1 | BORDERS, BARRIERS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR

> There is something about walls. You know with the whole Vietnam experience, when we were trying to express the whole experience, the lives lost, what did we come up with? A wall. We built this wall [on the US–Mexico border] to express something. There is no question that the wall says something in and of itself. And it depends on which side of the issue you are on as to what you think it says. For someone like myself that tends to look at migration as a phenomenon of the poor – it is so connected to the poor – that wall is almost like a denial of the humanity of the poor. I am not even going to recognize that you are a human being. This wall says that. (Ruben Garcia, director of Annunciation House, El Paso)

Globalization and borders

The physical barriers built by the United States, India, and Israel on their political borders are the largest and most expensive infrastructure projects undertaken in each country in the new millennium (Kabir 2005; Rael 2011; Weizman 2007). All three of these border security projects were under consideration for many years, but had not been completed owing to the high cost, local political resistance, and concerns about the damaging stigma associated with building barriers, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Indeed, as the Cold War ended and the discourse of globalization was ascendant, the idea of building a massive and expensive barrier on a political border seemed anachronistic. The establishment of free trade agreements such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the removal of internal border checkpoints in the European Union (EU) appeared to confirm progress towards a borderless world (Ohmae 1990, 1996).

In the 1990s, there was unease about the cultural, economic, and political changes that might be brought by globalization, but it often focused on the possibility of conflict around the world as traditional ways of life were defended from the spread of 'Western' practices (Barber 1995). The process of globalization did result in international production networks as many companies moved manufacturing jobs

out of wealthy countries into other parts of the world. At the same time, many agricultural societies restructured their economies as development was linked to the idea of free trade through the removal of trade barriers at borders (Brunet-Jailly 2011; Sparke 2006). The world's population grew rapidly but unequally during the decade, with much of the increase concentrated in poorer countries, which often resulted in the expansion of urban slums (Davis 2004). At the same time, advances in transportation and communication technologies increased awareness of how other people lived around the world.

By the end of the 1990s, the potential cultural and economic impacts of immigration into wealthier countries from other parts of the world was a significant issue (Heyman 1998). In the United States, the idea of a permanent physical barrier was proposed to slow the flow of immigrants and drugs across the vast southern border with Mexico (Andreas 2009; Nevins 2010). In India, immigration and smuggling were concerns, as was the need to define the boundaries of the still relatively new country (Jones 2009b; Krishna 1994). In Israel, there were ongoing debates about the territorial extent of the state and how to incorporate or exclude the millions of Palestinians that live in the occupied territories (Gordon 2008; Yiftachel 2006). These concerns resulted in more spending on border security in all three countries at the end of the twentieth century. Indeed, despite the rhetoric of globalization and a borderless world, the 1990s saw almost as much border fencing globally as the previous four decades of the Cold War combined (Hassner and Wittenberg 2009). In the United States, for example, the number of Border Patrol agents was doubled in the 1990s, new strategies of enforcement were tested, and a few short sections of physical barrier were built (Heyman and Ackelson 2009). Even more aggressive border security projects were proposed but languished unfunded because the political and public will was not yet there to support them.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States,[1] multiple bombings in major cities across India, and the Second Intifada in Israel/Palestine, these projects moved to the front of the queue and were rapidly built in each country. While the causes cannot simply be reduced to terrorism, and the consequences have broader ramifications, these discourses did provide the necessary fear and affect to make border security an immediate priority. This chapter links together the seemingly disparate border security projects in the United

States, India, and Israel by arguing that there are broad similarities in how the barriers were justified in each country, in how they affected the local lived experience of the borderlands, and in the long-term consequences they will have in each society and globally.

The global war on terror

This book is about the global war on terror, not terrorism itself. During the past decade, the United States, India, and Israel were attacked by terrorist organizations and the fear felt by people in each country is very real. In the United States, 2,976 people were killed in New York City, Washington, DC, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania, on 11 September 2001. In India, the killing of 166 people during the siege of Mumbai in November 2008 received the most extensive international attention, but there were also major bombings in India every year from 2001 to 2008. In Israel, just in the month of March 2002, 142 people were killed in bombings. The purpose of this book is neither to deny these facts nor diminish their significance. These were all horrible acts and are to be condemned in the strongest terms. The focus here, however, is specifically on how these events were understood after the fact. Rather than investigating the causes of terrorism or revisiting the acts themselves, this book is about how the governments and the people of these countries responded to these provocations.

The discourse of the global war on terror differed from previous geopolitical narratives of the Cold War in two critical ways that allowed open borders to be perceived as a security threat. The first shift is the description of the enemy-other in the global war on terror as an evil that has no place in the modern world. The idea that the enemy-other is outside the spaces of modernity is substantially different from the earlier rhetoric of the Cold War, which emphasized the containment and prevention of the spread of communism (Campbell 1992). While the Soviet Union was described by Ronald Reagan as an 'evil empire,' it had international legitimacy because it was another sovereign state, a member of the United Nations, and on the UN Security Council. Conflict during the Cold War predominantly occurred when the Soviet Union or the United States attempted to project power beyond their borders. In contrast, in the global war on terror, the enemy is denied legitimacy anywhere in the world (Gregory 2004; Gregory and Pred 2007; Oza 2007a).

This shift in the rhetoric is evident in the speeches the leaders of the United States, India, and Israel gave in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Former US president George W. Bush (2002: 5) argued in a speech on 14 September 2001 that 'Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.' In India, the former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (2001) made a nationally televised speech on 14 September to declare that 'Every Indian has to be a part of this global war on terrorism. We must, and we will, stamp out this evil from our land, and from the world.' Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon (2001a) used similar language on the evening of 11 September when he said, 'The fight against terror is an international struggle of the free world against the forces of darkness who seek to destroy our liberty and our way of life.' In the global war on terror, the rhetoric is no longer about containing the enemy; it anticipates eliminating the enemy from the world.

The second shift is the description of this evil threat as global and no longer constrained by geography. In the Cold War, the dominant geopolitical narratives relied on the metaphors of containment and dominoes. This simplistic but evocative narrative described the countries that surrounded the Soviet Union as having the greatest risk of falling, like dominoes, to communism (Dodds 2003). In the global war on terror, the threat is no longer limited to neighboring areas. Instead, the enemy-other could strike anywhere, at any time, against anyone, as attacks in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States demonstrated. Crucially, the local context of the attack is removed and instead each instance is described as another equivalent example of global terrorism. Therefore, while evil is 'stamped out' elsewhere, it is essential to secure political borders to prevent the enemy-other from entering the secure space of the modern state.

The concern about a globally capable and evil enemy-other abroad exposed feelings of vulnerability at home (Low 2008). As officials in the United States, India, and Israel assessed what steps could be taken to prevent future attacks, each country's long and relatively open borders appeared to be an immense security risk (Brunet-Jailly 2006). An underlying assumption in these discussions was that at some previous point in history most borders had been closed and that the process of globalization resulted in an opening of borders

not only to the movement of people and goods but also to these new threats. The opposite is closer to the truth. While there are examples of militarized borders in past eras – for example, the Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War – most political borders have never been militarized. Even the simple idea of using mutually agreed-upon borders to divide separate states is a relatively recent development (Murphy 1996).

The changing purpose of borders

The idea of building a wall to keep someone out (or in) is not a new phenomenon. The earliest sections of the Great Wall of China were built over 2,500 years ago with the most recognizable parts constructed over 500 years ago. Hadrian's Wall in northern England was begun by the Roman Empire in AD 122 to define its northern boundary and prevent the movement of raiders. Most medieval cities had walls and fortifications to protect their people and resources in the event of an attack. All of these walls are early examples of political territoriality, which Sack (1986: 19, emphasis in original) defines as '*the attempt by an individual or group to affect influence or control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographical area.*' However, prior to the modern era, there was not a systematic use of bounded territories to signify political claims (Murphy 1996). Instead, through most of human history there were small centers of power, such as the walled cities of the medieval era in Europe, which had absolute control only over nearby lands. Between these centers of power were loosely or un-administered spaces with overlapping and often contentious claims made by multiple kingdoms, city-states, or empires (Scott 2009).

Over the past 300 years, as technological advances in communication and transportation allowed the expansion of state administration, the precise role played by boundaries changed from defensive military lines, to markers of sovereignty, to sites for preventing the movement of undesired people (Rosière and Jones 2012). The oldest purpose of political borders was to mark military defensive lines beyond which one ruler would not allow the army of an opposing ruler to go. A few of these boundaries still remain in the contemporary world – for example, the demilitarized zone on the Korean peninsula or the line of control that separates Indian and Pakistan forces in Kashmir. These types of borders are anomalies where competing territorial claims are

TABLE 1.1 Barriers initiated or substantially fortified since 2000 (n = 25)

Year started	Initiating country	On border with
2000	Israel	Lebanon
2001	Uzbekistan	Afghanistan
2001	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
2002	India	Bangladesh
2002	Israel	West Bank
2003	China	North Korea
2003	Botswana	Zimbabwe
2003	India	Pakistan
2003	Saudi Arabia	Yemen
2004	India	Burma
2004	Thailand	Malaysia
2004	Kuwait	Iraq
2005	Brunei	Malaysia
2005	United Arab Emirates	Oman
2006	United States	Mexico
2006	Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan
2006	Saudi Arabia	Iraq
2007	Pakistan	Afghanistan
2007	Iran	Pakistan
2009	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan
2009	Burma	Bangladesh
2010	Israel	Egypt
2010	Iraq	Syria
2011	Greece	Turkey
2011	Azerbaijan	Armenia

not settled and militaries maintain control of the zone that separates the two states.

Most contemporary borders, however, are no longer defensive lines. Rather they are mutually agreed-upon boundaries that separate different sovereignty regimes where one administrative and legal system ends and another begins (Brunet-Jailly 2011; Elden 2009; Murphy 1996). The creation of the United Nations after WWII formalized this system in which each UN member recognizes the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other members. Security barriers on political borders were largely unnecessary because the risk of invasion by a neighboring state subsided and was replaced by the performance of sovereignty in the form of a global visa and passport regime (Salter

2006; Torpey 2000). The border between Mexico and the United States, for example, does not mark a defensive line where each country is concerned about the invasion of the opposing military; instead, it marks the territorialized edge of different systems of law, economy, and politics (Craib 2004).

Over the twentieth century, the practice of absolute sovereignty over a bounded territory produced substantial wealth inequalities globally, which increased the desire of many people to move either to avoid deteriorating conditions in their home state or to seek better economic opportunities elsewhere (Agnew 2009; Baldwin et al. 2001). These movements, along with the possibility of hostile people or items passing into the state, resulted in a new purpose for borders as a location to prevent the unauthorized movement of people. The border barriers in the United States, India, and Israel – as well as the twenty-two other barriers begun since 2000 – must be understood in the context of this consolidation of authority over bounded territories and the subsequent divergence of wealth globally (see Table 1.1). The average annual per capita GDP (in 2010 USD) of the countries that have built barriers since the fall of the Berlin Wall is $14,067; the average for the countries on the other side of these barriers is $2,801. Consequently, the feelings of uncertainty from the global war on terror played a crucial role in justifying the construction of these barriers, but the underlying purposes and consequences cannot be understood through the narrow window of terrorism and security alone.

Although the stigma associated with building barriers on borders disappeared, barriers are still controversial, and even the terminology to describe these barriers is contentious. In Israel, the barrier is called the 'security fence' or the 'anti-terror fence.' In Palestine it is referred to as 'the wall' or the 'Apartheid wall.' The barrier itself also changes forms. In urban areas, near Jerusalem/al-Quds or in Qalqilya, it is a big concrete wall. However, the majority of the barrier is indeed a fence, but a very elaborate and expensive one. It has rolls of barbed wire, an accompanying road, as well as high-tech motion-detection systems. In English, fence and wall have distinct connotations. Fence sounds more temporary and permeable, evoking a picket fence or chain-link fence around a suburban yard. Wall, on the other hand, has the connotation of being much more permanent and solid with the strong sense that it blocks movement as well as vision. Neither accurately describes the entirety of the West Bank security project.

Similarly, the US project is primarily a 'fence' but much more elaborate than the term normally implies. The Indian project is probably accurately described as a fence, but it also includes roads, barbed wire, and floodlights along its length. For clarity, throughout this book the more general term 'barrier' will be used to describe the new border security structures, except when quoting directly from interviews or other documents.

Ungoverned space and uncivilized people

Although the decisions to build barriers on these specific borders relied on different justifications in the United States, India, and Israel, they were based on similar representations of the territory on the other side as ungoverned and the people as uncivilized. The feelings of vulnerability generated by the actions of a very small number of terrorists were reanimated and mapped onto narratives about modernity and civilization. These civilizational narratives subsumed other considerations and made the barrier on the border – which previously had seemed incongruous with democratic ideals of openness and freedom – now seem essential to protect those same ideals from external threats. The negative stigma associated with barriers after the Berlin Wall disappeared and the security projects were rapidly completed.

In all three cases, the territory on the other side of these borders was described as an ungoverned space, where modern sovereign-state practices that bring order and stability were absent or incomplete. Narratives of civilization and wilderness are not a novel aspect of the discourse of the global war on terror but, rather, are emblematic of the expansion of the sovereign-state system around the world throughout the modern era (McClintock 1995; Said 1979). European colonialism was imbued with the idea of bringing civilization and modernity to the 'savages' that lived in the wilderness, although the underlying motive was capturing territory for resources and labor. European explorers treated most lands they encountered as *terra nullius*, or land belonging to no one, because they did not find what they considered to be modern forms of governance (Carter 1989). In the process of colonizing these lands, they also instituted new forms of territorial administration based on maps, surveys, and censuses of the people, which eventually formed the basis for the decolonized states that emerged after WWII (Edney 1997; Winichakul 1994).

In the twenty-first century, almost the entire globe is administered

space and is assigned to a single government that represents the territory at the UN. Consequently, the contemporary narratives about ungoverned space do not claim that these neighboring areas are wilderness exactly, but rather that there is not a properly functioning sovereign state there. The implication is that although the territory was assigned to a state, the process of actually taking control of the territory is incomplete (Fields 2010, 2011). Mitchell (2010) connects the contemporary geopolitical narratives about ungoverned space to the 'broken windows' theory of urban policing. The theory suggests that if broken windows, or other forms of vandalism, are allowed to persist in a neighborhood, other potential vandals could perceive it as a signal that vandalism is accepted and that rules can be ignored. In order to counteract this problem, proponents advocate increased policing, more surveillance, and swift punishments for minor infractions to ensure that people respect authority and behave in an orderly manner.

Moreover, Mitchell (ibid.) argues that the same idea is used to promote order in the global state system. Governments that do not maintain control in their territories are seen as a risk to the entire system and therefore require additional surveillance and policing to restore a basic level of governance. Similarly, rogue regimes that flout international obligations by not respecting the basic human rights of their citizens or by harboring anti-state actors such as terrorists are seen as a 'broken window' that needs to be repaired. The US National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism mentions these potentially ungoverned spaces specifically, stating that 'terrorists benefit from physical safe haven when states grant them access to territory, or when they gain access to ungoverned, ill-governed, or under-governed space within states that lack effective control over their own territory' (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006: 15). This view of the state system does not see sovereignty as the absolute right of every state, but rather contingent upon upholding these basic tenets of order and stability (Elden 2009). It is a vision of the modern state as a utopia that must fend off the dystopia that lurks at its borders.

The persistence of the idea of *terra nullius* in modern political debates is most evident in Israel and Palestine. The logic of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is predicated on the argument that there is not another state structure in that territory and that they are historically Jewish lands. When Israel builds in East Jerusalem, across

the Green Line (the 1949 armistice line), Palestinian officials say it is in their territory and an egregious violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which establishes rules for the treatment of civilians during times of war and which prohibits settling people in occupied territory. The Israeli government argues that the Green Line is not an international border and the West Bank was never a self-governing state. Further, they point out that the local populations were the ones that refused to recognize it as a border in 1949. In the official Israeli view, the West Bank is not a sovereign territory and there is not another state that is a party to the conflict, which renders the Fourth Geneva Convention irrelevant. Furthermore, statements by the Israeli government argue that the West Bank barrier is an example of the older purpose of borders as a defensive line that exists only to prevent the incursions of a threatening enemy on the other side (Israeli Ministry of Defense 2007). The Palestinian Authority is described as unable or unwilling to control its population, which means there is not a partner for peace and there is not an administration in the West Bank capable of upholding the obligations of a modern sovereign state. These statements argue that the barrier is temporary, only for security, and not meant to be a modern political border that divides different areas of sovereignty and administration. However, in practice, barriers often institutionalize distinctions through different sets of laws, economies, and politics, which, this book argues, is one of the primary goals of the Israeli barrier.

In the United States, Mexico is represented as a wild territory where the state is no match for drug cartels. Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, across from El Paso, Texas, is the quintessential example of this lawlessness. In US government statements and media reports, the Mexican government is described as either too weak or too corrupt to maintain control over its territory. In either case, it demonstrates that Mexico generally, and the borderlands specifically, are ungoverned spaces that lack a modern sovereign state. The border space is treated as untamed land that needs to be conquered, controlled, and brought within the sovereignty regime of the state (Brunet-Jailly 2005, 2006). The only short-term solution is to declare a state of emergency, to deploy the National Guard at the border, to increase the number of Border Patrol agents, and to build a barrier to prevent these uncivilized and violent practices from spilling over into the territory of the United States.

In India, Bangladesh is described as a state that cannot control its borders and cannot prevent radical extremists from operating within its territory. The government of India accuses Bangladesh of harboring separatist leaders and allowing the flow of weapons across the border because the Bangladesh government is too weak or too corrupt to bring order to its territory. Additionally, the disorder in Bangladesh is blamed for pushing millions of immigrants across the border into India to look for work. This concern is compounded by the physical geography of Bangladesh as a low-lying deltaic plain that could potentially be devastated by any sea-level rise that accompanies climate change (Karim and Mimura 2008). Consequently, India has to gain firm control over the borderlands to prevent that threat from spreading into India by building a barrier and by increasing patrols on the formerly open and sparsely guarded border.

Just as the territories of the neighboring states are represented as ungoverned spaces, the people on the other side of the border are described in ways that dehumanize them and make them appear unworthy of modern human rights. These 'othering narratives' began with representations of terrorists as evil, violent, and irrational people driven primarily by a hate for the modern freedoms of civilization. However, these same representations of good and evil, civilized and barbaric, were mapped onto the entire populations of the neighboring countries. In the process, the violent and deplorable behavior of a few people is perceived to be condoned or at least tolerated by all of the people.

These othering narratives emphasize the negative characteristics of the people on the outside, which reinforces the feelings of the superiority of the members of the group (Paasi 1996, 1998). As the other across the border is dehumanized, basic human rights are connected to citizenship in the state, rather than understood as a universal concept. In the public discourse in each country, the people without the marker of democratic citizenship are denigrated and maligned as not respecting laws, as wanting to destroy the civilized order, and therefore not worthy of equal protection under its laws. These representations coalesce around the view that any measures necessary should be taken to prevent the evil-other from entering the territory of the state regardless of the consequences it might have for individuals, particularly if they are not citizens of the state.

While the United States, India, and Israel fortified borders based

on representations of a threatening other on the outside, the European Union, at first glance, appears to be a counter-example. Indeed, over the same decade, the EU added twelve new members across eastern Europe, a single currency was adopted by several EU members, and internal barriers to movement were removed in many parts of the EU. There are two problems with this counter-argument. First, the expansion of the EU did not result in the removal of borders completely, but rather it shifted them to the edges of the new member states (van Houtum 2010). At these sites, there was a similar hardening of the border as these national borders became the edges of the EU (Kaiser and Nikiforova 2006). Secondly, many EU member states continue to grapple with the presence of an 'internal other' that is perceived to not be part of the dominant group (Johnson 2008; Johnson and Coleman 2012). These fears of internal others were exacerbated by the perception that residents of the new eastern European countries would move to the original EU states or that lax border controls could allow immigrants from Africa and Asia easier access. This sentiment is evident in the rise of right-wing political parties in western Europe and in the EU response to refugee flows during the Arab Spring revolts in 2011 (Bialasiewicz 2011; Williams 2006). Indeed, Saskia Sassen (2006) characterizes the militarization of the Mediterranean as the 'Berlin Wall on water.' Furthermore, Denmark reestablished its border checkpoints in 2011 and several other EU members are considering taking the same step (Steininger 2011). Consequently, beyond the veneer of integration, the EU exhibits many of the same exclusionary border-making practices as the United States, India, and Israel.

In sum, the fear that justified the barriers on each of these borders was not just about a deterritorialized terrorist threat, but specifically about the ungoverned space across the border where dangerous people are perceived to live and have the potential to threaten the stability of the modern sovereign state. By describing the territory as governed by a less-than-modern state and the people as less-than-human, it becomes much easier to imagine building an exclusionary barrier to protect 'us' from 'them'.

Defining state subjects and territory

Although the narratives that justified the barriers in the United States, India, and Israel placed the blame squarely on external con-

cerns of globalized terrorist networks and neighboring ungoverned spaces, the underlying cause and enduring significance of the barriers are internal to each state. All sovereign states attempt to be 'nation-states' by representing their people as a single group that has a strong bond to the land. Despite nationalist histories that describe a long connection between a people and a territory, all modern states are relatively recent creations (Scott 2009). As these states emerged over the modern era, they gained control over larger territories and justified those claims of sovereign authority by marking their territory with boundaries on maps and by describing the newly incorporated population as a single nation (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1996; Winichakul 1994).

Since the first modern sovereign states came into existence in Europe in the middle of the seventeenth century, these entities have consistently increased their authority over particular territories and peoples (Mann 1988; Neocleous 2008). The modern state system passed a significant milestone with the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, which began to institutionalize the practice of mutual recognition of bounded sovereign territories. This idea spread around the world through European colonialism as local political systems were replaced with territorially defined colonies. This transition occurred by mutually recognizing borders with other states, standardizing languages and measurements, establishing a centralized government bureaucracy, creating a cycle of military expenditures and tax increases, developing detailed maps of their territory, and conducting censuses to identify the people in their territory (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Murphy 1996, 2005). This slow creep of the government into everyday life means that the rural peasant of the seventeenth century, who was largely unknown to the state and received few benefits, is now a modern citizen who is documented as soon as they are born, educated in the state's schools, provided for through social services, and protected by its police, judges, and military (Foucault 1977, 2003; Scott 2009).

James C. Scott (1998, 2009) describes this transition from a mobile and uncategorized people to a settled and counted population as the process of making it 'legible.' The state's power comes from the ability to define and legitimize a particular set of economic, cultural, and political practices in a territory. Unknown populations, whether mobile or simply uncounted, disrupt the order of the state because they are difficult to locate, control, and tax. John Torpey (2000)

uses the metaphor of the state 'embracing' the population to understand mechanisms like issuing passports which regulate legitimate movement and bring the population within the domain of the state. Similarly, Michel Foucault (2003) argues that 'one governs things' so it is important to locate and name the things like territory and subjects that are to be governed. Foucault (ibid.: 244) calls this process 'governmentality':

> 1) The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical apparatuses of security. 2) The tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward the preeminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, and so on) of this type of power – which may be termed 'government' – resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific government apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges [*savoirs*]. 3) The process or, rather, the result of the process through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and gradually becomes 'governmentalized.'

The formalization of the boundaries in the United States, India, and Israel is part of this larger process of governmentalizing a territory, of embracing the population, and making both legible. Because there is not a preexisting essence to any identity or territorial category – they are all socially constructed perspectives on the world – defining state subjects and territories is an iterative process as these categories are imagined, defined, and contested. Over time new people are folded into the state imaginary, while others are excluded from it. It is a process that never reaches an end and which must be reproduced, reiterated, and reified to remain effective. Although the expansion of the state creates the impression of a singular powerful entity, in reality the state consists of a multitude of individuals that make decisions that promulgate the idea of the state and sovereignty every day (Agnew 2009).

The histories and demographics of the United States, India, and Israel have some distinct parallels that make this process of defining

state territory and subjects particularly important – and difficult – to implement. First, all three countries were created in territories that were previously British colonies, albeit ones with different degrees of British colonial influence and duration.[2] The British techniques of colonization created a sharp break with previous administrative systems and implemented a new British-style government based on territorial sovereignty and private property. The complete replacement of the governance structures in all three places dramatically curtailed the possibilities at the time of decolonization. The idea that the emergent sovereign state represented a preexisting nation of people simply did not make sense. In the United States and Israel, there was a wholesale reimagining of who belonged there as people from distant places resettled the land. In India, rather than reinstating an indigenous government, the 1947 partition created territorial arrangements that had never existed before.

During their creation, all three countries were shaped by massive migrations of people to new places where they lacked a connection to the land. The original thirteen colonies that became the United States were populated predominantly by European immigrants and slaves from Africa who displaced Native American populations. The vast majority of the current US population is not native, but rather their ancestors moved there at some point.[3] Furthermore, the United States grew substantially after its creation as it claimed Native America-populated areas in the west and conquered and annexed the territory of at least two internationally recognized sovereign states: Mexican territory during the Mexican–American War of the 1840s and the Kingdom of Hawai'i, which was overthrown with the support of US marines in 1893, then annexed in 1898. The original land area ceded to the American colonies by the British was 2.15 million sq km; today the United States territory is 9.8 million sq km, or almost five times as large.

Prior to the Zionist movement, less than 5 percent of the population in Palestine was Jewish (McCarthy 1990). In 1947, when the UN proposed a partition of British Mandate Palestine that gave the new state of Israel 56 percent of the land, the Jewish population had grown to about one third of the total population. After the 1948 war, Israel claimed 78 percent of the land and then occupied the rest in 1967. Hundreds of thousands of non-Jewish people were expelled or fled, and over a million Jewish people moved to Israel from around

the world, completely reshaping the identity of the land (Falah 1996; Morris 2004).

India was also created through a British-mandated partition that produced massive population movements (Tan and Kudaisya 2000). As the Indian independence movement pressured the British to leave India, there were many different proposals about what type of independent state or states they should leave behind. In the end, they decided to partition it based on religion, creating separate homelands for Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan.[4] Never before were there religiously defined states in South Asia and, despite the violence in the years leading up to the partition, there was a history of relatively peaceful relations between the communities (Pandey 1991). Furthermore, in many places, even using the separate categories of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' did not match the syncretistic and blurred realities on the ground (Jones 2006, 2007). After the partition, however, minority populations in both new countries were targeted for attacks and encouraged to leave (Chatterji 2007). An estimated 500,000 to 1 million people died and 14 million people became refugees and fled to the country where their religious group made up the majority.[5] These millions of people had to make a new home in a new land, and the maps of the new countries had to be reimagined as homelands.

More generally, beyond an attachment to a civic state, all three countries have diverse populations without a singular identity that links them together. The immigrant history of the United States results in a population that is composed of a wide range of people from all around the world. This diversity is one of the strengths of the United States, but also makes defining the character of the nation more difficult. In Israel, in addition to the large Palestinian population, the Jewish population is diverse and is composed of people from western Europe, eastern Europe, Russia, the United States, and the Middle East. It is further divided between secular and orthodox populations. Although these communities share a Jewish heritage, the fact that their ancestors lived in dramatically different places for thousands of years resulted in substantial differences in views and traditions. In India, the diversity of the population has less to do with the flood of refugees after the 1947 partition and more to do with the enormous variety of languages and cultural practices that are represented in its population of over one billion people. Twenty-nine languages are spoken by at least one million people

and 122 different languages are spoken by at least ten thousand people (Census of India 2001).

In all three countries, a discourse of exceptionalism developed to overcome the undeniable diversity and lack of an ethnic justification for being a nation-state. In the United States, the notion that America stands above other states is a pillar of the political discourse, and has been for two centuries. As former speaker of the US House of Representatives and 2012 presidential candidate Newt Gingrich put it, 'American exceptionalism refers directly to the grant of rights asserted in the Declaration of Independence,' and 'which relates directly to our unique assertion of an unprecedented set of rights granted by God.' A 2010 public opinion poll indicated that 58 percent of Americans agree with the statement 'God has granted America a special role in human history' (Tumulty 2010). In India, the Hindu right pursues a chauvinistic version of history that positions Hinduism as a pure religion superior to all others (Oza 2007b). The idea of Hindu exceptionalism played an important role in Indian politics with the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (Nanda 2009). In Israel, the notion that the population is the chosen people of God imbues many decisions. As Alam (2009: 4–5) argues, Zionist leaders:

> constantly remind the Jews that they are an ancient people, divinely favored, uniquely talented, racially superior, and undefeatable, who deserve more than any other people to make history as a great nation. The Zionists would have to construct an ideology of Jewish Exceptionalism. … These exceptionalist claims now form an integral part of the self-image of most Israelis and Jews.

These histories and demographics result in anxiety in all three countries about precisely who is a member of the nation and about precisely where the territory of the state is located (Krishna 1994). The boundary-making practices of the state continue to institutionalize the state's sovereign authority to make decisions within that territory and to administer the lives of those particular people. They also exclude other people from participating in the modern democratic practices of the state. The view of the population as exceptional stands in for other ethnic markers of identity and comes to be seen as the quality that sets each country apart. Furthermore, as part of the iterative discourse, the exceptional qualities are held up as both the strength of the state and the cause of antipathy towards it. Because they are

exceptional, they are a target for attacks (Bush 2001a). Consequently, any measures necessary to protect that special quality, even exceptional measures that contradict the human rights protections of their constitutions, are justified.

Borders and exceptional enforcement practices

The new barriers in the United States, India, and Israel are each part of a set of aggressive enforcement practices at the border that attempt to create the order of a civilized society by sorting out who belongs in the state's territory. However, the disorder of the borderlands, just beyond which the unknown people of another sovereign state live, often requires enforcement techniques that are beyond the normal laws of the state. In order to understand the role these exception practices play in the modern sovereign-state system many scholars turned to the writings of Giorgio Agamben (Agamben 1998, 2005; Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004; Ek 2006; Gregory 2004, 2006, 2007; Long 2006; Minca 2005, 2006, 2007; Neocleous 2008; Pratt 2005; Salter 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008). Agamben analyzes ancient Roman law in order to introduce the concepts of the *Homo sacer* and the state of exception, which he argues are the foundations of both democratic and authoritarian governments in the contemporary era. Agamben draws on Benjamin (1968) and Schmitt (1985, 1996) to argue that the power of sovereignty comes not just from the ability to make and enforce laws in a defined territory, but specifically from the ability to decide when those laws can be suspended.

The legal systems of all sovereign states include a provision of some kind that allows a declaration of a state of emergency when there is an imminent threat to the continued existence of the state (Hussain 2003; Neocleous 2008). In a state of emergency, the laws of the state remain in place, and most people are still required to follow them; however, the sovereign itself is able to operate aggressively both inside and outside the legal system simultaneously in order to impose order and authority (Calarco and DeCaroli 2007). States of emergency were originally intended for military threats posed by invading armies, but were frequently used in other situations, such as during periods of labor unrest, economic crisis, or environmental disaster. Mark Neocleous (2008) argues that the declaration of an emergency is not a rare event, but rather a normal part of the practice of sovereignty in the modern era. The discourse of the global war on

terror created the necessary environment where uncertainty justifies indefinitely extending these emergency powers, which reordered the status quo (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Davis 2001; Klein 2007; Ó Tuathail 2003).

This expansion of sovereign power has led some theorists to suggest that the state of exception is a global environment in which everyone could potentially be taken outside the normal laws of the state at any moment (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004). It is evident that many sovereign states expanded their ability to conduct surveillance and security operations within their territory while simultaneously decreasing oversight by the public and the courts (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Gregory and Pred 2007; Singh 2006). However, the claim of an all-encompassing state of exception is not helpful for theorizing sovereign power because it creates an impasse (Connolly 2004). An all-encompassing sovereign power is potentially everywhere; but also at any given moment nowhere. Beyond the unique space of the camp – Agamben's work describes Nazi camps during WWII and other scholars applied his theory to the US camp at Guantánamo Bay, where people are held indefinitely without charges and with limited or no access to lawyers or courts – the places where sovereign power actually operates are indistinct and unpredictable. Without being able to locate where sovereign power is, who is carrying it out, and what actions are triggering the decision on violence, it is impossible to properly analyze its practice. The state is not a monolithic entity that operates uniformly everywhere. Instead, particular individuals in particular places make the decisions on imposing sovereign authority every day (Butler 2004; Jones 2012). Furthermore, the claim that we are all already living in an all-encompassing state of exception seems to overlook the reality that there is not a single sovereign in the world. Rather the territory of the world is partitioned between many sovereign authorities who employ differential tactics to manage particular populations.

Therefore, political borders are key sites to locate these exceptional practices of sovereign power and to analyze how, why, and by whom they are deployed. All three countries have promulgated special rules for the conduct of the global war on terror generally and in border areas specifically. In the United States, President Bill Clinton first declared a state of emergency to combat terrorism in 1995, which was renewed and expanded every subsequent year

by President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama (Bush 2007a, 2007b; Obama 2010a). Additionally, several US border states declared states of emergency in 2005 owing to violence in Mexico (Blumenthal 2005). The US Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to waive any law in order to facilitate the construction of the US barrier and the US Border Patrol has broad authority to stop and search individuals and vehicles within 100 miles (160km) of the border or coastline (Haddal et al. 2009). In India, the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act gave the government expansive authority to investigate suspected terrorists within and beyond Indian territory. The law was rescinded in 2004, but many of the provisions were transferred into the permanent legal code (Singh 2006). The Indian Border Security Force also has special guidelines that give it wide latitude to operate in border areas to protect the national security of India (Indian Border Security Force 2004). In Israel, emergency laws have been in place since it became a state, in the West Bank there are many overlapping legal regimes owing to the territory's still-undefined status, and all of the land between the barrier and the Green Line is a 'seam zone' under special military jurisdiction (Braverman 2009). The combination of new emergency powers from the war on terror and special rules for border areas creates an ambiguous, and dangerous, space near political borders. Unsurprisingly, in all three countries the violence and dehumanization of borderland residents increased with the construction of the barrier as simply being in the exceptional space of the borderlands made the residents appear to be a potential danger to the state.

Conclusion

Territorial and identity categories are not preexisting 'things' in the world, but rather are a set of ideas and practices that were institutionalized through various technologies of communication and governance over the past several hundred years (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1996, 2002). While all nations are equally invented, they nevertheless are very real – but only to the extent that people believe that they are. Maps depict the borders of states as facts and establish these lines in our consciousness as natural parts of the landscape. From childhood, people are taught that they belong to one of these groups and they adhere to the behaviors and practices expected of that particular identity. As the boundaries between these categories

are hardened, the other on the outside becomes more different and potentially threatening. The barrier on the border contributes to both the narrative of security and to the narrative of the nation by further inscribing the edges of these categories into the earth and our imaginations.

While the emergence of the security state blurs internal–external distinctions by simultaneously pursuing state objectives abroad while monitoring and patrolling for threats within the state, it also requires a clear definition of the inside and outside of state space. Political borders are crucially important symbolic spaces because the narratives that legitimize sovereign power are predicated on claiming tight linkages between the territory, the people, and the state. In the United States, India, and Israel the construction of the barriers was accompanied by a sharpening of discursive distinctions between the people and places on the inside and the evil, dehumanized, and disorderly others who are kept out. They materially and symbolically mark the margins of the exceptional, civilized world and protect it from the perceived anomie on the outside.

The next three chapters describe how the construction of the barriers was justified in the United States, India, and Israel. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven analyze the consequences the barriers have on the lives of people in the borderlands and on the political discourse in each country. Chapter Eight argues for the enduring significance of borders and barriers as performative sites where political claims are substantiated and contested.