.* I, c. 18 (AL IV.1, 40; c. 18, 81b6–9): "Inducere autem non habentes sensum impossibile est. Singularium enim sensus est; non enim contingit accipere ipsorum scientiam. Neque enim ex universalibus sine inductione, neque per inductionem sine sensu"; *Anal. post.* I, c. 2 (AL IV.2, 113; c. 2, 71b33–72a5); *De sensu et sensato* c. 6 (c. 6, 445b16–17): "Nec enim intelligit intellectus quae exterius nisi cum sensu".

22 Cf. Aristoteles, *Anal. post.* I, c. 22 (AL IV^1, 49; c. 22, 84*a* 8–10); *Metaph.* X, t. 2 (AL XXV^2, 185; I c. 1, 1052*b*18); cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, (ed. J. Hamesse), p. 135: "In unoquoque genere est dare aliquod primum et mimimum quod fit metrum et mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere"; Averroes, *In Metaph. IV* com. 2, (ed. Iuntina), 1553, f. 31b.

1.19 Item primum sub communi conceptu boni est appetibile, quia secundum Augustinum,[23] appetendo quodcumque bonum appetimus primum bonum. Ergo a proportione: sub omni conceptu entis primum ens est intelligibile.

1.20 Haec tria ultima argumenta arguunt quod non solum communis conceptus entis potest formari, vero secundum: quod primum ens etiam per ipsum habet intelligi.

1.21 Respondeo: ad quaestionis evidentiam primo distinguetur ordo in entibus; secundo declarabitur quaestio: in hoc ordine procedit intellectus; tertio ostendetur ex his quomodo entis creati et increati formari communis conceptus ⟨possit⟩; quarto concludetur quomodo conceptus ille communis et primus, et quomodo non-primus.

1.22 Circa primum attendendum quod in creatis entibus ordo est in essendo.[24] Primo namque occurritur intellectui esse simplex, analogice dictum de decem praedicamentis, de quo Avicenna I *Metaphysicae* esse communiter dictum per multas significat intellectiones a quibus res quaelibet in sua certitudine suae essentiae dicitur ens.[25]

1.23 Secundo occurrit hoc esse determinatum certitudine alicuius entis decem praedicamentorum qua est aliqua res. Unde Avicenna:[26] intentio entis

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5 argumenta] *om.* T ‖ non] *posse add. sed exp.* T 8 distinguetur] distingueretur T 10 quomodo] quaestio T#1 *corr. in* (*mg.*) T#2 16 intellectiones] exactiones T' *sed exp.* T

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23 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate* XIII, c. 5, (CCL 50A), p. 392: "Quapropter quoniam verum est quod omnes homines esse beati velint idque unum ardentissimo amore appetant et propter hoc cetera quaecumque appetunt …".

24 *Pro tota discussione modorum essendi, videsis* Henricum de Gandavo, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum* a. 26, q. 1, (ed. Badius), Parisius 1520, I, f. 157$^{rB–C}$: "Gradus igitur intentionum inspiciendi sunt sub ente in creaturis secundum rationem perfectionis et imperfectionis, ut ex opposito vel supereminenti cognoscamus quomodo ponendae sunt in Creatore. Est igitur intelligendum secundum quod in parte dictum est supra quod ista quinque differunt in omnibus creaturis: esse simpliciter, et esse hoc, et esse aliquid, et esse hoc aliquid, et esse hoc aliquid actu". *Multae auctoritates, tam philosophicae quam theologicae, quae in textu Raymundi citantur, apud* Summam *Henrici, loco citato, reperiuntur*.

25 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, c. 5, (ed. Van Riet), I: 34–35.

26 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, c. 5, (ed. Van Riet), I: 34–35: "Dico ergo quod intentio entis et intentio rei imagninantur in animabus duae intentiones; ens vero et aliquid sunt nomina multivoca unius intentionis nec dubitabis quin intentio istorum non sit iam impressa in anima legentis hunc librum. Sed res et quicquid aequipollet ei, significat etiam aliquid aliud in omnibus linguis; unaquaeque res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus et albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo. Et hoc est

et rei in anima imaginantur duae, in tantum intentiones una; quaecumque enim habet suam certitudinem, quae est eius quidditas qua est id quod est, et hoc quia est, vel potest esse, similitudo divini exemplaris.

1.24 Tertio occurrit esse aliquid determinatum forma specifica, quae est natura. Aliqua enim secundum Boethium[27] est verius cuiusque rei specifica differentia; nihil enim aliud est natura secundum Augustinum[28] nisi id quod intelligitur in suo genere aliquid esse.

1.25 Quarto occurrit hoc esse hoc aliquid signatum in supposito ultima determinatione essentiae. Unde Avicenna II *Metaphysicae* res ex hoc quod dicitur aliquid, non sequitur ipsum esse aliquid signatum,[29] nec refert si tota species sit in unico individuo. Tunc enim secundum Avicennam III *Metaphysicae* uno modo est species, alio modo non est species; uno modo est universale, alio modo non est universale.[30]

1.26 Quinto occurrit circa hoc aliquid in actu, ut si est Dei effectus; propter quod esse actuale res habet: esse quidditativum definitivum per suam essentiam in divino exemplari rationem habente. Istud autem duplex esse, esse materiale et actuale, designat Avicenna III *Metaphysicae* in principio.[31]

1.27 Isti autem quinque gradus differunt re vel intentione.

1.28 Extra hunc ordinem omnino est divinum esse, in quo haec omnia per omnimodam indifferentiam sunt id ipsum. Unde non est sub ente nec sub aliquo praedicamento, immo nec simpliciter in praedicamento, cum sit principium et solum esse. Unde secundum Avicennam VIII *Metaphysicae*:

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1 imaginantur] imaginatur T ‖ intentiones] actiones T 9 II] I T 11 III] I T 17 materiale] male T 22 VIII] V T

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quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium, nec intendimus per illud nisi intentionem esse affirimativi".

27 Cf. Boethius, *Contra Eutychen* I, (ed. Rand), p. 80: "natura esset unamquamque rem informans differencia specifica".

28 Cf. Augustinus, *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum* 2.2, 2, (PL 32), p. 1346: "Natura nihil aliud est quam id quod intelligitur in suo genere aliquid esse".

29 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* II, c. 2, (ed. Van Riet), I: 78: "… ex hoc autem quod ipsa dicitur aliquid, non sequitur ipsam esse aliquid designatum in effectu".

30 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* III, c. 2, (ed. Van Riet), I: 108: "Cum autem fuerit unum specie, sine dubio erit unum differentia; constat autem quod quicquid est unum genere, multa est specie; unum vero specie, aliquando est multa numero, aliquando non est unum numero, scilicet cum natura totius speciei fuerit in uno individuo; et hoc uno modo erit species et alio modo non erit species; eo quod uno modo est universale et alio modo non est universale …".

31 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* III, c. 1, (ed. Van Riet), I: 104.

necesse esse non habet quidditatem aut certitudinem aliam praeter necesse esse.[32] Hoc de primo.

1.29 Circa secundum attendendum quod (praeter duos modos quos ponit Porphyrius ascendendo et descendendo per lineam praedicamentalem—de quibus nihil ad praesens) in ordine entium intellectus procedere potest simpliciter, arguitive, apprehensive.

1.30 Secundo modo: cum enim omnis nostra cognitio oriatur a sensu, primo ab eo quod est hoc aliquid actu arguit hoc aliquid et ab hoc aliquid aliud et ab hoc ad esse hoc aliquid in genere ⟨il⟩limitatum ens, licet limitabile quod est ultimum in creatis. Cum autem omne tale ens sit non a se, sed ab alio, omnes isti gradus entis aliquid ens a se esse, scilicet principium et purum illimitatum et illimitabile arguunt et concludunt.

1.31 51^{vb} Primo modo, resolutio | : idem enim est processus ab ente compositiori usque ad ens simplicissimum, non solum in genere neque solum ⟨in specie⟩, neque ad ens quod occurrit omne genus nec potest esse genus; sed etiam ad ens primum quod nec est entium nec concernit omne genus, sed est supra et extra omne genus.

1.32 Tertio modo, apprehensione simplici: est contrarius processus in entibus, tam ex parte intelligibili quam ex parte intelligentis. Ex utraque enim parte primo movet intellectum et tangit esse purum et absolutissimum illimitatum et illimitabile secundum gradus iam dictos; hoc de secundo.

1.33 Circa tertium attendendum quod conceptus entis quandoque fundatur in sola communitate intentionis, ubi est in secundis intentionibus, sicut est genus generis, species specierum, praedicamentum et simile in similibus; quandoque fundatur in communitate rei sub intentione ut in secundis intentionibus applicatis primis intentionibus, ut homo et asinus est species; rationale et irrationale est differentia; substantia et quantitas genus, et similiter in similibus; quandoque fundatur in communitate intentionis ut in primis intentionibus. Hoc autem dupliciter contingit: vel univoce ut omnia quae sunt in eodem praedicamento sunt sub eodem genere generalissimo, cuius respectu omnium idem est nomen et ratio; vel analogice, sicut decem praedicamenta sub ente, ubi, etsi identitas, non tamen aequalitas rei et rationis.

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7 Secundo] Primo T ‖ nostra] natura *a.c.* T 9 hoc] *om.* T ‖ ⟨il⟩limitatum] limitatum T
13 Primo] Secundo T 15 etiam] neque T 16 concernit] curuit *dub.* T

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32 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* VIII, c. 4, (ed. Van Riet), II: 401: "Igitur necesse esse non habet quidditatem nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est *anitas*".

1.34 Nullo autem praedictorum modorum potest formari conceptus communis entis creati et increati sub ente, cum ens absolutissimum nec re nec ratione possit limitari sub ente, nec esse simpliciter ⟨sub eo⟩ quod non est de se, ⟨quod⟩ nec esse possit aliud quam esse possit esse sub eo esse ⟨quod potest non esse⟩. Cum igitur primum esse sit illimitatum et illimitabile semper remanet absolute esse, immo necesse esse.

1.35 Quoniam autem esse creatum est similitudo expressa et expressiva entis increati quod est esse per se, hoc modo analogicae similitudinis intellectus format sibi communem conceptum similitudinis, assimilatum secundum dici sub communi appellatione entis, sola ratione concepta. Et secundum has vias procedere debent rationes probantes vel negantes communem conceptum de his posse formari, quamvis plures excedant et falso concludant. Haec de tertio.

1.36 Circa quartum attendendum quod ens sic communiter conceptum et dictum, quod secundum Avicennam[33] est metaphysicae subiectum, secundum aliquos est impressio intellectus prima quam apprehendimus quia omnes alias continet; prima adhuc praedicatione, sicut 'ens huiusmodi' determinatio et de omnibus entibus ⟨praedicatur⟩; probatio consequentiae, quia sequitur ad omnes alias, sicut 'tale ens' sequitur ad omnia entia. Prius enim est illud a quo non convertitur consequentia.

1.37 Secundum autem alios, licet ens sic acceptum modis praedictis possit esse prima impressio intellectus—prima in qualibet impressione quam ipse format et facit sibi—, non tamen simpliciter potest esse prima impressio quae fit intellectui, cum ille talis conceptus communis formari non possit nisi ex aliis conceptibus praeconceptis, praecognitis, praecollatis, praeabstractis.

1.38 Item quos omnes primum esse quod nihil aliud est nisi esse absolutum; quod prius occurrit intellectui et prius ipsum movet et tangit ut prima eius notio et naturalis impressa apprehensio; prima quidem simplicitate ultra quam non est resolutio. Prima enim causalitate a qua effluit prima omnium motio; prima adhuc universalitate in qua continetur omnis esse ratio et per

8 hoc modo] hoc modo = *scripsi*] homo *dub.* T 12 quamvis] quia *dub.* T 14 quartum] *om.* T 16 quam apprehendimus] quam apprehendimus] quod apprehensive T 18 probatio] prima T 24 intellectui] *dub.* T 27 omnes] quos omnes *dub.* T

33 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, c. 2, (ed. Van Riet), I: 12: "Igitur ostensum est tibi ex his omnibus quod ens, inquantum est ens, est commune omnibus his et quod ipsum debet poni subiectum huius magisterii".

fectio; prima postremo intelligibilitate in qua est, immo quae est omnium intelligibilium ratio, cum nihil aliud sit quam pura essentia, veritas, et forma.

1.39 In hoc forte decipiuntur alii, existimantes universalitatem et primitatem absolutissimam primi esse menti impressam esse universalitatem et primitatem ab omnibus entibus abstractam et ratione conceptam; quae secundum veritatem rei prima impressio intellectus esse non potest, cum sit operatio ipsius intellectus.

1.40 Quod ad praesens teneo et sub intellectu praedicto; rationes directe concludentes pro ista parte concedo.

1.41 Ad oppositas dicendum ad primam, ...

Quaestio secunda

Quaeritur utrum ens creatum, non cointelligendo ens increatum, possit intelligi.

2.1 Et videtur quod non: quia omne ens creatum est ens ab alio secundum Augustinum contra Felicianum:[34] creatura, inquit, est ex eo quod vero est Dei voluntate facta substantia; sed impossibile est intelligi ens ab alio nisi intelligatur ens a quo; ergo impossibile ens intelligi ens creatum, ente increato non cointellecto; quare, etc.

2.2 Item secundum doctrinam Philosophi relativa, cum posita se ponunt,[35] 52ra simul cointelliguntur; sed creans relative dicitur ad creatum, | sicut causa ad effectum; quare, etc.

2.3 Item ens increatum movet effective in ratione principii, movet etiam obiective sub ratione veri; sed sub ratione principii impossibilis est secunda motio cuiuscumque agentis creati, non coexisistente et coagente prima; ergo sub ratione qua movet ut verum, impossibilis erit motio cuiuscumque veri

5 abstractam] abstractivam T ‖ conceptam] conceptivam T 10 primam] primum T. *Textus quaestionis primae Raymundi ex abrupto desinit; utrum amanuensis vero ex proposito responsiones ad argumenta in exemplari servatas omiserit, an, multo probabilius, reportator Raymundi* Quaestionum disputatarum *eas omiserit ut novam quaestionem reportare possit, nescimus.* 12 ens creatum ... increatum] *haec verba ab amanuensi lineis proximis interseruntur codicis*; *signum manifestius est, quo amanuensem ex altero exemplari transcripssise ostendatur.* 14 creatum] increatum *a.c.* T 20 cointelliguntur] colliguntur T

34 Cf. Augustinus, *Contra Felicem* lib. II, n. 18, (CSEL 25.2), p. 848: "Sic ergo corpus, sic anima, sic intelligitur universa creatura facta a Deo, non genita de Deo ut hoc sit quod Deus".

35 Cf. Aristoteles, *Praedic.* c. 6, 7b15–8a12 (AL I.1, 21).

creati, non exsistente et coagente prima, ergo similiter secunda apprehensio sine prima; quare, etc.

2.4 Item intelligendo 'nullum creatum esse' intelligitur necessario 'ens increatum esse', ergo multo fortius intelligendo creatum esse. Consequentia patet. Antecedens probatur, quia nullo ente creato exisistente vel intellecto non exsistere, conclusio est 'nullum creatum esse vel intelligi'; sed omnis veritas ponit veritatem primam secundum Augustinum *Soliloquiorum*;[36] ergo intellectio omnis veritatis ponit intellectionem primae; quare, etc.

2.5 Item secundum Avicennam III *Metaphysicae*:[37] prima apprehensio intellectus est esse; non-esse res posterior, quale est omne esse creatum, quia necessario respectivum praessupponit absolutum, sicut actus reflexus praesupponit directum; ergo esse absolutum, cum sit esse primum et primarium; ergo increatum esse est prima impressio intellectus; sed impossibilis est secunda impressio sine prima; quare, etc.

2.6 Item intellectus nihil apprehendit nisi sub ratione veri; sed omne verum creatum intantum est verum inquantum est simile primo vero et inquantum dissimile falso, secundum Augustinum, *De vera religione*:[38] Veritas, inquit, similitudo summi principii a qua falsitas ostenditur, scilicet, per dissimile; sed impossibile intelligi verum vero non-simile nisi cointellecto vero cui est simile; quare, etc.

2.7 Contra: necesse est primo intelligi medium antequam intelligatur extremum quod intelligitur per illud medium; aliter enim simul attingeretur extremum et medium, et neutrum per consequens intelligeretur per alterum. Sed omne creatum est medium per quod intelligitur esse increatum. Ergo vero cointellecto esse increato, necessario intelligitur esse creatum; quare, etc.

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6 conclusio] quaestioni T 10 posterior] peccatum T ‖ quia] quare T 15 veri] vera T 16 creatum] increatum T 25 vero] *dub.* T

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36 Cf. Augustinus, *Soliloquiorum libri duo* II, c. 15, 28, (CSEL 89), p. 83: "Nihil autem verum sine veritate; nullo modo igitur interit veritas".

37 *Potius* Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, c. 5, (ed. Van Riet), I: 41: "… esse vero notius est quam non-esse, esse enim cognoscitur per se, non-esse vero cognoscitur per esse aliquo modo".

38 Cf. Augustinus, *De vera religione* c. 36, 66–67, (CCSL 32), p. 231: "Ut ergo veritas forma verorum, ita similtudo forma similium. Quapropter quoniam vera in tantum vera sunt, in quantum sunt, in tantum autem sunt, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt, ea forma est omnium quae sunt, quae summa similitudo principii et ueritas est, quia sine ulla dissimilitudine est. Unde falsitas oritur, non rebus ipsis fallentibus, quae nihil aliud ostendunt sentienti quam speciem suam, quam pro suae pulchritudinis acceperunt gradu, neque ipsis sensibus fallentibus, qui pro natura sui corporis affecti non

2.8 Item quanto inter aliqua maior est distantia intelligibilitatis entis creati et increati quam albi et nigri? Ergo si album potest intelligi, non cointelligendo nigrum, multo fortius ens creatum, non cointellecto ente increato; quare, etc.

2.9 Item quaecumque uni et eidem sunt cointelligibilia inter se sunt cointelligibilia, sicut aequalia. Ergo si intellecto quolibet creato esse, cointelligibile est necessario increatum esse; omnia autem creata esse sunt inter se cointelligibilia, et Deus igitur erit similiter cointelligibilis. Hoc autem est simpliciter falsum; ergo et illud ex quo sequitur; quare, etc.

2.10 Item res, veritas rei, et intellectus in intellectione aequantur, cum eadem sit dispositio rei in esse et veritate II *Metaphysicae*;[39] sed esse creatum et increatum non solum separabilia sed etiam separabilia sunt et infinita separata re et veritate; ergo et intellectum; quare, etc.

2.11 Item voluntas potest aliquid velle, non volendo Deum, utpote peccatum; immo etiam spernendo Deum secundum Augustinum. Ergo, a proportione potentiarum ad obiecta intellectus poterit aliquid intelligere, non cointelligendo Deum; quare, etc.

2.12 Item secundum Avicennam[40] prima conceptio intellectus est res ad quam stat resolutio omnium conceptionum. Sed Deus non clauditur nec continetur sub ente, cum sit supra-ens secundum Dionysium;[41] ergo nec concipitur, conintellecto ente; quare, etc.

2.13 Responsio: Ad quaestionis evidentiam videtur hic distinguendum: primo ex parte intelligibilis; secundo ex parte intelligentis, sive quaestio quaerat de termino incomplexo ut si intelligendo creatum cointelligatur increatum, sive intelligatur de propositione complexa, ⟨ut⟩ si intelligendo creaturam esse intelligatur Creatorem esse.

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3 multo] *dub.* T 6 sicut] sic T 11 II] III T 18 Avicennam] Augustinum T ‖ res] *dub.* T 19 Sed] Nec T 20 supra-ens] semper ens T ‖ concipitur] colligitur (*dub.*) T

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aliud quam suas affectiones praesidenti animo nuntiant, sed peccata animas fallunt, cum verum quaerunt relicta et neglecta veritate".

39 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* II, c. 1, 993b30–31 (AL XXV#3, 43).

40 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, c. 5, (ed. Van Riet), I: 31–32: "Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se …".

41 Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, *De diuinis nominibus* c. 1 (sec. Robertum Grosseteste) in: *Dionysiaca*, p. 355, col. 4: "Etenim non hoc aliquid quidem est, hoc aliquid autem non est; neque quo quidem est quo autem non est; sed omnia est ut omnium causa, et in ipso omnia principia, omnes conclusiones omnium totorum comprehendens et praehabens, et super omnia est, ut ante omnia supersubstantialiter superens".

2.14 Uno enim modo creatum et increatum considerari possunt sub istis intentionibus, ex relatione quae oritur ex respectu creantis ad creatum, sicut causae ad effectum. Et hoc modo, sicut in relativis, quo cointellecto uno, cointelligitur reliquum; qui enim intelligit ens ab alio necessario intelligit a quo, sicut probat prima ratio.

2.15 Alio modo possunt considerari secundum illud quod sunt in materiis propriis et sic ad hoc cum esse creatum, ⟨secundum⟩ id ipsum quod est, dependeat ab esse increato omnino in esse et veritate, ac per hoc intelligibilitate, licet non econverso, necessario claudit illud ⟨in⟩ intellectu suo ac per hoc ⟨ens increatum⟩ cointelligitur, ipso cointellecto, licet intelligens non discernat cointelligendo, sicut probat tertia ratio et quarta.

2.16 Tertio modo possunt considerari secundum ordinem conceptuum. Concipiuntur autem hic sub ratione veri, et boni ⟨et⟩ entis, quae sunt primae conceptiones circumeuntes intellectum. Prius namque apprehenditur esse purum, quod solum est esse primum, quod nihil est nisi ipsum esse et pura veritas, quae solum est veritas prima, quae nihil aliud est nisi veritas quam esse vel verum aliquid specie, modo, vel ordine, limitabile vel limitatum. 52^{rb} Unde sicut verum hoc vel tale materiale esse non est intelligibile | non cointellecto vero vel esse, sic nullus conceptus entis creati qui est secundum formam est sine conceptu entis increati, qui est primus. Et sub hoc sensu dicitur una veritas omnium verorum ab Anselmo et dicitur unum esse omnium entium a Dionysio, non solum causative sed expressive. Ad hoc tendebat ratio quinta et sexta.

2.17 Ex parte autem intelligentis distinguendum est. Convenit enim rem dupliciter intelligere secundum Philosophum in I *Posteriorum*,[42] scilicet, in universali et in particulari. Potest enim secundum ipsum res eadem sciri in universali et ignorari in particulari. Primo modo in universali cognoscitur res indeterminate sub quodam communi confuso, sicut omnes volentes secundum Augustinum XIII *De trinitate* c. 5[43] et IX: "Volentes quodcumque bonum volunt beneficium bonum, propter quod volunt esse aliud bonum", ut dicitur ibidem, nec tamen propter beneficium determinate et in particulari volunt Deum, qui tamen simpliciter est beneficium bonum. Sic simpliciter intel-

3 quo] qui T 7–8 dependeat] *Seq. spat vac.* T 10–11 discernat] discumveniat T 18 materiale] *dub.* T 19 vero] ii *add. sed exp.* T 20 sine] *dub.* T 27 universali] *p.c.* T 28 quodam] quondam T ‖ volentes] nolentes (*dub.*) T 29 IX] add. De Q. c. 1 T

42 Cf. Aristoteles, *Anal post.* I, c. 14, 79a5–6 (AL IV^2, 131): "... quemadmodum universale contemplantes multoties unum particularium non sciunt quia non intendunt".

43 Cf. Augustinus, *De trin.* XIII, c. 5, (CCL L^A), pp. 392–393.

lectus, intelligendo quodcumque verum, intelligit primum verum, confuse tamen et indeterminate et in universali, nec tamen propter hoc determinate et in particulari intellectu quid est Deus vel quid esse Deum unum. Hoc autem dicit Damascenus[44] libro III c. 1 quod cognitio Dei naturaliter est nobis inserta et Boethius III *De consolatione*:[45] innata est nobis veri bonique cupiditas, ratione scilicet primorum conceptuum entis, veri, et boni. Ex quorum quolibet concludi potest propositum.

2.18 Considerandum autem quod sive primi conceptus entis, veri, et boni dicant, secundum aliquos primum ens verum et bonum, sive secundum alios dicant horum trium communem conceptum ad creatum et increatum, de quo erit sequens quaestio, simpliciter tamen est cognitio in universali; primo modo in universali per causam, secundo modo in universali per praedicationem solum secundum dici. Utroque enim modo primum ens verum et bonum est primum movens, primum tangens intellectum in intelligendo.

2.19 Hunc modum intelligendi tradit Augustinus VIII *De trinitate*[46] c. 3: "simul", inquit, "primum bonum cum audis hoc et illud bonum. Si ergo potueris, illis detractis, prospicere bonum per se ipsum, prospexeris Deum, etc.".

2.20 Hoc etiam videtur intellexisse Avicenna I *Metaphysicae*,[47] dicens quod "praeter testificationem sensibilium potest homo scire Deum esse intentione propositionum universalium, quae quidem sumuntur per viam generalium intentionum, sicut sunt ens, verum, et bonum, et consimiles".

2.21 Et tertio modo: in particulari cognitores et determinate sub natura et specie propria praecise sub primis conditionibus, sicut determinate appetendo bonum appetit homo videre, amare, et tenere Deum; et sic non est necesse intelligendo creatum vel increatum esse cointelligere Deum in particulari.

17 prospexeris] prospexit T 19 testificationem] rectificationem T

44 Cf. Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* c. 3, (ed. Buytaert), p. 16: "Sicut enim diximus, cognitio exsistendi Deum naturaliter nobis inserta est".

45 Cf. Boethius, *De philosophiae consolatione* III, c. 2, (ed. Stewart-Rand), p. 232: "Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas …".

46 Cf. Augustinus, *De trin.* VIII, c. 3, (CCL L), p. 273: "Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud, quae possunt alias dici etiam non-bona, si potueris sine illis quae participatione boni bona sunt perspicere ipsum bonum, cuius participatione bona sunt … si ergo potueris, illis detractis, per se ipsum perspicere bonum, perspexeris Deum".

47 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* I, c. 3, (ed. Van Riet), I: 23: "Postea vero manifestabitur tibi innuendo quod nos habemus viam ad stabiliendum primum principium, non ex via testificationis sensibilium, sed ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium per se notarum, quae facit necessarium quod ens habet principium quod est necesse esse …".

Primo quidem quia nullum creatum, immo omne creatum, exprimit perfecte increatum, nec 'creatum esse' 'increatum esse', sicut suum esse; nec possit intelligi praeter suum esse, nec potest cogitari non esse cum sit ipsum esse. Creatum vero non est suum esse et potest intelligi praeter 'est' et, cum in termino sit ipsum esse, potest cogitari non esse. Secundo, quia cognoscere Deum vel Deum esse in particulari includit cognitionem divinae essentiae cum includat cognitionem terminorum subiecti et praedicati; sed propria ratio terminorum non potest cognosci per aliquod creatum nisi sub ratione communi alicuius vel aliquorum attributorum. Tertio, quia esse increatum continet et exprimit omnes rationes et perfectiones essendi et essentiandi non solum creatorum et creandorum sed etiam creabilium. Nullum autem exprimit vel repraesentat illud nisi secundum aliquam imperfectam similitudinem arctatam et limitatam in proprio genere ac per hoc imperfecte. Quarto, quia ex intellectu creati esse non cointelligitur atque participatione alia nisi esse, quia hoc esse non praesupponit nec includit nec infert nisi esse.

2.22 Esse autem communiter dictum vel cointellectum non in particulari sed in universali tantum exprimit Deum vel esse divinum, et hoc solum probant rationes ad hanc partem affirmative adductae, scilicet, cointelligere in universali; oppositae autem rationes negant hoc totum in particulari.

2.23 Potest dici tamen ad primum quod verum est in cognitione arguitiva et collativa, quia unum probatur per aliud, sicut conclusio per praemissas; non in cognitione apprehensiva simpliciter quin unum continet et includit alterum secundum ordinem conceptuum intelligibilium.

2.24 Ad secundum dic quod si in proposito sit maior distantia in ratione entitatis, non tamen in ratione vel ordine conintelligentis quo unum includit intellectum universali, ut visum est.

2.25 52^{va} Ad tertium dic quod verum esset si illud | unum convertibiliter et commensurabiliter intelligeretur utrique, sicut est de aequalitate. In proposito autem non est sic, quia increatum universaliter intelligitur quando creatum convertibiliter vel commensurabiliter intelligitur.

2.26 Ad quartum dic quod creatum et increatum separata sunt re et veritate rationibus propriis et in particulari, non ratione similitudinis et commensurabilitatis et per consequens intelligibilitatis in universali.

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5 sit] sic *dub.* T 6 divinae essentiae] divinam esse T 10 essentiandi] *dub.* T 14 participatione] pertractatione T 30 intelligitur] *om.* T ‖ quando creatum] creato T

2.27 Ad quintum dic quod per vitae imperfectionem quod voluntas nihil potest velle nisi sub ratione veri boni vel apparentis; nullus enim aliquid operatur ad malum aspiciens secundum Dionysium.

2.28 Ad sextum dic quod Deus dicitur super-ens, non quin concipiatur ab intellectu sub ratione entis, sed quia infinitum excedit essentiam cuiuslibet alterius entis.

Quaestio tertia

[Quaeritur] utrum de non-ente possit formari conceptus intelligentiae.[48]

3.1 Et videtur quod non: Augustinus 22 *Super Genesim*:[49] "intellectus aut intelligit et est verum; aut non intelligit et non est verum"; quare, etc.

3.2 Item ad intelligere requiritur potentia, ratio, et obiectum; sed deficiente potentia vel ratione, impossibile est intelligere; ergo et deficiente obiecto.

3.3 Item de ente per accidens secundum Philosophum[50] non potest esse scientia, non practica, non speculativa; sed non-ens plus distat ab ente per se; quare, etc.

3.4 Item secundum Philosophum[51] sicut sensus se habet ad sensibile, ita et intellectus ad intelligibile; sed sensus nihil potest sentire sine sensibili exsistente; quare, etc.

3.5 Item intellectus est rei similitudo; sed similitudo est relatio; ergo destructo altero, reliquum destruatur; quare, etc.

3.6 Item destructo intellectu, destruuntur voces; ergo destructis rebus, destruitur intellectus, a simili; quare, etc.

3.7 Item de futuris habetur notitia; non per propriam speciem acquisitam; ergo sine re potest scientia acquiri, quod est contra dicta.

3.8 Item III *De anima* non-ens non potest habere rationem obiecti moventis vel ultimi terminantis, cum ab obiecto primo habeatur moveri.

3.9 Item 'quid est' non potest sciri nisi sciatur 'si est' vel 'quia est', II *Posteriorum*;[52] sed de non-ente non est scire 'si est' vel 'quia est'; quare, etc.

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1 vitae imperfectionem] mente imperfectionem T 5 infinitum] finitum T 9 non] sic T 10 et] *om.* T 17 sensibili] *add.* non T

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48 Cf. Mathaei de Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione*, (ed. G. Gál), BFS I^2, pp. 201–222, *ubi multae eaedem auctoritates argumentaque inveniuntur*.

49 Cf. Augustinus, *Super Genesim* c. 25, n. 52, (PL 34), p. 476.

50 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* VI, c. 2, 1026b2 (XXV^2 118).

51 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* II, c. 1, 993b30–31 (XXV^2 37).

52 Cf. Aristoteles, *Anal. post.* II, c. 8, 93a20–b16 (AL IV^2, 165–166).

3.10 Item nullum accidens non eductum a subiecto conservatur a subiecto, ut patet in lumine; sed species est tale accidens; quare, etc.

3.11 Item ens et esse sunt idem re; sed inseparabilia re sunt inseparabilia intellectu; ergo esse nisi sit actu non intelligitur.

3.12 Item ens est primum intelligibile; sed sublato primo intelligibili, aufertur quodlibet sequens; ergo nihil nisi ens potest intelligi.

3.13 Item sicut res se habet ad esse, sic ad intelligere II *Metaphysicae*;[53] ergo ad non-esse sequitur non-intelligere.

3.14 Item Boethius libro de *Divisionum*:[54] de re quae non est non potest esse scientia; ergo et si non-ens non potest sciri, quare nec intelligi.

3.15 Item intelligere sequitur esse; ergo qui tollit esse tollit intelligere; sed non-ens tollit simpliciter esse; quare, etc.

3.16 Item destructo priori, destruitur posterius; sed tale est sensibile respectu intelligibilis; quare sine sensibili non erit intelligibile.

3.17 Item Bernardus 'Ad Eugenium': intellectus cognoscit veritatem et creatam rationem veritatis; sed hoc est per rei exsistentiam; quare, etc.

3.18 Item XII *Confessionum*:[55] species lapsa reparatur non de parte speciei, non de specie alia, non de memoria, sed de obiecto; quare et per obiectum conservatur.

3.19 Item generationes specierum habent ordinem essentialem; ergo necessario dependent a primo; sed primum est ipsum obiectum; quare, etc.

3.20 Item destructis primis, impossibile est quid eorum remanere; ergo nec intelligere, nec esse.

3.21 Contra: si non-ens non est intelligibile, 'non-ens non est esse intelligibile' est verum intelligibile; et ⟨hoc⟩ solet arguere Anselmus *De veritate*.[56]

3.22 Item secundum Philosophum sicut verum est esse quod est, ita verum est non-esse, quod non est;[57] sed omne verum est vel esse potest intelligibile; quare, etc.

3.23 Item res extra et ipsa intellecta sunt in diversis subiectis; sed quae sunt in diversis subiectis, altero destructo, alterum potest remanere.

10 sciri] scire T 25 arguere] arguit T ‖ Anselmus] Augustinus *a.c.* T

53 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* II, c. 1, 993b30–31 (XXV², 37).

54 Cf. Boethius, *De divisione*, (ed. J. Magee), p. 44: "… si enim nulla subiecta sit res quam significat vox, designativa esse non dicitur …".

55 *Re vera* Augustinus, *De trin.* XI, 3.6; 4.8, (CCL L), pp. 340–341, 343.

56 Cf. Anselmus Cantuariensis, *De veritate* c. 1, (ed. Schmitt), p. 176.

57 Cf. Aristoteles, *De int.* c. 9, 17a27–33 (AL II.1, 9).

3.24 Item omne quod quid est indifferens est ad esse et non esse actu; ergo potest esse actu praeter intellectum actu; quare, etc.

3.25 Item, essentia et esse se habet sicut prius et posterius; ergo potest intelligi essentia praeter esse.

3.26 Responsio: Ad quaestionis evidentiam primo intelligendum est de intel- 5
52^{vb} lectu; secundo de non-ente; tertio ex divisionibus decla|rantibus propositum; quarto per rationes confirmabitur; quinto ex superhabundantia declarabitur quid est obiectum intellectus non-entium.

3.27 Circa primum attendendum quod secundum Commentatorem *Super tertium De anima*:[58] famosior cognitio divisionis intelligibilis est in duas accep- 10
tiones, scilicet, in fidem, quae est apprehensio complexorum, cum apprehenditur esse vel non esse, vel concipiendo modum essendi determinatum sub aliqua differentia temporis, ut esse fuisse vel fore, affirmative vel negative; informatio est etiam quae est apprehensio incomplexorum, concipiens simpliciter et absolute simplices rerum quidditates et formans inde conceptus. 15

3.28 Circa secundum attende quod cum dicitur 'non-ens', negatio potest negare simpliciter et absolute omne rei esse actuale, intelligibile et essentiale et ideale quorum notitiam dedi superius in quadam quaestione.[59] Et sic patet acceptio Commentatoris super XI: "Non esse non ens, inquit, simpli- 20
citer quod non habet esse nec imaginationem; alio modo negare potest esse actuale tantum quo res est effecta et in actu", non tamen alios modos praedictos et rationes essendi praedictas.

3.29 Circa tertium attendendum quod accipiendo intellectum primo modo pro actione quae est fides vel apprehensio complexorum, sic oportet quod 25
iuxta rei exsistentiam concipiat intellectus intelligentiam in esse fuisse vel fore, negative vel affirmative ubi supra *Super Genesim*:[60] quod intellectus aut intelligit quod est verum; aut, si non est verum non intelligit. Et sic intelligo ab eo quod res est vel non est dicitur, etc. Et Anselmus *De veritate* c. 10: De veritate efficaci, et effecta et in anima;[61] ut autem veritas fundetur intelligen- 30

12 concipiendo] concurrendo T 27 ubi supra] quinto T 28 quod] *om.* T

58 Cf. Averroes, *De an.* III, c. 21, (ed. Crawford), p. 455.

59 Cf. *supra* q. 1, n. 22–29.

60 Cf. Augustinus, *Super Genesim* c. 25, n. 52, (PL 34), p. 476.

61 Cf. Anselmus, *De veritate* c. 10, (ed. Schmitt), p. 190: "DISCIPULUS. Video et animaduerto in aliis quasdam esse tantum effecta, quasdam uero esse causas et effecta. Ut cum ueritas qua est in rerum existentia sit effectum summae ueritatis, ipsa quoque causa est ueritatis quae cogitationis est, et eius quae est in propositione; et istae duae ueritates nullius sunt causa ueritatis".

tiae praeteriti et futuri ubi nulla subest exsistentia docet Augustinus XII *Confessionum*.[62] Accipiendo autem intellectum pro actione quae est formatio simplcium, scilicet, quid dicant conceptio et apprehensio, sic ad rei simplicem intelligentiam non requiritur rei exsistentia post conceptae quiditatis apprehensionem. Sed intelligimus cum volumus: ex parte intellectus abstrahentis esse quidditativum et distinctum ab esse et non esse, ab hic et nunc et omni differentia temporis; ex parte speciei exprimentis, tunc ut res est absolute, sicut abstracta est ab esse et non-esse et ab omni modo essendi ex parte quidditatis, quae secundum Avicennam V *Metaphysicae*[63] habet esse quidditativum sine esse actuali, cum quidditas et esse quidditativum differant, ut in Deo.

3.30 Simpliciter accipiendo non-ens primo modo, privans omnem modum essendi, privat omnem modum intelligendi. Quod enim non est ideale factibile essentiale intelligibile vel actuale nullo modo potest esse obiectum intellectus. Non-ens autem, privans esse actu non alios modos essendi, potest intelligi, immo esse actuale primum, nisi species nihil facit ad intelligendum rei, sed inde intelligitur unde memorialis; unde memoria perdita reparatur, scilicet a specie rei vel notitia; ex futurorum cognitorum praevisione quorum, licet non in propria natura, habetur apprehensis certa cognitio secundum Augustinum ad Cassiodum, ex sciendorum dispositione, cum opus agentis a proposito nihil possit fieri sine verbo vel praecedente secundum Augustinum IX *De trinitate*[64] c. 5.

3.31 Circa quintum attendendum quod obiectum intellectus non potest esse res quae iam non est nec species quae est tantum similitudo rei et ratio intelligendi non-obiectum, cum scientia sit de rebus non de speciebus; sed quidditas rei conservata acquisita, inventa operatione intellectus et per ipsum conservata, quae est verbum, ratio quidditatis, vel definitio; species igitur intelligentis non est obiectum, sed ratio intelligendi, inveniendi, concipiendi obiectum; species vero est ratio conservandi qua intuita intellectus fertur ulterius in notitiam et conceptum de re, quae si vere fuerit concepta, est veritas quidditatis et definitio et ratio rei sub esse quidditativo et scibili et est verbum, dicente Augustino XV *De trinitate*[65] c. 14: 'Quid est, inquit, etc.'.

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6 ab] ab T ‖ hic] huc T 16 species] speciei T 18 scilicet] sed T ‖ cognitorum] cognitione *a.c.* T 19 natura] habet *add. seu anticip.* T 20 Cassiodum] *Non invenimus.* 21 vel] nihil T 28 intelligentis] intelligens T 32 dicente] dicunt T

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62 Cf. Augustinus, *Conf.* XI, 18.23–24, (ed. O'Donnell), pp. 156–157.

63 Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* V, c. 2, (ed. Van Riet), II: 244–245.

64 Cf. Augustinus, *De trin.* IX, 5.8 (CCL L), pp. 300–301.

65 Cf. Augustinus, *De trin.* XV, 14.23 (CCL L^{a}), p. 496.

Et Philosophus IV *Metaphysicorum*[66] c. 16 ante finem, scilicet quia veritas est ratio formalis obiecti intelligibilis, veritas et conformitas ad illam; ideo nulla creata veritas vere cognoscitur nisi relata ad humanam ideam ut menti praesidentem superlucentem monentem et tangentem vero obiective quidditatem. Sed cum alia conceptio formetur de ente, alia de non-ente, veritas autem iudicetur ex | adaequatione rei ad intellectum, non ad exemplar 53ra divinum, cognitio autem naturalis sine lumine supernaturali; nec generali motione supposita, privanda sit noblissima operatio naturaliter sibi debita, cum secundum Damascenum lib. II c. 12: Impossibilis sit substantiam esse naturalis operationis expertem (idem lib. III c. 15[67] nec sit possibilis cognosci sine ea actione ⟨quae⟩ est secundum naturam): quod autem horum sit verius, alibi declarabitur.

3.32 Ad primum patet quod loquitur de actione intellectus, quae est fides et apprehensio complexorum in quibus est verum et falsum proprie.

3.33 Ad secundum quod non deficit obiectum cum quidditas concepta sit obiectum intellectus, per quam acquisitam habet scientiam de re.

3.34 Ad tertium quod de ente per accidens non est scientia, non propter defectum non-entitatis, sed contingentiae et causalitatis causarum.

3.35 Ad quartum quod non est simile in hoc quia sensus non est conservatio speciei sicut intellectus, nec est conceptus rationis obiecti, cum sit simpliciter passivus.

3.36 Ad quintum quod verum est de simplicitate reali participata a duobus, non de intelligibili, quae est similitudo unius et accidens alterius.

3.37 Ad sextum quod voces destruuntur non simpliciter, sed secundum hoc. Vel dic quod non destruuntur ut significant rem, sed ut significant hoc vel hoc esse.

3.38 Ad septimum quod de futuris cognitio acquiritur non per speciem rei sed per speciem impressam fusam a causa concepta.

3.39 Ad octavum quod non-ens non est obiectum, sed quiditas concepta rei; non ut entis actu vel non entis sed absolute sumptae.

3.40 Ad nonum quod quidem sequitur 'si est', non in esse actuali sed quidditativo, sicut patet in rosa non existente actu.

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1 scilicet] sed T 4–5 quidditatem] quidditativem T 5 non-ente] *spat. vac.* T 6 adaequatione] acquisitione T 8 operatio] opere T 9 esse] sine *add. sed exp.* T 19 conservatio] conservatus *a.c.* T 22 participata] partitiva T 23 unius] verius T 25 non] vere (*dub.*) T

66 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* IV, c. 8, 1012b5–17 (XXV², 82).

67 Cf. Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* c. 59, (ed. Buytaert), pp. 242–243.

3.41 Ad decimum quod verum est de dispositione in medio et sensu, non imaginatione vel intellectu.

3.42 Ad undecimum quod sunt idem re uniformiter accepta non diversimode, sed non esse ut accepta et esse in actu re.

3.43 Ad duodecimum quod ante accepit ens absolute et simpliciter cui opponitur non-ens simpliciter, quod non est intelligibile, ut dictum est.

3.44 Ad tertium decimum quod verum est de esse quidditativo, quod si non sit vere conceptum nec est vere intellectum. Vel potest dici de complexis.

3.45 Ad quartum decimum quod Boethius loquitur de non-ente omnino, de quo nullus est sensus, experientia, imaginatio, vel conceptus, sicut dictum est.

3.46 Ad quintum decimum quod eo modo quo intelliguntur sequuntur esse; eo modo tollens esse tollit intelligere, actualiter vel totaliter.

3.47 Ad sextum decimum quod sensibile prius est efficiendo, non conservando. Unde cadente sensu, remanet imaginatio et intellectus ex conceptis.

3.48 Ad septimum decimum quod intellectus veritatem rei et rationem eius cognoscit per quidditatem, si vere sit concepta, sicut verum verbum.

3.49 Ad octavum decimum, quod reparatur species vero de parte per configurationem vel de specie apprehensionis primae, de qua movetur ut prius, secundum Augustinum et Philosophum.

3.50 Ad nonum decimum: species habent essentialem ordinem in causando, non tantum in conservando, sicut saepe dictum est.

3.51 Ad vicesimum: quod, destructis primis, nec essentia nec esse remanet in esse actuali, sed in ⟨esse⟩ essentiali et quidditativo.

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3 uniformiter] *dub.* T 18 vero] non T 19 de qua] donatio (*dub.*) T 21 causando] creando T

CHAPTER 16

Esse consecutive cognitum: A Fourteenth-Century Theory of Divine Ideas

Garrett R. Smith

The divine ideas in medieval thought typically serve two functions: they are the models by which God creates, and the means by which God knows creation.[1] Here I will focus on a problem found in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theories of divine ideas that pertains to the second of these functions. The problem is this: if we call the divine essence the primary object of divine cognition and creatures the secondary objects, how can the divine intellect cognize both its primary and secondary objects without some sort of discursive movement and a subsequent violation of the traditional doctrine of divine immutability?

There was a solution to this problem that won many adherents in the fourteenth-century. In brief, this solution held that the relation between the primary object and the secondary objects of divine cognition is one of "following": in Latin the noun is *consecutio*, the verb *consequor*. The secondary objects "follow" in the sense that simply by cognizing the primary object of the intellect, the divine essence, God also knows the secondary objects as necessary

1 For studies on the divine ideas, cf. O. Boulnois—J. Schmutz—J.-L. Solère (eds.), *Le contemplateur et les idées: modèles de la science divine, du néoplatonisme au XVIII^e siècle*, Paris 2002; Norris Clarke, "The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism", in: D.J. O'Meara (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, Albany, NY 1982, pp. 109–127; Vivian Boland, *Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis*, Leiden—New York—Köln 1996; John F. Wippel, *Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas* (The Étienne Gilson Series 16), Toronto 1993; L.M. de Rijk, "*Quaestio de ideis*: Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism", in: J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk (eds.), *KEPHALAION: Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C.J. De Vogel*, Assen 1975, pp. 204–213; Jacqueline Hamesse, "*Idea* chez les auteurs philosophiques des 12^e et 13^e siècles", in: M. Fattori and M.L. Bianchi (eds.), *Idea. VI Colloquio Internazionale Roma, 5–7 gennaio 1989*, Roma 1990, pp. 99–135; Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, "*Propter dicta Augustini*. Die metaphysische Bedeutung der mittelalterlichen Ideenlehre", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 64 (1997), pp. 245–262; Idem, *Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in late Medieval Thought*, Leiden—New York—Köln 1993.

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correlatives of the divine essence.[2] Thus there is no movement or change on the part of the divine intellect that might compromise divine immutability. Several fourteenth-century thinkers endorsed this solution, such as Iacobus de Aesculo, Franciscus de Mayronis,[3] Aufredus Gonteri,[4] Petrus Thomae,[5] and Ioannes Baconthorpe.[6] Moreover, Bartholomaeus Mastrius wrote favorably of the theory in the seventeenth century.[7] James of Ascoli was the first to defend the view, and his treatment enjoyed a modest influence: both Petrus Thomae and John Baconthorpe cited James by name and quoted his arguments.[8] The principal critics of the *consecutio* theory were Guillelmus de Alnwick,[9] who criticized James of Ascoli, and Petrus Rogerius,[10] a critic of John Baconthorpe.[11]

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2 The use of the term *consecutio* was not restricted to treatments of divine cognition. Thomas of Sutton described the motion of the will, and the movement of the intellect from cognition of principles to conclusion, as well as the relation between the downward motion of a heavy object and its weight with the term *consecutio*, and Hervaeus Natalis held that when thinking of humanity, Peter and John "follow" necessarily. Cf. Thomas de Suttona, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 7, (ed. Johannes Schneider), München 1977, pp. 215–216; Hervaeus Natalis, *De secundis intentionibus* d. 1, in: Judith Dijs, *Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus Distinctiones I&II: Critical Edition with Introduction and Indices*, Ph.D. Diss., Universiteit Leiden 2012, pp. 119–120.

3 Cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, *Conflatus* prol., q. 14, Venezia 1527, f. 9ra.

4 Cf. Aufredus Gonteri, *Ordinatio* II, q. 4, ad arg. princ. 1, Pamplona, Archivo de la Catedral, Ms. 5, f. 4$^{rb–va}$.

5 Cf. Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* qq. 2–4, (ed. Garrett Smith), Petri Thomae opera I, Leuven 2015, pp. 26–94.

6 Cf. Ioannes Baconthorpe, *Quodlibet* I qq. 9–12, Venezia 1527, ff. 16va–25ra; *Quodlibet* II qq. 1–3, 7, Venezia 1527, ff. 28ra–33ra; 37ra–38^{vb}; *In Sent*. I d. 39 a. 1, Venezia 1526, f. 111va–113va; *In Sent*. II d. 1 q. 4 a. 1–2, Venezia 1526, f. 130$^{ra–vb}$.

7 Cf. Bartholomeus Mastrius de Meldula, *Disputationes in Sent*. I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, n. 36, Venezia 1731, p. 98.

8 Cf. Ioannes Baconthorpe, *In Sent*. II, d. 1, q. 4, Venezia 1526, f. 130^{rb}; Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 3, a. 1; q. 4, a. 2, (ed. Smith), pp. 58–60, 71–74. Baconthorpe paraphrases an argument from James' *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, while Peter treats material from Questions 4 and 5 of the same work.

9 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi X) q. 2, 4, (ed. Athanasius Ledoux), Firenze—Quaracchi 1937, pp. 109–116.

10 Petrus Rogerius' arguments may be reported in several of John Baconthorpe's quodlibetal questions, though he is mentioned by name only twice. Cf. Baconthorpe, *Quodibet* II, q. 2, Venezia 1527, f. 29va; *Quodlibet* II, q. 3, Venezia 1527, f. 31va. For Petrus Rogerius' theory of divine ideas, cf Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Borgh. 89, ff. 246^{r}–250va.

11 Peter Aureoli criticized the ultimate presupposition of the *consecutio* theory, namely, the

In what follows, I will (1) examine the background of the *consecutio*-theory in Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus' accounts of divine cognition; (2) discuss James of Ascoli's explanation and defense of the theory; (3) survey William of Alnwick's arguments against James of Ascoli and consider whether they succeed; (4) Finally, in an Appendix I edit James of Ascoli's *Quaestio ordinaria* 4, the first statement of the *consecutio* theory.

1 Origin

The *consecutio* theory is a solution to a very old problem, one occasioned by Aristotle's divine 'Thought-Thinking-Itself'. If God were to have a cognition of something other than God, then, according to Aristotle, the divine mind would undergo a change from thinking of God to something other than God. Such a change would introduce potency into God, which is contrary to Aristotle's proof of the existence of an unmoved mover. Also, a change for God, who is the best being, could only be a change for the worse. Furthermore, if God were to think of things in the created realm, he could think of base and vile things, which, in virtue of being thought by God would become nobler than God. Consequently, Aristotle concluded that God does not think about creatures and his cognition is only of his own divine substance.[12]

The Aristotelian commentator Themistius (ca. 317–ca. 385 A.D.) introduced a highly influential (mis-) interpretation into the discussion of divine cognition.[13] According to Themistius, God, the first intellect, is the cause of the order and arrangement of the world. God knows himself and by knowing himself he knows himself to be the cause of the world. God then intellects everything that exists. But because of the problems that Aristotle raised against this view,

description of creatures as secondary objects of divine cognition, without, however, discussing the *consecutio* theory. Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum* I, d. 35, p. 2, a. 1, (ed. Sarnanus), Roma 1596, Vol. 2, pp. 771a–774b.

12 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII (Λ), c. 9, 1074b15–1075a10.

13 Regarding Themistius' discussion of divine knowledge, see Salomo Pines, "Some Distinctive Metaphysical Conceptions in Themistius' Commentary on Book Lambda and their Place in the History of Philosophy", in: J. Wiesner (Hrsg.), *Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung*, Berlin 1987, Band II, pp. 177–204. Themistius' commentary on *Metaphysics* XII (Λ) survives in Arabic fragments, Hebrew, and a Latin translation of the Hebrew from 1558. On Themistius' life and works, see Robert B. Todd, "Themistius", in: V. Brown *et alii* (eds.), *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries*, Washington, D.C. 2003, Vol. 8, pp. 56–102, especially pp. 90–91.

Themistius holds that God thinks the world and everything in it all together by a sudden movement. Thus, contrary to Aristotle, there is more content to the divine cognition than the divine essence alone, and there is also a movement, however swift, from cognizing the divine essence to cognizing creatures by means of the divine essence. Although Themistius' paraphrase of *Metaphysics* XII was not available in the Latin West during the medieval period, his basic position was known through the commentary of Averroes.[14] Averroes rejected Themistius' claim that the divine intellect cognizes creatures by a sudden movement, but he adopted the second feature of Themistius' account, namely, that God knows creatures by knowing his own essence as their cause, albeit with a slight modification: God knows himself as pure, absolute being (*esse*) and as the cause of the being of all other things.[15] Averroes explained this with the example of heat: someone knowing the nature of heat *qua* heat will also know it as it is present in other things.[16]

By the late thirteenth century, the Themistian modification of Aristotle was firmly imbedded in a consensus view that held that God knows creatures by knowing his essence as it is imitable by a creature. There is thus a relation of imitation between a creature and the divine essence. In the final decades of the thirteenth century, Henry of Ghent added to the discussion of the divine ideas the description of the divine essence as the primary object of divine cognition

14 Cf. Averroes, *In Met.* XII, com. 51, Venezia 1562, Vol. VIII, f. 336^{vb}M–337raA. Peter Auriol characterized both Themistius' and the Scotist position in terms of primary and secondary objects and argued against both. Cf. Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum* I, d. 35, p. 2, a. 1, (ed. Sarnanus), Roma 1596, Vol. 2, p. 771a–774b. Peter recited three opinions: that of Aristotle and Averroes, Themistius, and a position that Sarnano identifies in the margin as the "opinio Scotistarum" (p. 771a), and the important manuscript of the *Scriptum*, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Borgh. 329, on f. 367^{rb} identifies as the "opinio modernorum doctorum". On the rubrics of the Sarnano edition and Borghese 329 manuscript, see Christopher Schabel, "Auriol's Rubrics: Citations of University Theologians in Peter Auriol's *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum*", in: S.F. Brown—T. Dewender—T. Kobusch (eds.), *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), Leiden—Boston 2009, pp. 3–38. Baconthrope interprets Auriol as attacking Scotus and defends Scotus against Auriol's criticism at *In Sent.* I, d. 39, a. 1, Venezia 1526, f. 113^{rb}, and *Quodlibet* I, q. 9, a. 2, Venezia 1527, ff. 18ra, 18^{vb}.

15 Note, however, that there was a medieval debate regarding whether Averroes accepted the second aspect of Themistius' position as well. On this debate, cf. extract 17 of Ferrandus Hispanus' commentary on the *Metaphysics*, (ed. Griet Galle and Guy Guldentops), "Ferrandus Hispanus on Ideas", in: G. van Riel and C. Macé (eds.), *Platonic Ideas and Concept Formation in Ancient and Medieval Thought*, Leuven 2004, pp. 51–80, at pp. 78–79.

16 Cf. Averroes, *In Met.* XII, com. 51, Venezia 1562, Vol. VIII, f. 337raA–C.

and creatures as the secondary objects. But the question then arises, what is the relation between the primary and secondary objects?

Henry's views on the objects of divine cognition are part of his general practice of attributing features of the human psychological apparatus to the divine. He places the three Aristotelian acts of the intellect in God (simple apprehension, composition and division, and reasoning),[17] the aforementioned primary and secondary objects, and the notion that both human and divine intellects produce their objects of thought into *esse cognitum*.[18] In brief, perhaps more than any of his medieval predecessors, Henry attempted to explain the psychological operations in God by modeling them on creatures.

Henry treats the distinction of primary and secondary objects of cognition most fully in *Quodlibet* IX q. 2, which treats the question of whether God could produce many species of creatures if he did not have a plurality of ideas.[19] Henry begins his solution to this question with a general point about the intellect.[20] According to Henry, the intellect is a passive power, and as such it cannot

17 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* V, q. 1, (ed. Badius), Paris 1518, Vol. I, ff. 150^{v}–154^{r}.

18 On this latter claim, cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, (ed. R. Macken), Opera omnia XIII, Leuven 1983, pp. 30–31: "Et est talis haec Dei cognitio in cognoscendo se secundum rationem formae exemplaris, a quo secundum rationem causae formalis habent esse aliquid per essentiam ipsa exemplata in esse suo cognito. Et hoc quemadmodum intellectus noster entia facta ab ipso constituit in esse cognito". Later in the same question Henry also states that God constitutes essences in their *esse quidditativum*; cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, (ed. Macken), p. 34: "… propter creaturas plures specie differentes, ut sint aliquid per essentiam, necesse est ponere ideas plures in Deo, quibus in notitia sua habet praesentialiter, ut in mundo archetypo, singula praesentia ab aeterno, et quae numquam futura erant in existentia, possibilia tamen fieri, et quae erant futura, et hoc in esse suo quidditativo quod sunt per suam essentiam per divinam scientiam constitutam".

19 On Henry's theory of divine ideas, cf. Jean Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique*, Paris 1938, pp. 86–103, pp. 293–295; Theo Kobusch, "Heinrich von Gent und die neuplatonische Ideenlehre", in: L.G. Benakis (ed.), *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale* (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 6), Turnhout 1997, pp. 197–209; L.M. de Rijk, "Un tournant important dans l'usage du mot *Idea* chez Henri de Gand", in: *Idea*, pp. 89–98; Pasquale Porro, "*Ponere statum*. Idee divine, perfezioni creaturali e ordine del mondo in Enrico di Gand", in: *Mediaevalia* 3 (1993), pp. 109–159; Richard Cross, "Henry of Ghent on the Reality of Non-Existing Possibles—Revisited", in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 92 (2010), pp. 115–132, especially pp. 121–126.

20 Though it may appear that 'intellect' is used here in an univocal sense, note that Henry holds with Averroes that one can maintain the analogical character of the term by affirming a certain difference between divine and human knowledge, namely, that the divine knowing is the cause of being, but being is the cause of human knowing. Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, (ed. Macken), p. 28.

engage in the act of understanding unless an object moves it to act. But the term 'object' can refer to two cognitive functions: first, an object can inform an intellect and move the intellect in virtue of the objects' actuality, or, second, it can serve as the term of the act of understanding, that is, that to which the act is directed. The first of these functions of an object cannot apply to the case of divine cognition. This is because Henry, following Aristotle and Averroes, holds that if God's intellect was perfected by cognizing a creature outside of God, then God would not be the noblest of all beings. So Henry focuses on the second function of object, which he subdivides into two, thereby introducing the distinction between primary and secondary objects. For Henry, the primary object is that which informs the understanding and moves the intellect to act. In the case of God, this is the divine essence. The divine essence is the *per se* object of the divine intellect, and the only *per se* object of the divine intellect.[21] A secondary object is any object of thought different from the primary object. In the case of God, the secondary objects of his cognition are creatures, for if God knew only the divine essence, then, following Aristotle's criticism of Empedocles in the *De anima*, he would be the most ignorant of all beings.[22]

Henry further subdivides the notion of a secondary object of divine cognition to correspond with two ways that creatures exist in God. One is how they exist in God but are the same as God, the other is the way they are distinct in themselves, even if still contained in divine cognition. In the first way, the things outside God are present in God but are the same as God in every way. Henry's example of this sense of secondary object is a statue of Hercules: Hercules can be known by knowing the statue insofar as it is a thing, rather than knowing that it is an image of Hercules. This is somewhat mystifying; what Henry seems to mean is that Hercules is known by means of a statue without knowing that the statue is the medium. The second sense of secondary object, namely, the way creatures exist in their own natures, is clearer. To take the example of the statue of Hercules again, Hercules cannot be known perfectly unless the image that represents Hercules is known under the aspect of being an image. God knows creatures by knowing the divine essence. But this is not the essence taken simply as the divine essence, but rather the essence

21 For a discussion of Henry's views on the object of the intellect in the context of human cognition, see Jerome V. Brown, "Abstraction and the Object of the Human Intellect according to Henry of Ghent", in: *Vivarium* 11 (1973), pp. 80–104; on human cognition in general, cf. Bernd Goehring, "Henry of Ghent on Human Knowledge and Its Limits", in: *Quaestio* 12 (2012), pp. 589–613.

22 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, (ed. Macken), p. 27; Aristotle, *De anima* I, c. 5, 410b5–6.

understood as the principle (*ratio*) and exemplar of creatures. This involves a relation to a creature, not as existing in reality outside of God, but only as an object of divine thought. The relation of the creature *qua* object to God is one of imitation, that is, the creature is known as imitating God. Once we arrive at the notion of imitation we have Henry's definition of a divine idea, namely, the divine essence known as imitable by a creature. The relation (*ratio*) of imitability is in the divine essence in potency or *in virtute*,[23] but it is actualized or made explicit by the activity of the divine intellect cognizing the divine essence, much like in Henry's theory of the divine attributes, according to which the divine intellect first cognizes the divine essence prior to producing the other divine attributes.[24]

If the divine essence were to have only one *ratio* of imitability, then God's knowledge of creation would be indistinct and universal. Thus in order for God to understand the plurality and distinction of creatures, he requires a plurality of *rationes*. In an early text, *Quodlibet* II question 1, Henry suggests that the single *ratio* by which God knows creatures becomes a plurality of *rationes* as a result of an activity that Henry calls *protensio*. This term *protensio* indicates an extending or stretching forth, a word derived from the verb *protendo*.[25] In the context of the divine ideas, *protensio* refers to both the extension on the part of the divine intellect from one *ratio* to many *rationes* as well as the relation of imitation itself. There is a *protensio*, a stretching forth of the divine intellect, from the divine essence known as imitable to the creature as the second term of the relation of imitation. The example Henry provides to explain *protensio* is that of a tree. The tree grows up from the root for a certain distance remaining one. Eventually it continues to expand outward by growing branches in all directions. In line with this example, we are supposed to imagine the divine intellect initially contemplating only one *ratio* in the divine essence in which creatures are known indistinctly, then the divine gaze moves outward to creatures in their

23 Cf. also *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 8, (ed. Badius), Paris 1518, Vol. II, f. 313^{r}: "Quod quidem simplex ut sic comprehensum est ab intellectu, et hoc ut diversimode imitabile est, est formaliter et actualiter ipsae distinctae sive diversae ideae, ita quod ipsa divina essentia eo quod simplicissima est et summe una ex se virtute et quasi in potentia continet omnes imitabilitates ideales quasi radix et fundamentum sicut et omnium aliorum quae in divinis secundum aliquam pluralitatem sunt sive considerantur … ita quod illae imitabilitates ideales opere intellectus sunt in essentia intellecta ut in radice formaliter et secundum actum …".

24 For Henry's account of the relation between the divine intellect and the other divine attributes, cf. *Quodlibet* V, q. 1, (ed. Badius), I, ff. 150^{v}–154^{r}.

25 Cf. Dan Arbib, "Henri de Gand: La Protensio et le tournant de l'infini", in: *Les Études philosophiques* 91 (2009), pp. 477–503, especially pp. 494–495.

distinct plurality.[26] This activity of *protensio* bears a striking resemblance to the more controversial aspect of Themistius' theory of divine knowledge, namely, the sudden movement to things on the part of the divine intellect.

In light of these terminological precisions, Henry can provide an answer to the question about the relation of the primary object of divine cognition to the secondary object. This is because simply by knowing his own essence as imitable, God is able to know all secondary objects existing outside himself in their various grades of being. Henry once again borrows an example from Averroes to support this point: if someone were to know the nature of heat, he would then know heat as it is found in all of its instantiations. In a statement that encapsulates what the later *consecutio* theory attempted to convey, Henry states that by "distinctly knowing one [of two] relatives, necessarily and simultaneously the other [relative] is known as well".[27] Relations consist of three elements: two terms or foundations, and the relation itself that joins the terms. If we apply this to God, then the divine essence is one term, the creature the second term, and the relation between the two is that of imitation. God, by knowing himself as imitable, founds relations of imitation to creatures, and thereby he knows the other term of the relation without any discursive movement of the intellect from cause to effect or potency to act. But in the end, Henry may not entirely avoid positing discursivity in God, for there is still the distinction between the divine essence known as such, as opposed the divine essence known as the exemplar cause of creatures. In the first, creatures are known in potency, in the second they are understood actually. So there appear to be at least two instants in the divine cognition of secondary objects, instants in which the sum total of the contents of divine cognition are different, thus requiring some movement to account for the difference.

Duns Scotus is typically seen as a critic of Henry of Ghent on the problems associated with the divine ideas.[28] As we have seen, Henry defines a

26 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* II, q. 1, (ed. R. Wielockx), Opera omnia VI, Leuven 1983, p. 7: "Est enim iste respectus idealis, tantum protensus usque ad ipsam essentiam absolutam, unicus, et non plures nisi per protensionem dehinc ulterius mediante suo per se obiecto ad supposita illa in quae numeratur: unicus scilicet quasi a radice divinae essentiae usque ad essentiam creaturae, plures vero ulterius, ut protensus est ad supposita essentiae creatae, ad modum virgulae, quae, a radice protensa, usque ad aliquam distantiam tenet unitatem et deinde ulterius a cono quodem per plures virgulas ramificatur, ut dictum est in exemplo de radio".

27 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 2, (ed. Macken), p. 30: "Cognoscens enim distincte unum relativorum, necessario simul cognoscit et aliud".

28 On Scotus' theory of divine ideas, cf. Tobias Hoffmann, *Creatura intellecta. Die Ideen und*

divine idea as the relation of imitation; Scotus, however denies this and instead defines a divine idea as the creature as known (*creatura intellecta*).[29] Scotus also criticized Henry's views on exemplar causality and the eternity of essences.[30] Despite his criticism of Henry, however, at a deeper level Scotus adopted elements of his own position from Henry. For example, Scotus furthered Henry's program of imposing aspects of the human cognitive apparatus on God, adopted the thesis that the divine intellect is productive of the essences of creatable things, and, most importantly for our present purposes, he tacitly adopted Henry's distinction between primary and secondary objects of cognition.[31] As far as Scotus' influence on the thinkers who hold the *consecutio* theory is concerned, we shall examine a text in the *Ordinatio* that examines Henry's notion of *protensio* and probably enjoyed an indirect influence, and one from the *Quodlibet* that directly influenced James of Ascoli.

Scotus considered Henry's notion of *protensio* and accepted it in a modified sense. This occurs in a passage of the *Ordinatio* that the important manuscript Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, Ms. 137 annotates with the comment "Scotus 'extra' manu sua", and a similar remark is found in the margin of Vat. lat. 882 in a second hand: "'extra' de manu Ioannis".[32] The passage is then a note that Scotus himself inserted into the primitive text of the *Ordinatio*, perhaps in the margin, after reconsidering his views.

Possibilien bei Duns Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz von Mayronis, Poncius und Mastrius (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittalalters Neue Folge 60), Münster 2002; Timothy B. Noone, "Scotus on Divine Ideas: *Rep. Paris. I-A, d. 36*", in: *Medioevo* 24 (1998), pp. 359–453, especially pp. 359–390; Idem, "Aquinas on Divine Ideas: Scotus's Evaluation", in: *Franciscan Studies* 56 (1998), pp. 307–324; Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, Burlington, VT—Aldershot 2005, pp. 60–69; Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 75–89, 125–132.

29 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 35 q. un., (ed. Commissio Scotistica), Opera omnia VI, Città del Vaticano 1963, p. 263 n. 43.

30 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., Opera omnia VI, pp. 276–281.

31 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 28, Opera omnia VI, p. 281: "Omnia etiam motiva quae adducuntur de intellectu divino, videntur posse adduci de intellectu nostro, quia si aliquid non sit, potest a nobis intelligi (et hoc sive essentia eius sive exsistentia eius), et tamen non propter intellectionem nostram ponitur quod illud habeat verum esse essentiae vel exsistentiae; nec est differentia aliqua, ut videtur, inter intellectum divinum et nostrum quoad hoc, nisi quod intellectus divinus producit illa intelligibilia in esse intelligibili, noster non producit primo". Note that I have modified the punctuation.

32 The passage is *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., nn. 37–43, Opera omnia VI, pp. 285–288. For the annotations, see p. 285 app. crit. ad lin. 20.

In the passage in question Scotus advances two objections against his own view, which is that the divine intellect produces the essences of creatures into intelligible being.[33] The objections attempt to establish that any production that occurs will be a production into real being, that is *esse simpliciter*, rather than being under the qualification of being thought about (*esse cognitum*), which is only being in a certain respect (*secundum quid*). Scotus' response to the objections is to reformulate the relation between the primary and secondary objects of divine cognition. He argues that the notion of an object moving or causing the act of a power can be taken in a univocal and an equivocal sense of 'causing'. In God, the divine essence is entirely absolute, uncaused, and unprincipiated, and it serves as a cause of cognition for the divine intellect. The divine essence moves the divine intellect to cognize the divine essence; thus the divine essence is the first term or primary object of the divine intellect's cognition. This movement from (quasi) potency to cognition to actual cognition is causation in a univocal sense of causation. The divine essence also moves the intellect "beyond" the cognition of the divine essence to the second term or secondary object of cognition, which is the creature. In this case, the causation that the divine intellect undergoes is said equivocally. An example from human cognition is the generation of an object contained in an intelligible species: while the species itself is generated in real being in the intellect, the object being thought about is only generated *secundum quid* in what Scotus calls diminished being.[34] To return to the divine case, Scotus describes what

33 On this passage cf. Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, pp. 68–69.

34 On diminished being, cf. Armand Maurer, "*Ens diminutum*: A Note on its Origin and Meaning", in: *Mediaeval Studies* 12 (1950), pp. 216–222. On the relations between acts, intelligible species, and diminished being, cf. Peter King, "Duns Scotus on Mental Content", in: O. Boulnois—E. Karger—J.-L. Solère—G. Sondag (eds.), *Duns Scot à Paris: 1302–2002*, Turnhout 2004, pp. 65–88; Richard Cross, "Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species", in: *Quaestio* 10 (2010), pp. 135–154; Idem, *Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition*, Oxford 2014, pp. 189–195. Note that according to King, Scotus, while at Oxford, described diminished being as a second-rate kind of being on a low ontological level and ascribed it to the contents of intelligible species and the secondary objects of divine cognition; then, at Paris, he abandoned all talk of diminished being in his expanded discussion of the divine ideas in *Reportatio* IA, d. 36, in favor of the view that objects of thought have no being of their own but supervene on the intelligible species. Cross, "Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of Cognitive Acts and Species", pp. 140–141, criticizes King's interpretation of the Parisian position as one of supervenience, but accepts that Scotus abandoned diminished being at Paris. The evidence King and Cross adduce for the change in position is: (1) at Paris, Scotus' account of divine ideas does not contain the discussion of diminished being in terms of *esse simpliciter* and *esse secundum quid* found in *Ordinatio* I, d. 36,

happens as the extending of the divine cognition beyond the first object to the second object, that is, an act of *protensio*.[35] Scotus immediately qualifies what he means by *protensio*, however, stating that it is in fact not a relation in act, as it had been for Henry, nor is it something in the primary object stretching to the

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q. un., n. 45, Opera omnia VI, p. 288, with the example of an Ethiopian who is white with respect to his teeth; (2) In *Reportatio* IA, d. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, (ed. Wolter-Bychkov), Vol. II, p. 402, n. 65; (ed. Noone), p. 418, n. 54, Scotus says that things with only *esse cognitum* are literally nothing ("lapis in esse cognito tantum nihil est secundum rem"). Contrary to (1), however, is the fact that elsewhere in the Parisian *Reportatio*, at Book II, d. 1, q. 2 (another *locus classicus* for discussions of the divine ideas), Scotus does provide a discussion of diminished being in terms of *esse simpliciter* and *secundum quid*, complete with the example of the Ethiopian, a discussion which is nearly *verbatim* with the account in the *Ordinatio*. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* II, d. 1, q. 2, nn. 12–13, (ed. Wadding-Vivès), Opera omnia XXII, Paris 1894, pp. 527–528. (2) was stated in similar terms in the *Ordinatio*, in an addition to the primitive text labeled "Scotus extra manu sua", meaning that the addition is probably contemporaneous with the text in the *Reportatio* quoted by King and Cross. Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 35, q. un., n. 51, Opera omnia VI, p. 267: "Intelligere Dei ad lapidem non habet coexigentiam (patet), nec dependentiam, nec e converso. Probatio: obiectum nihil est". This does not constitute further evidence for the King-Cross thesis, however, because to claim that a stone is something or has being *secundum rem* in this context is to say that it has real eternal being outside God, which is precisely the view that Scotus ascribes to Henry of Ghent's theory of *esse essentiae* and *esse actualis existentiae*, against which he devotes much of *Ordinatio* I, dd. 35–36, to refuting. Furthermore, at Paris Scotus states explicitly that a stone has diminished being when it is taken under the qualification of 'being understood' (*esse intellectum*), which is equivalent to *esse cognitum*. Cf. *Reportatio* II, d. 1, q. 2, n. 13, (ed. Wadding-Vivès), Opera omnia XXII, pp. 527–528: "… lapis intellectus comparatus ad esse, verum habet esse diminutum, ita quod esse lapidis in cognitione est esse diminutum lapidis, et secundum quid …. Ideo concedo quod lapis secundum verissimum esse est intellectus aeternaliter, ita quod respectu intellectionis accipitur secundum esse simpliciter, sed totum, ut 'lapis intellectus', est esse diminutum" (I have modified the punctuation and removed the emphasis of the Vivès edition). For another text from *Reportatio* IA on diminished being, where Scotus clearly endorses it, see *Reportatio* IA, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, n. 38, (ed. Wolter-Bychkov), Vol. II, p. 361. Thus I conclude that Duns Scotus did not abandon the notion of diminished being at Paris.

35 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 41, Opera omnia VI, p. 287: "Haec via bene dicit, in hoc, quod essentia 'ut ratio movens' est omnino indistincta, univoce quasi movens ad se ut ad primum terminum actus, et quasi aequivoce movens ad obiectum secundarium ut ad secundum terminum actus; ita quod nec in intellectu (patet), nec in ratione motiva, nec in intelligere, nec in primo termino, oportet ponere distinctionem. Sed cum dicitur 'actus quasi aequivoce principari ut est obiecti secundarii', non est aliud nisi ipsum—quasi ultra primum obiectum—protendi ad secundum virtute principii obiectivi, aequivoci ad terminum secundum".

secondary object. It is rather an act in which the secondary object is referred to the primary, which implies that the secondary object has some kind of being, namely, diminished being.[36] Scotus' sense of referral here is explained earlier in *Ordinatio* I d. 30 and d. 35, where he describes divine cognition as a case of Aristotelian third-mode relations, which cover the relation of measure and measured.[37] For Aristotle, relations of this type are non-mutual; term *a* depends on term *b* but not contrariwise. Aristotle's example is human cognition, which depends on or is measured by an external object which in turn is the measure and does not depend on human thinking. My thought of a stone, for example, depends on the extramental stone, which does not depend on my thinking of it for its existence. For Scotus, in the case of God, the situation is reversed: the divine thinking is the measure and secondary objects are all measured, and they depend on divine thinking by means of a non-mutual relation, which is another way of saying they are referred to the divine cognition.

Scotus concludes his discussion of *protensio* in the 'extra' with an attempt to head off an objection. In light of his discussion, one might charge that he has fractured the single act of divine cognition into a plurality of acts with his theory of univocal and equivocal causation. Scotus thinks that he can avoid this consequence because secondary objects do not immediately terminate the act of divine cognition, nor do they move the intellect, but they follow (*sequuntur*) the divine essence.[38] This remark, in passing (and repeated at Paris[39]), that the creatable quiddities follow the divine essence is one inspiration of the *consecutio* theory that is the subject of the present discussion.

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36 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 42, Opera omnia VI, p. 287: "Sed quid est actum sic protendi? Non relationem esse in actu, nec in obiecto primo ad secundum,—per te; ergo est obiectum secundum referri ad actum vel primum obiectum: hoc non est nisi habentis aliquod esse …".

37 Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 30, qq. 1–2, n. 31, Opera omnia VI, pp. 181–182; I, d. 35, q. un., n. 27, Opera omnia VI, p. 256.

38 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 43, Opera omnia VI, pp. 287–288: "Ergo falsa est imaginatio 'intelligere' distingui (ad hoc ut sit multorum) quasi in multa 'intelligere'; immo in ipso non oportet aliquam differentiam esse, ut quasi est medium inter rationem et primum terminum, quem sequuntur secundaria: ergo falsum quod obiecta secundaria immediate terminant 'intelligere', sicut nec movent,—nam neutro modo necessario requiruntur ad actum, sed requiruntur in ratione termini, ad actum ut huius; hoc non dicit nisi relationem in obiecto secundo".

39 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* IA, d. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 16, (ed. Wolter-Bychkov), St. Bonaventure, NY 2008, Vol. II, p. 385: "Sed si quaestio intelligitur: 'utrum aliquid creatum posset terminare actum divini intellectus tamquam obiectum secundario terminans illum actum, quia includitur eminenter in primo terminante illum actum, et terminat ratione et virtute primi obiecti primo terminantis actum divinum'—sic dico quod potest, quia tale

In his *Quodlibet* q. 15 Scotus examined in great detail the role of the intelligible species in human cognition and the relation between it and the object it contains. According to Scotus, the agent intellect has two actions: the first is to make the potentially intelligible actually intelligible, the second is to make the potentially understood actually understood.[40] The first action is what is commonly known as abstraction: the agent intellect generates an intelligible species from the phantasm contained in the imagination.[41] In the second, the presence of the intelligible species enables actual intellection to occur. There are also two metaphorical actions which accompany the two real actions. The

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obiectum non necessario coexigitur ad actum, sed magis sequitur et dependet ab actu: non enim se habet huiusmodi obiectum ad actum intellectus divini ut mensura ad mensuratum eius, sed e converso".

40 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* q. 15, a. 1, n. 16, (ed. Wadding-Vivès), Opera omnia XXVI, Paris 1895, p. 146: "… posset dici quod intellectus agens habet duas actiones ordinatas. Prima est facere de potentia intelligibili actu intelligibile, vel de potentia universali actu universale. Secunda est facere de potentia intellecto actu intellectum. Primum intelligitur sic, quod virtute intellectus agentis de phantasmate in phantasia gignitur species intelligibilis in intellectu, vel aliqua ratio in qua actu relucet intelligibile, quae breviter loquendo dicatur species intelligibilis, et istam gignitionem realem repraesentativi de repraesentativo dicitur concomitari quaedam gignitio metaphorica obiecti de obiecto, scilicet intelligibilis de imaginabili, quod ideo rationabiliter dicitur, quia tale esse obiectivum habet obiectum in repraesentari, quale habet repraesentativum correspondens; et ideo translatione reali facta in repraesentativo, quando de corporali gignitur spirituale, scilicet de repraesentativo singulari gignitur repraesentativum universale, consimilis dicitur vel intelligitur translatio in obiectis de corporali ad spirituale, vel de singulari ad universale. Secunda actio poneretur per quam de potentia intellecto fieret actu intellectum, ubi similiter intelligitur factio metaphorica ex parte obiectorum correspondens factioni reali ex parte eorum, quibus tenditur in obiecta, quia realiter speciem intelligibilem sequitur actualis intellectio, et sicut prima translatio de potentia ad actum, sic etiam secunda diceretur fieri per intellectum agentem, tam ex parte obiectorum, et hoc metaphorice, quam ex parte illorum in quibus relucent obiecta, et hoc realiter pro tanto, scilicet quod virtute intellectus agentis de phantasmate gigneretur species intelligibilis, et sic metaphorice de potentia intelligibili gigneretur actu intelligibile; et secundo virtute speciei intelligibilis gigneretur actualis intellectio, et sic metaphorice loquendo in obiectis de potentia in intellecto fieret actu intellectum". For similar discussions in earlier works, cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, ad arg. princ. 4, n. 386, (ed. Commissio Scotistica), Opera omnia III, Città del Vaticano 1954, p. 235; *Reportatio* IA, d. 3, q. 4, ad arg. princ. 3, n. 119, (ed. Wolter-Bychkov), Vol. I, p. 219.

41 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 89, a. 3, (ed. Commissio Leonina), Opera omnia V, Roma 1889, p. 264: "Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus".

first accompanies the first real action, and it concerns the object or content of the intelligible species. The object, say a stone, undergoes a metaphorical transferral from the realm of the material to the immaterial. In the second metaphorical action, accompanying the production of actual intellection, the object is made actually understood from being only potentially understood. For Scotus, the real productions concern the intelligible species, which are accidents of the genus of quality inhering in the intellect. The metaphorical productions concern the object in the species, that is, what is being thought about, which enjoys only diminished being. As we shall see below, the distinction between real and metaphorical production exercises direct influence over James of Ascoli and the development of the *consecutio* theory. James applied the distinction to divine cognition, something Scotus did not do.

To conclude our discussion of Henry and Scotus, I note that the main innovation driving the later debate was Henry's move to apply elements of the human psychological apparatus to God, though he retained the common scholastic position that the divine ideas are relations of imitation. Scotus followed in Henry's footsteps and also modeled divine cognition on human cognition, but he realized that when the stages of divine intellection are examined in detail, the creaturely essence will be produced and cognized prior to the formation of any relations of imitation. Thus Scotus denied the traditional definition of a divine idea as a relation of imitation in favor of the view that it is the creature taken as known. The *consecutio* theory, which is hinted at in one of Scotus' marginal annotations, is the result of further reflection on the relation between the primary and secondary objects of divine cognition.

2 The *Consecutio* Theory according to James of Ascoli

We turn now to the *consecutio* theory, of which James of Ascoli was one of its earliest proponents.[42] James was a Franciscan who studied at Paris, becoming a master of theology by 1310, the year he was listed as a master in the trial doc-

42 On James of Ascoli, cf. William O. Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus", in: C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century* (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), Boston 2007, pp. 567–649, at pp. 591–594; Dominik Perler, "What are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists", in: D. Perler (ed.), *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 76), Leiden 2001, pp. 203–226, at pp. 211–217; Timothy B. Noone, "Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus's Formal Distinction: Taxonomy, Refinement, and Interaction", in: S.F. Brown—T. Dewender—T. Kobusch (eds.), *Philosophical*

uments of Marguerite Porete.[43] He was also active at the council of Vienne in 1312. His surviving works are a *Quodlibet*, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, and a *Tabula* or index of the works of Scotus and Henry of Ghent. James disputed his *Quodlibet* around 1311; the *Quaestiones ordinariae* refer to conclusions already proven in the *Quodlibet*, giving us a *terminus a quo* for their composition.[44] Since William of Alnwick quoted the *Ordinary Questions* around 1315, we know that they were composed between 1311 and 1315, probably closer to 1311 if James completed them before leaving Paris for the Council of Vienne.

James' discussion of the *consecutio* theory is found in the fourth question of his *Ordinary Questions*. The title of the question is "whether in God the actual knowledge of a creature presupposes the habitual knowledge of a creature". What this amounts to is a discussion of the relation of *esse intelligibile*, which is the intelligibility or aptitude that an essence has for being understood, and *esse intellectum*, which is understood or cognized being that an essence has when it is actually understood by some intellect.[45] The question asks which kind of being is prior in God, that is, whether the divine intellect presupposes the intelligible being of a creature prior to actually thinking about it, or whether the divine act of thinking constitutes the essence of a creature in its intelligibility by the same act. It should be noted that Scotus, when he analyzed divine cognition into a process of instants of nature in *Ordinatio* I d. 35, posited in the

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Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), Leiden—Boston 2009, pp. 127–149. For editions of his works, cf. T. Yokoyama, "Zwei Quaestionen des Jacobus de Aesculo über das Esse Obiectivum", in: L. Scheffczyk—W. Dettloff—R. Heinzmann (Hrsg.), *Wahrheit und Verkündigung. Michael Schmaus zum 70. Geburtsdag*, München—Paderborn—Wien 1967, Band 1, pp. 31–55; Ludwig Hödl, "Die Seinsdifferenz des Möglichen im Quodlibet des Jakob von Ascoli OM (Quaestio 5—Einführung und Edition)", in: O. Pluta (Hrsg.), *Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert*, Amsterdam 1988, pp. 565–593.

43 Cf. Paul Verdeyen, "Le procès d'inquisition contre Marguerite Porete et Guiard de Cressonessart (1309–1310)", in: *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 81 (1986), pp. 47–94, especially pp. 50–54.

44 For the references, see p. 512 lin. 14–15 and p. 523 lin. 4 of the edition in the Appendix.

45 Properly speaking, for James *esse intelligibile* has two elements: a formal element, according to which it means a potential relation of reason, in contrast to *esse cognitum* or *esse intellectum*, which are actual relations of reason, and, second, a material aspect according to which *esse intelligibile* is something absolute which is prior to and serves as the term of the relation of intellection. Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 4, a. 4, ad motiv. 8 (Appendix, p. 526 lin. 1–18). In *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 48 James characterizes *esse intelligibile* as "midway" between real being and being of reason, because it is founded on real being but is prior to being of reason.

second instant that God both produced the stone in intelligible being and that he understood the stone.[46] So for Scotus, the answer to the question James asks is negative: the divine intellect does not presuppose the intelligibility of a creature, for *esse intellectum* and *esse intelligibile* are located in the same instant of nature.

For James of Ascoli, however, the intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*) of a creature is prior to its being as actually understood or cognized being (*esse intellectum*). This means that the intelligible being of a creature is a prerequisite for its being cognized by the divine intellect. James' argument in defense of this position shows his reliance on Henry and Scotus' move to posit elements of the human cognitive apparatus in God. James argues that every power which has an adequate object knows whatever it knows by means of that object. But the divine essence is the adequate object of the divine intellect, and thus whatever the divine intellect knows, it knows by means of the divine essence. James draws the further conclusion from this argument that the divine intellect first must have present to it the intelligible object before the object is actually understood. By this he means that since the divine intellect is moved to its act by its adequate object, the divine essence, the essence must be present to the intellect in order for any cognition to occur.[47]

But how are the essences of creatables made present to the divine intellect? According to James, the divine essence represents them to the divine intellect.[48] During the decades prior to Scotus, the scholastics seem to have rarely discussed whether the divine essence is representative of creatures. There was a common opinion, for example, that in the beatific vision the divine essence serves as a *speculum voluntarium*, and that God chooses what to show to creatures via a representation. But this is a claim about human cognition, not divine. The claim that the divine essence represents all things is not required by the pre-Scotist theory of divine ideas in which the ideas are relations of imitation. In that prior theory, all the divine intellect has to do is cognize the essence

46 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 35, q. un., n. 32, Opera omnia VI, p. 258.

47 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 4, a. 2 (Appendix, p. 515 lin. 1–7). The language of presence is not foreign to the thought of Duns Scotus. Cf. *Reportatio* IA, prol., q. 1, a. 2, n. 36, (ed. Wolter-Bychkov), Vol. I, p. 12: "… nihil potest esse in intellectu obiective nisi vel obiciatur intellectui praesentialiter in se ipso vel in aliquo repraesentativo eius realiter exsistente". On the notion of presence, cf. Joel Biard, "Intention et Présence: la notion de *presentialitas* au XIV^{e} siécle", in: D. Perler (ed.), *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 76), Leiden 2001, pp. 265–282.

48 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 4, a. 2 (Appendix, p. 515 lin. 8–13).

and in doing so it realizes that it can be imitated in various ways. But in the wake of Scotus' apparently devastating criticism of this position, a new way had to be found to account for the presence of creatable things to the divine intellect. Scotus, as we have seen, argued that they are generated by the divine intellect in a series of logical instants. But in a few passages he also claimed that they are represented to the divine intellect by the divine essence, which virtually or eminently contains them.[49] James may then be adopting some of Scotus' stray remarks into his own theory.

In light of James' view that the divine intellect presupposes for its cognition the presence of objects in intelligible being, we might wonder whether this implies an imperfection in the divine intellect. James, however, assures us that this is not the case. Rather, the appearance of imperfection arises because of the supreme perfection of the divine essence, which possesses such a fullness of perfection that it can make every secondary object present to the divine intellect. In this context, James examines an interesting hypothetical, which is an echo of Scotus' opinion that the divine intellect is productive of the essences of creatures. For James, in light of his position that the divine essence represents creatures to the intellect, the divine intellect would only be productive *per impossibile*. We know that hypothetically the divine intellect can do whatever the human intellect can do, for whatever is a perfection of the created intellect is eminently contained in the divine intellect. Therefore, since the human agent intellect produces quiddities in intelligible being, the divine intellect must be able to do this also. But that this is not necessary James proves by analogy to the angelic intellect. The angelic intellect, which is a higher order of

49 On the issue of whether the essences of creatable things are produced or represented, cf. my "The Origin of Intelligibility according to Duns Scotus, William of Alnwick, and Petrus Thomae", in: *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 81 (2014), pp. 37–74, especially pp. 39–50. William of Alnwick thought that Scotus had contradicted himself on this point. Petrus Thomae, though he did not accuse Scotus of contradiction, thought that Scotus' remarks on the production of essences should be interpreted in light of the text of *Quodlibet* q. 15 quoted above in note 40. Later Scotists, however, did not see these two theses as in conflict. Antonius Trombetta (1436–1517) thought that the divine intellect produces secondary objects in intelligible being because the divine essence virtually and eminently contains them. Cf. Antonius Trombetta, *Quaestiones metaphysicales* XII, q. 8, Venezia 1504, f. 98^{rb}. Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) thought that for the divine intellect to produce something by cognizing it was simply to represent it; cf. Bartholomaeus Mastrius and Bonaventura Bellutus, *Disputationes in XII libros Metaphysicorum* d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, n. 16, Venezia 1647, Vol. II, p. 59b, cited by Marco Forlivesi, "La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectiv: Suàrez, Pasqualigo, Mastri", in: *Les études philosophiques* 57 (2002), pp. 3–30, at p. 25, note 2.

intellect than the human agent intellect, does not produce quiddities in intelligible being; this is not because of some imperfection of the angelic intellect, however, but rather because in its creation God endowed it with the intelligible species of everything it would ever need to cognize. Thus the lack of production in the angelic intellect is not a sign of imperfection. And since God also has a higher order of intellect than the human, the same must also be true of God. The divine intellect presupposes the quiddities of creatures as present in intelligible being, but far from being a mark of imperfection, this points instead to the supreme perfection of the divine essence.[50]

We turn now to James' statement of the *consecutio*-relation between the primary and secondary objects of divine cognition. Starting with the cognitive processes of the human intellect, James distinguishes between two ways an essence is caused in intelligible being:

> … [S]omething can have intelligible being [*esse intelligibile*] from another in two ways: either effectively [*effective*] or consecutively [*consecutive*]. [Something has intelligible being] effectively in the way that the quiddities of material things have intelligible being effectively from the agent intellect, insofar as the agent intellect causes them effectively in intelligible being according to the Philosopher and the Commentator. But [things] have intelligible being consecutively from the [intelligible] species caused by the agent intellect, because, after the intelligible species of a stone has been placed in the intellect, the intelligible being of the stone follows naturally as a correlative object of the species, and it does so without any effective causation, because the [intelligible] species of a stone does not cause the stone properly and effectively in intelligible being; but the intelligible being only follows the [intelligible species] through the mode of a certain kind of necessary correlation.[51]

'Effective' causality is a type of efficient causality; an effect caused by an agent utilizing effective causality is caused in "real" being (*esse reale*), as opposed to intentional or diminished being. In human cognition, the agent intellect causes the quiddities of material objects in intelligible being when it abstracts from the phantasm of a material being and separates the quiddity from its material conditions, thereby transferring the quiddity from the order of the material to the order of the intelligible and generating the intelligible species. Again, the

50 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 4, a. 3 (Appendix, p. 517 lin. 16–p. 518 lin. 15).

51 Ibid. (Appendix, p. 518 lin. 16–p. 519 lin. 7).

intelligible species is a real accident of the soul in the genus of quality. In addition to the effective production of a quiddity there is a consecutive production of the contents of the species. Here a stone, for example, has intelligible being in the intellect from the intelligible species of a stone that was generated by means of effective causality. So we are talking about the presence of the object itself to the possible intellect, a presence which depends upon the intelligible species. We thus have a relation, one term being the intelligible species, the other the object itself contained in the species, or, alternatively, the content of the species. James calls this second term the correlative object of the intelligible species. This correlative object is properly speaking not caused in the sense that the agent intellect causes the species to exist as a real accident in the soul; yet despite this it still depends on the intelligible species for its intelligible being. This cognitive process is more clearly stated in Question 5 of James' *Ordinary Questions* where we find that, much like Scotus' discussion in *Quodlibet* q. 15, there are two acts: an act in which the intelligible species is produced, and one in which intellection of the species is produced. The object of thought follows in virtue of the fact that it is contained in the species, though only the species is properly said to be caused.[52]

Applying this to the case of divine cognition, James utilizes the distinction between effective and consecutive causality to explain how God knows creatures. When we consider the instant of nature in which creaturely quiddities have intelligibile being prior to their being actually understood, James holds that in this instant they have being, though not by means of effective causality, for this would be an action *ad extra*. An action of this kind is impossible because the divine essence as such has no causal power to cause things in real being.[53] Rather, such causal power is exercised by the divine will. The quiddities of creatures instead follow upon the divine essence, once the essence is posited in divine cognition. The quiddities are caused by means of consecu-

52 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 3, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 53: "… est sciendum quod in nobis eadem productione numero qua species lapidis producitur per se in intellectu possibili, eadem productione numero et non alia producitur per accidens lapis in esse intelligibili. Similiter eadem productione et non alia qua intellectio lapidis productitur per se in intellectu creato, eadem productione numero et non alia consecutive producitur per accidens lapis in esse intellecto".

53 James defines *esse reale* in *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 44: "Esse reale est illud quod convenit rei ut existit formaliter in propria natura. Et tale esse non convenit nisi singulari vel ei quod habet esse in singulari, quia solum singulare existit per se et primo in propria natura. Universalia autem non existunt nisi ut habent esse in singularibus …".

tive causality, and follow upon the essence as its correlative objects.[54] Properly speaking, consecutive causality is not causality at all, for James states that the quiddities of creatables follow the divine essence without any causal medium. The term "follow" here means "follow in the process of cognition", so that there is still a logical sequence even if there is no causality. We might wonder what all this means; is the divine essence surrounded by an eternal cloud of essences that it represents to the divine intellect? And how does the *consecutio*-relation manage to be non-causal? James does not provide answers to these questions in his fourth *Ordinary Question*, though he does in the fifth.

In his fifth *Ordinary Question* James revisits the *consecutio* theory and offers some clarifications. Here he restates his distinction between effective and consecutive causality as a distinction between proper and metaphorical causality. Something which is caused consecutively is then caused only in a metaphorical sense. Properly speaking, the intelligible being of creatures, either as they are contained in the divine essence or as cognized by the divine intellect, is not caused, save in this extended, metaphorical sense. James further develops the analysis of consecutive causality as a relation: according to James, to posit the prior is also to posit the posterior without any causal action or mediation.[55] He also adds that the relation of *consecutio* is a relation of essential dependence.[56] Finally, James claims that in *Ordinary Question* 4, when he described the quiddities of creatures as correlative objects of the divine essence, he was speaking by way of a similitude, rather than positing that there are real objects following the divine essence *ex natura rei* (a Scotist phrase meaning "prior to the act of the intellect"). Despite this qualification, however, James maintains that the quiddities of creatures have being in act distinct from the divine essence,[57] as

54 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 4, a. 3 (Appendix, p. 519 lin. 8–18).

55 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 3, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 52: "Circa quod sciendum quod aliquid ab alio potest esse causatum dupliciter: vel proprie vel metaphorice. Proprie, quando ipsum causatum est effective productum a sua causa mediante aliqua productione, sicut calor ab igne et species intelligibilis ab intellectu agente et obiecto simul. Metaphorice vero dicitur aliquid esse causatum ab alio, quando ipsum causatum non est productum ab alio effective mediante aliqua productione, sed solum dependet ab illo consecutive; ita quod posito illo priori istud naturali ordine sequitur, istud tamquam posterius sequitur suum prius absque omni causatione media".

56 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 3, (ed. Yokoyama), pp. 52–53: "… Illud quod est posterius alio essentialiter et non potest esse sine illo, illud necessario dependet ab eo, sicut causatum metaphorice a sua causa. Hoc est evidens, quia hoc intelligimus per causatum metaphorice, scilicet quod dependeat ab alio priori essentialiter consecutive …".

57 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 1, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 42: "Item

indeed they have being distinct from the divine cognition.[58] This being is only intentional being, which is "midway" between pure being of reason and real being outside God.[59] Within the realm of intentional being, the quiddities are intentionally distinct from each other, which means that they each have distinct representations in the divine essence.[60]

To return to our original problem, the relation between the primary and secondary objects of divine cognition, we find that James' solution is to posit creatures as correlatives of the divine essence. They are not produced, as was the case for Henry and Scotus, nor are they caused save in an improper, metaphorical sense. As relations, however, they function very much like Henry's relations of imitation: simply by knowing one term, the divine intellect knows the second. For James, however, the quiddities of creatures are present to the divine intellect not because of an extension or quasi-movement outward like a tree growing a branch, but because the quiddities of creatables are eminently contained in the divine essence and represented by it to the divine intellect.

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quando aliqua sunt totaliter idem, multiplicato uno multiplicatur et reliquum. Sed illa quae repraesentantur in essentia divina, ut repraesentantur in ipsa, sunt plura. Probatio, quia illa quae repraesentantur distincte in aliquo habent aliquam pluralitatem in illo. Essentia autem, quae repraesentat omnia intelligibilia distincte, est una. Ergo quidditates creaturarum, ut habent esse repraesentatum in essentia divina, habent aliquod esse distinctum ab essentia".

58 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 1, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 42: "Item id quod est in aliquo solum obiective impossibile est quod sit totaliter idem cum eo quod est in illo formaliter. Quod patet, quia tunc idem secundum quod idem esset in aliquo obiective et non obiective; quae sunt contradictoria. Sed cognitio, qua Deus cognoscit creaturam, est in Deo formaliter. Lapis autem cognitus a Deo non est in Deo formaliter, sed solum obiective. Probatio, quia si lapis esset in Deo formaliter, tunc Deus esset formaliter lapis. Ergo lapis cognitus necessario distinguitur a cognitione qua cognoscitur".

59 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, (ed. Yokoyama), pp. 44–45: "Esse vero intentionale est illud quod convenit rei ut habet esse obiective sive repraesentative in aliquo alio ente reali. Et quia repraesentari obiective in aliquo indifferenter convenit tam universali quam etiam singulari, ideo esse intentionale non magis appropriat sibi universale quam singulare nec e converso. Et tale esse intentionale est debilius esse reali, et ideo semper fundatur in ipso, licet obiective".

60 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 45: "Distinctio vero intentionalis est illa, qua aliqua distinguuntur solum in esse obiectivo sive repraesentativo". For James' application of his discussion of *esse reale*, *esse intentionale*, and *esse rationis* to the problem of divine cognition, cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, (ed. Yokoyama), pp. 47–51.

3 William of Alnwick's Objections to the *Consecutio* Theory

We turn now to the objections of William of Alnwick († 1333), a Franciscan long known to have been a close associate of Duns Scotus at Paris.[61] He was also a critic of James of Ascoli, attacking James several times in his *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* and even in his later *Determinationes*. William criticized the *consecutio* theory in Questions 2 and 4 of his *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, which were disputed *ordinarie* at Oxford around 1315.[62]

William criticizes James' distinction between having intelligible being effectively and consecutively in Question 2 of his treatise.[63] He seems to have James' account in *Ordinary Question* 4 in mind. After reciting James' position, William focuses on effective causality and asks how we know the intelligible being of a material object produced by the human agent intellect. Since we know material objects by means of intelligible species, we have two options for knowing their intelligible being: either by means of their essence, insofar as it is the contents of the intelligible species, or through the species itself. William quickly dismisses the first way with the terse remark that the quiddity of the material

61 On William of Alnwick, cf. William Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus", cit., pp. 598–600; Stephen D. Dumont, "William of Alnwick", in: J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Malden, MA—Oxford 2003, pp. 676–677; Guido Alliney, *Time and Soul in Fourteenth Century Theology: Three Questions of William of Alnwick on the Existence, the Ontological Status and the Unity of Time*, Firenze 2002, pp. XI–XIII; Timothy B. Noone, "Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction", in: *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993), pp. 231–261; Idem, "Ascoli, Wylton, and Alnwick on Scotus's Formal Distinction: Taxonomy, Refinement, and Interaction", cit., especially pp. 146–148; Dominik Perler, "What are Intentional Objects?", cit., pp. 217–221; Otto Wanke, *Die Kritik Wilhelms von Alnwick an der Ideenlehre des Johannes Duns Skotus*, Ph.D. Diss., Bonn 1965.

62 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*, q. 2, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 30–39; q. 4, a. 2, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 109–116.

63 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 2, (ed. Ledoux), p. 38: "Ultimo sic: ipse dicit quod aliquid esse intelligibile est dupliciter: effective et consecutive. Effective, quemadmodum quidditates rerum habent esse intelligibile ab intellectu agente, consecutive autem habent esse intelligibile a specie intelligibili causata per intellectum agentem. Quaero igitur an quidditas rei materialis, secundum esse intelligibile causatum ab intellectu agente, intelligatur ab intellectu nostro immediate per essentiam suam aut per speciem. Non primo modo, quia non est praesens intellectui per essentiam; nec secundo modo, quia illud quod intelligitur per speciem repraesentatur per speciem, et tale habet esse intelligibile consecutive per speciem, et sic esse intelligibile causatum per intellectum agentem esset esse intelligibile consecutivum per speciem, et ita unum membrum sequeretur ad aliud; unus ergo modus ponendi irritat alium".

object "is not present to the intellect through its essence", by which he means that the agent intellect only produces the intelligible species by means of effective causality, not the contents of the species, which, on James' view, only follows consecutively on the species. The second option fails as well. The problem with it is that when the human intellect knows a material object by means of an intelligible species, the object known is represented and as such, since we are again considering the contents of the species, the object can be known only consecutively. Thus, in order for the intellect to understand the quiddity of a material object that has been effectively produced by an intelligible species, the intellect must first know the object consecutively. But consecutive cognition is supposed to follow effective, according to James, so the net result of James' distinction is a circularity of cognitive processes. As William puts it, "… and so one member [of the distinction] follows the other; therefore, one mode of positing [i.e. member of the distinction] aggravates the other".

Another criticism of James' version of the *consecutio* theory occurs in q. 4, a criticism which William directs against the distinction between proper and metaphorical causality from James' *Ordinary Question* 5. Here William attempts to reduce metaphorical (consecutive) to effective causality. He accepts from James the claim that consecutive causality is a relation of essential dependence. Such a relation can be defined as one in which the posterior depends on the prior and can have no being without it. But for Alnwick, for one thing to depend on another for its very being is a causal dependence, which must then be in the genus of cause; thus consecutive causality is ruled out, since it is only metaphorical. If it is admitted with James of Ascoli that the quiddities of creatures essentially depend on the divine essence and are distinct from it, then they depend causally on the divine essence and their production is effective rather than consecutive, for the only causal power that the divine essence has is as a productive principle of real beings.[64] As we have seen, however, James would not accept that the divine essence as such has any causal power, though this does not affect William's point that dependence relations

64 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 4, a. 2, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 112–113: "Item, illud quod est posterius alio dependens ab illo essentialiter sine quo nullo modo potest esse, dependet ab ipso secundum aliquod genus causae, quia dependentia aliquorum essentialis, quorum unum non potest esse sine alio, est causalis; sed esse intelligibile creaturae consequens essentiam divinam, si sit distinctum ab ea, est posterius ea dependens ab ea secundum suam essentiam intentionalem sine qua nullo modo potest esse; igitur dependet essentialiter ab essentia divina sive causaliter, et producitur effective ab ea, quia essentia divina nihil causat extra se cuius essentia non est principium producendi effectivum". I have altered the punctuation here to clarify the sense.

are causal. Interestingly, Petrus Thomae, another adherent of the *consecutio* theory, makes much the same argument against James in his treatise devoted to intelligible being.[65]

The principle that motivates William of Alnwick's criticism of James of Ascoli is one that he established in the first two questions of his *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*. This principle states that the form that represents something else, whether this form is an intelligible species or the divine essence, is in reality (*realiter*) the same as the entity that it represents.[66] The entity that is represented by the divine essence has no distinct being of its own; its being is the being of the divine essence. The represented being of a creature differs from the divine essence only by an extrinsic denomination, which simply means that whatever being it has it has from God. In reality, the cognized being that a creature has differs in no way from God. In God there is only a single act of intellection and a single, eternal *esse cognitum*. There is no act which expands outwards to creatures as was the case with Henry of Ghent, nor is the single divine act divided into a series logical states as it was for Duns Scotus. The single divine *esse cognitum* comprises both the divine essence and all secondary objects.[67] In a response to an objection, William does concede that there is an order, but it is not between primary objects and secondary objects or among multiple cognized beings, but, rather obscurely, in the termination of the single act of cognition.[68] What he means is that the divine *esse cognitum* is primarily directed towards the divine essence, but the same, single act is also directed towards creatures in a secondary sense.

It is not clear, however, that William of Alnwick's motivating principle undermines James of Ascoli's position. James indeed holds that creatures have distinct representations in intentional being, which are founded on the real being

65 Cf. Petrus Thomae, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 3, a. 1, concl. 5, (ed. Smith), p. 58.

66 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 1, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 15–16; q. 2, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 44–57.

67 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 2, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 48–49.

68 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 2, (ed. Ledoux), p. 52: "Respondeo quod, cum cognitio Dei primo terminetur ad essentiam suam, oportet concedere quod cognitio Dei sit primo essentiae suae et quod esse cognitum sit primo esse essentiae et quod essentia primo habet esse cognitum, ita quod primitas refertur ad habere, non autem ad esse cognitum. Eodem modo concedendum est quod esse cognitum ab aeterno est secundario creaturae, quia ad ipsam secundario terminatur cognitio Dei. Tamen primo esse cognitum non est essentiae divinae, nec secundario cognitum est creaturae. Per hoc patet ad formam rationis, concedendo quod essentia divina et creatura habent ordinem respectu cognitionis, sed non in esse cognito, ita quod ordo ponatur in ipso esse cognito, sed tantum habent ordinem in esse cognito terminative".

of the divine essence. But James is explicit in *Ordinary Question* 5 that entities in intentional being or that are intentionally distinct enter into no composition with each other or with that which contains them.[69] William may have in mind Henry of Ghent's version of the intentional distinction, which, at least in James' interpretation does involve composition. But James is careful to distance his version of the intentional distinction from that of Henry's.[70] Furthermore, although at first glance James appears to endorse a threefold division of being into the "realms" of real being, intentional being, and being of reason,[71] more careful attention to the text reveals that for James the most fundamental division of being is between being in the soul and real being outside the soul.[72] Intentional being then is not real being, and so positing distinct intentional entities does not compromise the real unity of God as Alnwick claims. The reason for James' distinction between intentional being and being of reason is that he is trying to separate fictitious beings or essences that arise solely from the consideration of the intellect and are repugnant to real being from essences that have representations in some other being. That is, James wants to differentiate entities such as a house or the divine idea of Socrates, which are not repugnant to actual existence, from entities such as a goat-stag, which is.

Despite the polemics by which William expresses his positions, his views are the next logical step from those of James of Ascoli. Like James, William holds that the divine essence represents the essences of creatures to the divine intellect, and he also argues that creatures are contained in God. Indeed, where James had only one mode of containment, eminent containment, William adds two more: exemplaric in the divine intellect, and virtual in the divine power.[73] When it came to the relation of the primary and secondary objects of divine cognition, James retained the basic element of Henry and Scotus' theory, namely that there was some sort of production. For James, this production was not in the divine mind but rather from the divine essence. He was uncomfortable with the language of causality, as we have seen, and qualified consecutive production as causation in only a metaphorical sense. William of

69 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, corollarium 3, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 46.

70 Ibid., (ed. Yokoyama), pp. 46–47.

71 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, (ed. Yokoyama), p. 44: "… est intelligendum quod triplex est esse in universo: scilicet esse reale, esse intentionale et esse rationis".

72 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5, a. 2, (ed. Yokoyama), pp. 43–44.

73 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quodlibet* q. 6, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 369–377.

Alnwick seized on this, and denied even this metaphorical sense. For William, there can be no production of secondary objects in any way, and he denies the whole notion of consecutive causality.[74]

William of Alnwick's solution to the problem of secondary objects is then to save divine immutability by denying the various kinds of motion or logical states or instants of nature that were required by Henry and Scotus' move of positing features of human cognition in God. The consequence of denying these logical stages for William of Alnwick is that he still has to account for divine knowledge and the presence of creatables in the various internal powers of God. Thus Alnwick has to develop a complicated system of containment. In brief, though all in God is really the same, nevertheless creatures have being from and are contained in various aspects of God by means of different modes of containment. They are contained eminently according to the mode of perfection (*perfectionaliter*) in the divine essence and they are contained virtually in the divine power. In virtue of their containment, creatures have represented and expressive being in the divine essence, and they have being in the divine knowledge as well. But in every one of these cases, Alnwick insists that creatures have no being other than or distinct from that which contains them.[75] So it seems that the cost of denying all discursive movement and cognitive production in God is that one must then posit the echoes of creation in every internal power or aspect of God. This is possible for William of Alnwick because of another Scotist analytical tool, the formal distinction, which allows for a qual-

74 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 4, a. 2, (ed. Ledoux), p. 114: "Teneo igitur quantum ad hunc articulum quod esse intelligibile sive repraesentatum creaturae ab aeterno non est productum proprie nec consecutive, nec primo nec secundario, nec per se nec per accidens, nec etiam esse intentionale conveniens creaturae sive obiecto a specie intelligibili creata est productum consecutive, sed aeque primo ex parte rei producitur sicut species intelligbilis, et omnium istorum causa est quia esse intelligibile sive repraesentatum per esssentiam divinam aut per speciem intelligibilem est idem realiter cum forma repraesentante, sicut ostensum [est] in prima quaestione et secunda".

75 Cf. Guillelmus de Alnwick, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* q. 1, (ed. Ledoux), p. 16: "Hoc etiam declaro sic: res creata et creabilis habet esse in essentia divina perfectionaliter prout est omnium perfectionum eminenter contentiva; secundo habet esse in potentia divina virtualiter prout est omnis causalitatis contentiva; tertio habet esse in essentia divina modo repraesentativa et expressiva; quarto habet esse in scientia divina in quantum est omnium aliorum cognitiva; sicut igitur res creata aut creabilis prout continetur in essentia divina perfectionaliter et eminenter non est aliud ab essentia divina et prout continetur virtualiter in Deo non est aliud quam potentia Dei, sic prout habet esse repraesentatum in essentia divina non est aliud quam essentia divina repraesentans et prout habet esse scitum sive cognitum in scientia Dei non est aliud quam scientia Dei".

ified distinction between the various divine powers and the divine essence, all of which contain creatures in the aforementioned ways.[76]

Conclusion

The *consecutio* theory, which proved popular in the early fourteenth century, originated as a solution to the Aristotelian problem of how the 'Thought-Thinking-Itself' could know the world of which it is the cause. Since Aristotle had ruled out direct knowledge of creation, Themistius attempted to show that God could know creation by knowing the divine essence. This view was widely held in the thirteenth century, and Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus attempted to give detailed accounts of the mechanics of divine intellection. Their discussions relied on the assumption that there was a similarity between human and divine cognition. For Scotus, at least, this is unsurprising given his position on the univocity of being: 'intellect' for Scotus is a univocally common perfection. In Scotus and his later followers, the relation between the intelligible species and its content in human cognition serves as a model for the relation between the divine essence and the secondary objects; in effect, the divine essence functions as a divine intelligible species.

James of Ascoli was one of the earliest proponents of the *consecutio* theory. He took Henry's language of primary and secondary objects, Henry's notion of God's knowledge of a relation, and fused them with Scotus' theory of real and metaphorical production from his *Quodlibet* q. 15. According to James, creatures are correlatives of the divine essence, for they are metaphorically produced by it. Simply by positing the divine essence in the divine gaze is enough for the secondary objects to be seen as well. Henry and Scotus had also described a kind of movement or stages in divine cognition and the production of creatable essences to account for divine knowledge of secondary objects. James tried to eliminate these features of apparent movement from divine cognition in favor of the position that creatures are contained in the divine essence. William of Alnwick took matters to the next logical step, eliminating James' metaphorical causality as well as some of the features of human cognition that Henry and Scotus had posited in God. Because William had eliminated the divine production of intelligible being, he was, like James, obliged to develop a sophisticated theory of modes of containment in order to account for

76 For William of Alnwick's version of the formal distinction, cf. his *Quodlibet* qq. 1–2, (ed. Ledoux), pp. 179–249 and the studies by Timothy Noone cited above in note 61.

the presence of creatures to the various divine powers. Whatever the cogency of William's arguments, they were ultimately unsuccessful in stopping the spread of the *consecutio* theory. A decade after William wrote, John Baconthorpe gave the theory its most extensive defense.[77]

77 I wish to thank Kent Emery for his many years of instruction and friendship, the participants of the conference for their comments, Anik Stanbury (Notre Dame) for commenting on an earlier draft of this article, and the libraries and librarians who supplied reproductions for the edition, especially Dr. Christoph Mackert of the Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, who provided high resolution digital photographs.

Appendix: Iacobi de Aesculo, *Quaestio ordinaria* 4

Ordinary questions were solemn, public disputations held by a master who determined the topics in advance.[78] The *Quaestiones ordinariae* of James of Ascoli survive in six manuscripts, four of which contain the complete set of five questions.[79] Question 4, which is edited below, survives in the following five manuscripts:

C* = *Cambridge, University Library, Ms. Ff.III.23

Late 14th–early 15th c., English, 340 × 325 mm, 2 cols., 256 ff. || IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (ff. 112^{rb}–131^{rb}). Utrum noticia actualis omnium divinorum ad intra presupponitur in deo patre productioni verbi passive quod sic—potest esse per se terminus productionis. Expliciunt questiones ordinarie Iacobi de Esculo. There is a running header of "questio ordinaria Iacobi de Esculo". **Other Contents**: IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *De primo principio* (ff. 1ra–12^{rb}); IDEM, *Quodlibet* (ff. 13ra–110^{vb}); IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quodlibet* (ff. 131^{rb}–175va); FRANCISCUS DE MAYRONIS, *De virtutibus* (ff. 177va–198va); IDEM, *Formalitates* (ff. 198va–216^{rb}); IDEM, *Sermo de indulgentiis* (ff. 216^{rb}–221^{rb}); IDEM, *De dominio civili* (ff. 221^{rb}–224^{vb}); PETRUS THOMAE, ⟨*Quaestiones de esse intelligibili*⟩ (ff. 225ra–240^{vb}); IDEM, ⟨*Quaestio de distinctione praedicamentorum*⟩ (ff. 240ra–241^{vb}); IDEM, ⟨*Quaestiones de modis distinctionum*⟩ (ff. 241^{vb}–259va). **Reference**: C. Hardwick, *A Catalogue of the Manuscripts Pre-*

78 On the genre of ordinary questions, cf. B.C. Bazán, "Les questions disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie", in: B.C. Bazán—G. Fransen—D. Jacquart—J.F. Wippel (eds.), *Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médicine*, Louvain 1985, pp. 13–149; Timothy Noone, "Scholasticism", in: J.J.E. Gracia and T.B. Noone (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Malden, MA—Oxford 2003, pp. 55–63, at pp. 61–62.

79 According to L.M. de Rijk, James' *Quaestio ordinaria* 5 also survives in Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 31 dext. cod. 8, ff. 34^{rb}, 34^{vb}. But in fact ff. 34$^{r–v}$ in this manuscript is part of Duns Scotus' *Quodlibet*. The text from James' Question 5, a. 1, that de Rijk quotes is actually that of Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 4871, f. 34^{vb}, a manuscript which de Rijk does not cite. Cf. L.M. de Rijk, "*Quaestio de ideis*: Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism", in: J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk (eds.), *KEPHALAION*: *Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation* …, pp. 204–213, at pp. 212–213, note 21, and p. 213, note 25. Unknown to Yokoyama, who edited *Ordinary Question* 5 from MSS **CVV$_2$**, there is also a copy of Question 5 in Worcester, Cathedral and Chapter Library, Ms. Q.99, ff. 116ra–116^{vb}, as was noted by A.G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians*, Oxford 1934, p. 331. The Worcester manuscript also contains several questions from James' *Quodlibet*; for the titles and foliation, see *Oxford Theology and Theologians*, p. 330.

served in the Library of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge 1857, Vol. 2, pp. 420–422; Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Tractatus de primo principio*, (ed. M. Müller), Freiburg i.Br. 1941, pp. XXIV–XXV.

L* = *Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Ms 609

Mid-14th c., German, parchment, 340 × 235 mm, 91 ff., 2 cols. From the collection of the philosophical faculty, former shelf mark H 76. || ⟨IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 4⟩. Alia questio (rubricated in red). Queritur utrum noticia actualis creature presupponatur in deo noticie habituali eiusdem et videtur quod sic—non est prior generatione hiis que sunt ad finem sed magis e converso (ff. 85ra–86va). There is a running header of "questio 52^{a}". ⟨IDEM, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5⟩. ⟨U⟩trum noticia actualis quam habet deus de creatura posuerit ipsam ab eterno in aliquo esse causato et arguitur quod sic—ideo non potest esse per se terminus productionis (ff. 86va–89^{rb}). There is a running header of "questio 53^{a}". This ms. contains only two of James' *Quaestiones ordinariae*. They are at the end of a section of anonymous questions on diverse topics, several of which are also present in Città del Vaticano, BAV, Cod. Vat. lat. 1012 and Kraków, Bibl. Jag., cod. 732. **Other Contents**: IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quodlibet* (ff. 1ra–20^{rb}); ⟨ANONYMUS, *Quaestiones quodlibetales*,⟩ (ff. 24ra–25^{vb}); GUILLELMUS DE ALNWICK, *Quaestio de scientia* (ff. 26ra–26^{vb}); ⟨ANONYMI, *Quaestiones de diversis*,⟩ (ff. 27ra–89^{rb}); ANTONIUS ANDREAE, *De principiis naturae* (ff. 89va–91^{rb}). **Reference**: P. Burkhart, *Die lateinischen und deutschen Handscriften der Universitäts-Bibliothek Leipzig*, Wiesbaden 1999, Band 2.1, pp. 269–271.

N* = *New Haven, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, MS Marston 203

Second half of the 15th c., English, paper, 287 × 201 mm, ii + 96 + ii ff., 2 cols., provenance unknown. || IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (ff. 1^{r}–17^{v}, *tabula quaestionum* f. 17^{vb}). Utrum noticia actualis omnium divinorum ab intra presupponitur in deo patre productioni verbi passive quod sic—potest esse per se terminus productionis … Expliciunt questiones ordinarie Iacobi de esculo. A second hand has heavily corrected the text of this manuscript. **Other Contents**: IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quodlibet* (ff. 17^{v}–55^{v}); ⟨IDEM, *Tabula Scoti*⟩ (ff. 59^{r}–88^{r}); ⟨IDEM, *Tabula quodlibetorum Henrici de Gandavo*⟩ (ff. 89^{r}–94^{v}). **Reference**: B.A. Shailor, *Catalogue of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the Beinecke Rare Book Library Yale University*, Binghamton, NY 1992, Vol. III, pp. 378–381.

V* = *Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 1012

14th c. (early 1320's), German, parchment, 341×252 mm, ii + 128 ff. || IACOBUS DE AESCULO, ⟨*Quaestiones ordinariae*⟩ (ff. 60va–66va, *tabula quaestionum* f. ir). Explicit quolibet magistri Iacobi de esculo. Incipit aliud scilicet magistri Iacobi eiusdem. Utrum noticia actualis quam habet deus de creatura posuerit eam ab eterno in aliquo esse causato et arguitur quod sic—ad finem sed magis e converso. Expliciunt questiones disputate a fratre Jacobo de esculo ordinis fratrum minorum cum suo quodlibet magistri sacre theologie. In this manuscript, q. 5 of the *Ordinary Questions* has been moved to the beginning of the work. **Other Contents**: GUILLELMUS DE ALNWICK, *Quaestiones de esse intelligibili* (ff. 1ra–12^{rb}); IDEM, *Quodlibet* (ff. 12^{rb}–39ra); IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quodlibet* (ff. 46ra–60ra); there is a group of fifty-seven questions forming a unit, questions which have been attributed to various early fourteenth-century authors (ff. 66va–110ra); a collection of twenty-seven questions, labeled "third quodlibet" (ff. 110ra–128^{vb}). In the set of fifty-seven questions there are four questions on the divine ideas that are related in some way to James of Ascoli: (1) *Utrum ydee sive rationes ydeales precedant vel sequantur perfectiones creaturarum in deo ut iste perfectiones sunt ab essentia divina distincte et inter se* (ff. 88va–90^{rb}); (2) *Utrum esse intelligibile quod habuerunt creature ab eterno in mente divina sit esse causatum* (ff. 90$^{rb–vb}$); (3) *Utrum res in mente divina ut distincte ab essentia divina prius habuerint esse intelligibile quam intellectum* (ff. 90^{vb}–91va); (4) *Queritur an Deus cognoscat omnia alia a se* (ff. 91va–92ra). (1) bears a title similar to James' *Quodlibet* q. 2 (*Utrum perfectiones creaturarum virtualiter contentae in essentia divina secundum quod habent ibi esse proprium et distinctum inter se et ab essentia praecedunt rationes ideales*); following a quotation of the arguments of Robert Cowton and William of Alnwick against Scotus' theory of divine ideas, the author of (1) borrows an argument from James' *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5. Questions (2) and (3) are paraphrases or perhaps examples of an author reading 'secundum alium', a phenomenon which William Duba notes is present in several other questions in this codex. Question (2) is a paraphrase of James' *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 5 and question (3) is a paraphrase of James' *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 4; (3) is also present in Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 732, ff. 28va–29^{rb}. Question (4) was edited by Schwamm and attributed to James of Ascoli without any attempt to prove the authorship. Schwamm was criticized for this by Doucet, and he later retracted the ascription. **Reference**: A. Pelzer, *Codices Vaticani Latini* II.1, Bibliotheca Vaticana 1931, 493–499; W.O. Duba, "Continental Franciscan *Quodlibeta* after Scotus", in: *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, pp. 640–649; Hermann Schwamm, *Robert Cowton O.F.M. über das göttliche*

Vorherwissen, Innsbruck 1930, pp. 44–54; Id., *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern*, Innsbruck 1934, pp. 228–229; Victorin Doucet, review of *Robert Cowton …*, in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 24 (1931), pp. 391–393.

V_2 = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 4871

14th c., parchment, 340×245 mm, ii + 170 + i ff. || IACOBUS DE AESCULO, ⟨*Quaestiones ordinariae*⟩ (ff. 26ra–36^{vb}, *tabula quaestionum* f. 25^{v}). Queritur utrum notitia actualis omnium divinorum ad intra presupponatur in deo patre productioni verbi productioni verbi passive—non potest esse per se terminus productionis. The text is ascribed to James of Ascoli in the *tabula quaestionum*. **Other Contents**: RICHARDUS DE CONINGTON, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (ff. 2ra–12va); MARTINUS DE ALNWICK, *Quaestiones supplement. in I Sent.* (ff. 14ra–22ra); IACOBUS DE AESCULO, *Quodlibet* (ff. 26ra–36^{vb}). This codex also contains numerous anonymous questions, as well as selected questions from Hugo de Novo Castro, Robertus Cowton, Franciscus de Marchia, and Petrus de Falco. **Reference**: G.J. Etzkorn, *Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum. A Description of Some One Hundred Manuscripts of the Vaticanus Latinus Collection* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 50), Leiden—New York—Köln 1996, pp. 171–180.

The manuscripts divide into two clear families, one English (MSS CN), the other continental (MSS LVV$_2$). The English family is inferior to the continental, for it is plagued by constant *homoioteleuta*, additions, inversions, substitutions, and large omissions (for example, p. 512 lin. 18 obiecti] intelligibilis sub propria ratione *add.* CN; p. 519 lin. 11–14 hoc—quia] *om.* [*hom.*] CN; p. 519 lin. 18 absque—necessario] *om.* CN). Some of these accidents distort the internal structure of the question by obscuring the division of the question into articles (for example, p. 511 lin. 11–16 in—primo] *om.* CN; p. 512 lin. 4–6 hoc—secundum] *om.* CN), perhaps an attempt to rectify the error found in the continental tradition announcing three articles at the beginning of the question when the question actually has four. The accidents of the English family all seem scribal in nature and do not reflect authorial revision. As a result, I follow the readings of the English family only when the continental family is marred by *homoioteleuta* (which occurs only twice: p. 516 lin. 20–21 potest—non] *om.* [*hom.*] LVV$_2$; p. 520 lin. 6–8 oportet—intelligibile] *om.* [*hom.*] LVV$_2$). Within the continental family, there are a number of minor accidents that suggest a closer affinity between MSS L and V$_2$ than between either of them and MS V (such as p. 510 lin. 3 Quaeritur] *om.* CN V; p. 513 lin. 3 obiecti] eius CN *om.* LV$_2$; p. 521 lin. 8 divina] obiective *add.* LV$_2$; p. 524 lin. 19 divina] *om.* LV$_2$).

However, MS L and V_2 each share a *homoioteleuton* with MS V independently of the other (p. 513 lin. 19–21 creati—intelligibilis] *om.* [*hom.*] VV_2; p. 514 lin. 14 intelligibilis—obiecti] *om.* [*hom.*] LV), which suggests that all three manuscripts are independent witnesses of their exemplar. In the edition below I follow for the most part the readings of any two members of the continental family, that is, in cases where there is disagreement among the continental family I take the reading that is supported by two witnesses, departing from it only in the case of obvious error.

In the edition all variants are recorded and the Latin has been classicized. Also, in one entry in the *apparatus fontium* I have silently corrected the text. At p. 512 lin. 13–14 I quote material from James' *Quodlibet* q. 1. Here MS V erroneously has "relationem" instead of "remotionem"; the latter reading I have taken from the copy of the *Quodlibet* in Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 31 dext. cod. 8, f. 51^{va}.

⟨Iacobi de Aesculo⟩

⟨Quaestio ordinaria 4⟩

C 124^{vb}
L 85ra
N 12ra
V 65^{vb}
V_2 32^{vb}

Quaeritur utrum notitia actualis creaturae praesupponatur in Deo notitiae habituali eiusdem

Et videtur quod sic: illud quod non habet prius esse intelligibile quam esse intellectum, illud non est prius cognitum in habitu quam in actu sed magis e converso; creatura est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: illud quod de se non habet aliquod esse, nec reale nec rationis, in quocumque esse ponatur, necessario ponitur per actum alicuius potentiae; sed creatura de se non habet aliquod esse, cum sit pure nihil; ergo creatura in quocumque esse ponatur, sive sit esse reale sive sit esse intelligibile, necessario ponitur per actum alicuius potentiae. Prima autem potentia in Deo est intellectus, igitur creatura quod habeat esse intelligibile, hoc habet per actum intellectus, igitur non habet esse prius intelligibile quam esse intellectum.

Praeterea, omnis potentia quae non potest ferri in aliquod obiectum nisi prius habeat illud obiectum praesens necessario dependet in actu suo ab illo obiecto (probatur, quia potentia quae non dependet ab aliquo obiecto potest ferri in illud obiectum, sive illud obiectum ponatur in esse sive non, aliter enim dependeret); sed intellectus divinus non dependet a creatura in aliquo esse, nec in esse reali nec in esse intellectuali; igitur intellectus divinus in actu suo non praesupponit creaturam in esse intelligibili.

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3 Quaeritur] *om.* CN V alia quaestio *praem.* L 5 Et ... illud] quod sic arguitur CN ‖ prius] primum *sed mg. corr.* V_2 5–6 quam ... non *om.* V 6 illud *om.* CN 7 ergo ... quod] quia CN ‖ Probatio minoris] probo minorem L ‖ illud] id V_2 8 esse *sup. lin.* N ‖ rationis] ideo *add.* CN 8–9 esse ponatur] ponitur CN 9 ponatur] productum V ‖ alicuius potentiae *inv.* L 9–12 sed ... potentiae *om.* (*hom.*) CN 11 esse reale *inv.* V ‖ intelligibile] intentionale V 12 Prima ... potentia] potentia autem prima L ‖ intellectus] intellectio V 13 igitur] ergo C V_2 ‖ creatura] est illud (*?*) *sed mg. corr.* N ‖ habeat] habet V ‖ intelligibile] intellectuale V_2 ‖ hoc habet *inv.* CN ‖ habet] patet L 14 igitur] ergo C V_2 ‖ esse prius *inv.* CN ‖ esse *om.* CN 15 Praeterea] item CN ‖ nisi] non L 16 suo *om.* CN 17 illo] isto V ‖ probatur ... obiecto] sed potentia omnino independens V ‖ probatur *om.* CN 18 sive *iter. sed corr.* N ‖ illud obiectum *om.* CN *inv.* V ‖ in *om.* CN 19 enim] illud V ‖ non dependet *om.* V 20 nec ... esse *om.* (*hom.*) CN ‖ nec ... esse] sive CN ‖ intellectuali] intelligibili CN L ‖ igitur] ergo CN 21 actu suo *inv.* CN

Contra: qualemcumque ordinem per se habent aliqua ubi sunt distincta realiter sive secundum rem, consimilem ordinem habent ut sunt distincta secundum rationem (patet, quia distinctio secundum rem accipitur per comparationem ad distincta realiter); sed ubi notitia actualis et habitualis distinguuntur re, ibi per se loquendo habitualis praecedit actualem, licet per accidens actualis aliquando praecedat habitualem; igitur in Deo, ut sunt distincta secundum rationem, habitualis praecedit actualem.

⟨Ad quaestionem⟩

Ista quaestio non quaerit de notitia habituali alicuius obiecti complexi contingentis, sed quaerit de simplici notitia quidditatis creaturae. Hoc supposito, in ista quaestione tria sunt facienda, quia primo praemittam duas distinctiones necessarias ad quaestionem, secundo ex illis dicam ad quaestionem illud quod videtur mihi probabilius, tertio ponam motiva alterius partis.

⟨Articulus 1⟩

Primo dico quod aliquid potest praesupponi alicui dupliciter: vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem. Haec est prima distinctio quam praemitto.

C 125ra Secunda distinctio est ista, quod notitia habitualis potest | accipi dupliciter: uno modo large pro ipsa praesentia obiecti intelligibilis apud intellec-

L 85^{rb} tum, et hoc vel in re quando obiectum | est praesens per essentiam suam ipsi intellectui vel in aliquo repraesentativo supplente vicem obiecti quando

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1 per se *om.* CN 2 realiter sive *om.* CN ‖ ordinem] rationis *add.* CN ‖ habent] habebunt L ‖ ut] ubi CN ‖ distincta *om.* CN 3 secundum rem] rationis CN ‖ rem] rationem L 6 accidens] actum V ‖ actualis aliquando *inv.* CN ‖ igitur] ergo CN ‖ in Deo *om.* CN V ‖ ut] ubi CN L 7 praecedit] actu *add.* L 9 non] praecedit *add.* C praecedit *add. sed del.* N 10 quidditatis] quidditativa V 10–11 Hoc supposito] haec praesupposito V 11–16 in … Primo *om.* CN 11 tria] duo *sed corr.* L 12 secundo] secundum V ‖ illis] istis V_2 ‖ dicam] dico V 13 illud] id V_2 16 praesupponi alicui] alicui(*mg.* N) supponi CN ‖ dupliciter] etc. C 17–18 Haec … quod *om.* CN 18 quod] quia V ‖ notitia] etiam *add.* N ‖ habitualis] etiam *add.* C 19 large *om.* C *mg. al. man.* N ‖ ipsa *om.* CN ‖ obiecti] instanti scilicet large C *sup. lin. et* instanti scilicet large *add sed del.* N ‖ intelligibilis] intelligibili C 20 re] se CN ‖ obiectum] oppositum C ‖ suam *om.* CN 21 supplente] sive gerente *add.* CN

1–3 Cf. Duns Scotus, *Reportatio examinata* prol. q. 1 a. 4 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov I, p. 42 n. 111): "Qualis ordo realis esset inter aliqua si essent distincta realiter, talis est ordo eorum secundum rationem, ubi sunt distincta secundum rationem."

obiectum est absens; alio modo potest accipi notitia habitualis magis stricte
V_2 33ra pro quadam perfectione posteriore et media inter praesentiam | obiecti et actum secundum.

Hoc de primo articulo.

⟨Articulus 2⟩

Quantum ad secundum, pono duas breves conclusiones iuxta duplicem distinctionem praemissam.

Prima conclusio est ista, quod notitia habitualis primo modo sumpta ipsius creaturae praesupponitur in Deo secundum rem notitiae actuali eiusdem.

Secunda conclusio est ista, quod notitia habitualis creaturae secundo
N 12^{rb} modo | accepta praesupponitur in Deo secundum rationem notitiae actuali eiusdem.

Et suppono hic unum quod alias fuit probatum, scilicet quod essentia divina ex natura rei distinguitur ab intellectu et ab eius notitia. Hoc supposito, arguo sic ad primam conclusionem: illud quod secundum se ut habet esse distinctum ab omni alio continet in se supereminenter rationem cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis sub propria ratione, illud natum est facere praesentiam illius obiecti apud intellectum sibi proportionatum (haec est evidens ex terminis, quia si species alicuius obiecti quae non continet ipsum obiectum eminenter sed solum est quidam effectus aequivocus ipsius ob-

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1 obiectum] oppositum C ‖ potest accipi] accipitur L ‖ accipi … habitualis] notitia habitualis accipi CN 2 posteriore] posteriori CN L ‖ et] quasi C quasi *add.* N ‖ media *clarius mg. al. man. rescr.* N 3 secundum] et *add.* L 4–6 Hoc … secundum *om.* CN 6 secundum] articulum *add.* V ‖ pono] ergo *add.* CN ‖ breves *om.* CN ‖ breves conclusiones *inv.* V_2 6–7 iuxta … praemissam *om.* CN 8 conclusio *om.* CN 9 praesupponitur] praesupponatur V_2 10–12 Secunda … eiusdem *om.* (*hom.*) V 11 accepta] sumpta CN ‖ praesupponitur] praesupponatur V_2 13 suppono] praesupponitur CN ‖ unum … scilicet *om.* CN ‖ scilicet *iter.* V_2 ‖ essentia] natura C naturalia *sed in* natura *mut.* N 14 divina *mg. rescr.* N ‖ ab *om.* CN 14–15 supposito] praesupposito CN 15 illud *om.* CN ‖ secundum *iter.* L 16 supereminenter] supereminentem L 17–18 illud … obiecti *om.* V_2 17 illud … est] potest LV ‖ facere] ferre L *sup. lin. rescr.* N 18 illius] cuiuscumque CN ‖ obiecti] intelligibilis sub propria ratione *add.* CN ‖ sibi proportionatum *inv.* CN 18–19 haec … terminis] patet CN 20 obiectum *om.* CN 20–513.1 aequivocus … obiecti] eius(*del.* N) obiecti aequivocus CN 20 aequivocus *om.* L

13–14 Cf. Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodlibet* q. 1 a. 4 (V f. 46va): "… ostendo hic duas conclusiones: prima conclusio sit ista, quod essentia, vita, et intellectus et voluntas et huiusmodi perfectiones simpliciter sunt in Deo formaliter ex natura rei, et quod non dicantur de Deo solum per remotionem. Secunda conclusio est ista, quod ista distinguuntur in Deo ex natura rei."

iecti potest facere praesentiam obiecti apud intellectum in quo est, multo magis illud quod continet eminenter ipsum obiectum potest facere praesentiam obiecti apud intellectum); sed essentia divina ut habet esse distinctum ab omni alia perfectione divina continet supereminenter rationem cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis creati sub propria ratione; igitur essentia divina ut est distincta ab intellectu divino et eius notitia actuali nata est facere sufficientem praesentiam cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis creati sub propria ratione apud intellectum. Et tunc ultra: essentia divina prius ex natura rei est praesens intellectui divino sub ratione obiecti intelligibilis quam actu intelligatur, ergo prius facit sufficientem praesentiam cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis creati apud eius intellectum quam actu intelligatur aliquod ipsorum, et per consequens notitia habitualis creaturae primo modo
V 66ra praesupponitur ex natura rei notitiae actuali eiusdem. Probo minorem, |
C 125rb quia quidquid continetur in essentia divina continetur mere intelligibiliter, |
cum sit purus actus; sed essentia divina ut distinguitur a quacumque perfectione divina continet eminenter perfectionem cuiuscumque creaturae sub propria ratione; ergo essentia divina ut distinguitur a quacumque perfectione divina continet eminenter intelligibilitatem cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis creati sub propria ratione; ergo essentia divina ut distinguitur a quacumque perfectione divina nata est facere sufficientem praesentiam cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis creati in ratione obiecti apud intellectum
N 12va divinum. |

1 facere] forte *sed sup. lin. corr.* N ‖ praesentiam] ipsius *add.* L ‖ in quo] ergo V ‖ est *om.* VV_2 2 illud] *mg.* L id V_2 ‖ facere] forte *sed sup. lin. corr.* N 3 obiecti] eius CN *om.* LV_2 4 divina] per *add.* C per se *add.* N 4–5 rationem … intelligibilis] omnem perfectionem alterius obiecti intelligibilis cuiuscumque CN 5 creati] causati L ‖ propria *sup. lin.* N ‖ igitur] ergo CN V 5–6 essentia divina] ipsa CN 7 sufficientem praesentiam *inv.* CN ‖ obiecti] aperi(*?*) *sed del. et exp. et sup. lin. corr.* N ‖ intelligibilis creati *inv. sed corr.* V 8 intellectum] divinum *add.* CN 8–9 essentia … praesens] ex natura rei essentia divina est praesens prius CN 8 prius *post* rei V 9 obiecti *om.* CN ‖ intelligibilis] intelligibili C 10 intelligatur] intelligat N 10–11 ergo … intelligatur *om.* (*hom.*) L 10 ergo] igitur V_2 ‖ facit] facto(*?*) *sed sup. lin. corr.* N 11 obiecti *om.* V_2 ‖ eius *om.* CN ‖ intelligatur] intelligat CN 12 ipsorum] in posteriorum V ‖ primo modo *om.* CN ‖ modo] sumpta *add.* V 13 praesupponitur] supponitur L ‖ rei] primo modo *add.* V_2 ‖ Probo minorem] probatio minoris V_2 14 quia *om.* CN ‖ intelligibiliter] intelligentia L 15 purus actus] *inv.* C actus prius *sed* prius *del. et* purus *sup. lin. inser.* N ‖ purus] primus V ‖ distinguitur] distinguatur V ab *add.* L 17 ergo] igitur L 18–20 continet … divina *om.* (*hom.*) L 19–21 creati … intelligibilis *om.* (*hom.*) VV_2 20 facere] forte *sed corr.* N 21 obiecti intelligibilis *inv. sed corr.* L ‖ obiecti *om.* C ‖ obiecti] aperti *sed sup. lin. corr.* N

13 Probo minorem] Cf. supra lin. 3–5.

Secunda ratio ad idem: illud quod est totalis et perfecta ratio cognoscendi aliquod obiectum apud quamcumque potentiam, illud natum est facere propriam praesentiam illius obiecti apud illam potentiam (haec patet, quia sicut illud quod est ratio cognoscendi se ipsum apud intellectum natum est facere praesentiam sui ipsius apud intellectum, ita pari ratione illud quod est ratio cognoscendi aliud apud intellectum natum est facere praesentiam alterius apud intellectum); sed essentia divina prout distinguitur ab intellectu divino est perfecta et distincta ratio cognoscendi quidditatem cuiuscumque creaturae sub propria ratione; igitur essentia divina nata est facere praesentiam cuiuscumque quidditatis creaturae in ratione obiecti apud intellectum suum. Et tunc ultra: essentia divina prius est praesens intellectui divino quam actu intelligatur aliqua creatura; ergo in illo priori facit propriam praesentiam cuiuscumque creaturae in esse intelligibili; igitur prius habetur praesentia cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis creati in ratione obiecti apud intellectum divinum quam actu intelligatur aliquod ipsorum. Probatio minoris: verbi gratia accipio lapidem gratia exempli et quaero aut lapis est ratio cognoscendi se ipsum apud intellectum divinum aut non. Non potest dici quod sic, quia illud quod est ratio cognoscendi se ipsum apud intellectum | est mensura vel quasi mensura cognitionis; lapis autem non est mensura nec quasi mensura cognitionis divinae; ergo lapis non est ratio cognoscendi se ipsum apud intellectum divinum. Quaero igitur quid est illud quod est ratio cognoscendi lapidem apud | intellectum divinum? Aut est essentia aut aliquid aliud. Si essentia, habetur propositum. Si aliquid aliud, ergo multo magis essentia, et sic semper habetur propositum.

L 85va

V_2 33^{rb}

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1 Secunda … illud] idem C item N ‖ ad] illud *add.* V ‖ idem] illud L est talis *add.* V 2 facere] forte *sed sup. lin. corr.* N 3 illam] istam V ‖ haec patet *om.* CN 4 illud] id V_2 ‖ cognoscendi] agendi V 5 ipsius *om.* CN ‖ illud *om.* LV 6 aliud apud] apud illum L ‖ apud intellectum] a primo intellectu V 7 apud intellectum] a primo intellectu V ‖ prout] scilicet ut CN ut L 8 perfecta … distincta] distincta et perfecta *sed corr.* N 9 igitur] ergo CN V ‖ essentia divina *om.* CN ‖ nata] natum C ‖ facere] forte *sed sup. lin. corr.* N 10 creaturae] *om.* L creatae V 10–11 in … praesens *om.* V 10 obiecti *om.* V_2 11 suum *om.* CN ‖ divina] et *add. sed exp.* L ‖ prius est *inv.* L ‖ divino] prius *add.* V 12 intelligatur] intelligitur CN ‖ ergo] igitur L ‖ illo] isto N V 12–13 propriam praesentiam *inv.* CN 13 igitur] ergo CN V 13–14 prius habetur] primum habet V 14 praesentia] praesentiam LV ‖ intelligibilis … obiecti *om.* (*hom.*) LV 15 intelligatur] intelligitur CN 15–16 Probatio minoris] probo minorem CN V 16 verbi … et *om.* CN ‖ verbi] vero L ‖ accipio] minorem *add. sed exp.* V ‖ quaero] de lapide *add.* CN 17 Non *om.* C *sup. lin. al. man.* N 19 cognitionis] communis *sed sup. lin. al. man. corr.* N intellectionis *sed corr.* V_2 20 nec] vel CN L ‖ ergo] igitur V_2 21–22 Quaero … divinum *om.* (*hom.*) N 21 Quaero … quod] quidquid ergo C 22 lapidem] lapidis L ‖ est *om.* C *sup. lin.* N 22–23 essentia] extra V_2 23 essentia] extra V_2 ‖ aliquid] igitur L

Tertio ad idem sic: omnis potentia quae habet aliquod obiectum simpliciter adaequatum, quidquid cognoscit, cognoscit per rationem illius obiecti (patet inductive de singulis potentiis); sed essentia divina est obiectum simC 125va pliciter adaequatum | intellectui suo; ergo quidquid cognoscit intellectus divinus, cognoscit per rationem essentiae; ergo prius habetur praesentia cuiuscumque obiecti intelligibilis apud intellectum divinum antequam actu intelligatur aliquod ipsorum.

Confirmatur, quia aeque perfecta est essentia divina in repraesentando sicut intellectus in intelligendo; sed intellectus divinus potest intelligere quodcumque intelligibile; ergo similiter essentia divina repraesentat quodcumque intelligibile, aliter enim essentia divina non esset ita perfecta in intelligibilitate sicut intellectus divinus est perfectus in intellectualitate, quod videtur inconveniens.

Quarto et ultimo est auctoritas beati Augustini v *Super Genesim*, ubi loquitur de perfectionibus creaturarum dicens "omnia primitus habens sicut ipse est, neque enim ea faceret nisi cognosceret antequam faceret, nec cognosN 12^{vb} ceret nisi videret, | nec videret nisi haberet ea quae nondum facta erant nisi quemadmodum est in se non factus." Igitur secundum ipsum prius Deus habet perfectiones creaturarum sicut obiecta actu intelligibilia quam ipsa intelligat, igitur creaturae non habent esse intelligibile per intellectum divinum sed magis per rationem essentiae, et quod ista sit intentio beati Augustini patet expresse per ultimum verbum istius auctoritatis quae dicit sic: "nec ea haberet quae nondum facta erant nisi quemadmodum est in se

1 Tertio … sic] item CN ‖ quae habet] habens CN 2 cognoscit *om.* V 3 de … potentiis *om.* CN 4 intellectui suo *inv.* V_2 ‖ suo] divino CN *om.* L ‖ ergo] igitur L 6 antequam] in ipsa essentia quam CN ‖ actu *om.* L 7 intelligatur] intelligitur CN ‖ ipsorum] et *add.* V_2 8 quia] quod C ‖ repraesentando] repugnando L 9 in *om.* N 10 quodcumque] obiectum *add.* CN ‖ similiter *om.* CN ‖ repraesentat] sibi *add.* CN V_2 11 intelligibile *om.* C *sup. lin.* N ‖ enim *om.* CN ‖ divina *om.* CN 11–12 in intelligibilitate] intelligendo L 11 in *om.* N *sup. lin.* V_2 12 intellectus divinus] e intellectus N ‖ divinus … perfectus *om.* C ‖ est … in *om.* V ‖ est perfectus *om.* N 13 quod … inconveniens *om.* CN ‖ videtur] est V 14 Quarto … Augustini] item Augustinus CN ‖ beati *om.* L ‖ V] 4 L 2 V ‖ Genesim] capitulo 3 *add.* CN 14–15 loquitur … dicens] dicit sic CN 17 nisi haberet *om.* L ‖ haberet] nec haberet *add.* CN ‖ erant] sunt CN 18 quemadmodum … factus] ea haberet secundum modum secundum quem ipse factus non esset haec sunt verba Augustini L ‖ factus] est quae sunt verba beati Augustini *add.* V_2 ‖ Igitur] ergo CN ‖ ipsum] intentionem Augustini ibi CN 18–19 Deus habet *inv.* V 20 igitur] ergo CN ‖ habent] aliquod *add.* CN 21 beati *om.* CN L 22 ultimum verbum *inv.* N ‖ istius] illius CN L ‖ quae] quia L ‖ sic] *om.* CN sicut V

15–18 Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram* v c. 16 (csel xxviii.1, Wien 1894, p. 159). 23–516.1 Ibid.

non factus". Igitur videtur quod creaturae ut habent esse intelligibile ut sic habent esse omnino increabile sicut ipse Deus; ergo etc.

Secundam conclusionem, scilicet quod notitia habitualis creaturae secundo modo praesupponatur in Deo secundum rationem notitiae actuali eiusdem, ostendo sic breviter: illud quod habet rationem actus primi praesupponitur secundum rationem actui secundo vel ei quod habet rationem actus secundi, et hoc per se, licet aliquando per accidens contingat oppositum, ubi actus primus generatur ab actu secundo; sed notitia habitualis habet rationem actus primi vel quasi primi, notitia vero actualis in Deo habet rationem actus secundi vel quasi secundi; ergo notitia habitualis in Deo, cum non sit acquisita ex actibus, praesupponitur secundum rationem notitiae actuali.

Hoc de secundo articulo principali.

⟨Articulus 3⟩

Quantum ad tertium articulum, ubi restat determinare modum et possibilitatem istius positionis, est sciendum quod aliqua potentia apprehensiva praesupponat in sua operatione praesentiam obiecti secundarii. Hoc potest contingere dupliciter: vel ex imperfectione sui vel ex perfectione
C 125^{vb} alterius, scilicet | obiecti primarii. Ex imperfectione quidem sui contingit quando potentia cognitiva non potest facere praesentiam obiecti secundarii. Quando enim potentia cognitiva non continet virtualiter nec eminenter perfectionem obiecti secundarii, tunc ad hoc quod talis potentia habeat actum circa illud obiectum necessario praeexigitur praesentia illius obiecti vel in se vel in aliquo alio. Ex quo enim illa potentia apprehensiva non con-

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1 Igitur] ergo CN V 2 habent] habeant CN ‖ esse omnino *inv.* CN ‖ increabile] incausabile CN V_2 ‖ ergo etc *om.* CN ‖ ergo] igitur L 3–5 scilicet … eiusdem *om.* CN 4 modo] accepta *add.* V 5 sic breviter] breviter si V_2 ‖ sic *om.* L ‖ breviter *om.* CN 5–6 praesupponitur] praesupponatur L 7 actus] primi *add. sed exp.* L ‖ et hoc *om.* CN ‖ hoc] patet *add.* V ‖ contingat] contingit CN 8 ab] ex CN a V_2 ‖ actu secundo *inv.* V_2 ‖ habitualis] secundum *add.* L 9 vero *om.* CN 11 actibus] praepositio *add. sed exp.* L 13–16 Hoc … possibilitatem] de modo et possibilitate CN 16 istius] illius N L ‖ est sciendum *inv.* N ‖ est] *om.* C dicendum *add. sed del.* V_2 ‖ aliqua] aliquam *al. man.* N 17 praesupponat] supponat C suppone *sed in* praesupponeretur *al. man. mut.* N praesupponatur V ‖ praesentiam] praesentis V ‖ secundarii *om.* LV ‖ Hoc *om.* CN 18 dupliciter] ex duobus CN ‖ perfectione] imperfectione *sed al. man. corr.* N imperfectione V 19 quidem sui *inv.* V_2 ‖ quidem *om.* V 20–21 potest … non *om.* (*hom.*) LVV_2 22 tunc] sed certe V 23 illud] id V_2 ‖ obiectum] idem *add.* V ‖ praeexigitur praesentia] praeexigit (per *add.* V) praesentiam LV ‖ illius] istius N 24 vel *om.* CN ‖ illa] ista N V

tinet virtualiter nec eminenter perfectionem talis obiecti secundarii non potest facere talis potentia praesentiam huius obiecti, et ideo ad hoc quod talis potentia apprehendat illud obiectum necessario praeexigitur praesentia illius obiecti, et hoc provenit ex imperfectione et defectu potentiae quae
L 85^{vb} non potest facere | praesentiam talis obiecti secundarii. Aliquando vero hoc provenit non ex imperfectione potentiae quasi ipsa non possit facere praesentiam huius obiecti, sed magis hoc provenit ex perfectione alterius. Quando enim obiectum primarium alicuius potentiae est tantae perfectionis quod ipsum non solum natum est facere sui praesentiam apud illam
V_2 33va N 13ra potentiam, | sed etiam natum est | facere praesentiam cuiuscumque obiecti secundarii illius potentiae apud ipsam, tunc illa potentia non solum praesupponit in sua operatione praesentiam obiecti primarii sed etiam praesupponit praesentiam omnium illorum quorum praesentia nata est haberi per obiectum primarium, et hoc non provenit ex imperfectione potentiae sed magis ex perfectione obiecti primarii illius potentiae.

Ad propositum dico quod licet intellectus divinus praesupponat in sua cognitione praesentiam creaturarum in esse intelligibili, tamen hoc non provenit ex imperfectione intellectus divini sed magis ex perfectione essentiae divinae, quia si per impossibile intellectus divinus non praesupponeret creaturarum quidditates in esse intelligibili, adhuc posset eas causare et facere in esse intelligibili multo magis quam intellectus noster agens. Si enim intellectus creatus potest facere de potentia intelligibili actu intelligibile, multo magis intellectus divinus hoc posset, quia quidquid perfectionis est in intellectu

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2 facere … potentia] talis potentia facere CN ‖ huius] huiusmodi C L 3 apprehendat] apprehendit CN 4 illius] istius V ‖ et hoc] quod CN ‖ hoc] haec V ‖ provenit] et procedit *add.* V 5 Aliquando] actum L ‖ vero] enim CN 6 non *om.* L 7 praesentiam huius] huiusmodi praesentiam CN V_2 ‖ obiecti *om.* CN LV_2 ‖ hoc *om.* CN ‖ perfectione] imperfectione *sed al. man. corr.* N 8 Quando] quod V ‖ obiectum] oppositum C ‖ primarium *om.* V ‖ potentiae] cognitivae *add.* CN 9 natum est *inv.* CN ‖ sui praesentiam *inv.* CN ‖ illam] ipsam V 10 est] facere *add. sed al. man. del.* N 11 ipsam] illam potentiam C istam potentiam N et *add.* V ‖ illa] ista N V 12–13 praesupponit praesentiam *om.* CN ‖ praesupponit *om.* L 13 illorum] istorum N V 14 obiectum] oppositum C ‖ et hoc] quod CN 15 perfectione] imperfectione L ‖ illius] istius N 16 sua] sui C L 17 praesentiam] essentiam CN ‖ creaturarum *om.* V ‖ intelligibili *scr. sed in* totali *al. man. mut.* N ‖ hoc] licet *sed al. man. corr.* N 17–18 provenit] procedit V 19 divinae *om.* CN 19–20 creaturarum quidditates *inv.* CN V_2 20 posset] possit CN potuisset V ‖ eas] ipsas CN ‖ causare] creare LV ‖ et facere *om.* CN 22 facere] faceri *sed sup. lin. al. man. corr.* N 23 hoc] haec V ‖ quia quidquid] quidquid enim CN

C 126ra creato totum continetur eminentiori modo | in intellectu divino. Sed quod intellectus divinus ipsas non causet in esse intelligibili, hoc est ex perfectione essentiae divinae quae nata est facere praesentiam cuiuscumque obiecti secundarii in esse intelligibili sub propria ratione ipsius, quia ipsa est propria ratio cognoscendi unumquodque sub propria ratione sui, sicut quod
V 66rb intellectus agens angelicus non | faciat intelligibilia in potentia intelligibilia in actu sicut facit intellectus agens noster. Hoc non provenit ex defectu intellectus angelici, cum sit multo perfectior quam intellectus noster, sed hoc provenit quia secum habet concreatas species omnium rerum secundum aliquos. Similiter dico in proposito quod intellectus divinus non faciat quidditates creaturarum intelligibiles in potentia actu intelligibiles. Hoc non provenit ex imperfectione intellectus divini, quoniam ipse posset hoc facere, sed magis hoc provenit ex plenitudine perfectionis ipsius essentiae in qua unumquodque habet esse intelligibile obiective quantum natum est intelligi.

Secundo sciendum est circa hoc quod aliquid potest habere esse intelligibile ab alio dupliciter: vel effective vel consecutive. Effective sicut quidditates rerum materialium habent esse intelligibile effective ab intellectu agente in quantum intellectus agens causat eas effective in esse intelligibili

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1 totum] obiectum C obiectum *sed al. man. del. et exp.* N ‖ in *om.* V 2 non] creaturas V ‖ causet] causat CN ‖ in *sup. lin.* L ‖ hoc] haec V 4–5 quia … sicut *om.* V ‖ quia … sui *om.* CN ‖ propria] perfecta L 5 ratione] ipsius *add. sed del.* L ‖ quod] etiam propria ratione sui *add.* V 6 intellectus] causat *add. sed del.* N ‖ agens angelicus *inv.* V ‖ agens *om.* CN ‖ faciat] facit CN ‖ intelligibilia in *om.* CN 6–7 intelligibilia] intellecta L 7 actu] intelligibilia *sup. lin. al. man. add.* N ‖ facit *om.* CN ‖ agens noster *inv.* L ‖ Hoc] *om.* CN 8 perfectior] fortior V ‖ quam] sit *add.* V quod V_2 9 secum habet *inv.* CN ‖ concreatas species *inv.* CN 10 Similiter dico] consimiliter CN ‖ quod] sicut *add.* L ‖ faciat] facit V 11 quidditates] quidditatem rerum CN ‖ potentia *om.* CN ‖ intelligibiles *om.* CN 12 imperfectione] defectu CN ‖ quoniam] quin CN quasi V ‖ ipse] non *add.* V ‖ posset] possit CN L ‖ hoc *om.* V ‖ facere] forte *sed sup. lin. al. man. corr.* N 13 magis *om.* CN 14–15 intelligi *sup. lin. al. man.* N 16 est … hoc *om.* CN ‖ est *om.* L ‖ aliquid] aliquod V 17 ab alio] sub alio *sed del. et* de *sup. lin.* N ‖ ab] sub C ‖ consecutive] vero habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa specie causa *add.* (*homoeoceph.*) *sed al. man. del.* N ‖ Effective *om.* V 18 materialium] naturalium C ‖ esse *om.* N ‖ effective] effectu L

9–10 Cf. Bonaventura, *In Sent.* II d. 3 p. 2 a. 2 q. 1 (Opera omnia II, Quaracchi 1885, pp. 117–121); Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* Ia q. 55 a. 2 (ed. Leon. V, Roma 1889, p. 56); Richardus de Mediavilla, *In Sent.* II d. 3 a. 6 q. 2 (ed. Brescia 1591 II, pp. 63–64); Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodlibet* V q. 14 (ed. Paris 1518 I, f. 175^{v}G); Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* II d. 3 q. 3 (ed. Wadding-Vivès XXII, p. 594 n. 13); Idem, *Ordinatio* II d. 3 p. 2 q. 2 (ed. Vat. VII, pp. 555–556 n. 325).

secundum Philosophum et Commentatorem. Consecutive vero habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa specie causata ab intellectu agente, quia posita specie
N 13rb intelligibili ipsius lapidis in intellectu, consequitur naturaliter | esse intelligibile lapidis sicut obiectum correlativum illius speciei et hoc absque omni causatione effectiva, quia species lapidis non causat proprie et effective lapidem in esse intelligibili sed solum esse intelligibile consequitur ipsam speciem per modum cuiusdam correlationis necessariae.

Ad propositum dico quod quidditates creaturarum in illo priori in quo habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa essentia divina antequam sint actu intellectae non habent esse intelligibile ab ipsa essentia divina quasi ipsa essentia
L 86ra divina | causet eas effective in esse intelligibili, quia hoc est omnino fictitium et impossibile, cum ipsa essentia divina, ut est praevia intellectui, nullam habeat actionem ad extra; sed solum quidditates creaturarum habent esse intelligibile ab essentia divina consecutive, quia, posita essentia divina, ista necessario resultant in esse intelligibili sicut obiecta correlativa ipsius essentiae, non quidem ad quae ipsa essentia divina referatur sed magis e converso,quia ipsa referantur ad ipsam essentiam sicut posita specie lapi-
C 126rb dis, lapis | absque causatione media necessario resultat in esse intelligibili.

Haec de tertio articulo.

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1 Philosophum … Commentatorem] imaginem(imaginationem N) Philosophi et Commentatoris CN 2 intelligibile] intelligibili L 2–3 causata … intelligibili] intelligibili esse enim intelligibile speciei V 2 ab] ipso *add.* V_2 ‖ agente … posita] cognoscente posita enim CN 4 lapidis *om.* L ‖ obiectum] oppositum C *scr. sed in* ad *mut.* N ‖ illius] ipsius CN L ‖ et … absque] sine CN 5 quia species] species enim CN ‖ proprie … effective] effective proprie CN ‖ et *om.* L 5–6 lapidem … intelligibili] esse intelligibile lapidis V 6 intelligibile] lapidis *add.* CN ipsius lapidis *add.* V 8 creaturarum *om.* CN ‖ illo] isto N V 10 intelligibile] effective *add.* C (quia posita essentia ipsa *add. sed del.*) effective *add.* N ‖ ipsa *sup. lin.* V ‖ divina *om.* CN 10–11 essentia divina *om.* CN 11 causet eas] esset causa(*sup. lin.*) earum N ‖ causet] causat *sed al. man. corr.* L ‖ effective] effectivas C ‖ intelligibili] intelligibile *sed al. man. corr.* L ‖ hoc] haec V_2 11–14 hoc … quia *om.* (*hom.*) CN 11 omnino] esse V 12 cum] quia L 14–15 divina ista] ipsa CN 15 resultant] ut *add.* CN ‖ esse] essentia V_2 ‖ correlativa] corporea V_2 16 quidem *om.* CN ‖ divina *om.* CN 16–17 e … essentiam] quae ad ipsam referantur CN 17 quia] quod V_2 ‖ referantur] referuntur V 18 lapis *om.* L ‖ absque … necessario *om.* CN ‖ esse] specie CN 19–520.3 Haec … tale] contra hoc tamen arguitur sic CN 19 Haec] hoc L

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1 Cf. Aristoteles, *De Anima* III c. 5 (430*a*14–17); Averroes, *Comm. in De anima* III com. 18 (ed. Crawford, Cambridge, MA 1953, pp. 439–440).

⟨Articulus 4⟩

Quarto restat ponere motiva alterius opinionis et respondere ad ipsa, quorum primum est tale: illud quod de se non habet aliquod esse actu in quocumque esse ponatur, ponitur mediante aliquo actu causativo alicuius potentiae; sed creatura de se non habet aliquod esse actu, cum sit pure nihil; igitur si creatura habeat esse intelligibile, oportet quod constituatur in tali esse mediante aliquo actu productivo alicuius potentiae. Prima autem potentia in Deo simpliciter est intellectus; ergo si creatura habeat esse intelligibile, hoc habet necessario per actum intellectus; ergo creatura ante actum intellectus divini non habet esse intelligibile nisi in | potentia. V_2 33^{vb}

Secundo sic: quidquid habet prius esse intelligibile in Deo quam esse intellectum pertinet ad memoriam Patris; sed secundum beatum Augustinum XV *De Trinitate* 'Verbum divinum nascitur de omnibus quae sunt in memoria Patris'; si ergo creatura prius aliquo modo haberet esse intelligibile in memoria Patris quam esse intellectum in intelligentia, Verbum divinum de notitia creaturarum nasceretur, et ita esset verbum creaturae, et per consequens non esset necesse esse, quod est inconveniens.

Tertio sic: omnis actus praesupponens obiectum secundarium extrinsecum dependet ab ipso; sed notitia divina in nullo esse dependet a creatura; ergo creatura secundum nullum esse praesupponitur cognitioni divinae.

3 illud] id V_2 ‖ aliquod esse *inv.* L ‖ actu *om.* CN 4 ponatur] necessario *add.* CN ‖ causativo] creativo L 5 sed *om.* CN ‖ actu *om.* CN ‖ nihil] vel C vel *sed sup. lin. al. man. corr.* N 5–6 igitur] ergo CN V 6 si creatura *inv.* V_2 ‖ creatura *om.* CN 6–8 oportet … intelligibile *om.* (*hom.*) LVV_2 6 quod] sicut *add.* C 8 in Deo *mg. al. man.* N ‖ si] necessario habet *add. sed del. et exp.* N 9 habet necessario *inv.* CN V 9–10 ergo … intellectus *om.* (*hom.*) V 9 ergo] igitur L ‖ creatura *om.* CN 9–10 actum intellectus] illum actum CN 10 divini] *om.* CN cum *add.* V ‖ habet] ex se *add. sed del.* V 11 Secundo … quidquid] item (quod *sup. lin. add.* N) CN ‖ habet … Deo] prius in Deo habet esse intelligibile V ‖ prius esse *inv.* L 12 sed] Verbum divinum *add.* CN V_2 ‖ beatum *om.* CN L 13 De *om.* CN ‖ Trinitate] dicit quod *add.* V ‖ Verbum divinum *om.* CN V_2 14 memoria] essentia V ‖ ergo] igitur L ‖ creatura] creaturae CN V_2 ‖ aliquo … haberet] haberet aliquo modo V ‖ modo] habeat *add. sed del.* N *om.* L ‖ haberet] habeant CN haberent V_2 ‖ intelligibile *om.* C 15 Patris *om.* C ‖ esse … in] esset L ‖ in intelligentia *om.* V ‖ divinum] nascetur *add.* C nascitur *add.* N 16 nasceretur … ita] ergo CN ‖ creaturae] creaturarum CN 16–17 per consequens] ita CN 17 esset *om.* CN 18 Tertio sic] item CN 19 ab … dependet *om.* (*hom.*) V ‖ ipso] illo C isto N ‖ esse *om.* L 20 creatura *om.* CN ‖ esse] cognitum *add.* CN ‖ cognitioni divinae *om.* CN

12–14 Cf. Augustinus, *De Trinitate* XV c. 14 (CCSL La, Turnhout 1968, pp. 496–497): "Verbum nostrum … simile est in hoc aenigmate illi verbo dei quod etiam deus est quoniam sic et hoc de nostra nascitur quemadmodum et illud de scientia patris natum est."

Quarto sic: illud quod est formaliter necesse esse non praeexigit ante se aliquid quod ex se est possibile esse; sed Verbum divinum est ex se formaliter necesse esse, creatura autem secundum quodcumque esse est possibile esse; igitur Verbum divinum non praesupponit creaturam in aliquo esse; sed
N 13va si creaturae prius haberent | esse intelligibile in essentia quam esse intellectum in intelligentia, secundum illud esse praecederent Verbum; igitur etc.

Quinto sic: si creaturae prius naturaliter relucerent obiective in essentia divina quam in eius intelligentia, cuicumque Deus ostenderet essentiam suam eo ipso necessario ostenderet omnia quae relucerent in ea, et ita Deus non posset facere quod ego viderim essentiam et non viderem omnia quae relucerent in ea, quod est inconveniens.

Sexto sic: perfectior est intellectus divinus quam intellectus creatus; sed intellectus creatus, licet praesupponat obiectum primum, non tamen praesupponit obiectum secundarium, immo facit ipsum, quia facit intentiones secundas; ergo multo magis intellectus divinus potest facere obiecta secundaria; creaturae autem sunt obiecta secundaria; ergo etc.

C 126va Septimo et ultimo sic: si creaturae | haberent prius esse intelligibile in essentia divina quam in eius intelligentia, quaero de illo esse intelligibili: aut est esse reale aut est esse rationis, cum non sit dare medium V et VI *Metaphysicae*. Non potest dici quod sit esse reale, quia tale esse necessario excluderet

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1 Quarto … illud] item CN 2 aliquid *om.* LV ‖ ex se[1] *post* 1 formaliter V ‖ esse *om.* V ‖ sed *om.* CN 3 creatura] creaturam V_2 ‖ est] *om.* L solum *add.* V 4 esse *om.* N ‖ igitur] ergo CNV 4–6 sed … etc *om.* V 5–6 prius … intelligentia] secundum aliquod esse praesupponeretur notitiae L 5 in essentia *om.* V_2 5–6 esse … intelligentia] intelligentia creaturae V_2 6 praecederent] praecederet CN L ‖ igitur etc *om.* CN ‖ igitur] ergo L 7 Quinto sic] item CN ‖ sic] quia *add.* LV_2 ‖ creaturae *om.* CN *post* relucerent V_2 ‖ prius *om.* L ‖ relucerent] relucent CN ‖ obiective] prius L *om.* V_2 8 divina] obiective *add.* LV_2 9 necessario ostenderet *inv.* L ‖ ostenderet] sibi *add.* CN ‖ relucerent] relucent CN V_2 ‖ ea] essentia LV_2 9–11 et … ea *om.* (*hom.*) V 10 posset] possit habere C possit N ‖ ego viderim] aliquis videret CN ‖ viderim] divinam *add.* V_2 ‖ viderem] videret CN 11 relucerent] relucent CN ‖ quod … inconveniens *om.* CN 12 Sexto sic] item CN ‖ sic] quia *add.* LV_2 ‖ intellectus *om.* CN ‖ sed] et V 13–14 praesupponit obiectum *om.* CN 14 obiectum] ipsum L ‖ immo … facit] sed illa facit puta CN 15 obiecta] oportet *sed al. man. corr.* N omnia V_2 15–16 secundaria] sed *add.* CN 16 autem sunt] aut sint V ‖ autem *om.* CN ‖ ergo etc *om.* CN ‖ ergo] igitur L *om.* V 17 Septimo … sic] item CN ‖ creaturae *om.* CN ‖ haberent prius *inv.* CN 18 quam] esse intellectum *add.* CN ‖ illo] isto NV 19 esse *om.* CN ‖ est esse] purae CN ‖ dare *om.* CN 19–20 et … Metaphysicae] Metaphysicae et 6 CN 20 potest … esse *om.* CN ‖ tale … excluderet] illud extenderet C illud extendit se ad(*sup. lin.*) N ‖ tale] est *add.* L

19–20 Cf. ANONYMUS, *Auctoritates Aristotelis* 1.155 (ed. HAMESSE, Louvain 1974, p. 128); ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica* V c. 7 (1017*a*8–1017*b*9); VI c. 2 (1026*a*33-*b*2).

creationem; nec potest dici quod sit ens rationis, quia omne ens rationis vel est ens rationis quia factum a ratione vel est ens rationis quia non habet esse obiective nisi in ratione; sed istud esse intelligibile quod habet creatura antequam sit actu intellecta non potest dici quod sit factum per rationem, quia tunc non praecederet actum rationis, nec etiam habet esse primo obiective in ratione, quia per istam prius habet esse in essentia quam in intelligentia; ergo nullo modo est ens rationis, et per consequens nihil.

Sustinendo primam viam, licet secunda via sit valde probabilis, respondeo ad ista septem argumenta.

L 86^{rb} Ad | primum, quod est idem cum primo argumento ad principale, respondeo simul: quando dicitur quod 'illud quod de se non habet aliquod esse in quocumque esse ponatur, necessario ponitur per actum secundum alicuius potentiae', dico quod licet ista maior sit multis apparens, tamen non est usquequaque vera, quia, sicut dictum est in tertio articulo, adhuc potest habere esse ab alio non solum effective sed consecutive, ita quod illo posito in esse suo, hoc consequenter subsequitur in esse sibi debito absque omni causatione media. Sic est in proposito, quia posita essentia divina, quae est propria ratio cognoscendi unumquodque distincte, omnia resultant in esse intelligibili sicut obiecta correlativa ipsius essentiae absque omni alia causatione.

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1 potest … ens *om.* CN ‖ ens] esse CN ‖ vel *om.* CN 2 ens … quia *om.* CN ‖ quia *om.* L ‖ est … rationis *om.* CN ‖ est *om.* V 3–4 sed … quia] istud enim intelligibile non esset suum a ratione C illud enim esse(*sup. lin. al. man.*) intelligibile non esset secum(*?*) a ratione N 3 istud] illud L ‖ habet] a *add.* L 5 tunc] enim *add.* CN ‖ etiam] prius CN ‖ primo *om.* CN 6 in ratione] memoriae C in(*sup. lin.*) memoria N ‖ prius habet] habet prius obiective L ‖ prius] rationem primo CN ‖ habet] essentia(*sup. lin. al. man.*) *add.* N haberet V ‖ in] memoria *add.* C ‖ essentia] memoria (essentia *add. sed al. man. del.*) N ‖ in intelligentia] intellectiva L ‖ intelligentia] intellectu CN 7 ergo] igitur V_2 ‖ ens] esse CN ‖ et … consequens] ergo est CN ‖ nihil *om.* V 8–9 Sustinendo … argumenta *om.* CN 8 via *om.* V 9 ista] illa L 10–11 quod … respondeo] istorum et primum principale CN 10 idem] primum V ‖ primo argumento *inv.* V 11 quando] cum CN ‖ quod *om.* LV_2 12 ponitur] ponatur CN 13 licet *om.* CN L ‖ ista] illa L ‖ sit … tamen *om.* CN ‖ multis] multum L ‖ tamen non *inv.* L 14 est *om.* LV_2 ‖ quia … adhuc] aliquid enim CN ‖ adhuc] quod aliquid V 15 esse] intelligibile *add.* V ‖ alio] de *add.* V ‖ sed] etiam *add.* CN solum *add.* V ‖ illo] isto V 16 subsequitur] ponitur C ponatur N ‖ sibi … absque] debito hic sine C debito hac(*sed del. et exp. et* illi *sup. lin. al. man.*) sine N 17 causatione] debita *add. sed del.* V_2 17–20 quia … causatione] in esse suo C in esse suo *scr. sed del.* N 18 in *sup. lin.* L 19 obiecta] obiectiva L opposita V 19–20 causatione] creatione L

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10 Cf. supra p. 510 lin. 5–14. 14 Cf. supra p. 518 lin. 17–p. 519 lin. 7.

Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod 'Verbum divinum nascitur de omnibus quae sunt in memoria Patris,' dicendum quod aliqui non habent pro inconvenienti illud quod sequitur, quod Verbum divinum nascatur de notitia creaturarum. Sed quia alias ostendi oppositum, ideo dico aliter quod 'Verbum nascitur de omnibus quae sunt in Patris memoria', hoc est nascitur de notitia essentiae quae est ratio cognoscendi omnia quae sunt in memoria Patris. Et quod illud argumentum ita concludit contra eos sicut contra me ostendo, quia certum est quod paternitas prius habet esse intelligibile in Deo quam
V_2 34ra intelligatur, quia paternitas in | divinis non constituitur in esse | intelligi-
N 13^{vb} bili per actum intellectus divini, et tamen Verbum non nascitur de notitia paternitatis secundum eos, ergo multo magis non sequitur 'creatura prius habet esse intelligibile quam intelligatur, ergo Verbum nascitur de notitia creaturae', quia Verbum in divinis non nascitur de se nisi de notitia primi obiecti.

1 cum … quod] autem CN ‖ divinum *om.* CN 2 quae … Patris] etc. CN ‖ dicendum] dico CN 2–3 inconvenienti *scr. sed del. et al. man. rescr.* N 3 illud] id V_2 ‖ sequitur] scilicet *add.* CN ‖ nascatur] nascitur N L 4 Sed … ideo *om.* CN ‖ dico] tamen *add.* CN ‖ Verbum] divinum *add.* L 5 in] notitia *add. sed del.* V_2 ‖ Patris memoria *inv.* CN ‖ hoc] haec V 5–7 hoc … quod *om.* CN 7 illud] istud etiam CN ‖ ita *om.* CN L ‖ concludit] *iter.* N concludat V_2 ‖ eos] vos V 7–8 ostendo quia *om.* CN 8 quia] quod V ‖ est] enim *add.* CN 9 intelligatur] intelligibile intellectu C intellectum (actualiter *sup. lin. al. man. add.*) ab intellectu N 11 paternitatis] Patris CN ‖ prius *om.* CN 12 quam] priusquam CN 13 in divinis] divinum CN ‖ non] numquam V ‖ de] per CN V_2

2–4 Cf. Alexander de Alexandria, *Quodlibet* q. 7 a. 2 (London, British Library, Ms. Add. 14077, f. 158$^{va–b}$): "Secundo probandum est quod intellectio etiam creaturarum praecedit in Patre productionem Verbi … Sexta ratio sic formari: actioni agentis non solum praeintelligitur ratio agendi sed etiam illud quod ad eam necessarie sequitur; ad cognitionem autem divinae essentiae sequitur cognitio creaturae, et ideo productio Verbi non solum praesupponit cognitionem divinae essentiae et essentiam divinam in Patre sed etiam praesupponit cognitionem creaturarum in Patre." 4 Iacobus de Aesculo, *Quodlibet* q. 2 a. 3 (ed. Yokoyama, p. 69). Cf. Idem, *Quaestiones ordinariae* q. 1 a. 3 (V_2 f. 26^{v}–27^{r}): "Respondeo ergo aliter ad quaestionem et dico duo conclusiones breves. Prima est affirmativa, et est quod Pater ut praesupponitur Verbo habet notitiam actualem omnium eorum quae sunt formaliter in Patre. Secunda conclusio est negativa, et est quod Pater ut praesupponitur non habet notitiam actualem alicuius eorum quae sunt formaliter in Filio et Spiritu Sancto ut sunt in ipsis … Item pro ista conclusione [prima] videtur esse beatus Augustinus XV *De Trinitate* ubi dicit quod 'Verbum nascitur de omnibus quae sunt in Patre', supple 'formaliter.'"

Ad tertium, cum dicitur quod 'actus praesupponens obiectum secunda-
V 66va rium extrinsecum dependet ab ipso', dico quod verum est, et illud | quod
C 126vb praesupponitur | ipsi notitiae in ratione alicuius causae ita quod intellectus accipiat notitiam ab ipso aliter non. In proposito autem licet creatura prius habeat esse intelligibile quam intelligatur, non tamen creatura est causa suae notitiae nec etiam ratio cognoscendi se ipsam apud intellectum, sed essentia divina sola est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia alia. Aliter posset dici iuxta ea quae dicta sunt superius quod quia intellectus divinus praesupponit creaturam in esse intelligibili, hoc non est ex imperfectione sui quin ipse posset facere sed hoc est ex plenitudine perfectionis essentiae.

Ad quartum, cum dicitur quod 'si creaturae haberent prius esse intelligibile quam actu intelligantur, secundum illud esse praecederent Verbum', dico quod non sequitur, quia licet creatura prius reluceat in essentia divina obiective quam in eius intelligentia, non tamen relucet obiective in essentia divina nisi ut habet esse in tribus suppositis. Et ratio est quia licet creatura resultet necessario in esse intelligibili, posita essentia divina, non tamen resultat simul in eodem signo naturae cum ipsa essentia divina, quia obiectum simpliciter necessarium, cuiusmodi est creatura, est posterius natura in omni esse suo obiecto primario, quod est essentia divina. Verbum autem divinum est simul natura cum ipsa essentia et ideo quantumcumque secun-

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1–2 obiectum secundarium] suppositum CN 1 obiectum] necessariam *add. sed del.* V_2 2 ab ipso] etc. CN ‖ et … quod] quando CN ‖ et] quod L 3 ipsi … causae] in ratione alicuius causae notitiae CN ‖ quod] iste *add.* CN 4 accipiat] habeat CN 5 creatura *om.* CN 6 etiam *om.* CN 6–7 ipsam … se *om.* (*hom.*) V_2 7 essentia … sola] tota essentia divina CN ‖ divina sola *inv.* L ‖ posset dici *om.* CN 8 ea … quia] praedicta dico quod(*sup. lin. al. man. iter.* N) CN ‖ dicta … superius] superius dicta fuit V ‖ quod quia *inv.* L ‖ divinus *om.* CN 8–9 praesupponit] praesupponat CN L 9 creaturam *scr. sed in* istam *al. man. mut.* N ‖ hoc *om.* CN ‖ imperfectione] perfectione V_2 ‖ quin] quoniam N L 10 posset] possit CN ‖ facere] ista in illo esse *add.* CN ‖ ex] perfectione *add. sed exp.* V 11–12 quartum … intelligantur] aliud quod tunc CN 11 prius esse *inv.* L 12 praecederent] praecedere C 13 quod] hoc *add.* CN ‖ quia] quod L ‖ creatura] creaturae CN ‖ prius reluceat] reluceat prius obiective L ‖ reluceat] reluceant CN 14 obiective *om.* L ‖ non tamen *inv.* CN ‖ relucet] relucent CN 14–15 essentia divina *inv.* CN 15 habet] habent CN ‖ Et] cuius CN ‖ creatura] omnia C 16 resultet] *om.* C relucet N reluceat V ‖ necessario *sup. lin. al. man.* N ‖ intelligibili] in essentia divina *add.* V ‖ posita] in *add.* V_2 17 resultat] relucet V ‖ cum ipsa *iter.* C 17–18 obiectum] oppositum C 18 simpliciter necessarium] secundarium simpliciter L ‖ simpliciter] non *mg. add.* V ‖ necessarium cuiusmodi] secundarium cuius C ‖ necessarium] secundarium N 19 obiecto … quod] primario obiecto cuiusmodi V ‖ divina *om.* LV_2 20 divinum] esse *add. sed exp.* L ‖ quantumcumque] quodcumque L

8 Cf. supra p. 517 lin. 19–p. 518 lin. 7.

dum esse intelligibile praesupponatur suae notitiae, non tamen ex hoc praesupponitur Verbo nisi secundum illud esse esset causa Verbi, quod tamen non est verum.

Ad quintum, cum dicitur quod 'si creaturae naturaliter relucerent in essentia divina, Deus non posset alicui ostendere essentiam nisi ostenderet sibi omnia quae relucerent in ipsa', dico quod Deus ostendendo alicui essentiam suam non ostendendo aliquod obiectum extinsecum, hoc non est ex parte essentiae in quantum habet rationem obiecti sed hoc est ex parte voluntatis divinae quae influit ad cognitionem unius non influendo ad cognitionem alterius, sicut si speculum posset libere movere visum, tunc posset movere ad visionem sui absque hoc quod moveret ad visionem ali-
C 127ra cuius eorum quae naturaliter relucerent in ipso; sic est in | proposito.

N 14ra Ad sextum, cum dicitur quod 'perfectior | est intellectus divinus quam intellectus creatus', concedo. Ad minorem, cum dicitur quod 'intellectus
L 86va creatus facit obiecta creata, ergo multo magis intellectus | divinus', dico quod licet intellectus divinus non faciat, hoc non est ex defectu sui quin posset facere sed hoc est ex perfectione essentiae, ut prius dictum est. Et praeterea intellectus noster possibilis non causat nisi relationes rationis, et istas etiam causat intellectus divinus multo perfectius quam intellectus noster; sed illud esse intelligibile creaturae quod praesupponitur suae notitiae non est relatio rationis, et ideo non est ad propositum.

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1 esse] *om.* L creatura *add.* V ‖ intelligibile] creatura *add.* V ‖ praesupponatur] praesupponitur CN 2 illud esse] hoc CN ‖ esse *om.* L ‖ tamen *om.* CN V_2 3 est] verbum *add.* C 4–6 cum … ipsa] quod tunc non possit Deus alicui ostendere essentiam etc. CN 5 alicui ostendere *inv.* V ‖ essentiam] divinam *add.* V 6 relucerent] relucent V_2 ‖ quod *sup. lin. al. man. iter.* N ‖ ostendendo alicui] alicui ostendat CN ‖ ostendendo] ostendat L 7 non *sup. lin.* L ‖ obiectum] oppositum C 8 habet] habent V ‖ obiecti] in Deo V ‖ sed] ideoque V_2 ‖ hoc est] in quantum C in quantum *sed del.* N ‖ hoc] haec V 9 quae influit] influentis CN ‖ influit ad] fluit in V ‖ influendo *om.* CN 10 ad] in LV ‖ sicut *iter.* C ‖ posset] possit CN 11 absque] sine CN 12 naturaliter relucerent] relucent naturaliter CN ‖ naturaliter *om.* L ‖ relucerent] relucerent L relucent V_2 ‖ est *om.* CN 13 cum dicitur] concedo CN 14 intellectus … concedo] humanus et CN 14–15 cum … divinus *om.* CN 15 ergo *om.* LV ‖ quod *iter.* N *om.* L 16 licet *om.* CN ‖ intellectus divinus *inv.* CN ‖ faciat] obiectum *add.* V ‖ hoc] haec V ‖ sui] *om.* L suo V ‖ posset] possit CN 17 facere] forte *sed al. man. corr.* N ‖ hoc est *om.* N ‖ hoc] haec V_2 ‖ hoc est *om.* C ‖ perfectione] parte L ‖ Et *om.* CN L ‖ praeterea] propterea C propterea *sed del.* N 18 noster *om. sed* enim noster *sup. lin. al. man. suppl.* N ‖ relationes *mg. al. man. rescr.* N ‖ istas] illas L 20 esse] est L ‖ suae notitiae *inv.* L 21 et … propositum *om.* CN

17 Cf. supra p. 517 lin. 16–p. 518 lin. 7.

Ad ultimum, quando dicitur 'de illo esse intelligibili: aut est ens reale aut rationis', dico quod 'esse intelligibile' dicit unum formaliter et aliud fundamentaliter. Formaliter dicit quandam relationem rationis potentialem, sicut 'esse cognitum' formaliter dicit quandam relationem rationis actualem. Fundamentaliter vero dicit aliquid absolutum quod natum est esse terminus intellectionis super quod fundatur illa relatio rationis potentialis. Quando ergo quaeritur an illud esse est reale aut rationis, dico quod illud esse intelligibile, quantum ad id quod importat formaliter, est esse rationis, quia formaliter esse intelligibile non dicit nisi quandam relationem rationis potentialem, et ista relatio potentialis non praesupponitur notitiae actuali creaturae sed consequitur eam sicut aliquid constitutum per eam. Esse autem intelligibile creaturae quantum ad id quod importat fundamentaliter et materialiter, prout dicit aliquid absolutum praevium intellectioni quod natum est terminare ipsam intellectionem, non est esse rationis, quia ut sic praesupponitur actui rationis. Ergo dices tu 'est esse reale', dico quod proprie non est esse reale sed magis intentionale, nisi velis vocare 'esse reale' omne esse quod non est factum per intellectum; sed tale esse reale, cum non sit aliquid nisi
V_2 34^{rb} pure | obiective, in nullo excludit creationem.

1–2 quando … rationis *om.* CN 1 illo] isto V ‖ aut] ens *add.* L 2 quod] illud *add.* CN ‖ esse] omne V_2 ‖ intelligibile] duo *add.* CN V_2 2–3 fundamentaliter] fundamentum L 3 dicit] addit(*?*) N ‖ potentialem *om.* L 4 formaliter dicit *om.* CN ‖ formaliter] supernaturaliter V ‖ quandam] quemdam V 4–5 Fundamentaliter] fundamentum L 5 aliquid] aliquod CN 6 illa] ista N V 6–8 potentialis … intelligibile *om.* CN 6 potentialis] formalis V 7 ergo] igitur L ‖ an illud] aut id V_2 8 quantum] ergo *add.* CN ‖ id] illud CN ‖ quod] esse *add.* C illud esse *add.* N 9 quandam] rationem *add. sed del.* N ‖ relationem] respectum V 9–10 potentialem] potentialis *sed corr.* L 10 ista] ita L ‖ relatio] rationis *add.* CN ‖ notitiae *om.* V 11 eam] ipsam C V_2 ipsum N ‖ eam] ipsam C ipsum N ‖ Esse] extra V_2 12 id] illud CN 13 prout … aliquid] potest dici aliquod V ‖ prout] *scr. sed del. et exp.* N si *add.* V_2 ‖ dicit] mihi *add.* V_2 ‖ intellectioni] intellectui CN 14 ipsam *om.* CN ‖ intellectionem] et illud *sup. lin. al. man. add.* N 15 dices] ut sic dicit C ut sic dicis N dicis L ‖ tu *sup. lin.* N ‖ esse reale] creatura(*mg. al. man.*) in esse reali N 16 reale] cum non sit aliquid nisi pure obiective in nullo excludit creationem *add.* (*homoeoceph.*) *sed del.* N ‖ intentionale] intelligibile CN ‖ velis *sup. lin.* N ‖ vocare] ex(*?*) *add.* N ‖ esse … esse] omne esse reale L ‖ reale *om.* V_2 ‖ esse *om.* V_2 ‖ quod *om.* CN 17 est *om.* CN ‖ factum] nisi *add.* L ‖ intellectum] et isto(illo N) modo est esse reale *add.* CN et tunc concedo isto modo quod est esse reale quia illud esse non est perfectum per intellectum *add.* L ‖ sit] fit N 18 obiective *sup. lin. al. man. rescr.* N ‖ excludit] creaturam *add. sed exp.* L

⟨Ad argumenta⟩

Ex dictis patet responsio ad argumenta principalia quae fuerunt dicta in disputatione. Quaedam autem fuerunt contra dicta respondentis, et illa non repetam, et quaedam contra me, et ad illa respondeo. Unum erat istud: quod ponitur in definitione alicuius est prius eo; actus ponitur in definitione habitus II *Ethicorum* et IX *Metaphysicae*; ergo notitia actualis est prior notitia habituali, quod est contra dicta.

Secundo ad idem sic: illud quod est absolutius est prius relato; sed actus est absolutior habitu, quia ponitur in eius definitione; ergo etc.

Respondeo: dico quod illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius intrinsece et essentialiter est prius eo, sicut animal est prius homine; sed illud quod ponitur in definitione alicuius extrinsece per additionem, non oportet quod sit prius illo origine, quia forma ponitur in definitione materiae et compositum ponitur in definitione utriusque, et tamen forma non est prior
C 127^{rb} materia nec compositum | prius utroque. Similiter illud quod est absolutius non oportet quod sit prius origine licet sit prius perfectione, quia finis est absolutior his quae sunt ad finem, et tamen finis non est prior generatione his quae sunt ad finem sed magis e converso.

2–4 Ex … istud] contra ista CN 2 principalia] argumenta *add.* V_2 ‖ quae] quae V 3 Quaedam … respondentis] contra respondentem V ‖ autem *om.* V_2 ‖ illa] ista V 4 et *sup. lin.* V ‖ ad illa] ista V ‖ istud] illud L ‖ quod] adhuc arguitur dupliciter *sup. lin. al. man. praem.* N 5–6 habitus] secundum Philosophum *add.* V 6–7 notitia … dicta] etc. CN 8 Secundo … illud] item CN ‖ ad *om.* V ‖ sic *om.* L ‖ illud] id V_2 ‖ relato] relativo CN ‖ sed *om.* CN ‖ actus *mg.* V 10 Respondeo] ad primum CN ad ista ad primum cum dicitur quod illud quod ponitur in definitione *add.* V ‖ quod … definitione *iter.* (*homoeoceph.*) *sed del.* N 11 et … eo *om.* CN ‖ prius] prior L ‖ animal] in definitione hominis *add.* CN ‖ homine] eo CN ‖ illud *om.* CN 12 extrinsece] *om.* CN et *add.* V ‖ additionem] alicuius *add. sed del.* N 13 quod sit] esse CN ‖ illo] isto N eo L ‖ origine] ordine CN ‖ quia forma] forma enim CN ‖ definitione] alicuius per additionem *add.* (*homoeoceph.*) *sed del.* N 14 ponitur *om.* CN V ‖ et … forma] forma tamen CN 15 prius *om.* CN ‖ utroque] utriusque L ‖ Similiter] nec V sic V_2 ‖ illud … absolutius *om.* CN ‖ absolutius] similiter *add.* V 16 quod sit] absolutius esse CN ‖ origine] ordine N 16–17 quia … absolutior] patet de fine et C (ut *sup. lin. add.*) patet de fine et N 16 finis] non *mg. add.* V 17–18 et … converso *om.* CN ‖ et … finem *om.* (*hom.*) V 18 converso] Expliciunt quaestiones disputatae a fratre Jacobo de esculo ordinis fratrum minorum cum suo quolibet magistri sacrae theologiae *add.* V

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6 Cf. Anonymus, *Auctoritates Aristotelis* 12.26 (ed. Hamesse, p. 234); Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.* II c. 1 (1103*b*21–22); *Metaph.* IX c. 5 (1047*b*31–34).

PART 5

Meister Eckhart's Legacy

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CHAPTER 17

More Than One Eckhart? The Parisian Eckhart and the 'Opus tripartitum'—The Need for a More Homogeneous Picture of His Thought

Jan A. Aertsen †

1 The Parisian Eckhart: "Deus est intelligere" (Not: "esse"), "Being" is the "ratio creabilitatis"

A major event in the domain of Eckhart studies was the (re)discovery of a set of three questions in 1927, which date from Eckhart's first professorship in Paris during the academic year 1302–1303. They reveal a "Scholastic" and hitherto unknown, "other" picture of the Meister. Typical of the Parisian Eckhart is his provocative claim in the first Question, "Whether in God being [*esse*] and understanding [*intelligere*] are the same?", that God is understanding and not being.[1] The *Quaestio parisiensis* I has undoubtedly been the most discussed text of Eckhart in the last decades.[2]

1 Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Quaestio parisiensis* I: "Utrum in Deo sit idem esse et intelligere?" (in: *Die lateinischen Werke* [= LW], edited on behalf of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Stuttgart 1936–, Band V, pp. 37–48). Engl. transl.: A.A. Maurer, *Master Eckhart, Parisian Questions and Prologues. Translated with an Introduction and Notes*, Toronto 1974.

2 Cf. M. Grabmann, *Neuaufgefundene Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts und ihre Stellung in seinem geistigen Entwicklungsgang. Untersuchungen und Texte* (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften XXXII, 7), München 1927 (repr. in: M. Grabmann, *Gesammelte Akademieabhandlungen*, Paderborn 1979, pp. 261–381); R. Imbach, *Deus est intelligere. Das Verhälnis von Sein und Denken in seiner Bedeutung für das Gottesverständnis bei Thomas von Aquin und in den Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts*, Freiburg (Schw.) 1976; B. Mojsisch, *Meister Eckhart: Analogie, Univozität und Einheit*, Hamburg 1983, pp. 21–23, 30–41; E. Zum Brunn, "Les premières 'Questions Parisiennes' de Maître Eckhart", in: K. Flasch (Hrsg.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart*, Hamburg 1984, pp. 128–137; W. Schüßler, "Gott: Sein oder Denken? Zur Problematik der Bestimmung göttlicher Wirklichkeit in den *Quaestiones parisienses* Meister Eckharts von 1302/03", in: L. Honnefelder und W. Schüßler (Hrsg.), *Transzendenz. Zu einem Grundwort der klassischen Metaphysik*, Paderborn—München 1992, pp. 163–181; S. Grotz, "Meister Eckharts Pariser Quaestio I: Sein oder Nichtsein ist das hier die Frage?", in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 49 (2002), pp. 370–398.

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1. The introductory part of this Question (nn. 1–4) presents three different positions concerning the order of *esse* and *intelligere* in God. The first one is that of Aquinas, the second refers to a view of Eckhart he had expounded "elsewhere". Crucial, however, is the third position, which begins with a programmatic statement that reverses the order between *esse* and *intelligere* suggested in the previous arguments:

> Third, I show that it no longer [*non ... modo*] seems to me that God understands because he is, but rather that he is because he understands so that God is intellect and understanding, and understanding is the ground [*fundamentum*] of being itself.[3]

In support of this claim of the primacy of the intellect Eckhart quotes the opening words of the Gospel of John: "Therefore it is said in John 1:1: 'In the beginning was the Word [*In principio erat Verbum*], and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'. [...] The Word, however, is completely related to the intellect". With an irony unusual in a Scholastic *quaestio* the Meister remarks: "The Evangelist did not say: 'In the beginning was being [*ens*], and God was being'".[4] Eckhart's appeal to a biblical authority is, of course, selective, for one could object that, in the famous text in Exodus 3:14, it is God who reveals himself as "He who is". Obviously, it is not the biblical authority itself that is decisive, but its selection is determined by a metaphysical option. It is interesting to note, however, that, as we shall see, Eckhart refers twice to this basic text of the medieval onto-theology later in the Question. He now reinforces the primacy of the metaphysics of the Word by adding two other authorities: John 14:6: "I am the truth" and Augustine's comments on this text in *De trinitate* (VIII, 2); and "'truth' pertains to the intellect, just as 'word'".[5]

The introductory part of the *quaestio* is completed by another identification, namely that of the concept of *esse* with what is created: "being" means

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3 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 4 (LW V, p. 40): "Tertio ostendo quod non ita videtur mihi modo, ut quia sit, ideo intelligat, sed quia intelligit, ideo est, ita quod deus est intellectus et intelligere et est ipsum intelligere fundamentum ipsius esse".

4 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 4 (LW V, p. 40): "Quia dicitur Ioh. 1: 'in principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud deum, et deus erat verbum'. Non autem dixit evangelista: 'in principio erat ens et deus erat ens'. Verbum autem se toto est ad intellectum".

5 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 4 (LW V, pp. 40–41): "Item dicit salvator Ioh. 14: 'ego sum veritas'. Veritas autem ad intellectum pertinet [...]. Quod verbum tractat Augustinus VIII *De trinitate* c. 2. Unde patet veritatem ad intellectum pertinere sicut et verbum".

"to be caused". Eckhart again advances authorities for this identity and first refers to another text in the prologue of the Gospel of John (1:3): "All things were made through him" (*Omnia per ipsum facta sunt*)—a text which should be read according to the Meister as "All things made are through him" "so that being itself [*ipsum esse*] comes to what is made afterward". He observes that, in accordance with this, the fourth proposition of the *Liber de causis* says: "the first of created things is being" (*prima rerum creatarum est esse*). As soon as we come to being, we come to a creature; "being" primarily has the *ratio* of "creatable" (*creabilis*). "Wisdom", on the contrary, which is related to the intellect, does not have the character of "creatable". Therefore, Eckhart concludes the introductory part, God, who is the creator and not creatable, is intellect and intellection, and not *ens* or *esse*.[6]

The divine character of *intelligere* as "uncreatable" is repeated in the third Parisian Question. This *quaestio* actually is not a question disputed by Meister Eckhart but by his Franciscan colleague Gonsalvo of Spain, who was *magister regens* at the University of Paris in the same year as Eckhart. Yet, Eckhart's name is connected with this Question insofar as it contains a summary of his eleven arguments (*rationes Equardi*) "to show that the intellect, its act and habit are more excellent than the will, its act and habit".[7] The sixth *ratio* for the pre-eminence of the intellect claims that "understanding is, as such, uncreatable [*increabile*]", to which it is added that this is "why a box in the mind is not creatable".[8] The addition is meant to illustrate another aspect of the opposition between *esse* and *intelligere*: what has been made or created is an extramental reality in contrast to the interiority of what is in the mind.

II. In the continuation of the *quaestio*, Eckhart's focus is not, as one would expect on the basis of the initial phrasing of the question, the relation between *intelligere* and *esse* in God, but their opposition. His attention is largely devoted

6 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 4 (LW V, p. 41): "Et sequitur post verbum assumptum Ioh. 1: 'omnia per ipsum facta sunt', ut sic legatur: 'omnia per ipsum facta, sunt', ut ipsis factis ipsum esse post conveniat. Unde dicit auctor De causis: 'prima rerum creatarum est esse'. Unde statim cum venimus ad esse, venimus ad creaturam. Esse ergo habet primo rationem creabilis […]. Sapientia autem, quae pertinent ad intellectum, non habet rationem creabilis. […]. Et ideo deus, qui est creator et non creabilis, est intellectus et intelligere et non ens vel esse".

7 Cf. Gonsalvus Hispanus, *Quaestiones Disputatae* (*secundum aliam reportationem*, q. 5), (ed. L. Amorós), *Quaestiones Disputatae et de Quodlibet*, Quaracchi 1935, pp. 378–385. The *rationes Equardi* are found in *Quaestio parisiensis* III, nn. 6–20 (LW V, pp. 59–64).

8 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* III, n. 11 (LW V, p. 60).

to the claim that God is "beinglessness": he first makes some observations on the presuppositions of this claim (nn. 5–8) and then offers arguments in support of the provocative thesis that "in God there is no being" (nn. 8–11). The general observations intend to clarify the assumption that intellection itself and what pertains to the intellect are higher and of a different order (*condicio*) than being (*esse*) itself.[9]

The first consideration is based on the common adage "The work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance" (*opus naturae est opus intelligentiae*).[10] The adage is meant to explain the finality in nature, even in things that have no knowledge of an end. Their movement has to be traced back (*reducitur*) to an intellect, by which they are directed to their end. Eckhart argues that the reductive analysis (*resolutio*) of what is imperfect to what is perfect thus stops (*stat*) in an intellect or intelligence as that which is the highest and most perfect. Therefore, *intelligere* is higher than *esse*.[11] One could wonder whether Eckhart's argument is conclusive: it demonstrates the hierarchical order between "intellect" and "nature", but not the superiority of *intelligere* over *esse*. That may be the reason that he connects his consideration with the Neoplatonic doctrine of the triad of perfections "being" (*esse*), "living" (*vivere*) and "understanding" (*intelligere*), whose order has been discussed by (pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite in his work *On the divine names* (c. 5, § 3).

Eckhart observes that, according to "some" (*aliqui*)—the anonymi referred to include Aquinas—, the order between the three perfections can be viewed in two ways. Taken "in themselves" (*secundum se*), "being" (*esse*) is first and more perfect than "living" and "understanding", since "being" comprehends every mode of being, and "living" as well as "understanding" are perfections of being. If, however, these perfections are regarded "in relation to the subject that participates in them", "understanding" (*intelligere*) is first and more perfect than "being", because a thing that participates in "being" does not necessarily participate in it according to every mode of being.[12] Eckhart rejects this view: "I believe

9 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 5 (LW V, p. 42): "Et ad ostendendum hoc assumo primo quod intelligere est altius quam esse et est alterius condicionis".

10 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Metaph.* IV, tract. 3, c. 1, (ed. B. Geyer), Opera omnia XVI/1, Münster 1960, p. 186; Thomas de Aquino, *De veritate*, q. 3, a. 1; *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 24.

11 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 5 (LW V, p. 42): "Dicimus enim omnes quod opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. Et ideo habentia intellectum sunt perfectiora non habentibus, [...] ita quod in intellectu et intelligente stat resolutio sicut in summo et perfectissimo. Et ideo intelligere est altius quam esse".

12 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 6 (LW V, pp. 42–43): "Dicunt tamen aliqui quod esse, vivere et intelligere dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo secundum se, et sic prius est esse,

the complete opposite", for "In the beginning was the Word". In the metaphysics of the Word, *intelligere* has the first place (*primum gradum*) among the perfections and precedes *esse*.[13]

III. Eckhart's second consideration is of special importance in view of the metaphysics of the transcendentals, since it introduces a heterogeneity of the terms "good" and "being" on the one hand, and the "true" on the other. The *ratio* of the "good" or the final cause is not found in mathematical objects, an idea derived from the third book of the *Metaphysics* (III, 2, 996a18–29), the book of the *aporiae*. One of the problems Aristotle examines is whether the consideration of all four kinds of causes belongs to one science or to more sciences. He observes that in many things not all kinds of causes are found. It is impossible, for instance, that the nature of the good and of finality are in things that do not possess motion. For that reason, Aristotle concludes, nothing is demonstrated in mathematics on the basis of the final cause.

Medieval authors attach considerable importance to Aristotle's assertion that, in contrast to natural objects, there is no goodness in mathematicals. Thomas Aquinas in his works uses Aristotle's statement as one of the objections against the convertibility of the good and being, because mathematicals are after all entities.[14] He rejects, however, this objection and holds on to the convertibility by seeking a way in which one can speak of the goodness of mathematical objects. Eckhart proceeds in a different direction. He accepts both the objection and the convertibility of the good and being (*ens*), and he argues that if the *ratio* of the good is not found in mathematicals, it is not found in the intellect, for this is the place of these objects. Consequently, there neither is the *ratio* of "being" because of its convertibility with the good.[15] Eckhart connects this conclusion with another assertion by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*,

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secundo vivere, tertio intelligere; vel in comparatione ad participantem, et sic prius est intelligere, secundo vivere, tertio esse". Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.

13 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 6 (LW V, p. 43): "Ego autem credo totum contrarium. 'In principio' enim 'erat verbum', quod ad intellectum omnino pertinet, ut sic ipsum intelligere teneat primum gradum in perfectionibus, deinde ens vel esse".

14 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 2, obj. 6; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 5, a. 3, obj. 2.

15 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 7 (LW V, p. 43): "Secundo accipio quod ipsum intelligere et ea quae ad intellectum pertinent, sunt alterius condicionis quam ipsum esse. Dicitur enim III *Metaphysicae* quod in mathematicis non est finis nec bonum, et ideo per consequens nec ens, quia ens et bonum idem". Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* II, n. 8 (LW V, p. 53): "Item: ens et bonum convertuntur. Sed in intellectu non invenitur ratio boni nec efficientis nec finis, ut patet III *Metaphysicorum*. Ut enim ibi dicitur, in mathematicis, quae

which suggests an opposition between the "true" (*verum*), which "pertains to the intellect", and the "good" (*bonum*). He quotes a statement from the Sixth Book (4, 1027b25), in which Aristotle holds that "truth and falsity are not, as good and evil, in things, but in the mind". Because the proper place of truth is the intellect, the "true" is not a "being" (*ens*).[16]

On the basis of these general considerations, which have made clear that the intellect and "being" belong to different orders, Eckhart presents, in the third part of the Question, a number of arguments for his claim of God's "beinglessness". The core of this argumentation is a doctrine of the causality of being, which considers the relation between cause and effect under the aspect of dissimilarity. The first argument, for instance, states that "nothing is formally in the cause and what is caused if the cause is a true cause". Now God is the cause of all being (*esse*)—as the *Liber de causis* says. Therefore, being is not formally in God.[17] A "true" cause is not a univocal cause, having the same form or essence as its effect, but transcends it.

2 The Deconstruction of the Hypothesis of a "Development" in Eckhart's Thought

The *Quaestio parisiensis* I has often been read as the proclamation of a fundamental reorientation in Eckhart's thought. The assertions that God is *intelligere*, not a being, and that his intellection is the foundation of his *esse* have been regarded by several interpreters as the marking of a "turn" in more than one respect, as a "rupture with traditions". First, Eckhart's thesis of God's "beinglessness" turns against the dominant metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, which is a metaphysics of "being" and takes the phrase "ipsum esse subsistens" as the most adequate description of God.[18] Eckhart's critical attitude sometimes receives an ideological overtone insofar as "Thomism" is associated with "Catholic or-

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sunt abstracta, nullum horum invenitur, quia ut sic solum sunt in intellectu. Quare in intellectu non invenitur ratio entis et sic intelligere non est aliquod esse, ut nominat actionem".

16 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 7 (LW V, p. 43): "Dicitur etiam VI *Metaphysicae*: bonum et malum sunt in rebus, et verum et falsum in anima. Unde ibi dicitur quod verum, quod est in anima, non est ens".

17 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 8 (LW V, p. 45): "Ex his ostendo quod in deo non est ens nec esse, quia nihil est formaliter in causa et causato, si causa sit vera causa. Deus autem est causa omnis esse. Ergo esse formaliter non est in deo".

18 On the relation between Thomas and Eckhart, cf. R. Imbach, *Deus est intelligere. Das Ver-*

thodoxy". Thus, it has been suggested that Eckhart's "anti-Thomism" would eventually bring out an inquisitorial process against the Meister.[19] Second, the first Parisian Question distances itself from the prevailing "metaphysics of Exodus" and expresses a "medieval critique of the onto-theology", the "first" critique in the history of philosophy, "more than six centuries before Heidegger" who criticized the entire Western metaphysical tradition because of its "onto-theological constitution".[20] Finally, Eckhart's claim of the constitutive role of the intellect with respect to "being" means a turn in the history of thought, namely a turn to "modernity", insofar as it would document the rise of "modern subjectivity", an anticipation of the *Cogito* and German idealism.[21] But above all not only the relation of the Parisian Eckhart to philosophical traditions is at stake, but also to his own project of the *Opus tripartitum*.

In the "General Prologue" to the *Opus*, Meister Eckhart explains "the intention [*intentio*] of the author", "the division of the entire work [*opus totale*]" and the "order and manner of proceeding" in it. As the title indicates, the *Opus tripartitum* is divided into three parts: the *Opus propositionum*, which would contain more than thousand propositions and would be the foundation of the other two parts, the *Opus quaestionum* and the *Opus expositionum*.[22] Eckhart presents his basic proposition "Esse est deus" and shows that the core of the "Work of Propositions" consists in a "metaphysics of the transcendentals"—a

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hälnis von Sein und Denken in seiner Bedeutung für das Gottesverständnis bei Thomas von Aquin und in den Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts, Freiburg (Schw.) 1976.

19 So B. Mojsisch, *Meister Eckhart: Analogie, Univozität und Einheit*, Hamburg 1983, pp. 21–22.

20 Cf. E. Zum Brunn—Z. Kaluza—A. de Libera—P. Vignaux—E. Wéber (eds.), *Maître Eckhart à Paris. Une critique médiévale de l'ontothéologie. Les Questions parisiennes no. 1 et no. 2 d'Eckhart*, Paris 1984, in particular p. 7. Martin Heidegger used this expression for the first time in the "Introduction" he later (1949) added to his inaugural lecture of 1929 "What is Metaphysics?" ("Einleitung zu 'Was ist Metaphysik?'", in: *Wegmarken*, Frankfurt am Main 1967, pp. 207–208).

21 Cf. K. Flasch, *Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter. Von Augustin zu Macchiavelli*, Stuttgart ^{2}2000, p. 454; J. Halfwassen, "Gibt es eine Philosophie der Subjektivität im Mittelalter? Zur Theorie des Intellekts bei Meister Eckhart und Dietrich von Freiberg", in: *Theologie und Philosophie* 72 (1997), pp. 337–359.

22 Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum*, nn. 2–6 (LW I, pp. 148–151). Helpful is the commentary on the Prologue by F. Brunner in the French edition of Eckhart, in: *L'œuvre latine de Maître Eckhart*, Vol. 1: *Le Commentaire de la Genèse, précédé des Prologues*, intr., text, transl. and comm. by F. Brunner—A. de Libera—E. Weber—E. Zum Brunn, Paris 1984, pp. 97–196. Engl. transl.: A.A. Maurer, *Master Eckhart, Parisian Questions and Prologues. Translated with an Introduction and Notes*, Toronto 1974.

phrase suggested by Josef Koch.[23] In no other medieval writing do these notions have such a prominent place. The phrase has, however, the disadvantage that it does not sufficiently express the special character of Eckhart's thought. A distinctive feature of his doctrine is the identification of the transcendental terms "being", "one", "true" and "good" with God.[24] The doctrinal objectives of Eckhart's project are in clear contrast to the metaphysical positions in the *Quaestio parisiensis*: "Deus est intelligere", not "esse", and the heterogeneity within the doctrine of the transcendentals of *verum* and the terms *ens / bonum*. How is this "otherness" to be explained?

It is not unusual in the historiography of philosophy to explain a thinker's discontinuities and heterogeneities by means of the hypothesis of a "development" in his thought; this solution has been employed, for instance, in the interpretation of Aristotle's and Heidegger's conceptions. The research paradigm of a "development" has also been applied to Meister Eckhart: There is not *one* Eckhart, but more than one. Scholars feel "forced" to this hypothesis, Ernst Reffke admits, since one sees no other way of explaining Eckhart's contradictory statements.[25]

The hypothesis of a doctrinal development is an attempt to reconcile the Eckhart of the *Quaestio parisiensis* I (1302/1303) with the Eckhart of the *Opus tripartitum*, a project which would originate from his second professorship at the University of Paris (1311–1313) and in which the basic proposition *Esse est deus* seems to revise the claim of God's "beinglessness". But how to assess this turn: is it a "return" to onto-theology or rather a "regression"? What also remains obscure are the proper reasons for this doctrinal change.

The hypothesis of a doctrinal development presupposes a sure and fixed chronology, but this presupposition has been challenged by the manuscript studies of Loris Sturlese. The Italian scholar established that the first stage of

23 Cf. J. Koch, "Sinn und Struktur der Schriftauslegungen Meister Eckharts", in: U.M. Nix—R. Öchslin (Hrsg.), *Meister Eckhart, der Prediger. Festschrift zum Eckhart-Gedenkjahr. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Dominikaner-Provinz „Teutonia"*, Freiburg—Basel—Wien 1960, pp. 73–103 [reprinted in: id., *Kleine Schriften* (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di Studi e Testi 127), Roma 1973, Band I, pp. 399–428, here p. 413].

24 Cf. the two propositions in the *Prol. in Opus prop.*, n. 4 (LW I, p. 167): "Notandum ergo prooemialiter primo quod solus deus proprie est ens, unum, verum et bonum. Secundo quod ab ipso omnia sunt, unum sunt, vera sunt et bona sunt". Cf. for Eckhart's doctrine J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought from Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, Leiden—Boston 2014, pp. 330–369.

25 Cf. E. Reffke, "Studien zum Problem der Entwicklung Meister Eckharts im Opus tripartitum", in: *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 67 (1938), pp. 19–95, here p. 19.

the *Opus tripartitum* has to be dated earlier than was assumed so far and that the Prologues had already been written in the middle of the first decade of the fourteenth century. The outcome of his investigation has, as the author himself observes, direct consequences for the interpretation of Eckhart: the distinction between an "early" and a "late" Eckhart is no longer tenable. One must rather depart from a "fundamental homogeneity" in his work.[26]

The deconstruction of the hypothesis of a "development" and the need for the interpreter of Eckhart's thought to show its "homogeneity" give new relevance to the programmatic meaning of the General Prologue to the *Opus tripartitum* for a systematic reading of his *entire* work.[27] Its meaning is not on a par with that of an individual question. The *Quaestio parisiensis* I is related to the *Opus* as a part is to the whole; the planned second part of the project was the *Opus quaestionum* and it is hardly conceivable that the "Work of Questions" would not include Eckhart's university disputations.[28] Interpretations which seek the unity of Eckhart's thought from the perspective of the Parisian Question wrongly reverse this relation of part and whole. Directive for their reading are the claims in this *Quaestio*; the *Opus* becomes a "supplement" to this text.[29]

The relation between the metaphysics of the *Quaestio parisiensis* and the metaphysics of the *Opus tripartitum* is complex, since the Meister follows different avenues. But we want to show that the reading of the Parisian Question is often one-sided and places the text in a too radical opposition to the *Opus*; Eckhart's concept of "being" is more differentiated than it has been suggested. The picture of an "anti-Thomistic" and "idealist" Parisian Eckhart, a harsh critic of the onto-theology, has to be modified. We continue, therefore, our inquiry into the coherence of Eckhart's work by means of two lines: we first intend a critical re-reading of the *Quaestio parisiensis* I, then we consider central issues in the Question in relation to the metaphysical positions of the *Opus tripartitum*.

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26 Cf. L. Sturlese, "Meister Eckhart in der Bibliotheca Amploniana: Neues zur Datierung des ‚Opus tripartitum'", in: A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Die Bibliotheca Amploniana: Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 23) Berlin—New York 1995, pp. 434–446, in particular p. 445 [reprinted in: id., *Homo divinus, Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse*, Stuttgart 2007, pp. 95–106].

27 Cf. the observation of T. Kobusch, *Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters*, München 2011, p. 375, that "the modern interpreter, if he does not want to misrepresent Eckhart's intention, has the duty to understand everything contained in the Latin and German work under the sign of the doctrine of the general concepts".

28 Cf. Z. Kaluza, "Les questions parisiennes: caractère et datation", in: E. Zum Brunn et alii (eds.), *Maître Eckhart à Paris*, pp. 157–166, here p. 164.

29 Cf. B. Mojsisch, *Meister Eckhart: Analogie, Univozität und Einheit*, pp. 41–43.

3 The *Quaestio parisiensis* I Reconsidered

The interpretation of the *Quaestio parisiensis* I is hampered by its incomplete form: the *pro* and *con* structure of arguments, which is common in Scholastic disputations, is lacking, and the text immediately starts with the "magisterial determination" of the question. The *Quaestiones parisienses* are probably summaries of redacted versions, which did not have come to us. The First Question is mostly treated as a self-contained text in Eckhart's thought. It will, however, be rewarding to read it in connection with the Second Parisian Question, which has received much less attention in scholarship, since the two questions have a common concern: they discuss the (non-)identity of being (*esse*) and understanding (*intelligere*) in rational creatures (q. II) and in God (q. I). In view of their doctrinal unity, it will be expedient to re-read the First Question in connection with the second one, because such an approach provides a better insight into Eckhart's discourse.

3.1 *"Resolutio": From the Difference to the Identity of "esse" and "intelligere"*

Taking the Parisian Questions I and II as one whole, we have to realize that what is counted as the Second Question in the codex and in the critical edition actually is the prior one and precedes the First Question as regards content.[30] If this re-ordering is taken into consideration, the dynamics and direction of Eckhart's way of thought become more manifest. He intends a *resolutio*, a reductive analysis of what is composed to what is simple, the "reduction" of what is different to what is identical, of the creaturely to the divine—we encountered the term *resolutio* in the First Question in the explanation of the adage "The work of nature is the work of an intelligence": The "resolution" of what is imperfect to what is perfect stops in the intellect as that which is the highest.

In the Second Parisian Question, Eckhart wants to prove that in an angel, like in any creature, the act of understanding (*intelligere*) is not identical with

30 Cf. the remark in *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 7 (LW V, p. 44): "sicut alias dixi, si species quae est in anima, haberet rationem entis, per ipsam non cognosceretur res cuius est species; quia si haberet rationem entis, in quantum huiusmodi duceret in cognitionem sui". Eckhart's remark refers to his account of the cognitive "nihilism" in the Second Question. The first to point out this fact was Raymond Klibansky in his "Commentariolum", in: *Magistri Eckardi, Quaestiones parisienses*, (ed. A. Dondaine), Leipzig 1936, pp. XXIV–XXV. In the French edition of the Parisian Questions, the order of the question has therefore been reversed, but in order to avoid confusion we preserve the traditional order from the German critical edition.

its being (*esse*)—his reply begins with the words *Dico quod non*. In the first part of his reply, he refers to an anonymous argument, whose author proves to be Thomas Aquinas. Eckhart extensively quotes Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* (I, q. 54, a. 2)—one of the few texts in which Thomas explicitly discusses the relation of *esse* and *intelligere*. There, he demonstrates their non-identity in creatures through the tension between the infinity of the act of *intelligere* and the limited being (*esse*) of every creature, which is determined to one (*determinatum ad unum*) according to its genus and species.[31] Eckhart cites this text rather freely and assesses Aquinas's argument positively: "Some demonstrate this well [*bene*]". Yet, at the end of the first part of his reply, he announces that he will follow another avenue than Aquinas: "I prove this in other ways [*aliis viis*]".[32]

In the second part of his reply, Eckhart advances eight arguments of his own, which claim that the act of understanding belongs to a different order than "being"; the "being" of the creature is determinate, but the intellect as intellect is not a being, it is "nothing". Several of these arguments are also used in the *Quaestio parisiensis* I, for instance, the (fifth) argument based on the idea that the *ratio* of the "good" is not found in mathematical objects, which are only in the intellect, and the convertibility of "being" (*ens*) and "good" (*bonum*),[33] and the (eighth) argument based on the doctrine of causality. The original first argument for the opposition between *intelligere* and *esse* rests on Eckhart's view of the "nihilism" of the intellect, which is the real innovation in the Parisian Questions and the result of a new reading of Aristotle's teaching in the Third Book of *De anima*.[34] From Aristotle's argument that the intellect as intellect must be "none of those things which it understands", just as it is necessary that the power of sight has no color in order that it may see every color, Eckhart draws the radical conclusion that in order for the intellect to know everything, it must

31 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 54, a. 2: "Secunda autem actio [sc. actio manens] de sui ratione habet infinitatem vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem, sicut intelligere, cujus objectum est verum; et velle, cujus objectum est bonum [...]. Esse autem cujuslibet creaturae est determinatum ad unum secundum genus et speciem".

32 Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Quaestio parisiensis* II, n. 1 (LW V, p. 49): "Et dico quod non. Aliqui autem ad hoc sic ostendunt bene [...]. Sed hoc ostendo aliis viis".

33 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* II, n. 8 (LW V, p. 53).

34 Cf. J. Caputo, "The Nothingness of the Intellect in Meister Eckhart's 'Parisian Questions'", in: *The Thomist* 39 (1975), pp. 85–115; J.A. Aertsen, "The Human Intellect: 'All things' and 'Nothing'. Medieval Readings of *De Anima*", in: R.L. Friedman and J.-M. Counet (eds.), *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De Anima*, Louvain—Paris 2013, pp. 145–160.

itself be not a being, and thus "nothing".[35] In both questions Eckhart maintains the "nihilism" of the intellect, in q. II with respect to the *created* intellect, in q. I with respect to the *divine* intellect.

The natural end *terminus* of Eckhart's reductive analysis or resolution is the affirmation of the *identity* of being and understanding in God. The *Quaestio parisiensis* I indeed begins with such a statement in the "magisterial determination" of the question: "One must say that they are the same in reality, and perhaps both in reality [*re*] and thought [*ratione*]".[36]

Eckhart proceeds in this Question in a similar manner as in the Second Question, insofar as he begins with referring to Aquinas's arguments for the identity of *esse* and *intelligere* in God, this time with precise references to his writings:

> First, I adduce proofs I have seen. Five are in the *Summa contra gentiles* (I, c. 45) and the sixth is in the First Part (of the *Summa theologiae*) [I, q. 14, a. 4]. All are based on the fact that God is the first and simple [*simplex*].[37]

Eckhart next goes, as in Question II, "different ways" from Aquinas, without, however, disqualifying Thomas's conception—in view of his defense of Aquinas's stand of the superiority of the intellect over the will in the Third Question and of his positive assessment of Aquinas's argumentation in the Second Question, there is no reason for ascribing an "anti-Thomism" to the Parisian Eckhart.[38]

Crucial in the *Quaestio parisiensis* I is his statement of the primacy of *intelligere* over *esse* in God. According to prominent scholars, this claim turns against the identity of *intelligere* and *esse* and introduces a difference into God, since the intellect is regarded as the constitutive ground (*fundamentum*) of being; God's being is the effect of his intellection.[39] But this interpretation is

35 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* II, n. 2 (LW V, p. 50): "Prima est, quia intellectus, in quantum intellectus, nihil est eorum quae intelligit, sed oportet quod sit 'immixtus', 'nulli nihil habens commune', ut omnia intelligat, ut dicitur in III *De anima*, sicut visum oportet nullum habere colorem, ut omnem colorem videat. Si igitur intellectus, in quantum intellectus, nihil est, et per consequens nec intelligere est aliquod esse".

36 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 1 (LW V, p. 37): "Dicendum quod sunt idem re, et forsan re et ratione".

37 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 1 (LW V, p. 37).

38 Cf. A. de Libera, *Maître Eckhart et la mystique rhénane*, Paris 1999, pp. 41–42.

39 Cf. R. Imbach, *Deus est intelligere*, p. 154; B. Mojsisch, *Meister Eckhart: Analogie, Univozität und Einheit*, p. 41. Cf. the critical remarks by W. Schüßler, "Gott: Sein oder Denken?", pp. 172–173.

questionable and implausible: First, because it is contrary to the tendency of Eckhart's movement of thought, the *resolutio* of what is composed to what is simple; second, because it is contrary to the explicit affirmation of a real identity in the reply to the question. Eckhart's statement involves another *ratio* or viewpoint within the position of identity. Moreover, the introduction of a difference into God contradicts Eckhart's basic teachings on the divine unity; there is in God no "otherness": "No distinction can be or be understood in God himself".[40] The crux is the meaning of the term *fundamentum*, which must signify here a conceptual rather than a real non-identity between *intelligere* and *esse*. An interesting parallel of such a meaning of the term can be found in Eckhart's discussion of the transcendentals in the Prologue to the *Opus propositionum*. There, he asserts that "being" is grounded (*fundatur*) and established (*figatur*) in the "one" and through the "one" (*unum*).[41] Yet, this relation does not exclude that these terms are convertible with one another *in re* and differ only *secundum rationem*.

3.2 *From Negation to "the Superabundance of Affirmation": Purity of Being ("puritas essendi")*

Another complicating factor in our understanding and interpretation of the *Quaestio parisiensis* I is, besides its incomplete form, the discrepancy between the determination of the Question—the identity of *esse* and *intelligere* in God—and the *corpus* of the reply with its focus on their opposition. Where in the Question does Eckhart elaborate on the identity and how does he conceive it? Relevant is the closing of his reply, his final word, so to say, which we have left aside so far.

There, he first summarizes the negative conclusion of his account: "So I say that being [*esse*] does not belong to God, nor is he a being [*ens*], but he is something higher than being".[42] In explanation of God's "beinglessness", Eckhart draws a parallel with Aristotle's theory of the intellect in *De anima*, which, including his example of the power of sight, was used as an argument for the "beinglessness" of the intellect in *Quaestio parisiensis* II:

> As Aristotle says that the power of sight must be colorless so that it can see all colors and that the intellect does not belong to the natural forms so that it can know all forms, so I also deny being itself [*ipsum esse*] and

40 Cf. Meister Eckhart, *In Ex.*, n. 60 (LW II, p. 66).

41 Cf. *Prol. in Opus prop.*, n. 9 (LW I, p. 171).

42 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 12 (LW V, p. 47): "Sic etiam dico quod deo non competit esse nec est ens, sed est aliquid altius ente".

> suchlike to God so that he may be the cause of every being [*causa omnis esse*] and precontain [*praehabeat*] all things.[43]

Eckhart presents an analogy argument (*sicut … sic*): Just as the condition for the possibility of intellectual knowledge is that the intellect is free of natural forms, so the precondition of the divine causality is that God is "beinglessness". He gives a twofold specification of this causality, namely the universality of what is caused (*causa omnis esse*) and the universality of things in the cause (*praehabeat omnia*).

The doctrine of causality is a dominant issue in the *Quaestio parisiensis* I; its primary place has to be understood against the background of Eckhart's movement of thought, the *resolutio* of the creature to God, which from a metaphysical point of view can be seen as the "reduction" of the effect to its cause. The doctrine of causality is a way of ensuring the divine transcendence with respect to created being, since a "true" cause excludes the univocity of being.

What deserves further attention is that the divine causality is described by Eckhart with the phrase "Deus omnia praehabet". The terminology betrays the influence of (pseudo-) Dionysius the Areopagite; the expression has been taken from his work *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5—*nota bene* the Chapter dealing with "Being" as divine name. Dionysius's concern is the same as Eckhart's: both thinkers want to show God's transcendence with respect to the being of creatures and seek the ontological condition of God's universal causality of being. The Areopagite argues: "God is not being to some extent [*quodam modo*], but is it absolutely and without limits; he possesses in advance all being [*totum esse*] in himself".[44] Eckhart and Dionysius seek the precondition of the divine causality in different directions. Eckhart holds that God must be "beinglessness" so that he may precontain all things, Dionysius, on the other hand, argues that God is the fullness of being and precontains all things so that he may be the (exemplary) cause of every being.

What has attracted Eckhart in the Dionysian idea (to which he refers but which he does not explain) is that things pre-exist in God "in an intellectual

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43 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 12 (LW V, pp. 47–48): "Sicut enim dicit Aristoteles quod oportet visum abscolorem, ut omnem colorem videat, et intellectum non esse formarum naturalium, ut omnes intelligat, sic etiam ego ⟨nego⟩ ipsi deo ipsum esse et talia, ut sit causa omnis esse et omnia praehabeat".

44 Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5, § 4. Cf. for the various Latin translations of the passage: *Dionysiaca*, (ed. P. Chevallier), Paris 1937, Vol. I, pp. 333–334. Saracene's translation reads: "Etenim Deus non quodam modo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte, totum in se ipso esse accepit et praeaccepit".

way" as the "ideas" or *rationes* of things. The conception of God's "precontainment" of all things, expressed in Dionysius's exposition of "Being" as divine name, is directive for Eckhart's determination, in the final section of the First Parisian Question, of the identity of *esse* and *intelligere* in God, which requires a positive understanding of divine being.

Eckhart's last word is not the denial of being, the claim of God's "beinglessness". The negation meant by him has rather what he calls a "superabundance of affirmation" (*superabundantia affirmationis*) as systematic aim. He states:

> As it is not denied anything to God that is his, so it is denied to him [what is not his]. These negations have, according to John of Damascus in the first book [of *On Orthodox Faith*], in God a superabundance of affirmation.[45]

Reference is made to the last of the Greek Fathers, John of Damascus (676–749). As in the case of Dionysius the Areopagite, it again is useful to look at the doctrinal background of Eckhart's short reference. He refers to Damascene's work *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 4, with the title "Concerning the nature of the Deity: that it is incomprehensible". The context of the cited statement thus is the tradition of negative theology.

Damascene argues: We ascribe negative predicates to God, such as "incorporeal" and "immobility". Yet, these do not give a true idea of his essence, for they do not indicate what God is but what he is not. When we would explain what the essence of anything is, we must not speak only negatively. In the case of God, however, it is impossible to explain what he is in his essence, and it is more proper to argue from his separation from all things. "For he is nothing of the things that are—not that he is non-being [*non-ens*] but that he is being above [*super*] all things that are, may even above being [*esse*] itself".[46] We find here the same thoughts about God's being as Eckhart states at the beginning of his conclusion.

Somewhat later in the same chapter, Damascene observes that there are some affirmations made concerning God which have the force of a "superabundant negation" (*superabundativae negationis*). For example, when we use the term "darkness", we do not mean darkness in God, but that he is not light, since

45 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 12 (LW V, p. 48): "Ut sicut non negatur deo quod suum est, sic negetur eidem ⟨quod suum non est⟩. Quae negationes secundum Damascenum primo libro habent in deo superabundantiam affirmationis".

46 Cf. Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 4, in particular: "Nihil enim eorum quae sunt est, non ut non-ens, sed super omnia entia et super ipsum esse ens".

he is above light; and when we predicate "light", we mean that he is not darkness.[47] What has scarcely been noticed in studies on the First Parisian Question is the significant turn that Eckhart gives to Damascene's account. Whereas the Greek Father speaks of "affirmations", which have the force of "superabundant negation", the latter reverses Damascene's statement and reads it as concerning "negations", which have a "superabundance of affirmation". This turn of negations into the force of affirmations holds for the attribution of "being" to God: he is not being but above being; he is not, however, non-being.

At the end of his conclusion, Eckhart actually effects this turn and affirms God's "being", significantly by another appeal to Dionysius's idea of God's "precontainment" of all things as the precondition of his causality of being.

> I say that God precontains [*praehabet*] all things in purity [*puritas*], fullness [*plenitudo*] and perfection, more abundantly and extensively, because he is the root and cause of all things. And this is what he intended to say, when he said: 'I am who am' (Ex. 3:14).[48]

The *Quaestio parisiensis* I closes with a reference to God's self-revelation as "He who is" in Exodus, the basic text of medieval onto-theology. Eckhart is not a fundamental critic of this tradition, but rather an innovator of it.[49] Already earlier in this Question, Eckhart had cited the Exodus text in the context of considerations in which he suggests an alternative view instead of God's "beinglessness" and leaves room for another semantics of "being".

> Since being [*esse*] belongs to creatures, it is not in God except as in its cause. Therefore being is not in God, but the purity of being [*puritas essendi*]. [...] 'Being' does not befit God, unless you call such purity 'being'.[50]

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47 Cf. Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 4: "Sunt autem quaedam affirmative de deo dicta virtutem superabundativae negationis habentia, puta tenebras dicentes in deo non tenebras intelligimus, sed quoniam non est lux, sed super lucem, et lux, quoniam non tenebrae est".

48 Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 12 (LW V, p. 48): "Dico enim quod deus omnia praehabet in puritate, plenitudine, perfectione, amplius et latius, exsistens radix et causa omnium. Et hoc voluit dicere, cum dixit: 'ego sum qui sum'".

49 Cf. W. Beierwaltes, "DEUS EST ESSE—ESSE EST DEUS. Die onto-theologische Grundfrage als aristotelisch-neuplatonische Denkstruktur", in: id., *Platonismus und Idealismus*, Frankfurt am Main 1972, pp. 5–82; on Eckhart, pp. 37–67.

50 Cf. the next note, below.

This notion is meant in the repetition of words in the Exodus text: "So the Lord, wishing to show that the purity of being is in him, said: 'I am who am'. He did not say simply 'I am' but added 'who am' ".[51]

Puritas essendi: the introduction of this concept seems to be a concession to the language of the ontology (" 'Being' does not befit God, unless you call such purity 'being' "), but in reality it is the key notion to which Eckhart returns in the conclusion of the Question. We translated the expression by "purity of being", contrary to Étienne Gilson who suggests that the phrase signifies the purity "*from* being". In Gilson's view, it seems paradoxical to define the God who reveals himself as "He who is" as a God in whom no trace of being can be found. This paradox arises from Eckhart's synthesis of Christian thought and Neoplatonism, which regards the One beyond being as the first principle of things. But the great historian of medieval philosophy is mistaken in this respect: the background of Eckhart's idea of *puritas essendi* is not the Neoplatonic doctrine of the One or "henology".[52] It is surprising that Gilson's erroneous view is accepted by several scholars.[53] By "purity of being" the fullness and perfection of being proper to God is meant, in contradistinction to the composite being (*ens* or *esse commixtum*), which is typical of the creature, as the discussion in the *Quaestio parisiensis* II has shown.[54]

The "purity of being" ascribed to God is a continuous moment in Eckhart's metaphysics. In his exposition of Exodus 3:14 in his Commentary, he notices that the repetition of "am" in the text "I am who am" indicates "the purity of the affirmation", which excludes every negation from God. It also indicates the "immixture" (*impermixtio*) of being and its "fullness" (*plenitudo*).[55] By that the transition is made to the final part of this essay.

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51 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 9 (LW V, p. 45): "Et ideo cum esse conveniat creaturis, non est in deo nisi sicut in causa, et ideo in deo non est esse, sed puritas essendi. […] ita dominus volens ostendere puritatem essendi esse in se dixit: 'ego sum qui sum'. Non dixit simpliciter 'ego sum', sed addidit: 'qui sum'. Deo ergo non competit esse, nisi talem puritatem voces esse".

52 Cf. É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, Toronto ^{2}1952, pp. 38–39. Cf. J.A. Aertsen, "Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Master Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)", in: E.P. Bos & P.A. Meyer (eds.), *On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, Leiden 1992, pp. 120–140.

53 Cf., for instance, J.M. Hacket (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, Leiden—Boston 2013, p. 92.

54 The expression "esse vel ens commixtum" is used in *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 4 (LW V, p. 40).

55 Cf. *In Ex.*, n. 16 (LW II, p. 21): "Tertio notandum quod bis ait: 'sum qui sum' puritatem affirmationis excluso omni negativo ab ipso indicat"; n. 17 (II, p. 23): "Sic li 'sum qui sum'

4 The Parisian Eckhart and the *Opus tripartitum*

Our re-reading of the *Quaestio parisiensis* I has led to a more nuanced picture of this text, since, as we found at the end of the preceding section, Eckhart's claim of God's "beinglessness" is not his last word and he introduces a more differentiated concept of "being". Consequently, the distance to the project of the *Opus tripartitum* is relativized. In the present section, we shall show that three typical issues of the First Parisian Question are integrated, sometimes with modifications, into the *Opus*.

4.1 *"Esse" Has the "ratio creabilitatis" (a): The Necessity of a Difference in the Creature*

In the introductory part of the *Quaestio parisiensis* I, Eckhart identifies the concept of *esse* with what is created: "As soon as we come to being, we come to a creature". He cites the fourth proposition from the *Liber de causis* "The first of created things is being" and concludes that "being [*esse*] has the *ratio* of creatable [*creabilis*]". This conclusion seems typical of the *Quaestio parisiensis* I, but is in fact not exclusively held by the Parisian Eckhart; it is rather a continuous moment in his thought. Apparently, this concept of "being" is not regarded as inconsistent with the basic proposition of the *Opus tripartitum*, *Esse est deus*.

When, in his Commentary on *Sapientia* 1:14 ("He created all things that they might be"), Eckhart analyzes the conditions of the causality of creation, he presents eight expositions of the text and notes as the sixth point:

> The *ratio* of creatibility is being [*esse*], according to the proposition 'The first of created things is being [*esse*]'. Hence, something produced by God, although it is a being [*ens*], is living [*vivens*] and is thinking [*intelligens*], is creatable only by reason of its being [*esse*]. This is why if something were living and thinking, but did not have any being above and beyond [*extra*] *vivere* and understanding [*intelligere*], it would be as such uncreatable.[56]

impermixtionem esse et eius plenitudinem indicat". Cf. Meister Eckhart, *In Genesim* I, n. 174 (LW I, p. 319): "Deus est esse purum, plenum et simplex et fons unicus omnis esse".

56 Cf. *In Sap.*, n. 24 (LW II, p. 344): "Rursus sexto notandum quod ratio creabilitatis est esse, secundum illud: 'prima rerum creatarum est esse'. Unde res product a deo, quamvis sit ens, vivens et intelligens, ratione tamen solius esse est creabilis. Unde si quid esset vivens aut intelligens, non habens esse aliquod praetor et extra vivere et intelligere, ipsum esset ut sic increabile".

Eckhart's *notandum* gives rise to some comments. First, he transforms, as in the Parisian Question, the well-known fourth proposition from *De causis* on what "is first created" into a thesis on what is "creatable". Eckhart clarifies the ground of the possibility of creation through a comparison with the possibility of sense knowledge of an apple. An apple has various aspects: it is colored, has taste and smell, is light or heavy, etc. But it is by reason of color alone that the apple is visible;[57] in Scholastic terminology: the "proper object" of the sense of sight is what is colored, since it is by this, not by its taste or smell, that an object is visible. Similarly, the proper object of creation is "being" (*esse*), since something is creatable only by reason of its being.

Second, Eckhart's *notandum* relates the *ratio* of creatibility to the triad of perfections, "being" (*ens*), "living" (*vivens*) and "thinking" (*intelligens*), which he also introduces in the First Parisian Question and to which we shall return later (in **4.2**). He argues that an ontological difference in a creature, which is living and intelligent, is necessary, for it would not be creatable, if "it did not have any being [*esse*] above and beyond *vivere* and *intelligere*". The necessity of a difference is also emphasized in the Commentary on Genesis. Where life pure and simple (*purum et simplex*) is found so that there is no other being above *vivere*, this living is uncreated and uncreatable. The *terminus* of creation is being (*esse*). Hence, all that has some being above living is made and created by reason of being (*esse*), but never by reason of living (*vivere*)—and Eckhart again compares the creatibility of something with the visibility of a body, possible only by reason of its color.[58]

A text that is crucial for a comprehensive interpretation of Eckhart's thought is *Sermo* XXIX (*Deus unus est*), since it is concerned with the non-identity of *esse* and *intelligere*, discussed in the Parisian Questions. Eckhart observes that the words *Deus unus est* can be taken in two ways. The emphasis can be laid on *est*, so that the meaning of the text is: "God, the one, *is*", or the emphasis can be laid on *unus*: "Your God is one God". Eckhart's account of the first reading is that "by the very fact that God is one, being [*esse*] belongs to him, which is to say he is his being, he is pure being [*purum esse*], and the being of all

57 Cf. *In Sap.*, n. 24 (LW II, p. 345): "Verbi gratia: pomum est coloratum, est sapidum, odoriferum, grave aut leve et huiusmodi, tamen ipsum visum tantummodo movet et est visibile ratione solius coloris, in nullo vero penitus ratione saporis, odoris et ceterorum huiusmodi".

58 Cf. *In Gen.* I, n. 112 (LW I, p. 267): "Ubi notandum quod vivum in ratione vivi increatum est et increabile. Hinc est quod ubicumque invenitur purum et simplex vivere, ita ut non sit esse aliud praeter vivere, increatum est. Terminus autem creationis esse est. Hinc est quod omne habens esse aliquod praeter vivere factum est et creatum ratione esse, nequaquam autem ratione vivere. Verbi gratia: [...] corpus est visibile ratione solius coloris".

things".[59] His explanation of the second reading, which emphasizes God's unity, argues that nothing else than God is truly and simply one (*unum simplex*), because nothing that is created is pure being and totally intellect, for then it would no longer be creatable (*creabile*). In God alone, *esse* and *intelligere* are identical, he is pure understanding (*purum intelligere*). The mark of the creature is that its being (*esse*) is composed; it has some being different (*differens*) from understanding, since *intelligere* is uncreatable and *esse* is "the first of created things", as the fourth proposition of the *Liber de causis* states.[60]

In his argumentation for the second reading of the text, Eckhart adopts ideas which he also advances in the First Parisian Question. Yet, whereas in the Parisian Question he maintains that "understanding" is superior to "being" and concludes that God is not *ens* or *esse* but *intelligere*, in *Sermo* XXIX he does not follow an opposition model, but integrates both perspectives on the basis of the notion of "one", which is absent in the Parisian Question. The sermon shows the identity of *unum*, *esse* and *intelligere* in the absolute sense.

4.1.1 The Causal Principle of "Similitude"

The fourth proposition of the *Liber de causis*, to which Eckhart in the First Parisian Question refers, has a Neoplatonic background: "being" is the first (since the most common) effect of the first Cause (or "first hypostasis"), which itself is not Being but the One or the Good beyond being.[61] Eckhart, however, identifies the first principle with the intellect, the "second hypostasis" in Neoplatonism, but agrees in the Parisian Question with the view of the dissimilarity between cause and effect: "Nothing is formally in the cause and what is caused, if the cause is a true cause".[62]

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59 Cf. *Sermo* XXIX, n. 301 (LW IV, p. 267): "*Deus unus est*. Notandum quod dupliciter hoc potest accipi. Primo sic: *deus unus est*. Nam hoc ipso quod unus, ipsi competit esse, id est quod sit suum esse, quod sit purum esse, quod sit omnium esse".

60 Cf. *Sermo* XXIX, n. 301 (LW IV, pp. 267–268): "Secundo sic: *deus tuus deus unus est*, quasi nihil aliud est vere unum, quia nec quidquam creatum est purum ⟨esse⟩ et se toto intellectus. Iam enim non esset creabile. […] Iterum etiam quod nihil praeter ipsum (sc. deum) potest esse purum intelligere, sed habet aliquod esse differens ab intelligere, nec aliter esset creatura, tum quia intelligere est increabile, tum quia 'prima rerum creatarum est esse'".

61 Cf. Aquinas's observations in his Commentary on the *Liber de causis*, lect. 4: "Sic igitur summum et primum rerum principium ponebant Platonici ipsum unum et bonum separatum, sed post unum et bonum nihil invenitur ita commune sicut ens; et ideo ipsum ens separatum ponebant quidem creatum, utpote participans bonitatem et unitatem, tamen ponebant ipsum primum inter omnia creata".

62 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* I, n. 8 (LW V, p. 45): "nihil est formaliter in causa et causato, si causa sit vera causa".

It is interesting to observe that the Meister, in his analysis of the causality of creation in his Commentary on *Sapientia*, notes as the fifth point, just preceding the sixth point, that "'Esse' has the 'ratio' of creatibility":

> Fifth, one should know that every agent makes something like itself. But God is totally being [*esse*] and works in creatures through being and according to being [...]. In being alone is the creature properly assimilated to God, its cause.[63]

In this *notandum*, Eckhart bases the causality of being, unlike the approach in the Parisian Question, on the "similitude" of cause and effect, expressed in the principle: *omne agens agit sibi simile*. In the same way, he proceeds in his Commentary on the other authority he calls upon in the *Quaestio parisiensis* I, in support of the identification of *esse* and what is created, namely John 1:3: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt". In this Commentary, Eckhart repeats the special reading of the text, which he suggests in the Question: "All things made are, that is, have *esse* by him [God]",[64] and he also gives an argument (*ratio*) for this statement, which consists in the causal principle of similitude. This principle does not exclude a fundamental ontological difference, as the continuation of the argument shows, in which Eckhart advances a basic distinction of the *Opus tripartitum* and maintains that everything below God is a "this or that being" (*ens hoc aut hoc*), not "being in the absolute sense". That belongs to the first cause alone, which is God.[65]

In the following brief text, Eckhart summarizes the various moments which enable him to connect the thesis, typical of the *Opus*, that God is *esse* with the identification of *esse* with what is created:

- "Every agent effects something similar to it";
- God is being (*esse*)—with a reference to the text in Exodus 3: "ego sum qui sum";

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63 Cf. *In Sap.*, n. 23 (LW II, pp. 343–344): "Praeterea quinto sciendum quod omne agens agit sibi simile. Deus autem se toto est esse et operatur in creaturis per ipsum esse et sub ratione esse. [...] In esse enim solo proprie creatura assimilatur deo, suae causae".

64 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 53 (LW III, p. 44): "Nota [...] quod [...] omnia tamen et singula, sive a natura sive ab arte producta, immediate ab ipso deo solo habent esse sive quod sunt, ut sit talis ordo litterae: *omnia facta per ipsum sunt*".

65 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 52 (LW III, p. 43): "Ratio ergo huius quod hic dicitur omnia per deum facta esse est, quia unumquodque agit sibi simile, nec quidquam agit ultra suam speciem. Omne autem citra deum est ens hoc aut hoc, non autem ens aut esse absolute, sed hoc est solius primae causae, quae deus est".

– Hence, God makes all that he makes to the end that it is and accepts being (*esse*)—with a reference to the text in Wisdom 1:14 "He created all things that they might be" and to the fourth proposition of the *Liber de causis*.[66]

4.1.2 The Twofold Being (*esse*) of Every Creature

In his Commentary on *Sapientia* 1:14, Eckhart notes as the third point in the analysis of the conditions of the causality of creation that a thing has no being in its essential or original cause and in the mind of the maker. A house in the mind is not a house, but receives its formal being (*esse formale*) insofar as it is produced outside (*extra*) by an efficient cause. All things are in God as the first cause and in the mind of the maker in an intellectual way (*intellectualiter*).[67]

The background of this *notandum* is a general proposition, which Eckhart more than once advances in his Latin work: Every creature has a twofold being (*duplex esse*), a "virtual" being (*esse virtuale*) in its original causes, in any case "in the Word of God", and a "formal" being (*esse formale*) outside, in the natural world.[68] This thesis integrates the two different levels of the causality of creation into the Parisian Question. The "first" or "virtual" being corresponds with Eckhart's appeal, in the final part of the *Quaestio* (see Section **3.2**), to the Dionysian idea of God's "precontainment" of all things (*Deus praehabet omnia*) as the precondition of the divine causality of being. The "second" or "formal" being corresponds with the being that is identified with what is created.

4.2 *The Triad of Perfections "Being", "Living" and "Understanding"*

The main characteristic of the Parisian Questions is Eckhart's "intellectualism": the primacy of the intellect and its act of understanding over "being". In the *Quaestio parisiensis* I, he seeks corroboration of the superiority of *intelligere* by

66 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 463 (LW III, p. 396): "Primum ⟨notandum⟩ est quod cum omne agens agat sibi simile, deus autem id quod est, est esse—Exodi 3: 'ego sum qui sum', et 'qui est misit me'—omne quod facit ad hoc facit, ut sit et esse accipiat, Sap. 1: 'creavit, ut essent omnia'. Et in *De causis* dicitur: 'prima rerum creatarum est esse' ".

67 Cf. *In Sap.*, n. 21 (LW II, p. 342): "Rursus tertio notandum quod res in sua causa essentiali sive originali non habet esse, similiter nec in arte sua nec in intellectu. Domus enim in mente domus non est […]. Esse autem domus […] formale accipit, in quantum extra producitur et educitur a causa et per causam efficientem. Omnia autem sunt in deo tamquam in causa prima intellectualiter et in mente artificis".

68 The basic text is *In Gen.* I, n. 77 (LW I, p. 238): "Nota quod omnis creatura duplex habet esse. Unum in causis suis originalibus, saltem in verbo dei […]. Aliud est esse rerum extra in rerum natura, quod habent res in forma propria. Primum est esse virtuale, secundum est esse formale".

the Neoplatonic doctrine of the three grades of perfection: "being", "living" and "understanding". As we have seen, he rejects the view that if these perfections are taken "in themselves", "being" (*esse*) is first and more perfect than the other two. "'In the beginning was the Word', which entirely pertains to the intellect"; from this perspective, "*intelligere* has the first place among the perfections". It is interesting to see how Eckhart, in the *Opus tripartitum*, deals with the triad.

Instructive is the key text on the doctrine of creation to which we referred more than once in the preceding section (**4.1**), namely Eckhart's analysis of the causality of creation in his expositions of Wisdom 1:14, "God made all things that they might be [*ut essent*]". In the recapitulation of his expositions, he maintains that the text means to say that all things "have being outside [*esse extra*] in the natural world"; nevertheless, they were in God "insofar as they are understanding [*intelligere*] and in an intellectual way"—the idea of the "twofold being" of a creature, which the Meister promptly extends to the triad of perfections: "Likewise, all things were in God, insofar as they are living [*vivere*] and life [*vita*]". Finally, he relates this interpretation to the reading of the beginning of the Gospel of John (1:3–4): "All things were made through him" (with respect to their "formal being" (*esse*)), and "What was made in him was life" (with respect to *vivere*), and "life was the light of man" with respect to *intelligere*, for the life of man is understanding and intellect.[69]

In the Commentary of John on the text in question, Eckhart gives a number of arguments for "the truth of the proposition" 'What was made in him was life' (*Quod factum est in ipso vita est*). One of them is based on the triad of perfections and consists of three points. The first point emphasizes the comprehensive character of the triad: "One must first know that these three—*vivere*, *esse* and *intelligere*—exhaust or complete the totality of being [*totum ens*]".[70]

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69 Cf. *In Sap*., n. 32 (LW II, pp. 352–353): "Et notandum quod in qualibet octo expositionum praemissarum littera debet ordinari secundum commune acceptionem, ut dicatur quod deus fecit *omnia, ut essent*, id est ut haberent esse extra in rerum natura, quamvis ab aeterno in ipso fuerint et aeternaliter secundum suas rationes, ut sunt intelligere et intellectualiter, et similiter sunt vivere aut vita, secundum illud Ioh. 1 (:3 ff.): [...] Sensus est quod 'facta', id est creata [...] 'per ipsum', deum scilicet, 'sunt', id est habent esse formale extra in rerum natura sub formis propriiis quibus sunt. Sed in ipso nondum sunt, ut sunt [...], sed sub ratione vivere et intelligere. Et hoc est quod ait Iohannes: 'in ipso vita erat', quantum ad rationem vitae vel vivere, 'et vita erat lux hominum', quantum ad intelligere. Vita enim hominis, ut homo, est intelligere et intellectus".

70 Cf. *In Ioh*., n. 63 (LW III, p. 51): "Quarta ratio est: ad cuius evidentiam sciendum primo, quod haec tria: vivere, esse et intelligere, evacuant sive implent totum ens". The same idea is found in the German work. Cf. *Predigt* 8.

The second point concerns the order among the three perfections, which is explained in a more differentiated manner than in the Parisian Question. Their order is different, when the perfections are considered "abstractly" (*in abstracto*), that is, without their subject, as when we say "esse", "vivere" and "intelligere", or when they are considered "concretely" (*in concreto*), that is, as "concretized" in a subject, as when we say "ens", "vivens" and "intelligens".[71] In the abstract, "to be" (*esse*) is the most perfect among the three, because no mode of being can be lacking to it, and on the same ground "to live" is more excellent than "to understand". In the concrete, however, the order is reversed: "being" (*ens*) holds the lowest place, that which is "living" (*vivens*) the second and that which is "intelligent" (*intelligens*) the highest. The reason is that in the concrete they are participating in these perfections and that every participating thing as such is empty and imperfect from itself. It is because of its own imperfection that a thing first partakes in a more imperfect degree of participation. Hence, a created thing is first a "being" (*ens*), is "living" (*vivens*) on a more perfect level, and is "thinking" (*intelligens*) on the last and supreme level, because what is thinking includes being.[72]

Eckhart next links the order of the perfections in a creature with a third point, noting that "what is lower is in a nobler and more perfect way in its superior qua essential order".[73] He argues that, on the basis of the three points mentioned, it is clear that "being" (*ens*) in what lives (*vivens*) is life as in its next superior; and what lives is intellect in its superior, which is *intelligens*. This is very well expressed, the Meister concludes, in the words of John 1: "what was made", or being, "was life in him, and life was the light of men".[74]

Eckhart, in his Commentary, intends with his appeal to the triad of perfections something more than a corroboration of the superiority of *intelligere* as in

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71 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 63 (LW III, p. 52): "Alius ordo istorum in abstracto, puta cum dicimus esse, vivere et intelligere; alius in concreto, puta cum dicimus ens, vivens et intelligens".

72 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 63 (LW III, p. 52): "In abstracto enim esse est perfectius inter tria. Ipsi enim esse nullus modus sive perfectio essendi deesse potest. [...] Pari ratione vivere est nobilius intelligere. In concreto vero opposito modo se habet: ens enim infimum tenet locum, vivum secundum, intelligens tertium sive supremum. Et est ratio: nam in concreto sunt participantia. Omne autem participans ut sic nudum et imperfectum est ex se ipso. Propter quod primo participat ex sui imperfectione in imperfectiori gradu participationis, et plus sapit naturam imperfecti. Hinc est quod res creata primo est ens, perfectius est vivens, postremo et supremo est intelligens. Sic ergo intelligens perfectius est quam ens eo quod includit ens".

73 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 63 (LW III, p. 53): "Tertio notandum quod inferius nobilius et perfectiori modo est in suo superiori ordine essentiali".

74 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 64 (LW III, p. 53): "Ex his ergo tribus manifestum est quod ens in vivente vita

the Parisian Question; he rather advances the mutual presence of these three perfections. This intention also appears from another argument he presents for the text "What was made was life in him". It is based on a proposition in his favourite writing, the *Liber de causis*, which states: "All of the first things are in one another after the mode appropriate for one of them to be in the other" (prop. 12), for in being there are life and intelligence, and in life there are being and intelligence, and in intelligence there are being and life—the proposition is an adaptation of prop. 103 in Proclus's *Elements of Theology*: "All things are in all things [*omnia in omnibus*], but properly in each".[75]

Eckhart next quotes the comments in the *Liber* on his statement, but in fact tacitly corrects their content. The *Liber* states:

> Verumtamen esse et vita in intelligentia sunt *duae* aliae 'alachili', id est intelligentiae, et esse et intelligentia in vita sunt *duae* vitae, et intelligentia et vita in esse sunt *duo* esse.

Eckhart cites:

> Et ibidem in commento: esse et vivere in intelligentia intelligentia et simplex intelligere est, esse et intelligere in vita simplex vivere et vita est.[76]

In his Commentary on the *Liber de causis*, Thomas Aquinas had criticized the statement that "being and life in intelligence are *two* intelligences, and being and intelligence in life are *two* lives, and intelligence and life in being *two* beings". He declares that "what is asserted in this Book seems to be corrupted and badly understood".[77] What is received in another perfection cannot constitute a separate entity, which is a doubling of that perfection. Eckhart already corrects in his quotation the assertion in the *Liber de causis* by reading: "Being [*esse*] and living [*vivere*] in the intelligence are intelligence and simple under-

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est, utpote in suo superiori proximo; et vivens in suo superiori, quod est intelligens, intellectus est. Et hoc est quod hic optime dicitur: *quod factum est* sive ens *in ipso vita erat, et vita*, id est vivens, *erat lux hominum*".

75 Cf. *In Ioh*., n. 61 (LW III, p. 51): "Secunda ratio, quia, sicut dicitur in *De causis*, 'primorum omnium quaedam sunt in quibusdam per modum quo licet ut sit unum in alio eorum'". Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio theologica, transl. Guillelmo de Morbecca*, prop. 103, (ed. H. Boese), Leuven 1987, p. 52: "Omnia in omnibus, proprie autem in unoquoque: et enim in ente et vita et intellectus, et in vita esse et intelligere, et in intellectu esse et vivere".

76 Cf. *Liber de causis*, prop. 12, (ed. Saffrey), p. 77; Meister Eckhart, *In Ioh*., n. 61 (LW III, p. 51).

77 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *In De causis*, prop. 12, (ed. Saffrey), p. 79.

standing [*intelligere*]; being and understanding are in life simple living and life".[78] The triad of perfections receives in the *Opus tripartitum* an all-inclusive character (*omnia in omnibus*); it becomes an integrating factor.

4.3 *The Doctrine of the Transcendentals: Hierarchization of "verum" and "bonum"*

Eckhart's "intellectualism" is not something incidental but a constant feature of his thought. A clear example of its continuity is the impact his intellectualism has on the basic teaching of the *Opus tripartitum*, the doctrine of the transcendentals, insofar as it leads to a heterogeneity of the terms.

In the *Quaestiones parisienses*, Eckhart maintains that the concept of "true" belongs to a different order than "being" and the "good", which are convertible with one another and are proper to the created world. It is striking that the heterogeneity is also found in the systematic account of the doctrine in the *Opus tripartitum*—to be sure, not between *verum* on the one hand, and *ens* and *bonum* on the other, but with respect to the relation between the "true" and the "good". The two expositions of the transcendentals "being", "one", "true" and "good" in Eckhart's Commentary on John show this fact.

In his first account, Eckhart prepares the order between *verum* and *bonum* through a primary division of created being (*ens*): The totality of being is first divided into extramental being, *ens reale* or *ens naturale*, which is divided into the ten categories, and intramental being or "cognitive being" (*ens cognitivum*): "One must speak about the *rationes* and the cognition of things in another way than about the things outside in nature".[79] Unlike the Parisian Questions, Eckhart integrates that which pertains to the intellect into the consideration of being. *Ens in anima* is a mode of being, whereas in the *Quaestio parisiensis* II he maintains that an *ens in anima* "is not a being", since it is contradistinguished to being that is divided into the ten categories, and what is contradistinguished to categorical being is not a being.[80]

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78 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 61 (LW III, p. 51). Cf. n. 139 (LW III, p. 117): "Nam et esse et intelligere in vita vita sunt vel potius vita est et vivere, ut patet ex *De causis*".

79 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 514 (LW III, p. 445): "Sciendum ergo quod ens secundum totum sui ambitum prima sui divisione dividitur in ens reale extra animam, divisum in decem praedicamenta, et in ens in anima sive in ens cognitivum [...]. Aliter autem loquendum est omnino de rerum rationibus et cognitione ipsarum, aliter de rebus extra in natura".

80 Cf. *Quaestio parisiensis* II, n. 4 (LW V, p. 51): "Ens in anima contradividitur contra ens, quod dividitur in decem praedicamenta, et contra substantiam et accidens, ut patet VI *Metaph.* (c. 2). Sed condivisum contra substantiam et accidens non est ens, ergo ens in anima non est ens".

But there is also continuity with the Parisian position insofar as Eckhart's account of the transcendentals connects the notions "true" and "good" with the primary division of "being": *verum* pertains to "cognitive being", *bonum* to "real being".[81] The effect is a dissociation of both notions that raises a problem in his exposition. "True" and "good" are distinguished on the basis of a *division* of being, though a general condition of the transcendentals, mentioned by Eckhart at the beginning of his account, is that they are *communia*.

The dissociation of *verum* and *bonum* is supported by references to different philosophical authorities, which stand for two ideas Eckhart presents in the First Parisian Question in order to clarify that *intelligere* is of a different order than *esse*. He refers to Aristotle's statement in his *Metaphysics* (VI, 4, 1027b25) that "truth and falsity do not exist, as good and evil, in things, but in the mind", as well as to Neoplatonic authorities, as Proclus and the *Liber de causis*, which express the hierarchical order between the intelligible world and the natural world: "the intellect is principle of the entire nature, as it is said in the comments on prop. 9 of the *Book of Causes*". Eckhart cites several of these comments, such as "Intelligence governs Nature by virtue of the divine power" and "Intelligence encompasses the things it produces, both Nature and the horizon of Nature", namely the Soul.[82] He also refers to a statement of the Greek philosopher Themistius (IVth century) that "the entire nature acts as if it is instructed by higher causes", namely an intellect, the idea underlying the adage "The work of nature [*opus naturae*] is the work of an intelligence [*opus intelligentiae*]", which Eckhart also advances in the First Parisian Question for the superiority of *intelligere* over *esse*.[83] The Meister not only appeals to author-

81 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 514 (LW III, p. 445): "Ex quo patet quod [verum] pertinet ad ens cognitivum et ad cognitionem, bonum autem pertinet ad ens reale sive ad ens naturale".

82 Cf. *In Gen.* I, n. 6 (LW I, p. 189): "Intellectus enim principium est totius naturae, sicut dicitur in commento nona propositione *De causis* sub his verbis: 'intelligentia regit naturam per virtutem divinam'; et infra: 'intelligentia comprehendit generata et naturam et horizontem naturae' [...]". Cf. *Liber de causis*, prop. 9, (ed. A. Pattin), in: *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), p. 157.

83 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 514 (LW III, p. 445): "[...] sicut manifeste colligitur ex diversis locis libri *De causis* et Proclo; item ex V et VI *Metaphysicae*. Adhuc autem sciendum quod, sicut in VI dicitur, bonum et malum sunt in rebus extra animam in natura reali, verum autem et falsum sunt in anima"; n. 518 (LW III, p. 448): "Patet hoc manifeste ex libro Procli et *De causis*, scilicet naturam sive ens naturale esse sub ente cognitivo et illo mediante produci in esse. Tota enim natura agit tamquam rememorata a causis altioribus, ut commentator inducit ex Themistio". Cf. *In Gen.* II, n. 203 (LW I, p. 676): "Sic etiam natura regitur per intellectum tamquam inferius et subiectum a superiori, ut dicit commentum nonae *De causis*. Et commentator XII *Metaphysicae* ait ex Themistio: tota natura agit tamquam rememorata

ities in order to show the dissociation of *verum* and *bonum*, he also advances an argument. The *ratio veri* is prior to and simpler than the *ratio boni*; indeed, the *ratio* of the good is in the intellect, not in things, and is itself not good but rather *ratio*, namely *logos*, word, principle and cause of the good.[84]

Since *verum* pertains to cognitive being and *bonum* to natural being, and "nature or natural being is under cognitive being [*sub ente cognitivo*] and is produced into being by its mediation [*illo mediante*]", it is thus "later" (*posterius*) than cognitive being.[85] The effect is the hierarchization of the notions of "true" and "good". It introduces a moment of tension in the doctrine of the transcendentals, which teaches a conceptual, not a hierarchical order between these terms.

The consequences for the place of the "good" in this doctrine become apparent in Eckhart's second account of the transcendentals in his Commentary on John. In this text, he again elaborates on the heterogeneity of *verum* and *bonum*. Truth is connected with the metaphysics of the Word: "'In the beginning was the Word'. The *ratio* or *verbum* leads the totality of things by means of the activity of the intellect as principle, and the true is in the soul, as it is said in the *Metaphysics*".[86] The "good", by contrast, is not related to what is internal, but to what is outside (*ad extra*). It is, therefore, properly the principle and source of the creatures: because something that is created is good, and because it is good it is created. In view of this convertibility, "the ancients were right in saying that the good is not in God—much less than in mathematical objects—, but that God is called 'good' insofar as he is the cause, the *ratio* and the principle of the good".[87]

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a causis altioribus, intelligentia scilicet aut intellectu". The reference to the Greek philosopher Themistius has been derived from Averroes's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, *In Metaph.*, XII, com. 8, in: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, Venice 1562 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1962), Vol. VIII, 303K–305D.

84 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 518 (LW III, p. 448): "Patet et hoc eo quod ratio veri prior est et simplicior quam ratio boni, quin immo et ipsa ratio boni in intellectu est, non in rebus nec ipsa est bona, sed potius est ratio, scilicet logos, verbum, principium scilicet et causa boni".

85 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 514 (LW III, p. 445); n. 518 (LW III, pp. 447–448): "[...] in creatis, ubi primo procedit ens cognitivum et ab ipso descendit ens extra in rebus naturalibus, utpote sub illo et posterius illo".

86 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 562 (LW III, p. 490): "Filius ipse logos sive ratio et verbum est, Ioh. 1: 'in principio erat verbum'. Ratio enim sive verbum rerum universitati praeest intellectu principiante, et verum est in anima, II *Metaphysicae*".

87 Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 562 (LW III, pp. 490–491): "Bonum autem ex sui proprietate non iam ad intus respicit, sed ad extra. Bonum enim non in anima est, sed in rebus extra, ut dicitur VI *Metaph.*; et in mathematicis non est bonum, ut dicitur in IV [lege: III] *Metaphysicae*.

It is "rightly" said that "the good is not in God". Eckhart's approval of this conclusion is remarkable, for it contradicts the first general condition of the transcendentals, including the "good", he had formulated, namely that they properly belong to God. The devaluation of the "good" is a constant feature of Eckhart's thought. For him, *bonum*, which had a primordial place in the thirteenth-century origin of the doctrine of the transcendentals in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono* (ca. 1230), is the lowest in the order of the transcendentals: "it is in the rear [*retro*], below [*deorsum*] and the last [*postremum*] among all the *communia*".[88]

Unde secundum hoc bonum ipsum proprie principium est et fons creaturarum; eo enim quod quid creatum est, bonum est, et quo bonum est, creatum est. [...] Et sub hoc sensu bene dicebant antiqui bonum non esse in deo, multo minus quam in mathematicis, sed ipsum nominari bonum pro tanto, quia ipse est causa, ratio et principium boni".

88 Cf. *In Gen*. II, n. 95 (LW I, p. 561): "Bonum autem retro est, deorsum est et postremum inter omnia communia, quae cum ente convertuntur". Cf. W. Goris, *Einheit als Prinzip und Ziel. Versuch über die Einheitsmetaphysik des ‚Opus tripartitum' Meister Eckharts*, Leiden—New York—Köln 1997, pp. 379 ff.: "The tension in the concept of the good".

CHAPTER 18

Eckhart and the Power of Imagination*

Alessandro Palazzo

> Tant y a que nous voyons par experience,
> les femmes envoyer aux corps des enfans, qu'elles portent au ventre,
> des marques de leurs fantasies [...]
> Des animaux il en est de mesmes: tesmoing les brebis de Jacob,
> er les perdris et lievres, que la neige blanchit aux montaignes
>
> MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, *Les Essais* I, 21

⁂

Introduction

What kind of thinker was Eckhart? All studies on Eckhart, in whatever direction they tend, whatever their approach or purpose, will give, sometimes unconsciously, an answer to this question. The controversy over Eckhart's purported mysticism, for instance, can be read in the light of this initial question. Kurt Flasch's thesis is an answer denying Eckhart the label of mystic.[1] The title of Kurt Ruh's seminal monograph, in contrast, characterizes Eckhart as a theologian, a preacher, and a mystic.[2] Different again is Dietmar Mieth's perspective, an understanding of mysticism as a way of life ("Lebenskunst").[3]

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1 Cf. K. Flasch, "Meister Eckhart—Versuch, ihn aus dem mystischen Strom zu retten", in: P. Koslowski (Hrsg.), *Gnosis und Mystik in der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Zürich—München 1988, pp. 94–110.

2 Cf. K. Ruh, *Meister Eckhart: Theologe, Prediger, Mystiker*, München ^{2}1989.

3 Cf. D. Mieth, *Meister Eckhart. Mystik und Lebenskunst*, Düsseldorf 2004.

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Eckhart emerges as a metaphysician from Burkhard Mojsisch's study on the concepts of analogy, univocity, and unity and Wouter Goris' study on unity.[4] For Alain de Libera, Eckhart belongs to what he calls the "déprofessionnalisation de la philosophie".[5] Another more recent book by Kurt Flasch depicts Eckhart as a philosopher of Christianity.[6]

Two other aspects, hermeneutics and preaching, arouse great interest among scholars, with the result that the image of Eckhart as an exegete and a preacher has been consolidated over the years and become predominant.[7]

Despite this outpouring of works emphasizing Eckhart's different activities and shedding light on various issues and problems, there is an aspect of his thinking, which has, to date, received less attention: his reflection on natural philosophical topics (*naturalia*). This oversight explains why thus far nobody has considered characterizing Eckhart as—at least *also* as—a natural philosopher. With "natural philosophy" I do not refer to Aristotle's *Physics*. Even though he also deals with standard physical issues such as matter and form, motion, alteration and generation, etc., Eckhart's «naturalia», as we shall see soon, include what can be understood as nature in a broader sense.

In this respect the texts are clear. In the prologue to the *Book of the Parables of Genesis* Eckhart declares that he intends to show the agreement between the symbolic (*parabolice*) and hidden contents of the Scriptures and divine, moral, and natural teachings:

4 Cf. B. Mojsisch, *Meister Eckhart. Analogie, Univozität und Einheit*, Hamburg 1983; W. Goris, *Einheit als Prinzip und Ziel. Versuch über die Einheitsmetaphysik des Opus tripartitum Meister Eckharts* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 59), Leiden 1997.

5 Cf. A. de Libera, *Penser au Moyen Âge*, Paris 1991.

6 Cf. K. Flasch, *Meister Eckhart. Philosoph des Christentums*, München 2009.

7 The literature on these aspects of Eckhart's activity is vast and constantly expanding: the classic reference study on exegesis is J. Koch, "Sinn und Struktur der Schriftauslegungen Meister Eckharts", in: Id., *Kleine Schriften* (Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi 127), Roma 1973, Band 1, pp. 399–428. For a concise overview of scholarship on exegesis and hermeneutics, see D.F. Duclow, "Meister Eckhart's Latin Biblical Exegesis", in: J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart* (Brill's Companion to the Christian Tradition 36), Leiden—Boston 2013, pp. 321–336. An innovative perspective on preaching is suggested by L. Sturlese, "Hat es ein Corpus der deutschen Predigten Meister Eckharts gegeben? Liturgische Beobachtungen zu aktuellen philosophiehistorischen Fragen", in: A. Speer und L. Wegener (Hrsg.), *Meister Eckhart in Erfurt* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 32), Berlin 2005, pp. 393–408; for a first glance at the situation in the field of studies on Eckhart's preaching, see B. Milen, "Meister Eckhart's Vernacular Preaching", in: J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, pp. 337–357.

> [...] sed potius hoc ostendere intendimus, quod his, quae probamus et dicimus de divinis, moralibus et *naturalibus*, consonant ea quae veritas sacrae scripturae parabolice innuit quasi latenter.[8]

Eckhart repeats this intention in the Proem to the *Commentary on the Gospel of John*. He aims to show that the truths of the principles, conclusions, and natural properties shine brightly in the words of the Scriptures, provided that they are interpreted by means of the natural doctrines.

> Rursus intentio operis est ostendere, quomodo veritates *principiorum et conclusionum et proprietatum naturalium* innuuntur luculenter—'qui habet aures audiendi!'—in ipsis verbis sacrae scripturae, quae per *illa naturalia* exponuntur.[9]

But which natural philosophical truths are consonant with the profound meanings of the Scriptures? Eckhart's modern interpreters usually focus on a few key topics:[10] matter and form, alteration and generation, lighting and heating, etc. These physical questions are reinterpreted by Eckhart, who refers them to a superior—metaphysical and divine—level of signification. Scholarly interest in these topics is probably whetted by this double level of meaning.[11]

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8 Eckhart's works will be cited from Meister Eckhart, *Die deutschen und die lateinischen Werke*, hrsg. im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG); *Die deutschen Werke*, hrsg. von J. Quint und G. Steer, Stuttgart 1936 ff., 5 Bände; *Die lateinischen Werke*, hrsg. von E. Benz; K. Christ; B. Decker; H. Fischer; B. Geyer; J. Koch; E. Seeberg; L. Sturlese; K. Weiss; A. Zimmermann, Stuttgart 1936 ff., 5 Bände. 'DW' and 'LW' refer to the volumes of German (deutschen) and Latin works, respectively. Cf. Eckhart, *Liber parabolarum Genesis*, LW I/1, n. 4, p. 454,8–10 (henceforward Italics in quotations is mine).

9 Eckhart, *Expositio Sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem*, LW 3, n. 3, p. 4,14–16.

10 Cf. A. de Libera, "Maître Eckhart et la controverse sur l'unité ou la pluralité des forme", in: K. Flasch (Hrsg.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart* (CPTMA, Beiheft II), Hamburg 1984, pp. 147–162; A. de Libera et E. Zum Brunn, *Maître Eckhart. Métaphysique du Verbe et théologie négative* (Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie 42), Paris 1984, especially pp. 84–103; A. Palazzo, "'Sub metaphora mulieris adulterae": la materia e la forma in Meister Eckhart", in: A. Palazzo (ed.), *Il desiderio nel Medioevo* (Temi e Testi 132), Roma 2014, pp. 75–95.

11 See above n. 10 and Ludwig Hödl, "Naturphilosophie und Heilsbotschaft in Meister Eckharts Auslegung des Johannesevangeliums", in: *Filosofia della natura nel medioevo*. Atti del Terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale, Passo della Mendola (Tn), 31 agosto–5 settembre 1964, Milano 1966, pp. 641–651, especially 644–646, 650–651.

Besides these themes, however, there are other naturalia which have been treated either not at all or insufficiently: celestial causality, the virtues of animals, plants, stones, and words, divination, psychosomatic processes, fascination, etc.[12] Eckhart's texts on these issues and their sources have not been examined; his views on these subjects have not been placed within the debates of his time; the relationships between the Latin and vernacular texts have not been studied. In fact, the relevance of this aspect of Eckhart's thought has hardly been evaluated.

This study will explore different aspects of the relationship between mind and body: maternal imagination, psychosomatic effects, and fascination. Even though they are peripheral to his main interests, these issues give an insight into Eckhart's approach to nature. They were at the centre of late medieval scientific discussions based on authoritative biblical, literary, and philosophical sources. Therefore, Eckhart's views on the power of imagination—the power of the soul to influence and modify the body and external matter—will be examined in relation to the late medieval debate and its sources.

1 *Genesis* 30,41: Jacob's Goats

Let's pay attention to the following passage:

> *Cernens autem Rachel.* Et infra: *ponebat autem Iacob virgas in canalibus aquarum*,[13] etc.
>
> Notandum quod praeter id quod Augustinus hic inducit de hypotheca et est in Glossa, sumpta ex Hieronymo, Avicenna VI Naturalium p. IV c. 4 sic ait: "attende dispositionem infirmi, cum credit se convalescere, aut

12 With the exception of Dagmar Gottschall, thus far nobody has addressed these issues: D. Gottschall, "La natura nel corpus omiletico di Eckhart", in: A. Cipolla e M. Nicoli (edd.), *Testi agiografici ed omiletici del medioevo germanico*, Atti del XXXII Convegno dell'Associazione Italiana di Filologia Germanica, Verona, 8–10 giugno 2005, Verona 2006, pp. 41–64; Ead., "„Man möhte wunder tuon mit worten" (Predigt 18). Zum Umgang Meister Eckharts mit Wörtern in seinen deutschen Predigten", in: A. Speer und L. Wegener (Hrsg.), *Meister Eckhart in Erfurt*, pp. 427–449. See also: A. Palazzo, "Predigt 54a 'Unser herre underhuop und huop von unden ûf sîniu ougen'. Predigt 54b 'Haec est vita aeterna'", in: G. Steer und L. Sturlese (Hrsg.), *Lectura Eckhardi IV*, Stuttgart 2016, pp. 29–61; Id., "*de sonne antwert gode*: umiltà e 'naturalia' in Meister Eckhart", in: A. Palazzo, F. Bonini, A. Colli (edd.), *La nobiltà nel pensiero medievale*, Fribourg 2016, pp. 181–200.

13 Gen. 30:41.

dispositionem sani, cum credit se aegrotare. Multotiens contingit ex hoc, ut, cum corroboratur forma in anima eius, patiatur ex ea ipsius materia et proveniat ex hoc sanitas aut infirmitas. Et est actio haec efficacior quam id quod agit medicus instrumentis suis et mediis. Et propter hoc homo potest ambulare super trabem, quae est in media via; sed si posita fuerit pons super aquam profundam, non audebit ambulare super eam, eo quod imaginatur in anima eius forma cadendi vehementer impressa, cui oboedit natura eius et virtus membrorum eius".

Rursus in libro suo De animalibus I.VII in fine sic dicit Avicenna: "de mirabilibus animalium est, quando gallina vincit gallum in pugna, erigit quasi esset gallus et elevat caudam suam et percutit suis alis in sua luxuria sicut gallus, et aliquando nascitur cornu in crure suo quasi gallo. Et in hoc potest percipi oboedientia naturae in cogitationibus animae, quando propter suam cogitationem post pugnam nascebatur ei cornu in crure".

Ad hoc facit quod Augustinus XI De trinitate c. 2 dicit quod "amor aut cupiditas aut libido corpus animantis vehementer afficit et, ubi non resistit pigrior duriorque materies, in similem speciem coloremque commutat. Licet videre corpusculum chamaeleontis ad colores quos videt facillima conversione variari. Aliorum autem animalium, quia non est ad conversionem facilis corpulentia, fetus plerumque produnt libidines matrum, quid cum magna delectatione prospexerint".[14]

The famous episode narrated in Gen. 30:25–43 can be considered one of the first examples of eugenics in history. After having served Laban for a long time and increased his wealth, Jacob wishes to return to his country with his wives and children. As wages he asks his father-in-law for dark sheep and spotted and speckled goats only, promising that he will continue to pasture Laban's flock. Laban agrees, but breaks his word and takes away the dark and differently coloured animals and gives them to his sons.

Jacob then plays a trick on Laban. He makes white stripes in shoots of poplar, almond and plane trees, by peeling off their bark. Then he puts the rods in the water troughs, so that the animals see them as they come to drink. The animals mate and conceive while looking at these rods and produce striped, spotted, and multi-coloured kids. Jacob only puts the sticks in the troughs, when the hardiest animals are in heat, so that they alone mate beside the rods, thus ensuring that all the animals he receives are sturdy, leaving the feeble ones to Laban.

14 Eckhart, *Expositio libri Genesis*, LW I/1, nn. 292–294, pp. 429,2–430,13.

Jacob's stratagem is a form of rational eugenic selection, yet the way it is accomplished appears to be miraculous. But how does Eckhart interpret this event? He understands Gen. 30:41 ("ponebat autem Iacob virgas in canalibus aquarum") in terms of natural philosophy by appealing to the idea that a mother's thoughts and desires at the moment of conception or during pregnancy may affect her foetus' appearance. Before turning to Eckhart, it is worth giving a brief sketch of the historical debate on this concept.

Originating in Antiquity,[15] then applied by the Fathers in their interpretation of the episode of Laban's flock,[16] during the Middle Ages maternal imagination became a successful conceptual tool used in several branches of knowledge and in connection with various topics: embryology, physiognomy, teratology, theories of extraordinary generation, prophethood, psychosomatic effects, etc. The idea underlying Jacob's eugenic mechanism—that the mother's sense perceptions have an impact on the progeny's appearance—was thus reworked in the form of a refined theory supported by authoritative philosophical and medical sources and accepted by the foremost medieval thinkers.[17] In the Renaissance and modern era this notion was not only cen-

15 Cf. C. Plinius Secundus, *Naturalis Historiae libri XXVII*, (edd. L. Ian et C. Mayohoff), Stuttgart 1986 (editio stereotype editionis prioris 1909), VII, 10, 52, pp. 18,19–19,6: "Similitudinum quidem inmensa reputatio est et in qua credantur multa fortuita pollere, visus, auditus, memoria haustaeque imagines sub ipso conceptu. Cogitatio etiam utriuslibet animum subito transvolans effingere similitudinem aut miscere existimatur, ideoque plures in homine quam in ceteris omnibus animalibus differentiae, quoniam velocitas cogitationum animique celeritas et ingenii varietas multiformes notas inprimit, cum ceteris animantibus inmobiles sint animi et similes omnibus singulis in suo cuique genere". Traces of this notion can also be found in works by other authors, e.g. Plutarchus (*De placitis* V, 12), Oppian (*Cynegetica* I), Heliodorus (*Aetiopica* X, especially X, 14–15), and in those of philosophers and physicians (see below note 17).

16 See below notes 20 and 21. The same exegesis is suggested by Isidore of Seville: cf. Isidorus Hispalensis, *Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX*, (ed. W.M. Lindsay), Oxford 1911, XII, 1, 58–60. During the Middle Ages, however, an understanding of Jacob's narration in terms either of symbols or miracles emerged, with the result that some authors did not take maternal imagination as a viable explanation for this biblical passage: cf. M. Angelini e M. Trinci (edd.), *Le voglie. L'immaginazione materna tra magia e scienza*, Roma 2000, pp. 14–16.

17 Cf. e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de malo* (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia 23), Roma—Paris 1982, q. 4, a. 8, ad 13m, p. 128,306–308: "aliqua imitatio fit in prole ex imaginatione parentis in ipso coitu, si sit fortis"; Albertus Magnus, *Quaestiones super De animalibus* (Editio Coloniensis 12), (ed. E. Filthaut), Münster 1955, XVIII, q. 3, p. 298,75–81: "[…] et propter hoc illa mulier regia, de qua refert Avicenna, imaginans figuram daemonis vel nani vel Aethiopis secundum alios, peperit filios consimiles, quia in

tral to the learned discourse, but also made its way into less technical debates and found larger audiences, becoming a belief deeply rooted in the popular mentality.[18]

Eckhart starts his analysis of Gen. 30:41 by alluding to Augustine and to Jerome, who is the source of the *Gloss*. Both Fathers applied maternal imagination to the exegesis of Jacob's episode. In his *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* Augustine links Jacob's episode with the tale of the woman accused of adultery for giving birth to a very lovely child who did not look at all like his parents. He adduces the explanation of the renowned physician Hippocrates who suggests that a picture may have hung in the bedroom, implying that the child resembles this picture and the woman looked at it while having sex. Augustine also claims that some details of the biblical story—why are shoots from different trees used together? Are the shoots one kind of wood only or of different types?—are not clear and must thus be read from a prophetic-allegorical perspective. This claim lays the foundations for the symbolizing interpretation which will later be adopted by many medieval exegetes.[19] Jacob, he claims, was indeed a prophet inspired by spiritual revelation and his actions were therefore not fraudulent.[20] In other words, even though Augustine considers Jacob to have been divinely enlightened and his actions to have had spiritual

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conceptu propter vehementem imaginationem succubuit virtus propria et virtus naturalis erat alterata secundum modum imaginationis". The source of the passage is Avicenna, *Liber canonis*, Venetiis 1507 (2nd Reprint Hildesheim 2003), l. III, fen. 21, tr. 1, c. 2, f. 362ra: "[…] de causis assimilationis est illud quod exemplificatur cum eo dispositio conceptionis in mente mulieris: aut viri ex forma humana exemplificatione firma". Other sources of the theory are Aristoteles, *Problemata* X, 10, 891b33–39; Hippocrates, *De natura pueri*; Galenus, *De theriaca ad Pisonem*, c. 11.

18 For a comprehensive account of the discussion in the Renaissance and the modern era, cf. M.-H. Huet, *Monstrous Imagination*, Cambridge, Mass.—London 1993; L. Daston and L.K. Park, *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750*, New York 1998, Chapter 5, pp. 173–214; M. Angelini e M. Trinci (edd.), cit., pp. 12–115; T. Griffero, *Immagini attive. Breve storia dell'immaginazione transitiva*, Firenze 2003, pp. 86–94, 121–174. Giovanni Battista della Porta, Paracelsus, Montaigne, and Malebranche are, among others, authoritative witnesses to this notion.

19 See above n. 16.

20 Cf. Augustinus, *Quaestionum in Heptateuchum libri septem* (CCSL 33), (ed. I. Fraipont), Turnhout 1958, I, q. 93, pp. 34,1153–35,1173: "In facto Iacob cum virgas excorticavit, detrahens viride, ut album varie adpareret et sic in conceptu fetus pecorum variarentur, cum matres in alveis aquarum biberent et *visis* virgis illam varietatem *conciperent*, multa dicuntur similiter fieri in animalium fetibus. *Sed et mulieri accidisse traditur et scriptum reperitur in libris antiquissimi et peritissimi medici Hippocratis, quod suspicione adulterii fuerat punienda, cum* ⟨*puerum*⟩ *pulcherrimum peperisset utrique parenti generique dissimilem,*

and symbolic meaning, they can still be explained rationally, as the scientist Hippocrates did when he referred to maternal imagination, a natural phenomenon.

In the *Liber quaestionum hebraicarum in Genesim* Jerome also uses maternal imagination as a key to understanding Jacob's trick. There are interesting additions to and differences from Augustine's exegesis in the *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*. Jerome says that the same thing happens to the Spaniards' herds of horses ("apud Hispanos"). He insists that it is natural for a woman to give birth to young who resemble images she has in her mind when she conceives ("hanc in conceptu feminarum esse *naturam*, ut quales perspexerint siue *mente conceperint* in extremo uoluptatis aestu quae concipiunt, talem sobolem procreent"; "hanc conceptuum esse *naturam*"). Finally, Jerome attributes to Quintilian the argument that Augustine attributes to Hippocrates: the famous orator once defended a woman whose 'crime' was giving birth to an Ethiopian by alluding to the power of maternal images at the moment of conception.[21]

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nisi memoratus medicus solvisset quaestionem illis admonitis quaerere, ne forte aliqua talis pictura esset in cubiculo; qua inventa mulier a suspicione liberata est. Sed ad hanc rem quam fecit Iacob virgarum ex diversis arboribus trium copulatio quid contulerit utilitatis, quod adtinet ad varias pecudes multiplicandas, non adparet omnino. Nec aliquid ad hoc commodum interest, utrum ex unius generis ligno varientur virgae an plura sint lignorum genera, cum sola quaeratur lignorum varietas. *Ac per hoc cogit inquiri prophetiam et aliquam figuratam significationem res ista, quam sine dubio ut propheta fecit Iacob; et ideo nec fraudis arguendus est. Non enim tale aliquid nisi revelatione spiritali eum fecisse credendum est*".

21 Cf. Hieronymus, *Hebraicae quaestiones in libro Geneseos* (CCSL, 72), (ed. P. de Lagarde), Turnhout 1959, pp. 37,2–38,2: "Tres enim uirgas, populeas et amygdalinas et mali granati, quamquam LXX styracinas et nucineas et plataninas habeant, ex parte decorticans uarium uirgarum fecit colorem, ut, ubicumque in uirga corticem reliquisset, antiquus permaneret color, ubi uero tulisset corticem, color candidus panderetur. Obseruabat ergo Iacob, et tempore, quo ascendebantur pecora, et post calorem diei ad potandum auida pergebant, discolores uirgas ponebat in canalibus et admissis arietibus et hircis in ipsa potandi auiditate oues et capras faciebat ascendi, ut ex duplici desiderio, dum auide bibunt et ascenduntur a maribus, tales foetus conciperent, quales umbras arietum et hircorum desuper ascendentium in aquarum speculo contemplabantur. Ex uirgis enim in canalibus positis uarius erat etiam imaginum color. *Nec mirum hanc in conceptu feminarum esse naturam, ut quales perspexerint siue mente conceperint in extremo uoluptatis aestu quae concipiunt, talem sobolem procreent, cum hoc ipsum etiam in equarum gregibus apud Hispanos dicatur fieri, et Quintilianus in ea controuersia, in qua accusabatur matrona, quod Aethiopem pepererit, pro defensione illius argumentetur hanc conceptuum esse naturam, quam supra diximus*. Postquam autem nati fuerant haedi et agni uarii et discolores ex albis et unius coloris gregibus, separabat illos Iacob et procul esse faciebat a pristino

Interestingly, the *Glossa ordinaria* reports the references to both Quintilian and to Hippocrates.[22]

2 Avicenna

The core of Eckhart's interpretation of Gen. 30:41, however, is formed not by the allusions to the interpretations of Augustine and Jerome, but by two Avicennian texts (*Liber de anima* IV 4 and *De animalibus* VIII 7) that illustrate the psychosomatic effects of thoughts, emotions, and images. Eckhart's intention is evident: the power of maternal imagination to act upon the foetus is only one of the effects that mental representations can have at the corporeal and physical level. The roots of the naturalistic understanding of the biblical passage concerning Laban's flock must therefore be found in Avicenna's writings, which are the main sources for the late medieval and Renaissance debate on the power of imagination.

The passages quoted from *Liber de anima* IV 4 and *De animalibus* VIII 7 belong to a large number of quotations from Avicenna that are scattered throughout Eckhart's work and must therefore be studied as parts of this whole. I have conducted a detailed survey of these quotations which shows Avicenna to be one of Eckhart's most important sources.[23] With 122 quotes, Avicenna is, after Aristotle, one of Eckhart's most quoted philosophical sources, almost equivalent to the *Liber de causis* and Maimonides.[24] Not only the sheer number,

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grege, si qui autem nascebantur unius coloris, id est albi siue nigri, tradebat in manibus filiorum Laban: et ponebat uirgas, quas decoriauerat in canalibus, ubi effundebantur aquae, et ueniebant ad potandum contra pecora, ut conciperent eo tempore, cum uenirent ad potandum".

22 Cf. *Glossa Ordinaria*, in: *Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria*, Argentinae 1480–1481 (Facsimile Reprint of the *Editio Princeps*, Adolph Rutsch of Strassburg), Vol. I, f. 78[a].

23 Cf. A. Palazzo, "'Ez sprichet gar ein hôher meister': Eckhart e Avicenna", in: L. Sturlese (ed.), *Studi sulle fonti di Meister Eckhart I* (Dokimion. Neue Schriftenreihe zur Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 34), Fribourg 2008, pp. 71–111, with an appendix containing a complete list of all Avicenna quotations. For Eckhart's indebtedness to Avicenna, cf. also K. Flasch, *Meister Eckhart. Die Geburt der „Deutschen Mystik" aus dem Geist der arabischen Philosophie*, München 2006, pp. 122–138; A. Palazzo, "Eckhart's Islamic and Jewish Sources: Avicenna, Avicebron, and Averroes", in: J. Hackett (ed.), *A Companion to Meister Eckhart*, pp. 253–298, here 257–271.

24 For a careful survey of the quotations of the *Liber de causis* and Maimonides' *Dux neutrorum*, cf. respectively F. Retucci, "'Her ûf sprichet ein heidenischer meister in dem buoche,

but also such formal factors as the precise location in the source (Book, Chapter, etc.) of a great number of quotations and their length and exactness show that Eckhart was extremely familiar with the writings of the Persian philosopher and physician. At a doctrinal level, theories from the *Metaphysics* and the *De anima*, the most quoted of Avicenna's works, capture Eckhart's attention and he explicitly subscribes to some of them. Furthermore, since Avicenna's quotations are found in all of his works, from the earliest—e.g., the *Sermo Paschalis* preached in 1294—to the latest—the *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, assumed to be the very last one—, it can be concluded that Avicenna was an authoritative interlocutor for Eckhart throughout his academic career.

The *De anima*, often combined with texts from Augustine—a combination that we also find in relation to the power of imagination—is one of the key sources for crucial motifs and themes for Eckhart: the two "faces" (*facies*) of the soul, the "ground" (*grunt*), the senses and the intellect in the process of knowledge, emanation, the hierarchy of being, etc. Avicenna is also one of Eckhart's sources in his discussions on "naturalia". Eckhart's views on imagination, its subjective psychosomatic effects, and the power of the mind to act upon external bodies must therefore be placed in the wider context of his reception of Avicenna's philosophy.

We now return to the texts quoted by Eckhart. In the first passage (from *Liber de anima* IV 4) Avicenna adduces two examples. The first is borrowed from his medical expertise: when a sick man is strongly convinced that he will become well and the form of this conviction becomes firmly rooted in his mind, his body is so affected by this form that he recovers; the opposite happens when a healthy man believes he is ill. The action of the form conceived of by the man is therefore more effective than any medical treatment based on the use of material instruments and media. Similarly, a man—this is the second example—is able to walk on a tree trunk that is in the middle of a street. But if the trunk is on a bridge over deep water, the image of falling will take root in his mind and his nature and the "power" (*virtus*) of his organs will be overwhelmed by it.

These examples illuminate the mechanism based on the psychophysiological functioning of the human compound of soul and body. As the first case demonstrates, the relationship between mental representations and

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daz dâ heizet daz lieht der liehte': Eckhart, il Liber de causis e Proclo", in: L. Sturlese (ed.), *Studi sulle fonti di Meister Eckhart I*, pp. 135–166, and D. Di Segni, "'verba sunt Rabbi Moysis': Eckhart e Mosè Maimonide", in: L. Sturlese (ed.), *Studi sulle fonti di Meister Eckhart II* (Dokimion. Neue Schriftenreihe zur Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 37), Fribourg 2012, pp. 103–140.

bodily reactions has important medical implications that did not go unnoticed by the physician Avicenna.

The behaviour of animals is characterized by the same mind-body interaction. In some cases, however, nature obeys the mind in such a way that the resulting phenomenon appears to be a wonder. In *De animalibus* VIII 7—the second text quoted—Avicenna describes one of these "mirabilia". After a victorious fight against a rooster, a hen perceiving herself too as a rooster, stands tall, lifts her tail and shakes her wings in a fit of lust ("in sua luxuria")—just like a rooster—and sometimes a spur, like that of a rooster, even appears on her shank.[25]

Both Avicennian quotations provide Eckhart with a basis for a rational understanding of Jacob's seemingly supernatural trick. The goats of Laban's flock, when copulating and conceiving in front of the striped rods, give birth to striped and spotted kids, as mind and body are closely intertwined and thus mental states and representations affect and trigger physical and physiological processes. In *Liber de anima* IV 4, shortly before the passage quoted by Eckhart, Avicenna gives more details about mind-body interaction in human beings. The operations and the passions ("accidentia") of the irascible and desiring faculties—fear, pain, anger, joy, sexual desire, etc.—and desires directly related to mental representations of the imaginative faculty belong to the human soul insofar as it is within the body; they are mental states which affect the body by causing changes in its temperament ("permutatio in complexione") and giving rise to bodily passions ("passiones in corpore").[26] In other words, Avicenna claims that some bodily transmutations are not due to material actions or passions in the body, namely interactions of its elements, but to the imaginative forms that exist in the human soul.[27]

3 Augustine

Eckhart closes his exegesis of Gen. 30:41 by quoting extensively a text in Augustine's *De trinitate* XI 2 that theorizes the maternal power of imagination. The context of Augustine's analysis is a description of the visual mechanism. According to the Bishop of Hippo, an act of vision involves three factors: the thing

25 Cf. Avicenna, *De animalibus* VIII, 7, in: *Avicennae Perhypatetici Philosophi … Opera in lucem redacta … De animalibus*, Venetiis 1508 (ripr. facs. Leuven 1961), f. 40va30–35.

26 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus*, (ed. S. Van Riet), Louvain—Leiden 1968, p. 4, c. 4, pp. 59,49–62,96.

27 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, p. 62,97–2.

that is seen, the sense of vision and the attention of the mind ("animi intentio") which keeps the sense of the eye focused on the thing, thus conjoining the first two factors. Augustine makes it clear that of these three elements only attention is incorporeal, whereas the visible thing is material and vision, as one of the five senses, belongs to the body.[28] When we perceive something by seeing it, the visible thing generates a form, an image of itself, in the faculty of sight: the act of vision is simply the sense of vision informed by this image.[29] Later Augustine refers again to the existence of these three factors in the act of vision, to the corporeal nature of both the form of the visible thing and the sense informed by it, and to the immaterial character of attention. Significantly, however, attention is now called "will" (*voluntas*).[30] This substitution must not be ignored, for will is now also credited with an extraordinary new ability which could not have been so easily attributed to "attention" (*intentio*).

The text on the mind's power quoted by Eckhart begins here. Love—or passion or strong desire—powerfully affects the whole of the living being's body and, in cases where matter does not resist, changes its form and colour, although matter is less responsive to influence.[31]

This metamorphosis can be observed in the small body of a chameleon, able to change its colour in response to those it sees.[32] Animals other than the chameleon undoubtedly have bodies which are more resistant to transformation, but in their cases too the mind can exert an influence upon matter through the phenomenon of maternal imagination. A foetus therefore often reveals what its mother strongly desired and looked at while having sexual pleasure. Augustine provides an embryological explanation of this fact, saying that in their very early phases of development embryos are very tender and malleable and easily conform to the will of the mother's soul and to her mental image, which has been generated by a body at which she gazed with strong desire.[33] Eckhart does not report this explanation, but it is certainly present in

28 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate* (CCSL 50A), (edd. W.J. Mountain et F. Glorie), Turnhout 1968, XI, 2, 2, p. 335,32–40. Another two Augustinian texts on maternal imagination are *Contra Iulianum libri sex* (PL 44), V, 14, 51, coll. 812–813; *De civitate dei* (CCSL 48), (edd. B. Dombart et A. Kalb), Turnhout 1955, XII, 26, p. 382,35–38.

29 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate*, XI, 2, 3, p. 336,68–70.

30 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate*, XI, 2, 5, p. 338,124–134.

31 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate*, XI, 2, 5, p. 339,140–143: "Et si tam violenta est ut possit vocari amor aut cupiditas aut libido […]". Eckhart omits the conditional clause, dealing immediately with the effects of love on the body.

32 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate*, XI, 2, 5, p. 339,144–145.

33 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate*, XI, 2, 5, p. 339,145–151.

his mind. Many examples of maternal imagination, Augustine continues, may be mentioned, but it is sufficient to recall the famous story of Jacob's goats, told in the most reliable of the books, the Bible.[34]

Unlike the text of the *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, this quotation of Augustine underlines the role of desire and passion in the process of maternal imagination. A mother can only transmit to her progeny traits shaped by the form present in her mind at the moment of conception, if, at the height of orgasm, she passionately desires the object corresponding to that image. The foetus is affected by its mother's mental images because of the tenderness of its matter. Since it is inside the maternal body, the foetus' body is a part of its mother's body. This is why Eckhart, following Augustine and Avicenna, regards maternal imagination as a particular form of subjective psychosomatic imagination.

4 On Avicenna, Again

Eckhart also refers to the Avicennian doctrine of the subjective psychosomatic effects of imagination in other works. In the *Sermo Paschalis*, one of his earliest writings, dating to his time as Bachelor of the Sentences in Paris in 1294, Eckhart examines the sacrament of the Eucharist. This work is noteworthy as the first version of his theory of humility and for its numerous references to the philosophical and scientific literature, a consistent mark of Eckhart's literary production. Avicenna is one of the authorities quoted. The first part ("Pascha nostrum") of the pericope ("Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus. Itaque epulemur": 1 Cor. 5:7–8) is at the heart of the sermon. Eckhart comments on it thus:

> Pascha nostrum etc.
>
> Videmus, quando mater infantem vult provocare ad comedendum et medicus infirmum ad sumendum medicinam, uterque utrumque commendat, quia opinio bona de his ut plurimum proficit, et talis imaginatio prima boni plus quandoque confert quam medicus per instrumenta. Unde visum est, ut ipsi referunt, quod gallina ex sola imaginatione quantum ad exteriorem dispositionem se transfiguravit in gallum. Unde volens

34 Cf. Augustinus, *De trinitate*, XI, 2, 5, p. 339,152–156: "Sunt exempla quae copiose commemorari possint, sed unum sufficit de fidelissimis libris quod fecit Iacob ut oves et caprae varios coloribus parerent supponendo eis variata virgulta in canalibus aquarum quae potantes intuerentur eo tempore quo conceperant".

> nos provocare ad manducandum pascha, primo proponit eius excellentiam dicens: pascha nostrum etc.[35]

The Apostle, in order to encourage everybody to eat the "Pasqua", draws attention to its excellence. Eckhart is undoubtedly persuaded that a positive image is an extremely effective motive power. A mother praises eating so that her child is encouraged to take food; a physician does the same with a medicine so that a sick person is encouraged to take it. A positive belief ("opinio") is very helpful and imagining something good helps more than a physician's instruments. Then Eckhart reports the passage on the hen's metamorphosis caused only by her mental image ("ex sola imaginatione").

Avicenna is not explicitly mentioned, but here Eckhart quotes the two passages that he later combines in the *Commentary on Genesis*. In both cases the bodily effects of the imagination appear within an exegetical context. The Avicennian doctrine serves as a useful hermeneutical tool for understanding the profound passage of the 1st *Epistle to the Corinthians*.

On other occasions Eckhart remarks that the value of the Christian virtue of confidence lies in the psychosomatic effects of mental images and in the mechanism of autosuggestion:

> Dic quam fiducialiter debet homo se deo committere et quam utile hoc est. Item, quantae efficaciae est fiducia, sicut docet Avicenna in exemplis.[36]

> Circa quod notandum quod ei, qui impugnatur, quattuor sunt necessaria, scilicet fortitudo, circumspectio, armatura et bona fiducia. […] Avicenna dicit et probat exemplis quod ad curam plus valet fiducia quam medicus et sua instrumenta.[37]

5 Fascination: Avicenna and Algazel

The influence of the mind on the body, autosuggestion, and maternal imagination reveal a fundamental ontological fact: the soul is superior to the body. As already noted, the soul and the body are intertwined, but this conjunction

35 Eckhart, *Sermo Paschalis a.1294 Parisius habitus*, LW 5, n. 4, p. 139,6–13.

36 Eckhart, *Sermo latinus XLVII*, LW 4, n. 481, p. 397,7–8.

37 Eckhart, *Sermo latinus XLV*, LW 4, n. 466, p. 385,7–12.

is accidental because the soul is not impressed in the body, but takes care of it.[38] It is an independent, incorporeal, and immortal substance.[39] The thought-experiment of the flying man shows that the soul is aware of its essence distinct from its body.[40]

The soul is able to affect and transmute its body, for it either has the same substance as, or, due to an improvement in its natural preparedness (*aptitudo*), enjoys a closer relationship with, one of the superior principles. Just as these principles—acting as "datores formarum"—clothe each material being with its specific form and can do this without need of physical contact or material action,[41] so can the human soul transform matter thanks to the forms present in itself.[42]

The soul can also act upon distant bodies, as the fascinator does by looking and by means of the estimative faculty.[43] If a soul, like that of the prophet, is extremely noble and powerful, matter throughout the world obeys it and is transformed by the images it conceives. The prophet is able to heal the ill, cause illness in the evil, turn one element into another, bring about rain and fertility. All these wonders, Avicenna concludes, occur "according to an intelligible necessity" (*secundum necessitatem intelligibilem*).[44]

Fascination and a prophet's extraordinary actions are usually described as transitive imagination. As a matter of fact, with regard to fascination and marvel-working the Latin text of Avicenna's *Liber de anima* refers to two other

38 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, p. 65,41–42: "Quod fit propter hoc quod anima humana […] non est impressa in materia sua, sed est providens ei".

39 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, (ed. S. Van Riet), Louvain—Leiden 1972, p. 1, c. 1, pp. 14,65–37,68.

40 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 1, c. 1, pp. 36,49–37,68.

41 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, pp. 62,3–63,13.

42 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, p. 63,13–15.

43 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, p. 65,36–38: "Multotiens autem anima operatur in corpore alieno sicut in proprio, quemadmodum est opus oculi fascinantis et aestimationis operantis".

44 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, pp. 65,38–66,53: "[…] immo cum anima fuerit constans, nobilis, similis principiis, oboediet ei materia quae est in mundo et patietur ex ea, et invenietur in materia quicquid formabitur in illa. […] tunc non est mirum si anima nobilis et fortissima transcendat operationem suam in corpore proprio ut, cum non fuerit demersa in affectum illius corporis vehementer et praeter hoc fuerit naturae paevalentis constantis in habitu suo, sanet infirmos et debilitet pravos et contingat privari naturas et permutari sibi elementa, ita ut quod non est ignis fiat ei ignis, et quod non est terra fiat ei terra, et pro voluntate eius contingant pluviae et fertilitas sicut contingit absorbitio a terra et mortalitas, et hoc totum proveniat secundum necessitatem intelligibilem".

faculties: the estimative for fascination[45] and will-power for marvel-working.[46] Whatever the faculties involved actually are, however, the crucial point is that matter obeys the mental representations conceived of by the soul rather than natural agents such as the four elements and their qualities (hot, cold, moist, and dry).[47]

What is usually regarded as transitive imagination is also documented in Eckhart's work. Elsewhere I have shown that the only explicit quotation from Avicenna to be found in the *Von abegescheidenheit* is an original adaptation of the chapter of Albert's *De somno et vigilia* which summarizes Avicenna's and Algazel's views on prophecy.[48]

> Ein meister heizet *Avicenna*, der sprichet: des geistes, der abegescheiden stât, des adel ist alsô grôz, swaz er schouwet, daz ist wâr, und *swes er begert, des ist er gewert, und swaz er gebiutet, des muoz man im gehôr-*

45 See above n. 43. Algazel also refers to the estimative: Algazel, *Metaphysica*, (ed. J.T. Muckle), Toronto 1933, p. 11, tr. 5, 9, p. 194,15–24: "Aliquando autem impressio alicuius anime pertransit ad aliud corpus, sic ut destruat spiritum *estimacione*, et inficiat hominem *estimacione*, et hoc dicitur fascinacio. Et propter hoc est illud proverbium, quod oculus mittit hominem in fossam, et camelum in caldarium, et dicitur quod hominem fascinari verum est; huius autem rei sensus hic est, quod quia multum placet ei camelus, et miratur de eo, et eius anima est maligna, et invidiosa, ***estimat*** casum cameli, et inficitur corpus cameli ab eius *estimacione*, et statim cadit". The role of the estimative in fascination has been noted by Jean R. Michot, *La destinée de l'homme selon Avicenne. Le retour à Dieu* (*maʿād*) *et l'imagination*, Louvain 1986, pp. 143–152. The term "aestimatio" and its derivatives in this context are difficult to translate and it is not surprising that scholars have given different renditions of them. When translating the phrase "aestimationis operantis" as "suggestion by concentration of imagination", Fazlur Rahman is thinking of the actions of a hypnotist: F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam. Philosophy and Orthodoxy*, London 1958, p. 50. According to Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300* (Warburg Institute Studies and Texts 1), London—Tourin 2000, p. 168, the fascinator "desires" ("estimat") the fall of a camel. However it is translated, the word "aestimatio" implies the existence of a form in the mind through which the fascinator exerts his negative influence on the person to be fascinated.

46 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, p. 66,53–55: "Omnino enim possibile est ut comitetur eius velle esse id quod pendet ex permutatione materiae in contraria: nam materia oboedit ei naturaliter et fit ex ea secundum quod videtur eius voluntati". On this point see D.N. Hasse, cit., pp. 167–168.

47 Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, p. 4, c. 4, p. 66,56–58: "materia etenim omnino est oboediens animae et multo amplius oboedit animae quam contrariis agentibus in se".

48 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De somno et vigilia*, (ed. A. Borgnet), Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 9, Paris 1890, III, 1, 6, pp. 184b–185b.

> *sam sîn*. Und solt daz wizzen vür wâr: swenne der vrîe geist stât in rehter abegescheidenheit, *sô twinget er got ze sînem wesene*; und möhte er gestân formelôsiclich und âne alle zuovelle, sô næme er gotes eigenschaft an sich. Daz enmac aber got niemanne geben dan im selber; dâ von enmac got niht mêr getuon dem abegescheidenen geiste, wan daz er sich selben im gibet.[49]

The power of the prophetic soul to transmute bodies ("in tantum enim ***posse*** animae dicunt aliquando congruere intelligentiae coelesti, quod mutabit materias corporum sicut ***voluerint***") is understood by Eckhart in terms of the prerogatives of the detached man. He can obtain what he wishes and his orders are necessarily obeyed ("swes er ***begert***, des ist er gewert, und swaz er ***gebiutet***, des muoz man im gehôrsam sîn").

A systematic and detailed treatment of prophecy is found in the *Commentary on the Gospel of John* (nn. 251–271) in relation to the verse 1:48 ("Priusquam te Philippus vocaret, cum esses sub ficu, vidi te"). Having elucidated divine foreknowledge by means of the paradigm Justice-just[50] and reported several examples from the Bible, the Saints, and the Philosophers,[51] Eckhart adduces numerous instances of human foreknowledge in Christian and pagan traditions[52] and then lays down the three laws governing the metaphysical-cosmological mechanism on which the human power to foresee future events depends: superior beings, by their very nature, communicate themselves to inferior beings; inferior beings receive them according to their capacity; at their highest level inferior beings are in contact with the lowest of superior beings.[53] God, as First

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49 Eckhart, *Von abegescheidenheit*, DW 5, pp. 410,7–411,5. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the two texts, including a synopsis of the textual dependence of Eckhart on Albert, cf. A. Palazzo, "'Ez sprichet gar ein hôher meister': Eckhart e Avicenna", cit., pp. 87–94.

50 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, nn. 252–254, pp. 209,16–211,10.

51 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, nn. 255–256, pp. 211,11–213,11.

52 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, nn. 257–261, pp. 213,12–216,15.

53 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, nn. 264–265, pp. 218,13–219,12. I have already discussed the issues of different capacities to receive the emanation, and that of the hierarchy of reality, in A. Palazzo, "'Plato dicit quod formae dantur secundum merita materiae': la fortuna di una sentenza platonica nelle opere di Eckhart", in: A. Palazzo (ed.), *L'Antichità classica nel pensiero medievale* (Textes et études du Moyen âge 61), Porto 2011, pp. 342–372, here 358–365, and Id., "Philosophical Meanings of *lux* (*Jo*. 1,4–5, 1,9) in Eckhart's *Commentary on the Gospel of John*", in: F. Amerini (ed.), "In Principio erat Verbum". *Philosophy and Theology in the Commentaries on the Gospel of John* (*II–XIV Centuries*) (Arca Verbi. Subsidia 11), Münster 2014, pp. 247–270, here 256–261. Eckhart's sources for both concepts are numerous.

Cause, pre-contains in Himself the ability to foresee things before they are brought about. Therefore, like the other perfections, foreknowledge is transmitted to the inferior creatures by God, and they receive it according to their capacity.[54] Dreams are a privileged condition for the reception of the prophetic influence, since when sleeping the human mind is not distracted by external events. This fact confirms that, although the emanation causing prophecy is the same, its influence is assimilated differently depending on the condition of the recipients.[55]

> Haec est radix, super quam fundant sapientes prophetiam naturalem et futurorum praecognitionem, iterum Avicenna in VI Naturalium parte 4 et Algazel in fine Physicae suae fascinationem. Gal. 3: 'quis vos fascinavit veritati non oboedire?' In hac etiam radice videtur quibusdam fundari pyromantia et eius germanae: aeromantia, hydromantia, geomantia et aliqua pars scientiae imaginum, sicut etiam ipsa physiognomia.[56]

The "sapientes", Eckhart claims, base natural prophecy and foreknowledge on the Neo-Platonic procession of the universe from the First Cause, whereas Avicenna and Algazel have fascination depend on this same hierarchical structure of reality. Moreover, according to some, the various forms of divination, namely pyromancy, aeromancy, hydromancy, geomancy, the science of images, and physiognomy, lie at this same Neo-Platonic structure.

It should be noted that Eckhart's analysis of human foreknowledge is much more than a mere digression; though concise, it is an original and comprehensive discussion of all the major aspects of this issue: how foreknowledge works, the different forms of divination, the relationship with divine foreknowledge, etc. This section of the *Commentary on John* is also noteworthy for the sources used: even though Eckhart only mentions the standard authorities on this matter explicitly (Cicero, Augustine, and Avicenna), he certainly also had recourse

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The *Liber de causis* is undoubtedly one of the most important: cf. e.g. *Liber de causis*, (ed. A. Pattin), in: "*Le Liber de causis*. Édition établie à l'aide de 90 manuscripts", in: *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 28 (1966), prop. 9 (10), n. 93, p. 158,12–18; nn. 98–99, p. 160,38–49; prop. 11 (12), nn. 106–107, p. 162,76–86. An interesting passage in: Meister Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, n. 61, p. 51,1–4, makes explicit this dependence.

54 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, n. 266, p. 221,2–7.

55 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, n. 267, pp. 222,15–224,2.

56 Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.* LW III, n. 268, pp. 224,3–225,1. Eckhart, however, points to the crucial role played by astral factors in the science of images and physiognomy; cf. ibid., pp. 225,1–226,2.

to Thomas Aquinas—the phrase "prophetia naturalis", which is characteristic of Thomas, is revealing—and to Albert the Great's *De somno et vigilia* and *De animalibus*. Nonetheless, unlike his Dominican predecessors, Eckhart does not distinguish divinely inspired prophecy from natural prophecy, in accordance with his conviction that there is no real difference between the gifts of nature and those of grace. It is probable that he also used technical writings on divination.[57]

With regard to fascination, some general remarks are appropriate. In Eckhart's day this was a controversial issue, debated by theologians and philosophers.[58] Also known as the evil eye, mentions of fascination date back to before the Middle Ages. Ancient sources associate it with animals (the mythic basilisk,

57 The editors of the third volume of the LW suggest that Eckhart used the *Speculum astronomiae*, a view which I do not entirely share. Assuming, however, that he did, was it the only technical work he used? If so, who are the "sapientes" and who the "quibusdam" that Eckhart mentions? These are just some of the questions I am attempting to answer in the study I am currently engaged in on this section of the *Commentary on the Gospel of John* (nn. 251–271). Eckhart's treatment of divination is even more surprising when one considers the attitude to divination, which became almost overwhelmingly negative after Étienne Tempier's condemnation in 1277. Around 1290, for instance, the bishop of Paris, the archbishop of Sens, and the Dominican Inquisitor condemned some books as erroneous, sacrilegious, and blasphemous. The list also included texts about various forms of divination; cf. J.-P. Boudet, *Entre science et* Nigromance. *Astologie, divination et magie dans l'Occident medieval* (*xii^e–xv^e siècle*) (Histoire ancienne et médiévale 83), Paris 2006, pp. 256–257.

58 The literature on fascination and, more generally, transitive imagination in the Middle Ages is now extensive. Cf. A. Maurer, "Between Reason and Faith: Siger of Brabant and Pomponazzi on the Magic Arts", in: *Mediaeval Studies* 18 (1956), pp. 1–18; L. Thorndike, "Imagination and Magic. The Force of Imagination on the Human Body and of Magic on the Human Mind", in: *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant* 7/2 (Studi e testi 237), Città del Vaticano 1964, pp. 353–358; A. Godet, *‚Nun was ist die Imagination anderst als ein Sonn im Menschen'. Studien zu einem Zentralbegriff des magischen Denkens*, Dissertation Universität Zürich 1982, pp. 3–22, 130–153; P. Zambelli, "L'immaginazione e il suo potere. Da al-Kindi, al-Farabi e Avicenna al Medioevo latino e al Rinascimento", in: A. Zimmermann und I. Craemer-Ruegenberg (Hrsg.), *Orientalische Kultur und Europäisches Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 17), Berlin—New York 1985, pp. 187–206; D.N. Hasse, cit., pp. 160–174; T. Griffero, cit., pp. 53–58; B. Delaurenti, "La fascination et l'action à distance: questions médiévales (1230–1370)", in: *Médiévales* [*En ligne*] 50 printemps (2006), pp. 137–154, mis en ligne le 15 septembre 2008, consulté le 10 janvier 2015 URL: http://medievales.revues.org/1420; A. Palazzo, "Albert the Great's Doctrine of Fascination in the Context of his Philosophical System", in: L. Honnefelder—H. Möhle—S. Bullido del Barrio (Hrsg.), *Via Alberti. Texte—Quellen—Interpretationen* (Subsidia Albertina 2), Münster 2009, pp. 135–215; V. Perrone Compagni, "'Artificiose operari'. L'immaginazione di Avicenna nel dibattito

certain kinds of wolf, etc.), mythological figures (Medusa, Narkissos), old sorceresses ("vetulae"), menstruating woman ("mulier menstruata"),[59] and erotic themes. It is also alluded to in the Sacred Scriptures (Sap. 4:12 and Gal. 3:1). From the first half of the 13th century on, however, the texts and ideas of Avicenna and Algazel (psychosomatic imagination, ontological superiority of the soul, prophecy, marvel-working, magic, etc.) monopolize the discussion. The works of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant, for instance, clearly demonstrate these influences.[60] The two Islamic philosophers are also Eckhart's real interlocutors. By contrast, the quotation of the famous verse from the Epistle to Galatians (3:1) is only a reference to a traditional authority in this context, but has no authentic conceptual value.

Eckhart, in fact, seems only to refer incidentally to this question. At first glance, he appears to show no great interest in fascination, referring to it as though just acknowledging a longstanding literary tradition. Unlike other scholastics, for instance, he says nothing about how the influence of the fascinator reaches his victim—the most contentious issue, in fact, in the dispute around the phenomenon. According to Avicenna and Algazel, fascination is a transitive action: the fascinator acts from a distance on the body of another, with negative consequences—an impediment, an injury, etc.—for the person or animal acted upon. The fascinator achieves this with his gaze alone, somehow using his estimative faculty. Medieval authors are mainly concerned with explaining the nature of the fascinator's evil influence (material or immaterial), the way it is transmitted (by contact or at a distance), and the way it is received (through the eyes of the victim? Through the mediation of the victim's imagination?).[61] None of these problems attracts Eckhart's attention.

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medievale sulla magia", in: M. Bettetini e F. Paparella (edd.), *Immaginario e immaginazione nel medioevo* (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 51), Louvain-la-Neuve 2009, pp. 271–296; Ead., "La differenza 156 del *Conciliator*: una rilettura", in: *Annali del Dipartimento di Filosofia* (Nuova Serie) 15 (2009), pp. 65–107; A. Robert, "Fascinatio", in: I. Atucha—D. Calma—C. Koenig-Pralong—I. Zavattero (eds.), *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, Porto 2011, pp. 279–290, here 280–284.

59 Cf. Aristoteles, *De insomniis* II, 459b29–460a32.

60 See above n. 58. Another important, but less influential, source in this context is Al-Kindi's *De radiis*: Al-Kindi, *De radiis*, (ed. M.T. D'Alverny et F. Hudry), in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 49 (1974), pp. 139–259, here 215–259.

61 This is one of the many explanations suggested by Albert the Great. The fascinator's influence is said to affect his victims' bodies not directly, but through the mediation of their imaginative faculty; with his gaze alone, the fascinator provokes fear in his victims—in the text quoted, children—, a fear which is at the origin of their bodily reaction—the tremor—and of their being enchanted. The fascinator, that is, exploits the psychosomatic

A number of elements in Eckhart's approach, however, are noteworthy. First, Eckhart assumes fascination to be a natural phenomenon that really exists. Nevertheless, neither its existence nor its naturalness can be taken for granted, since medieval authors hold different opinions on both points. Many subscribe to the idea that fascination is due to or influenced by the intervention of demonic creatures and is associated with or an aspect of necromancy.[62]

Secondly, Eckhart refers to fascination within his discussion of human foreknowledge (prophecy and divination), thereby emphasizing the connection between both phenomena.

Eckhart, as already noted, insists on the dependence of not only foreknowledge, natural prophecy, and divination, but also fascination, on Neo-Platonic emanation, in other words on a formal, intellectual causality. In so doing, he implicitly accepts Avicenna and Algazel's explanation of fascination as a process that occurs at a distance rather than through physical contact. According to the teaching of the *Liber de causis*, Eckhart argues that the First Cause, the Supreme Being, is rich through itself and thus communicates Itself to the inferior beings.[63] This giving establishes a chain of being in which the degrees are both connected and hierarchically ordered. Each superior being conveys its properties to the inferior beings, which receive them in an imperfect form in accordance to their natural capacity.[64] In the case of fascination, this disparity implies that the ability to act upon another's body is not equally accorded to everyone, being reserved for a few people, for those whose souls have become

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mechanism whereby a child's body suffers from the affections produced by his own imaginative faculty. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Quaestiones super De animalibus*, XVIII, q. 3, p. 298,68–75: "Et secundum hoc contingit, quod oculus fascinantis alterat corpora puerorum—et secundum hoc dicitur, quod oculus fascinantis proiecit rusticum in foveam, quia pueri figuras vel aspectus quorundam magis admirantur quam aliorum, et ex hoc causantur in pueris timor et tremor; et ita de aliis. Unde diversus modus imaginandi alterationem causat in qualibet parte corporis […]".

62 Cf. e.g. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Galatas*, (ed. E. Alarcón), Torino—Roma 1953, 3 lect. 1. On one occasion even Albert the Great abandons his usual naturalistic approach and invokes evil spirits to explain fascination; cf. Albertus Magnus, *Super II Sententiarum*, d. 7 a. 7, Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 27, Paris 1894, pp. 152b–154a.

63 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, n. 262, p. 217,3–5; *Liber de causis*, prop. 20 (21), n. 162, p. 180,48. On this proposition cf. W. Beierwaltes, "Primum est dives per se. Meister Eckhart und der Liber de Causis", in: E. Bos and P.A. Meijer (eds.), *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy* (Philosophia Antiqua 53), Leiden—New York—Köln 1992, pp. 141–169, here 163–164.

64 Cf. Eckhart, *Exp. in Ioh.*, LW III, n. 266, pp. 220,12–221,2.

closer to superior intelligences and thus more receptive and stronger than those of people who are the objects of fascination.

I believe that Eckhart relies on Albert the Great's *De intellectu et intelligibili* for the intuition that fascination must be placed within the framework of the universal emanation. Albert embarks on an analytical investigation wherein all the main points of Eckhart's argument can be found. The structure of reality is an emanation of the First Cause's intellectual light, whose manifestations are the layers of a hierarchy. As the procession moves away from its origin, the degrees of the chain of reality ("formae mundi") become less simple and perfect, before finally reaching the forms disseminated in the sublunary things.[65] Being the cause of everything, the First Cause pre-contains in itself all of reality in an absolutely simple way.[66] A soul can act upon external matter and perform wonders ("mirabilia") only if it re-ascends up the hierarchy and conjoins with the superior intelligences and the Divine Intellect.[67] In so doing, it becomes able, like the superior substances, to encompass, enlighten, and transform external matter.[68] The transmission of the formal light is received

65 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, (ed. A. Borgnet), Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 9, Paris 1890, II, 9, p. 516b: "[…] lumen causae primae generaliter loquendo, sui quatuor habet manifestationes […]. Unus autem inferior est, quo manifestatur inferiorum rerum terminatum ad terminos essentiales uniuscujusque rei. Secundus est, quo manifestatur in imagine sua quae est intellectus potentialis […]. Tertius autem est, quo manifestatur in lumine agentis universaliter in ordine minoris mundi […]. Quartus autem modus manifestationis est, quo manifestatur in ampliatione luminis sui intelligentiis moventibus orbes […]"; II, 2, p. 505b: "Ab intelligentia autem prima descendunt hujusmodi formae, et quo magis ab ipsa, eo magis efficiuntur materiales et ignobiles, ita quod ultima in descensu est forma elementalis et infima elementi quod est terra, quod esse dicitur faex elementorum". In spite of the analogies, Albert's *De intellectu et intelligibili* diverges from Eckhart in its idea of prophecy: in both the *De somno et vigilia* and the *De intellectu et intelligibili* Albert conceives of natural prophecy as other than divinely revealed prophecy, a conception radically different from Eckhart's.

66 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibli*, II, 1, p. 503b: "Intelligentia autem quae indivisibilis est et simplex substantia et essentia, cum ipsa sit causa prima, est indivisibilis forma et simplex […]"; II, 8, p. 515b: "[…] sunt [*scil.* formae] unum et idem in causa prima".

67 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II, 9, p. 516a: "Est autem intellectus assimilativus, in quo homo […] surgit ad intellectum divinum, qui est lumen et causa omnium. Fit autem hoc cum per omnia in effectu factus intellectus perfecte adeptus est seipsum et lumen agentis, et ex omnium luminibus et notitia sui extendit se in luminibus intelligentiarum ascendens gradatim ad intellectum simplicem divinum".

68 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II, 11, p. 519a–b: "[…] forma mundi ambit et illuminat totam materiam ordinis sibi subjecti, et unicuique proportionaliter lumen suum

proportionally according to the capacity of the recipient.[69] This brief picture demonstrates that Albert closely connects marvel-working with the Neo-Platonic organization of reality, to the extent that outside an emanationist universe wonders such as those of the Avicennian prophet would be inconceivable.

Conclusion

Where does the mind stand in relation to the body? How and to what extent does the mind influence the body? Can the mind also affect alien bodies? These questions were discussed by numerous thinkers in the West from Antiquity to Modernity. In this context, imagination was a crucial and effective conceptual tool, for each of the abilities and qualities attributed to it (maternal imagination, psychosomatic effects, fascination, marvel-working) made it possible to address the abovementioned problems.

Eckhart is among the many medieval thinkers who were enchanted by the power of imagination. According to him, maternal imagination, psychosomatic imagination, and fascination are among the "naturalia" hidden beneath the surface of the letter of the Scriptures. Eckhart is one of the exegetes of the famous episode of Jacob's goats, which, following Augustine and Jerome, he interprets, from a realistic perspective, in terms of maternal imagination. Images conceived of in the mother's mind provide him with a naturalistic pattern for an event that seems inexplicable according to the laws of natural causality. Eckhart's crucial hermeneutical move is his reduction of maternal imagination to a specific form of psychosomatic imagination, a specific way in which mental images affect the body. In other words, it is the Avicennian analysis of the psychophysiological mechanisms of the human compound that makes it possible to explain how Jacob's famous goats gave birth to striped and spotted kids.

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ubique praesens impartitur. […] et hoc etiam modo animae excellentium virorum plura ambiunt quam corpora propria, quando animae eorum formis mundi applicantur: et ideo aliquando obediunt eis transmutationes exteriorum, sicut obediunt formis mundi".

69 Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II, 9, p. 517b: "[…] cuicumque superiorum intellectuum intellectus applicatur humanus, qui est una de formis mundi, a lumine istius influunt in ipsum formae et species sui ordinis: et ideo quaedam notitia illius ordinis efficitur in ipso *per analogiam cujus potest illa recipere*. Et quia omne quod fit in aliquo, fit in eo *secundum potestatem suscipientis ipsum* […]".

Avicenna's investigation into the nature and abilities of the human soul is the basis for Eckhart's view that fascination is a natural action at a distance, a phenomenon which he discusses in a long section devoted to foreknowledge and divination within the context of the *Commentary on John* (1:48). Under the influence of Albert's *De intellectu et intelligibili*, Eckhart maintains that fascination is rooted in the procession which originates from the First Cause and gives rise to the hierarchical structure of reality. The effects of this emanation are received differently by different creatures, so that even among human beings fascinators are more powerful than their victims and can act upon them.

The power of imagination (imagination, psychosomatic imagination, and fascination), celestial causality, the virtues of animals, plants, stones, and words, divination, etc. are among the "naturalia" evoked by Eckhart in the prologue to the *Book of the Parables of Genesis*. Drawing an accurate and complete map of the physical side of Eckhart's thought means also investigating these heretofore neglected issues. I personally think that when they have all been carefully examined, we will be able to say: Eckhart was also a natural philosopher.

CHAPTER 19

Locutio emphatica: Argumentative Strategies in Meister Eckhart's German Sermons

Loris Sturlese

It is difficult to resist the temptation to read the sermons of Meister Eckhart one-by-one as historical documents of something that actually happened on a particular day in a particular church. Indeed, the texts themselves suggest this, and in some instances this seems to be legitimate, as in the case of the sermons that Eckhart preached in Paris, the written record of which is a *reportatio* taken down in shorthand "from the mouth" (*ex ore*) of the master by a reporter who sat at the foot of the pulpit, and then transcribed a fair copy of his text.[1] However, this is definitely not the case with the more than hundred sermons in Latin preserved in a manuscript in Bernkastel-Kues, which contains for the most part drafts written by Eckhart himself.[2] This fact would seem to exclude a naive "historical" reading of the sermons, for if the texts contained in the manuscript in Kues are drafts, this means that they were outlined in advance by the author in view of some use, and are the result of a consciously literary intention and process of composition.

If we turn to Eckhart's German sermons, the situation does not seem much different. The form of the German sermons is generally more definitive, and the texts sometimes contain historical references. But in general Eckhart did not like references to the 'here and now', to time and space, to political, social and ecclesiastical circumstances. In fact, his sermons occupy a sort of ethereal 'ideal place',[3] and always evince a similar structure that begins with the

1 Meister Eckhart, *Sermo Paschalis*, and *Sermo* in die b. Augustini habitus, ("reportatus ex ore magistri Echardi de Hochheim", LW V, pp. 131–148). Quotations according: Meister Eckhart, *Die lateinischen Werke*, Stuttgart 1936–2015, 6 Bände (= LW) and *Die deutschen Werke*, Stuttgart 1936—5 Bände (= DW, yet in progress). For an edition of the German sermons according the liturgical order see Meister Eckhart, *Le 64 prediche secondo il tempo liturgico*, (a cura di Loris Sturlese), Milano 2014, with MHG text, italian translation and commentary. The following pages summarize the interpretation given in the introduction to this book, pp. VII–LXXIV.

2 See Josef Koch, "Einleitung", in: LW IV, pp. XIII–XXIII.

3 Burkhard Hasebrink, "mitewürker gotes. Zur Performativität der Umdeutung in den deutschen Schriften Meister Eckharts", in: Peter Strohschneider (Hrsg), *Literarische und religiöse*

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theme drawn from the liturgical reading of the day or the feast, then develops the exposition and concludes with a final invocation of grace. Normally all of Eckhart's sermons have a similar length; only in some cases is the solemnity of the day highlighted by the greater length of the sermon.[4] These sermons, then, tell us very little of the historical events that occurred outside the walls of the church. More seems to be said about what is happening inside the church: some phrases are appellative ("now, listen to …!")[5] or suggest a chronology ("as I have said before …")[6] and a liturgical context ("the words that I read in Latin in German mean …").[7] Sometimes Eckhart gives local indications ("as I said in the convent of Mariengarten").[8] But is this really so much historical information as the text suggests at first sight, or are we rather dealing with ideal indicators for an ideal audience gathered in an ideal place? In other words, what is the relationship between the historical orality of Eckhart's actual preaching and the written sermons that constitute his literary legacy?

We must raise this question because we know that Eckhart was a professor of theology who was educated at the university in order to teach, discuss and write on Scholastic topics in Latin. The use of Latin was required for communicating with the international audience in the university. But unlike his fellow professors of theology, Eckhart paid special attention to preaching, especially to preaching in the vernacular.

Eckhart's strong interest in the use of the vernacular is already evident at the beginning of his career in the "Talks" (*Rede*) that he delivered just before 1298 in Erfurt.[9] His attention to the vernacular finds expression in such a masterpiece of "philosophy in the German language" as the *Book of Divine Consolation* (*Buch der göttlichen Tröstung*),[10] and it is something unique in the circle of professional theologians to which Eckhart belonged. Because the sermon

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Kommunikation in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, Berlin 2009, pp. 62–88; id., "Die Anthropologie der Abgeschiedenheit. Urbane Ortlosigkeit bei Meister Eckhart", in: *Meister-Eckhart-Jahrbuch* 7 (2013), pp. 29–44.

4 See for instance: Pred. Q 68: 1st Sunday in Advent; Pred. Q 38: Ember Wednesday in Advent; Pred. S 101: Sunday within the Octave of Christmas; Pred. S 102, Epiphany; Pred. S 103, S 104: Sunday within the Octave of Epiphany; Pred. Q 49: 3rd Sunday in Lent; Pred. Q 51: Wednesday after the 3rd Sunday in Lent; Pred. Q 47: Pentecost.

5 Pred. Q 51, DW III, p. 54: "Nû hœret ir wol …".

6 Pred. Q 68, DW III, p. 150: "Als ich wol ê gesprochen hân …".

7 Pred. Q 77, DW III, p. 334: "Diz ist geschriben in dem êwangeliô und sprichet ze tiutsche …".

8 Pred. Q 14, DW I, p. 233: "as ich sprach zo mergarden …".

9 Edited by Josef Quint in: DW V, pp. 137–376.

10 Edited by Josef Quint in: DW V, pp. 1–136.

was a prescribed academic exercise that students recorded and collected, we possess many sermons preached by university professors which usually were preached in Latin, but even if a university sermon had been preached in a vernacular tongue, it was almost invariably written in Latin.[11] The vernacular was used for preaching to ordinary people. We know, for example, that Bonaventure preached in French, Albert the Great in German and Thomas Aquinas in Italian, but the written records of their sermons are all in Latin.[12] Eckhart's decision to write and to publish in German is a remarkable transgression of a rule observed by professors all over Europe, which may be stated in this way: because of its seriousness and complexity, theological instruction should be published in the Latin language. In other words, for the professional theologian, the vernacular is a wholly inadequate means of expression. One point on which Eckhart was condemned in a Bull by Pope John XXII was for having formulated erroneous doctrines "in his sermons, and in front of inexperienced people" ("que docuit quam maxime coram vulgo simplici in suis predicationibus"), and for having "also drawn them up in writings" ("que etiam redegit in scriptis").[13]

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Research on Meister Eckhart has established about one hundred and twenty sermons in German, "drawn up in writings," as authentic. The commitment required by such a work is great: we are speaking of a sermon collection of a very significant size. The very fact of this collection gives rise to the question: Why did a successful professor and high official of the Dominican Order, who traveled back-and-forth between France and Germany, who first was trained as a student and then was licensed as a Master of Theology at Paris, enabling him to discourse and publish in Latin for an international learned public, decide to devote so much effort to a genre that lies outside the boundaries of his profession, and why, by adopting the vernacular, did he restrict his sphere of influence to a peripheral and modest religious culture?

11 See Johann Baptist Schneyer, *Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150–1350*, Münster i. W. 1969–1990.

12 For Bonaventura see *Sermones de diversis*, nouvelle édition critique par Jacques Guy Bougerol, Paris 1993, *Sermo* 44, pp. 579–593. According the witness of his biographer Guglielmo di Tocco (*Ystoria sancti Thome de Aquino*, ed. Claire le Brun-Gouanvic, Toronto 1997, c. 48, p. 183), Thomas Aquinas preached in Italian, "in illo suo uulgari natalis soli". However, neither of them published sermons in vernacular.

13 Bull edited by Loris Sturlese in: *Acta Echardiana* 65, in: LW V, pp. 596–600.

This question can be answered by reference to the historical importance of oral communication, particularly within the Dominican Order. There is an extensive literature[14] on preaching as the specific "mission" of the Order, whose members called themselves "the preachers", and on the urban commitment of the mendicant friars in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, their policy of establishing their convents in cities, and even on the development of the Order's church architecture, designed to satisfy the requirements of preaching to large crowds. The army of Friars Preachers had as its unique, non-violent weapon the power of the word that captivated and convinced people; as Eckhart himself said,[15] "great miracles can be done by the word." One could say that as an intellectual at the highest level of his Order, Eckhart belonged to the officers' staff of this army, and for a long time contributed to the development of its strategies. But these facts are widely known, as an abundant scholarly literature attests.

In the case of Meister Eckhart, however, we see a somewhat particular phenomenon. Doubtless, Eckhart's 'orality' originated in the pulpit, but upon closer inspection, his so-called 'orality' itself turns out to be a literary product, conceived and penned at his desk. In other words, the corpus of Eckhart's German and Latin sermons seems to be located midway between the textuality of his scientific professional writings and the orality of the sermons that he actually preached. On one side, then, we have the commentaries, questions and treatises written in Latin, which adopt the traditional university form of literary communication and exhibit the rigorous methods of Scholastic rationality and argumentation. On the other side, we have the orality of his sermons, particularly the vernacular sermons, which the author presents as records of events on a liturgical calendar familiar to every reader, and which he has composed according to the tenets of the *ars sermocinandi* of his time. And yet, if we look more closely at the text of the sermons in the *corpus* that constitutes his legacy, which is nothing other than a book that one should read and meditate on, it seems evident that the stage on which Eckhart imaginatively preaches is in fact a kind of 'utopian place', in the center of which are located only the 'I' of the preacher and the 'you' of the listener.

14 See for instance William A. Hinnebusch, *History of the Dominican Order. Origins and Growth to 1500*, New York 1965–1972, 2. Vols.

15 Pred. Q 18, DW I, p. 306. See Dagmar Gottschall, "Man möhte wunder tuon mit worten. (Predigt 18). Zum Umgang Meister Eckharts mit Wörtern in seinen deutschen Predigten", in: Andreas Speer und Lydia Wegener (Hrsg.), *Meister Eckhart in Erfurt*, Berlin—New York 2005, pp. 426–449.

Furthermore, if we consider the doctrinal content of the sermons, there is no considerable difference between what the author says in his sermons and what he says in his scientific works. Indeed, a significant feature of Eckhart's preaching is his systematic use of argumentative discourse, a philosophic "natural discourse" (*natiurlîche rede*) or "demonstrative discourse" (*bewærte rede*)[16] rather than the traditional style of homiletic exhortation. But if his sermons display a form of communication that is as literary as the form of his scientific works, why did Eckhart decide to dedicate so much of his intellectual energy to his sermons? I do not think that it is a matter of content, because, as I said, I do not see any significant doctrinal difference between Eckhart's Latin and German writings, whether they be treatises, questions, commentaries or sermons. What is different, however, is the form: whereas the textuality of his university writings follows the traditional model of strictly rational scientific discourse, in the sermons Eckhart can develop his arguments with the emotionality that characterizes the homiletic genre. In this perspective, Eckhart's preaching can be regarded as a form of communication that is not contradictory but complementary to his scientific communication. This corresponds with an understanding of philosophical reasoning that does not consist in syllogisms only, but is rather a spiritual exercise, a search for, and discovery of, the true self, the nourishment for a spontaneous and self-determined free life. This is exactly what philosophy was for Meister Eckhart.

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Eckhart surely reflected on the function and properties of the art of preaching, especially the art of preaching in the vernacular. The most significant traces of his reflection on the proper style of preaching can be found in the dossier of defense (the *Responsio*)[17] that he prepared and published in Cologne in 1326. In the *Responsio*, his reflection focuses on the concept of "emphatic locution" (*locutio emphatica*), a concept that appears for the first time in his dossier of defense, in which he refers to the concept strategically four times in few pages. In all four instances, Eckhart is defending the truth and orthodoxy of sentences extracted by his accusers from his German sermons and rendered in Latin translation, which are presented as material evidence supporting the charge of heresy against him. The sentences were extracted from their context,

16 Pred. S 101, DW IV, p. 342.

17 "Magistri Echardi Responsio ad articulos sibi impositos de scriptis et dictis suis", LW V, pp. 247–355.

to be sure, but as a professor of theology, Eckhart knew well that this was a common practice, and in his defense he does not dispute the prosecutors' method. In his rebuttal Eckhart faces the charges directly, without denial or mitigating qualifications. In what follows, I treat the four texts in which Eckhart refers to "emphatic locution" in order.

Proc. Col. 11, n. 23, LW V p. 323	**Pred. 77* [Q 11, DW I p. 187]**
Undecimus articulus sic dicit: "Qui nihil quaerit, non potest conqueri, si ipse nihil inveniat. Ipse invenit hoc, quod ipse quaesivit. Qui aliquid quaerit et intendit praeter deum, ille quaerit et intendit nihil et propter hoc accipit quod petit nihil accipiendo. Sed qui nihil quaerit nec aliquid intendit quam deum purum (vel pure), illi dat deus et discooperit (seu aperit) omne quod secretum deus habet in suo divino corde, quod **hoc fit ei ita proprium sicut est proprium dei, nec plus nec minus**, si ipse eum solum quaerat sine medio".	Ich sprach etwenne: der niht suochet, daz der niht vindet, wem mac er daz klagen? Er vant, daz er suochte. Swer iht suochet oder meinet, der suochet und meinet niht, und der umbe iht bitet, dem wirt niht. Aber der niht ensuochet noch niht enmeinet dan lûter got, dem entdecket got und gibet im allez, daz er verborgen hât in sînem götlîchen herzen, daz ez im als eigen wirt, als ez gotes eigen ist, weder minner noch mêr, ob er in aleine meinet âne mittel.

The accusers performed their job dutifully, with extreme care, in some cases even providing alternative translations of the incriminating words. In fact, they report Eckhart's logical argument in all its cogency. The argument may be expressed as follows: "One can search for God or for something *other than* God. One who searches for something other than God, who is Being, searches for non-being, for nothingness, and so in fact he will find nothing. On the contrary, those who search for God only obtain from him the revelation of what is hidden in his heart, and this completely, exactly as it is hidden in God, no more and no less".

This passage evokes typical Eckhartian ideas, which the prosecutors have identified and selected in their investigation, such as the doctrine of "pure nothing"[18] of creatures and the de-legitimization of popular forms of worship,

18 Pred. Q 4, DW I, p. 70, see too Proc. Col. I, n. 73, LW V, p. 225.

such as petitionary prayer. But the main cause of scandal in the eyes of the prosecutors is certainly the conclusion of such rationalistic subtlety and sophistry, namely that direct union with God is possible in this life, and that in this total union there is no kind of distinction between God and the creature, "no more and no less". Is this not pantheism?

In his defense, Eckhart proceeds in three steps.[19] First he defends the truth of his reasoning, which "is true, pious and moral, and it is clear from what was said" ("Verum est, devotum et morale et patet ex iam dictis"). Then he reformulates the doctrine of deification in an even more blatantly offending text, with explicit reference to his doctrine of "the divine man." At this point he refers to the concept of 'emphatic locution': "When I say at the end that God is as much the 'my own' of the divine man as he is the 'my own' of himself, I say this according to an emphatic way of speaking" ("Quod autem dicitur in fine: deus sic esse proprius homini divino sicut sibimet deo, emphatica locutio est"). It is according to this way of speaking, Eckhart continues in a third step, that the Scripture says "God, my God, I seek you in the dawn" (Ps. 62:1). The expression "my God" does not mean possession ("my") in any material sense, but rather is a declaration of the presence of God "in myself" as "mine" in the sense of "intrinsically my own". If God were not "in us" as intrinsically "our own", the works of God would not be ours, because no operation is "our own" if the principle of the operation is foreign to us, and it is not "ours in us" (here Eckhart employs the logic of Aristotle). Now, Isaiah (26:12) says that "all the works that God has made, were made as our own in us"; thus, "my God" means "God as the inherent principle in me as being my own". In conclusion, in the statement "God is as much 'my own' to the divine man as he is 'my own' to himself", the 'my own' does not signify a physical possession but a presence of God as divine principle intrinsically 'my own' to the divine man.[20] This presence cannot be anything but total, "without more and less", because God cannot be "more" present or "less" present.

At the end Eckhart adds an explanation of the concept of 'emphatic locution' as applied to the phrase "deus meus" (or "deus proprius homini divino sicut sibimet deo"). He says that "the emphatic form is used frequently and appropriately in the Scriptures, by the saints and by the preacher, according to what the heart suggests to the speaker for exciting the listeners to the love

19 Responsio (Proc. Col. II n. 24–25), LW V, pp. 324–325.

20 Responsio (Proc. Col. II n. 24), LW V, p. 324: "… secundum illud: 'deus, deus meus'—'meus' inquit—'ad te de luce vigilo'. Alioquin non essent opera dei in nobis nostra, nisi deus noster in nobis esset. Nulla enim operatio nostra est, nisi principium operationis nostrum sit, in nobis sit. Nunc autem Is. dicitur: 'omnia opera nostra nobis operatus es'. 'Nostra' ait et 'nobis'".

of virtue and of God himself", according to the saying of Jerome that celebrates the power of emotion and of tears: "O tear, thine is the power, thine is the kingdom … thou win over the Invincible, thou bind the Almighty, thou bend the Son of the Virgin".[21]

Let us sum up: the emphatic way of speaking (*modus loquendi emphaticus*) is, according to Eckhart, the Scriptures' very way of speaking, the way of speaking of the saints and the preachers. Its special feature is the ability to arouse emotion (e.g., "tears"), and this happens through particularly effective synthetic expressions ("Deus meus" or "Deus esse proprius homini divino sicut sibimet Deus"), which imply compelling meanings that can be unfolded and made explicit in a rational argumentative form.

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From what we have said, it appears that the emphatic manner of speech is something very different from the nebulous idea that circulates in the literature on Eckhart, namely 'emphasis' as synonymous with the 'exaggeration', 'ardor', 'impetus' or 'enthusiasm' of the mystical preacher, who tries to express in words his ineffable experience of God. In fact, medieval scholars knew a generic meaning of 'emphasis' as "rhetorical amplification" (Papias) and as a kind of "misuse" (Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham)[22] in the sense of a "rhetorical license" in which precision is lacking because of the enthusiasm welling up from the preacher's heart.[23] But as Susanne Köbele has

21 Responsio (Proc. Col. II n. 25), LW V, p. 324: "Sciendum enim quod scriptura, sancti et praedicator frequenter utitur et convenienter tali modo loquendi emphatico, secundum quod cor loquentis suggerit et magis excitantur auditores ad amorem virtutum et ipsius dei, secundum illud Hieronymi: 'o lacrima, tua est potestas, tuum est regnum. Tribunal iudicis non vereris, amicorum tuorum accusatoribus silentium imponis'. 'Non est qui vetet intrare. Si sola intras, non sola exis et vacua'. Plus crucias diabolum quam poena infernalis. 'Quid plura? Vincis invincibilem, ligas omnipotentem, inclinas filium virginis' ".

22 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 39, a. 4, resp.: "… sed est impropria vel emphatica locutio …"; id., *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 4, exp. textus, (ed. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, p. 141: "… quodammodo erit vera, sed erit emphatica locutio"; d. 5, exp. textus, (ed. Mandonnet), p. 161: "locutio emphatica sicut consuetum est in Scriptura, quod aliquis dicatur filius alicuius, quod sibi maxime competit"; Petrus Abaelardus, *Theologia 'Scholarium'*, II, n. 136, (ed. Buytaert/Mews), Turnhout 1978, p. 475, 2007–2008: "… non est proprietas sermonis, sed emphatice quedam abusio locutionis"; Guillelmus de Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III, 4, c. 3, (ed. Böhner/Gal/Brown), St. Bonaventure N.Y. 1974, p. 759: "a propria significatione … ad impropriam"; Papias, *Elementarium doctrinae erudimentum*, Venetiis 1496, s. v. (p. 105a).

23 Alois Haas, Sermo mysticus. *Studien zu Theologie und Sprache der deutschen Mystik*, Frei-

noted in a recent study,[24] Eckhart uses the term 'emphasis' in a more precise way, as a technical term of classical rhetoric designating the strength of the expression achieved by the trope of brevity. Indeed, Quintilian distinguishes between two types of emphasis: an emphasis "that means more of what it says", and an emphasis "that also means what it does not say", in short, elliptical speech.[25] Eckhart clearly understands the term in the second sense, and favors such 'emphasis' because of its ability to evoke emotion in the listener—and in the reader.

To test our interpretation, we can examine the second passage of Eckhart's *Responsio* in which he refers to the technique of 'emphatic locution':

Proc. Col. II, n. 29, LW V p. 324	**Pred. 113* [Q 15, DW I pp. 246–247]**
Decimus quartus articulus sic dicit: "Omnia debent impleri in vero humili homine. **Humilis homo et deus non sunt duo, sed sunt unum**". Caveat deus ne obmittat se infundere in hominem recte humilem. "Humilis homo non indiget quod deum roget, ipse potest deo imperare. Humilis homo est ita potens super deum, sicut ipse est, deus scilicet, potens super se ipsum. Si iste homo esset in inferno, oporteret deum venire in infernum. et oporteret infernum esse regnum caelorum. Oporteret deum facere de necessitate. Ipse cogitur ad hoc quod ipsum oportet hoc facere, quia istius esse est esse divinum et divinum esse est suum" [est divinum] esse.	aellú ding sond volbracht werden in dem reht demu°tigen mentschen … der demu^{e}tig mentsch vnd got sind ain vnd nit zwai […]. Dirre demu^{e}tig mentsch ist gottes also gewaltig, als er sin selbs gewaltig ist […] Ja bi got: wa^{e}r dirre mentsch in der hell, got mu^{e}st zu° im in die hell, vnd die hell mu^{e}st im ain himelrich sin. er mu°ss dis von not tu°n, er wurdi bezwungen dar zu°, das er es tu°n mu^{e}sti; wan da ist dirre mentsch go^{e}tlich wesen, vnd go^{e}tlich (247) wesen ist dirre mentsch.

burg Schw. 1979, pp. 19–36; id., *Geistliches Mittelalter*, Freiburg Schw. 1984, pp. 193–214. See Kurt Ruh, *Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik*, München 1996, Band III, pp. 233–234.

24 Susanne Köbele, "Emphasis, überswanc, underscheit. Zur literarischen Produktivität spätmittelalterlicher Irrtumslisten", in: Peter Strohschneider (Hrsg.), *Literarische und religiöse Kommunikation in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit*, Berlin—New York 2009, pp. 969–1002 (on Eckhart, pp. 976–991).

25 Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria*, VIII, 3, 83; see too VIII, 2, 11. Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch*

As in the first passage, Eckhart begins here by stating that all he has said "is true, moral and pious" ("Dicendum quod totum verum est, morale et devotum"), and yet formulated "in emphatic form, as has been said above about the tear" ("emphaticum tamen, sicut supra dictum est de lacrima"). He knows that the accusers have targeted his idea of the unity of man and God, and so he offers a comprehensive explanation of his locution:

> The meaning of the sentence 'The humble man and God are not two, but one' is clear if we consider the way in which Jesus prayed the Father on our behalf (John 17). In fact, the humble man as such makes no duality with humility in itself. Duality expresses division and is the root of division. How could someone be one if he were separated from unity, and how could someone be humble if he were separated from humility, and white if he were separated from whiteness and without whiteness? Thus, wherever in Hell the humble man might dwell, there necessarily humility would dwell also. Moreover, we know that for the same reason by which God is God, man is divine in an analogical sense; in fact no one can be divine without God, just as no one can be white without whiteness.[26]

Eckhart uses the figure of reduplication (*humilis inquantum humilis*) and the doctrine of analogy in order to explain the unity between God and the humble man, and the impossibility of positing any distinction in the realm of divine perfections. However, what we are most interested in is what Eckhart means and intends when he refers to 'emphatic' speech. A comparison with the previous text enables us to discover the following answer: the compendious and elliptical "emphatic formula" is in this case the following sentence: "man and God are not two different things, but one thing" ("homo et deus non sunt duo, sed unum"). This is what explains the long argument given above.

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der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. mit einem Vorwort von Arnold Arens, Stuttgart 1990, p. 298.

26 Responsio (Proc. Col. II n. 30), LW V, p. 325: "Quod autem dicitur quod talis "homo et deus non sunt duo, sed unum", patet ex eo quod Ioh. 17 salvator pro nobis orat patrem. Homo enim humilis in quantum humilis non est duo cum humilitate. Duo enim divisionem dicit et est radix divisionis. Quomodo autem esset quis unus divisus ab unitate, humilis divisus ab humilitate, album divisus ab albedine et sine albedine? Quapropter ubicumque in inferno esset humilis, necessario esset humilitas. Constat etiam quod eodem quo deus est deus, homo est divinus analogice. Nec enim quis est divinus sine deo, sicut nec album sine albedine".

By the same interpretation the third passage in which Eckart refers to 'emphatic locution' can also be explained:

Proc. Col. II n. 33, LW V p. 325	*Pred.* 92* [Q 12, DW I p. 194]
Adhuc autem sic: "Deus tantum festinat venire ad bonum hominem, **ac si divinum esse (vel divina essentia) velit rumpi**", "nisi ipse revelet nobis totam abyssum suae divinitatis".	Swenne got sihet, daz wir sîn der eingeborne sun, sô ist gote sô gâch nâch uns und îlet sô sêre und tuot rehte, als ob im sîn götlich wesen welle zerbrechen und ze niht werden an im selben, daz er uns offenbâre allen den abgrunt sîner gotheit

In these words of Eckhart his accusors read a kind of Pelagian determinism: "When God finds a good man, he is quick to come to him, as if his divine essence would burst if he would not manifest himself to him". Eckhart's response again consists in claiming the truth of the sentence "in an emphatic sense" ("Verum et emphaticum est"). The following argument, however, seems to shift towards a more general level:

> the Saints say that God frequently complains of man's sin, as if he would be injured and saddened more by the sin than by the sinner himself. Furthermore, it is known that Justice detests every unjust man more [than a just man does]. So Humility rejects and essentially detests arrogance more than a humble man does. The humble man detests arrogance by way of participation and through Humility itself, and the principle by virtue of which something has a property has more of that property than this something does.[27]

Eckhart's argument proceeds as follows: every perfection of God essentially detests and rejects its opposite and is attracted by its equal. God is Goodness

27 Responsio (Proc. Col. II n. 34), LW V, pp. 325–326: "Verum est et emphaticum et frequenter sancti dicunt quod deus sic dolet de peccato hominis, quasi ipsi plus noceat et contristet peccatum quam ipsum peccantem. Constat etiam quod omne iniquum plus detestatur ipsa aequitas secundum aliquod aequale. Sic humilitas plus repugnat et detestatur, utpote per essentiam, esse superbum quam aliquis humilis. Hic enim detestatur per participationem et per ipsam humilitatem esse superbum; et "propter quod unumquodque, illud magis" ".

itself, and therefore he is attracted by a good man, and he cannot be attracted in any but an essential way, that is to say, if he were not attracted, he would lose his being, that is, his Goodness. Once again, the *locutio emphatica* consists in a compendious formula ("ac si divinum esse velit rumpi …"), and the elliptical speech can be explicated by arguments drawn from principles of Aristotelian logic (*propter quod unumquodque, illud magis*).

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Additional confirmation for our interpretation comes from the last passage in which Eckhart refers to *locutio emphatica*:

***Proc. Col.* II n. 95, LW V p. 340**	***Pred.* 92* [Q 12, DW I p. 194]**
Tricesimus octavus sic habet: "Pater generat suum filium in anima eodem modo, sicut ipse generat eum in aeternitate, et non aliter. **Oportet eum facere, sive ei placeat sive displiceat**".	… und gebirt der vater sînen sun in der sêle in der selben wîse, als er in in der êwicheit gebirt, und niht anders. Er muoz ez tuon, ez sî im liep oder leit.

In this case again, the accusors have targeted a statement that they suspect supports a deterministic view. Indeed, Eckhart writes: "God *must* generate the Son in the soul, whether it pleases or displeases him". He defends this statement by stating that "it is true, and yet it is said in emphatic way" ("verum est. Tamen est locutio emphatica") "that praises the goodness and the love of God, who is totally good by essence. His goodness does not allow him to be lacking germination, as Dionysius says".[28] Eckhart has again uttered a compact, synthetic formula ("oportet eum facere, sive placeat sive displiceat"), but, as in all the previous instances, this formula implies an argument that can be unfolded and expressed in strictly logical terms, as needed.

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28 Responsio (Proc. Col. II n. 97), LW V, p. 341: "commendans dei bonitatem et amorem, qui se toto bonus est per essentiam, quae bonitas non sinit ipsum sine germine esse, ut dicit Dionysius. Propter quod et se ipsum dat et omne quod habet, secundum illud: 'cum illo omnia nobis donavit', Rom. 8, dummodo nos simus apti recipere, Apoc. 3: 'ego sto ad ostium et pulso', et Is. 3: 'exspectat dominus, ut misereatur vestri'. Ipsi enim dare est per

Let us draw some conclusions. The *locutio emphatica* seems to be a semantic dimension in which synthetic and elliptical rhetorical formulas, produced by the invention of the preacher, communicate emotion and truth "by meaning," in the words of Quintilian, "what they do not [explicitly] say". But what is the "not said" compressed and synthesized in an 'emphatic locution'? We know the answer: it is the solid, logically consistent rational argumentation that is presupposed by the brevity of the figure of speech, and without which the locution would be empty of any meaning. Indeed, as we have seen, Eckhart four times declares that a "sentence" he has spoken is an emphatic figure, and four times he declares its meaning by making explicit the logical argument that underlies it.

Meister Eckhart's decision to write not only scientific Scholastic works but sermons in the vernacular as well as in Latin therefore should be understood as a choice in favor of an emphatic style in order to profit from its communicative advantages. In terms of rhetorical persuasion, the power of emphatic vernacular expression is far greater than that of Latin logical speech. From this point of view we can agree with Kurt Ruh as well as with Haas, Köbele and others, who attribute to Eckhart's vernacular expression an "added value" ("Mehrwert") in comparison with his scientific Latin expression.[29] Indeed, one need only read Eckhart's German sermons to appreciate the high degree of flexibility and power of expression that he attains through this new linguistic instrument. Thus, Eckhart's preaching was far more than a simple parenetic and rhetorical form of speech. As our analysis shows, there is a close complementarity between the 'emphatic locution' of his vernacular sermons and the rational meaning, which can be expressed in strict philosophical terms, that is embedded in it. I believe that this is the authentic specific feature of Meister Eckhart's preaching, and his artful and unusual manner of speaking ensured the success of his preaching with a widely diverse audience, which even to this day has been enchanted by the strange and masterly interplay of the literary, emotional, parenetic and philosophical elements of his discourse.

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essentiam et per se, secundum illud: "primum dives est per se", et Matth. 23: 'quotiens volui congregare pullos tuos, et noluisti?' secundum Augustinum super illo".

29 Alois M. Haas, Sermo mysticus. *Studien zu Theologie und Sprache der deutschen Mystik*, Freiburg Schw. 1979, p. 81 and Kurt Ruh, *Vorbemerkungen zu einer neuen Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik im Mittelalter*, München 1982, p. 30. See too Susanne Köbele, *Bilder der unbegriffenen Wahrheit. Zur Struktur mystischer Rede im Spannungsfeld von Latein und Volkssprache*, Tübingen 1993, pp. 49–51.

PART 6

Mystical Theology and Contemplation

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CHAPTER 20

The *Tractatus de mistica theologia* by Ioannes de Indagine, O.Cart. († 1475)

Stephen M. Metzger

Ioannes de Indagine († 1475), a monk of the Charterhouse *Mons Sancti Salvatoris* (Salvatorberg) in Erfurt, was the most prolific author of the Middle Ages. He penned in excess of 500 works according to a *Retractio*, modelled on Augustine, that he wrote sometime in the last decade of his life. His biography that circulated among the Carthusian Order put the number closer to 450.[1] Amazingly for a corpus so large, few of his writings survive in multiple copies; the majority are preserved in single manuscript witnesses, often bound in collections of his writings ("theologische Sammelhandschriften") that were kept in the famous and impressive library of Salvatorberg.[2] As one might expect for a Chartermonk vowed to silence and a life of solitary contemplation, his *cor-*

1 L. Le Vasseur, *Ephemerides ordinis Cartusiensis: nunc primum a monachis ejusdem ordinis in lucem editae* I, Monstrolii 1890, pp. 463–496, 463a: "Joannes Hagen de Indagine … nobili prosapia ortus, cujus Tractatus de rebus spiritualibus variis aut ecclesiasticiis editi prodigiosam ejus scientiam indigitant; scripsit enim ultra quadrigentos quinquaginta libros …". For Ioannes' *Retractio*, see J. Klapper, *Der Erfurter Kartäuser Johannes Hagen: ein Reformstheologe des 15. Jahrhunderts* 2. *Verzeichnis seiner Schriften mit Auszügen* (Erfurter Theologische Studien 10), Leipzig 1961, p. 139 [this work will be cited hereafter as "Klapper 2"]: "In nomine Christi incipit: Retractio et dictorum declaracio. Paulus Apostolus Christi Ihesu in Cor. XI dicit: 'Si nos ipsos judicamus, non judicamur a domino.' Jam diu est et plus quam viginti anni transierunt, quod multa scripsi ego fr. Johannes Indaginis Carthusiensis in officio prioratus et extra, in exposicione quodammodo quadruplici Veteris et Novi Testamenti et omnium librorum Biblie, eorum qui in canone habentur aput Hebreos et qui extra sunt, et in variis sermonibus de tempore, de sanctis, ad seculares et religiosos ac aliis tractatibus, qui numerum excedunt forte CCCCC …".

2 S.M. Metzger, "The Manuscripts of Writings by Ioannes Hagen de Indagine, O.Cart.", in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 50 (2008), pp. 175–256, and Id., "Note: A Few More Manuscripts of Ioannes de Indagine, O.Cart.", in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 58 (2016), pp. 447–452. A catalogue for the library of the Charterhouse of Salvatorberg was composed in 1485 by Iacobus Volradi, an edition of which appears in: P. Lehmann, *Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz 2: Bistum Mainz, Erfurt* [= *MBK* 2], München 1928, pp. 239–593, Volradi's list of Ioannes de Indagine's works is on pp. 581–593.

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pus includes what is probably the largest collection of surviving autograph manuscripts from early European history.[3] This does not mean that he labored in obscurity and that his thoughts had no influence beyond the walls of his cell. In fact, he enjoyed a remarkable reputation for learning, and by his own testimony, which is confirmed by the works themselves, he wrote in response to requests from within and, more often, outside his Charterhouse.[4] He was, as Dennis Martin has argued, a "public intellectual".[5]

The Carthusian Order took a particular interest in matters of spirituality and contemplation, believing this to be their particular area of study, in which they were considered experts.[6] Unsurprisingly then, Ioannes de Indagine penned two treatises explicitly on mystical theology as well as many other treatises on spiritual and devotional concerns. The nature of mystical theology was of some moment in the middle of the fifteenth century. Beginning in 1452 a debate had erupted in Bavaria and the Tirol which involved Nicholas of Cusa and the Carthusian Vincent of Aggsbach, among others, and which additionally concerned the late Jean Gerson's and the thirteenth-century Carthusian Hugh of Balma's understanding of mystical theology.[7] At issue was how precisely to

3 According to my inventory (Metzger 2008, p. 177), there are 40 surviving autograph manuscripts. Unfortunatetly, Ioannes did not have a trained and polished book hand but wrote rather in a cursive style which sixteenth-century Carthusians and modern scholars have had difficulty deciphering; see, for example, a note in the catalogue of Salvatorberg's library (Lehmann, *MBK* 2, p. 264, ll. 42–43): "Hic libellus manu Joannis Indaginis illegibiliter omnino scriptus e loco amotus est, quia nullius utilitatis". For nearly all of the manuscripts containing works by Ioannes now preserved in the Charterhouse of Parkminster, Niel Ker and Alan Piper in their catalogue of *Medieval Manuscripts in British Libraries*, Vol. 4, Oxford 1992, remark that they are written in Ioannes' "very current hand"; see the entries in Metzger 2008, pp. 218–227, nn. 76–88.

4 Klapper 2, p. 145: "Post hec in anno domini 1451 a variis personis inductus fui et precipue a meo superiore ad scribendum aliqua pro aliorum utilitate, ut non solum michi, sed aliis prodesset mea lectio, et licet primo invitus, tamen acquievi eorum desiderio, et cepi primo scribere ad quorundam instanciam sermones de Spiritu Sancto".

5 D.D. Martin, "Carthusians as Public Intellectuals: Cloistered Religious as Advisors to Lay Elites on the Eve of the Protestant Reformation", in: C.M. Bellitto and D.Z. Flanagin (eds.), *Reassessing Reform: A Historical Investigation into Church Renewal*, Washington, D.C. 2012, pp. 232–253.

6 K. Emery, Jr., "Foreword", in: Margaret Porette, *The Mirror of Simple Souls* (Notre Dame Texts in Medieval Culture 6), trans. E. Colledge, J.C. Marler and J. Grant, Notre Dame, IN 1999, p. xxii.

7 There is a large scholarly literature on this debate, see especially E. Vansteenberghe, *Autour de la Docte Ignorance. Une controverse sur la théologie mystique au XV^e siècle* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 14), Münster i.W. 1915; Hugues de Balma, *Théologie mystique* (Sources Chrétiennes 408), (éd. F. Ruello et J. Barbet), Paris, Tome I, 1995; D.D. Martin, *Fifteenth-Century Carthusian Reform: The World of Nicholas Kempf* (Studies in

delineate and understand the relationship between the intellect and the affection (*affectus*) in mystical contemplation. In particular, the disputants differed on the precise role and extent of the intellect in mystical union. Did a rapt mystic have the use of intellect and ratiocination? Or was he subsumed completely in love? Did intellection play a necessary role either before or during the mystical ascent? Vincent of Aggsbach thought that Cusanus, and by extension Gerson and Marquard Sprenger (a prominent theologian in Munich) went too far when they gave a large role to intellection, especially knowledge acquired through study, in mystical theology.

There is no evidence linking Ioannes de Indagine or his treatises to this debate, but his treatise on mystical theology is significant as that of a contemporary German Carthusian, who, it can be fairly securely inferred, knew of those debates to the south. This study presents the first edition of the latest of Ioannes' two treatises (ca. 1457–1468). He presents an affective but intellectually rigorous and philosophically sophisticated understanding of mystical theology that culminates in the affective union with God in love. As we should expect given the nature of his literary production, he compiled this treatise principally from his reading of Hugh of Balma, Jean Gerson, and his confrère in Erfurt, Iacobus de Jüterbog as well as many other writers in the traditions of mystical and Scholastic theology. Even though he employs many philosophical principles in this treatise and evinces an affinity for the thought of Thomas Aquinas, Ioannes maintains the traditional opinion with regard to contemplation, i.e., that this experiential and savorous (*sapida*) 'knowledge' exceeds all knowledge obtained by means of ratiocination (i.e., philosophy) and is in every way superior to the theology that is taught in schools and universities (Scholasticism).

1 A Remarkable Carthusian

Johannes Brewer was born around 1415 in the village of Hattendorf, south of Stadthagen in the Diocese of Minden to a noble family.[8] According to the trea-

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the History of Christian Thought 49), Leiden 1992; Id., *Carthusian Spirituality: The Writings of Hugh of Balma and Guigo de Ponte*, New York 1997; K.M. Ziebart, *Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect: A Case Study in 15th-Century* Fides-Ratio *Controversy* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 225), Leiden 2014.

8 The principal and indispensable study of Ioannes' life and works is J. Klapper, *Der Erfurter Kartäuser Johannes Hagen: ein Reformtheologe des 15. Jahrhunderts 1: Leben und Werk* (Erfurter Theologische Studien 9), Leipzig 1960 [hereafter = Klapper 1]. The details of his life are also

tise presented here, his parents chose to send him to school before any of his siblings.[9] We do not know how large his family was. He had at least one brother, Hinrik, who became the Abbot of the Benedictine Abbey of Ilsenburg, which was active in attempts to reform monastic life in the second half of the fifteenth century. Ioannes had a close relationship with his brother and corresponded with him regularly.[10] The details of Ioannes' formal education are limited. Joseph Klapper hypothesized that Ioannes must have done his training in Arts at the University of Cologne believing that a Faculty of Arts did not exist at Erfurt until May 1439.[11] Four years after the publication of Klapper's study of Ioannes, his colleague Erich Kleineidam published the first volume of his definitive study of the medieval University of Erfurt, in which he chronicles the presence of a philosophical faculty in the university from its beginning in the late fourteenth century.[12] While Klapper's claim has some probability on account of the reputation of the University of Cologne and the training in philosophy that Ioannes displays in the work edited below and others, there is no explict evidence in either Ioannes' own accounts or in his Carthusian biographies to support it. One can possibly infer, however, in the autobiographical portion of the second register of his writings that Ioannes studied Arts in Erfurt.[13] Upon completing his degree in Arts, Ioannes matriculated into the Faculty of Law at Erfurt in late 1439, but he did not stay long, abandoning his studies after seven months.

According to his own account, at that time the plague was present in Erfurt, and Ioannes says that confronted with the inevitability of death, the fleeting vanities of this world, and the difficulty of pleasing God in the secular state, he resolved to enter the Charterhouse in Erfurt, taking the habit in 1440.[14] In the

found in: H. Rüthing, "Jean Hagen de Indagine", in: *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique*, Paris, Tome 8, 1973, coll. 543–552, and D. Mertens, "Hagen, Johannes", in: C. Stöllinger (ed.), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters Verfasserslexikon*, Berlin, Band 3, 1981, coll. 388–398. He has often been referred to as Johannes Hagen, Hagen being the largest town near his birthplace, which was rendered into Latin as 'Indaginis' or 'de Indagine'. Throughout this essay, I will refer to him according to the Latin spelling of his name "Ioannes de Indagine".

9 Ioannis de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 2, p. 639, ll. 17–19.

10 Klapper 1, pp. 16–17.

11 Ibid., p. 19.

12 E. Kleineidam, Universitas studii Erffordensis*: Überblick über die Geschichte der Universität Erfurt im Mittelalter 1392–1521 1: 1392–1460* (Erfurter Theologische Studien 14), Leipzig 1964.

13 Klapper 2, p. 144, see note 15, below.

14 Ibid., p. 128: "Natus de diocesi Myndensi in comitatu Scomborgensi, quinque miliaribus

register of his own works that he composed around 1457, he also claims that he decided against taking a degree lest he be pressed into administrative service in the Order, a self-consciously ironic statement as he was the Prior of the Charterhouse of Eisenach from 1454 until 23 November 1456.[15] He must have proved an able administrator, despite his misgivings and protestations, as he was also Prior of the Charterhouses near Erfurt (1457–1460), Frankfurt an der Oder (1461–1464) and Stettin (1464–1465?), before returning to Erfurt around 1465 where he lived the rest of his life.[16] It is clear that Ioannes did not wish to be a Prior or a public writer. He wanted to live as a simple and unassuming Chartermonk in prayer and contemplation, having a great desire for the Divine Office and the sudy of sacred Scripture.[17] In both cases he was pressed into service by external forces.

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a Hildensen, post in Erphort studens legum et canonum etc. in studio Erffurdensi in Thuringia anno domini 1440 regnante ibidem pestilencia videnque instabilem huius mundi statum et quia difficile est hominem placere deo in statu seculari propter varia impedimenta, votum emisi de intranda religione Carthusiensi in eodem loco, si et inquantum consensus michi daretur, et deo ordinante sic factum est".

15 Ibid., p. 144: "Unde ego predictus fr. Jo. Indaginis de diocesi Myndensi provincie Coloniensis de quadam villa Haddendorp prope civitatem Haghen vel Indaginen in comitatu Schowenbergensi inter Mynden et Hildensen sitatum natus, in studio Erffordensi insistens doctrine sacrorum canonum et legum per annos aliquot, et cum me ibidem aliqui amici et fautores mei ad suscepcionem graduum sollicitarent et ego reputarem me aliqualiter in predictis facultatibus post studium arcium aliqua sapere et quorundam doctorum favorem erga meam personam ad consenciendum presentirem, diucius hec in animo revolvens, de fine cepi diligencius cogitare, similiter de utilitate expensarum in eodem actu consumendarum, similiter de brevitate et miseria huius vite, precipue cum illo tempore, scilicet anno domini 1440 esset ibidem in loco pestilencia, visitavi aliquociens Carthusienses prope eandem civitatem, et desiderium, quod prius ad ordinem Carthusiensium conceperam, fuit auctum ex colloquio et visitacione quarundam peronarum ibidem. Et sic propositum de intrando prefatum ordinem volens exequi, fortiter ibidem pro ingressu religionis laboravi, et cum libenter vidissem, quod prius in utroque jure promoverim ad honorem ordinis, recogitavi et in mente revolvi, quod accepcio graduum possit michi esse occasio variarum inquietudinem et maxime promocio in prioratum, tamen evadere non potui, licet hec magna causa fuisset, quod gradus non accepi"; M. Eifler, "*Ut non solum mihi, sed aliis prodesset mea lectio*. Autographe und Unika ders Erfurter Kartäusers Johannes Hagen in einer Weimarer Handschrift", in: *Das Mittelalter: Perpecktiven Mediävistischer Forschung* 14.2 (2009), pp. 74–75.

16 Eifler, l.c.

17 Klapper 2, p. 145: "In ordine autem inclinacionem habui magnam ad Divinum Officium, similiter ad Divine Scripture studium, non tamen aliquos libros dictando scribere …".

Ioannes' training in theology was entirely self-taught, founded upon his formal education in philosophy in a Faculty of Arts and his exposure to legal principles and reasoning in the Faculty of Law at Erfurt. For the first ten years of his life in the Charterhouse he dedicated himself to reading and study, gathering excerpts and quotations to aid his memory on *folia* and *cedulae*, which he would later collect and bind into books.[18] His reading list was extensive. He began with the saints: Ambrose, Jerome, Dionysius the Areopagite (the entire *Corpus Dionysiaca*), Augustine, Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas. He included works on civil and canon law, on medicine (Galen, Hippocrates, commentaries, etc.), on nature, and interestingly histories and chronicles. He poured over commentaries and glosses on Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences*, taking care to mention those by Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. He also cited Thomas of Strasburg, Guillaume Durand (*Speculator*), William of Paris and Bartholomew of Urbino (*Multiloquio Augustini*). He did all of this work in order to aid his contemplation of God and eternal goods, and thereby move from the understanding of creatures to that of the Creator.[19]

These years of quiet study did not go unnoticed. Ioannes reports that sometime around 1450 he began to be asked to write for the profit of others from within and outside the Charterhouse. He demurred citing his own insufficiency and the fear of producing things useless and superfluous. Finally, in 1451 he was overwhelmed by the demand and at the behest of his superior he embarked upon a literary career the results of which were massive.[20] His refusal may appear to us as feigned humility, a rhetorical trope that he learned from read-

18 Ibid.: "… sed quasi pro memoria adiuvanda multa collegi in foliis et cedulis, que pauci timeo erunt posteris valoris, et sunt collect de libris sanctorum …". For an example of this kind of book, see Chicago, Newberry Library, Ms. 67.3 (Metzger 2008, pp. 190–191, n. 22), among several listed in the inventory.

19 Klapper 2, pp. 128, 145 ("Retinui quidem aput me ad memoriam reformandam et conservandam et propter contemplari ex his deum et eterna bona et de creaturis intelligere creatorem").

20 Ibid., p. 128: "Post hoc circa annum 1450 sepius sollicitus et rogatus, ut post lectionem multorum aliqua scriberem posteris profutura, ad quod recognovi me insufficientem. Ideo diu nolui acceptare, timens superflua fore et inutilia, tandem victus peticionibus scripsi: Erffordie sermones spirituales septem super illa Evangelii verba Jo. x: 'Ego sum vobiscum', declarando, quomodo quotlibet donum Spiritus Sancti est pastor et habet ostium et pascua, in quibus oves spiritualis pascit"; ibid., p. 145: "Post hec anno domini 1451 a variis personis inductus fui et precipue a meo superiore ad scribendum aliqua pro aliorum utilitate, ut non solum michi, sed aliis prodesset mea lectio, et licet primo invitus, tamen acquievi eorum desiderio, et cepi primo scribere ad quorundam instanciam sermones de Spiritu Sancto".

ing an author of Ciceronian style such as Jerome or Augustine. But we should guard our cynicism precisely because so many of his writings are in response to a particular person on a specific issue. In this regard a comparison with older yet contemporary Carthusians, who composed a impressive range of literary works, is instructive.

Ioannes was not the only Carthusian of his time to pen a large body of writing. Denys the Carthusian (1402–1471) and Ioannes' confrère in Salvatorberg Iacobus de Jüterbog (ca. 1381–1465) both wrote an impressive number of works, which enjoyed a large circulation. It is interesting here to note the differences and similarities between the three Chartermonks. Denys went to the University of Cologne to study philosophy prior to his joining the Charterhouse in Roermond because he believed that it was essential to his vocation as a monk, and he attained the degree of Master of Arts in 1424. The parallels with the career of Ioannes de Indagine are striking. He was an autodidact to the same degree as Ioannes and was zealous after truth which he saw as intergral to his calling. Therefore, not only his reading and compiling, but also his voluminous writing were part of his life as a contemplative monk. Like Ioannes' program of personal reading, Denys conciously studied philosophy at the University with the intention of progressing from the knowledge of creatures to that of the Creator.[21] The significant difference between Denys and Ioannes is that Denys was much more a proponent of the tradition of Scholastic discourse, even writing his own commentary on Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences*. Denys completely internalized the tradition of Scholastic learning to which he was exposed at Cologne. This is evident from the instances in his writings where he compares the various positions of one famous Scholastic master to another.[22] Unlike both Denys and Ioannes, Iacobus de Jüterbog was a formally trained theologian who had taught in the Faculty of Theology in the University of Kraków and had been a Cistercian monk before entering the Charterhouse in Erfurt. Consequently,

21 The definitive treatment of Denys the Carthusian and his intellectual formation and production is now K. Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian. The World of Thought Comes to Roermond", in: K. Pansters (ed.), *The Carthusians in the Low Countries: Studies in Monastic History and Heritage* (Miscellanea Neerlandica 43: Studia Cartusiana 4), Leuven 2014, pp. 255–304, here pp. 257–263; for a study of Denys' works and the surviving manuscripts, see Id., *Dionysii Cartusiensis Opera selecta. Bibliotheca manuscripta* 1A*: Studia bibliographia*, CCCM 121–121A, Turnhout 1991, 2 Vols.

22 K. Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian and the Doxography of Scholastic Theology", in: M.D. Jordan and K. Emery, Jr. (eds.), *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers*, Notre Dame, IN 1992, pp. 327–359, reprinted in K. Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot 1996, n. ix.

he had both a scholarly habit of mind and a reputation as a theologian, which explains the celebrity and diffusion of his works. In comparison with his two confrères, Iacobus' *corpus* is much more modest as it contains only around 130 titles, but they are preserved in 450 manuscripts and 30 medieval and early-modern printed books.[23]

Ioannes was motivated to some extent to write for his own use. He wrote many works that befit the devotion of a Carthusian and were no doubt aids to his contemplation. For example, he penned commentaries on every book in the Scriptures according to the four senses of interpretation (literal, allegorical, anagogical and tropological), which he counted as filling around eighty quarto-sized volumes.[24] There are also various works of a more spiritual nature, including two treatises on mystical theology. With his writing he put into practice the famous line from his Order's Constitutions that the monks preach with their hands since they cannot do so with their mouths.[25] As we mentioned above, many works in his *corpus* are compilations of texts by various authors as a result of his reading, a fact that has caused some readers to question the originality of his thought.[26]

Ioannes relates no inner desire to write voluminous treatises on topics of philosophy, theology and law for a broader public, but, perhaps seeing the benefit of the Carthusian program to disseminate the works of his confrère in Erfurt Iacobus, he embarked on a writing career fully cognizant that it was for the

23 L. Meier, *Die Werke des Erfurter Kartäusers Jakob von Jüterbog in ihrer handschriftlichen Überlieferung* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 37.5), Münster i.W. 1955; D. Mertens, Iacobus Carthusiensis*: Untersuchungen zur Rezeption der Werke des Kartäusers Jakob von Paradies (1381–1465)* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte 50: Studien zur Germania Sacra 13), Göttingen 1976.

24 Klapper 2, p. 125: "Ex his et aliis in quatuor sensibus, scilicet litterali, allegorico, tropologico, anagogico complevi. Et sunt plus quam LXXX volumina parva in medio arcu"; Eifler, cit., p. 75.

25 Guigo I, *Consuetudines* 28.2–4 (Sources Chrétiennes 313), Paris 1984, pp. 222–225: "Omnes enim pene quos suscipimus, si fieri potest scribere docemus … ut quia ore non possumus, dei verbum manibus predicemus. Quot enim libros scribimus, tot nobis veritatis praecones videmur".

26 Lehmann, *MBK* 2, p. 418 ll. 35–41: "Nota, quod ipse [Johannis Indaginis] morem habuit, quod cum quis liber aut tractatus ad manus eius venit, eundem incorporavit pro posse et communiter enucleando sentencias eius extraxit sub alio stilo simplici et intelligibiliori et quandoque abbreviavit et quandoque apposuit. Sic patet in istis titulis hic positis, de quibus tractant Anselmus vel Hugo vel doctor Jacobus Carthusiensis etc., licet nomina talium non expresserit, sicut per se fatentur alias in quodam scripto suo. Quare lector ex titulo auctores, si forte minus sibi auctenticus videtur, in his tractatulis fastidiosus non sit".

good of others as well as his own spiritual benefit.[27] Remarkably, he garnered a reputation outside of the Charterhouse for the quality of his erudition, and was put upon by both his Order and those from the wider society to give his opinion on various matters. That Ioannes' prior was among those who asked him to write stands in stark contrast to Denys, who was criticized by his prior and made to stop writing for a time.[28] Ioannes' opinions at least once brought the scorn of the Order upon him when he was censured and threatened with prison in 1454 (according to a report in a *Carta* from 1460) for causing annoyance to his breathern and scandal on the issue of his monastery's treatment of incorporated parishes, which may also be a reference to a disagreement he had with Iacobus de Jüterbog concerning the merits of pastoral care.[29] This incident did not cause him to stop writing, although the document stipulates that he needed the approval of his prior to send or receive letters and other texts. Nevertheless, his opinion appears to have been sought until this end of his life. His works would not be included in modern lists of medieval "bestsellers" (their circulation is too limited), but he did address a wide swath of fifteenth-century Germanic society. Ioannes says in his *Retractio* that he wrote for various ecclesiastical and secular people including bishops, princes, the faithful and the uneducated.[30] Dennis Martin gives the following description:

> Thus, while Johann produced conventional works on the full range of contemplative, mystical, ascetic, and moral theology topics, he also wrote on a variety of economic and political topics: for example, on droughts and rain-imploring Masses and, at the request of the Landgrave Wilhelm of Thüringia's master of agriculture, on the spirituality of farming (*De agricultura corporali et spirituali et de agricolis*), as well as whether monasteries may licitly supply cartage services in military compaigns as

27 Martin 2012, cit., p. 240.

28 Emery 2014, cit., pp. 274–287.

29 M. Sargent and J. Hogg (eds.), *The* Chartae *of the Carthusian General Chapter: Paris, BN, MS Latin 10888 I: 1457–1465 (ff. 1–157^{v})* (Analecta Cartusiana 100.5), Salzburg 1985, p. 94, ll. 8–16; Klapper 1, pp. 28–30; Mertens, *Jacobus*, cit., pp. 206–242; Martin 1992, cit., pp. 237–238; D.D. Martin, "Carthusians, God's Judgment, and the *Infestatio Thurcorum of the Fifteenth Century*", in: J. Hogg; A. Girard; D. Le Blévec (eds.), *Central European Charterhouses in the Family of the Carthusian Order* (Analecta Cartusiana 254), Levoča-Salzburg 2008, p. 62 n. 46; Martin 2012, cit., p. 240.

30 Klapper 2, p. 139: "… ad peticiones multorum et ad varias personas ecclesiasticas et seculares, episcopos, principes, plebeos ac simplices, nunc docendo, exhortando peccata ad vitandum, virtutes ad imitandum".

> part of their feudal obligations (*An licitum sit religiosis concedere currus ad bella*). He wrote a series of tractates for the landgraves of Thüringia, the duke of Saxony, the prince elector of Brandenburg and their various noble cousins, as well as their administrators on how to govern, including soldiering and chancery work, but also on management of comital fishponds. He even found time to write about how to collect taxes. For a prince's chief cook he wrote a work, *De rege et sacerdote*; for the Marquise of Brandenburg and her daughters, a manual of Christian comportment. He wrote on the perils of debased coinage for Landgrave Wilhelm of Thüringia but also on "spiritual numismatics" and, for the *Bürgermeister* of Eisenach, on the spirituality of business. He also dealt with marriage, marital sexuality (requested by a physician in Erfurt), the permissibility of dancing, prodigies of nature, epidemiology, and the use of torture in witchcraft cases.[31]

His writings, therefore, reflect a significant level of knowledge about, and contact with, the world beyond the walls of his Charterhouse.

It seems a reasonable assumption then that Ioannes would have been aware of the controversy concerning mystical theology in Bavaria. He knew Nicholas of Cusa, especially during the Cardinal's legation to Germany in the early 1450s, and they corresponded with one another on matters of ecclesiastical politics. Indeed, it seems that Ioannes had a certain admiration for the Cardinal, and it may be that Nicholas was one of the many encouraging Ioannes to write.[32] Ioannes, like most Carthusians of the time, supported the authority of a General Council.[33] He believed that such gatherings were the proper way to govern the Church and essential to much neeeded reform, but he acknowledged that it was impossible for a council to be in session continuously and therefore that a pope was necessary. Unlike his confrère Vincent, Ioannes did not hold Nicholas' abandonment at the Council of Basel of the cause for conciliarism against him.[34] Ioannes reserved his reform-minded admonishment of high-ranking churchmen for John of Capistrano.[35] The treatise on mystical theology edited below evinces no direct influence of Nicholas' conception of mystical vision, and there is no evidence to suggest that Ioannes wrote anything in Cusanus' defense against the criticisms of Vincent of Aggsbach.

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31 Martin 2012, cit., pp. 241–243.

32 Klapper 1, p. 117; Martin 2008, cit., p. 62; Martin 2012, cit., p. 239.

33 Emery 2014, p. 281.

34 Ziebart, l.c, p. 149.

35 Klapper 1, p. 117.

Rather, Ioannes' treatises on mystical theology are a part of a vibrant discussion concerning the nature of mystical theology and contemplation occurring in Erfurt and Eastern and Central Germany simultaneous to the debate in Tegernsee and Southern Germany. An older view held that Christian mysticism and theories of contemplation were absent from the religious life in Erfurt on the eve of the Reformation, but this idea was dependent on the assumption that evidence for such activity would be similar to that found in the Rhineland under the influence of Meister Eckhart.[36] Joseph Klapper suggested that Iacobus de Jüterbog's and Ioannes' spiritual writings necessitated a reappraisal of that view.[37] Erich Kleineidam confirmed that suspicion and showed the vibrancy of mystical theorizing in the Charterhouse at Erfurt among Iacobus de Jüterbog, Ioannes de Indagine and Iacobus Volradi.[38] Indeed, Ioannes seems to have taken a special interest in matters of spirituality and devotion beyond that typical even for a Carthusian. In addition to more theoretical treatments of mystical theology, contemplation, and spiritual practice, Ioannes wrote in defense of female visionaries, including Bridget of Sweden.[39] The following treatise by Ioannes de Indagine, therefore, should be read within this context. It is especially noteworthy, as we shall see below, that the only extant copy of this treatise by Ioannes de Indagine belonged to the Augustinian Canons of the Abbey of St. Meinulf, a part of the Windesheim Congregation, in Böddeken, south of Paderborn.

2 Two Treatises on Mystical Theology by Ioannes de Indagine

Ioannes composed two registers of his writings during the course of his life, which when read in conjunction with the catalogue and list of works compiled by the librarian of the Charterhouse in Erfurt, Iacobus Volradi, at the end of the fifteenth century are valuable resources for understanding his literary production and dating his works. Ioannes wrote the first of these registers around 1457, in which he gives a description of a long, two-part treatise on mystical theology:

36 T. von Kolde, *Das religiöse Leben in Erfurt beim Ausgange des Mittelalters: Eine Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der Reformation* (Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte 63), Halle 1898, p. 40 and n. 126.

37 Klapper 1, pp. 78–79.

38 E. Kleineidam, "Versuch zur Einheit der Theologie. Die Theologie der Erfurter Kartäuser am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts", in: E. Kleineidam und H. Schürmann (Hrsg.), *Miscellanea Erfordiana* (Erfurter Theologische Studien 12), Leipzig 1962, pp. 247–271.

39 Klapper 1, p. 79.

> Treatise on mystical theology. It begins *Sedebit solitarius et tacebit*, etc. There are two parts. The first part contains preparatory material for mystical theology and many things about the potencies of the soul and its virtues, on the corruption, cleansing and reformation of them, and on the reformation of the will, reason and memory. There are posited many things about the reformation of the memory, how one ought to think about the pains of hell and the joys of heaven, on the life of Christ and indeed almost all of the life of Christ is succinctly treated. The second part or treatise is on mystical theology in itself, what it is and how it is acquired. And here are placed the grades of contemplation, the sweet nature of mystical theolgy and many other things.[40]

This text is found in the autograph manuscript Weimar, Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek, Hs. Q.50, ff. 1r–60v.[41] In a detailed study of this codex, Matthias Eifler indicates on the grounds of both external and internal evidence that the treatise was composed around 1450.[42] In this manuscript, Ioannes designates the two parts of the treatise *libelli*, and it would not be surprising if this work is modelled on the *Tractatus de mystica theologia* by Jean Gerson, which is also divided into two *libelli*, treating the speculative and practical aspects of mystical theology.[43]

In the second register of his writings which dates to around 1468,[44] Ioannes describes another, smaller treatise on mystical theology:

> Treatise on mystical, that is savorous and experiential theology, namely how one ascends to it and how it is acquired and to what degree it differs from the other theology that is taught in the schools. And how it is sweet and does not know bitterness, and concerning preparatory exercises for

40 Klapper 2, p. 146: "Tractatus de theologia mistica. Anf.: 'Sedebit solitarius et tacebit' etc. Et sunt due partes. Prima pars continet preparatoria in theologiam misticam et ponit multa de potenciis anime et de virtutibus anime, de corrupcione atque sanacione ac reformacione earum. Et ponit de reformacione voluntatis, racionis ac memorie. Et ibi de reformacione memorie ponuntur multa, quomodo cogitare debeat de penis inferni, de gaudiis celi, de vita Christi, ac quasi tota vita Christi succincte ponitur. Secunda pars seu tractatus est de mistica in se theologia, quid sit et quomodo acquiratur. Et ibidem de gradibus contemplacionum, que ad suavitatem mistice pertinent theologie, multa ponuntur".

41 Metzger 2008, p. 235 #104.

42 Eifler, cit., p. 80.

43 Such a conjecture, of course, can be confirmed only by an edition and study of this treatise.

44 Eifler, cit., p. 74 n. 19.

> receiving mystical theology and how one ascends into God and to heaven and to the true good; and at what hours, and how after he has prepared himself, a person ought to prepare to acquire and receive it.[45]

A copy of this treatise is preserved in the codex Paderborn, Erzbischofliche Akademische Bibliothek, Cod. 118, ff. 162^{vb}–173^{rb}.[46] This is a collection of theological writings including the works of Iacobus de Jüterbog and Augustine. When the contents of this manuscript are compared to the catalogue compiled by Volradi, its contents are similar to that of a manuscript designated H.101 in the medieval register of which it may be a copy.[47] To my knowledge, neither H.101 nor an autograph of this treatise is extant.[48] Paderborn, EAB, Cod. 118 was owned by the Augustinian canons of St. Meinulf in Böddeken in the Diocese of Paderborn, and the section of the manuscript that contains the treatise on mystical theology was written in a Gothic bookhand typical of the copyists of that abbey. This house of canons belonged to the Windesheim Congregation.[49] They seem to have taken an interest in the writings of Iacobus de Jüterbog, possessing eight codices that contained his writings.[50] While Paderborn, EAB, Cod. 118

45 Klapper 2, p. 132: "Tractatus de mistica, id est sapida et experienciali theologia, scilicet qualiter ad ipsam ascendatur et quomodo acquiratur et qualiter differat ab alia theologia, que in scholis docetur. Et quomodo sit suavis et amaritudinem nesciat. Et de industriis preparantibus ad eam et qualiter ascendat in deum et ad celestia et vera bona et quibus horis et qualiter preparatus se homo debeat preparare ad ipsius acquisicionem et degustacionem".

46 U. Hinz, *Schriften der Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster* 18*: Handschriften-census Westfalen*, Wiesbaden 1999, pp. 250–251, n. 0551; Metzger 2008, pp. 217–218 #74.

47 Martin 2012, cit., p. 239 n. 16, erroneosly claims that Paderborn, EAB, Cod. 118 is Salvatorberg H.101 based on a confusing entry in Klapper 2, p. 37, which is actually to an annotation in the manuscript of the Salvatorberg catalogue (quoted above in note 26 and below in note 58), edited by Paul Lehmann, and not in the manuscript designated as H.101. Neither Lehman nor Klapper identify H.101 as Paderborn, EAB, Cod. 118, and in my inventory I placed H.101 among the manuscripts still awaiting discovery.

48 Interestingly, a fragment of a treatise on mystical theology appears in a manuscript now preserved in Moskva, Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennaia Biblioteka, Fonds 201 Nr. 35, ff. 157^{r}–158^{v}. Daria Barow-Vassilevitch and Marie-Luise Heckmann for the Web-site www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de, which presents a full description of the codex, write that this manuscript is H.135 in the catalogue of Salvatorberg, which suggests that unless these two folia are from H.101, Ioannes wrote a third treatment on mystical theology. Perhaps, Salvatorberg H.101 awaits discovery in a library in Eastern Europe or Russia.

49 W. Oeser, "Die Hanschriftenbestände und die Schreibtätigkeit im Augustiner-Chorherrenstift Böddeken", in: *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens* 7 (1967), pp. 317–318, 429 n. 68.

50 Mertens, *Jacobus*, cit., p. 113.

does contain works by Iacobus, the majority of the treatises in the manuscript are by Ioannes de Indagine. This is the only manuscript of his writings to be kept in the library of St. Meinulf.[51] After the suppression of this community in 1803, the manuscript fell into the hands of a country priest in the Diocese of Paderborn, Franz Xaver Schrader (1848–1911), who gave it to the library of the bishop.[52]

When precisely Ioannes wrote his shorter treatise on mystical theology is unclear. The treatises in the manuscripts now in Weimar and Paderborn are not identical. The text in Paderborn, EAB, Cod. 118 is not a copy of the second *libellus* in the Weimar manuscript. The two registers of Ioannes' writings provide both a *terminus post quem* and a *terminus ante quem* for the treatise in the Paderborn manuscript. It is probable that Ioannes penned this second treatise sometime between 1457 and 1468. Such a timeframe is confirmed by an examination of the codex itself, which indicates that this copy of the probable autograph was made during Ioannes' lifetime and perhaps shortly after the composition of the work. In his study of the library of St. Meinulf, Wolfgang Oeser judges the manuscript to have been compiled between 1460 and 1470 on the basis of watermarks on the paper in the codex, giving the probable dates for a series of watermarks in the manuscript based on the study of Charles-Moïse Briquet.[53] Unfortunately, neither Oeser nor the cataloguer of Paderborn, Ulrich Hinz, give the exact location of these watermarks in the manuscript.[54] It is hard to know, especially when working solely from a microfilm of the codex, when precisely the paper was prepared on which Ioannes' treatise on mystical theology appears. Nevertheless, the evidence from the registers of Ioannes' writings and the manuscript in Paderborn strongly suggest that this treatise on mystical theology was written sometime in the early 1460s, possibly during his career as a Prior, but it is likely that the original of the text was deposited in the Charterhouse in Erfurt from which the copy was made by the canons in Böddeken.

The intended audience of this treatise is also difficult to assess. It seems probable that Ioannes composed it for himself as a way to continue his spiritual growth and practice of contemplation. He may have composed the work

51 Oeser, cit., pp. 340–341.

52 Hinz, cit., p. 251; K. Hengst, "Franz Xaver Schrader (1848–1911): Ein Paderborner Landpfarrer als Freund und Förderer der Geschichte", in: *Zeitschrift für vaterländische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 124/125 (1974/1975), pp. 207–208.

53 C.-M. Briquet, *Les filigranes: dictionnaire historique des marques du papier dès leur apparition vers 1282 jusqu'en 1600 avec 39 figures dans le texte et 16112 fac-similés de filigranes*, 4 Tomes, 2ème éd., reprinted New York 1966.

54 Oeser, cit., p. 429 n. 68; Hinz, cit., p. 251.

for the canons of St. Meinulf, but this is pure speculation. There is no indication in the manuscript or the text that Ioannes intended his work for them. As members of the Windesheim Congregation, founded directly by the community in Zwolle, the canons of St. Meinulf most likely had a particular interest in spiritual and devotional writings, especially by a nearby Carthusian with a reputation for learning. Like most houses adhering to the *devotio moderna*, they copied books as an integral part of their religious observance.[55] At this time, the links between Carthusians and communities associated with the *devotio moderna* were strong.[56] The canons of St. Meinulf had an interest in the writings of Iacobus de Jüterbog, and perhaps, they were intrigued by the reputation of his younger confrère Ioannes, for which reason they acquired this codex. One more piece of evidence for the interest of communities belonging to the *devotio moderna* in the writings of Ioannes is that one of only two of his works to be printed, the *Tractatus de diversis gravaminibus religiosorum*, was published in Zwolle around 1481–1483.[57] Lastly, the genre itself makes determining an intended audience difficult because Ioannes, emulating Denys the Areopagite's famous work on mystical theology, writes as if this treatise was written for the instruction of a student. It is not clear, however, whether the student is not actually Ioannes himself.

3 The *Tractatus de mistica theologia* in Paderborn, Erzbischofliche Akademische Bibliothek, Cod. 118, ff. 162^{vb}–173ra

Ioannes de Indagine was a voracious reader before he became a prolific writer, and, unsurprisingly, his works evince the 'compiling' method typical of late medieval Carthusian authors. Consequently, it is difficult to separate Ioannes' views from those of the sources upon which he depends and paraphrases. An annotation to the entry for Salvatorberg codex H.101 in Iacobus Volradi's catalogue of 1485 draws the readers attention to Ioannes' practice of incorporating nearly every work or tractate that fell into his hands into his own writings often as a summary or paraphrase in terms that were easier to understand. The author of the note gives the example of such authors as Anselm, Hugh of Saint-Victor and Iacobus de Jüterbog, upon each of whom Ioannes frequently relied, and warns the reader that this can make his works appear "less authentic", espe-

55 Oeser, cit., pp. 317–318, 323.

56 On the *devotio moderna*, see J. van Engen, *Sisters and Brothers of the Common Life: The* Devotio Moderna *and the World of the Later Middle Ages*, Philadelphia 2008.

57 Martin 2012, cit., pp. 243–244.

cially when he was not fastidious in citing his authorities.[58] This is especially true concerning mystical theology, a genre for which by the fifteenth century there was a substantial body of commentary and authority that was viewed as the common possession of all practitioners and investigators of the subject.[59] Ioannes confects a mystical treatise from the writings of many authors, including Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor, Hugh of Balma, Jean Gerson, Iacobus de Jüterbog and Nicholas of Cusa. Ioannes creates an interesting conception of the nature of mystical theology by this 'extracting', paraphrasing, and compiling, which in the main is a combination of the theories of Hugh of Balma and Jean Gerson.

Broadly speaking, Ioannes conceives mystical theology as an experiential and savorous (*sapida*) knowledge, which pertains to the affect and is marked by the Dionysian triad of purgation, illumination and union. By arranging his understanding of mystical theology in this way, Ioannes displays his faithfulness to his three principal sources, Hugh of Balma, Jean Gerson and Iacobus de Jüterbog.[60] Ioannes divides his treatise into eleven chapters. He begins by defining mystical theology and juxtaposing it to philosophy and Scholastic theology. After these introductory remarks, Ioannes proceeds to the first step for attaining mystical theology, purgation, and the second chapter is marked by a long prayer which begs God's forgiveness and mercy (c. 2). He then considers which powers of the soul are apt for mystical union and knowledge and thereby

58 Lehmann, *MBK* 2, p. 418, ll. 35–41: "Nota, quod ipse [Johannis Indaginis] morem habuit, quod cum quis liber aut tractatus ad manus eius venit, eundem incorporavit pro posse et communiter enucleando sentencias eius extraxit sub alio stilo simplici et intelligibiliori et quandoque abbreviavit et quandoque apposuit. Sic patet in istis titulis hic positis, de quibus tractant Anselmus vel Hugo vel doctor Jacobus Carthusiensis etc., licet nomina talium non expresserit, sicut per se fatentur alias in quodam scripto suo. Quare lector ex titulo auctores, si forte minus sibi auctenticus videtur, in his tractatulis fastidiosus non sit".

59 For examples of this common spiritual currency in the case of Marguerite Porete, see Emery, "Foreword", cit., p. xiv.

60 I have relied upon the following modern studies: J. Auer, "Die *Theologia mystica* des Karthäusers Jakob von Jüterbog († 1465)", in: J. Hogg (Hrsg.), *Die Kartäuser in Österreich* (Analecta Cartusiana 83), Salzburg 1980–1981, pp. 19–52; Hugues de Balma, *Théologie mystique*, cit.; Martin, *Carthusian Spirituality*, cit.; C. Trottmann, "*Sic in vi affectiva*: Note sur *De theologia mystica* III, 27, sa réception par Vincent d'Aggsbach, son depassement par Gerson et quelques auteurs ulterieurs", in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 45 (2003), pp. 167–187; M. Vial, *Jean Gerson: théoricien de la théologie mystique* (Études de philosophie médiévale 90), Paris 2006; as well as the editions of Gerson's and Jacobus' treatises by A. Combes and S.A. Porębski respectively, which are fully cited in the apparatus to the text printed below.

differentiates certain kinds of knowledge: thought, meditation and contemplation (cc. 3–4). He explores more deeply the nature and content of mystical theology, which is anagogic, and this culminates in an explanation of its acquisition (cc. 5–6). This last chapter is an extensive paraphrase of three paragraphs in Hugh of Balma's treatise *Viae Sion lugent* from the section on the "illuminative way". Ioannes then paraphrases Hugh's "difficult question" from the same treatise, by which Ioannes defends and augments the conclusions he attained in the previous chapter (c. 7). This leads him back to an evaluation of the different types of knowledge available to the contemplative and man's ability to attain each (cc. 8–9). In the final two chapters (cc. 10–11), Ioannes gives a list of twenty exercises (*industriae*), which properly dispose one for mystical theology, and complements them with an examination of the Lord's Prayer and the Psalms as further practical ways that one can attain mystical union.

4 The Nature of Mystical Theology

The goal of mystical theology is union with God. This is the overarching theme of the treatise, which Ioannes repeats frequently, often in terms evocative of 1 Cor. 6:17, "But he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit". To accomplish this end Ioannes adopts Hugh of Balma's interpretation of the Dionysian triad of purgation, illumination and union. By combining the theories of Hugh with Jean Gerson's conception of mystical theology, Ioannes explores the nature of mystical theology, the process of moving from purgation to union, and the practical way that this can be accomplished. The key to understanding and achieving mystical union is to decipher the relationship between the intellect and affection. Union with God is love, properly located in the affection of the soul, but there is also cognitive content. Mystical theology teaches the "experiential knowledge of God", a notion with deep roots in the tradition of Christian mysticism but one that Ioannes found in Jean Gerson.[61] In this way, intellectual knowledge is crucial to beginning the ascent. As Augustine said, which was later repeated by Nicholas of Cusa, one cannot love that which one does not know.[62] Therefore, Ioannes intends to ascertain precisely the extent to which rational investigation and understanding play a role in mystical theology.

61 Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus*, c. 18, (ed. A. Combes), Lucani 1958, p. 72, ll. 38–39.

62 Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate* X.2.4, (ed. W.J. Mountain et F. Glorie), Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50, Turnhout 1968, pp. 315–316, ll. 1–32; cf. Ziebart 2014, cit., p. 114 n. 212.

The first chapter, which is unnumbered in the manuscript, acts as prologue that defines mystical theology and provides an overview of its nature. The text begins:

> "Arise, friend, and glory will be yours"[63], happy soul, who prepares herself by a pure heart to make within herself spiritual ascensions from virtue into virtue, from temporal things to eternal, from the visible to the invisible, from misery to glory. Thus, the soul is now eager in the mind for eternal things to see by holy contemplation and amorous delight the God of gods in Syon and to climb by fervent love in the friendship of God so that she might be glorified in his presence.[64]

After this exhortation, Ioannes juxtaposes mystical theology to that of the schools. Mystical theology teaches the experiential knowledge of God, which is a superior kind of knowledge. To illustrate his meaning, Ioannes provides an analogy. Mystical theology, like tasting honey, is known better by experience than by what one can learn in many books (*scriptura*). A scientific study of the properties of honey can truly convey neither how honey tastes nor one's enjoyment of it.[65] By implication, the academic study of theology is necessary for knowing God and inflaming one to love God, but that knowledge will always fall short in the fulfillment and attainment of that desire. Mystical theology is the secret wisdom of God (*occulta sapientia Dei*) which is hidden from those who in their own estimation are wise and prudent men.[66] Indeed, the knowledge of God accessible in mystical theology is impenetrable to those who rely on reason alone. Those who engage in such studies often succumb to the vices of vanity and curiosity, thinking themselves more knowledgeable than they truly are, a common worry among Christian writers concerning the danger of study.[67]

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63 Luke 14:9.

64 Ioannis de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia* [c. 1], (ed. S.M. Metzger, infra), p. 636, ll. 4–9: "'Ascende amice et erit tibi gloria', felix anima, que se preparat puro corde ut in se faciat ascensiones spirituales de uirtute in uirtutem, de temporalibus ad eterna, de uisibilibus ad inuisibilia, de miseria ad gloriam, ut nunc mente sit eternis intenta et uideat sancta contemplatione et amorosa dilectione Deum deorum in Syon, ascendatque in Dei amicitia feruido amore ut glorificetur in Dei presentia".

65 Ibid., p. 636, ll. 9–12: "Hoc enim docet theologia mistica que est experimentalis Dei cognicio, sicut qui gustauit mel cognoscit ipsum experientia amplius quam ille qui in scriptura multa legit de proprietatibus mellis et tamen numquam gustauit".

66 Ibid., p. 636, ll. 12–14: "Hec est occulta sapientia Dei que absconditur a sapientibus et prudentibus in occulis propriis et reuelatur paruulis, id est, humilibus".

67 Cf. 1 Cor. 8:1, Emery 2014, cit., pp. 263–264.

Mystical theology provides an antidote to the wisdom of the philosophers because it grounds the mind in God, whereby it stabilizes and protects the mind from its natural desire to wander, especially into error. To illustrate this principle, Ioannes employs an allegorical interpretation of Christ's calling the sons of Zebedee, James and John, an interpretation that Ioannes borrows from Gerson. James and John are on a boat which stands for the corruption of nature, and the sailor is reason. The sea is turbulent sensuality; Zebedee is the flux of mortality, fish are temptations. In the story Christ calls the brothers to shore, which in Gerson's and Ioannes' understanding is the call from wordly preoccupations to the 'shore' of eternity, where the good things of God are digested.[68]

This savorous and holy wisdom has a threefold anagogic nature, which Ioannes sets out in chapter five of the treatise. He repeats the definition of anagogy he found in Denys the Areopagite and Hugh of Balma. Mystical theology is characterized by a leading and rising action or ascent. Ioannes paraphrases Hugh's *De via illuminativa* from *Viae Sion lugent* to show the three different kinds of knowledge that are attained in this anagogic way. In the first two, one progresses through the four senses of scriptural interpretation, i.e., literal, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical, to arrive at a higher level of knowledge. In the first way, Ioannes and Hugh of Balma consider David who according to the literal sense is a normal human being, according to the tropological is a fighter defending the soul from the domination of the Devil, according to the allegorical sense David, as the killer of Goliath is understood as Christ conquering the Devil, and according to the third, anagogic way David, who is described as of "beautiful countenance", signifies the beauty of divinity in which souls rejoice.[69] Similarly, Ioannes and Hugh understand the Church by

68 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia* [c. 1], cit., p. 637, ll. 12–25: "Hec est que prohibet mentis euagaciones et mentem stabilit in Deo tanquam in centro ut fiat quasi immobilis. Hec est que reuocat hominem a fluctibus huius seculi et stabilit ipsum in litore eternitatis, sic Christus uocauit filios Zebedei a fluctibus maris ad littus qui relictis omnibus secuti sunt eum. Mare est sensualitas turbida et inquieta; sicut mare pater Zebedeus est fluxus mortalitatis; nauis est nature corruptio in qua omnes sumus; rethe est curiositas; nauta racio, philosophi huius mundi mercenarii, nauigacio raciocinacio, pisces temptationes, uenti turbationes mentis uocantur. Ab hiis per Christum ad littus eternitatis et ueritatis ideo relinquere debemus omnes uanitates et huius seculi occupaciones, omnia que uidentur et temporaliter currunt, et ad Christum feruenti desiderio tendere ut simus homines capientes, id est ut capiamus racionales motus et affectus que per homines significantur, et figamur in littore eternitatis, et ibi bona Domini degustemus"; cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus*, c. 34, cit., pp. 87–93, ll. 5–109.

69 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 5, cit., pp. 645–646, ll. 28–10: "Prima est de Deo in se, beatificans mentes celestes Deum in gloria contemplantes, et intellig-

studying Jerusalem according to these four senses: it is a city in the Holy Land, its walls signify a faithful soul, allegorically it is the Church of the faithful, i.e., the seat of Christ the King, and anagogically it is the vision of peace which the blessed in the triumphant church enjoy.[70] For the third understanding of anagogy, Ioannes drops the fourfold interpretation of Scripture. Rather this mode of anagogy is the rising- and leading-action itself, by which a mind tends towards God and is united with him. In this union the mind is taught all things that are useful for it to know. This occurs immediately for the saints enjoying the beatific vision, but the wayfarer is not so fortunate. He must make spiritual exercises and ardently seek spiritual desires. In order to fulfill this longing, he uses all creatures, figures and Scriptures for the purpose of rising to God (*in sursumactionem*). In this way, Ioannes places human knowledge in its proper

itur per figuras in sacra Scriptura, unde David erat homo quidam secundum litteralem sensum; secundum tropologiam et moralem, quia David 'pugnator forte' fuit, significat animam sanctam et deuotam que fortiter contra omnia pugnat uicia et contra dyabolum ne unquam sibi dominetur; secundum allegoriam significat Christum, quia David percussit Golyam et populum Israelis liberauit et Christus percussit in ligno crucis dyabolum et populum electum liberauit de manu eius et salutem magna fecit in Israhel, id est, in ecclesia fidelium; secundum anagogiam autem David, quia dicitur 'pulcher aspectu', significat pulchritudinem diuinitatis que est ineffabilis et sua pulchritudine sanctos letificat in gloria, 'hec est enim uita eterna', dicit Christus, 'ut cognoscant te solum uerum Deum et quem misisti Ihesum Christum', et hec anagogica exposicio sicut respicit Christum populum suum in gloria diuinitatis beatificantem"; cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "De via illuminativa" (Sources Chrétiennes 408), pp. 188–190, n. 10, ll. 1–18.

70 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 5, cit., p. 646, ll. 11–27: "Secunda anagogia est que respicit ecclesiam triumphantem secundum quod in sponsi amplexus totaliter ruit, unde Iherusalem secundum litteram dicitur ciuitas in terra sancta; secundum tropologiam autem, quia fuit muris circumdata et optime munita, significat animam fidelem que muris uirtutum debet custodiri et muniri et armis spiritualibus indui, ut fortiter contra dyabolum resistat et ipsum nequaquam admittat et sensus interiores et exteriores contra fallacias dyaboli et omnium uiciorum dicunt diligenter claudi; secundum allegoriam autem, qui[a] Iherusalem fuit sedes regni, significat ecclesiam fidelium que est sedes regum, nam in ipsa Christus solum suum posuit et leges dedit tanquam rex, unde Ysaias dicit "Deus noster, legifer noster ipse ueniet et saluabit nos", scilicet regens ecclesiam militantem exemplo uite et uerbo doctrine; secundum autem anagogiam, quia Iherusalem dicitur uisio pacis, significat ecclesiam triumphantem quia habitationes illius ciuitatis celestis sunt in plena et perfecta pace et quiete, concordia et amicicia, et ex hoc in maxima exultacione, unde et cantant et dicunt quia melior est dies una super milia, item "sicut letancium omnium habitacio in te", nam ex maxime pace habent maximum gaudium"; cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "De via illuminativa", cit., pp. 190–192, n. 11, ll. 1–24.

orientation. It is at the service of knowing God so that one may attain mystical union. Once he was accomplished this study of Scripture and the world around him and made spiritual ascensions in his heart, the wayfarer will lead a "sweet life" and God will reveal many things to him that he did not know. This revelation is the content of mystical theology which he could not attain by means of study alone.[71]

There is, therefore, some cognitive content even at the highest levels of mystical union, a point which Ioannes will return to later in the treatise. When a person attains mystical union, the love that he or she acquires contains knowledge. As Ioannes says in the first chapter, the holy martyrs, the confessors and other friends of God were well-educated in this wisdom, those who having been raised to heavenly heights by a pure heart were more learned in a short time than all of the wise men of this world.[72] It is not rational knowledge and, consequently, would not be recognizable to a philosopher. Indeed it is a wisdom

71 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 5, cit., pp. 646–647, ll. 28–25: "Tercia anagogia est sursum-ductio et actio, scilicet quando mens sursum tendit ad Deum et Ei uniatur et ab Eo de omnibus utilibus doceatur; Ipse dicit per Ysayam, 'Ego sum Deus docens te utilia'. (Confundantur autem omnes qui plectunt uana et inutilia). Et est in celo sine medio, quia sine medio sancti feruntur in diuinam fruitiuam uisionem, sed in terris positis hominibus necesse est vt per spiritualia exercicia sursum tendant et superna magno desiderio appetant et dicant, 'Osculetur me osculo oris sui'. Et qui diligunt celestia vtuntur omnibus creaturis, figuris et Scripturis in sursumactionem, quia in omnibus et per omnes ascendunt sursum per creaturas in Creatorem, per figuras in Ipsum qui significatur per omnia Deus cuius omnia, que sunt, participant entitatem, ueritatem et bonitatem, et per Scripturas que ideo dare sunt a Deo ut homines per earum doctrinam et informacionem ascendant in supernorum bonorum et gaudiorum contemplacionem. In Ezechiele legimus quod ubi fuit impetus spiritus, illuc et rote mouebantur quia ubi homo habet appetitum et affectum, illuc secum trahit sacram Scripturam et ei in omnibus istis seruit. Si vult et appetit humilitatem, multa exempla et dogmata humilitatis reperiet in ea, sic de caritate et de ceteris sanctis virtutibus. Et simili modo dicendum est de gaudio regni Dei quod si in mentem humanam perfecte intrauerit, tunc quidquid audierit aut legerit in sacris Scripturis faciet sibi ascensionem ad ista cupita gaudia beate vite. Similiter et in omni conuersacione humana facit comparaciones et ascensiones in celestia. Quoniam si uidet quod homines querunt temporalia bona, gaudia, delicias, diuicias, honores et laudes aut huiusmodi in temporalibus rebus et in mundo transitorio, gemit et apud se dicit, 'O si homines faciunt tanta pro caducis bonis et vanis, quanta te facere oportet pro eternis gaudiis que nunquam habent finem neque estimationem aut etatum numeracionem sed excedunt omnia incomparabiliter' ".

72 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 1, cit., p. 636, ll. 12–17: "Hec est occulta sapientia Dei que absconditur a sapientibus et prudentibus in occulis propriis et reuelatur paruulis, id est, humilibus. In hac sapientia edocti fuerunt sancti martires

devoid of arguments and the liberal arts. Rather, this wisdom is first tasted and received in the affection with amorous delight. From there, it redounds into the lower appetites and apprehensive powers of the human soul, and yet is still not received in the normal way of cognition. In a Dionysian paradox it is more truly called ignorance than knowledge,[73] but in that 'ignorance' are contained the truths of faith clearly. The mystic knows the workings of the Trinity and creation, especially in terms of creation's total dependence on God.[74] Experience

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utriusque sexus, confessores et alii amici Dei qui puro corde in superna eleuati amplius fuerunt edocti breui tempore quam omnes huius seculi sapientes".

73 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 6, cit., p. 651, ll. 20–32: "Et eciam quia 'stulta' reputatur a doctis huius seculi philosophis qui hunc modum acquirendi apprehendere non possunt, ymmo stulticiam reputant. Hec est altissima noticia et infallibilis sapientia de Deo, ubi non error neque opinio sicut in aliis scienciis et acquisicione earum per modum communem et scolasticum. Hec sapientia primo gustat et in affectum recipitur amorosa dilectione. Deinde in uires inferiores apprehensiuas et appetitiuas mittitur; non autem peruenitur ad eam modo communi, scilicet per studium aut congicionem creaturarum, sed necesse est ut ignote ascendat seu consurgat homo ad eam, scilicet ut non utatur actibus intellectus aut sensus sed pocius relinquat exercicia et actus intelligencie et experiencie intus et foris et omnia que creata sunt a Deo et mente ardenti consurgat ignote sine noticia et apprehensione aliqua sola tamen apprehensione fidei excepta".

74 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 8, cit., pp. 658–659, ll. 28–19: "Hec stulta doctrina, quam nemo philosophorum huius mundi cognouit, que sepe datur plus stultis et ideotis quam litteratus secundum maiorem puritatem anime et maiorem feruorem caritatis ad Deum et ad unionem cum Ipso, docet hominem de omnibus in celo et in terra ac omni creatura existentibus ac replet omnibus uirtutibus et donis. Hec enim sapiencia occulta, que absconditur ab oculis omnium uiuentium in carne, unit hominem cum Deo ut unus spiritus efficiatur cum Ipso, et hoc modo penetrare meretur que Dei sunt. Ideo per affectum istum ignitum illuminatur intellectus ut cognoscat que Dei sunt, unde et tunc uidere meretur Dei simplicitatem, bonitatem et ineffabilem eius sublimitatem. Uidet ibi qualiter manat Filius eternaliter a Patre per modum similitudinis et filiationis et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque per modum amoris et quod non sunt plures emanaciones in Deo sed alia uniuersa ut bonitas, misericordia, sublimitas, eternitas, etc. dicuntur per essenciam. Similiter raptus homo in hanc lucem uidet quomodo omnis creatura manat et procedit contingenter de primo principio et ab eo continentur vniuersa omni momento, sicut radius a sole in aere. Ideo si ad momentum suam subtraheret manum, omnia in nichil redigerentur. Ibi uidet quid tenendum sit de omnibus creaturis et qualiter in comparacione summi et incommutabils boni sunt quasi nichil et qualiter participant Dei bonitatem: alie in essendo, alie in uiuendo, alie in intelligendo, alie in uariis aliis proprietatibus et perfectionibus. Nam latent innumerabiles uirtutes in creaturis, eciam dona creature, ita ut nullus philosophorum huius seculi potuisset reperire minimi entis aut folii arboris totam naturam".

has conveyed these truths in the highest reaches of human reason, which Jean Gerson, drawing upon the tradition, had termed 'synderesis'.[75]

5 Purgation and Illumination

While mystical contemplation is at its highest level a totally affective knowledge of God, the intellect has an important role to play. This is true even at the lowest level from which one begins the ascent, which requires that the aspirant for mystical union undergo a thorough examination of himself and recognize his sinfulness and dependence on God's grace. Prayer, therefore, is essential to the first step of mystical theology, purgation. The majority of the second chapter of Ioannes' treatise, following the example of Iacobus de Jüterbog who was undoubtedly his model, is maked by a long prayer which can be used as a template by the reader. As mentioned above, the prayer contains a few autobiographical lines, in which Ioannes mentions his family and his decision to join the Carthusians.

Interestingly, the chapter on purgation begins with a quotation from Aristotle's *De anima*, that an agent can only act upon a potency that has been suitably disposed to receive that action.[76] Ioannes would have obtained a thorough knowledge of Aristotle during his education in the Faculty of Arts, which he sustained and augmented by his program of reading in the Charterhouse. Although he adheres to the demands of his subject, namely that mystical theology is superior in every way to that taught in the schools, Ioannes acknowledges the importance for study and even philosophy to lead one to mystical union. Even the pagan philosopher Aristotle had insights that are pertinent to the topic.

As if his reliance on Hugh of Balma's treatise on mystical theology was in doubt, Ioannes quotes in support of the necessity of penance the same quotation from the Book of Lamentations that Hugh employed to begin his treatise: "Vie Syon lugent eo quod non sit qui ueniat ad solemnitatem" ("The ways of

75 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 6, cit., p. 650, ll. 21–26; cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus*, c. 14, cit., pp. 33–35.

76 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 2, cit., p. 638, ll. 2–3: "Quia 'actus actiuorum sunt in paciente predisposito', ideo uidendum qualiter subiectum preparari debeat ut suscipiat in se hanc sanctam theologiam …"; cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II, 2 (414a11–12); J. Hamesse, *Les* Auctoritates Aristotelis*: Un florilège médiévale. Étude historique et édition critique* (Philosophes médiévaux 17), Louvain—Paris 1974, p. 179 #55.

Sion mourn because there is no one who goes to the solemn feast").[77] This quotation builds on another definition of mystical theology. Following the quotation from Aristotle, Ioannes claims he will investigate how one should prepare oneself to receive this holy theology which expels all other kinds of knowledge. Unfortunately, Ioannes remarks, in these days those who seek this science are few, and therefore, it is rightly said that the ways of Sion are mournful because there are few who traverse them to reach the heavenly city.[78] A comparison with the treatise on mystical theology by Ioannes' confrère, Iacobus de Jüterbog, makes explicit what Ioannes implies. Iacobus interpreted this verse to mean that the ways are sorrowful because so many clerics and laypeople spurn the most savorous science in favor of being consumed by wordly delights and other vain, vacuous and curious occupations. They investigate only terrestial things and spurn seeking heavenly speculation. Iacobus echoes and paraphrases in this assessment Hugh of Balma's own understanding of the verse.[79] This example provides a glimpse into Ioannes' paraphrasing technique, which condenses the meaning of his sources.

In his treatment of purgation, Ioannes draws from the deep resources of what has been termed 'Christian Socratism'.[80] The stage of purgation and penance is not a simple acknowledgement of one's sinfulness. It requires a true self-examination and self-knowledge, which, as the Delphic Oracle told Socrates, is the first step to wisdom. According to Aristotle (and paraphrased by Ioannes at the beginning of chapter six),[81] there is a natural desire in all people to know. By extension, there is also a natural inclination to one's own perfection and beatitude, which consists in the vision or knowledge of the highest good. Knowledge and goodness, i.e., intellection and affection, are therefore linked as the proper ends of human beings. This leads Ioannes to an examination of the

77 Lam. 1:4.

78 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 2, cit., p. 638, ll. 2–9: "Quia 'actus actiuorum sunt in paciente predisposito', ideo uidendum qualiter subiectum preparari debeat ut suscipiat in se hanc sanctam theologiam, que omnes sciencias expellit, quamuis hiis temporibus in paucis non solum secularibus sed eciam spiritualibus reperitur; ita ut recte dici posset illud Trenorum, 'Vie Syon lugent eo quod non sit qui ueniat ad solemnitatem', quia uie spiritualium exerciciorum, quibus ascenditur ad theologiam hanc, replentur luctu eo quod rari sunt qui transeunt per eas ad supernam ciuitatem".

79 Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica*, Proeem., (ed. S.A. Porębski), *Opuscula inedita* (Textus et studia historiam theologiae in Polonia excultae spectantia 5), Warszawa 1976, pp. 251–252, ll. 13–15; Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica*, Prologus (Sources Chrétiennes 408), Paris 1995, p. 124, n. 1, ll. 1–2.

80 P.-P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même: de Socrate à Saint Bernard*, Paris 1974, 2 Vols.

81 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 1 (980a21).

acquisition of knowledge which is threefold (c. 3). In his investigation into the different ways that knowledge is acquired Ioannes unites a variety of sources, Iacobus de Jüterbog, Hugh of Balma, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Hugh and Richard of Saint-Victor, Denys the Areopagite, Augustine, and Aristotle.

Ioannes adopts implicitly the principle stated in Rom. 1:20 that the invisible things of God are seen in creation. He draws from the treatise on mystical theology by Iacobus de Jüterbog to claim that by studying the mirror of creation one is lead to knowledge of God. Ioannes remarks that this idea has not been limited to Christian thinkers and that it is found in the writings of many philosophers, most especially the Platonists, who knew of the one, highest, spiritual good by means of their study of creation. As a consequence, they understood that this highest good was man's proper end in which consisted true happiness. The Platonists erred, however, by not realizing that their own teaching and understanding of the good necessitated them to live a life of humility and purity. Ioannes makes an interesting shift here. A consequence of the Platonists understanding was that they should have "done what is in themselves", a principle that Ioannes quotes from Bonaventure's *Breviloquium*. Self-reflection and self-knowledge lead one to understand not only that the good is his proper end and fulfillment, but also that this knowledge requires how one should act and comport himself. There is, in other words, an innate knowledge of the good and of good action. A person will naturally recede from evil and incline to goodness. Once this occurs, as Bonaventure and others make clear, God will give aid to the person with sanctifying and justifying grace to help him arrive at an end that he naturally intends. Man's natural knowledge of his highest good, which he can acquire through the study of himself and creatures, allows him to begin the path towards salvation as well as knowledge and love of God. It should be clear, however, especially from the passage quoted from Bonaventure, that knowing that the Good is one's proper end and that such an end requires a moral life provides a foundation upon which to receive God's grace, which is the true cause of salvation.[82] A person is not able to attain salvation or mystical union without divine grace.

82 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 6, cit., pp. 648–650, ll. 18–6: "Prima per speculum creaturarum in noticiam ascendere Creatoris; hanc sapientiam multi philosophi, precipue Platonici, habuerunt qui peruenerunt ex noticia creaturarum mobilium ad vnum summum bonum spirituale, simul et incommutabile, a quo dixerunt omnia facta esse et dependenciam habere atque felicitatem ueram consistere in illius summi boni cognicione, amore et imitacione, vt dicit Augustinus VIII° *De ciuitate Dei*. Et si Platonici secuti suas doctrinas fuissent et corda sua ad hoc summum bonum, humiliassent atque purificassent atque petiuissent dirigi vias suas ab eo in salutem, non fuissent relicti necque

At this point it seems prudent to step back for a moment to chapter four of the treatise and Ioannes' discussion of different types of knowledge. At the beginning of the chapter he notes that mystical theology is more proper to the affection than the intellect, quoting Hugh of Saint-Victor's famous phrase that "love more often enters when understanding [*intellectus*] stands outside", which is illustrated by the example of the Seraphim's superior relation to the Cherubim. Ioannes then considers the differences between thought (*cogitatio*), meditation (*meditatio*) and contemplation (*contemplation*), as established by Richard of Saint-Victor in his treatise *De contemplatione* (*Benjamin maior*), the teaching of which Ioannes largely repeats in this chapter. Thought is a vague and blind (*improvidus*) gaze towards transient things. One has a 'thought' easily and without effort. Thoughts arise from the forms and sensations of external

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in reprobum sensum dati, sicut illi qui cum Deum cognouerunt, non sicut Deum glorificauerunt, et ideo euanuerunt in cogitationibus. Quando namque homo facit quod in se est recedendo a peccatis et conuertendo se pro posse suo plene ad Deum, non relinquetur ab eo, sed uel Deus mittit angelum qui doceat eum uiam eterne salutis, sicut tempore legis Moysi multi gentiles edocti ut dicit Dyonisius in libro *Angelici iherarchie*, aut recte mittit predicatorem qui doceat ipsum, sicut docuit Deus Cornelium centurionem per sanctum Petrum Apostolum. Est enim regula theologorum qui quando homo facit id quod in se est, tunc Deus residuum supplebit. Deus autem offert cuilibet graciam excitando liberum eius arbitrium per quam facere potest quod in se est, vt dicit Bonauentura in *Breuiloquio*, quam si acceptat homo et facit quod in se est recedendo a malo et inclinando se ad bonum, acquirit graciam iustificantem per quam potest eciam naturaliter si perseuerauerit saluari. Si enim Deus hoc non faceret, tunc homo iuste haberet querelam contra Deum dicendo, 'Ecce feci quod in me fuit, et tu noluisti michi auxilium gratie tue dare'. Absit autem hoc a Deo qui paracior est dare graciam quam homines suscipere sunt parati. Et ideo prior Ipse stat ad ostium cordis et pulsat vt sibi aperiatur, et postquam intrauexit, non recedit nisi expulsus per peccatum mortale. Ideo dicit, 'Eum qui uenit ad me non eiciam foras', unde bene dicit sanctus Augustinus, Deus primo accedit ad hominem et primo recedit quia non recedit nisi homo prior recesserit ab eo uoluntarie peccando quod posuit in libero hominis arbitrio, dicens ad discipulos, 'Uultis ne vos abire', quasi diceret 'in arbitrio uestro positum est hoc', et Apostolus, 'Uidete ne quis desit gracie Dei', quasi diceret 'gracia Dei omnibus adest', sed uideat homo ne desit gracie Dei subtrahendo se ab ea per malam uoluntatem, unde patet quod ex naturali cognicione, quam habet homo, ex creaturis potest peruenire ad cognicionem summi boni. Et faciendo quod in se est peruenire potest ad ueram salutem non tamen ex suis uiribus sed ex gracia Dei, quia licet duo concurrant ad salutem hominis habentis usum racionis, scilicet propria diligencia et gracia Dei, tamen plus operatur gracia Dei sine qua nichil prodest labor hominis, unde et totum sepe attribuitur gracie que est fons et origo omnis boni. Ideo Apostolus dixit, 'Gracia Dei sum id quod sum', et iterum, 'non est uolentis neque currentis sed Dei miserentis'".

and internal senses, and occur by means of phantasms, species and the forms of things preserved in the memory or in the rational part of the soul. Thought corresponds to animal life, is not rational, and is marked by inordinate desire and concupiscence.[83]

Meditation is the cautious or prudent (*providus*) gaze that the soul ardently uses in the acquisition of truth and with much effort. It is hard for the mind to direct itself away from transient things and towards truth. To explain how this works Ioannes provides an example from the classical world, Orpheus in search of Eurydice, an analogy that he discovered in the *Mystical Theology* of Jean Gerson. Meditation is found in the rational part of the soul and requires contrition and compunction.[84] Finally, contemplation is the free gaze (*obtutus*) diffused in spiritual affairs. It takes work to rise to the contemplation of eternal goods and especially divine grace, but once the mind stands in the citadel of contemplation, it sees all things as easily as God sees them, i.e., as if one was standing on a high mountain. Contemplation is found in the intelligence, and,

83 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de misitica theologia*, c. 4, cit., pp. 643–644, ll. 18–22, 17–21: "Cogitacio est uagus et improuidus intuitus, facilis ad euagandum instabiliter, et sine labore faciliter habetur ex formis et sensacionibus sensuum exteriorum et interiorum, quia intuetur fantasmata et species ac formas rerum in memoria sensualitatis aut partis racionalis relictas ex quibus faciliter formatur cogitacio … Cogitacioni correspondet uita animalis et est non solum in racionali sed eciam in sensuali parte, unde et bruta cogitant et statim que cogitant appetunt; si placet, et consequuntur ad ea; si autem displicent, tunc fugiunt. Et sequitur sepe cogitacionem libido, cupido et concupiscencia et generatur per eam uita animalis".

84 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 4, cit., pp. 643–644, ll. 22–10, 21–23: "Meditacio est prouidus anime obtutus in acquisicione ueritatis uehementer occupatus et fit cum labore. Nam laboriosum est refrenare mentis euagacionem et dirigere ad ueritatem, unde poete finxerunt quomodo Orpheus suam quesiuit uxorem, dulci melodia fecit stare flumina et bestias, quia misticus theologus querens suam uxorem, id est, ueritatem quam querit sponsam accipere, facit stare flumina, id est, anime motus inordinatus quietat ut quietatis appetitibus carnis non impediantur in acquisicione ueritatis, facit concordiam in affectibus anime per melodiam interiorem. Et ipsa melodia intelligitur concordia uirium inferiorum cum superioribus in uera obediencia. Et perdidit uxorem quando serpentem calcauit et perducta fuit ad inferos quia tunc perdit homo ueritatem et ueram sapientiam quando calcat serpentem consenciendo eius suggestionibus prauis, quia tunc peccando ad inferos descendit, ad que deuotus homo deuota mente descendit, et stare flumina infernalia facit quando domat uehemenciam motuum cordis praui et eruit uxorem, id est, ueritatem, cum labore, hac tamen lege ut non respiciat retro quod si fecerit ad uomitum reuertendo penis quam prius habebat … Sed in meditacione consueuit esse deuocio, compunctio et contricio et correspondent hec racioni in qua ponuntur et constituntur in hiis uita racionalis".

Ioannes concludes, it is founded upon the intellectual life, which is a rare thing to find in our times.[85]

This is the level of mystical rapture, which is characterized by ecstatic delight and anagogic love located far beyond the visible world so that the inferior powers of the soul are rendered useless. There is a certain amount of violence at this stage as the soul leaves the body and is embraced in God's love. At this stage, as the example of Paul confirms, one will see things about which it is impossible to speak. In relation to Paul's rapture, Ioannes takes up an interesting discussion concerning the relation of the soul to the body in mystical rapture: did Paul's body lie there as if it were dead, its substantial form having been removed? Ioannes admits that he does not know the answer and directs one to the discussion of this question in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, one place among several in which Ioannes displays his reliance on Thomas' thought. It is at this level of contemplation that the desire for one's end is fulfilled, where the lover is transformed into the beloved, and where one truly becomes one in spirit with God.[86]

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85 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 4, cit., p. 644, ll. 10–16, 24–25: "Contemplacio est liber animi obtutus in res spirituales diffusus, et licet cum labore ascendatur ad eternorum bonorum contemplacionem, tamen quando stat animus in arce contemplacionis, tunc faciliter uidet omnia que iuxta Ipsum sunt et que infra et que supra, sicut positus in monte clare potest uidere que inferius fiunt, et que iuxta se quamuis ascendat cum labore et suspenditur animus per contemplacionem in supernis bonis inuisibilibus et transcendit omnia inferiora et uisibilia … Contemplacio autem ponitur in intelligencia et constituit uitam intellectualem, que raro reperitur temporibus nostris".

86 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 4, cit., pp. 644–645, ll. 25–11: "Et est in ea extatica dilectio et anagoycus amor raptus similiter in ea ponitur, quando mens rapitur super omnia uisiblia et corporalia et a sensacione omnium uirium inferiorum, ita ut non senciant uires inferiores in raptu nec parcipiantur. Et dicitur extasis quasi extra mentem sed raptus ultra importat uiolenciam quandam quia fit cum uiolencia et labore, sic Paulus fuit raptus in tercium celum quia raptus extra sensaciones corporis et sensuum et eciam uiuificacionem corporum, ita ut iaceret corpus suum tempore raptus quasi mortuum et ipsa nesciuit reuersus ad corpus an anima fuit sic rapta, ut desineret esse forma corporis sicut in morte, an solum fuerit rapta extra sensacionem et uiuificacionem et actus corporis manendo tamen corporis forma. Ideo dicit siue in corpore, scilicet manens anima ut forma, siue extra scilicet rapta et separatur ut in morte. Nescio. Deus scit. Sciuit tamen optime quod non fuit cum corpore raptus in celum sed predicto modo intelligendum est ut exponit Sanctus Thomas 2^a2^e 175 de raptu et extasi. Et fit raptus ex amore quia ex hoc quod ualde amatur Deus rapitur homo extra se ad ipsum Deum. Amor enim extasim facit et raptum ac stabilit hominem in amato ut eciam unum fiat cum amato, sic dicit Apostolus, 'Qui adheret Deo unus spiritus efficitur', scilicet cum Deo non quidem per essenciam sed per transformacionem …".

Because thought provides only a vague and imprudent gaze towards truth and corresponds with animal life, it needs divine help, which is provided by divine illumination, the second of the Dionysian triad from the *Celestial Hierarchy*. One can acquire wisdom through divine illumination. This illumination increases one's spiritual zeal and converts one in the fervor of charity towards the highest good. One moves from creatures to the Creator and from causes to effects, not in the natural mode of the philosophers, but rather as is taught in the Catholic faith. This is the first level of wisdom, and is attained only by spiritual men who have prepared and purified themselves properly through daily prayers and meditations.[87]

6 Perfection and Union

The last way to attain wisdom is more sublime and excellent than all of the others. Indeed, it is the most excellent and most noble wisdom that is achieved by means of the most ardent, unitive love, which lifts the mind without any medium to the heavenly heights and transfers it immediately into celestial love. This union occurs in the highest part of the souls, which the Latin affective tradition of mystical theology designates as 'synderesis', and is marked by a dramatic upsurge and lifting of the mind.[88] This process, however, is done in ignorance, because the object and the knowledge obtained is so far beyond the limits of discursive reasoning. In mystical vision, the mind can penetrate the most secret things of the divinity in a clearer way than any knowledge understood

87 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 6, cit., p. 650, ll. 7–20: "Secunda est sapientia que per immissionem spiritualium radiorum exercicio intelligencie et studii spiritualis acquiritur, et sic in spirituali studio et cordis puritate quando homo in feruore caritatis se conuertit ad summum bonum et ad lucem inaccesibilem transeundo a creaturis ad Creatorem, ab effectibus in causam non naturali modo, ut philosophi, sed ut docetur in fide catholica. Illuminatur homo sepius in multis per immissionem spiritualium radiorum a luce prima et incommutabili. Hanc viam proficendi habuerunt communiter sancti doctores ut Ieronimus, Augustinus, etc., qui in multis locis et libris mencionem facit de hac uia (si bene intelligitur) et alii similiter doctores sancti. Spirituales eciam uiri, qui sua corda Deo purificant et preparant et cottidie in orationibus, meditationibus et contemplacionibus ad Deum se leuant, merentur accipere hanc sapientiam a Deo et illuminari in multis ueritatibus que in Scripturis sacris et exposicionibus reperire non possunt".

88 For a useful survey of the Latin affective tradition for understanding pseudo-Denys, see B.T. Coolman, "The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition", in: *Modern Theology* 24.4 (2008), pp. 615–632.

by apprehension. This is the most noble wisdom of all and the most worthy knowledge of God, which grasped by means of ignorance is more brilliant, universal and useful than all knowledge, thoughts and apprehensions because a creature is united with its bridegroom (*sponsum*). At this point, Ioannes brings in the idea that this wisdom is a *sapida scientia* ("a savorous knowledge"). In light of the foregoing definition of this third type of wisdom, Ioannes says that those learned in this wisdom can rightly judge the philosophers of the world as stupid, because this highest knowlege is an infallible tasting of God, in which neither error nor opinion is found as it is in the other sciences which are acquired in a common and Scholastic way.[89]

89 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 6, cit., pp. 650–651, ll. 21–24, p. 652, ll. 11–14: "Tercia acquisicio sapiencie est sublimior et excellencior istis; ymmo et excellentissima et nobilissima que acquiritur per amorem ardentissimum vnitiuum, que actualiter sine omni medio disponente animi ad superiora rapit et in dilectionem suum immediate sursum transfert et consurgere actibus extensionibus facit, que in mistica theologia tradita in apice affectiue que est synderisis. Consurgit, que consurrectio per ignoranciam dicitur, ut remoto exercicio omnis ymaginis racionis intellectus et intelligencie per unionem ardentissimi amoris illud senciat in presenti quod inelligencia capere non potest, ymmo sepius omnis intelligencia et cognicio speculatiua ignorat. Et hec est tanto nobilior quanto nobilior est Seraphin, Cherubin et ipsa caritas nobilior sciencia, et potencia motiua nobilior cognitiua, in tantum enim cognicio per amorem unitiuum ad penetranda secretissima diuinorum clarior est omni cognicione apprehensiua. Et secundum hoc a Dyonisio, qui eam didicit a Paulo Apostolo, sic diffinitur tanquam nobilissima omnium sapiencia est dignissima Dei noticia per ignoranciam cognita preclarior, ymmo et uniuersalior et utilior aliis scienciis et cognicionibus atque apphrensionibus quia non tantum affectum supra se erigit et amore extatico perfecte unit creaturam sponso altissimo, et tantum eleuat intellectum ut multo plus omni prudencia et cognicione diuinis fulgoribus illustretur quam aliquo ingenii exercicio ualiat obtinere. Et alibi idem dicit Dyonisius de ea sit "hanc igitur irracionabilem amentem et stultam sapienciam excedentem omnem scienciam laudantes dicimus quod omnis est mentis et racionis et prudencie et sapiencie causa in ipsa, est omne consilium et ab ipsa est omnis cognicio et prudencia, et 'in ipsa sunt omnes thesauri sapiencie et sciencie absconditi', ubi per sapienciam et cognicionem denotatur plena perficio affectus et intellectus. Et uocat ipsam 'irracionabilem', quia nec racio ipsam apprehendit neque racione acquiritur neque inuestigacione studiosa nec eciam utitur racione in suo usu sed tantum amore amentem uocat, id est, sine mente et intellectu quia nec ipsa in suo exercicio utitur intellectum nec ad ipsam perueniri potest per intellectum sed solum per affectum et amorem feruentissimam; 'stultam' uocat, quia sine usu omnimode intellegencie in solo affectu consurgit quam nullus apprehendere potest intellectus. Et eciam quia 'stulta' reputatur a doctis huius seculi philosophis qui hunc modum acquirendi apprehendere non possunt, ymmo stulticiam reputant. Hec est altissima noticia et infallibilis sapientia de Deo, ubi non error neque opinio sicut in aliis scienciis et acquisicione

Ioannes models the next chapter (c. 7) on Hugh of Balma's "Difficult Question", from which he paraphrases extensively. Ioannes uses this text to defend and clarify the claims concerning the nature of mystical theology that he had made in the first six chapters. In his response to a question about the relation of the intellect to the affect for the full knowledge of God, which is based upon Augustine's *dictum* that "one can only love what one knows" ("nisi enim cognitum sit, non amatur aliquid"),[90] Ioannes examines the ways in which one can apprehend 'truth' and 'goodness'. God grants to human beings a twofold power for arriving in the heavenly heights and eternal good. The first is in the intellect by which is apprehended the highest truth, and the second is the affection by which is grasped the highest good. According to this distinction, there is a twofold way for ascending to the heights intellectually and through the intelligence. In this way, the intellect ascends through creatures into the Creator, which is signified by Rachel who is described in Genesis as "beautiful in face but sterile".[91] This mode of contemplation is beautiful. It is also called 'sterile', because it cannot generate any children at all, metaphorically speaking, unless the person leaves contemplation and engages in the activity of preaching, by which Ioannes alludes to his view of the meritorious aspect of pastoral care. The second mode of contemplation results in love, which is, of course, located in the affect, whereby one ascends to the heights of enflamed desires, seeking God alone, on account of which God sends his illumination. This results in an intimate union between the contemplative and God. This mode of contemplation is signified by Mary (Lk 10:39–42), who burned with love and desire to hear the word of the Lord and sat at his feet. This is more noble than what is in the intellect for which reason Mary is famously said to "have chosen the best part".

Ioannes further stipulates that that there are also two ways in which the contemplative can apprehend God in an intellectual way and two ways in an affective way. One can either proceed, as we have seen, from inferior things to superior ones and thus from creatures to the Creator, or one can move in the opposite direction from the superior to the inferior. In his description of this way of intellection, Ioannes give a summary of the process of the abstraction of forms from sensed particulars according to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which moves from sensation, to the formation of an intelligible species, to the

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earum per modum communem et scolasticum … Et quia hic modus contemplandi uidetur stulticia philosophis huius seculi, ideo sanctus Dyonisius hortatur Thymotheum, cui scribit Misticam theologiam, ut non manifestet eam in doctis doctoribus et philosophis huius seculi, ne derideant ea que capere non possunt".

90 Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate* X.2.4, cit., pp. 315–316, ll. 1–32.

91 Gn. 29:17.

action of the agent intellect upon the passive intellect by which individuating conditions are stripped away resulting in an act of universal knowledge.[92] This process of abstraction leads to divine illumination, which is the second mode of intellectual contemplation, because after one attains true knowledge of universals, he is lead to God, who is the source of all truth and creation. At this point, one is illuminated in knowledge. This is the better of the two modes of intellectual contemplation, because by means of the illumination one can accurately and perfectly judge the truth of all of the knowledge that one had previously acquired during the ascent. This second way, however, would not end in intellectual knowledge but instead in love for that which is bestowing the illumination. It therefore pertains to the affection. Ioannes adds that these two ways belong to *meditatio*, which he had described earlier. There is yet another way of apprehending God and arriving in him by means of the affection.

This is the superior way, for love is more becoming than knowledge, and here Ioannes alludes to Paul's discussion of love in 1 Cor. 13. Ioannes describes this way as the immediate infusion of divine grace on account of which a person is lifted into God's embrace without any meditation or contemplation. He is immediately united with God, they become one spirit, and he is enflammed, opened, illuminated and taught everything perfectly. This mode is taught in that theology which is called irrational and stupid because it is not attained by means of discursive reason, nor by means of the contemplation of the mind, nor in the common or Scholastic mode, but immediately God is felt by perfect men in the superior part of their souls. This presence shines like a flame and purges, illumines, teaches and governs all of the soul's lower powers. There can be no preparation or study that allows one access to this level of union. As a free gift of God's grace it can occur only according to his will. In this way, Ioannes has repeated the fourfold, chiastic structure for mystical theology that he found in Hugh of Balma.[93] This is a non-linear and non-sequential pattern. Even though

92 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 7, cit., pp. 655–656, ll. 21–1: "Et sic ascenditur primo per creaturas, sensibiles et corporeas que comprehenduntur sensu corporeo. Deinde sensus communis iudicat de uisis, auditis, tactis, odoratis et gustatis, et ymaginacio reseruat species, fantasia componit, et estimatiua elicit, memoria reseruat, et racio accipit species istas, et intellectus agens depurat a condicionibus indiuiduantibus et facit habitum sciencie uniuersalis et ponit in memoria intellectuali et intellectu possibili et ascendit per hoc ad omnium conditorem Deum per intelligenciam et ibi sistens illuminatur ad multorum scienciam, unde naturali uia ascendens aliquali luce perfusa et adiuta sed quando ad conspiciendas eternas raciones peruenit, tunc amplius illuminatur".

93 See the analysis of this way according to Hugh of Balma's *Mystical Theology* in Dennis Martin's Introduction to his *Carthusian Spirituality*, cit., pp. 26–34.

the relation of study to affective union is not a linear one, it is nevertheless the case that one needs to undergo the process of purgation and penance which is aided by self-reflection and study in order to attain the bliss of mystical ecstasy. Thus, while the highest level of mystical theology is purely affective, as taught in the Latin tradition since Thomas Gallus and the Victorines, it is clear that intellectual knowledge plays an indispensable role.[94]

After he has made these disctinctions between intellection and affection, Ioannes returns to the objection from Augustine. Ioannes concedes that, of course, we can love things that we have seen. But things unseen or unknown can never be loved according to the common or Scholastic mode. Thus it must be admitted that there is knowledge of a certain kind (*aliqualis cognitio*), namely faith, that does not require natural knowledge (*naturalis cognitio*), just as the philosophers say. That by which philosophers dismiss faith because it does not satisfy the criteria for scientific knowledge is precisely the reason why Ioannes can admit it as the basis for loving what one does not know. The truths revealed by faith are hidden from the human mind; reason alone cannot reach them. The light that fills the ecstatic is too bright to be grasped by the intellect, which is plunged into darkness and ignorance. It can love that which it is no longer able to grasp discursively.[95]

Although at the highest level of mystical rapture and union the rational mind is plunged into darkeness and ignorance, there is still cognitive content to be grasped. By this stupid teaching (*stulta doctrina*), the soul enflamed with love will be able to know the mysteries of the faith. She will see how the Son and the Spirit proceed eternally from the Father and understand the relations of the Trinity and divine nature. She will see clearly how the world is completely dependent upon God and how creatures proceed contingently from God. This will give her the final certitude of faith, and she will be perfected in all virtues. Indeed, the soul will be brought to its final perfection and, just like the blessed who enjoy the full vision of God, the rapt soul will receive the fullness of knowledge, virtues and merits.[96]

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94 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 7, cit., pp. 654–657.

95 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 7, cit., pp. 657–658, ll. 34–2: "Sic eciam intelligendum est illud Augustini, uisa amare possumus sed inuisa aut incognita nequaquam, scilicet modo communi et scolastico. Et eciam dicitur quod in proposito est aliqualis cognicio, scilicet fidei, non autem requiritur naturalis cognicio sicut philosophi loquuntur".

96 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 8, cit., pp. 658–660.

7 Practical Matters

In the final three chapters of the treatise, Ioannes gives some practical considerations to attain mystical union. Every human being has a natural inclination for this highest wisdom. Ioannes repeats what he had said earlier in the treatise concerning the natural aptitude for this wisdom. He examines the rational and irascible or desirous parts of the soul and their proper objects, the true and the good. Ioannes draws on examples from the world around him to make the point. Farmers and merchants labor with difficulty to accomplish their tasks and desires. Animals hasten after food that they have spied to satisfy their appetites, and so too should the spiritual man, whose soul naturally tends towards the highest truth and goodness, eagerly pursue his perfection.[97]

Finally, as an aid to the wayfarer to achieve this wisdom, in his last two chapters Ioannes provides practical instructions. He gives twenty exercises (*industriae*) which when performed will properly dispose a person for mystical theology. The inclusion of such a list is quite traditional in the genre and once again shows his dependence on Hugh of Balma, Iacobus de Jüterbog, and Jean Gerson. Indeed, Gerson's practical treatise on mystical theology was composed entirely of such considerations. Ioannes borrows *industriae* from all three authors, but it appears that many of them are original to him. Similarly, in the last chapter he provides four line-by-line commentaries on the Lord's Prayer (*Pater noster*) and a consideration of the Psalms to show how each predisposes one to mystical contemplation. Indeed, both the *Pater noster* and the Book of Psalms can be read according to the three 'ways': purgation, illumination and union. Ioannes' inclusion of commentaries on the Lord's Prayer shows his immersion in the tradition of Carthusian spirituality.[98] Hugh of Balma had included two treatments of the prayer in his treatise on mystical theology, and Ioannes seems to have been particularly dedicated to it. He composed a work that contained fifty-three such commentaries,[99] expounding the prayer according to different modes and intentions, none of which are similar to the treatments given in his *De mistica theologia*.

97 Ioannes de Indagine, *Tractatus de mistica theologia*, c. 9, cit., pp. 661–663.

98 J. van Engen, "Preface", in: Martin, *Carthusian Spirituality*, cit., pp. xviii–xix.

99 R. Damerau, *Der Herrengebetskommentar eines Unbekannten. Textkritische Ausgabe. 53 Auslegungen des Herrengebets des Kartäuserspriors Johannes Hagen (†1475). Textkritische Ausgabe* (Studien zu den Grundlagen der Reformation 4), Giessen 1996.

Conclusion

Ioannes' second treatment of mystical theology exhibits the compiling and extracting practice that was both typical of his style and Carthusian practice more generally. It is a confection of various authors in the tradition of Latin affective contemplation, especially the Victorines, Hugh of Balma, Jean Gerson, and Ioannes' confrère in Erfurt, Iacobus de Jüterbog. Indeed, Ioannes has effected a synthesis of Hugh of Balma and Jean Gerson much like his contemporary Carthusian Nicholas Kempf. Unlike Kempf, Ioannes treatise does not seem to have been motivated by the events of Tegernsee and the debate between Vincent of Aggsbach and Nicholas of Cusa, among others, despite his personal relationship with the Cardinal.

Not that Ioannes would have sided wholeheartedly with Cusanus. Although he may not have been as much of a curmudgeon as Vincent of Aggsbach, his interpretation of Hugh of Balma would most likely have been accepted by Vincent, and they shared other aspects in common. In his ecclesiology, Ioannes was also a conciliarist, although this was tempered by acknowledgment that a pope is necessary when a council is not in session. As we saw above, Ioannes was also a fiery critic on occasion and not above controversy, even with monks in his own house. Furthermore, he had an abiding interest in mystical theology and contemplation. He also wrote several treatises in defense of female visionaries, such as Bridget of Sweden. Thus, it would seem that the debate undertaken at Tegernsee concerning the affective or intellectual character of mystical theology was just the sort of thing that would have piqued Ioannes' interest, and given the multiple examples of his knowledge of events outside his Charterhouse, it is indeed likely that he knew of it. However, there is no evidence for his involvement, and this treatise in Paderborn, EAB, Cod. 118 gives no indication that it was written in response to either Nicholas of Cusa or Vincent of Aggsbach.

It seems more likely that the treatise was intended for the canons of St. Meinulf, but other than the provenance of the manuscript there is no evidence for that claim either. Why the canons were interested in Ioannes' theory is clear. Ioannes' conception of mystical theology, which emulates and paraphrases Hugh of Balma's, as requiring purity, humility, prayer, and study (not for the joy of learning but rather in pursuit of goodness and truth), as prerequisites for a union that can only be obtained when God acts would have appealed to a community in the spiritual tradition of the *devotio moderna*. It may simply be the case that having learned of the reputation of another learned Carthusian in Erfurt from their reading of Iacobus of Jüterbog, the canons desired a copy of his spiritual writings for their own practice of copying and devotion. In any

event Ioannes' treatise seems to confirm Joseph Klapper's and Erich Kleineidam's insight that, when read in conjunction with the tractates of Iacobus de Jüterbog and the mystical theology of the librarian Iacobus Volradi, there indeed was a vibrant tradition of mysticism in Erfurt and Central and Eastern Germany centered at the Charterhouse of Salvatorberg.

Principles of the Edition

Because Ioannes' treatise on mystical theology survives in a single manuscript witness, the text presented below adheres as close as possible to the orthography of the scribe. Obvious spelling errors have been corrected either silently with the original reading provided in the apparatus or by means of inserting a missing letter in square brackets "[]", but the spelling has not been normalized to a modern standard of Latin. On rare occasions missing words have been supplied, and these are also signalled with square brackets. Similarly, in a few cases alternative readings have been conjectured in the apparatus if the meaning of the sentence is difficult to construe. The text is broken into paragraphs to facilitate reading and in accordance with the sense of the text. On occasion we found it necessary to set off some of Ioannes' text in round brackets "()" to aid the reader. Modern punctation is given as an aid to the reader as well, but we have sought to minimize our insertion of punctuation and allow Ioannes' understanding of Latin grammar to do its work.

Sources are provided for the aid of the reader in an *apparatus fontium*. Because this text is a compilation arising from Ioannes' voluminous reading, discovering his sources has proved a challenging task. Of first priority was identifying his explicit references. This has been done in all but one case, an ambiguous reference to a commentary on Zacharia by Jerome. We have limited ourselves to citing the most recent or standard edition of a text. References to the books of the Scriptures are to the text of the Latin Vulgate. In terms of paraphrased material, we have limited ourselves, in most cases, to the most obvious text. Otherwise, the apparatus would swell as the entire history of theories of Christian mysticism would appear. In the main, these are citations to Hugh of Balma, Jean Gerson and Iacobus de Jüterbog. In order to show that these are paraphrases rather than direct quotations, these sources are marked with "confer" (cf.) in the apparatus. Doubtless there are paraphrased texts that we missed.

We have limited our use of italics to the titles of works named in the text, with the exception of two cases. The first line of the text is a sentence that Ioannes used at the beginning of most of his works. It is therefore not really

a part of this treatise, and we decided to mark it as such in italics. Similarly, the last chapter contains four interpretations of the Lord's Prayer, and we have set the text of the prayer off from that of his commentary by means of italics. Finally, we have presented the names of authors cited in the text by Ioannes, with the exception of those in the Scriptures, with small capital letters.

Abbreviations Used in the Edition

add.	*addidit*
corr.	*correxit*
del.	*delevit*
in marg.	*in margine*
inser.	*inseruit*
p.c.	*post correctionem*
sub l.	*sub linea*
sup. l.	*super lineam*
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis
PL	Patrologia Latina

[Ioannis de Indagine Tractatus de mistica theologia][100]

P 162^{vb} Incipit de mistica theologia tractatus

Succurre Christe cum beatissima Maria matre et omnibus sanctis tuis.

"Ascende amice et erit tibi gloria",[101] felix anima, que se preparat puro corde ut in se faciat ascensiones spirituales de uirtute in uirtutem, de temporalibus ad eterna, de uisibilibus ad inuisibilia, de miseria ad gloriam, ut nunc mente sit eternis intenta et uideat sancta contemplatione et amorosa dilectione Deum deorum in Syon, ascendatque in Dei amicitia feruido amore ut glorificetur in Dei praesentia. Hoc enim docet theologia mistica que est experimentalis Dei[102] cognicio, sicut qui gustauit mel cognoscit ipsum experientia amplius quam ille qui in scriptura multa legit de proprietatibus mellis et tamen numquam gustauit. Hec est occulta sapientia Dei que absconditur a sapientibus et prudentibus in occulis propriis et reuelatur paruulis,[103] id est, humilibus. In hac sapientia edocti fuerunt sancti martires utriusque sexus, confessores et alii amici | Dei qui puro corde in superna eleuati P 163ra amplius fuerunt edocti breui tempore quam omnes huius seculi sapientes.[104]

Hec sapientia trahitur de occultis et prerequirit cor mundum quia numquam proprie habitat in anima maliuola aut corpore subdito peccatis; numquam habitat in mente peruersi, quia amorosa Dei dilectio et inhesio in Deo per fervidam dilectionem, ut unus spiritus efficiatur cum Deo,[105] excludit omne peccatum. Non enim potest homo peccator Deo per caritatem inherere. Alii autem scholastici theologi, qui in libris student theolgiam et philosophi qui de creaturis ascendunt in noticiam creationis, sepe sunt superbi et aliis multis peccatis inuoluti sepe sunt vani et curiosi, et ex sapientia uerbosi peccatorum defensores erroribus inuoluti, sepe falsum pro uero suscipien-

4 preparat] animo *add. sed del.* P.

100 P = Paderborn, Erzbischöfliche Akademische Bibliothek, Cod. 118, ff. 162^{vb}–173va.

101 Lc 14:9.

102 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 18, (ed. A. Combes), Lucani 1958, p. 72 ll. 38–39; *etiam* Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 1, (ed. S.A. Porębski), *Opuscula inedita* (Textus et studia historiam theologiae in Polonia excultae spectantia 5), Warszawa 1976, p. 253 ll. 23–24.

103 Mt 11:25 et Lc 10:21.

104 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 2, cit., p. 256 ll. 9–12.

105 Cf. 1 Cor. 6:17.

tes et tanquam ceci de coloribus sic de eternis et ueris bonis disputantes.[106] Sed theologi mistici, qui sapuerunt quam suauis est Dominus,[107] qui ex familiari Dei consilio sunt edocti, qui ipsum solem iusticie non solum oculis cordis sed etiam ore cordis gustando inspexerunt, et breuiter in multi edocti tanquam a superiore ueritate ad inferiores et participatas ueritates descendentes, raro aut numquam decipiuntur. Hii inherent summo bono et in ipso tantum radicantur ut neque mors neque aliqua creatura poterit eos separare a caritate Dei.

Hec est unctio que docet populum Dei.[108] Hec est sapientia que non requirit argumentationes et artes liberales sed cor purum et in amore feruidum.[109] Hec est que sepius plus reperitur in ydeotis, rusticis et mulierculis
P 163^{rb} quam in maximis | philosophis et doctoribus. Hec est que prohibet mentis euagaciones et mentem stabilit in Deo tanquam in centro ut fiat quasi immobilis.[110] Hec est que reuocat hominem a fluctibus huius seculi et stabilit ipsum in litore eternitatis, sic Christus uocauit filios Zebedei a fluctibus maris ad littus qui relictis omnibus secuti sunt eum.[111] Mare est sensualitas turbida et inquieta; sicut mare pater Zebedeus est fluxus mortalitatis; nauis est nature corruptio in qua omnes sumus; rethe est curiositas; nauta racio, philosophi huius mundi mercenarii, nauigacio raciocinacio, pisces temptationes, uenti turbationes mentis uocantur. Ab hiis per Christum ad littus eternitatis et ueritatis ideo relinquere debemus omnes uanitates et huius seculi occupaciones, omnia que uidentur et temporaliter currunt, et ad Christum feruenti desiderio tendere ut simus homines capientes, id est ut capiamus racionales motus et affectus que per homines significantur, et figamur in littore eternitatis, et ibi bona Domini[112] degustemus.[113]

10 argumentationes] -s- *add. sed del.* P.

106 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 1, cit., pp. 254–255 ll. 16–30.

107 Ps 33:9, Ps 45:11; cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 2, cit., p. 256 ll. 30–32.

108 1 Io 2:27.

109 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 28, cit., p. 72 ll. 36–38; Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 1, cit., p. 253 l. 22.

110 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" ad 9, (ed. F. Ruello et J. Barbet), Sources Chrétiennes 409, Paris 1996, pp. 230–232 n. 43 ll. 34–10.

111 Mt 4:21–22.

112 Cf. Ier 31:12.

113 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 34, cit., pp. 87–93 ll. 5–109.

Capitulum 2M de preparacione ad theologiam misticam

Quia "actus actiuorum sunt in paciente predisposito",[114] ideo uidendum qualiter subiectum preparari debeat ut suscipiat in se hanc sanctam theologiam, que omnes sciencias expellit, quamuis hiis temporibus in paucis non solum
P 163va secularibus sed eciam spiritualibus reperitur; ita ut recte dici | posset illud Trenorum, "Vie Syon lugent eo quod non sit qui ueniat ad solemnitatem",[115] quia uie spiritualium exerciciorum, quibus ascenditur ad theologiam hanc, replentur luctu eo quod rari sunt qui transeunt per eas ad supernam ciuitatem.[116]

Preparacio huius uie est uera penitentia que cor humanum purgat a peccatis et illuminat atque docet ut aptetur ad hanc sapienciam amorosam. Infectus est palatus cordis per humores uiciorum, unde necesse est ut prius exhauriatur aqua uiciorum et siccetur, ut sic igne amoris ualeat succendi, et, ut homo purgetur per penitentiam, eligat sibi locum secretum et quietum ac uniuersa peccata in memoriam breuiter reducat sine tamen pausacione, precipue in carnalibus ne in carnales cadat delectaciones quando dolere debeat. Et ponat ante faciem mentis peccata sua, maiora sepius rememoretur et post hoc in generali omnia peccata quibus Deum offendit. Et deinde recogitet in amaritudine anime sue quod multa sit oblitus et quod eciam multa ignoret; "delicta enim quis intelligit",[117] dicit Psalmista Septuagintis. Doleat igitur quod multa commisit peccata que est oblitus, multa que eciam ignorauit et ignorat esse peccata et quod uelit libenter confiteri et penitere de omnibus, quando ad memoriam aut cognicionem sibi ueniant atque desideret a Domino Deo illuminari in cognicione ominium peccatorum suorum et ut oblita ad memoriam sibi reuertantur. Et hoc modo doleat pro uniuerso inquantum Deum offendit proponatque firmiter in corde suo ut uelit cessare ab omnibus et totis uiribus implere decetero quecumque Deus precepit et
P 163vb que placi-|-ta sunt ei habeat fidem et spem in Deum, et moueatur in ipsum spe, fide et dilectione moueaturque contra peccata uniuersa, et que confessus non est confiteatur adhuc humiliter sine sui commendacione, pure sine

28 ipsum] *in marg. inser.* P.

114 Aristoteles, *De anima* II c. 2 (414a11–12); J. Hamesse, *Les* Auctoritates Aristotelis*: Un florilège médiévale. Étude historique et édition critique* (Philosophes médiévaux 17), Louvain—Paris 1974, p. 179 n. 55.

115 Lam 1:4; cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* (Sources Chrétiennes 408), Prologus, (ed. F. Ruello et J. Barbet), Paris 1995, p. 124 n. 1 ll. 1–2.

116 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* Proeem., cit., pp. 251–252 ll. 13–5.

117 Ps 18:13.

aliorum accusacione, integre sine aliquorum dimissione, uere sicut peccauit. Et humiliet cor suum ualde in conspectu Dei recognoscens suam fragilitatem et Dei bonitatem, dicendo:

"O Domine, ego sum miser et fragilis et peccaui super arenam maris.[118] Plus secutus sum carnis delictaciones quam tuas iustificationes. Ingratus fui omnibus beneficiis tuis creacionis et redempcionis quod de nichilo me formasti et omnia que in celo et in terra sunt in usum mihi ordinasti ut omnia mihi seruirent ymmo et teipsum dedisti mihi, descendisti de celo et ut me liberares a morte et miseria assumpsisti corpus mortale cum omnibus penalitatibus et afflictionibus que generaliter humano generi adherent et graciam ac uirtutem non impediunt. Tu mortem subisti ut me a morte liberares. Tu humiliatus es infra omnes ut me exaltates super celos. Tu metum fuisti a principio natiuitatis et quasi omnibus relictis erga me sollicitus fuisti. Ne in utero matris perirem me, protexisti cum tamen plures perire sit, fecisti hoc sine meritis meis, tua gracia mihi prestitisti et ad baptismum post natiuitatem peruenire fecisti, ad confirmacionem et in uia tua me multis modis intruxisti, et inspirasti parentibus meis ut me ad discendum literras scolis traderent pre aliis fratribus meis et in multis doctrinis mentem meam illuminasti. Et, heu, ingratus fui sepius tantis beneficiis et donis; non te laudaui, non | tibi gracias egi pro beneficiis tuis innumeris, sed potius euanui P 164ra in laudibus et fauoribus hominum propriis, laudem sepe plusquam tuam quesiui. Temporalia pocius quam eterna et creaturas plusquam te Creatorem dilexi. Sed nunc, Domine, suscipe penitentem et tibi seruire uolentem omnibus diebus in cara et dura religione Carthusiensi. Tu enim Domine per Ezechielem dixisti, 'inquantumque hora ingemuerit peccator pro peccatis suis omnium peccatorum suorum, non memorabor amplius'.[119] Ecce doleo, Domine, et gemo et utinam amplius gemere possem pro peccatis meis quia utique libenter facere! Tu autem supple imperfectum meum et suscipe penitentiam tantillam quia utique non pono obicere nec prauam uoluntatem contra tuam graciam, sicut prius consueui. Respice in tuam misericordiam que infinita est et super omnia opera tua ne deficiat in me, 'ne dicatur inter gentibus ubi est Deus eius',[120] sed pocius miserere mei[121] et dimitte uniuersa peccata mea[122] sicut promisisti, ut sic 'iustificeris in sermonibus tuis, et cor

33 promisisti] -s- *add. sed del.* P.

118 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 3, cit., pp. 259–260 ll. 38–5.

119 Ez 21:6.

120 Ps. 78:10.

121 Ps 50:1.

122 Ps 24:18.

mundum crea in me, O Domine Deus meus',[123] et sana animam meam ab omnibus infirmitatibus, ignorantiis et maliciis et concupiscentiis malis.

"Respice, Pater Sancte, in faciem Christi tui qui tibi plus placuit et maiorem honorem dedit quam inhonoracio omnium peccatorum totius mundi, ymmo quasi arena maris omnis iniquitas apparebit si comparata fuerit ad misericordiam tuam et posita in statera cum passionis Christi merito. Suppleat passio Filii tui quitquit imperfectionis in me inuentum fuerit. O Christe Redemptor, qui es aduocatus noster apud Patrem tuum interpella pro nobis
P 164rb delectissimam Patrem, | et ostende ei latus et uulnera que pro nobis pertulisti. Ora pro nobis, O Christe Saluator, secundum naturam qua minor es Patre, et exaudi nos in natu[r]a qua equalis es Patri.

"Et tu gloriosa domina mater Christi que nobis salutem produxisti, ora Filium tuum pro me infero et omni populo fideli ostende Filio pecus et ubera et reduc ei in memoriam omnia que in mortali uita prestitisti ei beneficia ipsum lactando, nutriendo, portando et ei in omnibus necessitatibus corporis prouidendo, quia scimus quod te honorans nichil tibi oranti pro nobis negat precipue cum te constituit propter hoc aduocatam nostram in dextera sua dicens, 'Mater, pete a me quod uis, non enim phas est ut auertam faciem meam a te' ".[124]

Et alii sancti similiter inuocandi sunt ac cogandi ut pro se orent specialiter autem illi ad quos habet maiorem deuocionem et quibus amplius in hac uita seruiunt ut sit homo que per se et propriis meritis non potest obtinere per sanctorum merita et intercessiones consequatur. Et aliquot uiribus se exerceat in hac compunctione cum tamen moderacione ne ex uehemencia et excessum uires anime et corporis destruat et faciat hec tam diu quousque senciat in consciencia sua quietationem et pacem atque confidenciam ad Deum, et donec appetitus peccandi confringatur.

Hoc autem conicere potest quando homo non sentit in se delectationem et desiderium peccandi dum cogitat de peccatis. Et si quis hanc uiam ascen-
P 164va dendi ad perfectionem dimiserit, nequaquem ad hanc theologiam | sapidam peruenire poterit, quia non uidetur Deus occulis impuris quia non possunt purificari nisi per penditentiam modis superius dicte. Et taliter eciam siccatur humor carnalium desideriorum ut sic anima siccata ab omnibus humoribus allicitis citius inflammetur in diuino amore et sursum leuetur non pregrauata aliquo pondere concupiscentiarum illicitarum.

24 exerceat] excerceat P.

123 Ps 50:6, 12.

124 3 Rg 2:20

Capitulum 3[M] de tribus uiribus anime apprehensiuis et tribus appetitiuis

Hec theologia mistica non in uiribus sensualitate sed racionalitate apprehenditur. Ideo dicendum est de differencia harum uirium.[125] Nam tres sunt uires apprehensiue seu cognitiue.

Primo ascendenda est apprehensio sensualis, sicut sensus communis apprehendit res per species sibi presentatas, deinde ymaginacio reseruat, fantasia componit, estimatiua elicit et memoria retinet omnia predicta. Hec uires occupantur circa corporalia, et correspondet eis sensitiuus appetitus qui eciam est in brutis animalibus sicut iste apprehensiue[126].[127]

Secunda dicitur 'racio', et est quedam uis anime deducens conclusiones ex premissis et primis principiis non alligata corporeo organo, sicut sensualitas licet in corpore speculetur fantasmata et discurrat, et operacio eius plus a luce intelligencie quam ex primis suscipitur. Concludit autem dupliciter: uno modo ex luce superioris intelligencie et primis principiis, et dicitur superior porcio racionis et uocatur 'uir'; secundo modo ex inferioribus que per experiencia acquiruntur sensuum exteriorum et interiorum in sensualitates, et uocatur 'mulier'.[128] Et huic apprehensiue correspondet secundus appetitus qui dicitur 'racionalis' qui appetit iuxta hanc apprehensionem quam immediate sequitur. Et dicitur quandoque 'libertas' et 'liberum arbitrium' eo quod libere eligit et quandoque dicitur 'appetitus dominatiuus' quia dominatur in homine super uires anime et corporis, in hiis scilicet que participant racionem et apte sunt obedire.[129] Hoc dicitur propter
P 164[vb] uires irracionales que eciam dicuntur pure | naturales ut sunt uegetatiua, nutritiua, etc. Dicitur eciam 'uoluntas racionalis'. Et quando appetibile est arduum, tunc dicitur 'irascibilis', et delectabile dicitur 'concupiscibilis', quo-

24 uegetatiua] uehetatiua P.

125 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 9, cit., p. 22 ll. 6–8.

126 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 12, cit., pp. 30–32 ll. 4–33; Id., ibid., c. 16, cit., pp. 36–38 ll. 3–29; *etiam* cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* Ia q. 78 a. 5 corp., (Editio Leonina), Roma, Vol. 5, 1889, p. 256a.

127 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 12, cit., pp. 30–32.

128 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 11, cit., pp. 29–30 ll. 4–31.

129 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 15, cit., p. 35 ll. 8–11.

niam hee due uires ponuntur secundum sanctos doctores Augustinum, Thomam et communiter non solum in sensualitate, ut ARISTOTELES posuit,[130] sed eciam in racione.[131]

Tercia uis apprehensiua est suprema. Et uacatur intelligencia et accipit a Deo quandam lucem connaturalem qua cognoscit prima principia que dicuntur quandoque 'dignitates', quandoque 'raciones' aut 'concepciones', unde in Psalmo, "Signatum est super nos lumen uultus tui Domine"[132].[133] Hanc sequitur in appetitu synderisis que est simplicis boni appetitus, et dicitur synderisis quandoque habitus sic inclinans ad bonum uniuersaliter et in communi ut omne bonum est faciendum, omne malum uitandum.[134] Dicitur eciam ipsa inclinacio procedens ex habitu predicto, et eciam dicitur ipse actus inde procedens. Et predicte uires habent suas illuminaciones non solum autem apprehensiue sed eciam appetitiue quia ipse effectus lumen habet in se, sicut calor ignis lucem habet, unde non solum lux lucet sed eciam ardens ignis lucem producit; nec solum lumina sunt hee uires sed eciam habent facultatem recipiendi illustraciones seu illuminaciones sicut specula lucent et suscipiunt illuminaciones tanto melius et clarius quanto sunt puriora.[135] Et hee illuminaciones non sunt essencia anime nec semper fuerunt in anima, ut Plato estimauit,[136] sed acquiruntur per prima principia, per demonstraciones et per experiencias sensuum exteriorum et interiorum quedam per racionem, quedam per sensualitatem et a Deo principaliter illuminatur.

Et superiores uires in predictis uiribus sunt apciores ad hanc misticam theologiam et tanto amplius quanto puriores et humiliores, sicut specula concaua et bene polita forcius et melius suscipiunt lucem et illuminaciones solis quam impura et maculata. Et sicut macule nocent speculis et impe-

9 ad] *in marg. inser*. P.

130 Aristoteles, *De anima* III c. 9 (432b5–6); Hamesse, *Les* Auctoritates Aristotelis, cit., p. 188 n. 166.

131 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 15, cit., p. 36 ll. 18–24.

132 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 10, cit., pp. 26–27 ll. 8–22.

133 Ps 4:7.

134 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 14, cit., pp. 33–35.

135 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 17, cit., pp. 38–41.

136 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 18, cit., pp. 43–44 ll. 39–55.

P 165ra diunt ne suscipant splendorem solis, sic macule peccatorum et | uaria fantasmata impediunt speculacionem eternorum bonorum, et hanc theologiam sanctam que mistica, oc[c]ulta et sapida dicitur, que docet de omnibus non a creaturis ascendendo in Creatorem tanquam 'a posteriori' sed pocius descendendo de Creatore ad creaturarum cognicionem et 'a priori' cognoscendo quasi per causam effectus que est optima cognicio et est certissima inter omnes noticias quas potest habere natura racionalis aut intellectualis.

Capitulum 4m ponit differenciam inter cogitacionem, meditacionem et contemplacionem

Ad theologiam misticam plus requiritur affectus, scilicet feruidus et purus in Deum, quam affectu attingitur Deus, scilicet per amorem qui "sepius intrat ubi intellectus foris stat",[137] ut dicit uenerabilis Hugo *Super angelicam Ierarchiam*, et est sicut Seraphin supremus ordo angelorum immediate Deo appropinquans plusquam Cherubin. Seraphin interpretatur ardentes et signatur affectus immediatus Deo appropinquans et ipsum penetrans; Cherubin plenitudo sciencie et est in intellectu;[138] non sit tamen Deum complectens utiliter, tamen scitur horum differencia.

Cogitacio est uagus et improuidus intuitus, facilis ad euagandum instabiliter, et sine labore faciliter habetur[139] ex formis et sensacionibus sensuum exteriorum et interiorum, quia intuetur fantasmata et species ac formas rerum in memoria sensualitatis aut partis racionalis relictas ex quibus faciliter formatur cogitacio. Meditacio est prouidus anime obtutus in acquisicione ueritatis uehementer occupatus et fit cum labore.[140] Nam laboriosum est refrenare mentis euagacionem et dirigere ad ueritatem, unde poete finxerunt quomodo Orpheus suam quesiuit uxorem, dulci melodia fecit stare flumina et bestias, quia misticus theologus querens suam uxorem, id est, ueritatem quam querit sponsam accipere, facit stare flumina, id est, anime motus inordinatus quietat ut quietatis appetitibus carnis non impediantur

11 affectu] *forsitan* intellectu. 13 Ierarchiam] gerarchiam P.

137 Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Commentariorum in Hierarchiam coelestam S. Dionysii Areopagitae secundum interpretationem Joannis Scoti* VI c. 7, (PL 175), col. 1038D.

138 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 6, cit., p. 271 ll. 14–16.

139 Cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De contemplatione* [*Benjamin maior*] I cc. 3–4, in: M.-A. Aris, *Contemplatio: Philosophische Studien zum Traktat* Benjamin Maior *des Richard von St. Vicktor mit einer verbesserten Edition des Textes* (Fuldaer Studien 6), Frankfurt a.M. 1996, pp. [8]–[10].

140 Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De contemplatione* I c. 4, cit., p. [9] ll. 30–31.

in acquisicione ueritatis, facit concordiam in affectibus anime per melodiam interiorem. Et ipsa melodia intelligitur concordia uirium inferiorum cum
P 165^{rb} superioribus in uera obediencia. Et perdidit | uxorem quando serpentem calcauit et perducta fuit ad inferos quia tunc perdit homo ueritatem et ueram sapientiam quando calcat serpentem consenciendo eius suggestionibus prauis, quia tunc peccando ad inferos descendit, ad que deuotus homo deuota mente descendit, et stare flumina infernalia facit quando domat uehemenciam motuum cordis praui et eruit uxorem, id est, ueritatem, cum labore, hac tamen lege ut non respiciat retro quod si fecerit ad uomitum reuertendo penis quam prius habebat.[141] Contemplacio est liber animi obtutus in res spirituales diffusus, et licet cum labore ascendatur ad eternorum bonorum contemplacionem,[142] tamen quando stat animus in arce contemplacionis, tunc faciliter uidet omnia que iuxta Ipsum sunt et que infra et que supra, sicut positus in monte clare potest uidere que inferius fiunt, et que iuxta se quamuis ascendat cum labore et suspenditur animus per contemplacionem in supernis bonis inuisibilibus et transcendit omnia inferiora et uisibilia.

Cogitacioni correspondet uita animalis et est non solum in racionali sed eciam in sensuali parte, unde et bruta cogitant et statim que cogitant appetunt; si placet, et consequuntur ad ea; si autem displicent, tunc fugiunt. Et sequitur sepe cogitacionem libido, cupido et concupiscencia et generatur per eam uita animalis. Sed in meditacione consueuit esse deuocio, compunctio et contricio et correspondent hec racioni in qua ponuntur et constituitur in hiis uita racionalis.

Contemplacio autem ponitur in intelligencia et constituit uitam intellectualem, que raro reperitur temporibus nostris. Et est in ea extatica dilectio et anagoycus amor raptus similiter in ea ponitur, quando mens rapitur super omnia uisiblia et corporalia et a sensacione omnium uirium inferiorum, ita ut non senciant uires inferiores in raptu nec parcipiantur. Et dicitur extasis quasi extra mentem sed raptus ultra importat uiolenciam quandam quia fit cum uiolencia et labore, sic Paulus fuit raptus in tercium celum quia raptus extra sensaciones corporis et sensuum et eciam uiuificacionem corporum, ita ut iaceret corpus suum tempore raptus quasi mortuum et ipsa nesciuit
P 165va reuersus ad corpus an anima | fuit sic rapta, ut desineret esse forma corporis sicut in morte, an solum fuerit rapta extra sensacionem et uiuificacionem et actus corporis manendo tamen corporis forma. Ideo dicit siue in corpore,

141 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 23, cit., pp. 57–58 ll. 37–63; cf. Publius Ovidius Naso, *Metamorphoses* x.

142 Cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De contemplatione* I c. 4, cit., p. [9] ll. 25–28.

scilicet manens anima ut forma, siue extra scilicet rapta et separatur ut in morte. Nescio. Deus scit. Sciuit tamen optime quod non fuit cum corpore raptus in celum sed predicto modo intelligendum est ut exponit Sanctus Thomas 2^a2^e 175 de raptu et extasi.[143]

Et fit raptus ex amore quia ex hoc quod ualde amatur Deus rapitur homo extra se ad ipsum Deum. Amor enim extasim facit et raptum ac stabilit hominem in amato ut eciam unum fiat cum amato,[144] sic dicit Apostolus, "Qui adheret Deo unus spiritus efficitur",[145] scilicet cum Deo non quidem per essenciam sed per transformacionem, sicut ferrum ignitum coformatur igni non quidem ut fiat ignis cum maneat in sua natura ferrum sed per transformationem. Calor enim habet uirtutem congregandi et uniendi homogenia sic amor diuinus quasi ignis unit spiritum hominis cum Deo et inde separat sensualitatem tanquam uile a precioso. Et omnes uires anime in Deum tendere dicunt ut ibi tanquam in suo centro quiescant quia ibi habent omnia que desiderant, nec in alio ista reperire possunt ideo nec in alio quiescere ualent, unde et recte torrente uoluptatis potantur anime sancte quando in Deo stabiliuntur. Ibi namque omnia que desiderari possunt habentur, quia ibi habentur summe diuicie, summe dignitates delicie et omnia que appeti possunt in hac uita que hic fantastice sed ibi plenissime habentur. Irascibilis in Deo possidet summum arduum in quod tendit; concupiscibilis in delectabile sed illud summe habetur in Deo. Ideo quiescere non potest nisi in ipso racionalis tendit ad uerum, sed hoc summe est in Deo qui est prima et summa ueritas, unde nunquam quietatur anima in suis appetitibus nisi in summo bono in quo omnia habentur plenissime, et ipsum summum bonum habet omnia bona. Ideo potens est replere animam in bonis in eternum.

Capitulum quintum de triplici anagogia

Quia theologia mistica, sapida et sancta est de anagogia et sursum-actione et ductione, ideo notandum quod triplex est. Prima est de Deo in se, beatificans mentes celestes Deum in gloria contem-|-plantes, et intelligitur per P 165^{vb} figuras in sacra Scriptura, unde David erat homo quidam secundum litteralem sensum; secundum tropologiam et moralem, quia David 'pugnator forte' fuit, significat animam sanctam et deuotam que fortiter contra omnia

143 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* IIaIIae q. 175 a. 5.

144 Cf. Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Commentariorum in Hierarchiam coelestam* VI c. 7, (PL 175), coll. 1037D–1038A.

145 1Cor 6:17.

pugnat uicia et contra dyabolum ne unquam sibi dominetur; secundum allegoriam significat Christum, quia David percussit Golyam et populum Israelis liberauit[146] et Christus percussit in ligno crucis dyabolum et populum electum liberauit de manu eius et salutem magna fecit in Israhel, id est, in ecclesia fidelium; secundum anagogiam autem David, quia dicitur "pulcher aspectu",[147] significat pulchritudinem diuinitatis que est ineffabilis et sua pulchritudine sanctos letificat in gloria, "hec est enim uita eterna", dicit Christus, "ut cognoscant te solum uerum Deum et quem misisti Ihesum Christum",[148] et hec anagogica exposicio sicut respicit Christum populum suum in gloria diuinitatis beatificantem.[149]

Secunda anagogia est que respicit ecclesiam triumphantem secundum quod in sponsi amplexus totaliter ruit, unde Iherusalem secundum litteram dicitur ciuitas in terra sancta; secundum tropologiam autem, quia fuit muris circumdata[150] et optime munita, significat animam fidelem que muris uirtutum debet custodiri et muniri et armis spiritualibus indui, ut fortiter contra dyabolum resistat et ipsum nequaquam admittat et sensus interiores et exteriores contra fallacias dyaboli et omnium uiciorum dicunt diligenter claudi; secundum allegoriam autem, qui[a] Iherusalem fuit sedes regni, significat ecclesiam fidelium que est sedes regum, nam in ipsa Christus solum suum posuit et leges dedit tanquam rex, unde Ysaias dicit "Deus noster, legifer noster ipse ueniet et saluabit nos",[151] scilicet regens ecclesiam militantem exemplo uite et uerbo doctrine; secundum autem anagogiam, quia Iherusalem dicitur uisio pacis, significat ecclesiam triumphantem quia habitationes illius ciuitatis celestis sunt in plena et perfecta pace et quiete, concordia et amicicia, et ex hoc in maxima exultacione, unde et cantant et dicunt quia melior est dies una super milia, item "sicut letancium omnium habitacio in te",[152] nam ex maxime pace habent maximum gaudium.[153]

Tercia anagogia est sursum-ductio et actio, scilicet quando mens sursum
P 166ra tendit ad Deum et Ei uniatur | et ab Eo de omnibus utilibus doceatur; Ipse

146 1 Rg 17:48–51.
147 1 Rg 16:12.
148 Jn 17:3.
149 Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* (Sources Chrétiennes 408), "De via illuminativa", pp. 188–190 n. 10 ll. 1–18.
150 Cf. Ps 59:11, Ps 107:11.
151 Is 33:22.
152 Ps 86:7.
153 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "De via illuminativa", cit., pp. 190–192 n. 11 ll. 1–24.

dicit per Ysayam, "Ego sum Deus docens te utilia".[154] (Confundantur autem omnes qui plectunt uana et inutilia.) Et est in celo sine medio, quia sine medio sancti feruntur in diuinam fruitiuam uisionem, sed in terris positis hominibus necesse est vt per spiritualia exercicia sursum tendant et superna magno desiderio appetant et dicant, "Osculetur me osculo oris sui"[155].[156] Et qui diligunt celestia vtuntur omnibus creaturis, figuris et Scripturis in sursumactionem, quia in omnibus et per omnes ascendunt sursum per creaturas in Creatorem, per figuras in Ipsum qui significatur per omnia Deus cuius omnia, que sunt, participant entitatem, ueritatem et bonitatem, et per Scripturas que ideo dare sunt a Deo ut homines per earum doctrinam et informacionem ascendant in supernorum bonorum et gaudiorum contemplacionem. In Ezechiele legimus quod ubi fuit impetus spiritus, illuc et rote mouebantur[157] quia ubi homo habet appetitum et affectum, illuc secum trahit sacram Scripturam et ei in omnibus istis seruit. Si vult et appetit humilitatem, multa exempla et dogmata humilitatis reperiet in ea, sic de caritate et de ceteris sanctis virtutibus. Et simili modo dicendum est de gaudio regni Dei quod si in mentem humanam perfecte intrauerit, tunc quidquid audierit aut legerit in sacris Scripturis faciet sibi ascensionem ad ista cupita gaudia beate vite. Similiter et in omni conuersacione humana facit comparaciones et ascensiones in celestia. Quoniam si uidet quod homines querunt temporalia bona, gaudia, delicias, diuicias, honores et laudes aut huiusmodi in temporalibus rebus et in mundo transitorio, gemit et apud se dicit, "O si homines faciunt tanta pro caducis bonis et vanis, quanta te facere oportet pro eternis gaudiis que nunquam habent finem neque estimationem aut etatum numeracionem sed excedunt omnia incomparabiliter".

Et quando assuescit homo in Scripturis, creaturis et huiusmodi asensciones facere in | corde suo ad celestia, tunc dulcem ducet uitam et Deus sibi P 166rb reuelabit plurima que non nouit. Ipse enim suis dilectoribus et sursum tutoribus consueuit reuelare celestia et dare hanc theologiam, ne si quis suo studio et industria acquirat, glorietur et putet se aliquid esse.[158] Deus autem vult solus glorificari quia ipse sibi gloriam reseruauit et alteri non dabit

4 exercicia] excercicia P. 28–29 tutoribus] cutoribus P.

154 Is 48:17.

155 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "De via illuminativa", cit., pp. 192–194 n. 12 ll. 1–28.

156 Ct 1:1.

157 Cf. Ez 1:20.

158 Cf. Gal. 6:3.

ea[159] vt dicit per Ysayam, "Gloriam meam alteri non dabo nec laudem meam sculptilibus",[160] et Apostolus dicit, "Soli Deo honor et gloria in secula seculorum",[161] vt sic homo humilietur et recognoscat hanc theologiam, sicut et omnia alia bona, haberi a Deo, et ideo ad Deum se exigat totis viribus, se humiliet in omnibus, et a Deo postulet qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat. Quandoque tamen dispensatiue hanc theologiam misticam et sapidam negat, ne forte superbiant homines et putent se aliquid esse, sed subtrahit eam vt appetitus dilectorum suorum qui semper ad eam tendere debent et talentum suum in ea expendere ut, quod hic in uita fuerit dispensatiue et vtiliter ac salubriter negatum, hoc concedatur post hanc uitam in gloria ad quam nos Filius Dei feliciter perducat qui est benedictus Deus in secula. Amen.

Capitulum sextum de triplici modo acquirendi scientiam

Insitum est naturaliter mentibus racionabilibus desiderium sciendi et "omnis homo naturaliter desiderat scire",[162] quia desiderat suam perfectionem, suam propriam actionem et suam beatitudinem que est in visione seu cognicione summi boni.[163] Est igitur triplex acquisicio sapiencie.

Prima per speculum creaturarum in noticiam ascendere Creatoris;[164] hanc sapientiam multi philosophi, precipue Platonici, habuerunt qui peruenerunt ex noticia creaturarum mobilium ad vnum summum bonum spirituale, simul et incommutabile, a quo dixerunt omnia facta esse et dependenciam habere atque felicitatem ueram consistere in illius summi boni cognicione, amore et imitacione, vt dicit Augustinus viii° *De ciuitate Dei*.[165] Et si Platonici secuti suas doctrinas fuissent et corda sua ad hoc summum

159 Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De doctrina christiana* II.6.7, (ed. J. Martin), CCSL 32, Turnhout 1962, p. 35 ll. 1–7.

160 Is 42:8.

161 1Tim 1:17.

162 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* I c. 1 (980a21); Hamesse, *Les* Auctoritates Aristotelis, cit., p. 115 n. 1.

163 Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica ad Nichomachum* X c. 7 (1177a12–13, 16–17), Hamesse, *Les* Auctoritates Aristotelis, cit., p. 247 n. 207; cf. Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* II pr. 4 n. 25, (ed. C. Moreschini), München—Leipzig 2005, pp. 39–40 ll. 75–80; Hamesse, *Les* Auctoritates Aristotelis, cit., p. 288 n. 19.

164 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 2, cit., p. 257 ll. 37–38; Rom. 1:20.

165 Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De civitate Dei* VIII c. 9, (ed. B. Dombart et A. Kalb), CCSL 47, Turnhout 1955, p. 225 ll. 1–6.

bonum, humiliassent atque purificassent atque petiuissent dirigi vias suas
P 166va ab | eo in salutem, non fuissent relicti necque in reprobum sensum dati, sicut illi qui cum Deum cognouerunt, non sicut Deum glorificauerunt, et ideo euanuerunt in cogitationibus. Quando namque homo facit quod in se est recedendo a peccatis et conuertendo se pro posse suo plene ad Deum, non relinquetur ab eo, sed uel Deus mittit angelum qui doceat eum uiam eterne salutis, sicut tempore legis Moysi multi gentiles edocti ut dicit Dyonisius in libro *Angelici iherarchie*,[166] aut recte mittit predicatorem qui doceat ipsum, sicut docuit Deus Cornelium centurionem per sanctum Petrum Apostolum.[167] Est enim regula theologorum qui quando homo facit id quod in se est, tunc Deus residuum supplebit. Deus autem offert cuilibet graciam excitando liberum eius arbitrium per quam facere potest quod in se est, vt dicit Bonauentura in *Breuiloquio*,[168] quam si acceptat homo et facit quod in se est recedendo a malo et inclinando se ad bonum, acquirit graciam iustificantem per quam potest eciam naturaliter si perseuerauerit saluari. Si enim Deus hoc non faceret, tunc homo iuste haberet querelam contra Deum dicendo, "Ecce feci quod in me fuit, et tu noluisti michi auxilium gratie tue dare". Absit autem hoc a Deo qui paracior est dare graciam quam homines suscipere sunt parati. Et ideo prior Ipse stat ad ostium cordis et pulsat vt sibi aperiatur, et postquam intrauexit, non recedit nisi expulsus per peccatum mortale. Ideo dicit, "Eum qui uenit ad me non eiciam foras",[169] unde bene dicit sanctus Augustinus, Deus primo accedit ad hominem et primo recedit quia non recedit nisi homo prior recesserit ab eo uoluntarie peccando quod posuit in libero hominis arbitrio,[170] dicens ad discipulos, "Uultis ne vos abire",[171] quasi diceret 'in arbitrio uestro positum est hoc', et Apostolus, "Uidete ne quis desit gracie Dei",[172] quasi diceret 'gracia Dei omnibus adest', sed uideat homo ne desit gracie Dei subtrahendo se ab ea per malam uoluntatem, unde patet quod ex naturali cognicione, quam habet homo, ex creaturis potest
P 166vb peruenire ad cognicionem | summi boni. Et faciendo quod in se est perue-

21 me] ad *add.* P.

166 Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, *De caelesti hierarchia* c. 4, (ed. P. Chevalier), *Dionysiaca* II, Paris—Bruges 1950, pp. 807–808.

167 Act 10:18–25.

168 Bonaventura, *Breviloquium* va c. 2, Opera omnia V, Quaracchi 1891, p. 253b.

169 Io 6:37.

170 Cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De libero arbitrio* III.24.73.251, (ed. W.M. Green), CCSL 29, Turnhout 1970, p. 318 ll. 69–73.

171 Io 6:68.

172 Hbr 12:15.

nire potest ad ueram salutem non tamen ex suis uiribus sed ex gracia Dei, quia licet duo concurrant ad salutem hominis habentis usum racionis, scilicet propria diligencia et gracia Dei, tamen plus operatur gracia Dei sine qua nichil prodest labor hominis, unde et totum sepe attribuitur gracie que est fons et origo omnis boni. Ideo Apostolus dixit, "Gracia Dei sum id quod sum",[173] et iterum, "non est uolentis neque currentis sed Dei miserentis".[174]

Secunda est sapientia que per immissionem spiritualium radiorum exercicio intelligencie et studii spiritualis acquiritur,[175] et sic in spirituali studio et cordis puritate quando homo in feruore caritatis se conuertit ad summum bonum et ad lucem inaccesibilem transeundo a creaturis ad Creatorem, ab effectibus in causam non naturali modo, ut philosophi, sed ut docetur in fide catholica. Illuminatur homo sepius in multis per immissionem spiritualium radiorum a luce prima et incommutabili. Hanc viam proficendi habuerunt communiter sancti doctores ut Ieronimus, Augustinus, etc., qui in multis locis et libris mencionem facit de hac uia (si bene intelligitur) et alii similiter doctores sancti. Spirituales eciam uiri, qui sua corda Deo purificant et preparant et cottidie in orationibus, meditationibus et contemplacionibus ad Deum se leuant, merentur accipere hanc sapientiam a Deo et illuminari in multis ueritatibus que in Scripturis sacris et exposicionibus reperire non possunt.

Tercia acquisicio sapiencie est sublimior et excellencior istis; ymmo et excellentissima et nobilissima que acquiritur per amorem ardentissimum vnitiuum, que actualiter sine omni medio disponente animi ad superiora rapit et in dilectionem suum immediate sursum transfert et consurgere actibus extensionibus facit,[176] que in mistica theologia tradita in apice affectiue que est synderisis. Consurgit, que consurrectio per ignoranciam dicitur, ut remoto exercicio omnis ymaginis racionis intellectus et intelligencie per unionem ardentissimi amoris illud senciat in presenti quod inelligencia capere non potest, ymmo sepius omnis intelligencia et cognicio speculatiua
P 167ra ignorat. Et hec est tanto nobilior quanto nobilior | est Seraphin, Cherubin et ipsa caritas nobilior sciencia, et potencia motiua nobilior cognitiua, in tantum enim cognicio per amorem unitiuum ad penetranda secretissima diuinorum clarior est omni cognicione apprehensiua. Et secundum hoc a Dyonisio, qui eam didicit a Paulo Apostolo, sic diffinitur tanquam nobilissima

30 est] *in marg. inser*. P.

173 1Cor 15:10.

174 Rm 9:16.

175 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 2, cit., p. 258 ll. 5–7.

176 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 2, cit., p. 258 ll. 12–16.

omnium sapiencia est dignissima Dei noticia per ignoranciam cognita preclarior, ymmo et uniuersalior et utilior aliis scienciis et cognicionibus atque apphrensionibus quia non tantum affectum supra se erigit et amore extatico perfecte unit creaturam sponso altissimo, et tantum eleuat intellectum ut multo plus omni prudencia et cognicione diuinis fulgoribus illustretur quam aliquo ingenii exercicio ualiat obtinere.[177] Et alibi idem dicit Dyonisius de ea sit "hanc igitur irracionabilem amentem et stultam sapienciam excedentem omnem scienciam laudantes dicimus quod omnis est mentis et racionis et prudencie et sapiencie causa in ipsa, est omne consilium et ab ipsa est omnis cognicio et prudencia, et 'in ipsa sunt omnes thesauri sapiencie et sciencie absconditi'"[178],[179] ubi per sapienciam et cognicionem denotatur plena perficio affectus et intellectus. Et uocat ipsam 'irracionabilem', quia nec racio ipsam apprehendit neque racione acquiritur neque inuestigacione studiosa nec eciam utitur racione in suo usu sed tantum amore amentem uocat, id est, sine mente et intellectu quia nec ipsa in suo exercicio utitur intellectum nec ad ipsam peruenire potest per intellectum sed solum per affectum et amorem feruentissimam; 'stultam' uocat, quia sine usu omnimode intellegencie in solo affectu consurgit quam nullus apprehendere potest intellectus.

Et eciam quia 'stulta' reputatur a doctis huius seculi philosophis qui hunc modum acquirendi apprehendere non possunt, ymmo stulticiam reputant. Hec est altissima noticia et infallibilis sapientia de Deo, ubi non error neque
P 167rb opinio sicut in aliis | scienciis et acquisicione earum per modum communem et scolasticum. Hec sapientia primo gustat et in affectum recipitur amorosa dilectione. Deinde in uires inferiores apprehensiuas et appetitiuas mittitur; non autem peruenitur ad eam modo communi, scilicet per studium aut cognicionem creaturarum, sed necesse est ut ignote ascendat seu consurgat homo ad eam, scilicet ut non utatur actibus intellectus aut sensus sed pocius relinquat exercicia et actus intelligencie et experiencie intus et foris et omnia que creata sunt a Deo et mente ardenti consurgat ignote sine noticia et apprehensione aliqua sola tamen apprehensione fidei excepta. Et dicat continue in corde suo: quando apprehendam, quando constringar amplexibus castissimus, quando unus spiritus cum Ipso quem desidero efficiar, ut moriar mihi et mundo, et sibi soli uniam semper. Et necesse

177 Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, *De mystica theologia* c. 1, (ed. P. Chevalier), *Dionysiaca* I, Paris—Bruges 1937, pp. 576–577.

178 Dionysius Areopagita, *De diuinis nominibus* c. 7, cit., pp. 386–387.

179 Col 2:3.

est ut mens recedat ab omnibus que sunt in creaturis ymmo et que sunt existencia in Creatore, scilicet essencialia Dei que habent similitudinem in creaturis, oportet relinqui, ne occupetur homo in talibus racionibus eternis et comparacionibus. Similiter relinquere debet non-existencia, id est, ea que pertinent ad Trinitate personarum in vnitate essencie, que dicuntur 'non-existencia' secundum DYONISIUM,[180] eo quod non habent in creaturis aliqua similitudinem, unde relictis omnibus actionibus interioribus et exterioribus ac omnibus abiectis mens in apice consurgere debet ignote,[181] id est sine preuia intellectione et cognicione et tendere in superna per amorem ut transferat se totaliter in amatum, id est, in Deum, ut fiat unius cum Ipso spiritus. Et quia hic modus contemplandi uidetur stulticia philosophis huius seculi, ideo sanctus DYONISIUS hortatur Thymotheum, cui scribit *Misticam theologiam*, ut non manifestet eam in doctis doctoribus et philosophis huius seculi,[182] ne derideant ea que capere non possunt. Et Christus dixit, "Nolite sanctum dare canibus et nolite margaritas proicere ante porcos, ne conculP 167va cent eas pedibus suis",[183] quia sacra misteria non sunt indignis reuelanda, | ne contempnant ea et ne superbiant contra Deum in hiis sed tantum humilibus de quibus est spes quod uiam purgandi superius positam non abhorreant sed pocius amplexentur, diligant et assumant in practica.[184] Qui eciam diffidere non dicunt quamuis laborent quandoque diu quia improbus labor omnia superat et quod diu differtur tandem desideranti et laboranti conceditur. Differtur eciam ut cum datum fuerit diligencius, custodiatur quod laboriose est acquisitum. Si autem in presenti uita negatur, hoc fit aut quia non recte queritur aut quia Deus nouit occulta, malum forte superbie negligencie aut predictionis sequeretur quia forte dicerent qui ista accipientes secuti sumus quia gustauimus Deum bona, et sic inimici Domini menciuntur ei quando cibat eos ex adipe frumenti et de petra melle saturat.[185] Et sic quandoque ex amicis fiunt inimici quando abutuntur bonis Deum qui tamen desiderant gustare et laborant perseueranter et si non datur in presenti pregustacio, datur in futuro plena refectio prestante Christi Domino nostro qui replet in bonis desiderium sanctorum suorum in secula. Amen.

20 quia] *in marg. inser*. P. 22 custodiatur] *in marg. inser*. P.

180 Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, *De mystica theologia* c. 5, cit., pp. 599–600.

181 Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, *De mystica theologia* c. 1, cit., pp. 567–568.

182 Id., ibid.

183 Mt 7:6.

184 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 1, cit., p. 255 ll. 13–30.

185 Ps 80:16–17.

Capitulum septimum de opposicionibus contra predicta et de eorum solucionibus

Hec autem que predicta sunt, licent sint fulcita auctoritatibus sanctorum qui nequaquam sunt cogitandi uelle decipere homines et scribere ea que non sunt, tamen quidam arguunt contra ea scripturis et racionibus multis.

Primo, quia in Psalmo scriptum est, "In meditacione mea exardescet ignis",[186] et est sensus quod meditacio precedit feruorem ignis et caritatis. Nam ex premeditacione beneficiorum Dei accenditur ignis caritatis in affectu.[187]

Item, quia dicit sanctus Augustinus, "uisa quidem amare possumus, incognita autem nequaquam",[188] unde primo oportet procedere cogitando et intelligendo antequam amemus aliquid nisi enim cognitum sit, non amatur aliquid.[189]

Item, probatur racionbius sic, quia in diuinis est summa potencia, summa sapida et summa bonitas, unde patet quod amorem et bonitatem precedit sapientia.[190]

P 167^{vb} Item, eciam in nobis precedere | debet cognicio ut primo cognoscamus res antequam diligamus. Similiter eccclesia militantes imitatur pro posse triumphantem,[191] ut dicit Dyonisius; in triumphanti autem precedunt Throni, deinde Cherubin, ultimo Seraphin, quia Throni sunt sedes Dei et sunt illi qui purificant sua corda ut in ipsis Deus resideat. Deinde crescunt in sapientia ut fiant Cherubin per plenitudinem sapiencie, post hoc fuit Seraphin per caritatem, etc.[192].[193]

Sed in oppositum sunt uerba Dyonisii *de mistica theologia* et ea que superius sunt dicta et quia eciam in Psalmo dicitur, "Gustate et uidete quo-

8 premeditacione] pre- *sup. lin. inser.* P.

186 Ps 38:4.

187 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* (Sources Chrétiennes 409), "Quaestio difficilis" pro 1, pp. 182–184 n. 3 ll. 12–5.

188 Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate* X.2.4, (ed. W.J. Mountain et F. Glorie), CCSL 50, Turnhout 1968, pp. 315–316 ll. 1–32.

189 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" pro 2, cit., p. 184 n. 4 ll. 1–5.

190 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" pro 3, cit., pp. 184–186 n. 5 ll. 1–23.

191 Cf. Dionysius Areopagita, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia* c. 1, *Dionysiaca* II, pp. 1071–1104.

192 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" pro 4, cit., pp. 186–188 n. 6 ll. 1–28.

193 Cf. Thomas Gallus, *De caelesti hierarchia* c. 7, *Dionysiaca* II, pp. 1051–1054 ll. 855–868.

niam suauis est Dominus".[194] Primo dicit 'gustate' quod pertinet ad affectum, deinde 'uidete' quod pertinet ad intellectum.[195]

Et ista eciam habentur in ecclesia triumphante, ubi propinquius accedunt ad Deum, et primo Seraphin et interpretantur ardentes, deinde Cherubin, id est, sciencie plenitudo.[196]

Similiter tres persone in diuinis quarum ultima, cui attribuitur amor, plus ad nos accedit, et cetera.[197]

Pro horum solucione est notandum secundum sanctum DYONISIUM, "hec sapiencia dicitur Christianorum",[198] unde et fidei Christiane cognicionem et caritatis fundamentum presupponit, unde hanc theologiam misticam nullus mortalium quantocumque preditus ingenio et laborans exercicio potuit eam apprehendere que ponitur in apice mentis et summitate affectus transcendens omnem facultatem nature. Ideo nunquam potuit naturali inuestigacione acquiri sed communiter solis filiis paterno affectu misericorditer et pie reseratur. Ideo bene dicitur mistica, id est, occulta et clausa, quia clauditur multis et reseratur paucis a Magistro, qui in celis habitat,[199] ne uilescat et ne humiles superbiant et eciam ut sic confundantur superbi doctores quibus exprobrari potest sic uos nichil scitis et quantumcumque sapicitis. Hanc tamen non potestis apprehendere sapienciam.[200]

Considerandum est tamen quod misericors Deus dedit duplicem uirtutem pertingendi homini in superna celorum et ad eterna bona: prima in intellectu quo apprehenditur summa ueritas, secunda est in affectu quo
P 168ra capitur summa | bonitas. Et secundum hoc est duplex modus ascendendi in superna. Primus est per intelligenciam et ascendit intellectus per creaturas in Creatorem, et significatur per Rachelem que legitur fuisse uenusta facie sed sterilis.[201] Sic hec contemplacio est pulchra et quia intellectu in se non meretur homo, ideo dicitur esse sterilis, et eciam quia non generat filios in predicacione nisi descendat ad actiuam. Alius per affectionem, scilicet amoris, et est in affectu qui ascendit flammigerorum desiderium sursum ad

194 Ps 33:9.

195 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" con 5, cit., p. 198 n. 16 ll. 1–5.

196 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" con 8, cit., p. 202 n. 19 ll. 2–6; Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mytica* c. 6, cit., p. 271 ll. 14–16.

197 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" con 7, cit., p. 200 n. 18 ll. 10–13.

198 Dionysius Areopagita, *De mystica theologia* c. 1, *Dionysiaca* I, cit., p. 565.

199 Cf. Mt 9:9.

200 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" Solutio, cit., p. 204 n. 22 ll. 1–12.

201 Gn 29:17.

solum Deum aspirans ex sibi inmisso igne desuper ut sibi intime uniatur et unus spiritus cum eo efficiatur. Et significatur per Mariam que ardebat amore et desiderio audiendi uerbum Domini et secus pedes eius sedit. Et hec est nobilior illa que est in intellectu, unde in euangelio legitur Maria optimam partem elegit que non auferetur ab ea[202].[203]

Ulterius est notandum quod est duplex contemplacio intellectus, similiter duplex amor affectus; seu dupliciter feruor acquiritur in affectu et dupliciter in intellectu. Primo est contemplacio que ascendit de inferioribus ad superiora de creaturis in Creatorem, et significatur per XLII mansiones qui exeuntes de Egipto ambulauerunt per desertum uenirent in terram promissionis,[204] quia in deserto huius mundi ambulamus hiis mansionibus donec ad celestem terram perueniamus; contemplando et gradus et mansiones faciendo in creaturis donec ad Creatorem peruniamus.[205]

Et alia est contemplacio que de superioribus inchoatur quando lumine desuper infunditur menti et illuminatur mens secundum regulas eterne ueritatis et in racionibus eternis illuminatur. Et secundum illud lumen desuper inmissum et infusum iudicat de inferioribus et tanto certius quanto clarius et plus istud lumen desuper infusum suscipit in se et sic iudicat secundum raciones eternas et secundum exemplar a quo omnis creatura ortum sunt.[206] Et hoc modo illuminati et purgati uiri sursum eleuati in racionibus eternis legerunt et studuerunt scienciam multam. Et sic ascenditur primo per creaturas, sensibiles et corporeas que comprehenduntur sensu corporeo. Deinde sensus communis iudicat de uisis, audi-|-tis, tactis, odoratis et gustatis, et ymaginacio reseruat species, fantasia componit, et estimatiua elicit, memoria reseruat, et racio accipit species istas, et intellectus agens depurat a condicionibus indiuiduantibus et facit habitum sciencie uniuersalis et ponit in memoria intellectuali et intellectu possibili et ascendit per hoc ad omnium conditorem Deum per intelligenciam et ibi sistens illuminatur ad multorum scienciam, unde naturali uia ascendens aliquali luce perfusa et adiuta sed quando ad conspiciendas eternas raciones peruenit,

P 168[rb]

202 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" Solutio, cit., p. 206 nn. 23–24 ll. 1–18, 1–5.

203 Lc 10:42.

204 Hugo de Sancto Victore, *De archa mystica* I c. 14, (PL 176), col. 700; cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De contemplatione* I c. 6, cit., p. [13] ll. 21–36.

205 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" Solutio, cit., pp. 206–208 nn. 24–25 ll. 5–8, 1–12.

206 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" Solutio, cit., pp. 208–210 n. 26 ll. 1–13.

tunc amplius illuminatur.[207] Et tunc ex luce ibi suscepta iudicat plenius et perfectius omnia per que prius ascendit et eciam alia que iuxta et infra se sunt, quia posita quasi in monte et luce superiori inferiora clarius intuetur, et hec intelligencia non ponit finem in cognicione sed afficitur ardore et ideo terminatur in amore et Ipsum diligit ad quem ascendit et a quo illuminatur. Et sic meditacio [vel] contemplacio terminatur in amore sine quo nichil prodest, unde dicit sanctus AUGUSTINUS quod non licet semper uolitando cogitare sed amando inherere ut semper cogitatcio uel meditacio precedit affectionem sancti et puri amoris.[208]

Alius est modus apprehendendi Deum et perueniendi in Ipsum per affectum et hic est dignior priori modo, sicut dignior est caritas sciencia. Sine caritate nullum ualet donum, nulla sapiencia, nulla elemosina. Si enim quia haberet linguam homini et angelorum et habuerit omnem scienciam et distribueret omnes facultates in elemosinas pauperum et tradiderit corpus suum ita ut ardeat, et caritatem non habuerit, nichil sibi omnia ista et alia proderunt, dicit in sentencia Apostolus Prima [ad] Corinthios XIII.[209]

Et duplex modus apprehendendi et amplexandi Deum amorosis affectibus. Primus est scolasticus et communis et fit ascendendo sursum ex meditacionibus et contemplacionibus beneficiorum Dei et creaturarum quibus incalescit animus. Et sursum in igne amoris ascendit ad illum qui omnia creauit et omnia sua bonitate gubernat, conseruat et omnibus benefacit in
P 168va quo plene sunt omnes perfectiones omni rerum, | in quo eciam omnia bona sunt ad quem animus in amore afficitur et ipsum appetit amplecti et propter hoc purgat se ab omnibus que estimat displicere Deo. Et sursum in oracione, meditacione ac contemplacione amorosa se leuat et petit se admitti ad osculum et amplexum ut unus spiritus efficiatur cum Deo per transformacionem et conformitatem, sicut ferrum in igne positum transformari uidetur in ipsum per conformitatem quia non essencialiter a sua transit natura quamuis in se calorem ignis suspiciat, sic anima quo ad Deum. Et in Scripturis sanctis, quas legit, facit sibi ascensionem et unicionem cum Deo similiter in oracionibus, et quia diligit Deum et appetit sibi uniri. Ideo quasi ad centrum tendit in ipsum et omnia que agit ad hoc ordinat ut apex affectus, que

207 Cf. Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae* Ia q. 78 a. 4 et q. 79 a. 3; cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 12, cit., pp. 31–32 ll. 9–33.

208 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" Solutio, cit., p. 212 n. 30 ll. 1–9; cf. Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Trinitate* VIII.3.4, cit., p. 272, ll. 21–24.

209 1Cor 13:1–3.

est sinderisis, ipsum attingat amplexibus sanctis et castis. Hic est communis modus contemplandi et amorosa dilictione ascendendi in Deum.

Alius autem est modus quando preuenitur homo diuina gracia et immediate sine preuia meditacione, contemplacione aut mentali ascensione in amplexus Dei suscipitur, Deo unitur, unus spiritus efficitur cum ipso inflammatur, dilatatur, illuminatur et de omnibus perfecte docetur. Hic modus docetur in theologia que dicitur irracionalis, amens et stulta, ut superius expositum est, quoniam non ascendit in Deum per discursum racionis neque per mentis contemplacionem neque communi modo et scolastico sed immediate in uiris perfectis attingitur Deus superiori parte anime affectiuus que ut flamma accenditur a diuino igne, scilicet Spiritu Sancto, et sic inflammata lucet et omnes uires inferiores purgat, illuminat, docet et gubernat.

Et secundum has distinctiones patet faciliter responsio ad argumenta in principio huius capituli mota. Nam prima argumenta procedunt de communi uia et scolastico modo et in proficientibus quorum, quilibet habet, dicere "in meditacoine mea exardescet ignis",[210] quia se confricant et excitant in ascensum spiritualem eo quod ignis caritatis in eis nondum est perfectus. Quando autem perficitur non indigent tali ascensione per medi-
P 168vb taciones sed a superiori inflammantur et illuminatur et audiunt | uocem prophete dicentis, "Gustate et uidete quoniam suauis est Dominus".[211] Hec uerba dicta sunt de uia perfecta et quo ad theologiam misticam in uiris perfectis in caritate qui in suo superiori sine preuia meditacione illuminantur et docentur quia ibi gustant quam suauis est Dominus de quo prius multa audierunt sed tunc primo cognoscunt quando inflammantur et gustant, sicut qui multa legit de sapore uini. Tunc primo perfecte intelligit et cercius cognoscit quando actualiter sapit. Primo tamen ascenditur meditacione in uiris imperfectis qui quando perueniunt ad capitos amplexus et oscula relinquunt meditaciones et unus spiritus cum Deo effecti sibi inherent fortiter. Et est simile quando edificantur testudiens lapidee super ligna supposita que postea deponuntur quando perfecta est testitudo. Sic in proposito simili modo est intelligendum quod meditacione deposita postquam homo perfectus factus in contemplacione perseuerabit ipsa perfectio et unicio ad Deum sine meditacione.

Sic eciam intelligendum est illud AUGUSTINI, uisa amare possumus sed inuisa aut incognita nequaquam, scilicet modo communi et scolastico. Et

35 inuisa] et *sup. l. add. sed del.* P. ‖ aut incognita] aut in- *in marg. inser.* P.

210 Ps 38:4.

211 Ps 33:9.

eciam dicitur quod in proposito est aliqualis cognicio, scilicet fidei, non autem requiritur naturalis cognicio sicut philosophi loquuntur.

Sic quando arguitur quod de Thronis ascenditur in Cherubin et ultimus in Seraphin. Dicendum quod hoc iterum est uerum, de modo communi et scolastico, quia sic sit ascensus in meditacione et puritate cordis, sed modo mistico, sicut docetur in mistica theologia, descensus fit a superiori ad inferiora tanquam a Seraphin in Cherubin et in inferiores choros angelorum. Beati tamen in celo uident et uidendo amant et non econuerso. Hoc est illa racione quia in beatis non est aliqua mixtio impuritatis sicut in nobis quos semper oportet purgari a fantasmatibus in intellectione et eciam in amorosa affeccione, eo quod multa impura fantasmata occurrunt, unde transitur de omnibus actibus apprehensiuis ad ipsam appetitiuam que in suo superiori parte exclusis omnibus apprehendit Deum et ipsum amplexatur ut unus spiritus cum eo | efficiatur et in ipsum transformetur non essencialiter sed per P 169ra similitudinem. Et in cogitacione dicit, "quando amplectar et quando uniar dilecto meo et, O Domine, quando te diligam et constringam et unus spiritus efficiar tecum". Et tendit apex affectus in Deum, sicut lapis in centrum, quia amor est pondus et non quiescit nisi in centro suo quod est Deus benedictus, ad quem sine meditacione preuia sicut lapis ad suum tendit centrum.[212] Et sic secundum Apostolum spiritus noster spiritui Dei unitus sentit que Dei sunt.[213] Hec est sapiencia quam Apostolus inter perfectos loquebatur.[214] Et Christus promisit dicens, "Sedete in ciuitate donec induamini uirtute ex alto",[215] sicut sacerdos se a capite primo induit et sic descendit. Sic hic apex affectus primo tangitur, deinde descendit ignis in uires inferiores.

Capitulum octauum quod homo per hanc misticam theologiam docetur de omnibus et acquirit omnes uirtutes et merita

Hec stulta doctrina, quam nemo philosophorum huius mundi cognouit, que sepe datur plus stultis et ideotis quam litteratus secundum maiorem puritatem anime et maiorem feruorem caritatis ad Deum et ad unionem cum Ipso, docet hominem de omnibus in celo et in terra ac omni creatura existenti-

212 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* "Quaestio difficilis" Solutio, cit., p. 216 n. 34 ll. 12–16.

213 Cf. 1Cor 2:11.

214 1Cor 2:6.

215 Lc 24:49.

bus ac replet omnibus uirtutibus et donis. Hec enim sapiencia occulta, que absconditur ab oculis omnium uiuentium in carne, unit hominem cum Deo ut unus spiritus efficiatur cum Ipso, et hoc modo penetrare meretur que Dei sunt. Ideo per affectum istum ignitum illuminatur intellectus ut cognoscat que Dei sunt, unde et tunc uidere meretur Dei simplicitatem, bonitatem et ineffabilem eius sublimitatem. Uidet ibi qualiter manat Filius eternaliter a Patre per modum similitudinis et filiationis et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque per modum amoris et quod non sunt plures emanaciones in Deo sed alia uniuersa ut bonitas, misericordia, sublimitas, eternitas, etc. dicuntur per essenciam. Similiter raptus homo in hanc lucem uidet quomodo omnis creatura manat et procedit contingenter de primo principio et ab eo continentur vniuersa omni momento, sicut radius a sole in aere. Ideo si ad momentum suam subtraheret manum, omnia in nichil redigerentur. Ibi uidet quid tenendum
P 169^{rb} sit de omnibus creaturis | et qualiter in comparacione summi et incommutabils boni sunt quasi nichil et qualiter participant Dei bonitatem: alie in essendo, alie in uiuendo, alie in intelligendo, alie in uariis aliis proprietatibus et perfectionibus. Nam latent innumerabiles uirtutes in creaturis, eciam dona creature, ita ut nullus philosophorum huius seculi potuisset reperire minimi entis aut folii arboris totam naturam.

Qui autem cum Deo unus efficitur spiritus per hanc theologiam intelligit omnia clarius que latent in ordine, pondere et mensura, bonitate, plenitudine et pulchritudine omnis creature. Hec practica et unio dat omnes uirtutes et perficit eas. Nam per hanc certitudinem acquirit fidei eo quod uidet illum in quem credit et experiencia sapit ueritatem fidei de Dei unitate et trinitate, de creatione et reformacione lapsi hominis, de omnibus credendis. Hic roboratur spes quoniam quodammodo tenere incipit quod sperauit. Hic caritas ignitur quia ipsum fontem caritatis amplexcitur et intrat. Ideo perficitur in homine tali perfecta caritas ut illum cum quo unus efficitur spiritus perfecte diligat et proximum sicut seipsum, quia se tunc non carnaliter sed spiritualiter et pure diligit et animus unitus igni consumenti omnis, id est, Deo, et ardet et in se comburit omnes humores uiciorum.

Et eleuatur sursum illuminatur et augetur in omnibus uirtutibus. Ibi prudencia docetur quia illuminatur animus ad uidendum omnia que Deo sunt placita et que agenda sunt in omni conuersacione et uita. Ibi iusticia acquiritur que reddit singulis debita, scilicet Deo honorem et cor purum ut semper in se habeat Deum. Ad seipsam habet iusticiam que inferiora producit in superiorum obedienciam ut caro per omnia obediat spiritui. Ad Christum

6 manat] *p.c. in marg.* P. 32 et] *sub l. inser.* P.

iusticiam habet et Spiritum Sanctum quoniam diligit sicut Patrem et omnia membra Christi diligit et ad ea afficitur sicut ad se. Ideo compatitur afflictis et congaudet prosperitatibus omnia. Hic acquiritur fortitudo quia tali summo eligit ex sapore inherere ita ut nec timore gladium neque ignem neque aliquam creaturam et eciam quia fortiter Deus custodit hominem sibi unitum in hac theologia ut sit cum eo unus spiritus. Hic docetur temperancia quia gustata suauitate Dei decrescit et perit omnis inordinata concupiscencia carnis in homine et omnis intemperancia | in quam homo cadit quando P 169va non habet meliores delectaciones. Non enim potest esse sine delectaciones. In hac contemplacione efficitur homo familiaris Deo. Ideo timor inordinatus excluditur, perfectio caritatis infunditur, et plenitudo omni scienciarum ac uirtutum copiose homini in hac sapiencia mistica confertur. Ideo relictis aliis studiis ad huius sapiencie studium per cordis puritatem perfectam, per desiderium sanctum. per recordacionem beneficiorum Dei et graciarum actionum sursum tendat et semper uniri Deo desideret et tandem cum Deo constringatur ut unus spiritus efficiatur et dicat, "introduxit me rex in cellaria sua".[216]

Hic eciam uniuersa acquiruntur merita quia quociens ex hac practica mens mouetur in Dei dilectionem, tociens meretur regnum Dei eo quod quilibet actus ex caritate precedens meretur beatitudinem, et sufficit unus, sicut uerior opinio dicit fuisse in angelis sanctis quia unico actu eleuari per graciam in Deum confirmati sunt in gloria. Alii tamen actus non superfluunt caritatis in homine quia ad premia accidentalia, que sunt in bono creato, ualent et eciam amplius stabiliunt hominem et radicant, in bono letificant, augent merita et habitus acquirunt, etc., unde precipue religiosi qui mundum reliquerunt debent studere huic sapiencie relictis aliis studiis ut sic uere fiant sapientes.

Ad hoc omnia sua debent ordinare studia et semper in oracionibus dicere: "O Sapiencia increata, que ex ore Altissimi prodisti,[217] quam nullus mortalium docere potest, sed tu solus qui eam doces amicis tuis humilibus de te confidentibus et tibi adherentibus totis uiribus in cordis puritate, ueni ad docendum nos uiam prudencie ut semel edocti per te omnia clarissime ad salutem necessaria cognoscamus". Amen.

216 Ct 1:3.

217 Eccl 24:5; Sap 8:1.

Capitulum nonum de naturali inclinacione hominis ad hanc theologiam misticam et persuacionibus ad eam

Ad hanc sapienciam tendere debet homo summo nec excusatur si eam negligit eo quod naturale desiderium hominis ad ipsam inclinet et omnes anime uires naturali appetitu ad eam tendant. Nam anima tres habet uires, scilicet irascibilem que, ut superius dixi, ponitur non solum in sensualitate sed
P 169^{vb} eciam in parte racionali et concupiscibilis similiter, unde | irascibilis racionalis tendit in summe arduum nec quietatur nisi in ipso summo. In omnibus reperit defectum ardui, ideo non potest quietari nisi in ipso summo arduo in quo nullus est defectus. Ideo, sicut naturaliter inclinatur, ita sequi debet desiderium naturale. Et hoc pefecte non potest intelligere nisi actualiter inhereat summo arduo et unus spiritus efficiatur cum Ipso et libertatem ueram consequatur, et tunc intelliget experiencia uerba Christi dicentis, "In hoc mundo pressuram habebitis se in me pacem".[218]

Uis rationalis tendit in summe uerum. Omnis autem creata ueritas est uera participacione summe ueritatis inquantum concordat cum ea et participans ea, unde non quietatur in aliis ueritatibus. Nullus ueniat ad summam et increatam ueritatem in qua relucent omnes ueritates, ubi docetur omnem scienciam. Ideo studiose ad eam tendat. Hic cessat omnis uarietas opinionum et omnis falsitas, quia unitur animus cum luce eterna et summa ueritate in qua omnia uidet. Sic eciam uis concupiscibilis naturaliter tendit in bonum nec quietatur nullus in summo bono. Ideo sequi debet naturale suum desiderium et bonum summum omnibus uiribus et conatibus apprehendere atque se ad hoc preperare per magnam humilitatem et oracionem. Humilitas namque fodit foueam et concauitatem facit in mente ut copiose diuina et summa bonitas suscipiatur. Et oracio impetrat quod merita hominis non possunt, unde uires partis racionalis nunquam perficiuntur, nisi in hac theologia mistica in qua pefecte quietantur et ad eam tendunt. Ideo quilibet, precipue religiosus, debet mutari quod natura dictat et naturale desiderium inclinat ut faciendo quod in se mereatur diuinitus adiuuari super ea que nature sunt.

Ad hec eciam hortantur actus humani quia et agricola magnos subit labores ut frumenta acquirat que appetit, multo amplius homo laborare agrum cordis sui infatigabiliter debet ut perueniat ad fructum salutis in hac sapiencia stulta. Et si generatur in principio, non cesset, sed laboret infatigabiliter
P 170ra recogitans illud sapiencie, in paucis | uexati, in multis bene disponentur.

218 Io 16:33.

Sic et mercatores ut acquirat diuicias temporales ambulant uias difficiles et periculosas, multo amplius homo laborare debet spirituali studio ut thesaurum huius sapiencie inueniat in quo omnia bona possidebit ut dicere possit, "Uenerunt michi pariter omnia bona cum ea",[219] et tunc omnia temporalia ut stercora reputabit. Sic milites diuerssimos labores et pericula corporis ac ulnera tollerant ut honorem transitorium acquirant, multo amplius homo racionalis ad altissimum honorem et perpetuum per hanc theologiam tendere debet. Et uidemus eciam uegetabilia quod figunt radices in terra et pullulant ac fructus producunt multos, sic sine dubio fructus salutis producit homo quando radicatur et unitur summo bono quia producit fructus salutares uirtutum graciarum et donorum flores et omnia bona. Sic bruta animalia laboriose currunt ad alimenta uisa que appetunt, et racionalis homo amplius currere debet spirituali studio ad alimenta perpetua in quibus non tantum reficitur sed eciam saciatur quia in bonis sanctorum replebitur desiderium quando uniuntur Deo. Sic uidemus eciam naturalia tendere ad loca sua sibi conueniencia nec proprie quiescere extra ipsa, unde graue non quiescit nisi deorsum, et si non impeditur, tendit naturaliter ad terre centrum, et leuia tendunt sursum tanquam ad loca naturalia et sibi conueniencia per omnia, unde homo spiritualis in omnibus actibus humanis in omnibus creaturis et motu earum accipere debet doctrinam et compulsus earum loquela quia loquuntur ad hominem docendo ipsum suis actibus ut tendat eciam ad suum naturale desiderium uerum et sufficiens, id est, ad ipsum summum incommutabile et perfectissimum bonum in quo omnia bona plene et perfectissime habentur, scilicet omnis sublimitas, omnis ueritas, omnis bonitas, omnis dulcedo, omnis uirtus, omnis sciencia, omnis copia et sufficiencia et quitquid potest desiderari in ipso plenius possidetur et habetur perfectius quam cogitari postest aut doceri.

P 170^{rb} Unde hiis et consimilibus confricari debet | animus et sursum tendere in principium primum et summum bonum a quo omnia descendunt et tendunt naturali appetitu, ut quiescant in suis bonis tanquam in participacione summi boni. Ex hoc enim agricola querit frumentum et reficiatur et habundet et est participacio summi boni. Refeccio enim plena et habundancia uera est ibi sed participatiue in creaturis nec potest esse desiderium creature nec ad ea que participant summum bonum. Ideo alie creature desiderant delectabilia secundum naturam ut grauia deorsum, leuia sursum; alie secundum sensum delectabilia ut bruta et alie aliter et semper sub racione boni et appetibilis et delectabilis que omnia sunt participaciones

219 Sap 7:11

summi boni in quo est summa bonitas et copia omnium bonorum excellencia et honor perfectus. Ideo iugiter tendere ad ista debet sancto studio omnis homo. Et licet sic persuadeatur, hec theologia tamen non sic docetur, quia solus Magister, qui habet cathedram in celo, docet eam humilibus et dicit, "Ego sum Deus docens te utilia",[220] scilicet necessaria ad salutem et ueram bona, et nullus preter me hoc facio propter meipsum, et ut confundam superbos et exaltem humiles[221] et amicis meis secreta reuelem et doceam quomodo michi placere debeant et possint et michi adherere ut nulla uirtute a me separentur. Hec est uia salutis uere. Ideo in omnibus appetenda et cor ad hanc scienciam puritate, humilitate et flammigeris desideriis preparandum ut tandem accipiat que desiderat et dicat, "Quia melior est dies in atriis tuis super milia",[222] quia uniuersi dies et delectaciones huius uite non possunt compari ad minimam illuminacionem et delectacionem que habet in summo bono, et queritur thesaurus iste in agro cordis deuoti, quia in planicie amoris puri cordis quasi semper dicit in suis desideriis, "quando ueniam et amplexer te, quando te apprehendam et constringam et deosculer et nemo me amplius despiciat, da michi Domine quod appeto ut forcius tibi seruiam, plenius tibi inheream, clarius tuam uoluntatem intelP 170va ligam et perpetuo tibi ser-|-uiam gustatis bonis tuis qui es benedictus in secula".

Capitulum decimum de industriis ad hanc altissimam theologiam disponentibus

Quia nemo repente fit summus[223] et Deus homini uires dedit quibus utatur in spirituali profecta et meritis cumulandis, ideo videndum est in proprosito de industriis deseruientibus in hac sapiencia.

Prima quod quilibet suam uocacionem consideret, sicut uocatus est. Alii enim uocantur timore, scilicet ne dampnentur; alii amore tanquam filii; alii trahuntur dulcedine.[224] Ideo qui uocatur timore attendere seipsum debet et purificare cor suum ab illicito timore et exercitari in bonis exerciciis, ut

220 Is 48:17.

221 Cf. Lc 1:51–52.

222 Ps 83:11.

223 Cf. Hugo de Balma, *Theologia mystica* (Sources Chrétiennes 409), "De via unitiva", p. 94 n. 59 l. 13.

224 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus secundus practicus* c. 1, cit., pp. 131–134 ll. 41–74.

ascendat in Dei familiaritatem per amorem, ut sic aptus possit fieri ad hanc sapienciam que datur filiis et non seruis.[225]

Secunda industria ut quilibet suam complexionem et inclinacionem attendat quia "anime sequuntur corpora," dicit PHILOSOPHUS,[226] et quidam naturaliter inclinantur ad solitudinem ex naturali desiderio spiritualium exerciciorum, et isti proficere possunt in hac theologia nec per obediencie opera impediantur. Alii diligunt solitudinem quia inhumani in conuersacione non ualentes concordare cum hominibus. Ideo sunt bestiales sicut quedam bruta crudelia solitudinem diligunt. Ideo bene dixit PHILOSOPHUS quod solitarius aut est Deus, scilicet primo modo (diligens solitudinem), aut dyabolus, scilicet secundo modo.[227] Idem ponit IERONIMUS super Zachariam[228] prophetam. Alii inclinati sunt naturaliter ad occupaciones; isti ceteris paribus minus apti sunt sed melius in operibus et officiis pro aliorum utilitate deputandi sunt, quamuis desperandum non sit eis de hac sapiencia occulta quia potens est eam dare hiis qui propter aliorum utilitatem ex caritate fuerint occupti. Caritas enim meretur ut crescat et tandem in amplexus sponsi ruat.[229]

Tercia industria quod gradatim ascendere discat, scilicet ab osculo pedum in uia purgatiua se exercendo, deinde ad osculum manus per graciarum actionem de beneficiis Dei se occupando, ut tandem possit peruernire ad osculum oris et amplexus sponsi.[230] Nemo enim repente fit summus, sed per gradus est ascendendum fideliter et fortiter.

P 170^{vb} Quarta industria | ut curiositatem excludat et non sibi in hac contemplacione uane placeat neque alios que hanc graciam non habent despiciat. Sepe enim subtrahitur gracia deuocionis racione uanitatis et curiositatis, ut sic homo humilietur ut amplius per afflictionem mentis purgetur ut eciam discat aliis compati in ariditate cordis et ut sciat graciam esse Dei, quando habet spirituales consolaciones et non propriis uiribus, et futuram timeat famem apud inferos, quia ibi est maxima ariditas cordis que nunc prefiguraretur in mentis ariditate.[231]

225 Cf. Io 15:15.

226 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus secundus practicus* c. 2, cit., p. 136 ll. 6–8; PSEUDO-ARISTOTELES, *De physiognomia* I.

227 Cf. Aristoteles, *Politica* I c. 2 (1253a27–29); Hamesse, *Les* Auctoritates Aristoteles, cit., p. 252 n. 8.

228 *non invenimus*.

229 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 9, cit., pp. 287–288 ll. 12–17.

230 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 2, cit., p. 257 ll. 10–18.

231 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus secundus practicus* c. 6, cit., pp. 157–

Quinta industria quod uniuerse passiones restringantur inordinate, et origo omnium attendatur et in ortu suo occidantur. Maxime autem affectus amoris est attendendus quia est fons omnium passionum, unde si homo habuerit inordinatum amorem, tunc pullulant continue peruerse cogitaciones et affecciones. Ideo primo et ante omnia depurandus est amor ut sic purus ad Deum et sic possit ascendere sursum, et fit tripliciter secundum Rychardum de Sancto Victore, scilicet ex admoracione sicut regiam Saba admirata fuit sapienciam Salomonis;[232] secundo ex magnitudine deuocionis actiue et contemplatiue uite, sicut scriptum est in Canticis, "que est ista que ascendit per desertum, scilicet huius mundi ad celestia, ex aromatibus mirre, id est, actiue uite, et thuris",[233] id est feuore contemplatiue; tercio ex magnitudine exultacionis, unde in Canticis "que est ista que ascendit de deserto deliciis affluens in nixa super dilectum suum".[234]

Sexta industria fugere, quantum possibile est, occupaciones quia "sapiencia scribitur in tempore uacuitatis et qui minoratur actu percipiet eam".[235] Non enim potest sapiencie studiose intendere quia cura exteriora et extranea multum occupatur. Pluribus enim intentus uix est ad singula sensus. Non tamen propter huius sapiencie studium occupacio per obedienciam imposita est abicienda ne scilicet quis uoluerit seruire Christo cum Martha nec suscipiatur ad audiendum uerbum Domini cum sorore eius Maria, nec est totaliter deserenda occupatis in officiis quantum hominis quibus
P 171ra uacant ad spiritualia. Hec | exercicia studiose se conuertere dicunt et scribere sapienciam in corde suo qui sepe tanto amplius desiderant eterna, quanto plus affliguntur certa carnalia et temporalia bona.[236]

Septima industria est usus temporatus in alimentis ut non fiat excessus in superfluis nec eciam minoracio in subtractione in defectionem nature, sed ut corpus alatur congrue et moderate ut seruire ualeat anime in spiritualibus exerciciis et dometur ne lasciuiat contra racionem.[237]

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27 et] oportet *add. sed. del.* P.

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161 ll. 50–98; cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 9, cit., p. 294 ll. 9–20.

232 3 Rg 10:4–5; cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus primus speculativus* c. 36, cit., p. 97 ll. 41–44; cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De contemplatione* V c. 12, cit., p. [137] ll. 4–11.

233 Ct 3:6.

234 Ct 8:5.

235 Eccl 38:25.

236 Cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 9, cit., pp. 292–293 ll. 35–19.

237 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus secundus practicus* c. 5, cit., pp. 147–154; cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 9, cit., pp. 303–305 ll. 1–28.

Octaua industria ut queratur locus aptus, scilicet occultus et quietus, ut non impediatur ab exterioribus tamen dulcis psalmodia sepe animi sursum in spiritualibus leuat et uires anime et corporis recreat ut fiat apta ad celestia bona. Sic legimus quod psalte ludente coram Helizeo Spiritus Sanctus in ipsum cecedit et prophetauit.[238] Fugiendi igitur sunt tumultus qui ipse dicunt et melodia adiuuans acceptanda. Quidam tamen sunt qui hiis non iuuantur; ideo melius est talibus ut in solitudine se ponant et omnes tumultus ac strepitus fugiant.

Nona industria est de tempore quoniam tempus nocturnum est magis quietum; ideo magis aptum tamen prius sompnus est capiendus et celebranda digestio ne humores ascendentes impediant suauitatem contemplacionis. Similiter tenebrosus locus aptus est et tempus tenebrosum, ne uisus uagetur ad accipiendas distractiones et mentis euagaciones.[239]

Decima industria est corporis disposicio, scilicet ut quandoque prosternatur ut Maria Magdelena ante pedes Ihesu,[240] quandoque flexis genubus ut Salamon quando orauit,[241] quandoque procidat in faciem sicut legitur Christus fecisse in oracione,[242] quandoque manus extendat sicut Moyses quando Aaron et huc tenuerunt manus eius extensas, et quandoque expandat sicut Christus in cruce, quandoque sursum respiciat sicut discipuli tempore Ascensionis Christi quia eleuatis manibus Christo ascendente respexerunt in celum.[243] Et quilibet consideret habitudinem sui corporis et in
P 171^{rb} qua disposicione maiorem graciam et quietem senserit in ea, se exercicere | amplius poterit. Tamen ualet multum sursum respectio ut eciam motum corporis ostendat se appetere gaudia celestia et non ea que in terris sunt diligere.

Undecima industria ut, quia longe ab eternis bonis elongatur, ideo frequenter ad ea in spiritualibus exerciciis aspiret, et ascensiones in corde suo per meditaciones de creaturis in Creatorem faciat et uniri sepius Deo petat.

Duodecima industria ut uariis exerciciis se occupet ne positus in uno tedio afficiatur ut deficiat, unde uidemus si quis utitur uno ferrulo, afficitur tedio et cessat sepe antequam satueretur. Si autem pluribus utitur ferru-

27 ascensiones] ascendendo *scr. et in marg. corr.* P.

238 Cf. 4 Rg 3:14–15.

239 Cf. Ioannes Gerson, *De mystica theologia: Tractatus secundus practicus* c. 9, cit., pp. 182–191; cf. Iacobus de Paradiso, *De theologia mystica* c. 9, cit., pp. 301–302 ll. 7–35.

240 Cf. Lc 10:39.

241 Cf. 3 Rg 8:54.

242 Cf. Mt 26:39.

243 Cf. Acta 1:9–11.

lis, tunc amplius comedit et appetitum suum amplius extendit. Sic similiter in spiritualibus est, unde precipue attendet passionem Christi et totam eius uitam et de singulis beneficiis gracias agere, et nunc mutari proposito firmo puritatem natiuitatis Christi, nunc acerbitatem passionis, nunc gloriam resurrectionis et cogitare qualiter per corpus humanum resplendeat gloria diuinitatis, ut sic possit peruenire ad uisionem diuinitatis, que simulat per corpus Christi si diligencius et purius meditetur.

Terciadecima industria, ut nunquam dicat, sufficit michi sed semper tendat ad ulteriora et perfectiora ne arguatur de talento abscondito. Et si non datur quod queritur cito, tamen ipse actiones spirituales, quibus homo tendit ad superna, sunt in se meritorie, et hominem aptant ad eterna, domant passiones, et succendunt desiderium eternorum dummodo fuerint pure et fortiter exercitate, quia si superficialiter sine feruore fiunt, tunc sepius amplius nocent quam proficiunt.

Quartadecima ut de imperfectione ad perfectionem cottidie transseat, et si non actu, tamen proposito et intencione. Sic uidemus quod sol primo obscure uidetur in suo ortu et clarior continnue usque ad meridiem perueniens apparet. Simili modo anima in contemplacione incipit ab obscuris
P 171va quia a temporalibus in quibus est remota similitudo et lux obscura, | deinde ascendit ad spiritualia ubi plus uidetur ymago et similitudo Dei ut tandem ad ipsum solem iusticie in suo fonte mereatur.

Quintadecima ut omnia exercicia faciat ordinante et non interrupte, quia spiritualis homo debet ordinare tempus labori corporis pro exercicio uirium corporis et consumpcione humorum superfluorum, similiter et exercicia spiritualia in meditacionibus Psalmorum, Canticorum spiritualium et beneficiorum altissimi, quoniam tunc habitum et consuetudinem in spiritualibus acquirit quibus faciliter ad superiora leuari potest et eciam hoc modo quietat passiones cordis. Si autem inconsiderate facit sua exercicia et ex carnali delectacione aut tedio de uno ad aliud transeundo, acquirit maiorem cordis inconstanciam et impuritatem. Sic uidemus in religiosis qui relicto seculo monasteria ingrediuntur, sed ibi non proficiendo nec ordinate sua exercicia assumendo plus deficiunt quam in seculo et fiunt curiosi, suspiciosi, uani et omnibus malis replentur affectibus eo quod anima non potest esse sine delectacionibus sed necesse est ut in aliquo delectetur. Si igitur non applicat se fortiter ad spiritualia, inimicus immittit sibi carnalia et inutilia quibus occupetur ut deficiat semper in peius, unde et quanto minus occupantur tumultibus exterioribus quibus excludantur motus cordis tanto amplius

5 et] *sub. l. inser*. P.

crescunt habitus uiciosi in talibus. Ita uidemus quod religiosi deficientes in senio sunt peiores quam in nouiciatu fuerunt et sequuntur sensum suum et in spiritualibus ydeote sunt, cito murmurant et detrahunt, quia que sua sunt querunt.

Sextadecima industria quod homo humile ualde ponat in corde suo fundamentum, quia hanc sapienciam abscondit Deus superbis, quibus resistit, et dat paruulis, id est humilibus, quos et gracia sua replet que ad yma a montibus fluit, unde expedit ut quilibet discipulis huius sapiencie studeat in practica tenere gradus humilitatis quos Benedictus in *Regula* ponit[244] et ante eum antiqui patres, sicut legitur in *Institutis patrum*,[245] ut per hanc
P 171^{vb} humilitatem seipsum frangat tota-|-liter et a propria estimacione recedat ac propria uoluntate, et omnem uilitatem et abiectionem intus et foris amplexetur, et ad omnia inutilem se ex corde reputet. Et sicut dicit Anselmus in libro *De similitudinibus* discat quilibet defectus suos cognoscere, deflere, confiteri, persuadere et libenter audire ab aliis et pacienter tolerare quando despicitur;[246] ymmo eciam hoc appetere, qiua tunc ad apostolicam meretur peruenire caritatem et ad hanc theologiam sanctam.

Decimaseptima industria quod in omnibus exerciciis attendat cordis puritatem tanquam finem et omnia ad ea ordinet in ieiuniis, uigiliis, laboribus et ceteris, ut cor purificetur ab omnibus illicitis affectibus. Et quantum exercicia ad hanc puritatem deseruiunt, assumenda sunt, sed quantum contrariantur, fugienda et declinanda.

Decimaoctaua industria quod puritatem tandem ordinet ad caritatem que tanto maior erit, quanto anima purior. Et ideo faciat omnia ex caritate et ad caritatem omnia ordinet, sicut Apostolus hortatur dicens, et "omnia uestra ex caritate faciat",[247] et iterum, "finis precepti dilectio de corde puro consciencia bona et fide non ficta".[248] Et quidquid huic dilectioni contrariatur fugiendum est.

Decimanona industria quod anima studeat se uirtutibus pro posse ornare quia Domino uirtutum non potest placere nisi uirtutibus fuerit ornata. Et ideo uirtutes studiose acquirat, attendat earum dulcedinem originem et finem, et quia omnia bona conferunt anime et sanant omnes languores eius,

244 Benedictus, *Regula* VII nn. 5–11, (ed. R. Hanslik), CSEL 75, Wien 1977, pp. 43–45.

245 Cf. Ioannes Cassianus, *De institutis coenobiorum* XI c. 10, (ed. M. Petschenig), CSEL 17, Wien 2004, p. 200 ll. 1–4.

246 Cf. Eadmer, *Liber de S. Anselmi similitudinibus* c. 106, (PL 159), col. 668A.

247 1Cor 16:14.

248 1Tim 1:5.

tolluntque ignoranciam et conferunt ueram scienciam quia et lucem in se habent, dicit Leo Papa.[249]

Uicesima industria ut non solum inordinatos affectus sed eciam uniuersa fantasmata de corde abiciat et inutiles cogitaciones, tanquam muscas immundas, et studeat sursum se erigere ad Deum et quitquit Deus non est excludat ut sic exclusis omnibus creaturis et racionacionibus ignotis ad Creatorem omnium et summum bonum tendat, et tandem in amorosos amplexus ruat et dicat, "Dilectus meus michi et ego illi qui pascitur inter
P 172ra lilia",[250] et est benedictus in secula seculorum. Amen. |

Capitulum undecimum quomodo scripture ad hanc contemplacionem deseruiunt

Deus "qui habitat lucem inaccessibilem quem nullus hominum uidit",[251] scilicet comprehensiue, et eciam in hac uita in claritate glorie nec potest uidere et uiuere,[252] ut dixit Deus ad Moysen, dedit lucem suam in Scripturis et in suis inspiracionibus et inmissionibus ut ad ipsum tandem fontem perueniatur, unde solis radius apparet quandoque in pariete. quandoque in aere et quandoque in ipso sole. Sic radius diuinus lucet nobis in Scriptura quasi in pariete quia sub cortice littere latet interior splendor anagogie; secundo in spiritualibus immisionibus quibus animam quasi aerem illustrat et illuminat, hec lux percipitur in spiritualibus exerciciis, scilicet contemplacionibus, etc.; tercio in se, quasi in raptu, uidetur quando anima rapitur ab actibus suis, et unus spiritus fit cum eo, et seruit anime omnis Scriptura in uia purgatiua, illuminatiua et unitiua.

Uerbi gracia accipiamus oracionem dominicam et oremus pro anime purgacione sic: O *Pater noster qui es in celis*, quia tu eterne Pater qui es Creator omnium, qui es omnium nostrum Pater gubernacione et prouisione sine creacione, et es in celis ubi tua gloria clare apparet sanctus, rogamus te miseri ut prouideas nobis paterno affectu, purges nos a peccatis ut fiamus clari ut celum et ornati uirtutum stellis et moueamur in actibus bonis et ad ulteriora semper sicut celum semper mouetur. *Sanctificetur nomen tuum*, id est, in nobis sanctum habeatur ut purificetur cor nostrum a terreno affectu. Hoc dicitur sanctum quod est separatum ab immundicia et quod

249 Cf. Leo Magnus, *Epistola XV* c. 13, (PL 54), col. 687A–B.

250 Ct 2:16.

251 1Tim 6:16.

252 Ex 33:20.

sine terra est nomen tuum, id est, res significata per nomen tuum, scilicet tu ipse in nobis sanctificeris quando cor nostrum purgatur ad tui suscepcionem. *Adueniat regnum tuum* ut scilicet excludatur regnum carnis peccati et omnis immundicie et tu solus regnes in nobis tua gracia, et purifices nos; *fiat uoluntas tua sicut in celis et in terra* ut puri simus sine macula sicut celestes ciues. Ideo rogamus quod de nobis terrenis et inmundis facias celestes
P 172^{rb} puros et mundos. *Panem nostram cottidia-|-num da nobis hodie*, scilicet puritatis quo indigemus cottidie tanquam pane quo reficimur. Da nobis panem lacrimarum cottidie eo quod cottidie peccamus ut eciam cottidie medicinalem panem accipamus. *Et dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris*, ut purificati ab omni peccato te contemplari ualeamus. *Et ne nos inducas in temptacionem*, id est, ne permittas cadere in temptacionem peccati, ne iterum maculemur quia nichil prodest loco nisi precaueatur recidiuacio. *Sed libera nos a malo*, scilicet macule spiritualis qua anima maculatur, rogmaus te ut perfecte nos purges in uia purgatiua ab omni malo ueniali et mortali ab omni malo quod obscuratu animam et tibi reddit displicibilem ab omni malo pene et culpe. Ab omni malo malicie infirmitatis spiritualis et concupiencie male. *Amen*, id est, fiat tua gracia sicut petimus a te Domine benedicte. Sic oramus et alias scripturas et psalmos pro purgacione dicentes: "Domine, quid multiplicati sunt qui tribulant me",[253] scilicet uicia, ideo petimus purgari, etc.

Secundo exponuntur in uia illuminatiua sic et in Psalmo in oracione dominica. O Fili Dei qui es Pater noster qui redemisti et docuisti; Pater enim respectu creature est quelibet persona quia una non agit sine alia in creaturis; tamen Patri attribuitur potens purgacio, Filio illuminacio, Spiritu Sancto unio amoris. Unde nunc dicimus: O *Pater noster qui es in celis*, id est, in puris mentibus illumina occulos anime nostre ut te uide animus in claritate cordis nostri. *Sanctificetur nomen tuum*, id est, tu ipse qui significaris per nomen sanctus et clarus in illuminacione mentis nostre habearis. *Adueniat regnum tuum* et tua claritas in nobis regnet et omnia interiora nostra obediant regno lucis tue. *Fiat uoluntas tua sicut in celo et in terra*, ut uideamus claritatem tuam in terra saltem participatiue, sicut uident eam clare in celo, et fiat obediencia uoluntatis tue per lucem gracie et sapiencie tue in terra cordis nostri sicut fit in celo. *Panem nostrum cottidianum da nobis hodie*, id est, claritatis
P 172va et illuminacionis tue que reficiat sua luce quasi alimento interiora nostra | continue. *Et dimitte nobis debita nostra* etc., que impediunt illuminacionem tuam, dimissis autem peccatis redit claritas tua ut te cognoscamus. *Et ne nos*

253 Ps 3:2

inducas in temptacionem qua perdatur claritas tua in nobis. *Sed libera nos a malo* tenebrositatis et obscuritatis mentis. Sic eciam oramus, "Domine, quid mulitplicati",[254] scilicet hostes spirituales qui obscurunt mentem et tollunt spiritualem lucem, etc.

Tercio exponuntur scripture in uia unitiua. Exemplum de hac eadem oracione dominca, *Pater noster*, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus, *qui es in celis*, id est, in mentibus puris que ut celum sunt ornate et pure. *Sanctifectur nomen tuum*, scilicet in nobis hoc fit quando unimur et unus spiritus tecum efficimur. *Adueniat regnum tuum*, ut tuus amor regnet in nobis, uniat nos tibi. Et sic *fiat uoluntas tua* in nobis terrenis ut tibi uniamur et a te agamur et faciamus que tibi placent ex hac unione, sicut faciunt illi qui tibi uniti sunt in celo. *Panem nostrum cottidianum*, etc., id est, panem caritatis feruentis quo tibi unimur. *Da nobis hodie*, id est, in diebus nostris quibus dicitur hodie ut reficiamur et sustentemur atque in te crescamus iugiter. *Et dimitte nobis debita nostra* per amorem et unionem sanctam ad te ex hac cognoscimus quod dimittis nobis omnia si uniamur tibi in uno spiritu. Et tunc eciam non *inducis nos in temptacionem* quia tibi uniti in caritate et spiritu superare possumus omnes temptaciones. Et tunc eciam *liberas nos a malo* quia unio, qua unus tecum efficimur spiritus, aufert a nobis omnia mala et confert omnia bona. Non enim malum culpe etc., potest nobis dominari quando tu in nobis dominaris tuo amore et gracia. Sic eciam dicimus, "Domine, quid muliplicati sunt",[255] scilicet qui uolunt separare mea caritate tua et separe unitatem spiritus tecum etc.

Et quando in usu hec per exercicium cottidianum dicuntur, facilis erit tocius Scripture exposicio que sunt lumina data nobis a Deo. Et ideo si anima fuerit pura sine macula splendida, potest splendorem sacre Scripture in se suscipere, sicut in simili uidemus de radio solis qui illuminans uniuersum mundum clarius et forcius se infundit se rebus puris et bene dispositis quam
P 172^{vb} ceteris. Sic uidemus quod ad aerem | clarum et mundum suscipitur et ipsum illuminat. Si autem fuerit aer impurus per uarios humores et uapores seu grossas ex[h]alaciones, tunc non illuminatur cito a sole, ymmo radii solis impediuntur ne ad terra transeant per nubem densam in medio solis et terre positam. Sic eciam si peluis de auricalco fuerit purgata, splendor radiorum solis pulchre in ea suscipitur. Si autem maculata non sit, illuminatur et in aliis pluribus rebus hec uideri possunt. Et hoc modo splendor diuine lucis in

28 se] *sup. l. inser.* P. 29 aerem] clarum *add. sed del.* P.

254 Ps 3:2.

255 Ps 3:2.

Scripturis sanctis latens, si inuenerit mentem puram sine macula, faciliter in ea splendet et eam docet, clarificat et illuminat, unde bene dixit Abbas Theodorus, sicut legitur in *Institutis patrum* quod ad solucionem dubiorum et mentis illuminacionem ac intellectum Scripturarum nullus modus efficacior quam mentis purificacio. Ideo, idem sanctus pater in inquisicionibus ueritatis plus in oracionibus et ieiuniis ac uigiliis quam in reuolucione librorum ac uoluminum se occupauit.[256] Sic hodie homines deuoti Deo uniti et unus spiritus effecti cum eo clarius sepe intelligunt et melius diuina eloquia ex spirituali unctione que docet eos de omnibus plus quam uiri septem sedentes in alto ad contemplandum. Sic sancti doctores Dyonisius, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Ieronimus, Augustinus, et ceteri innumerabiles non promoti in theologia scripserunt rectissime uarias exposiciones ueras et sanctas. Nam uncti fuerunt Spiritu Sancto et intus illuminati per Spiritum Sanctum qui sicut promisit Christus induxit eos in omnem ueritatem ut intelligentur eciam alta Dei. Uiderunt enim prima ueritate et luce eterna cui fuerunt uniti omnem ueritatem non superficialiter tantum uidendo sed eciam intus gustando. Et uidemus hodie quod humiles et puri multos sensus ex sacris eliciunt Scripturis nondum aperti aliis quia pro tempore, sicut nouerit expedire Deus reuelat occulta ut sic sapiencia continue crescat et repleatur terra sciencia. Ideo et clausi sunt secundum mores sacre Scripture iuxta Danielem ut pertranseant multi, et multiplex fiat sciencia[257] et ut ipse
P 173ra inuocetur qui habet clauem Dauid ut aperiat | et nemo claudat.

Et possunt hee tres uia, scilicet purgatiua, illuminatiua et unitiua, referri ad tercius spirituales et misticos sensus sacre Scripture super sensum litteralem fundate et in eo abscondite, sicut exposui lacius quasi per omnes libros ueteris testamenti. Et exposicio tropologia pertinet ad uia purgatiuam quoniam docet quomodo anima debeat purgari a uiciis et ornari sanctis uirtutibus. Et secundum hoc tota Scriptura exponi potest, et homo qui recognoscit in se dominari uicia aut passiones utiliter assiunt hanc exposicionem et precipue in oracione Psalmorum et orat pro remissione et expurgacione peccatorum. Et dicit, "Beatus uir qui [non] abiit", scilicet a Deo, "mala uoluntate in consilio impiorum", dando consensum, "et in uia peccatorum non stetit", scilicet mala operando, "et in cathedra pestilencie non sedit", sclicet mala docendo.[258] Ideo et orat ut mala que conmisit consilio consensu opere aut doctrina sibi dimittantur, et ut "in lege Domini sit eius uoluntas et meditetur

256 Cf. Ioannes Cassianus, *De institutis coenobiorum* v c. 33, cit., pp. 106–107 ll. 19–2

257 Cf. Dan 12:4.

258 Ps 1:1.

in ea libere die ac nocte"[259] et non seruitute seruili. Et talis homo purgatus a peccatis omnibus "erit tanquam lignum fructiferum quod est plantatum secus decursus aquarum",[260] etc.

Ad uia autem illuminatiuam pertinet allegoria que illuminat ecclesiam in hiis que credendi sunt fide illuminando oculos cordis. Et sic oramus, "Beatus uir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum"[261] quia populus Dei beatus est quasi uir unus quando non recedit a Deo sed uiriliter malo resistit et illuminatur a Deo ut sciat que sint Deo placita omni tempore. Ideo non recedit a Deo per consilium malum, sicut illi qui ignorant Dei iusticiam qui sunt obscurati in cordibus suis. Et in uia peccatorum non stetit quia non sunt tenebrosi in malicia sed illuminati in Dei iusticia nec habent ignoranciam Dei sed perfectam scienciam. Ideo non sedent in cathedra pestilencie ut doceant mala sed pocius ut doceant bona omni tempore quia illuminati a Deo intelligunt, cogitant die et nocte ut amplius et perfectius illuminentur et erunt sicut lignum ferens fructum bonum in salutem, etc.

Sed ad uiam unitiuam sic exponitur, "Beatus uir qui non abiit a Deo"[262]
P 173rb sed in eius manet unione et ami-|-cicia unusque spiritus cum ipso. Ideo non transit in uia impiorum nec stat in uia peccatorum mala operando ut recedat a Dei unione. Et in cathedra pestilencie non sedet mala operando quia unicio ad Deum prohibet omnia mala et perducit ad omnia bona et ut voluntarie in lege Dei meditetur die ac nocte et fiat ut lignum fructiferum iuxta fluenta aquarum. Hec et alia innumerabilia bona ueniunt ex unione anime sancte ad Deum et hiis unicionibus non querit terrena sed celestia quoniam in omnibus, que ad uiam unitiuam pertinent, ad celestia tendit ut in celestibus habitet et ut celestia meditetur, desideret et ad ea tandem post huius uite finem perueniat prestante Christo Domino nostro qui est Deus benedictus in secula. Amen.

Et potest predictis addi alia exposicio oracionis dominice communis ad quamlibet predictarum uiarum. O *Pater noster* Deus trinitas qui es Pater, omnium creatore, gubernatore, prouisiore, redemptore et saluatore quia opera Trinitatis sunt indiuisa quo ad exteriora qui es omnium nostrum Pater et nos sub te fratres sumus. *Qui es in celis* quia ibi uideris clare et eciam in celestibus mentibus per graciam et claritatem ac uaria dona fac nos celum ut simus alti puri sine macula mobiles in bono et ornati stellis uitutum sicut

259 Ps 1:2.
260 Ps 1:3.
261 Ps 1:1.
262 Ps 1:1.

celum. *Sanctificetur nomen tuum*, id est, nobis sanctum habeatur foris et intus et purget a luxuria per donum sapiencie ut simus puri, clari et tibi semper uniti. *Adueniat regnum tuum* et repellatur regnum cupiditatis et carnis ac gule per donum intellectus et tu regnes in nobis et excludas omnes tenebras uiciorum illumines et unias nos tibi. *Fiat uoluntas tua sicut in celo et in terra* ut auferetur auaricia et detur consilium et misericordia ut purgemur a terrenis cupiditatibus, illuminemur ut celum et uniamur tibi sicut ciues celi. *Panem nostrum cottidianum da nobis hodie*, corporalem et spiritualem panem uite et intellectus gracie et glorie sapiencie et intelligencie contra accidiam, fortitudinem et esuriem iusticie ut purgemur fortiter, illuminemur clare et tibi uniamur beate. *Et dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et*
P 173va *nos* | *dimittimus debitoribus nostris*, quando nos petunt et faciunt quod possunt in satisfactione sicut et nos facimus dimitte nobis dando nobis luctum amarum pro peccatis et scienciam lugendi exclude inuidiam et purga nos a peccatis nostris, illumina corda nostra in tua gracia, et fac nos tecum unum in spiritu. *Et ne nos inducas in temptacionem* sed conserua nos a temptacione ire et omnium uiciourm ne preualeant contra nos. Da nobis donum pietatis ut supremus temptaciones in mansuetudine possidendo terram cordis nostri et ut purgemur contra temptacionem, ut illuminemur ad sciendum qualiter resistere debeamus, et fac nos tecum unum spiritum ut fortificemur per hec contra omnes temptaciones. *Sed libera nos a malo*, scilicet presentis uite et future a malo pene et culpe, a malo infirmitatis, malicie, ignorancie et concupiscencie per donum timoris quo declinatur a malo, et per ueram humilitatem purga nos a omni malo, et illumina nos in bono ut unus tecum spiritus semper simus. *Amen*, id est, fiat.

CHAPTER 21

A Newly Discovered Recension of Gerson's *Annotatio doctorum aliquorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt*: Evidence for Gerson's Reading of *De imitatione Christi*?

Daniel Hobbins

Introduction

One of the most interesting works of Gerson is also one of the shortest: his list of authorities who "spoke" about contemplation, the *Annotatio doctorum aliquorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt*. Gerson frequently suggested a cluster of books on a given topic for readers, but in this case he assembled the books into a separate list, a sort of bibliography in some degree of order and with occasional remarks.[1] The work testifies to Gerson's bookishness and to his thinking in terms of "canons" of authoritative books. This was one way to deal with the abundance of Christian literature on a topic such as contemplation. It is possible, perhaps probable, that this "Annotatio" served as the model for the "Annotatio" that Jean the Celestine compiled of his brother's works.

As André Combes first remarked, these lists have a syncretic nature. Gerson considers all authors who have treated a topic without respect to their school: Cistercians, Augustinians, Victorines, Dionysians, Gregorians, all currents flow into one by reason of that which unites them, an approach Combes describes as "une attitude gersonienne".[2] More broadly the *Annotatio* effectively embodies the mystical tradition in the Latin West, as Kent Emery himself has observed: here we find a group of standard, approved authorities who wrote about contemplation, from Dionysius, to Augustine and Gregory, to Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard and Hugh of Saint Victor, to the author of the *Liber de spiritu et*

1 For more on these lists, see D. Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity before Print: Jean Gerson and the Transformation of Late Medieval Learning*, Philadelphia 2009, pp. 33–36; and André Combes, "Études gersoniennes. I. L'authenticité gersonienne de l''Annotatio doctorum aliquorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt'", in: *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age* 12 (1939), pp. 332–335.

2 Combes, "Études gersoniennes", p. 335.

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anima, to Bonaventure.[3] By Gerson's day, mystical theology had come to be associated with specific authors and texts. In this way, the work effectively represents a material way of thinking that characterized late medieval theology.

Although Ellies Du Pin printed the list as a self-standing piece in his *Opera omnia* (1706), Combes observed that in the manuscripts the work appears to be nothing more than a bibliographical appendix to Gerson's *De theologia mystica*.[4] Combes drew on the work to support his grand thesis—developed over decades in many volumes—that Gerson experienced a mystical encounter on 1 October 1425 that altered his views on the mystical ascent and brought about a "conversion" to the mystical life.[5] More narrowly, Combes showed that both *De theologia mystica* and the *Annotatio* survive in at least three recensions, and that the different recensions probably originated with Gerson himself. For Combes, these changes were evidence of Gerson's evolving estimation of Ruysbroeck's *De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum*, about which he wrote two important letters to Barthélémy Clautiers in 1402 and 1408, and evidence by extension of his own development on the theme of mystical theology.[6]

Combes conceded that still unknown copies of the *Annotatio* might yet supply new evidence. He therefore found reason to be circumspect about the interpretation of the changes to be found in the different recensions of the *Annotatio*. In fact every year brings to light more manuscripts of Gerson's works, and unknown or lost works of Gerson continue to be discovered and published. My own research has uncovered a fourth recension of the *Annotatio* in Greifswald, Bibliothek des geistlichen Ministeriums (Nikolaikirche), Hs. XIII.E.76; and Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. 763, a manuscript that was partially copied by Gabriel Biel and that formerly belonged to the Brethren of the Common Life at Butzbach. The Giessen manuscript includes a number of works of

3 See Kent Emery, Jr., "The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent", in: J.A. Aertsen—K. Emery, Jr.—A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts / After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century*, Berlin—New York 2001, pp. 59–124, here at p. 70.

4 André Combes, *Essai sur la critique de Ruysbroeck par Gerson*, Paris 1945–1972, Vol. 1, pp. 441–442.

5 For a convenient access into the problem see Jeffrey Fisher, "Gerson's Mystical Theology: A New Profile of Its Evolution", in: Brian Patrick McGuire (ed.), *A Companion to Jean Gerson*, Leiden—Boston 2006, pp. 205–248, here pp. 207–208. See also Marc Vial, *Jean Gerson Théoricien de La Théologie Mystique*, Paris 2006, pp. 13–14.

6 On the correct spelling, Clautiers rather than Clantier as found in Glorieux, see Jan de Grauwe, *Historia Cartusiana Belgica* (Analecta Cartusiana 51), Salzburg 1985, p. 13.

Gerson besides the *Annotatio*: sermons especially, but also letters, including many known to exist in only one or two other copies. Clearly, the compilers of this manuscript had rare materials at their disposal; how they obtained them is worth further consideration.

This article presents a study and edition of this recension of the *Annotatio*. This version of the list is later than the three versions known to present scholarship; it appears to date from sometime after 1424, perhaps 1428 or 1429, the period just before Gerson's death. The changes to the *Annotatio* are not trivial. Richard of Saint Victor, who is listed second in the earlier recensions, now appears third and is no longer described as the first after Dionysius to treat the topic systematically. Instead, he follows Hugh of Saint Victor and is designated as the "sequax et discipulus Hugonis". Both the Greifswald and the Giessen manuscripts include this change. Even more surprising are two additions that appear at the end of the text in the Giessen manuscript and that could be construed as evidence of a separate recension of the *Annotatio*. The second addition is a proof for God's existence that comes from a letter that Gerson wrote in 1428 to Oswald of Bavaria at the Grande Chartreuse. The first addition follows the passage that marked the close of the text in the earlier recensions. There, Gerson (if we accept that he is the author of this addition) quotes a brief and famous passage from *De imitatione Christi*. If Gerson did supply these additions, then this quotation belongs to the earliest evidence we now have for the readership of *De imitatione Christi*, which modern scholarship dates to 1418.[7] One might pause to consider: had this version of the *Annotatio* been known to scholarship long ago, then the centuries-long quarrel over the authorship of the *Imitation* might never have taken place. If we attribute this recension to Gerson, then it seems that he had read *De imitatione Christi* shortly before his death, and that he was impressed by the work's elegance and its challenge to the curiosity of academics. He did not write the work, but he may well have admired it.

I begin with a description of the Giessen manuscript, unknown to both Combes and Glorieux but a precious witness to the distribution of some of the rarest works of Gerson into the Empire in the 1460s. I turn next to the Greif-

7 On the earliest manuscripts, see B.J.H. Biggs (ed.), *The Imitation of Christ: The First English Translation of the 'Imitatio Christi'*, Oxford 1997, p. xxx, note 24, summarizing Huijben and Debongnie, who count thirty-eight manuscripts datable to between 1424 and 1439. The earliest dated copy of Book 1 is dated 1424, and the earliest dated copy including Books 1–4 is dated 1427. Also on the circulation of the work see Roger Lovatt, "The Imitation of Christ in Late Medieval England", in: *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (5th Series) 18 (1968), pp. 97–121.

swald manuscript, likewise unknown to Combes and Glorieux. I then consider the new evidence of these manuscripts and what it tells us about the development of the *Annotatio*. When considered together with the changes to the earlier recensions, this new recension reveals Gerson's growing estimation for Hugh of Saint Victor over the course of his career. The article concludes with an edition of the *Annotatio* as found in the two manuscripts.

2 Gerson Manuscripts in the Library of the Church of St Mark in Butzbach

Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. 763 originally belonged to the library of the church of St. Mark in Butzbach, a fourteenth-century parish church that was re-established as a house of the Brethren of the Common Life in 1468.[8] The library has reached us today partially intact, a remarkable survival of 205 medieval manuscripts and 308 incunabula in the Universitätsbibliothek of Giessen, which acquired the collection in 1771.[9] This extraordinary collection of important and in some cases unique witnesses to late medieval spirituality includes among its most important manuscripts the *Nachlass* of Gabriel Biel (†1495), who served as prior of the house in Butzbach from 1469 to 1479.[10] The rest of the collection holds its own interest as the library that Biel and his colleagues gathered and organized.

8 The ownership mark appears on the back cover: "Liber capituli ecclesie sancti Marci in Butzbach".

9 See Wolfgang Georg Bayerer, "Libri capituli ecclesiae sancti marci: Zur Katalogisierung der Butzbacher Handschriften an der Universitäts-Bibliothek Giessen", in: *Wetterauer Geschichtsblätter* 24 (1975), pp. 57–91. This article only treats half of the manuscripts owned by the Butzbach Markusstift. See further the two-volume catalogue, Wolfgang George Bayerer (Hrsg.), *Die Handschriften des ehemaligen Fraterherrenstifts St. Markus zu Butzbach in der Universitätsbibliothek Giessen*, Band 1, and Joachim Ott (Hrsg.), *Die Handschriften des ehemaligen Fraterherrenstifts St. Markus zu Butzbach in der Universitätsbibliothek Giessen*, Band 2.

10 Cf. L. Hellriegel, "Gabriel Biel in Butzbach", in: *Wetterauer Geschichtsblätter* 18 (1969), pp. 73–82. See also Detlef Metz, *Gabriel Biel und die Mystik*, Stuttgart 2001, pp. 68–74, which briefly discusses (mainly by listing) the mystical works in the Markusstift. For a study that explores the manuscripts of this collection for information on Biel's career, see Wolfgang Georg Bayerer, *Gabrielis Biel Gratiarum Actio und andere Materielen zu einen Testimonien-Biographie bezüglich seiner Universitätsjahre in Heidelberg, Erfurt, Köln* (*und Tübingen*) *aus Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Giessen* (Forschungen aus der Handschriftenabteilung der Universitätsbibliothek Giessen), Giessen 1985.

Among the library's treasures is an important set of manuscripts of the works of Gerson. Nineteen manuscripts from this library survive with one or more items by Gerson, including Gabriel Biel's autograph copy of his German translation of Gerson's *Opus tripartitum*.[11] The core of the Gerson collection is contained in six manuscripts: Hss. 675, 761, 762, 763, 764, and 764a.[12] Together, these manuscripts encompass nearly the entire sequence of Gerson's major works: the important letter-treatises, the principal "magisterial works", Latin sermons, guides for confessors and works of spiritual and doctrinal instruction, treatises of advice to the Celestines and Carthusians, polemical tracts, the major late works (*De consolatione theologiae*, the *Monotessaron*, the *Collectorium super Magnificat*), and many others. Only two major categories are entirely missing: these volumes include no poetry and, not surprisingly, no French sermons. (The volumes do contain a few French prose works in the more popular Latin translations.) This collection naturally includes many works that had spread widely throughout the Empire by the mid-fifteenth century. But it also includes some of Gerson's rarest works, mostly to be found in Hs. 763. This manuscript contains numerous rare works, including many that had previously been known only in copies originally produced in Paris.

Despite its importance, this manuscript and the larger collection have received no attention from Gerson specialists. The first volume of the Giessen catalogue appeared only in 1980. These manuscripts were therefore unknown to André Combes and Palémon Glorieux. Gilbert Ouy, the greatest scholar of Gerson manuscripts in the twentieth century, devoted most of his attention to the copies made by Gerson or by his brother Jean the Celestine, as well as to the important library at Saint Victor in Paris.[13] For Ouy, the distribution into the Empire was interesting only insofar as it supplied further evidence of the role played by Jean the Celestine in the editing and distribution of Gerson's works.

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11 Hs. 851. The nineteen manuscripts are Hss. 673–675, 680, 753, 761–765, 764a, 771, 809–811, 816–817, 851, and 1266. Another manuscript, Hs. 763a, might have been belonged to this library.

12 Another manuscript with several works of Gerson, Hs. 763a, might have originated in Butzbach.

13 For an overview of his career as a Gerson scholar, see Gilbert Ouy, "Discovering Gerson the Humanist: Fifty Years of Serendipity", in: Brian Patrick McGuire (ed.), *A Companion to Jean Gerson*, Leiden 2006, pp. 79–132. Ouy first catalogued the Gerson manuscripts at Saint-Victor in: Danièle Calvot et Gilbert Ouy, *L'oeuvre de Gerson à Saint-Victor de Paris: catalogue des manuscrits*, Paris 1990. He catalogued the entire collection in: *Les manuscrits de l'Abbaye de Saint-Victor: catalogue établi sur la base du répertoire de Claude de Grandrue (1514)*, Turnhout 1999, 2 vols.

In fact surviving copies of Gerson's works produced in German-speaking lands far outnumber those produced in France. Scholars have barely begun to untangle the lines of this vast transmission.[14] The Giessen manuscripts belong to this great German embrace of Gerson, figured as the fifth doctor of the Church on the pulpit at Bad Urach.[15] They deserve recognition as one of the most important manuscript collections of Gerson's works anywhere in fifteenth-century Europe, a collection that rivalled the other major fifteenth-century collections at Saint Victor in Paris, at the Celestines of Lyon, and at the Grand Chartreuse, and that in its variety surpassed the great collections of Gerson's works at the Charterhouses of Aggsbach, Basel, Buxheim, Cologne, Erfurt, and Mainz.[16] We might see this effort as an important intermediate step toward the first publication of the *opera omnia* in 1483 at Cologne. Following the Council of Basel, the Benedictine houses in Bavaria and Lower Austria and Charterhouses throughout Europe began to assemble the works of Gerson available to them through their networks. During the 1460s and 1470s, the Brethren at Butzbach, Biel among them, launched their own enterprise to collect Gerson's works. Benefiting from their position near the Rhineland, where many of Gerson's works were easily available and regularly copied, the Brethren gathered his works into a series of volumes.[17] But realizing too that many other works of Gerson were unavailable to them, they somehow managed to find and copy those works, which they probably found at Paris.

3 Description of Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. 763

The evidence for this statement is circumstantial but strong. The rare works from Paris, mostly letters and sermons, fill the volume that includes the *Annotatio*. Giessen 763 is a paper codex of 249 folios, quarto-sized (21.5×14.5 centimeters), copied in or near Mainz and Butzbach from around 1460 to 1470.[18] The binding, in dark brown leather, is the work of a fifteenth-century binder in Butzbach. A paper label on the front cover designates the volume as a Gerson

14 For a first attempt, see Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity before Print*, pp. 183–216.

15 Id., ibid., p. 6.

16 See further ibid., pp. 221–224.

17 On the tremendous production of Gerson's works in the Rhineland, see Carla Bozzolo, "La production manuscrite dans les pays rhénans au XVe siècle (à partir des manuscrits datés)", in: *Scrittura e civiltà* 18 (1994), pp. 183–242.

18 For the physical description, I have relied on the recent description by Joachim Ott, *Die Handschriften des ehem. Fraterherrenstifts St. Markus zu Butzbach in der Universitätbib-*

recueil manuscript: "Sermones et proposiciones Gersonis". The volume includes at least two separate parts copied at three different times by four hands: Hand A, ff. 2^{r}–191^{v} and 222^{r}–234^{v}; Hand B, ff. 193^{r}–215^{v}; Hand C, ff. 235^{r}–244^{r}, 249^{v}–250^{v}; and Hand D, ff. 247^{r}–249^{v}. Joachim Ott has identified Hand B as that of Gabriel Biel, who copied three sermons of Gerson at some point during his time as preacher at Mainz cathedral from 1457 to 1465.[19]

The most striking feature of the Gerson texts found in this manuscript is their rarity. The volume includes a large number of Gerson's sermons and letters, a few of his works related to the Schism, as well as a few short works by other authors.[20] The full range of Gerson's works was unavailable in German-speaking lands until the printing of the *opera omnia* in the 1480s first at Cologne (1483) and then at Strasbourg (1488). Gerson *recueil* manuscripts produced in the Empire vary in their contents according to region, but they nonetheless draw from a fairly predictable body of texts.[21] Any sermons they contain are likely to have been preached at Constance or possibly at the synod at Reims in 1408, a sermon that Gerson later distributed and corrected.[22] The letters that circulated in the Empire were either letter-treatises that Gerson intended to circulate as independent works[23] or letters that served as the introduction to an independent work, such as the letter prefacing *De libris legendis a monacho*.[24] In all cases these letters belong to the period after 1400. By contrast, the Giessen manuscript contains a series of letters and sermons that belong to the earliest period of Gerson's literary and preaching activity. Most of these works had no circulation whatsoever outside of Paris and survive in fewer than five

liothek Giessen, Band 2. *Die Handschriften aus der Signaturenfolge Hs 761—Hs 1266, NF-Signaturen, Ink-Signaturen*, Wiesbaden 2004, pp. 110–113. I have used a microfilm for my study of the text.

19 See Ott, *Handschriften*, p. 110.

20 See *De assumptione beate marie virginis* of Ps.-Augustine, *De epiphaniis* of Rufinus Aquileiensis, the *Epistola ad Lanzonem* of Anselm of Canterbury, and an excerpt from the *Libellus* of Johannes Schoonhoven in defense of Ruysbroeck's *De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum*.

21 On regional variation in the Empire in the circulation of Gerson's works, see Daniel Hobbins, "The Council of Basel and Distribution Patterns of the Works of Jean Gerson", in: Michael Van Dussen and Pavel Soukup (eds.), *Religious Controversy in Europe, 1378–1536: Textual Transmission and Networks of Readership*, Turnhout 2013, pp. 137–170.

22 For Gerson correcting the work in 1425, see the description of Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 3126 in *OC* 5.xx.

23 For example a work such as *De religionis perfectione et moderamine*, no. 49 in the edition, *OC* 2.232–245.

24 Nos. 57 and 446 in the edition, *OC* 2.275–276, 9.609–613.

copies. Seven of them survive in just one other copy.[25] Just two works survive in more than ten manuscripts (reckoning by the figures in Glorieux's edition): an excerpt from *De statu papae et minorum praelatorum* (27 copies listed in Glorieux), and *Super quotidiano peregrini testamento* (11 copies). The appearance of such rare works in the 1460s in Butzbach is itself important evidence of the desire to recover the complete works of the chancellor, including works that had probably never circulated outside Paris before this time. (See Appendix A for a complete list of contents).

The hand that Joachim Ott designated as Hand A copied most of the manuscript (ff. 2^{r}–191^{v}, 222^{r}–234^{v}), including all of the works of Gerson except for the three sermons copied by Gabriel Biel (Hand B, ff. 193^{r}–215^{v}, nos. 239, 253, and 249), and the two letters to Barthélemy Clautier at the end of the volume, copied by Hands C and D (C: ff. 235^{r}–244^{r}, 249^{v}–250^{v}; D: ff. 247^{r}–249^{v}). Watermarks suggest that Hand A was at work around 1470 in Butzbach. Most of the works copied by Hand A are sermons and letters; nearly all date from early in Gerson's career, or at least from before 1415. Just one work, *De sacramento altaris* (no. 462), apparently dates from the Lyon period (in 1425)—but even that date must be considered open to question given that the work is in fact undated, and that Glorieux never justified his dating of the work to 1425.[26] None of the works can be dated with certainty to the period at Constance, 1415 to 1418.[27]

What we have then is a large collection of rare materials that belong to Gerson's early career at Paris. Nearly all of these texts survive today only in manuscripts produced in Paris. It seems safe to assume a direct line of transmission from exemplars in Paris to the Giessen manuscript. All four copyists of Hs. 763 had access to and copied rare texts. Thus we should probably imagine the copying of this codex as a single project, an attempt to fill in the gaps in a large but incomplete collection of Gerson's works. We could propose various scenarios for how the compilers of the Giessen manuscript found their exemplars.

25 This includes nos. 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 23, and 270. Glorieux knew of only one copy of no. 2, which is also in the Giessen manuscript, but another copy survives in: Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Hs. 211, ff. 52^{r}–54^{v}. See H. Hagen, *Catalogus codicum Bernensium*, Bern 1875.

26 See *OC* 1.136, 9.xv.

27 Two works might belong to this period: no. 42, Gerson's letter to the dauphin's tutor, Arnoul Charton, and no. 410, *De illuminatione cordis*, which Glorieux dates to before July 1417. Both works survive in only a few manuscripts. On the letter to Arnoul Charton, see Jacques Verger, "Ad prefulgidum sapiencie culmen prolem regis inclitam provehere: L'initiation des dauphins de France à la sagesse politique selon Jean Gerson", in: *Penser le pouvoir au Moyen Age (VIIIe–XVe Siècle): Études d'histoire et de littérature offertes à Françoise Autrand*, Paris 2000, pp. 427–440.

Perhaps they learned of an unknown body of writings of Gerson, especially sermons and letters, and made their way to Paris in search of exemplars (they might have learned of such works from Jean the Celestine's list of Gerson's works[28]). Perhaps they had contacts in Paris who sent them the desired copies. Or perhaps—what seems to me less likely, since there is no evidence for these texts in other manuscripts outside of Paris—the compilers found manuscripts or a single compilation of these rare works of Gerson close at hand, and the Giessen manuscript is thus a witness to a chain of transmission that is now lost from view. Whatever actually happened, we can say with certainty that Hs. 763 represents an ambitious attempt to assemble rare works of Gerson that were almost entirely unknown outside Paris.

One further observation. According to Joachim Ott, Hand A copied two sections, a first longer section consisting mostly of sermons and letters (ff. 2^{r}–191^{v}), and a second shorter section containing the *Annotatio* and four brief works (ff. 222^{r}–234^{v}).[29] The letters and sermons in the first longer section are all extremely rare, and in fact all of them can be found in just two Paris manuscripts, both of which belonged to the library of Saint Victor: Paris, BnF lat. 14902 (Glorieux's Ms. C), and BnF lat. 14907 (Glorieux's Ms. E).[30] We can thus be fairly confident that Scribe A was copying from pre-existing collections of Gerson's works. Further study of the Saint Victor manuscripts might clarify the relationship between these manuscripts and Giessen 763.

4 Another Recension of the *Annotatio*: The Greifswald Manuscript

One of the great challenges facing Gerson scholars is a superabundance of evidence in the manuscripts. It so happens that a recension of the *Annotatio* that is close to the recension of the Giessen manuscript has been in print since the nineteenth century, though it has escaped the attention of previous scholars. In 1865 and 1866 Theodor Pyl published a catalogue of the manuscripts in the Bibliothek des geistlichen Ministeriums of the Nikolaikirche in Greifswald. One manuscript in this collection, Hs. XIII.E.76, contains over twenty-five works of Gerson, including at f. 213^{v} the *Annotatio doctorum aliquorum qui de contem-*

28 These lists are edited in: *OC* 1.23–26, 29–33.

29 See Ott, *Handschriften*, 110. These two sections are written in a very different style, one a formal bookhand, the other a bastard script appropriate for note-taking. Ott nonetheless considered these two *Stilansätze* of the same hand.

30 For descriptions, see Calvot and Ouy, *L'oeuvre de Gerson à Saint-Victor de Paris*, pp. 73–82, 118–126.

platione locuti sunt, which Pyl transcribed and published in its entirety as part of his description.[31] Critical edition shows that it represents a recension of the text that is closer to the recension of the Giessen manuscript than to any other manuscript. Though I have not seen this manuscript, I have incorporated the Greifswald recension (as it appears in Pyl's catalogue) into the discussion that follows.

5 Assessing the Evidence

The changes to the text of the *Annotatio* in the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts do not change our understanding of the development of Gerson's thought in any fundamental way. Nonetheless, the two manuscripts do represent a new stage of the text and therefore a conscious decision by Gerson to modify the list. Before turning to these changes, we should first rehearse the textual tradition of the *Annotatio* as understood by Combes and as communicated (quite awkwardly and even incorrectly) in the third volume of Glorieux's critical edition, which appeared in 1962.

As Combes first demonstrated, Gerson continued to revise both *De theologia mystica* and the *Annotatio* to the end of his life. Speaking of the *Annotatio*, Combes remarked on the work's essential "mobilité".[32] He knew of eight manuscripts of the *Annotatio*, which he divided into three groups: five manuscripts belonging to an original version composed before 1422 (IJNXA^{a}), around the time of *De theologia mystica* in 1402–1403; one manuscript belonging to the revision of 1422, at the same time as the revision of *De theologia mystica* (H); and two manuscripts belonging to a third recension after 1422 (LR), perhaps in 1429.[33] Combes's arguments for this chronological sequence of his three recensions have been generally accepted,[34] though it must be acknowledged that Max Lieberman challenged the very authenticity of the *Annotatio*, which he attempted to attribute to Jean the Celestine between 1419 and 1422.[35] If we assume for a moment that the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts

31 See T. Pyl, "Die Handschriften und Urkunden in der Bibliothek der Nicolai-Kirche zu Greifswald", in: *Baltische Studien* 20:2 (1865), pp. 148–195; 21:1 (1866), pp. 1–148. The manuscript in question is described at 21:1 (1866), pp. 141–144.

32 See Combes, *Essai*, 1.450–451: "… la mobilité qui le caractérise essentiellement".

33 Combes, *Essai*, 1.526–529, with a summary of the dating on 566. The editions appear in: ibid., 1.652–664, 822–824, and 868–869.

34 Glorieux incorporates them into his edition at *OC* 3.293.

35 Lieberman's argument is too complex for summary here, but his central objection to the

belong to a recension that is later than any of Combes's manuscripts, then the text of the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts supports Combes's reconstruction. That is to say, the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts both agree more closely with the readings in manuscripts LR, the recension after 1422, than with the readings of Combes's other manuscripts. For example, like manuscripts LR, the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts both omit the reference to Ruysbroeck's *De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum*. Thus the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts support Combes's reconstruction of how Gerson revised the text of the *Annotatio*. The critical edition below lends further support for a date for this recension after Combes's third recension. On the other hand, if we assume that Gerson did continue to revise the *Annotatio* after Combes's third recension, then we should probably adjust the date of that third recension to sometime before 1429.

We turn now to the text of the Greifswald and Giessen manuscripts. The first significant change to this text appears in both the Greifswald and Giessen recensions and involves the placement of Hugh and Richard of Saint Victor. In the earlier recensions "Magnus Dionysius" appears first followed by Richard, "quasi primus post eum". But Gerson apparently began thinking about the placement of Hugh soon after the completion of the first recension of the work, perhaps as part of a general reappraisal of Hugh that continued to the end of his career.[36]

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attribution to Gerson is that the *Annotatio* mentioned Ruysbroeck's *Spiritual Espousals*, a work that Gerson had partly condemned. Max Lieberman, "Chronologie gersonienne: Gerson ou D'Ailly: *Annotatio doctorum aliquorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt*", in: *Romania* 79 (1958), p. 354, and see the summary of the entire argument on pp. 374–375. Combes intended to publish a rebuttal to Lieberman but apparently never did so. See André Combes, *La théologie mystique de Gerson: profil de son évolution*, Rome 1963–1964, 2 Vols., p. 53, note 33. In my judgment Lieberman's arguments failed to undermine Combes's arguments for the authenticity of the *Annotatio* in his 1939 article, "Études gersoniennes". Nonetheless, the whole question might benefit from a thorough but concise reevaluation. Gilbert Ouy and Marc Vial have also rejected Lieberman's arguments: see Gilbert Ouy, "Le Célestin Jean Gerson: copiste et éditeur de son frère", in: Herrad Spilling (ed.), *La collaboration dans la production de l'écrit médiéval*, Paris 2003, pp. 293–294; and Marc Vial, *Jean Gerson Théoricien de La Théologie Mystique*, Paris 2006, p. 61, note 1. For an overview of Combes' response to Lieberman, see his *Essai*, Tome 4, *L'évolution spontanée de la critique gersonienne* (*deuxième partie*), Paris 1972, pp. 10–13, and the index s.v. "Lieberman (Max)".

36 For an overview of Gerson's use of both Richard and Hugh of Saint Victor, see Johann Stelzenberger, *Die Mystik des Johannes Gerson*, Breslau 1928, pp. 39–43.

A key moment in this development, external to the *Annotatio*, appears in his famous "letter of consolation" to Pierre d'Ailly. There Gerson reports his recent appraisal (*venit nuper ad manus meas*) of Hugh's *Super Ecclesiasten*, a work that stunned him with its powerful treatment of contemplation through the image of coals, fire, and smoke.[37] Unfortunately, the dating of this letter is mired in controversy, and much depends on its resolution. Noël Valois first proposed a date of 1408. Combes considered this much too late and argued instead for 1395—a date that I am inclined to accept. Max Lieberman later attempted to push the dating back to 1409 or 1413, the dates that Glorieux accepted for the edition, though without carefully evaluating Combes's arguments, possibly without even being fully aware of them.[38] Moreover, the language that Gerson uses to describe the moment when he apprehended the book—*venit nuper ad manus meas*—might be taken to imply a discovery, but Lieberman rightly observed that this phrase might instead be taken to describe the *re*-discovery of a work that was already known to him.

In the earliest version of the *Annotatio* (Combes's manuscripts IJNXA^{a}), which mentions the *Super Ecclesiasten*, Hugh appears as the eighth author in the list, following Dionysius, Richard, Cassian, Augustine, Climacus, Gregory, and Bernard. The revision of 1422 (Combes's manuscript H) preserves this order but inserts a reference to Hugh immediately after Richard: "Est et libellus Hugonis, De arrha anime et de oratione". In his edition of this second recension, Combes raised the possibility that this entry was supplied by a reader. But he observed that the addition to the list of an important new work, "De arrha anime", that is the *Soliloquium de arrha anime*, pointed rather in the direction of Gerson. Combes thus proposed that at the time of the 1422 revision, and perhaps on account of it, Gerson had seen fit to bring the two Victorines together.[39]

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37 See *OC* 2.126. See further Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity before Print*, p. 26. Lieberman, "Chronologie gersonienne", 80 (1959), p. 306, contends that this phrase—*venit nuper ad manus meas*—might imply a discovery, but that it might also be taken to mean that Gerson was *rediscovering* a work that he already knew.

38 See André Combes, "Études gersoniennes. I. L'authenticité gersonienne de l'ʻAnnotatio doctorum aliquorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt'", in: *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 12 (1939), pp. 291–364, here at pp. 360–362, note 1. For the dating of the letter to Pierre d'Ailly to 1409 or 1413, see two articles of Max Lieberman, "Chronologie gersonienne", 80 (1959), pp. 289–336; 81 (1960), pp. 44–98. It should be noted that Combes tackled the dating of the *Annotatio* in 1945 (the first volume of his *Essai*), well before Lieberman had argued for the dating of the letter to Pierre d'Ailly. The whole issue needs revisiting.

39 See further Combes, *Essai*, 1.822, note f; and on the *Soliloquium* as a source for *De diligendo Deum*, which Gerson considered an authentic work of Augustine, see 1.654–655, note d.

The evidence of the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts supports this interpretation. But as a result of this additional entry, this second recension has two entries for Hugh, each of which lists the "De oratione"—better known today as *De modo orandi*.

This set the stage for the revision after 1422, witnessed by Combes's manuscripts LR. In this recension the description of Richard of Saint Victor as "quasi primus post eum" (i.e. after Dionysius) disappears. This change along with three other important variants—in every case a phrase fell out of the text—led Combes to suppose that his manuscripts LR represented a different authorial version of the text rather than scribal tinkering. For Combes, the most important of these variants was the omission of the reference to the *De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum* along with the cautionary phrase "cujus tertia pars suspecta est".[40] Combes interpreted this omission as evidence to support his argument that Gerson experienced a sort of conversion on 1 October 1425 with respect to the role of the affect in mystical theology. For Combes, this omission cast the *Annotatio* in an entirely new light: the *Annotatio* was not simply "un inventaire purement objectif et abstrait," but a work that witnessed the evolution of his thought.[41]

I doubt that the *Annotatio* can bear the interpretive weight that Combes wished to give it with regard to his larger thesis of a sudden conversion in 1425.[42] Nonetheless, there is perhaps something to the more narrow argument that the *Annotatio* reflects Gerson working out his understanding of the mystical tradition. Combes pointed to other texts in which Gerson reversed the chronological order and gave priority to Richard before Hugh and Augustine.[43] The Greifswald and Giessen manuscripts show a further evolution in Gerson's appraisal of the Victorines. Both manuscripts combine the two entries for Hugh and place the new single entry immediately before Richard. This new entry for Hugh preserves the order of his works and the previous wording, except that the repetition of *De oratione* disappears. The two manuscripts place the entry

40 For these variants see Combes, *Essai*, 1.822–824, 868–869. For Combes's discussion of this variant, see pp. 290–291, 526–529.

41 See Combes, "Études gersoniennes", p. 316: "… en suggérant irrésistiblement qu'au lieu d'être un inventaire purement objectif et abstrait, il participe au mouvement vital d'une pensée sans cesse en activité et qu'il se trouve emporté dans une évolution qui implique des retouches".

42 For criticism, see Edmund Colledge and J.C. Marler, "Tractatus Magistri Johannis Gerson De Mistica Theologia: St. Pölten, Diözesanarchiv MS. 25", in: *Mediaeval Studies* 41 (1979), pp. 378–386.

43 See Combes, *La théologie mystique*, 2.53–54.

for Richard after the entry for Hugh, and now describe Richard as the "sequax et discipulus hugonis, ambo de sancto uictore dicti", who reduced the subject to a body of doctrine. Part of Gerson's reappraisal of Hugh thus seems to have colored his appreciation of Richard as Hugh's disciple. If Richard retains his prominence as a master of contemplation, some of this glory is now reflected onto Hugh. And Hugh and Richard now constitute a kind of school, the *magister* and the *discipulus* who had both put the subject of contemplation onto a firm footing, and who therefore precede all other authorities—following Dionysius—who wrote about contemplation.

In this reappraisal of Hugh, Gerson approaches Bonaventure's appraisal of Hugh in *De reductione artium ad theologiam*. There, Bonaventure speaks of four sources of illumination, the last of which he designates the "superior" light, the light of grace and Sacred Scripture. Sacred Scripture teaches three truths:

> the eternal generation and incarnation of Christ, the pattern of human life, and the union of the soul with God. The first regards faith; the second, morals; and the third, the ultimate end of both. The doctors should labor at the study of the first; the preachers, at the study of the second; the contemplatives, at the study of the third. The first is taught chiefly by Augustine; the second, by Gregory; the third, by Dionysius. Anselm follows Augustine; Bernard follows Gregory; Richard follows Dionysius. For Anselm excels in reasoning; Bernard, in preaching; Richard, in contemplating; but Hugh in all three.[44]

Like Bonaventure, in the first three recensions of the *Annotatio* Gerson sees Richard and Dionysius as the great masters of contemplation, with Richard following Dionysius; and in the later recension(s) he recognizes Hugh's great authority, which extends as well to contemplation. Both Bonaventure and Gerson recognize in Hugh an extensive authority.

In our present state of knowledge, it is unclear if Gerson had read Bonaventure's *De reductione*; to my knowledge he never cites the work explicitly. Nonetheless, in his letter of 29 April 1400 to the College of Navarre Gerson does seem to echo Bonaventure's three truths when he speaks of the three parts of theology: that which is directed toward schoolmen (*scolastici*), that which builds

44 Translation by Emma Thérèse Healy, *Saint Bonaventure's De reductione artius ad theologiam: A Commentary with an Introduction and Translation*, Saint Bonaventure, N.Y. 1955, pp. 27–29. My thanks to Kent Emery for drawing my attention to this passage.

morals (*mores*), and that which is fitting for preachers. This threefold division then leads Gerson to name those authorities who excel in each area.[45]

On a more prosaic level, Gerson also seems to have made minor stylistic changes to the text. A clear example of this appears at the end of the section on Richard. The previous recensions close with the following:

> … cuius insuper scripta omnia nichil **fere** nisi contemplationem sapiunt aut resonant.[46]

The Greifswald and Giessen manuscripts move the word *fere* to follow *scripta*; I take the result as an improved reading:

> Cuius insuper scripta **fere** omnia nichil nisi contemplationem sapiunt aut resonant.

Another minor change apparently for clarity's sake occurs in the entry for Bernard, where the letter "ad fratres de monte dei" is given the further precision, "ad fratres *karthusienses* de monte dei". Nonetheless, the Greifswald and Giessen manuscripts leave most of the text undisturbed.

We might suppose that scribes or readers made such modifications rather than Gerson. Admittedly, we are working in the realm of probability rather than certainty. But again, we have already established that by placing Hugh second before Richard and by drawing the two together as *magister* and *discipulus*, the Greifswald and Giessen manuscripts present modifications that reflect an ongoing reappraisal of Hugh's place in the mystical tradition that is *already visible in the earlier recensions*. The simplest interpretation of the evidence is that Gerson himself produced a new recension only when he wished to make a substantial change to the text, such as moving Hugh closer to Richard, adding references to Augustine's *Enarrationes in psalmos* and to the anonymous *De spiritu et anime*, clarifying the author of the *Stimulus amoris ad Christi passionem*, and supplying the incipit to the *De VII itineribus eternitatis* (second recension); dropping the reference to Ruysbroeck and the description of Richard as first after Dionysius (third recension); and placing Hugh second, before Richard, and forging the two into a school of Saint Victor (Greifswald

45 See *OC* 2.33–34. Marc Vial first observed this connection between the *De reductione ad artium ad theologiam* and Gerson's letter. See Vial, *Jean Gerson*, p. 58 and note 1. Isabelle Fabre also occasionally cites *De reductione* in: *La doctrine du chant du coeur de Jean Gerson*, Paris 2005.

46 *OC* 3.293.

and Giessen recensions). And in such cases, he would likely have made stylistic changes as well. Presumably, he recopied the text in doing so.

We come then to the final two additions to the Giessen manuscript: the reference to the great *dictum* from the *Imitatio*, and the inclusion of his short letter to the Grande Chartreuse. How should we read these passages? As afterthoughts or perhaps postscripts to the text? As the additions of a scribe? For if in fact a scribe added these passages, then we should certainly think of the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts as belonging to a single recension.

In the first passage Gerson simply cites the famous passage from the beginning of the first book of the *Imitatio*:

> Eleganter quidam: Opto inquit magis sentire compunctionem, quam scire eius diffinitionem.

This quotation is followed immediately by a short text that Glorieux edited as a letter of Gerson to Oswald of Bavaria, the vicar of the Grande Chartreuse:

> Actus est prior potentia, et perfectum imperfecto[47]. Ista est veritas illa super quam fundatur resolutorie omnis demonstratio demonstrandi deum esse, nec apparet mihi veritas aliqua cercior et evidentior dum bene resolvo terminos, ita quod actus purus et perfectio sine imperfectione et deus, sunt convertibiliter idem. Non enim potest aliud maius et perfectius cogitari quam actus purus et perfectio sine imperfectione: quam deus. Aristoteles ponit in forma ix° metha⟨physica⟩ veritatem predictam, et exemplificat in multis[48]. Sicut homo vir prius est puero, quia puerum generat, et semen posterius est quam homo, sicut ovum quam gallina, hanc veritatem assumit Boethius 3° de consolatione post illud metrum divinum: O qui perpetua. Ad probandum deum esse, ubi dicit quod natura semper incipit a perfectis, et ita tandem oportet devenire ad primum perfectum quod est deus. Ergo pridem ludens mecum composui hos duos versiculos:
>
> Esse deum verum probat imperfectio rerum,
> Quas sine perfecto fingere nemo potest.[49]

47 A quotation from Book 8 Lectio 14 of Aquinas's commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle. See *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici …*, t. 2, *Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, Paris 1884, p. 417.

48 See Jacqueline Hamesse, *Les auctoritates Aristotelis*, Louvain 1974, p. 134, note 225.

49 Cf. *OC* 2.320–321.

On the face of it, these passages seem to fit awkwardly at the end of a work that is according to its own title a list of authors. Neither passage mentions the author of a work on contemplation, nor does either one address contemplation directly. The passage from the *Imitation* captures well the cast of mind that Gerson valued in his approach to moral topics generally: his well-known criticism of academic curiosity, coupled with his emphasis on piety over the intellect, especially in the late period at Lyon.[50] The letter to the Grande Chartreuse takes a principle from Aquinas's commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle and applies it to the existence of God. Its placement here is odd. To think of these two passages as belonging to a new recension, we would have to suppose that Gerson has stopped listing books at this point and has instead begun to imagine himself outside the text or in its margin, in a kind of postscript. Or, perhaps, Gerson was simply adding notes at the end of his copy of the *Annotatio*, without intending for this copy to make its way into circulation.

For what it is worth, the layout of the manuscript gives no indication before these two passages that the text of the *Annotatio* has ended. The two passages begin with capitals, and in this way they visually resemble all of the earlier entries. It is possible that a scribe added these passages. Thus the evidence from the manuscript is inconclusive.

The second passage, the letter to the Grande Chartreuse, is a rare text. Only one other copy survives, in Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. A.VIII.32, a volume originally belonging to the Carthusians of Basel. This important manuscript, first investigated by Edmond Vansteenberghe in the early twentieth century, includes a series of letters by Gerson that were assembled into a kind of dossier or register by Oswald of Bavaria, vicar of the Grande Chartreuse from sometime before 1424 to 1429.[51] The passage at the end of the Giessen manuscript comes in the unfoliated part of the Basel manuscript, designated "e^{xii}".[52] This letter apparently had no independent circulation outside the Basel Charterhouse. Thus if we are to suppose that a scribe was responsible for the addition of this passage, then we would have to imagine one who had very privileged access to this correspondence, such as one of the Basel Carthusians.

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50 See further Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity before Print*, p. 38.

51 For a description of the manuscript, see P. Glorieux, "L'activité littéraire de Gerson à Lyon: correspondance inédite avec la Grande Chartreuse", in: *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médievale* 18 (1951), pp. 239–243; *OC* 2.xl–xliii; and Veronika Gerz-von Büren, *La tradition de l'oeuvre de Jean Gerson chez les Chartreux: La Chartreuse de Bâle*, Paris 1973, pp. 64–66. On Oswald's career, see Glorieux, "L'activité littéraire", p. 241.

52 Edited as no. 77 in: *OC* 2.320–321; see Glorieux, "L'activité littéraire", pp. 288–289.

Gerson did recycle his own texts, perhaps especially during the period at Lyon. According to Glorieux, Gerson wrote the letter in question in 1428, perhaps around the time that he revised the *Annotatio*. So this text was on his mind in the late period at Lyon. For that matter the substance of this letter to Oswald is such that it might well have predated both the letter and the revision of the *Annotatio*. Essentially, the letter is nothing more than a proof for God's existence, and in this way it has an independent flavor. We might suppose that Gerson had worked out this proof at some earlier date, which he then brandished as the occasion demanded. Thus rather than think of the Giessen copy of the *Annotatio* as preserving the letter in the Basel manuscript, we might think of the Giessen copy and the Basel manuscript as independent witnesses to a proof of God's existence that Gerson had formulated at some earlier date.

It remains unclear why Gerson—if he was the author of this recension—would have included the proof at the end of the *Annotatio*. We could suppose a connection in Gerson's thought between contemplation of God and the proof of God's existence: for of course the contemplation of God must assume valid arguments for God's existence. Or as I suggested above, we might also suppose that the Giessen text derives from a copy of the *Annotatio* to which Gerson had supplied the reference to the passage in the *Imitation* and the proof of God's existence as notes to himself, perhaps without intending that this version be circulated in this exact form, and that somehow this author's copy of the text made its way into circulation following Gerson's death.

Unfortunately, apart from the final two items in the Giessen manuscript, the variants between the Greifswald and the Giessen recensions do not help to establish chronological priority between these two manuscripts. Apart from those final two items, all of the variants could be explained as scribal.

One variant in the Greifswald manuscript (again, as reprinted in: Pyl 1866) does call for special comment. It appears in the final section, a clarifying remark that appears neither in the Giessen manuscript nor in any of the earlier recensions:

> … et alter liber de triplici via ad deum, cujus initium est: Vie Syon lugent, **quem Hugo de Balvia composuit**; et alius de novo saeculo …
>
> GREIFSWALD, in: PYL 1866

> … et alter liber de triplici via, cujus inicium est: Vie Syon lugent. Et alius de novo seculo …
>
> GIESSEN

The Giessen manuscript agrees here with the first three recensions as edited in Combes. The additional phrase in the Greifswald manuscript could be a scribal addition. We should recall that Combes's second recension of the text from 1422, represented solely by his manuscript H (Paris, BnF, Ms. lat. 3126), supplied a similar identifying tag to the preceding work:

> Sunt alii tractatus compilati a novellis, ut *Stimulus amoris ad Christi passionem*, **auctor cujus est Hugo de Balma**, et alter liber *De triplici via*, cujus initium est: *viae Sion lugent* ….[53]

This phrase, "auctor cujus est Hugo de Balma," then fell out of the tradition.[54] If we see the additional phrase in the Greifswald manuscript as a gloss provided by Gerson, then it would seem to make sense to place the recension of the Greifswald manuscript after the recension of the Giessen manuscript. There is some external support for this. Gerson knew the *De triplici via ad Deum* for much of his career, but he first identified Hugh of Balma as its author only in two late works: in his *De elucidatione scholastica mysticae theologiae*, from 1424;[55] and again in another letter to Oswald of Bavaria from 1428, where Gerson identifies Hugh with nearly the same tag that he uses in the Greifswald manuscript.[56] It is probably not a coincidence that Gerson identifies Hugh of Balma as the author in three works, all of which can be dated to the last years of Gerson's life. If we were to consider the Giessen and Greifswald manuscripts as preserving two different recensions, we could still consider the final two notes of the Giessen manuscript as authorial if we suppose that Gerson supplied them to a copy that he did not intend to circulate, and that the Greifswald manuscript descended from a copy that omitted them. In any case, we are probably safe in assigning the recension of the Greifswald manuscript to the period 1424 to 1429.

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53 See Combes, *Essai* 1.824, note a.

54 See Falk Eisermann, *„Stimulus amoris": Inhalt, lateinische Uberlieferung, deutsche Uebersetzungen, Rezeption*, Tübingen 2001, pp. 503–505, who does not address the problem that the attribution to Hugh of Balma dropped out of the transmission after the second recension.

55 See *OC* 8.155: "Scripserunt et alii, nominatim Hugo de Balma in Tractatu de triplici via ad Deum …". Another reference to Hugh in the same work appears at 8.158. On the date of this text, 1424 as against 1429, see André Combes, *La théologie mystique de Gerson: Profil de son évolution*, Rome, 1963–1964, Vol. 2, p. 396 and note 107. On Gerson's earlier knowledge of Hugh, see Stelzenberger, *Die Mystik des Johannes Gerson*, p. 51. For more on the convoluted bibliographical history of the work, see Combes, *Essai*, 1.659, note a.

56 See *OC* 2.320: "Liber cui titulus est Viae Sion lugent, quem composuit H[ugo] de Balma cartusiensis …".

Conclusion

The evidence at hand is insufficient to determine the exact sequence of the texts of the Greifswald and Giessen manuscripts, nor to say if they represent a single new recension or two new recensions. I have suggested various scenarios to account for the discrepancies. If we take the final two passages of the Giessen manuscript as authorial, then one possibility would be to assume that the Giessen text is later than the text of the Greifswald manuscript. In that case, the identifying phrase of the Greifswald manuscript, "quem Hugo de Balvia composuit", is a scribal addition (unless we assume that Gerson added the phrase and later removed it). In this case, Gerson would have modified the text of Combes's third recension (represented by his manuscripts LR) on at least two occasions. First, he would have moved Hugh of Saint Victor into second position after Dionysius. Then he would have circulated this version (the Greifswald manuscript). Next, he would have added the two items that appear at the end of the text in the Giessen manuscript. This text would then have made its way into circulation, with or without Gerson's knowledge.

Perhaps a stronger argument can be made that the gloss of the Greifswald manuscript (as reproduced by Pyl in 1866) is authorial, given that Gerson also attributes the *De triplici via ad Deum* to Hugh of Balma in two other late works. In this case, we might see the text of the Giessen manuscript as prior to the text of the Greifswald manuscript. Even here, we might still consider the final two additions of the Giessen manuscript as authorial, though perhaps unintended for distribution.

These complexities should not obscure the fact that both manuscripts provide evidence at minimum of a fourth recension of the *Annotatio* in which Gerson reordered Hugh and Richard of Saint Victor. Scholars have sometimes placed great emphasis on the fact that for Gerson, Richard of Saint Victor was the most important author who wrote on contemplation after Dionysius.[57] Gerson's changing estimation toward Hugh now needs to be weighed more carefully. It is certainly possible that the discovery of more copies of the *Annotatio* could clarify the textual tradition. A new critical edition of this text based on all known copies is highly desirable, for in fact it now appears that the textual tradition may be more complex than Combes himself realized.[58]

57 See, e.g., Combes, *La théologie mystique*, 1.63–64; and Vial, *Jean Gerson*, p. 68.

58 See further Ouy, "Le célestin Jean Gerson", p. 292 and note 31.

We might assume that Glorieux's edition put Gerson scholarship on a firmer footing. But while that edition is invaluable for researchers, it did little to resolve and in some cases it actively obscured a host of knotty problems relating to the chronology of Gerson's works and in some cases even their attribution that scholars such as Vansteenberghe, Combes, and Lieberman had debated, often without clear resolution. Nowhere is this clearer than in the present case, where a key letter that might help us to date the earliest recension of the *Annotatio* is itself insecurely dated.

Appendix A: Contents of Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. 763

Work[59]	Folios	Year	MSS[60]
Sermo factus in die nativitatis (252)	ff. 2^{r}–5^{v}	1391?	2
Sermo factus in die circumcisionis domini coram Papa apud Tarasconam (212)	ff. 5^{v}–20^{v}	1404	3
Sermo factus in dominica in septuagesima, 1388 anno, Crastino Vincencii (233)[61]	ff. 20^{v}–32^{v}	1391?	2
Sermo factus in die sancto pasche (244)	ff. 33^{r}–36^{r}	before 1415	2
Sermo factus coram Alexandro Papa in die ascensionis domini (221)	ff. 36^{v}–49^{v}	1409	3
Sermo de euangelio xix dominice post octauas pentecost- et potest dici in dedicatione ecclesie (250)	ff. 49^{v}–68^{r}	1397	3
Collatio eiusdem sermonis (251)	ff. 68^{r}–78^{r}	1397	3
Documentum notabile de venerabili sacramento altaris (462)	ff. 78^{r}–82^{r}	1425?	5
Sermo de Sancto Bernardo (230)	ff. 82^{r}–93^{v}	1402	2
Sermo factus parisius in die Sancti Ludowici regis francorum (217)	ff. 93^{v}–108^{r}	1393?	3
Sermo factus in die omnium sanctorum (227)	ff. 108^{r}–118^{v}	1403?	2
Aliqua propositiones et aliqui sermones … in diuersis materiis. Et primo propositio facta massilie coram Papa Benedicto Anno 1403 9- nouembris (214)	ff. 119^{r}–132^{r}	1403	7
Quoddam excerptum de sermone facto Tarascone anno 1403^{o} coram Papa Benedicto (212)[62]	ff. 132^{r}–136^{r}	1404	3

59 Unless indicated otherwise, I have given the title of the work in the form in which it appears in the manuscript. The number following the title is the number of the work in Glorieux, *Oeuvres complètes*.

60 The manuscript figures below are drawn from Glorieux, *Oeuvres complètes*. Frequently, more manuscripts are now known, but I have not included these in the tally.

61 In the edition (*OC* 1.108, 5.xiii), P. Glorieux dated the sermon to 1391. But the day after the feast of St. Vincent (January 23) in 1391 was a Monday. The dating of this sermon presents problems that to my knowledge have yet to be satisfactorily resolved.

62 An excerpt from no. 212, *OC* 5.84, line 21, to p. 89, line 15. Glorieux interprets the date in the manuscripts as old style, thus he dates the sermon to 1 January 1404.

Work	Folios	Year	MSS
⟨Ad defendendum Concilii Pisani convocationem memorandum⟩ [untitled in the manuscript] (270)	ff. 136r–137r	1409	1
Quedam propositiones excerpte de lectione cancellarii parisiensis Anno 1409o apud Sanctum Victorem occasione cuiusdam dubitationis in facto unius militis cartusiensis (103)	ff. 137r–141v	1410	4
Anno 1410 crastino annunciationis (103a)[63]	ff. 141v–143v	1410	2
Littera cancellarii parisiensis ad suum fratrem Nicolaum Celestinum loquens de altero fratre suo Iohanne nouiter recepto in eodem ordine (23)	ff. 143v–145v	c. 1408	1
Cause propter quas cancellariam dimittere uolebat (2)	ff. 146r–149v	c. 1400	1
Propositio facta coram anglicis parisius euntibus ad sacrum Consilium Pisis et hoc ex parte uniuersitatis parisiensis Anno domini 1408 (271)	ff. 149v–157v	1409?	6
Propositio facta coram Consilio Generalis Constan(tiensis) ex parte regis francie … Anno domini 1416 die quinta maij responsiua ad quendam propositionem ex parte domini burgundie per episcopum attrabatensem prius videlicet die secunda dicti mensis factam (220)	ff. 157v–168v	1416	3
Et tunc postmodum dominus Cancellarius …[64]	f. 169r–v	1416	1
Tractatus de considerationibus quas debet habere princeps (42)	ff. 170r–178v	1417	3
Epistola quid et qualiter studere debeat nouus theologie auditor (5)[65]	ff. 178v–182v	1400	2
Epistola missa studentibus collegii nauerre parisiensis (6)	ff. 182v–186v	1400	1

63 Cf. Calvot and Ouy, *L'oeuvre de Gerson à Saint-Victor*, pp. 120–121.

64 Cf. Calvot and Ouy, *L'oeuvre de Gerson à Saint-Victor*, p. 75. Glorieux edits this among his documents in Vol. 10, p. 542 (document 72).

65 The work begins "Stimulavit me …" on *OC* 2.31. The first part of the letter appears below on f. 190r–v. In earlier editions these two were edited as separate letters. See further E. Vansteenberghe, "Quelques écrits de Jean Gerson, III. La première lettre de Gerson au collège de Navarre (texte intégral et date: 29 avril 1400)", in: *Revue des sciences religieuses* 13 (1933), pp. 411–424.

(cont.)

Work	Folios	Year	MSS
Epistola ad suum fratrem Iohannem[66] (9)	ff. 186v–189r	1401	1
Epistola ad dominum priorem ex parte fratris sui Nicolai super eiusdam fragilitate (10)	f. 189r–v	1401–1402	1
Epistola (4)	ff. 189v–190r	1400	1
Epistola (5)	f. 190r–v	1400	2
Letter to his brother Nicholas or to his superior [untitled in MS] (12)	ff. 190v–191v	1402	1
⟨Sermo de vita clericorum⟩ [untitled in MS] (239)	ff. 193r–201v	1404	3
Sermo super de omnibus sanctis (253)	ff. 201v–206r	1400	2
Sermo super in cena domini (236)	ff. 206r–208v	1397	3
Ps.-Augustinus, *De assumptione BMV*	ff. 209v–215v	??	??
Annotatio quorundam doctorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt (101)	f. 222r–v	1429?	13
Meditatio devota [?]. Brevia particula dominice orationis (408)	ff. 222v–223r	1400–1415	9
De illuminatione cordis (410)	ff. 223r–223v	before July 1417	3
Rufinus Aquileiensis, *De epiphaniis*	ff. 225r–228r	??	??
Anselmus Cantuariensis, *Epistola ad Lanzonem*	ff. 223v–230v	??	??
Tractatus de duplici statu in ecclesia dei curatorum uidelicet et priuilegiatorum (424)	ff. 230v–232v	before June 1409	27
Testamentum peregrini (400)	ff. 232v–234v	c. 1404	11
First letter to Barthélémy Clautiers [untitled in MS] (13)	ff. 235r–239v	1402	3
Johannes de Schonhavia, *Libellus*, excerpt	ff. 240r–244r	??	??
Second letter to Barthélémy Clautiers [untitled in MS] (26)	ff. 247r–250v	1408	2

66 In the edition, however, the addressee is given as Nicholas.

Appendix B: Edition

I have used Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. 675, as the base text, with variants from Greifswald, Bibliothek des geistlichen Ministeriums, Hs. XIII.E.76, as reprinted in Theodor Pyl, "Die Handschriften und Urkunden in der Bibliothek der Nicolai-Kirche zu Greifswald", in: *Baltische Studien* 21:1 (1866), pp. 141–144. For the sake of comparison, I have also included variants from the three manuscripts that belong to the second and third recensions of the work in the reconstruction of André Combes: H (second recension) and LR (third recension). See his *Essai sur la critique de Ruysbroeck par Gerson*, Paris, 1945–, 1.822–824, 868–869.

Sigla

Gn Giessen, Universitätsbibliothek, Hs. 675, f. 222$^{r–v}$

1866 Greifswald, Bibliothek des geistlichen Ministeriums, Hs. XIII.E.76, f. 213^{v}, as reprinted in Theodor Pyl, "Die Handschriften und Urkunden in der Bibliothek der Nicolai-Kirche zu Greifswald", in: *Baltische Studien* 21:1 (1866), pp. 141–144.

H Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 3126, f. 184$^{r–v}$

L Lyon, Bibliothèque municipale, Ms. 2005, f. 203^{v}

R Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. lat. 17489, ff. 155^{v}–156^{r}

Annotatio quorundam doctorum qui de contemplatione locuti sunt. Venerabilis magistri Iohannis Gerson.

Magnus dyonisius edoctus a paulo primus videtur hanc theologiam speculative tradidisse in suo de mistica theologia. Et in aliis libris suis sepius interserit.

Hugo de arra anime, et in tractatu de oratione, de archa noe, et super ecclesiasten, presertim in prologo, et super celestem gerarchiam, precipue vii° capitulo. Et alibi.

Venerabilis Richardus sequax et discipulus hugonis, ambo de sancto uictore dicti, materiam hanc ab aliis sub collaudatione vel admonitione traditam, reducit ad modum artis et doctrine in suo de archa mistica. Cuius insuper scripta fere omnia nichil nisi contemplationem sapiunt aut resonant.

Cassianus in collationibus patrum, nominatim in illa de caritate.

Augustinus in de vera religione, et confessionibus, et de diligendo deum, et de trinitate, et alibi pluries, ut per totum psalterium.

Alimachus in suo libro de xxx- gradibus scale.

Gregorius in suis moralibus sparsim, specialiter in vi, et in iii omelia super ezech[ielem].

Bernardus super cantica, et de diligendo deum, et ad fratres karthusienses de monte dei. Et alibi.

Auctor de spiritu et anima.

Bonaventura in suo itinerario totum miro et compendiosissimo artificio complexus est et in suo stimulo amoris.

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1 quorundam doctorum] doctorum aliquorum HLR 4 suo] sua 1866 6–8 Hugo … alibi] *om.* HLR 6 de] in 1866 ‖ archa] arrha 1866 7 ecclesiasten] Ecclesiasticen 1866 ‖ gerarchiam] ierarchiam 1866 8 vii° capitulo] *inv.* 1866 9–10 sequax … dicti] quasi primus post eum H: *om.* LR 11 archa] arrha 1866 12 fere omnia nichil] omnia nichil fere HLR ‖ contemplationem] contemplatione 1866 ‖ aut] ac 1866 12–13 resonant] Est et libellus Hugonis De arrha animae et de oratione *add.* HLR 15 in] *sup. lin.* Gn: suo *add.* H 16 et] in suo *add.* H: in *add.* LR ‖ et] ac H 17 Alimachus] Climacus HLR 1866 ‖ xxx-] triginta LR 18 suis] *om.* H ‖ vi] sexto HLR 1866 ‖ iii] tertia HLR: 3 1866 ‖ omelia] homilia HLR: homeliis 1866 20 karthusienses] *om.* HLR 21 alibi] Hugo, in suo De arca Noe, et De oratione, et Super Ecclesiasten, presertim in prologo, et Super celesten hierarchiam, presertim VII° capitulo, et alibi *add.* H: Hugo, De arca Noe, et De oratione, et Super Ecclesiastem, presertim in prologo, et Super celestem hierarchiam, precipue septimo capitulo, et alibi *add.* LR 22–23 Auctor de spiritu et anima. Bonaventura in suo] Bonaventura Auctor de spiritua et anima in suo 1866 23 itinerario] ite- *sed corr. sup lin. in* iti- Gn ‖ compendiosissimo] compendioso 1866 24 et] *sup. lin.* Gn

Sunt alii tractatus compilati a novellis ut Stimulus amoris ad Christi passionem, et alter liber de triplici via: cuius inicium est: Vie syon lugent. Et alius de novo seculo. Et alter de vii itineribus eternitatis. Scripta sunt denique super hoc in vulgari, et in sermonibus quibusdam ad clerum, et parvulis tractatulis, que omnia dinumerare non est nostrum.

Eleganter quidam: Opto inquit magis sentire compunctionem, quam scire eius diffinitionem.[67]

Actus est prior potentia, et perfectum imperfecto. Ista est veritas illa super quam fundatur resolutorie omnis demonstratio demonstrandi deum esse, nec apparet mihi veritas aliqua cercior et evidentior dum bene resolvo terminos, ita quod actus purus et perfectio sine imperfectione et deus, sunt convertibiliter idem. Non enim potest aliud maius et perfectius cogitari quam actus purus et perfectio sine imperfectione: quam deus. Aristoteles ponit in forma ix° metha⟨physicam⟩ veritatem predictam, et exemplificat in multis. Sicut homo vir prius est puero, quia puerum generat, et semen posterius est quam homo, sicut ovum quam gallina, hanc veritatem assumit Boethius 3° de consolatione post illud metrum divinum: O qui perpetua. Ad probandum deum esse, ubi dicit quod natura semper incipit a perfectis, et ita tandem oportet devenire ad primum perfectum quod est deus. Ergo pridem ludens mecum composui hos duos versiculos:

> Esse deum verum probat imperfectio rerum,
> Quas sine perfecto fingere nemo potest.

1 tractatus] tractus R 1–2 passionem] auctor cujus est Hugo de Balma *add.* H 2 via] ad deum *add.* 1866 ‖ lugent] quem Hugo de Balvia composuit 1866 3 alius] alter HLR ‖ vii] septem LR 1866 ‖ eternitatis] cujus initium est Eum qui venit ad me non ejiciam foras, De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum, cujus tertia pars suspecta est *add.* H 3–4 denique] aliqua *add.* HLR 1866 4 et] in H 5 tractatulis] tractatibus HL: tractantibus R ‖ dinumerare] denominare 1866 ‖ est nostum] *inv.* HLR: est necessarium 1866 6–22 Eleganter … potest] *om.* HLR 16 veritatem] veritatem *exp. sed rescr.* Gn ‖ assumit] assumit *exp. sed rescr.* Gn 18 semper] semper *exp. sed rescr.* Gn

67 *De imitatione Christi*, 1.1.6–8. Cf. Michael Josephus Pohl (ed.), *Thomae Hemerken a Kempis canonici regularis ordinis S. Augustini de Imitatione Christi quae dicitur libri IIII cum ceteris autographi Bruxellensis tractatibus*, Freiburg i. B. 1904, p. 6.

PART 7

Prospects of the Second Scholastic

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CHAPTER 22

Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) on John Duns Scotus's Metaphysical Groundworks of Theology: The Controversies on Infinity*

Roberto Hofmeister Pich

Introduction

There cannot be any doubts about the place of the Franciscan master Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) as one of the greatest names of Latin American colonial scholasticism. Briceño was born in Santiago de Chile, but he best be characterized as belonging to what could be considered the second generation of Scotist scholars in Peru—i.e., the generation after Jerónimo Valera (1568–1625).[1] Those scholars were all, more specifically, related to Lima, having acted and/or studied at the Convent of San Francisco de Lima, where Briceño himself received his philosophical and theological education and later worked as "Professor Primarius" and also as "Professor Iubilatus" of Sacred Theology.[2] On European soil, Alfonso Briceño gave lectures in Madrid and Rome, publishing, between 1639 and 1642, his remarkable and highly speculative *Controversiae* in the Spanish city.

The *Controversiae* are instrumental to form a clear picture of the reception of Scotus's (and Scotist) thought and the atmosphere of intellectual debates within the Franciscan Order and other academic institutions in those parts of

* In this essay, I make use of passages taken from two previous studies: R.H. Pich, "Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the *Controversiae* on John Duns Scotus's Philosophical Theology: The Case of Infinity", in: *The Modern Schoolman* 89 (2012), pp. 65–94; R.H. Pich, "Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) sobre o conceito de infinitude: três debates scotistas fundamentais", in: A.S. Culleton; L. Streck; R.R. Reis (orgs.), *Festschrift* [*um tributo a Ernildo Stein*]*: viveu às voltas com a metafísica e a fenomenologia*. São Leopoldo 2015, pp. 159–182. At any rate, the passages are rearranged and refined in many aspects. Section 3 is totally new vis-à-vis the 2012 essay, and its exposition is more detailed than the one offered in the 2015 study.

1 Cf. R.H. Pich, "Notas sobre Jerónimo Valera e suas obras sobre lógica", in: *Cauriensia* 6 (2011), p. 171.

2 Cf. M. Skarića, "Alonso Briceño. Apuntes para una historia de la filosofía en Chile", in: *La Cañada* 1 (2010), pp. 6–21.

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the "New World". Particularly Alfonso Briceño's knowledge about John Duns Scotus was taken to be so thorough that one of the censors of his books put down in writing how he used to be called by his contemporaries: "Scotulus", due to his congenial "sharpness of intelligence" (*ingenii acumen*) and intelectual "strength" or "vivacity" (*acritas*).[3] Fortunately, we nowadays have studies that help locate Alfonso Briceño's volumes in Latin American catalogues and libraries.[4] On the other hand, these extensive volumes remain sorely uninvestigated, although nearly all central issues of John Duns Scotus's theology and philosophy are discussed in them with a detailed consideration to the current debates on his doctrines.

What kind of literature did Briceño produce? He published 12 "Controversies" dealing with major subjects of John Duns Scotus's commentaries on the First Book of Peter of Lombard's *Sentences*, i.e., Scotus's *Ordinatio* I, although he actually shows profound knowledge, takes into consideration, and makes an extensive use of Scotus's entire *opera*. The *Controversiae* were transmitted in two volumes, published in Madrid in the period from 1639 to 1642.[5] It is important to realize that both volumes comprise only the *Pars Prima* of the controversies initially intended by Briceño. There are certain reasons to assume that the Chilean Master planned a *Pars Secunda*—in a third volume—that would treat the will and the power of God, as well as divine predestination and the Trinity, hence completing a comprehensive set of debates on all central topics of Scotus's thought in *Ordinatio* I. However, either the volume manuscript completely disappeared or it was actually never written.[6] In spite of some spec-

3 Cf. Alfonso Briceño, *Prima Pars Celebriorum Controversiarum in Primum Sententiarum Ioannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilis*, Madrid 1639 (1642), Vols. I–II. From now on, Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae …*, I (Volume I of the *Pars Prima*) or II (Volume II of the *Pars Prima*).

4 Cf. W.B. Redmond, *Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America*, The Hague 1972, p. 20; M.P. Cenci, "Notas bibliográficas sobre Alfonso Briceño", in: *Cauriensia* 6 (2011), pp. 213–232.

5 Claus A. Andersen, "Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition, "praecisiones obiectivae", and the Formal Distinction in Mastri and Belluto and Later Scotists Authors", in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 108:1–2 (2015), pp. 235–236 (pp. 183–247), footnote 127, suggests that "[i]t rather seems, however, that there were two editions of the work, one which was printed in 1638–1639 by the Typographia Regia in Madrid and another which was printed by Antonio Beller (Antonius Bellerus) in the same city in 1642. Except for the name of the printer and the year of publication, this latter edition […] seems to be altogether identical with the first one".

6 Cf. Cenci, "Notas bibliográficas …", cit., pp. 218–219; Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 2, p. 106.

ulations,[7] there is no exact and convincing information about any manuscripts that might have been left by Alfonso Briceño.[8]

What are, then, the contents and the structure of the *Controversiae*? The first interesting part of Volume I is the "Historical Apparatus" or the "Apologia" of the life and doctrine of Scotus, who is called "Subtle Doctor" and presented as a distinguished proponent of the Immaculate Conception. Briceño not only writes a biography of Scotus, but also an extensive history of the Franciscan school since Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure, including Scotus's historical "hearers" and "followers"—Francis of Mayronis, John of Bassolis, Peter Auriol, and William of Rubio, all of them appearing on the frontispiece of the edition—, in order to eventually justify the place of Scotus as the main authority and most representative figure of Franciscan thought.[9] More precisely, Scotus is presented as the "principal" (*praefectus*) on the school of the Minor Franciscans.[10] Before delving into the controversies themselves, Briceño offers a "Proaemium seu prolusiones authoris ad controversias theologicas",[11] which includes thirteen "Preparations" for the *Controversies*. Although the connection between the Preparations to the *Controversies* remains unclear in some aspects, one can realize that Briceño mainly exposes theological issues in the internal debates of Franciscan-Scotist circles, which were, however, discussed also by "Thomists", who usually defend opposite views.[12]

Essentially, the *Controversies* offer a "metaphysical doctrine" of God. Alfonso Briceño attempts to reveal the correct fundaments of theology, and this pre-

7 Cf. Redmond, *Bibliography of the Philosophy …*, cit., p. 20; Á. Muñoz García, "Alonso Briceño, filósofo de Venezuela y América", in: *Patio de Letras* 2:1 (2004), p. 126 (pp. 115–130).

8 R. Urdaneta, *Alonso Briceño: primer filósofo de América*, Caracas 1973, p. 99, informs us that Briceño's large personal library (containing over one thousand books) was inventoried after his death, and the list is located at the Archivo Episcopal de Caracas (Venezuela). There is a copy of it at the Franciscan Academy of History in Washington. Briceño was Bishop of Nicaragua and of Caracas; he died in Trujillo (Venezuela) in 1668, although some authors mention the year 1669. Cf. also W. Hanisch Espíndola, *En torno a la filosofía en Chile (1594–1810)*, Santiago de Chile 1963, p. 28; I. Manzano, "Alonso Briceño (1587–1668): Franciscano, Pensador, Obispo", in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 85 (1992), pp. 333–366.

9 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, *Apparatus Historicus*, pp. I–CXCVI.

10 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, *Prolusiones*, pp. 128–147. Briceño can be considered as the first Latin American author to have written a kind of "history of philosophy"; cf. Urdaneta, *Alonso Briceño: primer filósofo …*, cit, p. 27.

11 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, *Prolusiones*, pp. 3–147.

12 Cf. R.H. Pich, "Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the *Controversiae* on John Duns Scotus's Philosophical Theology: The Case of Infinity", in: *The Modern Schoolman* 89 (2012), p. 67.

cisely amounts to an investigation of seminal metaphysical ideas. He even claims that, by so doing, he imitates old habits in that regard, namely Thomas Aquinas's procedure in his theological commentaries[13] and, of course, John Duns Scotus's approach as well.[14] Briceño feels compelled to discuss "metaphysical subjects" (*metaphysicalia*), regarding them as a solid apparatus to major theological issues.[15] The *Controversies* begin with an account of the *essence* and *simplicity* of God's nature,[16] followed by an analysis of the *unity* of God,[17] the ontological *truth* of God,[18] and the *goodness* of God.[19] Up to this point, it is clear that the theoretical scheme pursued by Briceño was an account of God's essence and attributes in which, after a general treatment of them and considerations about the distinction between essence and attributes, as well as the differences among attributes themselves (*Controversy* I), he proceeds to present the attributes "in specie". Assuming a given doctrine of being and its convertible properties, Briceño believes that he first of all has to—and he does so at length and in a detailed manner—take into consideration the attributes of God insofar as God is conceived through the most general concept of "being", which is common to created things too. As it is well known in the Scotist tradition, the properties of being are "unitas", "veritas in essendo", and "bonitas",[20] and since "ens" can be predicated of God and those attributes are convertible to being, it seems that one is entitled to treat them as attributes of God as well. It is only after this that Briceño explores "other perfections of

13 For example, Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 5, aa. 1–6 (on the good), or I, q. 11, aa. 1–4 (on the unity of God), (cura et studio Sac. Petri Caramello cum textu et recensione leonina), *Summa theologiae—Pars prima et prima secundae*, Torino—Roma 1952.

14 For example, Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–3 ("On the Knowability of God"), (editio Vaticana), *Opera omnia III: Ordinatio—Liber primus: distinctio tertia*, Civitas Vaticana 1954, pp. 1–123, where the Subtle Doctor offers an account of God from "the principles of the nature of being and of its properties", or Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 3, p. 1, (editio Vaticana), *Opera omnia VII: Ordinatio—Liber secundus: a distictione prima ad tertiam*, Civitas Vaticana 1973, pp. 1–239, where Scotus discusses in seven questions "the individuation of material substance".

15 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 2, pp. 106–107.

16 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 1, pp. 1–105.

17 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 2, pp. 106–202.

18 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 3, pp. 203–242.

19 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 4, pp. 243–252.

20 For Scotus's view on these properties of being, cf. L. Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. *Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Münster ^{2}1989, pp. 99–143; G. Sondag, *Duns Scot. La métaphysique de la singularité*, Paris, 2005, pp. 89–102.

God", namely what he calls "the most singular affections of the divine nature" (*singularissimae divinae naturae affectiones*), which are actually the so-called modes of being of John Duns Scotus's metaphysics.[21] According to this structure of exposition, Briceño explains, in *Controversy* 5, the "infinity of God",[22] explaining afterwards the "immensity of God",[23] the "immutability of God"[24] and the "eternity of God".[25] Briceño also wants to expose the perfections that are attributed to God from creatures and that are less abstract and universal in the sense of appertaining *to an intellectual substance*. These are the "scientific knowledge" (*scientia*), the "will" (*voluntas*), and the "affect" (*affectus*) of an intellectual substance.[26] Presupposition for this is a remarkably extensive discussion on the "knowability of God for us",[27] as well as a much shorter controversy about the "incomprehensibility of God".[28] Of the three just mentioned perfections, Alfonso Briceño seems to have treated only "scientific knowledge", whereas "will" and "affect" were apparently left for corresponding *Controversies* in an intended *Pars Secunda* (in the unpublished Volume III). In fact, in Volume II of the *Pars Prima*, Briceño explores, in two further disputations about Scotus's doctrine, "God's scientific knowledge" (*Controversy* 11)[29] and, finally, "the ideas or the exemplars in the divine intellect" (*Controversy* 12).[30]

Still, we should ask how Briceño himself methodologically understands his own intellectual project of studying "Franciscan thought". What are the fundamental forms of Briceño's writing and debating? Again, the *Preparations* offer important clues. There, Briceño puts forward thirteen lengthy prefaces to dis-

21 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 2, p. 106.

22 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, pp. 253–291.

23 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 6, pp. 292–337.

24 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 7, pp. 338–360.

25 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 8, pp. 361–387.

26 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 2, p. 106.

27 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 9, pp. 388–712.

28 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 10, pp. 713–738.

29 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, II, 11, pp. 1–444; on the knowledge of the "future contingents" in *Controversia* 11, cf. M. Skarića, "Si los futuros contingentes son conocidos por Dios en si mismos, o sea, en su verdad determinada—Alonso Briceño (Introducción y traducción del latín: Mirko Skarića)", in: *Philosophica* 15 (1992), pp. 205–251; M. Skarića, "Predeterminación y libertad en fray Alonso Briceño", in: *Philosophica* 16 (1993), pp. 57–63; M. Skarića, "El conocimiento divino de los actos futuros en Báñez, Molina, Suárez y Briceño", in: *Philosophica* 29 (2006), pp. 287–303. Cf. Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, II, 11, pp. 1–444 (on the knowledge of the "future contingents"), and II, 12, pp. 445–565 (on "the ideas or the exemplars in divine intellect").

30 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, II, 12, pp. 445–565.

charge some erroneous claims in relation to John Duns Scotus, and—just like Francis of Mayronis, John of Bassolis, Peter Auriol, and William of Rubio before him[31]—he intends to continue paying honor to the "monuments" of Scotus's doctrines. Not only does Briceño make use of and *verbatim* transcribes comments by these "Scotists" of the first historical circle(s), but he also sees himself, in a sense, as one of them.[32] Briceño is concerned about the fact that "recent authors" (*neoterici*) silently disregard these great interpreters as if they could say something new and correct without first absorbing the available commentaries on Scotus's theological and philosophical views. Briceño thus wants to advance his intellectual work with proper consideration of the history of philosophy (i.e. of what is actually written in the sources of Scotus himself and of his first and immediate followers and interpreters). In order to find a motto, he quotes Bishop Synesius of Cirene (ca. 370–ca. 413): "It is less impious to steal the robe of a dead man than to steal a book from him".[33] Thinkers of the past must be studied, following the claim of going back *quasi ad fontes*, testing new theological views in the light of the original ones.

As already mentioned, the general scheme of Briceño's systematic construction of the *Controversies* follows a philosophical doctrine of God. If the first four *Controversies* were disputations on the "properties of the divine nature", namely those that belong to Deity as long as Deity is conceivable by creatures through the most abstract concept of being, Briceño's aim is also to treat the attributes

31 On the four historical "auditores", cf. Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, *Proaemium seu Prolusiones*, § 4, p. 3. It is unlikely that William of Rubio, a Spanish Franciscan Friar from Aragon, might have been a direct "hearer" of Scotus. In Paris, he was indeed a student in the period of 1315–1325, under Francis of Marchia. Cf. F. Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peter von Candias, des Pisaner Papstes Alexander V*, Münster 1925, pp. 253sqq.; B. Geyer (Hrsg.), *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie—Zweiter Teil: Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie*, Darmstadt [11]1960, p. 787.

32 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, *Proaemium seu Prolusiones*, § 1, p. 1. In fact, G. Cacciatore, "La escolástica española y la génesis de la filosofía latinoamericana. Alonso Briceño: metafísica e individualidad", in: *Revista de Filosofía y Psicología* 14:1 (2006), pp. 5–24, has again stressed the legitimacy of finding in Briceño a perfect example not only of a Scotist thinker able to promote new ideas within his tradition and regarding the disputations of his time, but also a confirmation of the (historiographical) hypothesis that Latin American scholasticism was by no means restricted to a repetition of Aquinas's theology and philosophy, either as such or according to the syntheses provided by authors such as Francisco Suárez and Gabriel Vázquez. This approach was first supported by J.D. García Bacca, "Introducción", in: *Alfonso Briceño—Disputaciones metafísicas* (*1638*), texto traducido del original latino por el Dr. Juan David García Bacca, Caracas 1955, pp. 15–62.

33 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, *Proaemium seu Prolusiones*, § 2, pp. 1–2.

predicated of God "precisely and strictly". But before doing so, he disserts on the modes of the divine nature, and, for that purpose, our author believes it necessary to distinguish "modes" from "attributes".[34]

What is a "modus" of God? Modes "are certain affections, or *quasi* affections of Deity, separate from it through reason alone, which are coherent with Him [i.e.: God] not somehow like those [aspects] that are attributed to the divine nature beginning from creatures in the way of qualities, or of inherences of forms, as the etymology of this word *attributum* brings forth".[35] Attributes, unlike modes, point to qualities or something like a "quid tributum" to God, beginning from creatures. The examples are "wisdom, mercy, justice, etc.", so that it becomes obvious that Briceño is talking about "pure perfections".[36] But (divine) modes are not attributed to God from creatures, for we do not find in them something like those qualities which can also be found in creatures: modes are rather the most singular *affections* of God. "Infinity" is of that kind, as well as "immensity", "immutability", and "eternity with necessity in being […]".[37] Truly, infinity plays a central role in the doctrine of divine modes, because all other modes are "connotations" of infinity in the fundamental sense of negation of finitude in essence.[38]

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34 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, p. 253.

35 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, p. 253: "Modo tamen antequam ad caetera attributa, quae presse et stricte Dei attributa astruuntur, descendamus; de modis divinae naturae disserendum est. Est enim distinguendo modos ut hic acceptos ab attributis; modi enim sunt quaedam affectiones, seu quasi affectiones Deitatis, ab illa solum per rationem dissitae, quae ei non cohaerent quasi divinae naturae ex creaturis tribuantur adinstar qualitatum, seu inhaerentium formarum, ut huius vocis *attributum* ethymologia praesefert; […]".

36 On the Scotist doctrine of pure perfections, cf. A.B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus*, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1946, pp. 162–175; J. Seifert, "A vontade como perfeição pura e a nova concepção não-eudemonística do amor segundo Duns Scotus", in: *Veritas* 50:3 (2005), pp. 51–84; Th.S. Leite, *O estatuto transcendental das* perfectiones simpliciter *na metafísica de João Duns Scotus* (Ph.D. Thesis, Graduate Program in Philosophy of the PUCRS), Porto Alegre 2013, 151pp. Cf. also below, Section 3 and its subdivisions.

37 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, p. 253: "[…]; quasi quid Deo ex creaturis tributum indicet; huius rationis sunt, sapientia, misericordia, iustitia, etc. Quae proprie attributa asseruntur, quia sunt formae adinstar qualitatum ex creaturis petitae; modi enim stricte accepti de quibus sequens disputatio disserit, Deo ex creaturis non tribuuntur; cum in illis non reperiantur quasi qualitates, sed sint singularissimae Dei affectiones".

38 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 6, p. 292; I, 7, p. 338; I, 8, p. 361.

The present study provides a depiction of the structure, method, and intellectual atmosphere of Briceño's philosophizing by exploring in particular the discussions of infinity in *Controversy* 5. It is well known that the concept of "infinite being" plays a special role in Scotus's metaphysics, both in the sense of being the best conceptual device to essentially think of God[39] and in the sense of (apparently) finding in the disjunctive property *infinitum-finitum* the first and most fundamental ontological division of reality.[40] Briceño restates these issues, and by so doing he partially confirms theses and partially points to new problems and directions about ontological infinity. Therefore, this should be both a case study about how Medieval and Iberian scholasticisms were studied in colonial academic institutions and about how colonial scholasticism was able to make important contributions to and beyond these traditions. Accordingly, I will explore and analyze *three* aspects of Briceño's discussions on infinity.[41] The first aspect is Briceño's understanding of infinity as such, following Duns Scotus's steps and confronting them with Thomistic views (1). The second point is the problem of how infinity is conceived by Briceño insofar as it has to be *essentially* predicated both of God, or the divine nature, and of attributes (2). Briceño's third controversial discussion on infinity concerns the question whether all "properties" in God, and specifically the "divine persons", are "formally infinite" (3).[42]

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39 Cf. R.H. Pich, "Infinite Creator", in: *Quaestio* 15 (2015), pp. 139–168.

40 Cf. for example, L. Honnefelder, *La métaphysique comme science transcendentale*, Paris 2002, pp. 61–77; Idem, *Duns Scotus*, München 2005, pp. 88–112.

41 Expositions of the Scotist theory of infinity can be found in: L. Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens—Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit* (*Duns Scotus—Suárez—Wolff—Kant—Peirce*), Hamburg 1990, pp. 108–199; R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, Oxford 1999, pp. 39–45; Idem, *Duns Scotus on God*, Aldershot 2005, pp. 91–98; G. Sondag, "Jean Duns Scot sur l'infini extensif et l'infini intensif", in: *Revue Thomiste* 105 (2005), pp. 111–122; R.H. Pich, "Infinity and Intrinsic Mode", in: R.H. Pich (ed.), *New Essays on Metaphysics as Scientia Transcendens*, Louvain-la-Neuve 2007, pp. 159–214; Idem, "Infinite Creator", cit., pp. 139–168.

42 Cf. Juan Duns Escoto, *Quodlibet* V, (introducción, resúmenes y versión de Felix Alluntis), *Cuestiones cuodlibetales*, Madrid 1968, pp. 165–201; R.H. Pich, "O *Quodlibet* V de João Duns Scotus: introdução, estrutura e tradução", in: *Scintilla* 6 (2008), pp. 111–153; F. Alluntis, "Introducción a Juan Duns Escoto *Cuestiones Cuodlibetales*", in: Juan Duns Escoto, *Cuestiones cuodlibetales*, Madrid 1968, pp. XI–XVIII; Idem, "Introducción, resúmenes y versión de Juan Duns Escoto *Cuestiones Cuodlibetales*", in: Juan Duns Escoto, *Cuestiones cuodlibetales*, Madrid 1968.

1 The *Controversy* on Infinity: The First Point of Dispute

Briceño's *Controversy* 5, on infinity,[43] is divided into three articles. In Article 1, he deals with "the objective reason of divine infinity"; in Article 2, Briceño asks "whether infinity belongs to the essential concept of Deity and of the [divine] attributes"; finally, in Article 3, he undertakes the investigation "whether there is some property in God which is not formally infinite". In order to clarify such issues, which are clearly formulated according to Scotus's thought, Briceño mainly interprets *Quodlibeta* V and VI.[44]

In Article 1, Briceño presents an account of infinity as "limitlessness" (*illimitatio*) and discusses Thomas Aquinas's view on divine (or, more precisely, ontological) infinity. He settles doctrinal oppositions between both authors and highlights the way in which, decades before, the Jesuit Gabriel Vázquez (ca. 1549–1604) had approvingly disserted on Aquinas and had refuted Duns Scotus's views with invalid arguments.

1.1 *Briceño on Aquinas's "Objective Reason of Infinity"*

Making use of "infinitas" and "illimitatio" mostly as interchangeable terms,[45] Briceño first advances at least four senses of *infinitas* or *illimitatio* that keep the basic idea of "negation of being of finity" ("negatio esse finitionis") but do not yet grasp its fundamental meaning: (i) as "incomprehensible" or negation of comprehension; (ii) as "eternity" or negation of duration; (iii) as "non being of finity" (*non esse finitionis*) regarding place or space (i.e., as "immensitas"); (iv) as negation of finity with respect to the virtue of an agent (i.e., as "omnipotentia"). However, the negation of finity which Alfonso Briceño is concerned with is basically the one grasped after the quidditative concept of God and this which refers to what he calls the most formal reason of being, i.e., "limitlessness according to essence".[46]

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43 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, pp. 253–291.

44 As well as *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3 (cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, (editio Vaticana), *Opera omnia II: Ordinatio—Liber primus: distinctio prima et secunda*, Civitas Vaticana 1950, pp. 125–243); I, d. 3, pp. 1–3 (cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, (editio Vaticana), *Opera omnia III: Ordinatio—Liber primus: distinctio tertia*, Civitas Vaticana 1954, pp. 1–357); I, d. 8, pp. 1–2 (cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, (editio Vaticana), *Opera omnia IV: Ordinatio—Liber primus: a distinctione quarta ad decimam*, Civitas Vaticana 1956, pp. 153–328).

45 Juan Duns Escoto, *Quodlibet* V, (ed. Alluntis), cit., nn. 11, 56, pp. 171, 198, also uses, with the same meaning, "interminatum" and "illimitatum".

46 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 1, p. 254: "Quia infinitudinis rationem, non nisi per negationem finis apprehendimus, sicut multipliciter fit, ut res finiatur; ita et illimi-

Characteristically, Briceño first highlights Thomas Aquinas's "official" view on infinity in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 7, aa. 1–2[47]—something that Duns Scotus himself did (with some different accents) fundamentally in *Reportatio parisiensis* I A.[48] Briceño reproduces Aquinas's opinion by saying that God is infinite because God has no potentiality, and "finity" (*finitas*) or "limitedness" (*limitatio*) exists in something—actually *in anything*—where potentiality is contracted by some given form. In this account, "matter" is limited, for it is contracted by "form", and form is limited as well, due to its composition with a receptive principle. A well-known example can be found among spiritual entities such as an angelic being. An angel's essence is limited, for it *is* in act only through the existence that is received—in which the essence participates—and really distinct from the essence. But the received existence is also limited, because of the essence of the angel as its proper subject. An actual entity, in turn, *that is not received* in anything material or potential is not contracted nor limited at all. But God is a form that subsists through itself and is "unreceived": "Deity" is not received substantially in anything having potentiality. God is, for that reason, limitless.[49]

Scotus's original argument criticizes the view that infinity or finity of any essence is caused by or depends on something (like a relation) from outside or on the partaking in something other than the essence itself for having reality.[50] Although Briceño offers several lines of reasoning to show Scotus's "strength of argumentation",[51] I would like to focus on a Scotist argument he formulates against Aquinas and in particular against Vázquez as a Thomist interpreter.

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tationem multiplicem per illud non esse finitionis, quod exprimit infinitudo, investigare possumus. […]. At de his negationibus finitudinis aut terminationis nihil expendit praesens articulus; sed de alio non esse, quod apprehenditur consequi ad quidditativum conceptum Deitatis, quo Deitas est, et quatenus refert formalissimam rationem essendi; et haec appelatur illimitatio secundum essentiam. Verum in constituenda ratione obiectiva huius infinitatis dissident authores".

47 Cf. also L. Sweeney, *Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought*, New York 1992, pp. 546 sqq. According to I. Agostini, *L'infinità di Dio. Il dibattito da Suárez a Caterus (1597–1641)*, Roma 2008, pp. 245–246, 17th Century Scotists strongly focused on this traditional view in their harsh criticisms of Aquinas's account of ontological infinity. The author, id., ibid., pp. 263–264, outlines Briceño's criticism against Aquinas's and Vázquez's accounts.

48 John Duns Scotus, *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture—Reportatio I A*, I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, nn. 52–62, (Latin Text with English Translation by A.B. Wolter and O.V. Bychkov), St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 2004, pp. 130–133.

49 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 2, p. 254.

50 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 4, p. 255. Cf. Pich, "Infinite Creator", cit., pp. 150–157.

51 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 5, pp. 255–256.

Loyal to his method of giving voice to Scotus's "historical hearers", Briceño presents an argument by Peter Auriol[52] to refute the Thomistic view. Peter Auriol affirms that what cannot be made "limitless" by a power does not need, to be "limited", any limiting principle from outside. Every such thing is limited by its own nature. If such a thing were (essentially) "indifferent", it might be brought to actual limitlessness by some power. But it should be clear that this form cannot be made unlimited by any power; even God cannot make the form of a particular stone unlimited, for it is "ex se finita". Any given form does not need "matter" or some "extrinsic principle" in order to be limited. "In reality", everything is limited through itself. For Briceño this reasoning amounts to the point that the finitude of something is previous to the fact that *matter* is made finite through *form*, and *form* through *matter*. But of course, any infinity is impossible "intrinsically" (*ab intrinseco*) in any creatable matter or form: it is essentially incompatible with it. Briceño, by formulating a refutation of the "traditional" Thomistic view with the help of Auriol's remarks, wants to remain very close to Duns Scotus's views against Aquinas in *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 140–144, and *Reportatio parisiensis* I A, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, nn. 52–57.

1.2 *Briceño and the "Objective Reason of Infinity" according to Gabriel Vázquez*

If the first step of Briceño's discussion with the "Thomists" was centered on a criticism of Aquinas's more explicit view about infinity, in a second step he criticizes more extensively an account given by Gabriel Vázquez,[53] who proposed a different way of understanding the limitlessness of God according to the essence. Vázquez affirms that the objective reason of infinity according to

52 Petrus Aureolus, *Commentarii in Primum Librum Sententiarum*, Roma 1596, I, d. 43, a. 1. Cf. Alfonso Briceño, *Controversia* 5, a. 1, § 6, p. 256: "Sed alia non contemnenda excutit Cardinalis Aureolus, Thomistarum fundamentum, in 1. *Sentent. distinction.* 43, *articul.* 1. In haec verba: *Praeterea; illud quod per nullam potentiam potest fieri illimitatum, immo semper remanet limitatum, non indiget extrinseco limitante; quoniam omne tale oportet esse limitatum ex natura sua; alioquin si esset indifferens, posset per aliquam potentiam trahi ad illimitationem in actu; cum non sit aliquid possibile sine agente illud potente reducere ad actum. Sed manifestum est, quod forma per nullam potentiam potest fieri illimitata; non enim Deus potest formam istius lapidis signati facere infinitam: ex quo patet, quod ex se est finita. Ergo non indiget materia, aut alio extrinseco ad hoc, quod limitetur. Solum enim per hoc forma illimitata dicitur; quia potest intelligi, ut communis, et praedicabilis; et idem contingit de materia in conceptu specifico; in re autem quodlibet est per se limitatum, cum neutrum eorum eorum sit per se universale*".

53 Gabriel Bellomontanus Vázquez, *Commentarii ac disputationes in Primam Partem S. Thomae—Tomus Primus*, Ingolstadt 1609, disp. 25, c. 5, pp. 143–144.

the essence is formally the "negation of being through another". Assuming—on the essential level—that an "effect" is previously contained in a cause's "efficacy", one can infer that every produced thing captures a part of its cause and as a consequence is limited "through the force of such participation". What is meant by infinity, thus, is the "non-being of production or participation" (*non esse productionis sive participationis*) through which a given thing turns to be or, more simply, "is limited".[54]

The argument will not work either, Briceño believes. His second reply to Vázquez is particularly important. If we concede that we can only apprehend divine properties through analogy—Briceño is apparently conceding this point to Vázquez—, we are forced to concede that there is no possible created infinity or no possible infinity in nature, be it extensive or intensive, that can be apprehended through the negation of causal dependence. As an (unfortunate) alternative—or as the only alternative by means of analogous metaphysical concepts—, it would be necessary for someone to have knowledge of some being indeed, like God, that would be its "own being". The central idea in the background is that "creatable infinity"—or infinity as we are able to grasp it—, either in respect to quantitative mass or in respect to gradual perfection, can only be apprehended through "the negation *of limit*". Therefore, the limitlessness of God—thinking about the concept we can naturally possess—cannot be obtained through the negation *of cause*, but only through the "non being of finiteness of virtual quantity".[55]

Briceño's refusal of the second line of reasoning proposed by Thomistic authors remains in accordance with the line of reasoning that Duns Scotus once offered in his works: infinity as a modal determination applied to God is not to be conceived of as a negation *of a causal relation* or *of some kind of participation*, because infinity is a mode of being intrinsic to the essence which is so determined; on the philosophical level of argumentation, it is clearly Duns Scotus's view that infinity should be obtained from finity of being.[56]

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54 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 7, p. 256.

55 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 8, pp. 256–257: "[…]. Sed infinitas ista creabilis apprehenditur per negationem termini, sive secundum molem quantitativam, sive secundum gradualem perfectionem; igitur, et illimitatio Dei in tota ratione essendi non concipitur per negationem causae, a qua profluat, sed per non esse finitionis quantitatis virtualis Dei".

56 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 132, (editio Vaticana), cit., p. 207. Cf. Pich, "Infinite Creator", cit., pp. 142–147, 163–164.

1.3 *Excavating Scotus's* Quodlibet *V*

Briceño structures *Controversy* 5 by disputes. The point of departure for his sentence on the objective reason of infinity presupposes an explanation of Scotus's *Quodlibet* V, which Briceño extensively quotes indeed.[57] Four aspects of Briceño's exegesis should be highlighted: (i) Scotus's *Quodlibet* V allows us to affirm that in God something is conceived "through the way of substance" and something "through the way of quality". "Deity" is conceived as substance and is like a substrate of all attributable perfections; "infinity" is apprehended as its "magnitude" or "virtual quantity", namely a "most limitless and endless" quantity of virtue.[58] (ii) It is also a view of Scotus in *Quodlibet* V that from "deity" the infinity of attributes is brought about as from "an ocean of being". Briceño insists that Scotus does not talk of a kind of emanation after the intellect or an intelligible-logical emanation of "notions". There is a formal distinction between deity and attributes—which are "formalities"—, and attributes are neither mere intellectual nor mere real productions. (iii) Moreover, although relational hypostases are brought to light out of deity, no infinity is originated in that way.[59] Since infinity belongs to the essence and to each predicate of God, every given formality in God is to be *really* identified with every other formality. Accordingly, the personal relations of the Trinity cannot claim infinity to themselves, for they do not claim for themselves to be really identical with the "opposite hypostases".[60] (iv) A fourth, previous, observation concerns the grounds on which the attributable properties "obtain" infinity from deity, but not the hypostases. The explanation for that lies in the ultimate formal reasons of attributes and hypostases. Since an "attributable formality" has or allows for "communicability", it is able to bear infinity within itself, but the hypostases are not like that. The reason why a hypostasis does not take part in infinity is its *incommunicability* to another. And this is an ultimate explanation: such incapacity rests on a hypostasis's own formal reason.[61]

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57 Juan Duns Escoto, *Quodlibet* V, n. 5, (ed. Alluntis), cit., pp. 196–197; Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, §§ 10–12, 257.

58 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 13, pp. 257–258.

59 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 14, p. 258.

60 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 15, p. 258: "Quod de ratione infinitudinis est, ut salva discretione formali omnem alium gradum essendi, qui fomaliter est in Deo, sibi identificet realiter; adeo ut haec identitas non sit quidam quasi materialis plurium praedicatorum in eamdem entitatem conventus; sed quod de ratione huius formalitatis sit identificari alteri realiter, ut pressius in controversia de distinctione attributorum ab essentia exaratum est. Quo fit, ut relationes personales infinitudinem sibi non vendicent; utpote quae sibi non identificent realiter oppositas hypostases".

61 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, § 16, p. 258: "Ratio autem apud Scotum, quare a Dei-

1.4 *The True Account of Infinity*

Briceño achieves the first aim of his investigation—that is the definition of infinity—through two "affirmations". In order to understand Briceño's account, a first (and quite short) look at the first assertion can suffice: He confirms the fundamental insight that "infinity through essence" is expressed "through the non being of finity" (*per non esse finitionis*) in the quantity of virtue—i.e., in the quantity of ontological perfection—or in the quantity of God's actuality. In this way, Briceño remains loyal to the view that infinity belongs to the essence as such and—against Vázquez—is not obtained through the negation of some external relation, but rather through the negation of finite being.[62]

Given the importance of the principle that the concept of infinity proper to God is achieved through negation of finite being, Briceño offers more details of this view by exploring an account by Bonaventure given in 1 *Sent*. d. 43 a. un. q. 2.[63] This is a summary of what Bonaventure affirms: infinity is conceived through "negation" (*abnegatio*) of "end" (*finis*), and this allows for two senses of

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tate attributales proprietates infinitudinem hauriant; hypostases vero non ita; a propriis rationibus formalibus attributorum, et hypostasum, accipienda est. Eo quod formalitas attributalis habilis est, ut infinitudinem referat; hypostasis vero non. […]. Unde fit, ut sicut in rationem formalem hypostasis ultimo defertur, quod incommunicabilis sit alteri supposito; ita et a ratione formali eiusdem hypostasis peti debeat illa non habilitas, ut a Deitate, a qua quasi pullulare intelligitur, infinitudinem trahat; cum tamen a Deitate attributa propriam illimitationem hauriant. […]".

62 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, 1, 5, a. 1, § 17, p. 259.

63 Cf. Bonaventura, *Liber 1 Sententiarum*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, concl., (iussu et auctoritate R.mi P. Leonardi M. Bello), *Opera theologica selecta—Liber 1 Sententiarum*, editio minor, Ad Claras Aquas (Florentia) 1934, Tomus 1, pp. 769–770. Cf. Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, 1, 5, a. 1, §§ 17–18, p. 259: "17. His praelibitis, dicendum primo: infinitatem per essentiam exprimi per non esse finitionis in quantitate virtutis, seu actualitatis Dei. Ita sancti patres, et scolastici doctores uno excepto Vazquez, qui nimis extorte pro se allegat Dionysium *de Divinis nominibus*, *cap*. 9. Qui dum Dei magnitudinem, virtutisque quantitatem elucidat, nec vel subobscure innuit eam dependentiae negationem: adeo ut mirum sit quid negationis dependentiae ex Dionysii verbis in mentem ipsius Vazq. irrepere potuerit, ut sanctum doctorem ad tale commentum trahere excogitarit. […]. Nec committam, ut ex scholasticis doctoribus, Bonaventuram praetereram exactissime rem absolventem, in 1. *sent. dist*. 43, *quaestion*. 2. *art*. 1. §. […]. 18. […]. Huius assertionis probationes petendae sunt ab impugnatione Vazquez […]". On the problem of knowing or apprehending the infinite according to Bonaventure, cf. Andreas Speer, "Verstandesmetaphysik. Bonaventura und Nicolaus Cusanus über die (Un-)Möglichkeit des Wissens des Unendlichen", in: Martin Pickavé (Hrsg.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), Berlin—New York 2003, pp. 530–540 (especially pp. 536–540).

it (by focusing on each term—"negation" and "end"—in turn), namely (i) "from the part of negation" and (ii) "from the part of end". The second meaning (ii) is divided as well: (ii') for one, "end" or "finis" is a "complement"; accordingly, "infinite" would consist in the "privation of complement", as it is said to be in matter, in substance, and in other genera. Since this implies lack of perfection, "infinite" in this sense is not predicated of God. (ii'') On the other hand, "end" or "finis" is rather a "terminus" or "limit", like the "end [limit] of a land"; accordingly, "infinite" would be that which lacks "limit". Bonaventure again divides this last sense of "infinite", introducing (i) an account of "negation" (*negatio*) divided in two kinds: (i') "privatively" (*privative*) and (i'') "negatively" (*negative*). (i') There can be an "infinite" *privatively* because it has no term or limit, but it is nonetheless apt (by nature) to have a term or limit; after all, it has a "limited being" (considered as such and in actuality). In this case, we can actually obtain "uncompletedness" (*incompletio*), and uncompletedness cannot be applied to God. (i'') There can be an "infinite" *negatively* when something has no limit and *is not apt* to have a limit. This is the proper way to affirm "infinity" of God's essence. Briceño thus follows the principle of achieving the concept of "infinite" through the negation of "finite". Although he does not follow the discussion of Duns Scotus on how "infinite" could be conceived when taken as an opposition to "finite" (i.e., as the term of a given metaphysical "contrariety" or of an "opposition contrarily [*contrarie*]"),[64] or even the particular and fundamentally "positive" way Scotus seems to understand the prefix "in" in "infinitum" through the idea of being "beyond" (*ultra*) or "excelling" every given or givable finite measure,[65] the Chilean Franciscan master does follow the Subtle Doctor in the principle that in metaphysics we obtain—or at least logically understand—*infinitum* from *finitum*.[66]

64 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis* II, qq. 4–6, nn. 18–20, (ed. R. Andrews et alii), *Opera Philosophica III—Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Libri I–V*, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1997, pp. 244–245; John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio I A*, I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 62, (ed. Wolter-Bychkov), cit., p. 133.

65 Cf. especially Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, p. 1 qq. 1–2, n. 132, (ed. Vaticana), cit., p. 207; John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio I A*, I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3, n. 51, (ed. Wolter-Bychkov), cit., pp. 129–130.

66 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 1, §18, p. 259. Cf. Pich, "Infinite Creator", cit., pp. 142–147, 163–164.

2 Infinity and the Essential Concept of Deity and of the Attributes

As already mentioned, the purpose of Article 2 of *Controversy* 5 is to discuss the opinion of those who affirmed that infinity does not belong to the quiddity of God *and* of God's attributes. Briceño revisits here the interpretation that Peter Auriol had given to this issue—at the end, he rejects it. And Briceño explores a more disputed point as well, namely the controversial and difficult thesis that "infinity is formally multiplied according to the difference of the attributes"—which in fact is Briceño's verdict in Article 2, as we clearly read in this statement: "The true sentence is put down, namely that infinity is formally multiplied according to the difference of the attributes".[67] We can say that the dispute in Article 2 concerns more Scotists than Thomists indeed. After all, if we presume the formal distinction between essence and attributes, is it the same to inquire whether infinity is a mode of God's quiddity (or essence) or a mode of God's attributes? Or, still: Do the divine attributes demand an infinity which is proper to them and distinct from the infinity of the divine essence?[68]

Briefly speaking, several opinions contest both the thesis that infinity belongs essentially to divine essence and attributes and that there are multiple infinities corresponding to the full concept of divine essence and of each divine attributable property. Peter Auriol, for example, firmly rejects the latter, and, according to Briceño, Auriol[69] does so because he works with the rejection of the formal distinction *ex natura rei*. In what I take to be the metaphysically more relevant argument, Auriol, beyond denying that there are several formally

67 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, p. 264; I, 5, a. 2, §§17–25, pp. 264–267.

68 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, §§1–2, p. 260: "1. Supposita sententia Scoti constituentis distinctionem formalem inter essentiam, et attributa: idem est disquirere, utrum infinitas sit de quidditate Deitatis, et attributorum? Ac expendere, utrum attributa propriam sibi infinitudinem asciscant ab illimitatione Deitatis formaliter condiscretam? Si enim attributa essent idem formaliter cum infinitudine Deitatis; et Deitas ipsa a propria attributorum illimitatione formaliter non dissideret; nec Deitas, et attributa; ex natura rei secerni possent. Hoc igitur constituto. 2. Aliqui ex Scoti sectatoribus opinantur; ex doctrina Scoti inferri, infinitatem non esse de quidditate Deitatis, nec attributorum".

69 In fact, today's scholarship has characterized in detail this kind of opposition between Peter Auriol's and John Duns Scotus's views on major philosophical subjects; Auriol's initial "Scotism" was soon replaced by quite original positions which brought him closer to both a moderate form of Thomism and to particular forms of "conceptualism" in metaphysics; cf., for example, J.A. Merino, *Historia de la filosofía franciscana*, Madrid 1993, pp. 387–391; Russell L. Friedman, "Peter Auriol", in: E.N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/auriol/; last accessed December 28, 2016.

distinct infinities in God, actually suggests that attributes do not add—beyond deity itself—any further intrinsic objective reasons: they just bring a given connotation to external things. Premising that, if things (called infinite) are identical *in reality* and *in reason intrinsically*, it necessarily follows that they have intrinsically the same infinity, one is forced to conclude that it would be impossible to multiply infinity without multiplying really or in reason things called infinite. If one denies, as Auriol does, the formal distinction between pure perfections and deity, accepting only several distinct connotations (*in connotatis*), then infinity and further modes of all divine aspects will be the same and just one—"re et ratione"—indeed.[70]

2.1 *Scotus on Intensive Infinity, Essence, and Attributes*

In order to find the right verdict concerning the central question of Article 2, Briceño has to explore, again, Scotus's *Quodlibet* V. He analyzes Scotus's *Quodlibet* VI as well, where, following Augustine, Scotus sustained that the "magnitude" (and so infinity as "magnitude" or "quantity of virtue") is not "outside" the essential concept of God.

Two things must be kept in mind about Scotus's views in those important texts. *First*, *Quodlibet* V allows us to affirm that the intensive infinity is not related to "being" (*ens*) as "an extrinsic property" (*extrinseca passio*), and it is not said of "being" in the same way as "verum", "bonum", and "unum" are said of it.[71] Intensive infinity is an intrinsic mode, and as such it does not add anything essential to the real concept of "being" or to the being to which it applies. *Second*, there is a "knot" to be unraveled in Scotus's *Quodlibet* VI, namely the intriguing assumption that, for God, it is the same "to be" (*esse*) and "to be great" (*magnum esse*).[72] Truly, "to be great" is viewed as more intrinsic to God than the

70 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 7, p. 262: "Secundus modus sentiendi est eiusdem Aureoli loco citato asserentis; non dari in Deo plures infinitudines formaliter condistinctas. Qui consequenter loquitur ad eam, quam sequitur sententiam, dum autumat; attributa non addere supra Deitatem rationes aliquas obiectivas intrinsecas, sed solam connotationem ad extrinseca. […]. *Quandocumq; aliqua coincidunt in idem, et re, et ratione intrinsece. Necesse est, quod habeant intrinsece eamdem infinitatem; non enim potest multiplicari infinitas sine multiplicatione reali, vel rationis, eorum, quae dicuntur infinita. Sed declaratum est saepe, quod omnes perfectiones simpliciter coincidunt in rationem Deitatis, quamvis distinguantur in connotatis: ergo intrinsece eadem erit infinitas omnium divinorum*".

71 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, §§ 11–14, p. 263.

72 Juan Duns Escoto, *Quodlibet* VI, a. 1, n. 25, (introducción, resúmenes y versión de Felix Alluntis), *Juan Duns Scotus—Cuestiones cuodlibetales*, Madrid 1968, pp. 216–217.

attributes "iustus" or "sapiens", but it is not an attribute, and "to be great" *passes over* to God because of the "highest identity" (*summa identitas*).[73]

The solution to the second difficulty can be found, according to Alfonso Briceño, through a correct reading of an important passage by Scotus, where the Subtle Doctor affirms the following: "[As Augustine says] about this magnitude: "it is the same to be greater as to be better"; essential goodness, through which a species is better than another, is not something added to the essence".[74] The lesson to be taken from the passage is that, for John Duns Scotus, both in creatures and in God "magnitude" or "quantity of perfection" passes both into (a) a *real identity* with the "objective reason" of which it is a magnitude (i.e., essence and attributes) *and also* into (b) a *formal identity*, preserved through the formal reason of the magnitude, which is bound "to the same formality with the quiddity of which it is a magnitude". The core of this challenging passage seems to be this: magnitude, and hence infinity (or also finity), has a *real identity* with the quiddities of which it is a magnitude (it does not add anything to them *quidditatively*) and also a *formal identity* with the proper contents or the formalities of which it is a magnitude (it does not add anything to them *formally*). In other words yet: a magnitude is neither really nor formally distinct from the essence or the attributes of which it is a magnitude.[75] Not having such

73 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 15, p. 264.

74 Juan Duns Escoto, *Quodlibet* VI, a. 1, n. 25, (introducción, resúmenes y versión de Felix Alluntis), cit., pp. 216–217: "Respondeo: dico quod omni proprietate per impossibile vel possibile circumscripta ab essentia divina, ipsa habet propriam magnitudinem, scilicet propriam infinitatem; habet enim gradum intrinsecum, sicut res finita habet propriam finitatem; imo magis sicut si circumscribas ab homine omnem proprietatem, adhuc habet propriam finitatem in ordine entium. […]. Est enim una species entium, quantumcumque immaterialis, alteri speciei immateriali aequalis vel inaequalis secundum perfectionem; ergo manet in ea magnitudo secundum perfectionem ut fundans istam aequalitatem, et tamen transit ista magnitudo in essentiam per identiatem; quia ait Augustinus XVI *De Trinitate* cap. 8 de ista magnitudine: "Idem est maius esse quod melius esse"; bonitas enim essentialis, qua una species est melhor alia, non est res addita essentiae". Cf. also Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 16, p. 264.

75 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 16, p. 264: "[…]. Unde infert Scotus, quod tam in divinis, quam in creatis, magnitudo seu quantitas perfectionis non solum transit in identitatem realem cum ea ratione obiectiva, cuius est magnitudo, sed etiam in identitatem formalem retenta tamen ratione formali illius magnitudinis, quae in eamdem coit formalitatem cum quidditate, cuius est magnitudo. Unde concludit Scotus, quod magnitudo, seu quantitas virtutis rei, adita identitate cum ratione illa obiectiva, cuius est magnitudo, manet in illa ratione obiectiva, quam transcendit essentialiter; sicut re manet sua propria quidditas, quando non est destructa. […]".

distinctions is a metaphysical sign that reveals that such determination—or, in our case, such a "mode", i.e., infinity as a magnitude—is maximally intrinsic to the quiddity it puts some determination upon.

2.2 *Briceño on Intensive Infinity, Essence, and Attributes: Determinations*

Under these premises, the Chilean master is able to pronounce his sentences on the debated topic in Article 2 of *Controversy* 5. His "first assertion" is that magnitude or quantity of virtue belongs to the quiddity of being as such. "Magnitude" (*magnitudo*) or "absolute goodness" (*bonitas absoluta*)—which is used here explicitly as a measure of ontological perfection according to which one "species" is better than the other—consists in the "integrity due to every objective reason in such order of beings". It is this quantity of virtue of an entity that allows the affirmation that, after comparison with another entity, it is ontologically "superior" to or it is "surpassed by" the other regarding "intrinsic actuality and magnitude". Each thing has an "integrity" (*integritas*) through its own essence,[76] and essence plus integrity, i.e., a thing's essential constitution, explains why a given kind of being excels or is excelled by another kind of being. This is the way in which a thing has its own "goodness" or "quidditative magnitude".[77]

The "second assertion" consists in assuring that "infinity" belongs to the "ultimate concept" of the "objective reason of which it is infinity". Therefore, the limitlessness of God, on the one side, belongs to the ultimate concept of divine essence—as it belongs to the ultimate concept of an attribute too. On the other side, the infinity of every attribute "transcends the ultimate formality of it"—which seems to amount to the assumption that infinity is more than the formality itself or, in a certain aspect, still goes beyond it. But the point being

76 Cf. Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 4, a. un., §§ 9–12, pp. 247–249.

77 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 17, p. 264: "Assertio prima: quantitas seu magnitudo virtutis non est est extra quidditatem entis, prout a creato, et increato praescindit. Hoc est expressum Scoti pronuntiatum; quod vel hac brevi ratione fulcitur. Quia magnitudo seu bonitas absoluta, per quam una species est melhor alia; nil aliud est, quam integritas ea debita cuilibet rationi obiectivae in tali ordine entium, quae inferat essentialiter negationem diminutionis cuiuslibet praedicati, quod ad rationem obiectivam illius integritatis spectet: et quae facta comparatione ad aliam rem; sub ista quantitate virtutis, superet aliam, aut superetur ab intrinseca actualitate, et magnitudine alterius. Atqui res per suam essentiam integra est, ut in controversia de bonitate aperuimus: et per suam essentialem constitutionem excedit aliam speciem entis, aut exceditur ab illa: igitur, et bonitatem, ac magnitudinem quidditativam nanciscitur".

made is about belonging intrinsically to something. Surely, if we talk about the magnitude of being that is respective to God, this magnitude is "intensive infinity", a magnitude that we cannot measure or put a limit to. But what is crucial here is that such a mode of such a being *is quidditatively*: it is *quidditatively* what it is. This means that magnitude cannot be outside a thing's essence because it cannot be outside of the "quiddity of being" *as such*. Since being is predicated quidditatively of an essence, it will not be possible "to extract" a magnitude from the quidditative reason of a being—neither of the divine essence or being.[78]

Briceño's statement about the way in which an affection or a mode is attached to its quiddity could be reinforced by remembering what Scotus had established as an "excellent rule"[79] for the "verification", in divine being, of (identity) propositions formed by abstract terms that express formalities, such as "wisdom", "goodness", etc.[80] Propositions formed in those abstract terms—i.e., terms obtained through a "most precise abstraction" (*abstractio praecisissima*)—, which are univocally common to God and creatures, contain terms (formally) distinct from one another *ex natura rei*. In the divine nature, however, and here in difference to creatures, propositions which combine those formalities cannot be falsified through any possible "separation" (*praecisio*) to be assumed between the terms.[81] What is decisive in this context is that it is not possible *to remove infinity* from absolute terms in divine being through any kind of abstraction. Infinity attaches to itself all other forms through (real-formal) identity; given any intelligible separation of absolute abstract terms,

78 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 19, pp. 264–265: "Assertio secunda: infinitas est de ultimo conceptu eius rationis obiectivae, cuius est infinitas; ac proinde illimitatio Deitatis, est de ultimo conceptu eius; et infinitudo cuiuslibet attributi transcendit ultimam formalitatem illius. […]. Atqui magnitudo seu quantitas rei non est extra quidditatem entis, prout ambit creatum, et increatum ut ostensum est; igitur nec prout trahitur ad esse Dei, extrahi poterit a quidditativa ratione illius".

79 Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 4, nn. 220–221, (ed. Vaticana), cit., pp. 275–276.

80 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 21, p. 265.

81 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 22, pp. 265–266: "[…]; in divinis vero per nullam praecisionem falsificari posse. Eo vel maxime; quo per nullam abstractionem tolli queat in divinis a terminis absolutis ratio infinitudinis, de cuius ultimo conceptu est omnem aliam formam per identitatem sibi adiungere; ac proinde data qualibet intelligibili separatione, semper relinquatur in terminis, etiam secundum ultimam praecisionem abstractis, ratio identitatis inter praedicatum, et subiectum, quam exprimat enuntiatio praedicatum, et subiectum coniungens, atque adeo ratio obiectiva a qua formalis veritas propositionis hauriatur".

infinity will nonetheless remain in them, also according to their "ultimate separation" (*ultima praecisio*). Therefore, it is the very reason of identity between predicate and subject in a corresponding proposition, and it will also be the "objective reason" for the "formal truth" (*formalis veritas*) of the proposition that is obtained[82]—such as "Wisdom is goodness", "Deity is goodness", etc. The situation is different regarding abstract terms—such as "animality" (*animalitas*) and "rationality" (*rationalitas*)—applied to creatures. There is real identity between them only "materially" (*materialiter*) (i.e., through a third factor: the subject where they really unite), but not through the quidditative reason of the terms in an essence. Through a *praecisio* of the terms and the material item in an identity composed or made up of concrete terms, such as "This animal is rational" (which amounts in abstract terms to the enunciate "What has this animality is what has this rationality"), the resulting composition or proposition "This animality is rationality" would of course be false. But especially abstract terms and predications behave differently in the divine being because of the—formal—role played by the affection of "infinity". Since infinity is inseparable from every formality in God, it is the very reason of the identity according to which any (theistic) proposition must be understood. Because of infinity, thus, the proposition "God is wise", built up by concrete absolute terms, is true, and the following proposition, built up by abstract terms, is true as well: "Deity is wisdom".[83]

2.3 *Briceño on the Plurality of Infinities*

It is in the "third assertion" that Briceño puts forward an intriguing conclusion. After reflecting about the infinity of every quidditative reason in God and about

82 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 22, p. 266.

83 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 22, p. 266: "[…]; verbi gratia, hoc animal est rationale, quae catenus est vera, quatenus innuit, quod habens hanc animalitatem est habens hanc rationalitatem: falsificatur propositio ex terminis abstractis composita, verbi gratia, haec animalitas est rationalitas. Quod secus fit in Deo in complexione, quam ex terminis absolutis formamus; a quibus sicut inseparabilis est intelligibiliter ratio infinitudinis, ita, et ratio identitatis, quam referat enuntiatio ex terminis abstractis constituta: quia non solum est vera ista enuntiatio; *Deus est sapiens*, sed etiam haec; *Deitas est sapientia*". On the topic of "identity" in propositions combining divine essence, divine attributes, and divine persons (also divine relations) in Scotus's philosophical theology, cf. S. Knuuttila, "*Predicatio identica* in Scotus's Theological Metaphysics", in: L. Honnefelder—H. Möhle—A. Speer—Th. Kobusch—S. Bullido del Barrio (Hrsg.), *Johannes Duns Scotus 1308–2008: Die philosophischen Perspektiven seines Werkes / Investigations into his Philosophy*, Proceedings of "The Quadruple Congress" on John Duns Scotus Part 3 (Archa Verbi Subsidia 5), Münster—St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 2010, pp. 265–276 (especially pp. 271–274).

the premise that essence and attributes, as well as the attributes among each other, are formally distinct *ex natura rei*, the Chilean master proposes the conclusion that there are, in God, "several infinities distinct from the nature of the thing [*ex natura rei*]". This account, Briceño says, supposes two premises: first, every attribute has a proper limitlessness which "transcends the ultimate reason" of the attribute itself—that is, it is a "mode" of it, which is more than the formal reason of the attribute itself; second, closely following John Duns Scotus, one needs to hold that attributes are (formally) distinct from each other *ex natura rei*. The conclusion, then, is that the "infinities" of the attributes, which essentially belong to them, *are distinct* from each other *ex natura rei* too.[84]

Briceño's defenses of the two premises of this reasoning are diverse and demanding, and they remarkably elucidate the fundamental aspects of Scotus's view on intrinsic modes and formalities. The treatment of both premises is comprised by focusing on the following key question: How can we support Briceño's thesis that there is a plurality of infinities? *First*, it seems to be quite reasonable to affirm that there are "several modes of finitude"—or several degrees of finitude or of quantity of finite virtue—in creatures, according to the diversity of metaphysical quiddities considered. Finitudes of created things are meant in the plural, since we find a "multiplicity of limitation" among created entities. After all, every *ratio* that is distinct *ex natura rei* from another *ratio*—such as "animality" and "rationality" in the same supposit—, and therefore imposes a limitation of its own on this degree of being, "is intrinsically limited according to the proper quantity of virtue of that concept".[85] *Second*, for the same reason, so Alfonso Briceño, we have to admit that in divine being objective *rationes* such as "wisdom" and "justice" are limitless, each time in a different way: since limitlessness belongs intrinsically to a quiddity, there is

84 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 25, pp. 266–267: "Assertio tertia, seu potius consectarium quoddam ex dictis erutum; dantur in Deo plures infinitudines ex natura rei distinctae. Patet, quia quodlibet attributum refert propriam illimitationem transcendentem ultimam rationem illius; sed apud Scotum attributa ex natura rei distinguuntur: ergo et illorum infinitudines".

85 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 30, p. 268: "Ad quartum argumentum, […] etiam dari plures modos finitatis in creatis iuxta diversitatem graduum metaphysicorum, qui finiuntur; cum quantitas virtutis sit de quidditate entis creati, ut ostensum est. Quo fit, ut iuxta discretionem entium, aut praedicatorum metaphysicorum, detur etiam propriae quantitatis seu integritatis virtualis pluralitas, ac proinde finitionis multiplicitas: cum quaelibet ratio, prout ex natura rei distincta ab alia, quo non refert illimitationem in eo gradu essendi, finiatur intrinsece secundum propriam quantitatem virtutis illius conceptus. Quare gradus animalitatis sortitur propriam finitudinem quidditativam ex natura rei distincta a finitudine, sive limitatione quidditativa rationalitatis. […]".

each time a distinct quidditative limitlessness.[86] Briceño believes that both in creatures and in God there is for all distinct quidditative aspects—in the same supposit—an "indivisibility and unity of the existential act", one undivided and unique "form of actuality" for all "predicates". In created substance, as in divine, concerning all perfections, there is "one simple existing" (*unica simplex existentia*), i.e., they exist by the "very same existence" (*ipsamet existentia*).[87]

Briceño makes the same point when discussing again what he had presented as Peter Auriol's opinion. He repeats the thesis that the limitlessness of divine attributes "transcends" the ultimate concept of the attributes themselves; there is a univocal common concept of pure perfections such as "wisdom", but "wisdom" is "divine wisdom" because of "illimitatio", and the same rule applies to "justice", "power", and other pure perfections as well. But for Peter Auriol such divine attributes are not formally distinct from each other and from essence, and so they share the same infinity. Briceño affirms that Auriol's strategy for understanding and then denying the formal distinction is wrongly placed. The "ultimate reasons" of distinction among quiddities or (formal) attributes cannot be agreed upon in a unity of an objective reason which is abstracted from them. Since their magnitude(s) of infinity are essentially linked to their ultimate reasons and do not add anything more, quidditatively speaking, the infinities of the attributes cannot be contracted into a unique reason of agreement or *convenientia*. The "convenientia" of the attributes in "infinity" *is not* a "convenientia" absolutely speaking (*convenientia simpliciter*), i.e., an agreement which might be abstracted or the term of an abstraction based on the "reason of differing" (of each ultimate quidditative *ratio* given) and brought, then, into the "unity of a concept". "Convenientia" in "infinity", Briceño explicitly affirms, only holds "in a qualified sense" (*secundum quid*), according to a given "comparison" (*proportionalitas*), namely just as one that sees that "the way how limitlessness of justice relates to justice, so limitlessness of wisdom relates to wisdom". This late comparison of infinities is all that we have to assume a "convenientia" of infinity among divine attributes themselves and between divine attributes and divine essence. In the end, ultimate differences cannot be brought, strictly speaking, into a "ratio convenientiae"[88] of objective reason, and so an intrinsic mode or a most singular affection cannot either.

86 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 30, p. 268: "[…]. Quod etiam in divinis pari ratione constituendum est; quia quo sapientia, prout ex natura rei distincta a iustitia, est illimitata in ratione sapientiae, eo refert quidditativam illimitationem distinctam ab infinitate iustitiae".

87 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 30, 268; I, 5, a. 2, § 32, pp. 268–269.

88 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 2, § 31, p. 268: "Ad quintum […] ex Aureolo; quod

Truly, Briceño eventually assumes a plurality of infinities because of the connection between a magnitude or quantity of virtue and the quiddity of which it is a magnitude or quantity of virtue: it is so connected to it that it cannot be abstracted from the quiddity, not even through an "ultimate separation". Briceño, however, also holds the thesis that infinity as a mode of being preserves or determines, because of the essence, the *existence* or *being* of a real substantial unity such as God: divine reality is or exists by the same infinite *esse*.

3 Infinity and the Division of Being in *Quantum* and *Non-quantum*

The third central problem about Scotus's theory of ontological infinity appears in Article 3 of *Controversy* 5, where it is asked "[w]hether there is some property in God which is not formally infinite". Again, the medieval source of the debate is John Duns Scotus's *Quodlibet* 5. There, Scotus had investigated whether divine hypostases or persons are infinite just as the essence of God is infinite. One might think the answer is unequivocally "yes", since there is *a real identity* between persons and Deity. For Alfonso Briceño, *as an interpreter of Scotus*, this is a controversial statement. It is not clear what Scotus's position concerning this point is and what the consequences for his theory of infinity and, we can add to the discussion, for his general account of the "transcendental properties of being" are.[89]

Let us begin with some lessons taken from Scotus's *Quodlibet* 5. To ask whether a relation is *formally infinite* is not the same as to ask whether a relation *is really the same* as something infinite or some infinite entity. Several

illimitatio attributorum transcendit ultimum conceptum quasi differentialem illorum; sapientia […] trahitur ad rationem talis sapientiae divinae per illimitationem in esse sapientiae; quo fit ut illimitatio imbibatur in gradu ultimo, et differentiali suae quasi constitutionis. Cum autem, apud Scotum, ultimae rationes differendi non coeant ad unitatem rationis obiectivae ab illis abstractae; eo fit, ut attributorum infinitudines trahi nequeant ad unam rationem convenientiae. Quare convenientia infinitudinum attributalium non est convenientia simpliciter, quae a ratione differendi depurari queat et ad unitatem conceptus colligi; sed solum convenientiae secundum quid, vel secundum proportionalitatem quamdam, quia sicut se habet illimitatio iustitiae ad iustitiam, ita illimitatio sapientiae ad sapientiam. Adi quae expendimus de ultimis differentiis ad unam rationem convenientiae non colligendi; […]". Cf. also Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 2, a. 2, §§ 22–42, pp. 128–135.

89 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §§ 1–3, pp. 269–270.

authors think that the "relation of origin" is formally infinite, because the divine essence, with which the relation is *really* identical, is *infinite*. They would reason as follows: "Divinity is infinite"; "Paternity is divinity"; "Therefore, paternity is infinite". For Scotus, however, the argument does not hold. After all, the major premise is true in "formal predication" (*praedicatio formalis*), but the minor premise is only true in terms of a "predication through identity" (*praedicatio per identitatem*). We cannot, thus, validly reach the conclusion above, which is a formal predication. In the conclusion, we cannot assume an identity of extreme terms which is higher than the identity of those terms with the middle term both in the major and the minor premise.[90]

Of course the discussion demands answers to questions like these: What is the distinction between divine essence and persons? Do the relations *add* something to the divine essence? Do they add *a perfection* different from *the perfection* of the Deity? Briceño raises these questions and emphasizes that, in order to resolve the controversial point, we do not need to settle right from the beginning whether the distinction between (divine personal) relations and divine essence is "formal", "virtual", or "of reason".[91] Briceño highlights that Scotus's position is that (i) divine relations do not claim to be (pure) perfections; (ii) the hypostases are not as such and formally infinite; (iii) the perfections of a person as such are not in each of the other persons as such, i.e., there is non-equality in the perfections of persons.[92] The Chilean Minorite is able to formulate long series of arguments[93] taken from Scotus's "historical hearers" (above all from Peter Auriol) and especially from contemporary authors such as Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548–1617), Gabriel Vázquez S.J., and Diego Granado S.J. (1571–1632), i.e., Scotist, Thomist, and "eclectic" thinkers with whom he wants to discuss this matter. Several of these arguments are grounded on "doubts" and "contrary arguments" which are present in Scotus's *Quodlibet* V itself.[94] I shall focus only on the second thesis by Briceño, because of its potential to clarify his

90 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 2, p. 270.

91 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 3, p. 270.

92 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §§ 1–65, pp. 269–291.

93 Authors such as Bartolomé Torres (1512–1568) defend that divine relations are infinite perfections; Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 3, p. 270. Other authors such as Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548–1617), Gabriel Vázquez S.J. and Diego Granado S.J. (1571–1632) defend that they have a "proper infinity"; Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 3, p. 270. Peter Auriol claims that the "objective reason" of a relation can express infinity, but relations cannot be perfections; Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 15, pp. 273–274.

94 Cf. especially the eleven arguments formulated in: Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §§ 3–14, pp. 270–273.

metaphysical stance: that divine relations *are not* infinite, and this is so because each of them is as such a *non quantum*.

3.1 *On Persons, Perfections, and Identity*

But even if our investigation focuses on the denial of infinity to divine relations as such, we must pay attention to the answer to the first topic at issue, i.e., whether divine relations are perfections. After all, if we correctly describe Scotus's account of pure perfections, we should be able to decide—following Alfonso Briceño's exposition—whether divine relations can possibly be perfections, and hence also "limitless".

Briceño believes that Scotus's view on pure perfections is essentially Anselm's view. From *Monologium* 15 we learn that a (pure) perfection is "that which, in whatever has it, is better [for that thing] to have it than to have not it".[95] Let us focus on just two aspects of interpretation: (i) *First*, we should not think that this aspect or that perfection is better than its contradictory opposite negation; in this sense, every positive entity is simply better that its contradictory opposite negation. The expression "non ipsam",[96] in the definition just given, designates whatever thing incompossible to that form, even if what fulfills the expression "non ipsam" is something positive. (ii) *Second*, the "in whatever [thing]" or "in quolibet"[97] of the definition does not mean "in whatever nature", but "in whatever supposit", taken absolutely or making a "separation" (*praecisio*) of the very essential notion or *ratio* of the nature of which a given thing is a *suppositum*. This should be Scotus's final understanding of Anselm's notion of pure perfection: a pure perfection is such that in whatever supposit, taken as such, and not as a nature, it is better itself (the perfection) than not itself or than *anything incompossible to itself*.[98]

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95 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3 § 16, p. 274: "Exaranda est ipsamet ratio perfectionis simpliciter simplicis; ut investigari queat, utrum illimitata perfectio relationibus insit? Docet ergo Scotus. *Secundum quod colligitur ex intentione Anselmi. monologii 15. perfectio simpliciter est, quae in quolibet habente ipsam melius est ipsam habere, quam non ipsam habere. Haec autem regula indiget duplici expositione:* [...]". Cf. also Anselm von Canterbury, *Monologion*, (ed. F.S. Schmitt), Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1964, 15, pp. 78–81. On Scotus's theory of pure perfections, cf. the literature mentioned in footnote 36, above.

96 Cf. previous note.

97 Cf. footnote 95, above.

98 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 16, p. 274. Cf. also id., ibid., I, 5, a. 3, § 17, p. 274: "*Est ergo intellectus propositionis iste, perfectio simpliciter est talis, quae in quocunque supposito, absolute considerato secundum rationem suppositi, non determinando naturam, in qua, vel cuius sit suppositum; melius est ipsum, quam non ipsum: hoc est, quam quodcunque incompossibile sibi*".

According to Scotus, one of the central consequences of this definition of pure perfections is that *no pure perfection is formally incommunicable*. There is proof for this point: What is formally incommunicable [or: what cannot be shared but by one thing alone] is formally incompossible "to whatever else" (*cuilibet alteri*). Again, this is valid if we understand the "to whatever else" according to the notion of the "supposit" as well, not of the nature of which it is a supposit. After all, what contradicts another, which is therefore destroyed by such a "repugnance" of the previous item, is not itself better than not-itself in the supposit. What is incommunicable—like a divine relation—is not better than not-itself, when that which has it is considered as a supposit.[99]

The first determination presented by Briceño is thus that "divine relations" do not mean "pure perfections". Briceño affirms that several Scotists follow this view regarding divine relations and pure perfections, just like followers of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas.[100] When the doctors investigate whether "relation" expresses "perfection", they (i) raise a question concerning "absolute" and "communicable" perfection, something that we can assume a relation possesses only indirectly, i.e., because of (real) identity with the essence. (ii) Surely, the discussion could be about a relative perfection, which would be, accordingly, "formally incommunicable". From theology, we take that "paternity" in the divine being is "incommunicable" to the Son. But can "paternity" as such (i.e., conceived through an *abstractio praecisissima* and thus as an incommunicable personality) make some perfection present? In any case, Briceño understands that the—most significant—"dissents" (*dissidia*) among the doctors are not about the existence of "relative perfections", about which he in fact is unsure. After all, any relative perfection would be essentially incommunica-

99 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §§18–19, pp. 274–275. Cf., for example, Juan Duns Escoto, *Quodlibet* V, a. 2, nn. 20, 31–32, (introducción, resúmenes y versión de Felix Alluntis), cit., pp. 175–176, 183–184.

100 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §40, p. 282: "His praelibatis; asserendum est, relationes divinas non importare perfectionem; sic Scotus loco citato, quem sequuntur omnes eius discipuli, [...]. Et ex sancti Bonavent. asseclis, [...]. Et ex Thomistis [...]". Among the Scotists, Briceño mentions Francesco Licheto (Lychetus) O.F.M. (ca. 1465–1520), Pierre Tartaret O.F.M. (†1522), Juan de Rada O.F.M. (ca. 1545–1608), and Filippo Fabri (Faber) O.F.M. (1564–1630); among the followers of Bonaventure, he mentions Petrus Trigosus O.F.M. Cap. (1533–1593) and Franciscus Longus a Coriolano O.F.M. Cap. (1562–1625); among the Thomists, he names Jean Capréolus O.P. (ca. 1380–1444), Tommaso di Vio (Cardeal) Caietano O.P. (1469–1534), and Luis de Molina S.J. (1535–1600). He also mentions two further names, which seem to refer to two medieval authors, namely Richard of Middleton O.F.M. (ca. 1249–ca. 1308) and Durand of St. Pourçain (ca. 1275–1332).

ble[101]—contradicting the very notion of perfection defended by Briceño and the Scotists. Moreover, there is no pure perfection in God which is not communicable to the three divine persons. The most challenging point of dispute rather concerns divine relations expressing pure perfections.

At any rate, any attempt of connecting, for the purpose of understanding the metaphysics of the Trinity and how "infinity" as a mode of being applies to it, "relation" and "perfection" requires a careful use of the notion of *perfectio simpliciter* (*simplex*). As already defined above, a pure perfection is that which in whatever (supposit) it is it is better that (perfection) than not that perfection (an incompossible form). And we must keep in mind that the three divine supposits—"Father", "Son", and the "Holy Spirit"—are constituted, in the personal being, by the so-called "hypostatic relations". According to this, for the supposit of the "father" (*pater*) it will never be better to be "filiation" (*filiatio*) than "non-filiation" (*non filiatio* or *non ipsa*, understood as something incompossible with filiation). After all, *filiatio* is itself a form or, as we might say, a proper identity of reality, which is relatively repugnant to *the constituting reason* of the "father" in its own being as a supposit, i.e., to the form "paternity".[102]

101 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversia*, I, 5, a. 3, § 40, p. 282: "[…]. Cui opinioni adscribendos censeo omnes eos Thomistas, qui cum solis verbis perfectionem relationibus divinis deferant; statim, ut inconveniens inaequalitatis divinarum personarum vitent, ad solam illimitationem absolutam Deitatis, quae communis est tribus suppositis, confugiunt: quod est absolutam tantum, et communicabilem perfectionem profiteri, non autem incommunicabilem, et relatam. […]. Igitur supposito hoc sensu, qui solus in praesenti expenditur, ineptum omnino est ad illmitationem absolutam, et communicabilem declinare; cum haec sub dissertationis dissidia cadere nequeat. Ergo, qui nullam perfectionem incommunicabilem agnoscit, re ipsa, licet aliud sub obscuris verbis innuere videatur, perfectionem relativam, ut talem, impossibilem esse autumat; cum perfectio relata, ut talis, sit essentialiter incommunicabilis. Quare, sicut uno ore inficiantur, possibilem esse in Deo perfectionem incommunicabilem tribus suppositis, ita relativam perfectionem negare coguntur, ne manifeste a doctrinae consequentia deficiant; cum relatio, ut talis, essentialiter sit incommunicabilis extremo opposito".

102 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 41, pp. 282–283: "[…]. Quia cum supposita divina constituantur in personali esse per relativas hypostases; nullatenus supposito patris, etiam sub formali ratione suppositi, melior esse posset filiatio, quam non ipsa: cum sit forma relative repugnans rationi constitutivae patris in esse suppositali, nimirum paternitati. Unde si Scotus in praedictis locis tantum agebat, divinis relationibus perfectionem simpliciter obstare; evidenter atque feliciter propositum adeptus est". For an account of Scotus's view on the "constitution of the divine persons", as well as on how "infinity" works for explaining the unity of divine essence, cf., for example, Cross, *Duns Scotus*, cit., pp. 65–70. On Scotus's Trinitarian doctrine and the metaphysical groundworks of it, cf. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, cit., pp. 127–248.

But what about the identity of the divine relations as such and to each other, both "in concrete" and "in abstract"? They cannot be identified with each other in any sense *realiter* because of their quiddity or because of their own formal identity as persons—*what* they ultimately *are*—, and they cannot be considered identical because of any kind of identity—real or formal—of any of them ("in concrete" or "in abstract") with infinity. If divine relations, which are not infinite, are eternally-simultaneously in the divine substrate, as, for example, "paternity" and "active spiration" are in "Deity", they can only actualize an identical conjunction "materially", because of a third item with which they are really identical: because of "Deity", with which they materially agree.[103]

3.2 *Why Do Relations Not Have Limitlessness? The First Division of Being*

This being said, loyal to the proposed emphasis of analysis concerning Briceño's Article 3 of *Controversy* 5,[104] but above all in respect to our author's interest in conceiving and systematizing a complete view of reality in its most fundamental aspects, which therefore has to include divine reality as such, we can now ask again: Why does John Duns Scotus affirm that, in divine relations, *finity and infinity do not apply*?

Briceño begins his explanation by reminding us of a further teaching by Scotus in *Quodlibet* 5: Infinity in entity means a *totality* in entity; in opposition, finity in entity means *partiality* in entity. Every finite (in act) as such is less than the infinite (in act) as such. Every finite entity, being less than an infinite entity, can properly be called "part", surely not a part of the infinite entity, for it has no parts whatsoever and would not have "*quasi*-parts" that would not be infinite themselves, but in the ontological sense that any being other than the infinite being is being through "participation". After all, every other being seizes a part of the entity that exists totally and perfectly in an infinite being.[105]

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103 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §§12–13, pp. 271–272; id., ibid., I, 5, §45, pp. 283–284: "At, quis non videat, hos authores argumenti efficacitate devictos ad materialem, et identicam illimitationem declinare, quae omnino extra controversiam est, cum tantum de formali ac incommunicabili relationum illimitatione disseratur. Quis enim unquam inficiatus est, filium, qua Deus est, illimitationem personalem Patris, et Spiritus Sancti eminenter praehaberet? Quatenus Deitas, ut illimitatissimum essendi pelagus, tum relatas, intra eminentiae suae ambitum colligat? Quo tantum fieret, ut filiatio materialiter, et identice ratione Deitatis aequalis foret tribus hypostasibus simul acceptis, formaliter autem spectata, illis longe impar, et inaequalis censenda esset; cum hypostases, ut tales formaliter, non praecontineant virtualiter relationes oppositas. Quod manifesta hac ratione confirmo".

104 Cf. above, end of Section 3.

105 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §31, p. 278: "Restat disquirere, quare finitas, et

What could we say of a divine relation such as "paternity", which, like anything else in the totality of reality, is at a first glance supposed to be either "infinite" like God or "finite" like a creature? "Paternity" cannot possibly be a part of infinite divinity in the way just explained, nor can it ever be, say, "excelled" by divinity: because of the infinity of divinity, the relation of "paternity", since it is compossible with "divinity" in the same supposit—in this case, in the supposit of the "father"—, is "absolutely" (*simpliciter*) identical to divinity. As a consequence, "paternity" cannot be *really* excelled[106] by divinity or anything else nor can it ontologically be a part nor can it have any determination of a part: the divine relation, thus, cannot possibly be "finite".[107]

But, as Briceño explicates by quoting Scotus's *Quodlibet* V at length and *verbatim*, "paternity" is not infinite either. Let us recall the reasoning of John Duns Scotus: the finite has the *ratio* of a part, the infinite has the *ratio* of "a complete" (*perfectum*) and of "a whole" (*totum*) in beingness, and so, out of its "completeness" of virtual quantity or intensifiable quantity in being and perfection, the infinite measures all other things as "greater", because of "proximity" (*acessus*) to it, and "lesser", because of "distance" (*recessus*) to it. But it is clear that an entity such as a divine relation or "paternity" does not have the reason of "totality" or completeness, for measuring according to a degree of perfection belongs to some "first" in a given order of measuring, and that "first"—ontologically—can only be the "absolute essence".[108]

A relation such as "paternity" is thus neither formally "finite" nor formally "infinite". Formal predication does not apply to *paternity*—or to any other hypostatic relation in God—and *infinite*. How can it be the case, then, concerning a metaphysics of transcendentals, that the first and immediate division of "being" is "infinite and finite", i.e., before all further divisions of being in other modal-disjunctive conceptual pairs and of course in the ten predicaments or the ten genera? Truly, for Scotus, "infinite-finite" do not divide *being*

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infinitas, divinis relationibus, non congruant? Quod referavit Scotus eodem quodlibeto 5. […]". On how Scotus interprets the Aristotelian conditions for an adequate concept of (actual) infinity, i.e. to be a "whole" (*totum*) and a "complete" (*perfectum*), cf. R.H. Pich, "*Positio impossibilis* and Concept Formation: Duns Scotus on the Concept of Infinite Being", in: *Patristica et Mediaevalia* 30 (2009), pp. 20–67.

106 As "divinity" itself, because of infinity as its intrinsic mode, cannot be really excelled by anything in the totality of beings.

107 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 31, p. 278.

108 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §§ 32–33, pp. 278–279. Cf. Juan Duns Escoto, *Quodlibet* V, a. 2, nn. 57–58, (introducción, resúmenes y versión de Felix Alluntis), cit., pp. 198–200.

insofar as it is already contracted to some given genus. When that contraction is obtained, we have "precisely" finite being. But Scotus seems to have been forced to conclude—especially in his late *Quodlibet* V—that "infinite-finite" does not divide "being" as such in its indifference, but only "quantitative being" (*ens quantum*). Moreover, "infinite-finite", as they clearly are *passiones* or disjunctions of being, "precisely" agree with being as it has "perfectionable quantity". This quantity belongs to entity only insofar as it can be *partial* or *total*—in beingness. And to such a "perfectionable quantity" as a property of being, it necessarily belongs, whenever a being is compared to another, to "excell" or "be excelled", to "be partial" or "total".[109] In any case, the first division of being must now be, bringing divine reality—i.e., triune divine being—into the picture, *quantum-non-quantum* or *quantum et non-quantum*.

Based on such careful readings and interpretations of Scotus's *Quodlibet* V, Briceño says, in the end, that, because "totality" and "partiality" in entity do not apply to divine relations, the concepts of finity and infinity cannot possibly apply to them either. In fact, there is a formal distinction between absolute attributable properties of God and Deity that—together with communicability—allows for the infinity of them. There is of course also a distinction between divine relations and divine essence; but why does that kind of distinction not allow for the infinity of divine relations as well? Truly, for the same reason as, say, the relation of origin or "paternity" is not an "ens quantum", we can also affirm that "paternity" does not express any "perfection". And a divine relation is not a total being, in the sense of plenitute of virtual quantity or quantity of ontological perfection, which therefore measures every other being or every other good either in terms of "proximity" or in terms of

109 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, §§ 33, 36, pp. 279, 280–281; I, 5, § 63, p. 290: "Ad octavum argumentum, respondetur, foecunditatem Dei, et communicabilitatem eius ad plura supposita esse perfectissimam, et illimitatissimam simpliciter: esto quod relativae hypostases, quae sunt termini divinae foecunditatis; nullam referant perfectionem. Sicut enim non obstat infinitudini huius foecunditatis, quod relationes non sint perfectiones simpliciter, sed tantum in tali genere essendi, ut oppositae sententiae assertores autumant; ita nec dedecebit eamdem illimitationem simpliciter divinae foecunditatis, ut relationes nullam perfectionem sibi vendicent. Unde, constanter asserimus, hypostasim filii esse formaliter diligibilem, sicut et bonam, bonitate, et integritate incommunicabili, et non quanta; non vero quanta, communicabili, et illimitata. Quare non placent Scotistae, qui hypostases non esse formaliter appetitibiles asseverant; cum bonitas et integritas non quanta, terminativa esse possit impulsivae et appetitivae virtutis. De quo adi *Controversiam quartam de bonitate num.* 7. Ubi de mente Scoti relationibus bonitatem, et integritatem transcendentalem inesse autumavimus; sed ea bonitas est, quam Scotus non quantam appelavit, et quae tantum exprimit propriam integritatem in tali ordine entium".

"distance". If that were the case, we would even have to deal with the inconvenient consequence that, having two or more "infinities" within divine reality, "Deity" itself—following the rule that every being should be measured by a total being because of its infinity—would be more or less perfect according to its proximity or its distance to hypostatic relations or a given relative property.[110] This is just one example of the theoretical difficulties that could arise if divine relations were *quanta*. Regardless of whether a similar critical argument could be raised concerning the assumption that divine attributes are *quanta* indeed, Briceño further mentions the difficulty that, in case divine relations were *quanta* and infinity would belong to them, reality would then have several infinite items which would be incommunicable and "entitatively discrete" (*entitative discreta*)—two divine persons, then, because of their "relative [infinite] quantity", would surpass the limitlessness of another divine person: two discrete infinities would excel one discrete infinity.[111]

Concluding Remarks

Scotus's contributions to a theory of ontological infinity and, more narrowly, a doctrine of divine infinity were recognized by all late medieval and post-medieval scholastic traditions or scholastic ways of doing theology and phi-

110 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 34, p. 279: "Cuius mens ex instituto referenda est, expendendaque vis illius rationis de totalitate, et partialitate; propter quam a divinis relationibus removet Scotus finitudinis, et infinitudinis conceptum. Et quoad finitatem attinet, evidenter id ab Scoto demonstratur, a nulloque in controversiam vocatum est; quo ad infinitatem vero, Scoti ratio infirma videtur, et quae contra ipsum ad hominem retorqueri queat in proprietatibus absolutis attributalibus inter quas, et Deitatem, non minor intercedit apud Scotum distinctio, quam inter relationes, et essentiam. Ita ergo ratio, quam de relationibus divinis instruit Scotus, contra ipsum retorquetur. Quia ideo paternitas ens quantum non est, vel quod eodem redit, non dicit perfectionem: *Quia alias esset ens totale infinitum referens plenitudinem quantitatis virtualis mensurantis omne aliud: ita ut per accessum ad talem quantitatem res fieret maior, et minor per recessum*. Adeo ut Deitas perfectior esset per accessum relationum, et minus perfecta per non accessum relativarum proprietatum; ut patet […] Quod videtur inconveniens quia alias esse Dei, ut supponitur ad relativas hypostases, minus perfectum a nobis apprehenderetur, quam ut est actu substratum, vel quasi susbtratum talium relationum".

111 Alfonso Briceño, *Controversiae*, I, 5, a. 3, § 35, pp. 279–280: "[…], ideo totalitatem infinitudinis, et quantitatis virtualis relationibus divinis repugnare, quia darentur plura infinita inter se incommunicabilia, ac proinde entitative discreta; ac fieret, ut duae personae propter relativam quantitatem alterius personae illimitationem superarent".

losophy. In fact, it also had influence on contemplative ways or ways which worked, for the sake of philosophical and theological knowledge *lato sensu*, with a division between a "natural, philosophical wisdom" and a "supernatural, theological wisdom", the first sometimes being called "scholastic", the second also called "mystical". So was the comprehensive method adopted, for example, by Denys of Ryckel / Dionysius Cartusiensis (1402–1471). Truly, in his mystical treatises, considering different forms of contemplation and taking the "negative way" (*via negationis*) of pseudo-Dionysius as the best possible contemplative way, namely a way between "affirmative theology" and "beatific vision", we are told that Denys of Ryckel seemed to have assumed Nicholas of Cusa's view that even a negative way of knowing anything about God has to yield some sort of "*quia*-knowledge" of "divine attributes". Among them, "infinity" plays a special role: it is "[…] the first, intrinsic and most worthy property of God".[112] Precisely in such contexts of his *opera*, so affirms Kent Emery, Jr., Denys of Ryckel—"uncharacteristically" indeed—praised John Duns Scotus for his analysis "of infinity as a positive attribute".[113]

In turn, in his expositions, the Chilean Fransciscan master Alfonso Briceño offers a rich and useful form of systematically investigating John Duns Scotus's doctrines and of applying Scotist theses of metaphysics to theological-philosophical discussions of the 16th–17th century—of course, the merits of the contents and argumentations in such debates can have perennial significance and are not at all distant to contemporary approaches in systematic theology and philosophy of religion. In the passages we have studied, (1) Briceño schematizes the traditional account of ontological infinity by Thomas Aquinas—which is reproduced and explored by Gabriel Vázquez—and offers criticisms against it in a way that makes room for Scotus's main views on this discussion. In doing so, Briceño explains and refines Scotus's metaphysical apparatus on the possibility of a real or ontological infinity. Although he explores the concept of *infinitum* from a specific understanding of the nega-

112 Dionysius Cartusiensis, *De contemplatione* I.a.40 (*Opera omnia* 41: 182D–A'), apud Kent Emery, Jr., "Twofold Wisdom and Contemplation in Denys of Ryckel (Dionysius Cartusiensis, 1402–1471)", in: Kent Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot—Brookfield 1996, p. 128.

113 Id., ibid. Cf. also Kent Emery, Jr., "Fondaments théoriques de la réception de la beauté sensible dans les écrits de Denys le Chartreux (1402–1471)", in: Kent Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot—Brookfield 1996, pp. 322–323; Idem, "Mysticism and the Coincidence of Opposites in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France", in: Kent Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot—Brookfield 1996, p. 21.

tion of the concept of *finitum*, Briceño is less consistent with original Scotism in explaining and making use of the epistemic way that Scotus believes lets us obtain an ontological notion of infinity. Briceño's strategy of understanding "infinity" through the negation of finite being is bound to the account offered by Bonaventure. (II) Our author proposes an innovative view concerning the thesis of the plurality of infinities "within" divine reality; the plurality of infinities is a logical consequence of assuming that an intrinsic mode such as infinity is neither really nor formally distinct from the quiddity of which it is an intrinsic mode, but at the same time transcends it—it says something specifically as a mode or: as a mode of existing—and belongs to it essentially. (III) By discussing the question whether all properties in God, and specifically hypostatic relations, are formally infinite, Briceño explores the concept of pure perfection and Scotus's interpretation of Anselm in this regard. Here, Briceño finely reproduces rules about how to determine the truth of enunciations containing concrete and abstract absolute terms or, alternatively, concrete and abstract relative terms in divine reality, eventually explaining why Scotus is forced to say that "illimitatio" or "infinitas" cannot be properly predicated of divine relations (and of personal properties). This leads Alfonso Briceño to affirm that "being" (*ens*) must be first divided in "quantum" and "non quantum", while "infinitum" and "finitum" divide—only later—the "ens quantum", since divine hypostases have an integrity, or an absolute goodness, but not ontological magnitude.

CHAPTER 23

Antonio Ruiz de Montoya's *Firestone of Divine Love* (*Sílex del divino amor*): The Spiritual Journey of a Jesuit among the Guaraní

Alfredo Santiago Culleton

Introduction: Antonio Ruiz de Montoya's Life, Works and Journeys

Everyone, to a greater or lesser extent, has heard about the storied Paraguay missions of the Jesuits and their political and intellectual work amid the Guaraní population, seeking to introduce them not only to Christianity, but to the highest virtues of philosophical tradition. Through one of their most illustrious missionaries, I will show an emblematic intellectual and spiritual path that can serve as a model of a not well-known generation of intellectuals.

Father Antonio Ruiz de Montoya was born in Lima, Peru, in 1585. To get an idea about this period: it had then been only one year since the first books were printed in Lima, namely the *Pragmática de los diez dias del año*, which induced the change in the calendar known as the Gregorian Correction, and the *Catecismo* in Spanish, Quechua and Aymara, which was approved by the III Council of Lima.[1]

1 In 1581, the administrative council (*Cabildo*) of Lima requested the king's permission to print books. By then, the ban was unsustainable given the needs created by university life and the evangelization of the *Indias* (J.T. Medina, *La imprenta en Lima*, Santiago de Chile 1904–1907, p. 437). In fact, in 1576, the Jesuits decided to publish grammars, dictionaries, confession manuals, and prayer books in both Quechua and Aymara, the main languages of the Andes (R. Vargas Ugarte, *Historia de la Iglesia en el Perú*, Lima 1953, pp. IX, XII–XIII). In 1579, they sent an emissary to Mexico in an attempt to convince the Italian printer Antonio Ricardo to establish his print house in Peru. Two years later, and with many bureaucratic difficulties, the press arrived in Lima, and it became the first printing press in the Viceroyalty of Peru. That same year, the new Archbishop, Toribio de Mogrovejo, and the Provincial of the Jesuits, Baltasar Piñas, also arrived there. Although he complied with the prohibition of Viceroy Martin Enriquez (R. Levillier, *El Perú y el Tucumán en los tiempos prehispánicos: ensayo sobre las afinidades de sus culturas primitivas*, Lima 1921–1926, p. 249), Mogrovejo formed a Provincial Council to discuss the need to print texts in the native languages. Since the publication of books was still prohibited, the Jesuits decided to send Father Andres Lopez to Spain for a license to print from the *Indias* Council. In 1584, the ban was lifted: the Provincial Council

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At the age of 21, Ruiz de Montoya joined the Society of Jesus and was sent to the recently founded Province of Paraguay as a missionary among the Guaraní, where he founded several *reducciones* in Guayrá. From 1622 onwards, he was the superior of the missions in Guayrá. Because of the Portuguese attacks against the *reducciones*, he decided to evacuate Guayrá, with over 10.000 Guaranís, in 1632. Traveling down the Paraná River, he re-settled them in what is now the north of Argentina. In 1637, he became the superior of all *reducciones*. As the attacks of the *Bandeirantes*[2] continued, he was appointed procurator of the Jesuit province at the Spanish Court. Ruiz de Montoya arrived in Madrid in 1638 and stayed there for five years, negotiating permissions to arm the native Indians against the Portuguese attacks. His mission was successful, but he was not allowed to return to the Guaranís. He went back to Lima and died there in 1652.

His works, five in total, were all published in Madrid during his stay there. They are: *Conquista espiritual* [*The Spiritual Conquest*] (1639), *Tesoro de la lengua Guaraní* [*Treasure of the Guaraní Language*] (1639), *Arte y vocabulário de la lengua Guaraní* [*Art and Vocabulary of the Guaraní Language*] (1640), *Catecismo en lengua Guaraní* [*Catechism in the Guaraní Language*] (1640) and *Sílex del divino amor* [*Firestone of Divine Love*] (1640).

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convened by Mogrovejo obtained the required authorization from the Royal Audiencia of Lima. At last, Antonio Ricardo could start printing the catechism, the original of which had been approved by the members of the *Indias* Council and the respective Reverend authority, and also to print the confessional and preparation for death with the assistance of Father Juan de Atienza, rector of the College of the Society of Jesus, and Father José de Acosta of that same order, assisted by two professional translators from Spanish to Indian languages. A secretary of the Royal Court supervised the work to guarantee that nothing but the cited catechism and confessional was printed in those languages at that time (see J.T. Medina, cit., p. 6). In 1584 and 1585, Antonio Ricardo printed three texts: *La doctrina cristiana y catecismo para la instrucción de los indios y de las demás personas que han de ser enseñadas en Nuestra Santa Fé* (1584); *El tercero catecismo y exposición de la doctrina cristiana por sermones para que los curas y otros ministros prediquen y un enseñen los indios ya las demás las personas* (1585); *Confesionario para los curas de indios con la instrucción contra sus ritos y exhortación para ayudar a buen morir* (1585). While Antonio Ricardo was printing the abovementioned Christian Doctrine, the Royal Court ordered him to publish also the *Pragmática de los diez dias del año*, which thus became the first book printed in South America (see R. Vargas Ugarte, cit., pp. 1–6).

2 The "Bandeirantes" ("those who carry the flag") were 17th-century Portuguese settlers in Brazil, so-called fortune hunters. They led expeditions called *bandeiras*, invading the interior of Brazil far south and west of the Tordesillas Line 1494, which officially divided the Castilian, later Spanish, (west) domain from the Portuguese (east) domain in South America (see L.H. Menezes Fernandes, *Um governo de engonços: metrópole e sertanistas na expansão dos dominios portugueses aos sertões do Cuiabá*, Curitiba 2015, pp. 43–62).

The works that interest us from the viewpoint of the history of ideas, or intellectual history, in Latin America are *Conquista espiritual* and *Sílex del divino amor*. The *Spiritual Conquest* has a great number of fantastic anecdotal stories that may sound strange to contemporary readers, but can be interpreted in three ways: firstly, on an anthropological level, the work offers an abundance of information to further our knowledge of the culture and mindset of the aboriginal people reflected in it; secondly, from the viewpoint of intellectual history, it is one of the most authentic expressions of the great missionary project of the Jesuits in the Paraguay region, which was not limited to a formal conversion of the population, but aimed at humanization in the most profound sense in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition; thirdly, it serves as a basis for the development of an original mysticism.

From this perspective, the marvelous and fantastic aspect of the *Conquista espiritual* is not confined to a single literary type, nor can it simply be ascribed to the author's temperament and imagination. (This narrative tradition is strongly present in the rest of Latin American literature since the 16th century and, more recently, in the 20th century with the so-called fantastic realism of Borges, Vargas Llosa, and García Marquez). The wonderful element in Ruiz de Montoya's work is a category of thinking that affects the book's central structure. If we were to remove the fantastic stories, almost nothing would be left, just as there would be almost nothing left of the Bible without this kind of story.

For the purpose of illustration only, I will render a passage from Chapter Three, right at the beginning of the book, where the author offers an extensive description of animals, devoting special attention to snakes.

> [...] there are still other species measuring three or four "varas" [1 vara = 10 feet, almost 3 meters, for a total of around 10 meters] which live amongst marshy bushes and come to the edge of the shrubs to wait for prey. They attack and catch it very fast and try to injure it with a very sharp bone that grows in their tail [...]. This action could clearly be observed when an Indian was attacked by one of these snakes. Although this snake caught him by the arms, the Indian resisted for a while. During the struggle, the snake, feeling dry, jumped into the water and quickly made a new attempt. However, the Indian was ready this time and the snake only managed to wrap itself around his body. He had a knife, hanging on his back and attached to his neck by a cord, and as fast as possible he cut up the wild animal, killing it. He was delighted to have something to eat that day and on other days, since all these animals are food that sustains the Indians [...].[3]

3 A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Conquista espiritual*, Bilbao 1892, pp. 20–21.

It is noteworthy that Ruiz de Montoya does not provide a technical description of the animal. Rather, it is more like a picture, a composition of relations, where everything like creation, the native man, life style, and a mystery is included. In order to interpret his description of this strange occurrence, we must take the following into account: In the description of Ruiz de Montoya, the world of the Guaranís, the Paraguayan jungle, is marvelous regarding both plants and animals, and it is superior to what a European might imagine. The marvels of grace correspond to these marvels of nature. It is a kind of new earthly paradise in which the missionaries repeat the marvels of the Apostle's era in the early Christian community.

Ruiz de Montoya does not fall into the myth of the noble savage. He equally points to sin, the evilness of some Indians, and the destructive action of the devil. The ambivalent mixture of good and evil is reflected in nature itself. Some animals accompany the action of the missionary, such as the horse of Saint Roque González which cries whenever someone calls the name of his martyred rider. At other times, animals appear as instruments of the devil's insidiousness, like the serpents, which ever since represent the original sin according to custom. A few animals appear predestined to be signs of God's goodness, and others to be signs of the devil's wickedness.

The world of the Guaranís is a continuous universe that cannot be fractionated into classes of things, plants, animals, and men. The animals permeate the life of men and even assimilate their mindset. In the same Chapter III, he says that the tigers "seek the worst meat, and if there are Spanish, blacks and Indians, they attack the black man, and if there are only black people, they attack the oldest or those that smell bad". Almost racist tigers! Later on, the tigers are described from a supernatural perspective, as instruments of the devil, in some cases, or as ministers of divine justice, in others.

The continuity of the universe occurs both between the different degrees of being of the *visible* world and between the latter and the *invisible* world. Some plants were given by the devil, others by men of God. In the text, we see that, before the arrival of the missionaries, the herb from Paraguay "was not drunk nor was it known except for a great witchdoctor or magician who was acquainted with the devil, as the latter revealed himself and said that when someone wanted to consult him, they should drink of that herb".[4] As a counterpart, the Apostle Thomas gave the Indians manioc, the herb for the witchdoctors, and manioc as food.[5]

4 Id., ibid., p. 39.

5 Ibid., p. 44.

The view of nature as something marvelous has its correspondence in a no less marvelous view of history. According to Ruiz de Montoya, profane history is integrated into sacred history, and the former participates in the marvelous character of the latter.

1 The *Sílex del divino amor* (*Firestone of Divine Love*)

The world of the *Spiritual Conquest* alludes to the missionary activity of the Jesuits, the civilizing process of the nomadic—often cannibalistic—tribes, martyrdom and death by hunger of the Jesuits companions, the atrocities of the *Bandeirantes*, the mass exodus of populations via fast-flowing rivers, waterfalls, and impenetrable jungles. This overwhelming world invades the *Sílex del divino amor*, in which the author "[…] day by day discovers traces of the divine Power in this New Orb",[6] in his own words. It is through this fantastic universe that Ruiz de Montoya follows the path of Ignatian spirituality among the Guaraní. In the *Firestone of Divine Love* he records years of an attentive and faithful observation of his life in the missions: a Guaraní Indian teaches him to live in God, the rivers and floods talk to him of inner life, and so on. He seduces us with the vitality and colorfulness of the Paraguayan jungle, the flight of the birds that cover the sky, river snakes that poison the waters to attract and devour defenseless small fish, the hawk that reminds him of the Holy Spirit that "enters by force and carries one away and, like the hawk does to the chicken, transports one to the sublime realm", the parrot, the sunflower that teaches him to pray, and the passion flower which the contemplative soul of Ruiz de Montoya turns into an inexhaustible world of symbols. He recalls Lima, his native city, with its earthquakes, and makes numerous references to navigation, speaks of its basic elements, of the compass, sail, anchor, and stars. He equally shows himself to be a meticulous researcher of insects and flowers. He teaches us to use binoculars to overcome distances, but also analyzes its parts and functioning, thus also illustrating the process of contemplation. He is passionate about astronomy and gives us the precise measures from the center of the Earth to its surface and from the Earth to each planet of the old Greek system in its last days prior to the victory of the theories of Copernicus and Galileo. He is interested in the human body and how it functions, tells us about the human crafts, becomes ecstatic when reflecting upon the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist, or about the *Fiat* of that Lady who, submerging into her noth-

6 A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Sílex del divino amor*, Lima 1991, Opúsculo 1, c. 1, p. 6.

ingness, opened the doors of redemption. He analyzes the faculties of the soul, image of the Trinity, or the qualities of the mind, the apex of the soul, which enables us to communicate and unites us with the being of God itself. All these elements intersect in a vibrant network of symbols that express an experience of knowledge in the most profound sense.

2 The Sources of the *Sílex*

Our main interest lies in the origin of the mystical doctrine of a missionary in Paraguay in the 17th century. Ruiz de Montoya portrays himself in the *Spiritual Conquest* as "an almost rustic man who does not know erudite language",[7] and the first model of inner life that he presents is that of "Ignatius, chief Indian".[8] "Remember", he says to himself, "that in those days you were desirous of finding an easy way to have the continuous presence of the first Cause. And it was the will of heaven that he (Ignatius), new to the faith, taught you, an old practitioner, in a single act of faith, what you were seeking".[9] At the end of the text, a new inspiring figure appears, Doña Luisa Melgarejo, "a well-known woman" who lives in the highest degrees of a mystical experience.[10] He presents himself as a humble man towards God's mysteries and understands spirituality as being accessible through simpler ways.

On the other hand, the way the author presents his ideas—although they are extremely original in their form of exposition—is rooted in the glossing of spiritual authors whom he brings to the surface on the basis of his own inner experience. This inner life, which so many authors nurture, transfigures the original texts into new experiences, which admittedly owe a debt to these friendly shadows, to tradition, but which, at the same time, affirm their own originality.

In this period of the 17th century, it is very difficult to identify the sources, to which they relate their own contribution, which is often fused with that of the great classics, or even with proscribed authors. Since Antiquity, there has been a generalized consciousness that private contributions become collective property. One might say that there are citations that, rather than helping identify influences, are a false clue to misguide the curious. One can find a certain

7 A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Conquista espiritual*, cit., p. 15.

8 A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Sílex del divino amor*, cit., Opúsculo III, p. 156.

9 Id., ibid.

10 Ibid., Opúsculo IV, Mansión XIII, p. 249.

logic in proceeding in this way: these authors quote occasional utterances, sentences, particularly from the Bible, but prudently ignore those authors whose works were disapproved by the Inquisition or that simply had not yet been officially accepted.

This is illustrated by an example from the work titled *De inquisitione pacis* (1617) by Álvaro de Paz (1560–1620), who forgets to cite Saint Theresa, while in the *Sílex* (1650), Ruiz de Montoya often cites her in the same texts glossed by Álvaro Paz, but fails to name the latter. Saint Teresa had been canonized in 1622. This is also attested in the following passage by Nieremberg (1595–1658):

> I have lacked everything and needed to beg or usurp other people's property, stealing piously from the holy Doctors their sentences, from the scholastics their speeches, and from the mystics their words. With my confession I want to prevent any calumny, declaring that in this book there are many things that belong to others.[11]

Among the many sources that feed Ruiz de Montoya, we emphasize some of the most evident ones:

(1) Juan Eusebio Nieremberg (1595–1658). This Spanish Jesuit, with whom Ruiz de Montoya had contact for some time in Madrid, is admired by him for his mystic writings contained especially in *De adoratione in spiritu et veritate* (Amberes 1631). From Nieremberg he extracts the idea of God's incomprehensibility, of God's presence in all real and possible beings, and of nothingness as the anteroom of all divine treasures. The rather diffuse and erudite style of Nieremberg is condensed and simplified in the writing of Ruiz de Montoya. This author prevails in Opuscule I, especially when Ruiz de Montoya deals with nothingness and space.[12]

(2) Diego Álvarez de Paz (Toledo, 1549—Potosí, 1620).[13] He was also a Spanish Jesuit. He studied at the Jesuit school of Alcalá de Henares, completed his religious education at the Colégio Máximo San Pablo de Lima. Ordained a priest, he became Professor of Arts, Theology and Holy Scripture at this school, and obtained his Doctorate in Theology at the University of San Marcos. He was the rector of the Jesuit School of Quito from 1595 to 1600, and of that in Cuzco from 1600 to 1604. This author is decisive in the fourth

11 J.E. Nieremberg S.J., *De la hermosura de Dios y su amabilidad por las infinitas perfecciones del ser divino*, Madrid 1890, p. XXI.

12 A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Sílex del divino amor*, cit., Opúsculo IV, p. 227.

13 D. Álvarez de Paz S.J., *De vita espirituali ejusque perfectione*, León 1608.

Opuscule and, although he is cited explicitly in the *Conquista espiritual*, is not referred to in the *Sílex*. The Opuscule IV discusses the levels of mysticism, called steps by John Climacus, habitations by Saint Theresa, degrees by Saint John of the Cross and Álvarez de Paz, and mansions by Ruiz de Montoya. Álvarez de Paz's texts that analyze inner processes, when used in the *Sílex del divino amor*, gain swiftness and drama; the erudite prose is surpassed by a warm, personal current of life experience. Personal experience gives to the *Sílex* a tone of proximity and authenticity not found in Álvarez de Paz.

(3) Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite. Although Pseudo-Dionysius is explicitly cited only three times, he is probably the author who left the greatest number of marks in the *Sílex*. It is not known precisely through which sources he reached Ruiz de Montoya, because his presence is very diffuse in Western spirituality even if it has a habitual presence in the more erudite libraries. The Neoplatonic view of mysticism, the angelology and the paradoxical language of Pseudo-Dionysius inspire important passages of the *Sílex*. The programmatic texts of negative theology, such as "God is not light, he is not goodness, he is not wise [...] in the way you might imagine it",[14] are in the authors who surround Ruiz de Montoya. In the *Sílex* yet other motifs of Pseudo-Dionysius are developed, such as the luminous darkness and foreknowledge, knowing beyond knowing, and others. The angelic hierarchies developed by Pseudo-Dionysius—just as in all of his work—as descending from God, are taken up in the *Sílex* as a ladder towards God.

(4) Hugh of Saint Victor († 1141). Following a suspicion expressed by José Luis Rouillon Arróspide,[15] we can find that there are entire passages taken from the *Soliloquium de Arrha Animae*,[16] especially those involving the sensorial experience of mysticism. "What is this that touches me so subtly and with such vehemence carries me away and with such sublime gentleness pleases me [...]?"[17] is a passage that is practically taken literally from Hugh of Saint Victor. We do not know precisely which sources brought Ruiz de Montoya close to Hugh of Saint Victor or to some Nordic mystics such as Eckhart and Tauler, or their successor Louis de Blois, but traces of these mystics can be identified in the way he discusses the preexistence in God, the "apex animae", the "scintilla" or spark of the soul

14 A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Sílex del divino amor*, cit., Apéndice III, p. 278.

15 J.L. Rouillon Arróspide, "Introducción", in: A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Sílex del divino amor*, p. CI.

16 Hugo de Sancto Victore, *Soliloquium de Arrha Animae*, (PL CLXXVI), col. 970.

17 A. Ruiz de Montoya, *Sílex del divino amor*, cit., Opúsculo III, pp. 115 sq.

through which the mystic seeks and is united with God, the radical statement that God is and the creatures are not, self-annihilation as the entry to mystical life, the existence of something uncreated in the soul. We do know that there were two works translated into Spanish that circulated on the Iberian Peninsula in the 16th and 17th century, which are Tauler's *Institutions* and the *Works* by Louis de Blois. The rejection of these views of mysticism by the Inquisition and some Jesuit superiors may have been the reason why there is a lack of citations of these authors in Ruiz de Montoya's text.

(5) There is also a great influence of Saint John of the Cross (1542–1591), the Carmelite mystic who was also very close to the Rhineland-Flemish tradition, particularly regarding the idea of mysticism as a maturation of faith, nothingness, and the process of annihilation.

3 Explicit Citations

There is an explicit reference to Bonaventura when, in the Epilogue, Ruiz de Montoya talks about Our Lady's Prayer, describing an apparition that turns out to be apocryphal. Outstanding among the explicit citations are the *Gospels* of Mathew, John, and Luke, the *Psalms* and the *Song of Songs*. Motifs such as seeking God, the proximity to God, the intimacy with God to which we are invited, renouncing material goods, senses, faculties, all wishes of the will are all topics that arise constantly in the *Sílex* and are explicitly taken from Scripture.

Saint Theresa is referred to 14 times in the *Sílex*. Ruiz de Montoya mentions her to confirm his position of prudence towards the extraordinary gifts in prayer.[18] He develops his analysis of the mind with images taken from Saint Theresa.[19] He contradicts her on the topic of surpassing the humanity of Christ in contemplation, but cites her respectfully. He copies from her the highest degrees of the *Moradas* (*Habitations*).

Cassian (360–435) is second among the authors most quoted in the *Sílex*, but his passages are among the longest cited. In them, he invites us to curb our imagination, to focus our thinking completely, removing it from any distraction, and to elevate ourselves to what is highest, stably preserving the memory of God, like the tightrope walkers who walk on ropes stretched high.[20]

18 Id., ibid., Opúsculo IV, p. 231.

19 Ibid., Opúsculo III, pp. 179 sq.

20 Ibid., Opúsculo II, p. 58.

Ruiz de Montoya refers to Saint Augustine to justify the overcoming of Christ's humanity in the highest degrees of prayer and to point out that if Christ says that he is the door and the way, then we are to go through it and not stop.[21]

Concluding Remarks: The Mysticism of Ruiz de Montoya

Like many of the great mystics, Ruiz de Montoya is eclectic. He takes up theories, manners of speaking, passages and even the general order of degrees of mysticism from different authors, but infers, prolongs, restructures, lends freshness, poetry, and life to what he takes up, and this is only possible due to profound personal experience. The search for God and the purification of the powers of the soul have in the *Sílex* a unique philosophical and abstract accent. God is above all the *first cause*. This *creole* (son of Spaniards, born in the Americas) that lived in the jungle and at Court, has acute sensibility, and is always dazzled by the universe. We might even call him the mystic of creation. The air, rivers, and insects, to which he unexpectedly returns in the middle of the most sublime contemplative experiences, express his roots in the cosmos, which he paradoxically radically renounces to rediscover in God transfigured.

For him, the path to mysticism is a process of simplification, renunciation, and annihilation. He insists, with Eckhart and Saint John of the Cross, on the need for complete renunciation of all wishes and desires, even the supernatural ones. Annihilation has a certain Neoplatonic connotation, as it requires one to abandon all matter and form in order to adapt to God who is pure spirit. This experience of God is made in the mind, the apex of the soul beyond the center that unifies the powers in a simple act of understanding and a single act of love of the human will, but whose point of departure is the contemplation of nature and its behavior in the light of revelation.

21 Ibid., Opúsculo III, pp. 144 sq.

CHAPTER 24

Hyacinthe de Chalvet on Beauty—Keeping Up Anti-Scholastic Appearances

Guy Guldentops

1 Chalvet and His *Theologian-Preacher*

Hyacinthe de Chalvet, a seventeenth-century little-known Dominican theologian, does not belong to the pleiad of thinkers who shaped the cultural landscape of early modernity. Hence, it is hardly surprising that his name occurs only very seldom in secondary literature.[1] In one of the most recent and succinct encyclopedia entries on Chalvet, written more than two hundred years ago, a certain Mr. Weiss summarizes Quétif and Echard's biography, which is partly based on Chalvet's autobiographical preface to his principal work.[2] According to Weiss, Hyancinthe is the grandson of Mathieu de Chalvet, an aris-

1 There is no lemma 'Chalvet' in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* or in: D. Berger und J. Vijgen (Hrsg.), *Thomistenlexikon*, Bonn 2006; nor is Chalvet mentioned in *Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts. Frankreich und Niederlande*, Basel 1993. Short biographical notes on Chalvet are found in: J. Quétif et J. Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Prædicatorum Recensiti*, Lutetiae Parisiorum 1721, Tomus II, pp. 698b–699b; J. M'Clintock and J. Strong (eds.), *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature*, New York 1885, Suppl. Vol. I, pp. 882b–883a; and L. Kennedy, *A Catalogue of Thomists, 1270–1900*, Houston 1987, p. 89. In some studies, Chalvet is briefly mentioned: see, for instance, U. Horst, *Unfehlbarkeit und Geschichte. Studien zur Unfehlbarkeitsdiskussion von Melchior Cano bis zum I. Vatikanischen Konzil*, Mainz 1982, pp. 33–34 (according to Horst, Chalvet "follows the tradition of his school"; this is clearly a truism); Ch. Teisseyre, "Le catalogue de la bibliothèque du Couvent des Dominicains de Bordeaux au XVIII[e] siècle", in: *Revue française d'histoire du livre* 56 [N° 54 / Nouvelle Série] (1987), pp. 69–88, at p. 72 (in Teisseyre's view, Chalvet offers "a very complete commentary on the *Summa*"; actually, Chalvet does not seem to have intended his works as a commentary on Aquinas); H. Filser, *Dogma, Dogmen, Dogmatik. Eine Untersuchung zur Begründung und zur Entstehungsgeschichte einer theologischen Disziplin von der Reformation bis zur Spätaufklärung*, Münster 2001, pp. 334–335 (on Chalvet's interpretation of the material object of faith).

2 See [?] Weiss, in: *Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne*, Paris 1813, Tome Septième, CACH, pp. 643b–644a. See the dedicatory letter to Giovanni Battista de Marinis, the General-Master of the Dominican order, in: H. Chalvet, *Theologus Ecclesiastes siue theologia ex selectioribus SS. Patrum, S. Scripturæ interpretum, veterum philosophorum, nec non poetarum testi-*

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tocratic politician from the Auvergne who translated Seneca the Philosopher into French.[3] Hyacinthe de Chalvet was born in 1605 in Toulouse. As a Dominican friar, he accompanied Count de Romorantin during his military expedition against the Turkish army in Candia.[4] Furthermore, Weiss narrates that during this campaign Chalvet visited the Holy Land and was captured on his way home. After his release in 1650, he returned to Southern France. In Toulouse, at the renowned convent of his Order, he taught theology and started writing his *Theologus Ecclesiastes*, his multivolume *magnum opus*. In 1659, he was awarded the *laurea magisterii* in Caen, at that time the intellectual capital of Normandy.[5] There, he also made friends with Pierre-Daniel Huet[6] and obtained a chair of

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monijs vno perpetuoque filo contexta [...], *Tomus Primus de Deo vno* [...], Tolosæ 1653, fol. 3^{r-v} of the front matter (I have used the copy of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek: urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10325315-6).

3 This translation appeared in 1604 and was posthumously reprinted in 1638 (I have seen only the Rouen edition of 1618, published under the title *Les Œuvres de L. Annæus Seneca mises en françois par Mathieu de Chalvet*). Weiss omits to mention that Mathieu de Chalvet also translated Seneca the Rhetor. On Mathieu de Chalvet (who was also a 'mainteneur des Jeux Floraux') and his influential translations, see J.E. d'Angers, "Le renouveau du stoïcisme au XVI^{e} et au XVII^{e} siècle", in: id., *Recherches sur le stoïcisme aux XVI^{e} et XVIII^{e} siècles*, éd. par L. Antoine, Hildesheim—New York 1976, pp. 1–32, at p. 6; A. Sussman, *The Elder Seneca*, Leiden 1978, p. 172; I. Luciani, "Jeux Floraux et 'humanisme civique' au XVI^{e} siècle: entre enjeux de pouvoir et expérience du politique", in: N. Dauvois (ed.), *L'Humanisme à Toulouse (1480–1596)*, Paris 2006, pp. 301–335, especially pp. 307, 314, and 334. It is unclear whether the Chalvets of Toulouse were relatives of Marc-Antoine Chalvet, who obtained a doctorate in law from the university of Aix-en-Provence in 1671 and to whom a French translation of Petronius has been attributed (see J.-C. Féray, *Encolpe et Giton ou le Satyricon de Pétrone moins le Banquet de Trimalcion*, Paris 2000, pp. 148 and 165–172).

4 The siege of Candia, which lasted more than twenty years, came to an end in September 1669. See M.D. Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam. Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe*, Oxford 2011, pp. 53–56, and 139–161. Before leaving France (in 1648?), Chalvet seems to have corresponded with Gaston de Renty, the superior of the Compagnie du Saint Sacrement; see R. Triboulet, *Gaston de Renty, 1611–1649. Un homme de ce monde—un homme de Dieu*, Paris 1991, pp. 202, 231–234, 324, and 353.

5 On the intellectual life in seventeenth-century Caen, see D.J. Sturdy, *Science and Social Status. The Members of the Académie des Sciences, 1666–1750*, Woodbridge 1995, pp. 163–165.

6 In his autobiography, Huet writes about Chalvet: "[...] as his pulpit exercises had drawn great audiences of the people of Caen, pleased with their applauses, he determined to fix his residence in this city. [...] He had long courted my friendship; [...] through my recommendation, the booksellers of Caen undertook to publish one part of this vast work [i.e., *Theologus Ecclesiastes*], some former parts having been already published in other places". See P.D. Huetii Episcopi Abrincensis, *Commentarius de rebus ad eum pertinentibus*, Amstelodami 1718, p. 212 = *Memoirs of the Life of Peter Daniel Huet*, Bishop of Avranches, Written by Himself; and

theology in 1662 (or 1663). Having taught for some eighteen years at the University of Caen, he returned to Toulouse, where he died in 1683.[7]

Besides his *Theologus Ecclesiastes*, Chalvet authored two hagiographical texts on *Les Grandeurs de S. Joseph* and *Les Avantages de S. Dominique*. His huge treatise on moral theology and political theory titled *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas ex utroque suggestu* was first published as part of his *Theologus Ecclesiastes* and later reissued as a separate work. This reprint also contains a long panegyric to the Angelic Doctor.[8] Moreover, it is noteworthy that Chalvet dedicated his *Theologus Ecclesiastes* to Giovanni Battista de Marinis, the General Master of the Dominicans, who not only financed the publication of Chalvet's chief work, but also ordered the Dominicans of the St. Thomas convent in Toulouse

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Translated […] by J. Aikin, London 1810, Vol. II, Book IV, p. 13. Chalvet was one of the theologians who signed the "Approbatio Facultatis Theologicæ Cadomensis", attesting that Huet's *De interpretatione* was "utmost useful for men studying both sacred and humane literature"; see P.D. Huetii *De interpretatione libri duo* […], Parisiis 1661 (last page of the front matter).

7 See also J.J. Percin, *Monumenta conventus Tolosani Ordinis FF. Prædicatorum primi* […], Tolosæ 1693, pp. 176b–177a: "Eodem anno 1683 *F. Hiacinthus Chalvet* Tolosas hujus domûs professus […] Cadomiensis Academiæ per 20 [!] annos Doctor Regius Theologiæ […], obiit hic […] laboribus studii & vitæ Regularis concionumque quas Tolosæ, Parisiis & plusquam in viginti Cathedralibus habuit fractus & consumptus. […] Statim post ejus obitum Campana nostra ad funus pulsata rupta est: quæ post quatuor menses refecta est".

8 See *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas ex utroque suggestu siue Theologia Moralis Angelici Doctoris in Conciones digesta: de Oeconomia et Politia Christiana*, Tolosæ 1682, pp. 169–172. In the 1664 edition of *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas ex utroque suggestu*, Chalvet already defended Aquinas against the attacks of the Jesuit Théophile Raynaud (alias Petrus à Valle Clausa). Whereas Raynaud argued that Aquinas is "not always free of error" (see *De immunitate autorum Cyriacorum a censura*, s.l., s.a., Diatriba I, pp. 5–6), Chalvet underlined that "he is proclaimed by all *Cyriaci* [i.e., Dominicans] as the Angelic Doctor, the Interpreter of God's Will, the Eagle among Scholastic Doctors, the Summit of Theology, the Most Resplendent Star, the Shield of Faith, the Teacher of the Truth, the Rule of Christian Doctrine" (see *Angelici Doctoris* […] *oratio apologetica*, at the beginning of the volume: *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas ex utroque suggestu siue Theologia Moralis Angelici Doctoris in Conciones digesta*, Tomus Sextus *Theologi Ecclesiastæ*, Cadomi 1664). On Raynaud, see M.-P. Lerner, "L'ʻincertaine et changeante fortune' posthume de Campanella entre dominicains et jésuites", in: *Bruniana & Campanelliana* 4 (1998), pp. 369–399, especially pp. 375–377 and 391–394; I. Agostini, *L'infinità di Dio. Il dibattito da Suárez a Caterus (1597–1641)*, Roma 2008, especially pp. 273–278; U. Paintner, "Streiten über das, was Streit verhindern soll. Die öffentliche Debatte um den *Index librorum prohibitorum* im konfessionellen Zeitalter", in: H.P. Jürgens und Th. Weller (Hrsg.), *Streitkultur und Öffentlichkeit im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, Göttingen 2013, pp. 297–322, especially pp. 319–321; G. Gasparri, "Notes on the Legacy of Durand in the Early Modern Era", in: A. Speer—F. Retucci—Th. Jeschke—G. Guldentops (eds.), *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His* Sentences *Commentary*, Leuven 2014, pp. 385–422, at p. 400.

to produce an edition of Peter of Tarentaise's *Sentences* commentary.[9] All this seems to indicate that Chalvet was a staunch Thomist, and that is indeed what Quétif and Echard claim: "Everywhere and always, he meticulously endeavored to compose his compilations or [to expound his] ideas in accord with the norm of St. Thomas's *Summa* and in full harmony with his doctrine".[10]

This view of Chalvet as a Thomist, however, is inaccurate. In his prefatory letter to the reader, printed at the beginning of the first volume of his *Theologus Ecclesiastes*, Chalvet stresses that he could no longer accept that "theology, the lofty pillar of religion, [...] the directress of moral life, [...] the queen of sciences, lay hidden behind the narrow walls of colleges". His aim is to lead theology "out of the alcoves of the schools" "into the free and open field". Theology should not merely be exercised in a dialectical manner "with compressed hand", but rather explain the mysteries of Christian faith "with open hand", that is with rhetoric.[11] Explicating the title of his work, he says:

> After having shaken off scholastic dust, Theology leaves the darkness of colleges and enters the light under the illustrious title *Theologus Ecclesiastes* ('The Theologian-Preacher'), a title which she has duly adopted, since she plainly and thoroughly treats all theological theorems, not in a scholastic manner, but in a rhetorical style.[12]

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9 On de Marinis (1597–1669), see M. Sanfilippo, "de Marini [!], Giovanni Battista", in: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 38, Roma 1990, pp. 540–542. The Toulouse edition of Peter of Tarentaise's *Sentences* commentary was printed in 1649–1652, that is, shortly before the first part of Chalvet's *Theologus Ecclesiastes* appeared.

10 J. Quétif et J. Échard, cit., p. 698b: "[...] vir laboris indefessi, ac lectionis per totam vitam assiduæ, in id ubique attentus & semper collimans, ut ad Divi Thomæ Summæ normam doctrinæque ejus ordinem sua sive collectanea sive meditata componeret". See also J. Aikin, *Memoirs of the Life of Peter Daniel Huet*, p. 92, note 16: "He [i.e., Chalvet] was very zealous for the doctrine of St. Thomas [...]"; and more recently B. Montagnes, "L'exaltation de saint Thomas d'Aquin à Toulouse en 1628", in: *Revue thomiste* 110 (2010), pp. 445–462, at p. 458: "[...] le jeune Hyacinthe Chalvet [...] est choisi parmi ses égaux pour défendre publiquement les thèses thomistes concernant le mystère de la Trinité". (Here one might ask: "Whose Thomism? Which Trinity?" The theory of the Trinity expounded in *Theologus Ecclesiastes*, more specifically in the volume *Libri duodecim de Deo trino*, Lugduni 1656, is not simply a reformulation of Aquinas's doctrine).

11 Chalvet alludes here to the well-known image of the closed and open hands whereby the Stoic Zeno illustrated the difference between dialectic and rhetoric: see, e.g., Cicero, *Orator*, 32, 113; for parallel passages, see *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, (ed. I. ab Arnim), Vol. 1: *Zeno*, fr. 75, Lipsiae 1921, pp. 21–22.

12 See the letter "Lectori meo", in: H. Chalvet, *Theologus Ecclesiastes* [...]*, Tomus Primus de*

Here, Chalvet explicitly presents himself to the reader as a modern author who has freed himself from the traditional scholastic method of theologizing. This impression is reinforced if one looks at the series of authorities he enumerates. Since his own arid mind was unfruitful, and since Suada, the goddess of eloquence, never touched his tongue, he decided to fly "like a little bee through all the gardens of the Holy Fathers, of the rhetors, philosophers, and poets"; he gathered their most beautiful flowers, and wove these excerpts into the crown that adorns his *Theologus Ecclesiastes*.[13] As examples of patristic authors he mentions Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory, and Tertullian; his models of ancient oratory are Cicero and Minucius Felix; the philosophers he lists are Plato, Hermes Trismegistus, and Aristotle; the poets are represented by Vergil, Ovid, Lucan, and Manilius. Nowhere in his Preface, however, does Chalvet refer to a theologian of the high or late Middle Ages: not even Thomas Aquinas is named.[14] Chalvet actually seems to have a somewhat ambiguous relation with Aquinas. On the one hand, he quotes or refers to Aquinas in various contexts, and more than once, he agrees with him, observing that "Divus Thomas" or "Angelicus Doctor" "clearly teaches" this or that doctrine.[15] On the other hand, Aquinas does not stand out as the unique awe-inspiring authority; his view is

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Deo vno [...], Tolosæ 1653, fol. 4^{r} of the front matter: "Hæc ergo nunc excusso Scolastico [!] puluere, ex Gymnagiorum [!] tenebris in lucem prodit, sub præclaro *Theologi Ecclesiastis* titulo, quem sibi iure merito vsurpauit, vt pote quæ cuncta Theologiæ Theoremata, non Scholastico, sed Oratorio stylo enucleate pertractet".

13 Ibid.: "Florida hæc mea Theologia cultioris latinitatis flores poscebat; quos vbi ex arida ingenij mei gleba ægre germinare aduerti (neque enim labijs meis Suada insedit; nec in ore meo apes mellificarunt), apiculæ more, per omnes S. Patrum, Oratorum, Philosophorum, nec non Poëtarum hortulos diu vagatus, pulchriores ex illis sententiarum & rationum flosculos excerpsi, quibus in fasciculum collectis, corollam texui, qua Theologus meus Ecclesiastes redimitus incederet". For the bee metaphor, see Seneca, *Epistulae morales*, 84, 3–5 (quoted by, among others, Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, I, Praefatio, (ed. I. Willis), Lipsiae 1963, p. 2, 17–21; John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, VII, 10, (ed. C. Webb), Oxonii 1909, Vol. II, p. 133, 10–15; and Thomas of Ireland, *Manipulus florum*, Prologus, Impressum per mag. Ioannem rubeum uercellensem, Venetiis, ca. 1494, fol. a ii recto).

14 Ibid. (fol. 4$^{r–v}$). See S. Meier-Oeser, *Die Präsenz des Vergessenen. Zur Rezeption der Philosophie des Nicolaus Cusanus vom 15. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, Münster 1989, pp. 108–109. I do not subscribe to Meier-Oeser's claim that Chalvet's work is "not a school theology, merely disguised in a different form, but rather a *theologia naturalis*, substantially colored by Neoplatonism". As we will see, Chalvet's theology is much richer than 'natural theology' and does have a 'scholastic' character; even his Neoplatonism is partly indebted to medieval scholasticism.

15 See, e.g., *Theologus Ecclesiastes* [...], *Tomus Primus* [= I], pp. 62b, 334b, and 428b.

usually cited among several other authorities. In some sections, as for instance in the section on beauty, Aquinas only occupies a subordinate place.

Chalvet devotes one entire *liber* of the first part of his *Theologus Ecclesiastes* to beauty (this book comprises 15 pages or some 2% of the first part, which is composed of 23 books). Since he considers beauty to be the first ray of goodness, the treatise on divine and created beauty immediately follows the treatise on God's goodness and precedes the tracts on the posterior emanations of divine goodness (namely sanctity, liberality, mercy, and clemency). The fact that Chalvet envisages beauty primarily in the light of goodness distinguishes his theory from that of Thomas Aquinas, who tends to associate the beautiful both with the good and the true.[16]

The elegant, though hardly original, treatise on beauty consists of three main *quaestiones*: the first question deals with beauty in general; the second question focuses on divine beauty; the third question discusses created beauty. Despite the use of the word *quaestio*, Chalvet's text does not have the dialectical structure of medieval philosophical or theological questions: he formulates only very few questions; the questions are not divided into articles but into chapters; he does not put forth arguments in favor of a *videtur quod* thesis, there are no *sed contra* considerations, and his answer is not followed by replies to objections. In Chalvet's *Theologus Ecclesiastes*, the word *quaestio* has lost its traditional scholastic meaning and simply denotes one of the principal sections of which a *liber* consists. Hence, it is obvious that his treatise on beauty does not belong to one of the medieval *quaestio* genres. Rather, it must be characterized as a kind of *compilatio*, i.e., a 'reader' in which the author-compiler mainly aims at selecting, assembling, and sometimes briefly commenting on extracts from multifarious authoritative texts.[17]

The first *quaestio* (on beauty in general) starts with a long chapter in which beauty is praised. This epideictic chapter consists of a short prologue and seven *elogia*, long laudatory paragraphs (the number of *elogia* may have been chosen for symbolic reasons, as it suggests both completeness and holiness[18]). Here

16 See J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Leiden 1996, pp. 351–359; id., *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, Leiden—Boston 2012, pp. 173–174; B.T. Sammon, *The God Who Is Beauty. Beauty as a Divine Name in Thomas Aquinas and Dionysius the Areopagite*, Eugene (Oregon) 2013, pp. 327–355.

17 Bibliograpical references in Chalvet's compilation are given in the numerous marginal notes.

18 See H. Meyer und R. Suntrup, *Lexikon der mittelalterlichen Zahlenbedeutungen*, München 1987, cols. 479–565, especially cols. 484–491; T. Holtz, "Zahl / Zahlenspekulation / Zahlen-

Chalvet argues that beauty is the first emanation of goodness and as such attracts and overpowers everything. In the subsequent chapters of the first *quaestio*, the compiler attempts to define beauty and to distinguish its different types. In the second *quaestio*, on divine beauty, he argues that God is the transcendent origin of all beauty. Moreover, he dwells upon Christ's beauty, and emphasizes that we ought to love God's supreme beauty above all things. The third and final *quaestio* describes the vanity of created beauty and warns of the pernicious effects elicited by beautiful bodies.

In what follows, I will analyze some of the abovementioned chapters and topics. This analysis will enable us to see from which sources Chalvet draws his theory of beauty and how he uses these sources.

2 Beauty in General

Beauty is defined as "the first emanation of goodness, its purest splendor, its most splendid ray, [...] the circle of divine light flowing from the good, remaining in the good, and always reflected toward the good". In support of this Neoplatonic concept of the beautiful, Chalvet quotes Psalm 18:6: "In the sun, God, the supremely good or rather the good itself, has set his tent, and He Himself proceeds as a bridegroom from his bedroom". Furthermore, he refers to the "ancient theologians", who "placed goodness in the center and beauty on the circumference". This idea is clearly taken from Marsilio Ficino's *De amore*, his commentary on Plato's *Symposion*. The Florentine Platonist bases this view on an influential passage from Pseudo-Plato's *Second Letter*, where it is said that "all beings are around the King of the universe", who "is the cause of everything beautiful".[19] Chalvet explains the view attributed to the "ancient theolo-

symbolik: II. Neues Testament", in: G. Müller u. a. (Hrsg.), *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, Berlin—New York 2004, Band 36, pp. 458–465, especially pp. 460–462.

19 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, [prologus], p. 410a. See Ficino, *De amore*, II, 3–4, (ed. R. Marcel), Paris 1956, pp. 149–150 (13^{v}–14^{r}); Ps.-Plato, *Letters*, II, 312E. On the interpretation of the *Second Letter*, see H.-D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, "Introduction", in: Proclus, *Théologie Platonicienne*, Paris 1974, Livre II, pp. xx–lix. Proclus views the Good as the "center" of all things (*Theol. Plat.*, II, 7, p. 51, 16–19 and p. 110, note 2) and as the "source of the beautiful" (*Theol. Plat.*, II, 9, p. 59, 21, referring to Plotinus, *Enneads*, I, 6, 6, 15). In this passage, Ficino is also influenced by Plotinus, *Enn.*, VI, 5, 5, and *Enn.*, VI, 7, 22, 25–26, where beauty is described as "what shines upon symmetry" (see Marsilio Ficino, *Über die Liebe oder Platons Gastmahl*, übersetzt von K.P. Hasse, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von P.R. Blum, Hamburg 2004, p. 379, note regarding p. 49, 20).

gians" with the observation that "in all things the internal perfection produces an external perfection".[20] Since Chalvet adopts the principle of Thomistic-Aristotelian epistemology according to which human knowledge starts from sense perception,[21] this "external perfection" is a *conditio sine qua non* for any knowledge of goodness, which is "hidden in the innermost of reality". If we were not moved by manifest exterior signs of goodness, we would not strive after it. Beauty, then, is so to speak "a flower of goodness", "the shiny splendor of the supreme Good in those things which can be perceived by the eyes, ears, and mind". Since beauty 'converts' sight, hearing, and the mind toward the Good itself, it is called in Greek κάλλος. Chalvet combines the well-known (Neo-)Platonic pseudo-etymology of κάλλος (as derived from καλεῖν, 'to call' or 'to provoke') with the Plotinian-Proclian flower metaphor and with the (Neo-)Platonic idea that beauty is "the incentive of all love".[22]

In the epideictic chapter on spiritual beauty, Chalvet goes on to cite more passages from *De amore*. With Ficino, he maintains that not only the beauty which inheres in the virtues of the soul, but also the beauty of bodies is incorporeal. The beauty of bodies does not reside in their material or quantitative aspects, and the beautiful form (*species*) of a person is pleasant to the soul, insofar as her or his incorporeal image is seen by the soul.[23] Remarkably, in his lengthy quotation from Ficino's chapter on the incorporeality of beauty, Chalvet omits one entire paragraph, in which Ficino criticizes some unnamed thinkers who define beauty as "proportional commensurability accompanied with some sweetness of colors". Following Plotinus, Ficino rejects the Aris-

20 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, [prologus], p. 410a.

21 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, 84, 6, resp.; 85, 3, resp.; *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, I, 2, §§ 45–46, (ed. M.-R. Cathala et R.M. Spiazzi), Taurini—Romae 1950, pp. 13–14.

22 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, primum elogium, p. 410a–b. For the flower metaphor, see Plotinus, *Enn.*, VI, 7, 32, 31–32 (see J. Halfwassen, "Schönheit und Bild im Neuplatonismus", in: V. Olejniczak Lobsien und C. Olk (Hrsg.), *Neuplatonismus und Ästhetik. Zur Transformationsgeschichte des Schönen*, Berlin—New York 2007, pp. 43–57, especially pp. 51–52); Proclus, *In Parmenidem*, IV, 855, 6–11, (ed. C. Steel—A. Gribomont—P. d'Hoine), Oxonii 2008, p. 23 (= ed. C. Luna et A.-Ph. Segonds), Paris 2013, p. 27 (with note 5 on p. 291). For the pseudo-etymology, see Plato, *Cratylus*, 416B–D; Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, 4, 7, (ed. B. Suchla), Berlin—New York 1990, p. 151, 9–10 (on this passage, see Y. de Andia, *Henosis. L'union à Dieu chez Denys l'Aréopagite*, Leiden 1996, pp. 71 and 253). On beauty as the cause of love, see Plato, *Symp.*, 201C, 204B–C, 211B–C; Ps.-Dionysius, *De div. nom.*, 4, 7 and 10, p. 152, 6–8 and p. 155, 8–10; Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I–II, 27, 1, arg. 3 and ad 3.

23 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, secundum elogium, pp. 410b–411a. See Ficino, *De amore*, V, 3, pp. 182–183 (43^{v}–44^{v}) and p. 184 (45^{v}).

totelian-Stoic understanding of beauty as symmetry,[24] because it implies that beauty consists in a certain disposition of parts, and this would mean that simple things (like pure colors, one single voice, scientific knowledge, or the soul) could not be beautiful. It is no coincidence that this passage has been left out from the quotation. Chalvet must have been aware that Ficino's criticism was implicitly directed against Aquinas's concept of beauty.[25] At the same time, this omission does not prove that Chalvet embraces a Thomistic theory of beauty. On the contrary, if that were the case, he could have quoted and criticized Ficino's anti-Thomistic passage or he could have argued that it is possible to reconcile Ficino with Aquinas.

In the chapter on the definition of beauty, it becomes even more manifest that Chalvet does not try to develop a Thomistic theory of beauty.[26] Here, he first formulates some rhetorical questions to point to the paradoxical nature of beauty: "What is brighter than beauty, which is the first ray of divine goodness, the splendor of God's countenance? What is obscurer? What is more evident? What is more unknown and more difficult to understand"?[27] These questions bring the compiler to quote the "common saying 'everything beautiful is difficult to know' ". Commenting on this adage, which can be found in Plato's *Craty-*

24 See Plotinus, *Enn.*, I, 6, 1, 21–55; Aristotle, *Metaph.*, XIII, 3, 1078a36–b1; *Top.*, III, 1, 116b21–22; *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, (ed. I. ab Arnim), *Chrysippi fragmenta moralia*, fr. 278, Lipsiae 1903, Vol. III, p. 68, 31–34; Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, IV, 13, 31. On Plotinus' criticism, see Th. Leinkauf, "Der neuplatonische Begriff des ‚Schönen' im Kontext von Kunst- und Dichtungstheorie der Renaissance", in: V. Olejniczak Lobsien und C. Olk (Hrsg.), *Neuplatonismus und Ästhetik*, pp. 85–115, especially pp. 88–89.

25 See Ficino, *De amore*, V, 3, pp. 183–184 (44^{v}–45^{r}). Hasse and Blum refer only to Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, II–II, 145, 2, resp.; see also *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, 31, 2, 1, resp., (ed. P. Mandonnet), Parisiis 1929, p. 724; *In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, 4, 5, (ed. C. Pera—P. Caramello—C. Mazzantini), Taurini—Romae 1954, p. 113, 60–65; *In Psalmos Davidis expositio*, 44, 2, (ed. S.E. Fretté), Parisiis 1876, p. 504b; *Super I Cor.*, 11, 2, § 592, (ed. R. Cai), Taurini—Romae 1953, p. 346; *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, IV, 8, (ed. Leonina), Tom. 47.2, Romae 1969, p. 227, 53–57.

26 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, pp. 413b–414b.

27 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, p. 413b. The view that beauty is "the splendor of God's face" also derives from Ficino, *De amore*, V, 4, pp. 184–185 (46^{r}–47^{v}), quoted at the end of *Theol. Eccl.*, I, 13, 1, 1, secundum elogium, p. 411a (see also below, note 31). This image may derive from Plotinus, who calls "the face of justice and temperance beautiful" (*Enn.*, I, 6, 4, 11–12 and VI, 6, 6, 39), but it is also influenced by the biblical phrase 'God's countenance' (see Gen., 33:10; Ps. 23:6 and 41:3; Paul, Hebr., 9:24); see also Augustine, *De trinitate*, II, 17 and Bonaventure, *Sermones de diuersis. Reportationes*, Sermo 54, § 6, (ed. J.G. Bougerol), Paris 1993, Vol. II, p. 705, 97: "God's face is the beauty of eternal wisdom, which is the origin of all things" (Ficino probably did not know this text).

lus and (Pseudo-)Plato's *Hippias maior*, Chalvet notes that "even Plato himself admits that he does not know at all what beauty is". In support of this claim he adduces an extensive quotation from the *Hippias maior*, more precisely from its aporetic conclusion.[28] Thereafter, he cites (Pseudo-)Plato's criticism of the identification of beauty and utility. Given that what has the power to produce something is useful, utility is identical with power. Since, then, we are active through some power, and since we mostly act wrong, power and utility mostly produce some evil. The beautiful, however, is never the cause of evil. Hence, it cannot be identified with the useful.[29]

After this negative part, Chalvet attempts to give a positive account of beauty. First, he points out that in Greek "the good is called καλλον [*sic*]". Yet, according to the Platonists, the beautiful differs from the good in three respects: first, with regard to the order of things (goodness is in the center, beauty on the circumference); second, in respect of causality (beauty is an emanation of goodness); and third as an object (goodness is the object of the will, beauty an object of the intellect). This differentiation of the good and the beautiful is based on a passage from Ficino's rather free paraphrase of Plotinus' *Treatise on Beauty*, where Ficino argues that "since beauty is an intelligible gift, it attracts only those who have cognition either in some intellectual manner or by sight or hearing, the main servants of reason".[30]

Having sketched some central aspects of beauty, Chalvet mentions four definitions of beauty that are given by the Platonists. (1) To begin with, he again mentions the view that "beauty is the ray, flower, and emanation of goodness, the splendor of God's face". Surprisingly, he attributes this view to Plato. (2) Next, he quotes a Plotinian definition of beauty: "something graceful or a kind of grace which entices us through sight, hearing, or reason". For this definition, he refers to Chapter 1 of Plotinus' *Treatise on Beauty*. However, this definition is not to be found in Plotinus; rather it is taken from Ficino's paraphrase of Plotinus' treatise.[31] Immediately after quoting this definition, Chalvet mentions the traditional Aristotelian-Stoic definition, according to which beauty is "a kind

28 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, p. 413b. See Plato, *Cratylus*, 384B; Ps.-Plato, *Hippias maior*, 304B-E.

29 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, pp. 413b–414a. See Ps.-Plato, *Hippias maior*, 295E–296D.

30 See Ficino, *In Plotinum: In Librum de pulchritudine* (i.e., *Enn.*, I, 6), Prooemium, in: *Opera Omnia*, Basileae 1576 (repr. Torino 1959), Vol. II,2, p. 1574, 26–31: "[…] quoniam pulchritudo intellectuale munus existit, ideo solos allicit cognoscentes: cognoscentes, inquam, siue intellectuali aliqua ratione, siue uisu, siue auditu ministris plurimum rationis".

31 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, p. 414a. See Ficino, *In Plotinum: In Librum de pulchritudine*, 1, p. 1574, 55–56 (freely paraphrasing *Enn.*, I, 6, 1, 1–20).

of proportion of the parts among each other in view of the whole, accompanied with the harmoniousness of color". This definition is also taken from Ficino's paraphrase, but whereas Ficino regards it as a definition of corporeal beauty and presents it as "the common opinion", Chalvet attributes it to "other [philosophers, i.e., different from Plotinus]" and considers it to be a definition of beauty in general. He adds that Plotinus refutes this definition with "four arguments". Even though these arguments can be traced back to Plotinus, it is quite obvious that Chalvet simply quotes or paraphrases Ficino's paraphrase of Plotinus (as a matter of fact, Plotinus does not distinguish four arguments; it is Ficino who structures Plotinus' argumentation in this way).[32] (3) Likewise, the second definition of beauty that Chalvet ascribes to Plotinus is actually borrowed from Ficino's paraphrase. Following Ficino, Chalvet notes:

> Beauty [*formositas*] is a kind of absolute perfection or grace and so to speak a flower of the form itself, principally of the form that dominates all other forms […], something divine and mighty, since it signifies the command of the ruling form, denotes the victory of divine art and reason over matter, and manifestly represents the very idea itself.[33]

In the passage which Ficino paraphrases here, Plotinus does not speak of beauty in general, but rather of the beauty of bodies in this material world; and in contrast with Ficino he does not explicitly say that beauty is a kind of absolute perfection. At best one might say that this interpretation can be inferred from Plotinus' thesis that "what is not dominated by form and concept is hideous".[34] (4) Chalvet concludes his chapter on the essence of beauty with what he considers to be "a common definition of created beauty, accepted by almost all [thinkers]". According to this definition, which is again taken from Ficino's *De amore*, "beauty is the grace [*gratia*] that mostly and mainly

32 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, p. 414a. See Ficino, *In Plotinum: In Librum de pulchritudine*, 1, p. 1575, 11–25 (based on *Enn.*, I, 6, 1, 21–55).

33 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, p. 414a: "[…] formositas (inquit) est absoluta quædam perfectio, siue gratia, & quasi flos quidam ipsius formæ, præcipue formis alijs dominantis, ipsa prolis huius indoles expressius referens patris effigiem. Diuinum, & imperiosum aliquid, quia & imperium regnantis formæ significat, & artis rationisque diuinæ victoriam refert super materiam & ipsam perspicue repræsentat idæam".

34 See Ficino, *In Plotinum: In Librum de pulchritudine*, 2, p. 1575, 56–60 (based on *Enn.*, I, 6, 2, 13–18). On this passage, see Th. Leinkauf, cit., pp. 98–99 (especially note 39); Leinkauf, however, does not indicate the Plotinian source of Ficino's view and does not observe that Ficino's concept of beauty rests on a free reinterpretation of Plotinus' view.

is born from the harmonious coherence [*concinnitas*] of several [elements]". Three kinds are to be distinguished: the soul's gracefulness, which derives from the conjunction of several virtues; the grace of bodies, which consists in the harmony of colors and lines; and acoustic charm, which consists in the consonance of many voices.[35] Both Ficino and Chalvet seem to ignore that this final definition is in contradiction with Plotinus' criticism of the Aristotelian-Stoic definition of beauty.

3 Divine Beauty

The *quaestio* on divine beauty opens with a chapter in which Chalvet argues that God, the most beautiful, is Beauty itself. In the first quotation, taken from Gregory of Nazianzus's *Oratio apologetica* in the Latin translation of Jacques de Billy, it is said that God, who is "all beauty and above all beauty", continuously draws those who love Him to a higher level because He always escapes human understanding. As Chalvet explains in his comment on this passage, divine beauty is at the same time incomprehensible and infinitely lovable.[36] Long additional citations from chapter 4 of Pseudo-Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus*, Ficino's *De amore*, and Denys the Carthusian's *De natura aeterni et veri Dei* further clarify this view, in which the affirmative assertions about God are subordinated to phrases belonging to apophatic theology and to the *via eminentiae*. With Denys the Carthusian, Chalvet holds that God is superessential beauty. First of all, this means that His absolutely transcendent beauty differs from created beauty in that it is the supreme cause of all beauty and 'beautifies' all things in accord with their own proportional capabilities. Moreover, God is incomparably beautiful because His activity (especially His intratrinitarian, purely actual and infinitely lightful activity) is eternal, most fitting to Himself, and consequently hyper-joyous.[37]

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35 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 2, p. 414a–b. See Ficino, *De amore*, I, 4, p. 142 (6^{v}–7^{r}).

36 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 1, p. 417a. See Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or.* 2 (= *Apologetica*), in: PG 35, col. 484, 7–20 = Gregorii Nazianzeni Theologi *Opera*, Iac. Billius [...] contulit, emendauit, interpretatus est, Parisiis 1630, p. 32a.

37 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 1, pp. 417a–418a. See Ficino, *De amore*, V, 4 and VI, 17, pp. 184–185 and 233–234 (46^{v}–47^{r} and 95^{v}–96^{v}); Denys the Carthusian, *De natura aeterni et veri Dei*, art. 57, in: *Opera Omnia* 34 (= *Opera Minora* II), Tornaci 1907, pp. 90–91 (the verb *pulchrificare* derives from Grosseteste's translation of *De divinis nominibus*, though it was already used before; see Isidore, *Etymologiae*, XVII, 8, 7, and *Dionysiaca*, (ed. Ph. Chevallier), Bruges 1937, p. 408, [1]). On Denys's theory of beauty, see K. Emery, Jr., "Fondements

This transcendence of God's beauty, which Chalvet describes in mystical terms, is counterbalanced in two subsequent chapters, one dealing with God's beauty as the origin of all created beauty, the other devoted to Christ's beauty.[38] In his Christological encomium, Chalvet starts from the observation that over and above the three created mirrors (*specula*) in which the splendor of God's beauty is reflected (namely the angels, the human souls, and the material world), there is Christ, in whom the ray of God's face shines most purely. Christ's "stupendous beauty" is portrayed by the bride in the Song of Songs (especially in Chapters 1 and 5), but as Chalvet notes, the bride actually sings of King Solomon's beauty, and this is only a very weak foreshadowing of the divine beauty of Christ, about whom the Psalmist says: "He is more beautiful in form than all children of men".[39]

Whereas all theologians agree that Christ is "the splendor of the Father and the figure of His substance", there is disagreement among the Church Fathers about the question of whether only Christ's spiritual beauty (i.e., the beauty of His soul and His divinity) or whether also His corporeal beauty is praised in this Psalm and other parallel texts. In seventeenth-century theology this topic was much-debated. The Spanish Jesuit Luis de Torres, for instance, writes more than seven dense pages on the question of "whether Christ exceeded all other mortals in corporeal beauty". At the beginning of his very detailed *disputatio*, Torres notes that "this question is particularly difficult, as it is rather seldom discussed by scholastic doctors: you will find hardly one or two who discussed it, while others touched upon it superficially or completely passed over it".[40]

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théoriques de la réception de la beauté sensible dans les écrits de Denys le Chartreux (1402–1471)" = Essay V, in: id., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot 1996, especially pp. 312–314; D. Wassermann, *Dionysius der Kartäuser. Einführung in Werk und Gedankenwelt*, Salzburg 1996, pp. 87–94.

38 For Aquinas's treatment of this latter question, see D. Bouthillier, "*Splendor gloriae Patris*: Deux collations du *Super Isaiam* de S. Thomas d'Aquin", in: K. Emery, Jr. and J. Wawrykow (eds.), *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans. Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, Notre Dame 1998, pp. 139–156; O.V. Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation. Reading Ancient and Medieval Texts after Hans Urs von Balthasar*, Washington, D.C. 2010, pp. 300–301; J.T. Slotemaker, "*Pulchritudo Christi*: The Sources of Thomas Aquinas's Understanding of the Beauty of Christ", in: *Archa Verbi* 8 (2011), pp. 114–144, especially pp. 130–136. In contrast with Aquinas and Chalvet, these historians do not discuss the beauty of Christ's body.

39 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 3, p. 419b. See Song of Songs, 1:1–2, 1:13–15, and 5:10–16; Psalm 44:3.

40 See Ludovicus Turrianus, *Selectarum disputationum in theologiam scholasticam, positiuam, & moralem, Partes duae* [...], Lugduni 1634, pp. 211b–218b, especially p. 211b. On this Jesuit (†1655), see C.H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*. II: *Renaissance Authors*,

Chalvet's less original treatment of the question covers almost two pages. First, he cites some authorities who deny Christ's bodily beauty: Basil, Theodoret, Eusebius, Cyril, Tertullian, Cassiodorus, and Michael Medina. According to Cyril of Alexandria, one should not glorify Christ's flesh, since the entire mystery of the incarnation consists in the *kenosis*, the 'emptying' which annihilates all majesty. In support of this view, he quotes Isaiah: "We saw Him, and He did not have form or beauty".[41] Cassiodorus, clearly influenced by Roman Stoicism, claims that Christ was more beautiful than other human beings, not because of the "milk-white color of His body, His golden-yellow locks or His conspicuous stature", but merely "because He had no sins".[42] Michael Medina adds that "as regards His corporeal form He was not more beautiful than Apollo, Adonis, Narcissus, Hippolytus, or than women like Helena and Ariadne".[43] Remarkably, Chalvet does not give any reference for this citation from Medina (he does not even specify whether he quotes Michael or Bartholomew Medina), so one might suspect that he picked this quotation from another author. After giving arguments for the negative answer, Chalvet adduces some authorities for the opposite view: Rufinus, Jerome, John Chrysostom, Damascenus, Nicephorus,[44] and Anselm of Canterbury, who in his *Cur Deus homo* utters his indignation about the disfigured representation of Christ by some bad painters.[45]

Firenze 1988, p. 465; J. Schmutz, "Torres, Luis", in: http://scholasticon.ish-lyon.cnrs.fr/Database/Scholastiques_fr.php?ID=1251. The view that Christ is both spiritually and corporeally the most beautiful human being was also defended by other Jesuit exegetes; see, for instance, Cornelius Cornelii a Lapide (†1637), *Commentarii in Canticum Canticorum*, 1, 16, Lugduni 1637, pp. 92b–93b.

41 See Cyril, *Glaphyra in Pentateuchum*, I, 4, in: PG 69, cols. 395aA–B/396aA–B; Isaiah 53:2, also quoted by Turrianus, cit., p. 212a.

42 See Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalmos*, 44, 3, (ed. M. Adriaen), Turnhout 1958, p. 404, 80–84.

43 See M. Medina, *Christianæ Parænesis siue De recta in Deum fide libri septem, Ad Philippum Catholicum Regem*, II, 7, Venetiis 1564, fol. 67r; the passage (also quoted by Turrianus, l.c., p. 212a) is part of a chapter devoted to the thesis that miracles prove the truth of Christianity. On this Franciscan theologian (†1578), see G. Díaz Díaz, *Hombres y documentos de la filosofía española*, Madrid 1995, Tomo V: M–N–Ñ, pp. 376–378; K. Reinhardt, *Bibelkommentare spanischer Autoren (1500–1700)*, Madrid 1990, II: Autoren M–Z, pp. 58–62.

44 Damascenus is quoted to the effect that "Christ's face was divine and life-engendering"; see *De fide orthodoxa*, IV, 16 (= 89), (ed. E. Buytaert), St. Bonaventure 1955, p. 334, 60–65. Nicephorus's depiction of Christ's beauty (*Ecclesiastica historia*, I, 40, in: PG 145, cols. 747–750) was quite famous; see, e.g., Federico Borromeo, *De pictura sacra*, II, 2, 10, (ed. K.S. Rothwell, Jr.), Cambridge (Mass.)—London 2010, pp. 72–75.

45 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 3, p. 420a: "Vnde Anselmus indignabatur prauis pictoribus, cum

Following the latter authorities, Chalvet maintains that

> Christ, our Lord, was the most beautiful [human being], not only with regard to the form of His divinity and the sanctity of His soul, but also regarding the form of His body, which supremely suited His condition, duty, and person, as the Angelic Doctor clearly teaches with the following words: A child, a virgin, a man, an aged person do not have the same beauty; likewise, a professor, a general, and a severe judge of private and public moral life have different kinds of beauty. […] Christ, then, chose the best, most perfect and worthiest composition of body and face with a view to the goal He had set Himself.[46]

Chalvet's alleged quotation from Aquinas's Psalms commentary is not a verbatim quotation from the *reportatio* of this commentary, and it manifestly differs from Turrianus's quotation of the same text.[47] The entire quotation is an extraordinary case of plagiarism: Chalvet inaccurately copies a passage from

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speciosam formam præ filiis hominum informi figura pingi videret". Cf. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, I, 1, (ed. F.S. Schmitt), Romae 1940, p. 49, 19–21.

46 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 3, p. 420a: "Pulcherrimus ergo fuit Christus Dominus, nedum diuinitatis forma, & animæ sanctitate, sed etiam corporis specie, vtpote quæ maxime deceret illius conditionem, munus, atque personam, vt præclare docet Angelicus Doctor his verbis: Non eadem est pulchritudo pueri, alia virginis, alia viri, alia senis: ita alia pulchritudo Doctoris, alia ducis, alia grauissimi censoris morum, & publicæ rei. Pro diuersitate igitur personarum, & officiorum decent diuersi vultus, vultuumque diuersi habitus, color, & externa vniuersa oris compositio diuersa. Ad eum igitur finem, quem sibi Christus Iesus proposuerat, optimam, summeque perfectam corporis, & oris compositionem, atque dignitatem elegit. Venerat enim ad hoc, vt homines prædicatione sua instrueret, & ad Deum conuerteret. Huic vero fini pulcherrima corporis species, tamquam aptissimum medium summopere congruebat".

47 See Aquinas, *In Psalmos*, 44, 2, (ed. S.E. Fretté), p. 504b (= Turrianus, cit., p. 214b): "*Speciosus forma prae filiis hominum.* […] pulchritudo, sanitas, et huiusmodi, dicuntur quodammodo per respectum ad aliquid, quia aliqua contemperatio humorum facit sanitatem in puero, quae non facit in sene; aliqua est enim sanitas leoni, quae est mors homini. Unde sanitas est proportio humorum in comparatione ad talem naturam. Et similiter pulchritudo consistit in proportione membrorum et colorum. Et ideo alia est pulchritudo unius, alia alterius: et sic hanc pulchritudinem Christus, secundum quod competebat ad statum et reverentiam suae conditionis, habuit. Non est ergo intelligendum, quod Christus habuerit capillos flavos vel fuerit rubeus, quia hoc non decuisset eum; sed illam pulchritudinem corporalem habuit summe quae pertinebat ad statum et reverentiam et gratiositatem in aspectu, ita quod quoddam divinum radiabat in vultu eius, quod omnes eum reverebantur, ut Augustinus dicit".

Juan de Pineda's commentary on the Psalms without noticing that the Spanish Jesuit paraphrased and expanded Aquinas's exposition of Psalm 44:3.[48] Interestingly, Chalvet quotes no other passages from Aquinas in his treatise on beauty.[49] After citing some lines from Aquinas's Psalms commentary (or rather from Pineda), Chalvet excerpts passages from, among others, Pacatus, Peter of Celle, Augustine,[50] and Bernard of Clairvaux. The final quotation, borrowed

48 See Ioannis de Pineda Hispalensis e Societate Iesu *Ad suos in Salomonem commentarios Salomon Praeuius, id est, de rebus Salomonis regis, libri octo*, v, 4, 8, Lugduni, 1609, pp. 274b–275a (relying on Aquinas, *In Psalmos*, l.c.): "[…] eam Christus dominus corporis & oris totius dignitatem, & pulchritudinem habuit, quæ cum summa reuerentia coniuncta esset, & quæ maximè deceret illius conditionem, atque munus & personam. Rem hanc docuit Diuus Thomas, fere his ipsis verbis, hoc psalmi loco. Vbi subtiliter significat Pulchritudinem non esse eandem in omnibus, neque respectu eiusdem finis. Sicut igitur alia est pulchritudo pueri, alia virginis, alia viri, alia senis; ita alia pulchritudo doctoris, alia ducis, alia grauissimi censoris morum, & publici prophetæ atque præconis verbi Dei; alia priuati hominis, cuius nihil intersit publicæ rei. Pro diuersitate igitur personarum & officiorum decent diuersi vultus, vultuúmque diuersus habitus, color, vocis diuersitas & externa vniuersa oris compositio diuersa. Ad eum igitur finem quem sibi Christus Iesus proposuerat, optimam, summéque perfectissimam corporis & oris compositionem, atque dignitatem elegit". On this Jesuit, see J. Schmutz, "Pineda, Juan de", http://scholasticon.ish-lyon.cnrs.fr/Database/Scholastiques_fr.php?ID=1017, and my "Spätscholastische Antworten auf die Hamlet-Frage", in: *Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie* 61 (2016), pp. 9–51, especially pp. 32–40.

49 Chalvet does not cite *Super Sent.*, I, 3, 2, expositio textus, (ed. P. Mandonnet), p. 106, *Summa theol.*, III, 14, 4, resp., or *Super Isaiam*, 53, (ed. Leonina), Roma 1974, Tomus 28, p. 214, 35–52. In particular, the commentary on Isaiah 53 is important, since here Aquinas argues that Christ's corporeal beauty "was hidden" to human beings "because of the weakness He had assumed" and "because of the poverty He had preserved".

50 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 3, pp. 420a–421a: "Pulcherrimum fuisse Adamum ex hoc probat Philo, quod animam à Deo accepit pulcherrimam. Domus enim quædam aut templum fabricabatur rationali animæ, quam illa diuina imago circumferre debebat.—Augustissima quæque species plurimum creditur habere de cœlo, ait Pacatus: ergo cum Christus totus esset cœlestis, imo diuinus, summa eum decebat corporis etiam pulchritudo. […]—Nobis enim credentibus (inquit Augustinus) vbique sponsus pulcher occurrit […] Pulcher in cœlo, pulcher in vtero, pulcher in terra […].—{Abbas cellesis *i.m.*} O Iesu conuiuis tuis quis sapor in faucibus? Quis odor in naribus? Quis splendor præ oculis? Quæ auditus modulatio? Quæ cordis iubilatio? […]—Hunc ergo pulcherrimum sponsum diligite, o sponse, inquit idem Augustinus: inspicite pulchritudinem amatoris vestri […]. Illud ipsum quod in eo derident superbi, inspicite quam pulchrum sit internis luminibus […]". Cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi*, 137–138, (ed. L. Cohn), Berolini 1896, p. 48, 2–11; Pacatus, *Panegyricus dictus Theodosio*, 6, 3, in: *In Praise of Later Roman Emperors. The Panegyrici Latini*, (ed. C.E.V. Nixon and B. Saylor Rodgers, with the Latin Text of R.A.B. Mynors), Berkeley 1994,

from one of Bernard's sermons on the Song of Songs, delineates the dialectic of light and darkness in the divine *kenosis*:

> Christ is black, but [only] in the eyes of the unwise, for according to the mind of the faithful He is extremely well-formed. The senses reject the black, faith approves Him as white and beautiful. […] The splendor and figure of God's substance is overclouded in the form of a slave for the life of the slave; the whiteness of eternal life becomes black in the flesh in order to clean the flesh. How magnificent are You to me, My Lord, in abandoning Your magnificence![51]

For Chalvet, Christ's sensible beauty is a core element of theology, not only because it concerns an essential point of the Christian dogma (namely the incarnation), but also because he believes that it is able to directly transform the life of the faithful. At the same time, he is convinced that God's intelligible beauty also affects the human soul in various ways. With Ficino, he maintains that it vivifies, excites, and illuminates the human soul.[52] Following Gregory of Nyssa, however, he holds that "divine beauty has its loveliness in terror".[53] Similar ideas on the transformative power of God's invisible beauty

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p. 650, 21–22; Peter of Celle, *Epistulae*, 46 (= III, 12), (ed. J. Haseldine), Oxford 2001, p. 192; Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 44, 3, (ed. E. Dekkers et I. Fraipont), Turnholti 1956, p. 496, 46–57, and *De sancta uirginitate*, 55, (ed. I. Zycha), Vindobonae 1900, p. 300, 12–21 (on Augustine's view of Christ's beauty, see J.-M. Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin*, Rennes 2008, pp. 155–172).

51 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 3, p. 421a: "Niger est, sed oculis insipientium: nam fidelium mentibus formosus valde. Nigrum sensus renunciat, fides candidum, & formosum probat. […] Splendor & figura substantiæ Dei obnubilatur in forma serui pro vita serui. Candor vitæ æternæ nigrescit in carne, pro carne purganda. Quam mihi decorus es, Domine mi, in ipsa tui positione decoris". Cf. Bernard, *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, Sermo 28, 2–3, (ed. J. Leclercq—C.H. Talbot—H.M. Rochais), Rome 1957, Vol. I, pp. 193, 6–12 and 194, 20–23, and Sermo 45, 9, (ed. J. Leclercq—C.H. Talbot—H.M. Rochais), Rome 1958, Vol. II, p. 55, 11–12 (see M. Döbler, *Die Mystik und die Sinne. Eine religionshistorische Untersuchung am Beispiel Bernhards von Clairvaux*, Göttingen 2013, pp. 177–181). Since Chalvet quotes the passages from Sermon 28 in a wrong order, and since he does not give a reference for the quotation from Sermon 45, it is not implausible that he copied the entire passage from an unidentified source.

52 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 1, p. 419a. Cf. Ficino, *De amore*, II, 2, p. 147 (10^{v}).

53 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, quartum elogium, p. 411b: "Diuina enim pulchritudo (ait Nyssenus) in terrore habet aliquid amabile". Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum*, Or. 6, (ed. H. Langerbeck), Leiden 1960, p. 191, 7–8 (commenting on Song of

are expressed in the chapter "Inspired longing for divine beauty", which is nothing but a verbatim quotation of one of Denys the Carthusian's theological-philosophical hymns. In these rather prosaic, though rhyming, iambo-trochaic disticha, Denys praises God for "embellishing the human hearts with natural and supernatural beauty through His deifying light". Furthermore, he observes that the elected "while seeing God with supreme delight, do not dare to behold His beauty without reverent fear". At the end of the hymn, Denys and Chalvet beseech God to take away all guilt, to dispel the ugliness of the passions, and to adorn human souls with the beauty of the virtues and the clarity of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.[54]

4 The Soul's Beauty

In several chapters, Chalvet sheds more light on the spiritual beauty of human beings.[55] He is well aware that the 'beauty of the soul' is a genuinely Platonic theme, expressed, for instance, in Socrates' profound and playful prayer which concludes the *Phaedrus*: "O Pan and other gods, please grant that my inner life be beautiful".[56] Chalvet's notion of the soul's inner beauty is deeply influenced by Stoic and Neoplatonic ethics. With Cicero, he holds that the soul's beauty "is more beautiful than the figure of the body", and he even adds that "it emulates the loveliness of heaven".[57] Moreover, he cites Seneca to the effect that if one

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Songs, 3:7–8 [1599 Geneva Bible]: "Behold his bed, which is Solomon's: threescore strong men are round about it, of the valiant men of Israel. […] everyone hath his sword upon his thigh for the *fear* by night"). This oxymoronic view of God somehow prefigures Rudolf Otto's interpretation of the numinous as *fascinans* and *tremendum*.

54 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 4, p. 421b: "[…] Non dumtaxat naturali, sed & supernaturali, miranda pulchritudine, mentes ornas Angelorum, cordiumque humanorum deificante lumine. […] te videndo summe gaudent, nec te intueri audent, abs timore reuerente […]". Cf. Denys, *De laudibus superlaudabilis Dei*, in: *Opera omnia*, Vol. 34, pp. 420–421; on this hymn, see K. Emery, Jr., cit., pp. 323–324.

55 On the notion of 'spiritual beauty' in the history of Western thought, see A. Falkenhagen, "Schöne Seele", in: G. Ueding u. a. (Hrsg.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Tübingen 2007, Band 8, cols. 542–566.

56 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, septimum elogium, p. 413b. Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 279B–C; on this passage, see D. Bouvier, "Socrate, Pan et quelques nymphes: à propos de la prière finale du Phèdre (279b4–c8)", in: F. Prescendi—Y. Volokhine—D. Barbu—Ph. Matthey (éds.), *Dans le laboratoire de l'historien des religions*, Genève 2011, pp. 251–262. In line with the Neoplatonic interpretation of this dialogue, Chalvet calls it "lib. de pulchro".

57 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 5, p. 416a. Cf. Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, III, 22, 75.

could look into the soul of a good man, one would see a beautiful, holy face, in which the brightness of the four cardinal virtues (justice, courage, temperance, and prudence) is strengthened by the splendor of frugality, continence, perseverance, friendliness, and above all *humanitas*.[58]

Chalvet also cites a short passage from Justus Lipsius's *Manuductio ad stoicam philosophiam*, in which the Louvain Neo-Stoic cites the following syllogism: "Who is worthy of being loved is beautiful; only the wise is worthy of being loved; thus, only the wise is beautiful".[59] This short quotation needs some comments. First, it should be noted that in Lipsius's *Manuductio* it is surrounded by two passages—one from Cicero's *De finibus* and one from Seneca's *Letters*—which are also cited in this context by Chalvet.[60] Secondly, even though Chalvet cites Lipsius verbatim, there are subtle differences in the manner in which they present the quoted syllogism. Unlike Lipsius, Chalvet does not indicate the source of the quotation (it is taken from Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Ethicists*, more precisely from a passage in which the Greek skeptic deconstructs the Stoic 'art of living'). What is even more important: whereas Lipsius interprets the argument as a *paradoxologia* (i.e., as an "inopinata sententia", a philosophical opinion that runs contrary to common belief), Chalvet presents it as "an axiom of the Stoics". Finally, Lipsius mentions the argument among other Stoic paradoxes (mainly taken from Plutarch's *De communibus notionibus*, Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, and Seneca); Chalvet, by contrast, cites Lipsius's quotation between on the one hand passages from Philo the Jew and Gregory the Great, and on the other, a quotation from Ficino's paraphrase of Plotinus' *Treatise on Beauty*. In short, the context in which the Stoic dictum appears is completely different; Lipsius cites it as a Neo-Stoic Christian humanist, Chalvet as a Neoplatonic Christian theologian.

In the quotation from Ficino's Plotinus, it is said that the soul's *formositas* is its natural state, since it is by nature a true form or actuality that subsists in itself

58 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 5, p. 416a. Cf. Seneca, *Epist.*, 115, 3.

59 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 5, p. 416b: "Hinc illud stoicorum accioma: 'qui dignus est amari, est pulcher. Solus sapiens amari dignus est. solus igitur pulcher' ". Cf. J. Lipsius, *Manuductio ad stoicam philosophiam*, III, 17, editio secunda, Antuerpiæ 1610, p. 185, based on Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos*, XI (= Against the Ethicists), 170. On Lipsius's Stoicism, see J. Papy, "The First Christian Defender of Stoic Virtue? Justus Lipsius and Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*", in: A.A. MacDonald—Z. von Martels—J.R. Veenstra (eds.), *Christian Humanism*, Leiden 2009, pp. 139–153 (on the sources of his *Paradoxa*, especially pp. 149–150).

60 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 5, p. 416a. Cf. Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, III, 22, 75 (see above note 57); Seneca, *Epist.*, 66, 2.

and lends the body its beauty. Therefore, Plato and Plotinus cite the old oracular saying according to which "each virtue, both intellectual and moral virtue, is a kind of purification and purity, since virtue is the soul's innate beauty". As soon as the soul is "cleansed from all corporeal dirt, it becomes not only beautiful, rather it becomes beauty, that is, a form that subsists by itself, an ideal *ratio*, an expression of God's face".[61] This ascetic catharsis, however, is not the final goal of human life. In the chapter that follows Denys the Carthusian's hymn, Chalvet argues that "we ought to love the most beautiful God above everything else". If one wants to grasp the soul's ideal beauty, one must re-enter into oneself and ultimately return to God. Chalvet knows these Neoplatonic motifs of introspection and conversion not only through Ficino[62] but also through Augustine and Pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux. He quotes the famous passage from Book X of the *Confessions*, where Augustine exclaims: "Too late came I to love You, o Beauty so ancient and so fresh, too late came I to love You! And look, You were within me, and I was outside, where I made search for You, and I ugly rushed headlong upon those beautiful things You have made".[63] In the same vein, Pseudo-Bernard, the author of a sermon "On Human Misery", holds that

61 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 5, p. 416b. Cf. Ficino, *In Plotinum: In librum de pulchritudine*, 6, p. 1577 (paraphrasing *Enn.*, I, 6, 6, 1–9).

62 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 3, pp. 414b–415a: "[…] percepturus autem incorpoream intra se referatur oportet. Reuocatus autem ad se non percipiet eam nisi possideat. Memento, si delectaris sensibili pulchritudine, quæ insensibilis pulchritudinis est imago, multo maiorem percepturum te voluptatem, quando ipsam animi pulchritudinem cognoueris: imo quando possederis". Cf. Ficino, *In Plotinum: In librum de pulchritudine*, 4, p. 1576, 56–61 (paraphrasing *Enn.*, I, 6, 4, 1–15).

63 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 5, p. 422b. Cf. Augustine, *Confessiones*, X, 27, 38, transl. W. Watts (1631), London—Cambridge, Mass. 1951, p. 147 (translation slightly modified). With regard to this passage of the *Confessions*, Mary Carruthers (*The Experience of Beauty in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 2013, pp. 166–167) asserts that "instead of drawing away from the sensory world, Augustine's cry to God as *pulchritudo* thrusts him vigorously into the midst of an energetic torrent of sensations. […] Augustine here deliberately does not take the neoplatonic route, in order to keep the human contact […]". This interpretation overemphasizes the metaphors of sensibility, which are paradoxically used to describe how a human being is 'touched' and attracted by God's immaterial Beauty; the chapter is influenced, not only by biblical motifs, but also by Plotinus' theory of love (see A. Pigler, *Plotin. Une métaphysique de l'amour*, Paris 2002, pp. 127–129, 173–180, and 271). On this passage, see also J.J. O'Donnell, *Augustine. Confessions*, Vol. III: *Commentary on Books 8–13*, Oxford 1992, pp. 196–198; J.-M. Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin*, pp. 173–182.—For this classic quotation, Chalvet refers to "*Soliloquia*, Chapter 31". The source of this 'misreference' may have been Thomas Gallus, who in his commentary on the Song of Songs also refers to the *Soliloquia* (without indicating the exact chapter), but it is more likely that Chal-

one should not desire anything but God, since everything beautiful one longs for will be found and enjoyed in God.[64]

5 Corporeal Beauty of Creatures

According to the aforementioned Christian-Neoplatonic line of thought, beauty should not be sought in the material world, because the corporeal beauty of creatures is only apparent. Chalvet, however, has contradictory views on corporeal beauty. On the one hand, he agrees with Plato, Boethius, and Denys the Carthusian that since the cosmos has been formed by God in accord with His own exemplary beauty, it has a "wonderful gorgeousness".[65] He also agrees with Ficino that the beauty of a body consists in "the vivacity of its actuality, a kind of grace which shines in it under the influence of its ideal form".[66] On the other hand, he stresses the imperfection of this beauty. With Diotima and Ficino, Chalvet observes that no corporeal being is beautiful in all respects.[67] God has depicted His own beauty in the angels, the human souls, and the material world, but whereas these divine paintings are exemplary ideas in the angelic

vet knew the passage through Bartholomew of Urbino's *Milleloquium veritatis*, in which the lemma "Deus" comprises a long quotation from Pseudo-Augustine's "*Soliloquia*, Chapter 31", including the passage cited by Chalvet. See Pseudo-Augustine, *Soliloquiorum animæ ad Deum liber unus*, 31, in: PL 40, cols. 887–888; Thomas Gallus's Third Commentary *Super Cantica canticorum*, 7, (ed. J. Barbet), Paris 1967, p. 223, 9–10; D. Aurelii Augustini *Milleloquium veritatis*, à F. Bartholomæo de Vrbino digestum […], Lugduni 1555, cols. 614–615.

64 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 5, p. 422b: "Quid ergo quæris extra Deum? […] Quid tibi placet sine ipso? […] Quodcumque bonum cupis, quodcumque pulchrum quæris, totum in ipso inuenies, & ipso perfrueris". Cf. Ps.-Bernard, *Sermo de miseria humana*, 6 in: PL 184, col. 1113B (= Sancti Bernardi Abbatis Volumen II, (ed. J. Mabillon), Parisiis 1690, col. 758A–B).

65 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 1, p. 418a, I, 13, 2, 2, p. 418b, and I, 13, 2, 4, p. 421b. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 28A and 29A; Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae*, III, metrum 9, 6–8; Denys, *De laudibus superlaudabilis Dei*, pp. 420–421.

66 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 4, p. 415a: "Quid tandem est corporis pulchritudo? Actus viuacitas, & gratia quædam ideæ suæ influxu in ipso refulgens". Cf. Ficino, *De amore*, V, 6, p. 188 (50r); on this passage, see Th. Leinkauf, l.c., p. 96; Leinkauf does not note that this text somehow anticipates Friedrich Schiller's definition of beauty as "lebende Gestalt" (see *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*, 15. Brief, (ed. S. Matuschek), Frankfurt a.M. 2009, p. 60).

67 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 2, p. 418a. Cf. Plato, *Symp.*, 210A; Ficino, *De amore*, VI, 18, pp. 235–236 (98r).

minds and rational notions in the human souls, they exist in corporeal things only as material "forms and images".[68]

Chalvet radicalizes this Neoplatonic depreciation of corporeal beauty by adding quotations from Robert Holkot, the biblical book of Proverbs, and Hermes Trismegistus. Chalvet cites Holkot, the fourteenth-century Dominican theologian and proto-humanist, to the effect that corporeal beauty is "a defective, infective, and deceptive good".[69] Commenting on Wisdom 7:10 ("I have loved her [i.e., Wisdom] more than health and beauty"), Holkot argues that corporeal beauty is imperfect in three respects: it is a defective good, since it is perishable; it is infective, since it seldom goes together with decency; and it is deceptive, since it produces pride and vainglory.[70] According to Proverbs 31:30, created beauty is "false and vain", which for Chalvet means that it is only a false external appearance, something fragile and ephemeral. The quotation from the Hermetic treatise 6—which Chalvet, following Ficino, regards as a part of *Poimander*—expresses an even more pessimistic, gnostic view. Here, the anonymous author thanks God because He gave him the certainty that "in this world there can be nothing good or beautiful, since it is an accumulation of bad and ugly things". The things perceived by the senses are nothing but *idola*, images that may cause "wonder" but actually are empty and worthless: "God allows no comparison and no imitation; His beauty is beyond compare".[71] This

68 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 2, 2, p. 418b. Cf. Ficino, *De amore*, V, 4, p. 185 (46^{v}).

69 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 3, 1, p. 423a: "Et vt dicit Holchot: 'Bonum defectiuum, bonum infectiuum, & bonum deceptiuum'". Since Chalvet gives a precise reference for this idea, it is not unlikely that he had some direct knowledge of Holkot's commentary on the Book of Wisdom. Another reason which supports this hypothesis is the fact that Holkot's commentary was "a normal part of the apparatus for biblical studies in the libraries of the later middle ages, both in England and on the continent". See B. Smalley, "Some Latin Commentaries on the Sapiential Books in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 25/26 (1950–1951), pp. 103–128, especially pp. 116–121 (quotation from p. 117).

70 See Ropertus Holkot, *Super libros Sapientie*, Hagenowe 1494 (repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1974), fol. q3$^{va–b}$; *Phoenix Rediviva Ex Relicta facundia Holkotiana palàm in lucem progrediens Seu Postilla Super Librum Sapientiae Salomonis*, [...] ornata ab admod. rev. & eximio P. Raymundo Ortz [...] Pars Prima, Coloniæ Agrippinæ 1689, c. VII, lec. 93, a. 2, p. 167a–b.

71 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 3, 1, p. 423b: "[...] in mundo bonum, seu pulchrum esse non possit. Siquidem mundus congeries est malorum, & turpium [...] Pulchrum verò, & bonum in mundo, aut in mundi partibus inuenire non licet. Nam quæcumque sensus mouent, idola sunt, & vanæ quædam admirationes". See *Corpus Hermeticum*, libellus VI, 4a–5, (ed. W. Scott), London 1968, pp. 168, 16–170, 2 = Ficino, *Mercurii Trismegisti Liber de Potestate et Sapientia Dei, cui titulus Pimander*, 6, Vol. II,2, p. 1844.

quotation shows that Chalvet did not read the Greek text: he simply copied the Renaissance edition of Ficino's translation, according to which sensible things are "admirationes"; this reading, however, must be a typographical error, since it is most likely that Ficino rendered the Greek σκιαγραφίαι as "adumbrationes" ("shadowy sketches").

These general ideas about the imperfect or even unreal beauty of material beings are also applied to the human body. Chalvet certainly does not deny the beauty of the human body. He adopts Ambrose's view that "the [beautiful] form of the body is an image of the mind, symbolizing its integrity: soul and body correspond most fittingly to each other owing to some harmonious proportionality". As a matter of fact, Chalvet pilfered this Ambrose quotation, which actually treats of St. Mary's beauty, from Turrianus's question on Christ's beauty, since the second half of the quotation is not Ambrose; rather it is a citation from Ficino's *De christiana religione*, which is found in Turrianus immediately after the quotation from Ambrose (since Turrianus himself does not mention the exact source of the Ficino quotation, one might suspect that he also read it in another author).[72] Furthermore, following Ficino, Chalvet holds that the beauty of the human body is rooted in "the well-mixed composition of the four elements whereby our body is most similar to the heavens". In this manner, the brilliance of the heavens, which consist of simple, ethereal matter, will easily shine through the human body, and the soul, as the perfect form of the human being, will be visibly reflected in the body's "pacified and obedient [that is, well-ordered] matter".[73]

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72 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, tertium elogium, p. 411a: "Forma enim corporis (inquit Ambrosius) simulachrum est mentis, & figura probitatis; harmonicaque quadam proportione anima & corpus sibi aptissime congruunt, vt docent Platonici". Cf. Ambrose, *De virginitate*, II, 2, 7, (ed. P. Dückers), Turnhout 2009, p. 216: "Nihil torvum in oculis, nihil in verbis procax, nihil in actu inverecundum: non gestus fractior, non incessus solutior, non vox petulantior, ut ipsa corporis species simulacrum fuerit mentis, figura probitatis"; Ficino, *De christiana religione*, 33, Vol. I,1, p. 63: "Sic natura comparatum est, ut corpus et anima proportione quadam harmonica congruant, atque in uno esse conueniant, motusque corporis in animam quodammodo, animae in corpus facile et uehementissimè penetrent"; Turrianus, cit., p. 215b: "Et quidem maximè pulchritudo Christum decebat, cùm, vt ait D. Ambrosius lib. 2. de Virginibus, simulacrum mentis sit species corporis figuráque probitatis. Cúmque anima et corpus proportione quadam harmonica congruant, vt inquit Ficinus".

73 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 4, p. 415a. Cf. Ficino, *De amore*, V, 6, pp. 188–189 (50^{v}–51^{v}). In this chapter, Ficino is influenced not only by ancient astrological and physiognomic theories but also by the scholastic doctrine of *redundatio* and *resultatio* (cf., e.g., Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I–II, 4, 6, resp.; III, 11, 2, resp.; III, 49, 6, arg. 3).

Chalvet connects Ficino's rather schematic description of the ideal human body with Nicolas Caussin's praise of human corporeal beauty, with a detailed *ecphrasis* of King Theodoric's "heroic beauty" which he found in one of the letters of Sidonius Apollinaris, and with another, shorter sketch of corporeal beauty by (Pseudo-)John Chrysostom.[74] Nicolas Caussin, a French Jesuit who became famous as both a confessor of Louis XIII and one of the first Egyptologists, is also the author of *Eloquentiae sacrae et humanae parallela*, an impressive study on pagan and Christian rhetoric.[75] In Book X, Caussin presents an example of an epideictic text on the beauty of the body. Chalvet plagiarizes a passage from this text:

> In men [beauty] is called 'dignity' (*dignitas*), in women 'attractiveness' (*venustas*), and in heroes one frequently praises the tallness of the body, the majesty of the head, the dignity of the face, the maturity of age, the flashing of the eyes, the equally respectable and graceful majesty which at the same time is able to blind and to invite the sense of sight.[76]

This quotation brings together some *topoi* that were important in the ancient, medieval, and early modern masculinized discourse on beauty. In particu-

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74 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 4, p. 415a–b. Cf. Sidonius Apollinaris, *Epistulae*, I, 2, 2–3, (ed. A. Loyen), Paris 1970, pp. 4–5; (Pseudo-)John Chrysostom, *Homilia de capto Eutropio*, 17, in: PG 52, col. 412 (Chalvet quotes Tilman's translation: see D. Ioannis Chrysostomi *Homiliæ duæ versæ* [...] Godefrido Tilmanno Cartusiæ Parisiensis monacho Interprete, Parisiis 1554, fol. 14^{v}).

75 On this author, see M. Fumaroli, *L'Âge de l'éloquence*, Genève 2002, pp. 279–298 and 334–338; S. Conte (éd.), *Nicolas Caussin: rhétorique et spiritualité à l'époque de Louis XIII*, Berlin 2007.

76 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 4, p. 415a–b: "In viris dignitas, in fæminis venustas appellatur: & in Heroibus quidem sæpe laudatur proceritas corporis, maiestas capitis, oris dignitas, ætatis maturitas, fulgor oculorum, veneranda pariter, & grata maiestas, quæ perstringat simul, atque inuitet aspectum". Cf. N. Caussin, *Eloquentiæ sacræ et humanæ parallela*, X, 7, Flexiæ 1619, p. 399bB. The passage from Caussin is preceded by the following sentence on *gratia*: "Beauty without grace is like a fish-hook without bait, and Aristides excellently compares [this grace] with Iris, with the sweetest harmony of a lyre [...]". In the first part of this sentence, Chalvet uses a not uncommon metaphor (cf., e.g., J.A. Weber, *Ars discurrendi de qualibet materia, ad centum fontes reducta*, Norimbergae 1707, p. 3: "Delectatio nuda est esca sine hamo, utilitas nuda est hamus sine esca"); the second part is based on a passage from one of Aelius Aristides' orations on Smyrna (*Oratio 17*, in: Aelii Aristidis [...] *Quae supersunt omnia*, (ed. B. Keil), Berolini 1898, Vol. II, p. 7, 18–21).

lar, it highlights the Ciceronian contrast between male and female beauty, an antithesis which Chalvet must have appreciated very much.[77]

Given his Ambrosian-Ficinian view on the harmony between body and soul, it is unsurprising that Chalvet disagrees with Seneca's criticism of Vergil, who had said that "virtue arising from a beautiful body is more graceful". In Chalvet's opinion, Vergil was not really wrong, since "virtue's brilliance is more delightful owing to the rays of corporeal beauty".[78] Corporeal beauty, then, plays an important role in social life. Referring to Psalm 44:3–5 and to the notorious story about Phryne, Chalvet argues that bodily beauty is a kind of "tacit eloquence".[79] In addition to this, he asserts that "as Aristotle has taught, good judges of reality should regard beauty as a not insignificant part of happiness". To corroborate this view, he quotes a passage from Pseudo-Lucian's *Charidemus*, where it is said that people gifted with beauty are the happiest and are honored by both gods and human beings. Accordingly, King Solomon owed his perfect happiness and supreme power to his beauty. In this passage on corporeal beauty as a part of happiness, Chalvet again plagiarizes Juan de Pineda. The paraphrase of Aristotle's and Pseudo-Lucian's texts is clearly copied from the Jesuit, and also the idealization of Solomon's beauty depends on Pineda's *Salomon Praeuius*.[80]

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77 Cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 36, 130. On the classical 'construction' of male and female beauty, see A. Corbeill, "The Republican Body", in: N. Rosenstein and R. Morstein-Marx (eds.), *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, Oxford 2006, pp. 439–456, especially p. 446.

78 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, tertium elogium, p. 411a–b. Cf. Vergil, *Aeneis*, V, 343; Seneca, *Epist.*, 66, 2. Vergil's line is also quoted by Turrianus, l.c., p. 215b.

79 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, sextum elogium, p. 413a. Phryne, a lovely Athenian *puella* (i.e., courtesan), was almost condemned by the judges; her lawyer Hyperides (called "Hypericles" by Chalvet) did not know how to defend her with his rhetoric, and therefore "instead of delivering the most elegant discourse, he took away Phryne's veil in order that the most elegant beauty of the virgin would perorate more elegantly [than he could]". Chalvet refers for this story to Plutarch (cf. Ps.-Plutarch, *Vitae decem oratorum*, 849E, in: *Moralia*, V.2.1, (ed. J. Mau), Leipzig 1971, p. 42), but he actually plagiarizes a passage from Diego de Celada's *Iudith Illustris Perpetuo Commentario Literali et Morali*, XXXV, Venetiis 1638, p. 413a (Celada's version of the story is based on Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, XIII, 59, (ed. G. Kaibel), Stuttgardiae 1962, pp. 301, 23–302, 19). On this story, see P.A. Rosenmeyer, "(In-)Versions of Pygmalion: The Statue Talks Back", in: A. Lardinois and L. McClure (eds.), *Making Silence Speak. Women's Voices in Ancient Greek Literature and Society*, Princeton 2001, pp. 240–260, especially p. 245.

80 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 1, 1, septimum elogium, p. 413a–b: "Pulchritudo fœlicitatis non minima pars censeri debet à bonis rerum æstimatoribus (vt docuit Aristoteles). Qui enim donum hoc pulchritudinis adepti fuere, omnium (inquit Lucianus) beatissimos fuisse visos [...]. Vnde verò tanta Salomonis fœlicitas [...]? Certe à pulchritudine". Cf. Pineda,

The passage cited above from Caussin has already indicated that according to Chalvet male beauty is, at least from a moral perspective, superior to female beauty (unlike *venustas*, *dignitas* normally has a positive moral connotation[81]). In the last chapter of the treatise on beauty, Chalvet further elaborates upon this idea. The title of this chapter ("The beauty of bodies is not only vain but false and endangers the soul's health / salvation") conceals its virulently misogynous contents. Indeed, it is merely a long cento of moralistic citations from Jerome, Vergil, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Bernard of Clairvaux, Juvenal, Tertullian, and the Bible, which should demonstrate that "the looks of a pretty woman are poisonous and fiery just as the sight of the basilisk".[82]

Conclusion

Chalvet is a well-read compiler who quotes numerous authorities verbatim and usually adds precise references to his sources, though he does not shrink from plagiarizing early modern scholastics. His theory of beauty can definitely not be characterized as a Thomistic doctrine; rather it is a Neoplatonic theory with Stoic and Christian influences. The most important sources of his bizarrely eclectic treatise on beauty are Plato and Platonists (Plotinus, Hermes Trismegistus, Boethius, and Ficino), but also Stoic authors (Seneca and Lipsius) and Christian theologians (Church Fathers, Pseudo-Dionysius, Anselm, Bernard, Thomas Aquinas, Robert Holkot, and Denys the Carthusian) are cited.

Ad suos in Salomonem commentarios Salomon Praeuius, VI, 3, pp. 425b–426a (referring to Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, I, 9, 1099b2–4, and Ps.-Lucian, *Charidemus* [= lib. 83], 6 and 20, (ed. M.D. Macleod), Oxonii 1987, p. 393, 14–17 and p. 400, 26–27). In his *Ethics* commentary, Aquinas also holds that corporeal beauty "contributes to the beauty of happiness" (*Sententia libri Ethicorum*, I, 13, (ed. Leonina), Tom. 47, Romae 1969, p. 47, 155–166; cf. *Summa theol.*, I–II, 4, 6–7, where corporeal beauty is not explicitly mentioned among the material things required for happiness).

81 At p. 424b, Chalvet speaks of the "inner charm (*venustas*)" of the soul, but this use of *venustas* is rather rare.

82 See Chalvet, cit., I, 13, 3, 2, p. 424a–b: "Aspectus vero pulchræ fæminæ, vt reguli, siue basilisci venenosus est, & ignitus, qui vitam intuentibus auferat [...]". On the basilisk, see, e.g., Albert, *De animalibus*, XXV, 13, (ed. H. Stadler), Münster 1920, pp. 1561–1562; for the idea that women are like basilisks, see, e.g., Augustinus Belgicus, *Sermones* (Noua Patrum Bibliotheca), (ed. A. Mai), Rome 1952, p. 454, 18; Bernard of Cluny, *De octo vitiis*, v. 791–792, (ed. K. Halvarson), Stockholm, 1963, p. 120; Albert, *Quaestiones super de animalibus*, XV, 11, (ed. E. Filthaut), Münster 1955, p. 266, 3–5; Erasmus, *Parabolae*, (ed. J.-C. Margolin), in: *Opera Omnia* I-5, Amsterdam—Oxford 1970, p. 280, 961–963.

Chalvet's ideas on beauty do not simply coincide with the views of the authors whom he copies or paraphrases. Unlike Denys the Carthusian, Chalvet does not interpret the beautiful as a transcendental nor does he emphasize that everything created is, insofar as it is, beautiful.[83] Willy Theiler's characterization of Plotinus as a "*Plato dimidiatus*"[84] can a fortiori be applied to Chalvet. His knowledge of Plato and ancient Platonism is restricted and probably second-hand, since he mainly depends on Ficino. Furthermore, in his theory of beauty, he draws only on Ficino's *De amore* and paraphrase of Plotinus' *Ennead* I, 6; Ficino's commentaries on the *Ion* and the *Phaedrus* are not quoted.[85] This is a pity, for in his *Phaedrus* commentary, Ficino shows that Plato is the source of the idea that beauty is "the consummate unfolding of the intelligible light and of the intelligible forms", "the clearest and most obvious of all divine things";[86] and it is also here that Ficino describes the act of writing philosophical texts as "the most beautiful of all games".[87] All this is missing in Chalvet's treatise on beauty. He does not even touch upon the connection between divine frenzy or inspiration and poetic beauty, a topic that Ficino treats not only in his *Ion* and

83 See Denys, *De venustate mundi et pulchritudine Dei*, art. 3–4, in: *Opera Omnia* 34, pp. 229a–230a (in this passage, which Chalvet does not quote in his treatise on beauty, Denys does not call *pulchrum* a *transcendens*, but he does mention the beautiful among the *convertibilia entis*, "which add nothing real to being" [p. 229aA]). On beauty as a transcendental in Denys, see K. Emery, Jr., "Fondements théoriques de la réception de la beauté sensible dans les écrits de Denys le Chartreux (1402–1471)", p. 315; id., "The Matter and Order of Philosophy according to Denys the Carthusian", in: J.A. Aertsen und A. Speer (Hrsg.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, Berlin—New York 1998, pp. 667–679, especially p. 675; J.A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, pp. 105–106 and 174–175; id., "The Triad 'True–Good–Beautiful'. The Place of Beauty in the Middle Ages", in: M.C. Pacheco et J.F. Meirinhos (éds.), *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale*, Turnhout 2006, pp. 415–435, especially p. 428; and M. Calma, "Témoignage sur le beau comme propriété de l'être: Jean Gerson et Denys le Chartreux", in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 54 (2007), pp. 464–482, especially pp. 478–481 (I do not agree with her claim that according to Denys "the beautiful is not a transcendental" [p. 480]).

84 See W. Theiler, "Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa", in: *Les sources de Plotin*, Genève 1957, pp. 65–103, especially p. 67; W. Cürsgen, *Henologie und Ontologie. Die metaphysische Prinzipienlehre des späten Neuplatonismus*, Würzburg 2007, p. 13.

85 Chalvet surely knows other commentaries of Ficino; in his tract on sanctity, for instance, he quotes long passages from his translation of and commentary on the *Euthyphro* (see Chalvet, cit., I, 14, 1, 2, p. 427a–b).

86 See Marsilio Ficino, *In Phaedrum: Argumentum*, 9, 2, in: *Commentaries on Plato*, Vol. I: *Phaedrus and Ion*, (ed. and transl. by M.J.B. Allen), Cambridge, Mass.—London 2008, p. 80 (Allen's translation, slightly modified); cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 250D.

87 See Ficino, *In Phaedrum: Commentum*, 51, p. 190 (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 276B).

Phaedrus commentaries but also in his *De amore*.[88] In short, Chalvet, who is manifestly not influenced by Ficino's understanding of art,[89] turns out to be a *Ficinus dimidiatus*.

In his treatise on beauty, Chalvet seldom comments on the authors whom he quotes. He does not attempt to explain or to critically discuss their ideas; nor does he try to harmonize contradictions between the various texts used in his compilation. Inconsistencies are to be found in particular in passages concerning corporeal beauty: the cosmos is beautiful, but nothing created is beautiful; the beauty of the human body reflects and accentuates the beauty of the soul, but corporeal beauty is also false and threatens the soul's well-being. It would be easy to ridicule Chalvet as an unintelligent compiler, unable to synthesize the disparate viewpoints of his sources. However, it should be observed that his compilation unveils some fundamental tensions inherent in Western thought, especially in medieval theology and philosophy. The multiple philosophical and theological traditions of Antiquity and the Middle Ages hand down ambivalent valuations of the created world and particularly of the human body. This variety of perspectives is mirrored in encyclopedic authors like Chalvet. Furthermore, we should keep in mind that his *Theologus Ecclesiastes* is a work of theological rhetoric, probably addressed to priests or future preachers. For such rhetorical readers, it may be helpful to encounter diverging or even contradictory standpoints and arguments, which can be deployed in various contexts and according to different circumstances.

It might seem tempting to read Chalvet's theory of beauty as a confirmation of Hans Urs von Balthasar's thesis that in the history of Western thought, and especially in scholastic theology, the beautiful is conceived of as "« *Erscheinung* », ἐπιφάνεια".[90] This interpretation of Chalvet, however, would be far from

88 See Ficino, *In Phaedrum: Commentum*, 4, 3, p. 52 (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 245A); *In Ionem: Argumentum*, 6–7, pp. 200–204; *De amore*, VII, 14, pp. 258–259 (121r).

89 On Ficino's *Kunstverständnis*, see P.O. Kristeller, *Die Philosophie des Marsilio Ficino*, Frankfurt a.M. 1972, pp. 247–250 and 287–293; U. Oehlig, *Die philosophische Begründung der Kunst bei Ficino*, Stuttgart 1992, especially pp. 51–83 and 96–97; Th. Leinkauf, *Grundriss: Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance (1350–1600)*, Hamburg 2017, Bd. 1, pp. 488–496.

90 See H.U. von Balthasar, *Herrlichkeit. Eine theologische Ästhetik*. III/1: *Im Raum der Metaphysik*, Einsiedeln 1965, p. 930: "Das Schöne ist ohne Zweifel « *Erscheinung* », ἐπιφάνεια. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt haben es die Griechen gesehen, […] und in ihrem Gefolge die großen ästhetischen Theologien des Mittelalters […]". See also M.P. Murphy, *A Theology of Criticism. Balthasar, Postmodernism, and the Catholic Imagination*, Oxford 2008, pp. 45–48.

accurate. First, it is doubtful whether his multifaceted theory of beauty can be adequately epitomized in one single notion. Secondly, Balthasar's vague and illogical description of beauty as the "appearance of the non-apparent" is not at all typical of Chalvet or any medieval author; even Eriugena, who coined the oxymoron *non apparentis apparitio*, did not use it to define beauty[91] (such a definition of beauty can be found, by contrast, in several modern philosophers[92]). Finally, like most scholastics, Chalvet does not employ the Christological term ἐπιφάνεια (or its Latin equivalents *apparitio*, *manifestatio*, or *ostensio*) in order to articulate his conception of beauty.[93]

Still, it is clear that Chalvet's doctrine of the beautiful, located between the tracts on divine goodness and on sanctity, is part and parcel of his Christian theology; accordingly, it has metaphysical, ethical, exegetic, and mystic aspects, which all converge in his laudation of Christ's spiritual and bodily beauty. However, this complex intertwining of Christian and pagan ideas on divine beauty together with the quasi-aesthetic theorization of asceticism should not lead us to the conclusion that Chalvet develops a 'theological aesthetics' (even though this phrase seems to have become quite fashionable among contemporary theologians). Such a Balthasarian reading of his little tract on beauty is completely anachronistic, since he does not offer anything that, properly speaking, can be called an 'aesthetic theory'.[94] Despite his acquaintance with ancient literature, his theory of beauty is molded neither by classical rhetoric or poetics

91 See Eriugena, *Periphyseon*, III, (ed. E.A. Jeauneau), Turnholti 1999, p. 22, 589–590.

92 See O.V. Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation*, pp. 37–46, 66–74, and 137–139. Secularized variations on the same theme turn up in late-modern aesthetics: see, for instance, U. Eco, "Per *L'ombra della ragione*", in: D. Eccher (ed.), *L'ombra della ragione. L'idea del Sacro nell'identità europea nel XX secolo*, Sesto San Giovanni—Bologna 2000, pp. 23–24: "Con la poetica dell'epifania si vagheggia a un'estasi che si produce di fronte alle cose di questo mondo"; see also A. Nehamas, *Only a Promise of Happiness. The Place of Beauty in a World of Art*, Princeton 2007, p. 70: "[…] beauty is always revealed in appearance but never completely"; and C. Menke, *Die Kraft der Kunst*, Frankfurt a.M. 2014, p. 55: "Das Schöne ist Schein".

93 As is well known, ἐπιφάνεια means 'surface' or 'appearance', and metaphorically refers to the self-manifestation of the divine, especially to Christ's apparition on earth. See B. Gladigow—D. Lührmann—H. Förster, "Epiphanie", in: H.D. Betz—D.S. Browning—B. Janowski—E. Jüngel (Hrsg.), *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft*, Tübingen 1999, Band 2, cols. 1367–1373.

94 Those who (like Bychkov [cit., pp. 3–5, 50, 160, and 323]) stress the "essential continuity" between scholastic theories of beauty and modern or contemporary aesthetics should re-read Alexander Baumgarten: the differences that distinguish his rhetorical *Aesthetica* (conceived as a "theory of the liberal arts", whose goal is the "perfection of sensitive knowledge" [*Aesthetica*, §§1 and 14, Frankfurt a.O. 1750, pp. 1 and 6]) from medieval doctrines clearly prevail over the few superficial resemblances; a fortiori scholastic theories

nor by Renaissance or early modern literary theories. Moreover, while many seventeenth-century authors outline a proto-aesthetic theory of art,[95] Chalvet does not show any genuine philosophical or theological interest in artistic or literary beauty. Insofar as his theology of beauty focuses exclusively on the beauty of God and His creatures, it bears a pre-modern stamp that antedates the era of aesthetics.

Should we then conclude that Chalvet is not a modern author? This conclusion would be incorrect, not only because he is a younger contemporary of Descartes (who died three years before the publication of the first volume of *Theologus Ecclesiastes*), but also because his work has some 'modern' characteristics: he wants to distance himself from scholasticism, he is (or at least pretends to be) familiar with a larger number of ancient authorities than were his medieval confrères, and he cites or plagiarizes a couple of Renaissance and early modern authors. However, his work also has several 'medieval' features: his knowledge of early modern philosophy appears to be quite limited, his manner of philosophizing and doing theology is reminiscent of the style and method of medieval compilers, and his Christian-Neoplatonic theory of beauty repeats or echoes many ideas formulated by authors from the fourth to the fifteenth century. Since, then, it is misleading to pigeonhole Chalvet simply as a 'medieval' or a 'modern' philosopher-theologian,[96] one might be inclined to

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of beauty have scarcely anything in common with (post-)Kantian aesthetics (cf. S. Hallivell's criticism of Bychkov, in: *The Classical Review* 62 [2012], pp. 428–430; see also A. Speer, "Aesthetics", in: J. Marenbon (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford 2012, pp. 661–684, and R. Campe—A. Haverkamp—C. Menke, *Baumgarten-Studien. Zur Genealogie der Ästhetik*, Berlin—Köln 2014).

95 Gerard Vossius, for instance, holds that the beauty of poetry consists in the measured length of the work, its grand subject-matters, well-balanced composition, and refined or even sublime style (see G.J. Vossius, *Poeticarum institutionum libri tres*, (ed. J. Bloemendal), Leiden 2010, pp. 318–321 and 1311–1313). Federico Borromeo defines the *decorum* as "the most beautiful light and charming flower, growing from human moral character" and analyzes it as a necessary requirement for religious art; he maintains that just as corporeal beauty adds something to the body's good health, from which it cannot be separated, so the *decorum* adds some indescribable quality to the right mean of virtue, from which it is inseparable (see *De pictura sacra*, I, 2, 4–7, (ed. K.S. Rothwell, Jr.), pp. 6–9; the editor [cit., p. 230, note 9] refers to Cicero, *De officiis*, I, 4, 11–15, but parallels are rather found at I, 27, 95 and 28, 98). On early modern 'aesthetics', see further J.R. Snyder, *L'estetica del Barocco*, Bologna 2005, and E.R. Koch, *The Aesthetic Body. Sensibility, Passion, and Corporeality in Seventeenth-Century France*, Cranbury 2008.

96 Ch.B. Schmitt makes a similar remark on G.F. Pico della Mirandola; see his *Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) and His Critique of Aristotle*, The Hague 1967, p. 31. See

classify him as an exponent of 'Second Scholasticism', but this historiographical label is not unproblematic.[97] Fortunately, the periodization of the history of philosophy and theology is an irrelevant issue—except, of course, for idealist historians who are searching for the spirit of medieval thought or the quintessence of modernity.[98]

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also L. Bianchi, "Renaissance und ‚Ende' des Mittelalters: Betrachtungen zu einem historiographischen Pseudoproblem", in: E. Rudolph (Hrsg.), *Die Renaissance und ihre Antike*, Tübingen 1998, pp. 117–130, especially p. 129, and my "Nicolaus Ellenbog's Anti-Lutheran Tract on Piety", in: C. Laes—G. Partoens—G. Guldentops (eds.), *Felici curiositate. Studies in Latin Literature and Textual Criticism from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century*, Turnhout 2017, pp. 659–684, esp. p. 669.

97 See M. Forlivesi, "A Man, an Age, a Book", in: id. (ed.), Rem in seipsa cernere. *Saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri* (*1602–1673*), Padova 2006, pp. 23–144, especially pp. 106–114; C. Esposito & M. Lamanna, "Premessa: Esiste una 'filosofia barocca'?", in: *Quaestio* 17 (2017), pp. 419–426.

98 This study would not have been possible without digital instruments like *Google Books*, *Library of Latin Texts*, and *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. A short version of this paper was read at a colloquium of the European Graduate School for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, organized by Marije Martijn and Wouter Goris (VU Amsterdam, August 2013). I thank Cal Ledsham (Melbourne) for his comments on a second draft.

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