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LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND THE POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY*

DAVID LEY

ABSTRACT. A new ideology of livability in urban development changed the Vancouver landscape between 1968 and 1978. The agents of liberal ideology were a new elite of professional, technical, and administrative workers whose consolidation coincided with Vancouver's transition toward a service oriented postindustrial city. This group founded an urban reform party which assumed political power in 1972. They challenged the commitment to growth, boosterism, and the city efficient held by former civic administrations, presenting in its place a program of apparently humane, socially progressive, and aesthetic urban development. Despite some significant successes, the new ideology was also elitist and has generated new problems of social justice, giving rise to a countervailing political movement in the late 1970s. Except in special circumstances it seems the ideology of the livable city is rarely compatible with criteria of social equity or economic efficiency.

IN 1968 a new liberalism was enunciated in Canada. It was endorsed at the national level in Pierre Trudeau's dramatic election as Liberal Prime Minister. The spring fever of Trudeaumania had much to do with style, as Trudeau presented himself as an unconventional politician, a middle-aged professional and intellectual who was in touch with the 1960s youth culture and sympathetic to the aesthetic lifestyle. His promises of greater participation and more open government, of ethnic and lifestyle pluralism, were conveyed with the air of one who understood the need for a break with the past. The unexpected drama and fervor of the French student riots the same spring had intimated just such a break, with their celebration of self-expression, creativity, and openness, and their central motif of "exhilarating, joyous festival."¹ Signifi-

cantly, a number of the theoreticians of the French student riots identified precisely the emergent class of intellectuals, professionals, and technical workers represented by Trudeau as the potential agents of radical change in social life. Perhaps the events of May, 1968, gave Trudeau added currency; his reputation as a left of center Francophone intellectual and his flamboyant consumption with style made him seem almost a personification of the times, an interpreter and guide of the historical process.

Trudeau's charisma proved irresistible in the ethos of the day, and very quickly it encouraged more local political responses. The same year, in Vancouver, The Electors Action Movement (TEAM) was founded as a municipal reform party with Arthur Phillips, its first president and four years later to be its first civic mayor, commenting that "It's hard to avoid Liberals these days."² A study of TEAM's leadership in 1968 showed the same profile of a newly emergent class: predominantly youthful, highly educated, middle and upper middle income, and heavily professional in occupation. More than sixty percent of TEAM leaders supported the federal Liberal party, with more of the remainder to the political left of the Liberals than to the right.³

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¹ Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 373.

² *Vancouver Province*, October 15, 1968.

³ Robert Easton and Paul Tennant, "Vancouver Civic

TEAM was to bring to Vancouver the same promises centered around lifestyle which, exemplified in Trudeau, so intrigued the national voter. The promise was that consumption should henceforth follow the canons of good taste. By 1974, when Phillips was mayor of a TEAM controlled council, a visiting Toronto alderman observed that "Art Phillips is Vancouver He has an unerring instinct for issues which aim at making Vancouver a beautiful city."⁴ His lifestyle, as a Vancouver columnist observed, "is a manual out of *The Beautiful People*."⁵

The urban manifestation of the new liberal ideology seemed to offer some marked departures from previous orthodoxy.⁶ Growth boosterism, the hallmark of Vancouver politics since the town's inception in 1886, was to be replaced by the liberal notion of the "livable city," a landscape in harmony with human sensibility. In 1978, TEAM's second mayor, reviewing his party's accomplishments over the previous decade, identified its two major achievements as controlling the unfettered appetite of property developers and terminating plans to make Vancouver a freeway city.⁷ It is noteworthy that these initiatives which TEAM claimed to have blocked would have been included in a definition of urban progress by previous civic administrations. But earlier ideas of progress were under attack. In a re-

markable statement in a government-sponsored publication, the regional planning director wrote that "Planning can be against growth, if that is society's goal, rather than for it."⁸

A new ideology of urban development was in the making. Urban strategy seemed to be passing from an emphasis on growth to a concern with the quality of life; the new liberalism was to be recognized less by its production schedules than by its consumption styles. These changes were not of course unique to Vancouver, but were felt to a greater or lesser extent in every major city in North America. But in some metropolitan areas the livable city ideology was expressed more forcibly and successfully than in others.⁹ In many cities liberalism in lifestyle and attitudes was not accompanied by such active politicization, still less by political success in civic elections. In older industrial cities the youthful, professional, liberal constituency remained a political minority, albeit an articulate one. In Philadelphia, for example, the liberal Democrats of Society Hill and other central neighborhoods were outvoted in civic elections in 1971 and 1975 by the city's traditional ethnic communities. Nevertheless, despite Mayor Rizzo's conservative (if nominally Democratic) administration with its priorities heavily influenced by its ethnic constituency, the economic power of the center city professionals led to some private and public initiatives in central city land use development. In Vancouver, in contrast, in a postindustrial west coast city where employment is dominated by service and administrative occupations, the liberal professional community, aided by a system of at-large civic elections, was influential enough to exercise both economic and political power. The cultural hegemony of the liberal community was reflected not only in the market place but also in public policy.

In Vancouver the ideology of the livable city was institutionalized in TEAM, a political reform party which from 1972 to 1978 assumed control of city hall, so that in Vancouver the

Party Leadership: Backgrounds, Attitudes, and Non-civic Party Affiliations," *B.C. Studies*, Vol. 2 (Summer, 1969), pp. 19-29.

⁴ John Sewell, in the *Vancouver Sun*, September 26, 1974.

⁵ Allan Fotheringham, in the *Vancouver Sun*, July 26, 1977.

⁶ At first it might seem as if this ideology might equally well be described as either radical or neoconservative. In fact both influences are present in the viewpoint under discussion, but two factors seem to be uppermost in justifying a liberal identity. Firstly, as noted, there was a majority sympathy among TEAM leadership in favor of the federal Liberal party. So too TEAM political strength was concentrated geographically in neighborhoods also supportive of the Liberals in provincial elections (footnote 55). Secondly, a number of TEAM's policies—for example those concerning the environment, pluralism and participation, lifestyle tolerance, and aestheticism—originated in social movements associated with the counterculture which had diffused from their radical source to receptive sections of the middle class, where they were developed into a socially progressive platform. Thus the ideology was appropriated by liberal reform groups who also shared a substantial overlap with the Canadian Liberal Party.

⁷ *Vancouver Sun*, March 11, 1978.

⁸ Harry Lash, *Planning in a Human Way* (Ottawa: Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1976), p. 15.

⁹ Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 87 (1976), pp. 309-32. An optimistic sign at Philadelphia International Airport welcomes arrivals to "America's Most Livable City."

relations between the socio-cultural, the political, and the economic dimensions of society formed an unusually interesting conjuncture.¹⁰ In this paper Vancouver will therefore provide a useful laboratory for examining the origins, evolution, and effects of a new liberal ideology of urban development developed by a newly emergent interest group. A detailed interpretation of events in Vancouver raises theoretical questions of more general significance.

THE POSTINDUSTRIAL THESIS

The changes in urban policy associated with the livable city ideology were associated with shifts at the economic, the political, and the socio-cultural levels of society, so that an understanding of the emerging urban landscape requires a prior grasp of wide-ranging processes of change in society itself. Such an examination will also place the Vancouver case study in its more general theoretical context.

It is helpful as a starting point to consider the insights of two significant theorists of modern western society, Daniel Bell and Jürgen Habermas.¹¹ Such a liaison might at first seem unlikely for Bell is often interpreted as a conservative thinker and Habermas as a radical. Postindustrial society is Bell's term, implicating at least partially a technological phase blurring ideological distinctions, where technology rather than the mode of production is a major force shaping society. Habermas in contrast speaks of advanced capitalist society, so that the distinction between broadly capitalist and socialist nations remains of some importance. But aside from the obvious differences there is also a deeper complementarity in their positions. Both see a decisive transition between nineteenth and late twentieth century society, between the industrial period (or period of early capitalism) and postindus-

trialism (late capitalism), so that modes of thought originating in the nineteenth century no longer fit the changed circumstances of the present era. Their work suggests a general schema for the interpenetration of the three levels of society: economics, politics, and culture (Table 1). But whereas Bell presents these changes in a historical narrative which obscures the tensions of change, in Habermas' more abstract discussion the concept of crisis, the disjuncture between the different levels of society, and tension between different sets of interests occupy a central position.

In the economy, a major break with nineteenth century society has been the declining role of unskilled labor in the production process and the growing importance of technology, not only in the factory but also in service industries and administration. Habermas reviews the epistemological consequences of the ascendancy of technology, equating it with the rise of technical solutions and positivist science.¹² As significant are the empirical consequences. Technology has become a dominant force in production; rather than the factory, university and research establishments are emerging as leading institutions. Theoretical knowledge has acquired a privileged status: "In capitalist society the axial institution has been private property and in the postindustrial society it is the centrality of theoretical knowledge."¹³

The rapid development of technology and technical management and problem-solving have brought about a remarkable transformation of the labor force this century. The proportion of white collar workers in the United States has risen from eighteen percent in 1900, to thirty-seven percent in 1950, and to forty-nine percent by 1974. Blue collar employment amounted to thirty-five percent of the workforce in 1974, about the same level as in 1900, though the proportion has been declining since 1950. Government forecasts anticipate that from 1968 to 1980 the gap will widen further as new job creation will favor white collar occupations by a ratio of five to two. The job categories showing the most pronounced growth (about twice the national rate) have been professional and technical occupations, which numbered less than a million workers

¹⁰ In the November, 1978, civic election TEAM elected only one of the ten aldermen. The reasons for this dismal showing are complex, but perhaps the most significant was internal feuding within the party. Thus another five members of the 1978 council (plus the mayor) were former members of TEAM, but had quit at various times over policy disagreements.

¹¹ The major works of each author relevant here are: Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), and idem, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Jürgen Habermas, *Toward A Rational Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970); idem, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); and idem, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

¹² Habermas 1970, op. cit., footnote 11.

¹³ Bell 1973, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 115.

in 1890 but over twelve million in 1974.¹⁴ In relative terms even more dramatic trends are underway in Canada. While the national labor force expanded by eight and a half percent from 1971 to 1975, white collar employment increased by twenty-six percent. Among the major white collar categories, the increase was most marked in professional and technical occupations which grew by thirty-three percent, and managerial and administrative positions which rose by sixty-five percent.¹⁵ In recent years a large new cohort of highly paid white collar workers has been added to the labor force. By 1975 this privileged cohort accounted for between twenty and twenty-five percent of all workers in both Canada and the United States. One worker in seven in each country was in a professional or technical occupation, part of a privileged, quaternary labor force.

There is an important subjective corollary to the numerical increase of senior white collar employees and professionals. These occupations enjoy the highest social prestige, whether the assessment is derived from the indicators of income and education or from perceived job rankings held by the public at large.¹⁶ In Canada both objective and subjective assessments have revealed that the highest prestige occupations are the senior white collar posts.¹⁷ Among these high status positions professionals are favored over owners, managers, and administrators: "Professional occupations ranked highly, particularly physician, university professor, county court judge, and lawyer."¹⁸ We might expect, therefore, that these professional occupations will contain a disproportionate share of a postindustrial state's tastemakers and opinion lead-

ers; as we will see, this expectation is borne out emphatically by their leadership role in Vancouver's urban reform movement.

A second corollary of the employment shift in the postindustrial state is the economic transition from a goods-producing to a service-producing society. Over seventy percent of the nonagricultural jobs in the United States were service-related by 1977 while less than thirty percent were goods-related, a reversal of the proportions in 1900.¹⁹ In the postindustrial city the office tower rather than the factory chimney dominates the downtown skyline.

A large number of these services are public rather than private; the different tiers of government employ about sixteen percent of the U.S. workforce, while the state's purchases amount to more than twenty percent of the nation's G.N.P. This active role of government is a second feature distinguishing postindustrial from industrial society (Table 1). Whereas in the nineteenth century government promoted entrepreneurial interests either actively or else indirectly, under postindustrialism state intervention has become forceful while its objectives are social, ecological, and even aesthetic as well as economic. Decision-making and the allocation of resources is now referred to the political arena and not only to the market place. Goal achievement for a particular interest group has become an exercise in political lobbying and not simply the execution of market power. As Bell has noted, "we have become a communal society, in which many groups now seek to establish their social rights—their claims on society—through the political process."²⁰ The politicization of varied interest groups is challenging the formerly firm hold of the business lobby on political decision-making; power is being diffused among a range of lobbyists, accelerated by programs which require consultation and participation among a plurality of legitimate interests. The single-minded commitment to efficiency, technical rationality, and economic development is tempered and in some instances overturned amid the competing claims of different "public interests."

At the socio-cultural level, Habermas con-

¹⁴ Bell 1973, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 115.

¹⁵ *Canada Year Book 1976-77* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1977). These groups represent the so-called quaternary occupations, regarded by several writers as symptomatic of advanced urbanism: see Jean Gottmann, "The Mutation of the American City: A Review of the Comparative Metropolitan Analysis Project," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 68 (1978), pp. 201-08.

¹⁶ D. Treiman, *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

¹⁷ B. Blishen, "A Socio-Economic Index for Occupations in Canada," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 4 (1967), pp. 41-53; and P. Pineo and J. Porter, "Occupational Prestige in Canada," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 4 (1967), pp. 24-40.

¹⁸ Pineo and Porter, op. cit., footnote 17.

¹⁹ *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977).

²⁰ Bell 1973, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 364.

TABLE 1.—FRAMEWORK OF MAJOR SOCIETAL RELATIONS

| | Industrial era (early capitalism) | Postindustrial era (advanced capitalism) |
|----------|--|--|
| Economy | Production; manufacturing; blue collar occupations | Centrality of technology; services; white collar occupations |
| Politics | Laissez-faire; alliances with entrepreneurs; business control | Intervention and regulation; plural interests and multiple criteria; power moving to professionals |
| Culture | Growth ethic; belief in progress; centrality of work <i>The industrial city</i> | Rise of an amenity ethic; role of the aesthetic; centrality of consumption <i>The postindustrial city</i> |

Source: Developed in part from Bell, 1973; Habermas, 1970, 1975 (see footnote 11).

tinually raises the necessity for preserving the personal world of values and meaning against the onslaught of the rational, bureaucratic, and secular world view. But during the 1960s a considerable cultural counteroffensive gained momentum. This movement was popularized by the counter-culture though its roots lay much deeper and its effects have infiltrated mainstream society to the extent of institutionalization in new legislation in some areas, notably environmental protection. In contrast to the rational world view it challenges, the cultural resurgence is characterized by its promotion of alternative values which emphasize the realm of experience, man's emotional, spiritual, and aesthetic nature.²¹ There is an insistence that the realm of meaning and the quality of experience are central concerns.

The assault on Cartesian rationalism and its political and technological apparatus has encouraged a liberation of the senses to occur. In the original counter-culture Habermas observed how "The lifestyle of protest is defined by sensuous and sensual qualities."²² Bell concurs that "The search for the modern was a search for the heightening of experience in all dimensions," but he takes the assessment further in positing the emergence of hedonism as a lifestyle: "The cultural, if not moral, justification of capitalism has become hedonism, the idea of pleasure as a way of life."²³

The sensuous and aesthetic philosophy released by the counter-culture has been appropriated in various forms by the growing numbers of North America's leisure class. Shorter working hours, earlier retirement and rising real wealth have diverted attention from basic needs to what Maslow identified as the higher need of self-actualization.²⁴ Even work itself is being redefined; a Canadian survey found that thirty percent of those interviewed placed self-fulfillment over conventional forms of job satisfaction as their major employment goal. Of all occupational groups, professionals expressed the greatest consensus on the primacy of the goal of self-fulfillment.²⁵ A second poll, on Canadian attitudes to the value of education, showed that lifestyle satisfaction was rated as of equal significance to economic advancement. But in British Columbia more than sixty percent of residents placed lifestyle satisfaction in first place, while less than twenty-five percent gave primacy to economic success.²⁶ The aesthetic lifestyle is becoming its own justification. At the same time these traits are not uniformly distributed; there is a geography of the postindustrial society.

Although it has been possible here to give no more than an outline of a postindustrial theory of society, we may see from this framework the appearance of a theoretically significant group of actors. Senior white collar workers in professional, technical, and administrative occupations account for over twenty percent of North America's workforce and

²¹ T. Roszak, *Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972). See also the conclusion of Zelinsky's speculative essay: Wilbur Zelinsky, "Selfward Bound? Personal Preference Patterns and the Changing Map of American Society," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 50 (1974), pp. 144-79.

²² Habermas 1970, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 33.

²³ Bell 1976, op. cit., footnote 11, pp. 118-21.

²⁴ Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

²⁵ *Job Satisfaction* (Montreal: Data Laboratories Research Consultants, 1978).

²⁶ *Vancouver Sun*, May 19, 1978.

TABLE 2.—BRITISH COLUMBIA EMPLOYMENT INDEX BY INDUSTRY, 1962–76

| | Forestry/ mining | Manufacturing/ construction/ transport | Trade/finance | Services | Public administration | All non- agricultural employment |
|------|---------------------|--|---------------|----------|--------------------------|--|
| 1962 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 1964 | 101 | 110 | 112 | 113 | 103 | 110 |
| 1966 | 112 | 126 | 126 | 140 | 111 | 127 |
| 1968 | 113 | 125 | 140 | 162 | 128 | 136 |
| 1970 | 121 | 129 | 151 | 183 | 138 | 147 |
| 1972 | 118 | 144 | 175 | 194 | 145 | 161 |
| 1974 | 135 | 162 | 204 | 220 | 171 | 184 |
| 1976 | 131 | 161 | 205 | 239 | 204 | 190 |

Source: Developed from data in Statistics Canada, *Estimates of Employees by Province and Industry*, Catalogue 72-516 (Ottawa, 1978).

form a theoretical counterpoint to nineteenth century notions of capital and labor; as a class in emergence they have received considerable theoretical attention and would seem to have the capacity to become a politically significant group. This cadre encompasses the outer limits of a nation's intellectuals; as a group they are highly educated and many have postgraduate training. Their younger members in particular exhibit a high degree of social if not political liberalism, and have plural life goals, placing a higher premium on self-fulfillment as a major career objective than any other occupational category. With a secure economic base, they represent the present day counterparts of Veblen's leisure class, displaying the canons of good taste, intent upon the aesthetic.²⁷ Their lifestyle is commonly consumption and status oriented in the pursuit of self-actualization, while their prestige is considerable and in many ways they are national opinion leaders. They are sensitive to amenity and social cachet in the places they adopt; an industrial landscape is anathema to them. It was from the ranks of this emergent elite that both Pierre Trudeau and Arthur Phillips were drawn.

VANCOUVER: A POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY

The postindustrial thesis has been developed primarily by sociologists and as such it is not locationally specific. Clearly it might fit circumstances more closely in San Francisco or London than in Cleveland or Glasgow. This section will examine several contexts of the

geography of Vancouver which suggest that the model presents some useful categories for examining social change and urban development within the city since the late 1960s.

A Service Economy

The articulation of an urban reform movement among professionals in the late 1960s needs to be seen against several contexts, the first of which was the occupational transformation of the British Columbia labor force (Table 2). During the period under review the workforce nearly doubled; the largest single period of job expansion was from 1972 to 1974, coinciding significantly with the peak of the development boom and the virtual doubling of house prices in Greater Vancouver. Particularly notable is the differential between categories in job creation. Despite British Columbia's reputation as a frontier economy, the primary and blue collar categories added new jobs at a rate much below the provincial average while white collar categories considerably exceeded the average. By 1976 over sixty percent of nonagricultural jobs fell in predominantly white collar categories; the rather different classification by occupation indicated (in June, 1978) a nonmanual share of sixty-five percent of all jobs, the highest provincial level in Canada.²⁸ Such detailed information is not available for Vancouver except for the census years. Since the metropolitan area accounted for over fifty percent of the province's labor force in 1971, however, it provides the major contribution to the provincial trends. The city of Vancouver, with almost one-quarter of provincial jobs in 1971, is over-represented in the

²⁷ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: New American Library, 1953); and John Diggins, "Reification and the Cultural Hegemony of Capitalism: The Perspective of Marx and Veblen," *Social Research*, Vol. 44 (1977), pp. 354–83. See also footnote 93.

²⁸ Statistics Canada, *The Labour Force*, Catalogue 71-001, Vol. 34, no. 6 (Ottawa, July, 1978).

fastest growing categories of trade and finance, and services; already in 1971 seventy percent of the city's jobs were in white collar categories. Between the 1951 and 1971 census the proportion of the city's labor force engaged in services and public administration increased by more than a half.

It is more difficult to establish trends in occupational rather than industrial categories because of changing definitions between census periods. It is certain, however, that within the city of Vancouver all white collar employment categories increased both absolutely and relatively from 1951 to 1971. Professional and technical employees probably doubled in number and by 1971 included one employee in seven; in contrast residents in blue collar occupations declined slightly overall, and by eight percent in relative terms. It seems certain that these trends have accelerated since 1971 with the office boom adding three thousand jobs a year downtown alone between 1968 and 1975. The downtown construction boom was of remarkable extent for the city's size and rapidly created a highrise skyline of offices and apartments. Between 1967 and 1977 downtown office space doubled to fourteen million square feet. Eight thousand new jobs a year were added in Vancouver from 1971 to 1975 (forty percent of the metropolitan total) and seventy-five percent of these were generated by new office construction.²⁹ The white collar proportion was much higher, and, including hotels, retailing, and public service facilities, was probably not less than ninety percent of new job creation.

The Rising Real Wealth of Western North America

A second and related contextual factor is Vancouver's location within the rapid growth region of the western one-third of North America. In the United States the distinction between the growth states of the west and south and the slow (or zero) growth states of the north and east has been suggested as the major feature of the nation's regional geography in the 1970s.³⁰ An east-west distinction

is equally marked in Canada where population growth in British Columbia and Alberta has been increasing at twice the national rate since 1966. These provinces also lead the nation in average weekly earnings; in 1976 the national level of \$228 contrasted with \$237 in Alberta and \$260 in British Columbia.³¹ These trends are accurately summarized in the housing market. In the Western Region of the United States (as defined by the U.S. Census), housing costs were fifty percent higher than the national average in 1978, while in Canada Vancouver, Calgary, and Edmonton have consistently figured (with Toronto) as the four metropolitan areas with the most expensive housing.

In 1976 a survey suggested that the mean household income in Vancouver was \$14,600, or seventy percent above the level in 1972; even discounting inflation, this represented a real gain of seventeen percent. Almost a quarter of the city's households earned in excess of \$20,000 a year in 1976; even in constant 1976 dollars this represented an increase of over twelve thousand households in the top income category over 1972.³² Another feature of this population cohort is revealed by demographic data. Although the city lost population from 1971 to 1976 it experienced a net increase of households, as large families left Vancouver to be replaced by one or two person households. Indeed despite a decrease of twenty percent in children under fourteen, there was a gain of five percent in the age group from twenty-five to forty-four years, the age range that might ordinarily be expected to include younger children.³³ One persuasive inference is that conventional households with children and a single wage earner were being displaced by one or two person households without children and with both spouses working. Support for this contention is provided by the construction of over 5,000 condominium units in inner city Vancouver between 1970 and 1976. A survey of condominium households in Greater Vancouver and Victoria conducted in 1977 showed that seventy percent of households contained no children, that in half

²⁹ Vancouver City Planning Department, *Employment Growth in Vancouver* (Vancouver, 1975).

³⁰ G. Sternlieb and J. Hughes, eds., *Post-Industrial America: Metropolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1975).

³¹ *Canada Year Book 1978-79* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1978).

³² Vancouver City Planning Department, *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 4 (October, 1977), p. 19.

³³ Vancouver City Planning Department, *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 5 (April, 1978), p. 16.

of them household heads were aged under forty years, that a quarter of households earned over \$24,000 and that the dominant employment categories were professional and managerial occupations.³⁴

The West Coast Culture Realm

Within the postindustrial cities employees in quaternary occupations are emerging as a new elite and, as such, the new tastemakers. In Vancouver an added context is the city's setting within the west coast cultural realm which has assumed a cultural hegemony in the development and diffusion of social movements and lifestyles. Meinig regards southern California as "a leisure society . . . the chief source-region of a new American life-style which has been expanding and elaborating for more than fifty years, featuring a relaxed enjoyment of each day in casual indoor-outdoor living, with an accent upon individual gratification, physical health, and pleasant exercise."³⁵ More recently San Francisco has been suggested as a new center of lifestyle innovation; over the past two decades it has been the headquarters of the ecology movement and various human potential societies.³⁶

Vancouver has been an intimate part of the west coast cultural realm for fifty years. California house styles have provided a major contribution to the city's landscape, while the headquarters of the Greenpeace Foundation make Vancouver a significant northern member of "ecotopia." An abiding popular image has linked Vancouver with San Francisco more than with any other city and it is not difficult to find substantial lifestyle associations.³⁷ One suggestive indicator is provided by the Canadian sales of *Gourmet*, a magazine

published in New York with the subtitle "the magazine of good living," and a message of consumption with style. *Gourmet* readership is at a high level in California and among the ten Canadian provinces there are also marked geographic differentials in the monthly sales of the more than fifty thousand copies, with the highest relative sales occurring in British Columbia, followed by Ontario and Alberta. Assuming that purchase of *Gourmet* intimates a distinctive set of values toward consumption, then proportionately those values are held most widely in British Columbia. The sales index has much higher values in metropolitan centers. Vancouver with less than two percent of the national population in 1976 contained almost five per cent of Canadian *Gourmet* subscribers.

These attitudes are reflected in the recent emergence of informal associations and a vigorous retail sector serving a leisure-seeking and consumption-oriented lifestyle. A marked transition of store types has occurred in many neighborhoods in response to the changing clientele. In Kitsilano, an inner city neighborhood with beaches, and mountain and ocean views, the main shopping street has been "making a comeback as a recreation and shopping area for the upwardly mobile condominium set. Trendy restaurants, clothes shops and other specialty stores are springing up like mushrooms after a spring rain."³⁸ The canons of good taste have extended especially to cuisine, as the city has experienced a rapid increase in specialty restaurants; directories indicate that the diversity of ethnic restaurants has expanded four-fold since 1961. Vancouver now claims more restaurants per capita than any other city in North America. Veblenian man has indeed triumphed!

From Theory to Ideology

Like all theory, the postindustrial thesis is not politically mute. Though it may develop as a description of societal change, it may subsequently become an instrument in the promotion of change. I have suggested that in the late 1960s the thesis found its historical moment, and that in the service-dominated professional and executive city it found its geographical moment. In Vancouver the thesis also became a political instrument as it was self-consciously appropriated as the slogan of

³⁴ S. W. Hamilton, *Condominiums: A Decade of Experience in B.C.* (Vancouver: British Columbia Real Estate Association, 1978). The sample included Victoria and suburban Vancouver as well as the city of Vancouver. For the city the figures cited would be biased even higher toward high-income, white-collar households.

³⁵ D. W. Meinig, "Symbolic Landscapes: Models of American Community" in D. W. Meinig, ed., *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 164-92; reference on p. 171.

³⁶ J. E. Vance, "California and the Search for the Ideal," *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 62 (1972), pp. 182-210.

³⁷ Ellen Nightingale, "The Tourist's Image of Vancouver," unpublished masters thesis, University of British Columbia, 1979.

³⁸ *Vancouver Province*, May 25, 1978.

urban reform.³⁹ In TEAM's view Vancouver's "destiny" was as a postindustrial city; the purpose of the political movement was then to hurry the urban development process toward this goal.

VANCOUVER: IDEOLOGY AND LANDSCAPE

Vancouver's most prominent journalist perceptively analyzed the tension which has existed in the city's development plans:⁴⁰

What is so amazing about Vancouver—a city so gifted in its setting, so profligate with its advantages—is that there is a constant struggle to preserve its assets There is the continual struggle in this town between the engineering mind and those who realize we live through our eyes and what they transmit.

Fotheringham perceptively casts urban development as a conflict between Cartesian rationalism and Veblenian sensibility, or in Habermas' terms between the forces of purposive-rational action and the needs of the socio-cultural lifeworld. As a resident of the social world out of which The Electors Action Movement was born, Fotheringham firmly sets himself on the side of those critical of Cartesian rationalism, of the engineering mind which "cannot grasp what is going on in the non-engineering mode."⁴¹ TEAM was founded to challenge such an ideology, and in so doing seemed to fill the role of an enlightened social movement in Habermas' formulation, where "science and technology are mediated with the conduct of life through the minds of its citizens."⁴² TEAM would enjoin science with sensibility.

The Industrial City: A Rational Ideology

For much of its history urban development in Vancouver has followed the categories of purposive-rational action, of the engineering mind. Vancouver was an industrial and port city from its founding in 1886 at the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway. While most of its immigrants were seeking a more bucolic setting than the Victorian cities of eastern North America and Europe, this did not blunt

an aggressive growth boosterism in Vancouver.⁴³ Vigorous port activity and a profusion of sawmills and lumber-affiliated industries were the dominant features of the 1,100 industrial plants which were boasted of in a 1927 jubilee report.⁴⁴

The political leaders of industrial Vancouver were eminent businessmen, an elite who passed interchangeably through the Board of Trade, the major social clubs, and the council chambers. Six Board of Trade presidents or vice-presidents between 1887 and 1914 were elected to mayoralty office.⁴⁵ Three-quarters of the city's mayors and nearly two-thirds of its aldermen between 1900 and 1925 were businessmen.⁴⁶ Indeed it was only in the 1960s that businessmen were surpassed as the occupation of a majority of newly elected council members; the newly ascendant group in the 1960s were professionals. The business elite introduced scientific management to Vancouver as they had elsewhere; the arrival of city planning in the 1920s intimated the same "elaboration of the processes of rationalization and systematization inherent in modern science and technology" which were the leit-motif of scientific management.⁴⁷ Vancouver adopted the classical Progressive model of government with a nonpartisan, at-large system of administration replacing the earlier ward system in 1936. The following year the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) was formed and dominated city council until 1968; over this thirty year period ninety percent of its candidates were elected to political office.

It is now generally acknowledged that Progressive municipal reform rationalized the ap-

³⁹ Deryck Holdsworth, "House and Home in Vancouver: Images of West Coast Urbanism, 1886–1929," in G. Stelter and A. Artibise, eds., *The Canadian City: Essays in Urban History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), pp. 186–211.

⁴⁰ Hardwick, op. cit., footnote 39, p. 82.

⁴¹ Angus Robertson, "The Pursuit of Power, Profit and Privacy: A Study of Vancouver's West End Elite, 1886–1914," unpublished masters thesis, University of British Columbia, 1977.

⁴² John Bottomley, "Experience, Ideology and the Landscape: The Business Community, Urban Reform and the Establishment of Town Planning in Vancouver, B.C., 1900–1940," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1977.

⁴³ Samuel Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, Vol. 55 (1964), pp. 157–69; and Bottomley, op. cit., footnote 46.

³⁹ Walter Hardwick, *Vancouver* (Toronto: Collier Macmillan, 1974), especially Chapter 10, "The Post-Industrial Challenge." Hardwick was a founder member of TEAM and senior TEAM alderman from 1968 to 1974.

⁴⁰ Allan Fotheringham, in the *Vancouver Sun*, December 21, 1977.

⁴¹ Fotheringham, op. cit., footnote 40.

⁴² Habermas 1970, op. cit., footnote 11, p. 80.

pearance of a more corporate and less representative civic government. From "the rationalization of life which came with science and technology . . . decisions arose from expert analysis and flowed from fewer and smaller centers outward to the rest of society."⁴⁸ This American conclusion was abundantly true in western Canada where businessmen were the typical advocates of municipal reform and where "reform" schemes often served to reduce the franchise in favor of higher income and propertied interests.⁴⁹ A centralized bureaucracy of experts exuded rationalism and scientific administration, for in the municipal civil service the engineering mind conveyed the dominant ideology. An article in the *Canadian Engineer* for 1923 entitled "Reasons for Town Planning" emphasized the successful formula: "Good city planning is not primarily a matter of aesthetics, but of economics. Its basic principle is to increase the working efficiency of the city."⁵⁰ The inevitable result of such an ideology was a convergence of political and economic interests as planning achieved little more than "the co-ordination of the desires and development policies of private interests."⁵¹ The nonpartisan, corporate model of centralized municipal government promoted business rationalism both in its political theory and in its daily practice.

In Vancouver the landscape which evolved from an ideology so accommodating to business and rational performance filled in closely the development guidelines laid out in Harland Bartholomew's master plan of 1929, a plan which the business elite had promoted, in part from a desire to stabilize land values. Bartholomew had promised that his plan would be viable until the time when Vancouver's population reached a million, a target which the

metropolitan area attained in the late 1960s. But it was not simply size alone which generated a serious challenge to the ideology of nonpartisan planning, but also the politicization of a new group of actors on the urban scene. The increasing size and dispersal of the metropolitan area caused growing traffic congestion and delays, and to restore an efficient transportation network, the NPA council and its technical staff approved in 1967 the first stage of a freeway system for the city. In a proposal typical of an ideology where plans came before people, efficiency before equity, and economic costs before social costs, the freeway alignment would have resulted in the destruction of a substantial portion of Vancouver's Chinatown. The plan, once it became known, was vigorously opposed by a coalition in which academics and architects were prominent. A few months later The Electors Action Movement was founded; the counteroffensive against the engineering mind was now formalized.

POLITICIZING THE NEW ELITE

The transition to a postindustrial society in Vancouver was accompanied by a shift from blue collar to white collar employment and from an economy based on manufacturing to one based on services. This transition, though not complete, has been accelerating since 1960 and the emergence of a new professional, technical, and administrative elite has given expression to a heightened lifestyle of consumption, and a concern with the aesthetic and the realms of human sensibility. A set of values aspiring to a higher quality of life, a livable city, could not help but breed skepticism of traditional growth boosterism, regarding it at best as banal, at worst as destructive. But city council continued to be under the control of the NPA with their unrelenting commitment to growth and the city efficient. As late as 1971 the last NPA mayor, a millionaire property developer, boasted that "Vancouver is the San Francisco of Canada . . . the New York. I can see it someday becoming the largest city in Canada. Montreal and Toronto have had it."⁵²

⁴⁸ Hays, op. cit., footnote 47.

⁴⁹ On money by-laws the Edmonton reform model allowed large property owners as many as four votes. In Western Canada, "the reform model of urban government was anti-democratic in the extreme"; James Anderson, "The Municipal Government Reform Movement in Western Canada, 1880-1920," in A. Artibise and G. Stelter, eds., *The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 73-111.

⁵⁰ Cited by Walter van Nus, "Towards the City Efficient: The Theory and Practice of Zoning," in Artibise and Stelter, eds., op. cit., footnote 49, pp. 226-46.

⁵¹ Van Nus, op. cit., footnote 50.

⁵² Quoted in John Bottomley and Deryck Holdsworth, "A Consideration of Attitudes Underlying Community Involvement With Civic Issues," in David Ley, ed., *Community Participation and the Spatial Order of the City*, B.C. Geographical Series No. 19 (Vancouver: Tantalus, 1974), pp. 59-74.




FIG. 1. TEAM aldermanic vote by polling district, 1972.

In 1968 the new elite was politicized with the formation of The Electors Action Movement to challenge the business ideology at city hall.⁵³ By the early 1970s the community at large shared its social values. In 1972, for example, a random sample of 1,650 adults in Greater Vancouver was polled in a survey covering a broad spectrum of attitudinal and behavioral items. One section of the questionnaire asked residents to rank in order of importance seventeen urban problems covering a wide range of economic, political, and social issues. The three perceived as most serious were 1) air pollution from industry, 2) water pollution, and 3) air pollution from private vehicles.⁵⁴ Environmental aesthetics was regard-

ed as the most pressing urban problem. It was therefore consistent that during the same year the voters should return eight out of ten TEAM aldermen in the civic elections and Arthur Phillips, the TEAM candidate, as mayor. The livable city ideology was not only institutionalized; it was now the policy of a council majority. After eight decades of domination by businessmen, during Vancouver's ninth decade, from 1966 to 1975, nearly seventy percent of newly elected aldermen were professionals or semiprofessionals.

TEAM Membership

Before examining the values which were translated into policy in TEAM's reform program it is necessary to consider first the party's power base. In 1972, the peak year of electoral support, the party's vote was strongly regionalized in Vancouver (Fig. 1). The top

⁵³ Besides TEAM, the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE) was formed in 1968 as a progressive workers' party. F. Miller, "Vancouver Civic Political Parties: Developing a Model of Party-System Change and Stabilization," *B.C. Studies*, Vol. 25 (Spring 1975), pp. 3-31.

⁵⁴ John Collins, *Urban Priorities and Attitudes: Socio-Economic and Lifestyle Determinants*, Vancouver Urban

Futures Project Report No. 6 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Department of Geography, 1973).

quintile of support was in a solid block in the west and southwest parts of the city; support weakened along a gradient from southwest to northeast with an equally solid block of polling districts in the bottom quintile located adjacent to the docks along the Burrard Inlet. The social composition of TEAM electoral support is indicated by correlating the 1972 vote by polling district against selected census tract characteristics from the 1971 census (Table 3). As the administrative units did not coincide, the polling districts were grouped to correspond to the sixty-eight Vancouver census tracts.

A fairly precise profile of census tracts which endorsed TEAM may be drawn from the moderate to strong correlations which emerge. The TEAM vote did not correlate significantly against life cycle variables measuring age and housing type, but there were consistently significant correlations against variables measuring socioeconomic status, with positive correlations against white collar occupations, education, and income. Beyond this, there is the strong suggestion of an "establishment" presence with strong positive correlations against Anglo-Canadian ethnicity and United Church affiliation, and negative correlations against Asian and Italian ethnicity, and Roman Catholic affiliation. The geographic core of TEAM support coincided closely with the areas of Liberal strength in provincial elections; in contrast the top quintile of NPA polling districts followed a zone in central Vancouver which corresponded with areas of electoral support for the free enterprise Social Credit party in provincial elections.⁵⁵

More specific information on TEAM supporters was provided by a twenty-five percent sample of the more than seven hundred households who were party members in 1973. Seventy-five percent of these households had Anglo-Canadian surnames. Occupationally the major category was professionals, comprising a third of all members and consisting especially of the legal profession, university professors, teachers, and architects; these professions alone supplied over a quarter of all

TABLE 3.—CORRELATES OF TEAM ALDERMANIC SUPPORT, 1972

| | |
|--|-------|
| United Kingdom ethnicity (Anglo-Canadian) | 0.78 |
| University degree | 0.75 |
| Administrative and managerial occupations | 0.73 |
| Sales occupations | 0.73 |
| Less than grade 9 education | -0.67 |
| United Church affiliation | 0.67 |
| Asian ethnicity | -0.65 |
| Mean family income over \$20,000 | 0.65 |
| Roman Catholic | -0.59 |
| Medicine and health occupations | 0.58 |
| Median income | 0.55 |
| Arts, religion, physical and social sciences | 0.55 |
| Canadian born | 0.54 |
| Median value of dwelling | 0.52 |
| University of B.C. faculty | 0.50 |
| Blue collar occupations | -0.48 |
| Italian ethnicity | -0.40 |

Source: Computed by author.

TEAM members. Other categories included businessmen (sixteen percent), clerical, sales, and service positions (thirteen percent) and semiprofessionals and housewives (nine percent each). Skilled and unskilled blue collar workers consisted of only five percent of membership. The occupational biases were sharpened among the leaders of TEAM according to a survey conducted in 1969 which showed that nearly sixty percent of the party's leaders were professionals or semiprofessionals while a little over twenty percent were businessmen. This profile was in sharp contrast to the NPA where almost three-quarters of identifiable leaders were businessmen.⁵⁶ Finally in the five civic elections from 1968 to 1976, two-thirds of TEAM aldermanic candidates were professionals or semiprofessionals. Indeed, Vancouver makes Bell's case for the ascendancy of the intellectual and the university only too well; in its 1972 majority council four of the eight TEAM aldermen were university professors.

"A CITY PEOPLE CAN LIVE IN AND ENJOY"⁵⁷

From its inception TEAM had seen itself as a reform party challenging the ideology of nonpartisan politics which meant in practice a policy of growth and the city efficient, a pol-

⁵⁵ Provincial electoral data are analysed in Julian Minghi and Dennis Rumley, "Toward a Geography of Campaigning: Some Evidence from a Provincial Election in Vancouver, B.C.," *Canadian Geographer*, Vol. 22 (1978), pp. 145-62.

⁵⁶ Easton and Tennant, op. cit., footnote 3. For a divergent view see Donald Gutstein, *Vancouver Ltd.* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975).

⁵⁷ A phrase appearing in TEAM campaign literature in 1974.

icy which strongly favored business interests. Part of its founding momentum had been opposition to the 1967 freeway plan, a scheme which incorporated all that was worst in planning dominated by the principles of rational efficiency. So too TEAM challenged the hegemony of business interests in urban development; indeed the party briefly held a remarkable policy which barred individuals with major real estate or construction interests from the board of directors or from running as an aldermanic candidate.⁵⁸ In 1972 when TEAM won control of council the role of the real estate industry and a strategy for urban development were perceived by the electorate as major campaign issues.⁵⁹ Consequently the shape of TEAM policy for urban development was perhaps the most significant element of its platform.

Like all party platforms, TEAM's urban policies were crystallized under the rubric of campaign slogans. In each of the five civic elections from 1968 to 1976, key phrases of its platform included "the livable city," "people before property," and "the quality of life." "What unites us," announced party election literature in 1970, "is a common concern for the quality of life in our city"; in 1976 TEAM was "for people, not concrete and asphalt."⁶⁰ The same year the major purpose identified by its planning and development guideline was "To plan and develop Vancouver for people," a strategy in which participation, aesthetics, pollution control, more parks, neighborhood preservation, and mixed land use were to be major elements.

In 1968 the party proposed the establishment of a public development authority to initiate redevelopment of "poorly used" land with twin objectives to "raise the value of the property and . . . increase tax revenue to the city" but also "Of even greater importance . . . improve the quality of life." The relative ordering of these two priorities was unchanged throughout TEAM's years of major-

ity control of city hall. By 1974 some success was claimed:

Gone was the development-at-any-price outlook sponsored by previous administrations Gone was the blind worship of urban growth Priorities have changed. Vancouver has become a more human city under TEAM management. TEAM has started making Vancouver a city people can live in and enjoy.

Nevertheless, by the next election, "the battle to make Vancouver a more human and livable city is not yet over."

The experience of urban living, the quality of consumption, was to be raised to a new primacy as a criterion for urban development. If reelected in the 1974 campaign, Arthur Phillips promised that his council would continue to follow "the over-riding principle that people matter most in Vancouver."⁶¹ In development terms the humanization of the city was the objective. Phillips had articulated this clearly in his nomination speech as unopposed TEAM mayoralty candidate in 1972, where he identified the main campaign issue as people versus property:⁶²

There is a feeling that Vancouver's growth is out of control I don't want more of the same. I want to put the people first I want to make Vancouver a place to live in and enjoy. I want to see pedestrian malls and mini-parks downtown—not just solid concrete.

TEAM's mayoralty candidate in 1970 had been even more direct: "I want to take the initiative in the development of Vancouver out of the hands of land sharks and property speculators."⁶³

Its ideology of development influenced other areas of reform strategy. In transportation policy, TEAM's initial reaction against freeways led to a consistent advocacy of public transportation (an improved bus service and a rapid transit system) and of "people over automobiles." It was unequivocally opposed to the construction of freeways: "Freeways in Vancouver must be banned at all costs" read a determined clause of the 1976 transportation policy. It is instructive to note not only what reform ideology was against but also what it was for. Aside from improved public transit the other proposal of the 1968 transportation platform was for "scenic drives, walkways and bikeways." In subsequent policy state-

⁵⁸ *Vancouver Sun*, April 27, 1968.

⁵⁹ An analysis of civic election issues is presented in Julian Minghi and Dennis Rumley, "The Vancouver Civic Elections of 1970 and 1972: A Comparative Analysis," in B. Barr, ed., *The Kootenay Collection of Research Studies in Geography*, B.C. Geographical Series No. 18 (Vancouver: Tantalus, 1974), pp. 35–49.

⁶⁰ Unless otherwise specified, quoted extracts are taken from published and unpublished TEAM campaign literature.

⁶¹ *Vancouver Sun*, November 13, 1974.

⁶² *Vancouver Province*, October 5, 1972.

⁶³ *Vancouver Province*, October 7, 1970.

ments the social and aesthetic components of transportation planning were elaborated. Two of the five clauses of the 1974 policy covered pollution control and the preservation of scenic beauty, while by 1976 the forging of physical and social objectives was completed with the adoption of a transportation guideline "to promote the livability of the city in accordance with TEAM's social policies." Antipathy toward the private automobile was related also to its ecological destructiveness. "I hope the day will come when two trees will be planted for every car sold in the city" observed TEAM's mayoralty candidate in 1970; "Clean air demands it and noise pollution requires it."⁶⁴ A vigorous program of park preservation and expansion and civic landscaping and beautification became a theme of the TEAM council. Indeed in the 1974 election campaign TEAM could claim that its first majority council had added more park acreage to the city than any other administration since 1887, the year after Vancouver's founding.

TEAM in Office: From Ideology to Practice

It is perhaps not too much of an overstatement to assert that if nonpartisan management, the engineering mind, placed economics and efficiency in a privileged position while discounting aesthetics, TEAM sought to reverse the priorities when it assumed control of city hall in 1972. A more humane and aesthetic city was a primary objective especially in the critical downtown core and inner city neighborhoods. In the central business district the major commercial street was closed to all but public transport, despite the opposition of retailers, and transformed into a landscaped pedestrian precinct; the preservation of historic buildings and of an entire district, Gastown, core of the early city, were secured; other heritage buildings were renovated for a new performing arts center and a separate art gallery. In the central residential neighborhoods densities were regulated through repeated downzonings, streets were blocked to check commuter through traffic, trees and shrubs were planted, and new parks were added while encroachment on existing parks was strictly prevented. Public access to the waterfront was improved and a fishermen's market was opened upon council initiative. In

short, public spaces were protected, animated, and humanized; a more vital and even festive ambience was sought and to some extent achieved, most notably in a series of successful annual spring and summer festivals in the parks, beaches, and bays around central city, whose sponsors included the city's social planning department. All of these initiatives flowed from TEAM's policy that Vancouver should be "a city people can live in and enjoy." The quality of urban experience, the satisfaction of the "higher needs" of human sensibility, became a daily preoccupation of city hall. At one level the ideology of May, 1968, the celebration of "exhilarating, joyous festival," was discernible in the emerging sense of place.⁶⁵

To such sensibilities few details were too small. Billboards were substantially reduced in number as an offense of visual pollution while a separate by-law banned the use of advertising sandwich boards on sidewalks by merchants. Noise pollution was addressed in the city's first noise by-law. New urban design standards were set up with an influential design panel to vet development applications. Few options were left untried in the pursuit of the canons of good taste.

In contrast to these energetic undertakings, economics and efficiency were rarely seen as pressing concerns. Even traffic circulation, the problem par excellence for systems reasoning, was removed from an engineering context and interpreted instead as a human problem, the inconvenience of the journey to work, which in turn "threaten[s] the amenity, or 'livability' of the region if allowed to grow unmanaged" by unwelcome commuter intrusion on inner residential districts.⁶⁶ With a downtown office boom and eight thousand new jobs a year being created in the early 1970s, there was no need for an employment strategy; TEAM concurred with a regional plan to decentralize jobs to suburban town centers in order to relieve the "congestion stresses" of commuting. Only in the recession of the late 1970s with unacceptably high vacancy rates in the overbuilt core was this strategy questioned. But even then TEAM was selective of its new employers. In a speech to the Vancouver Real Estate Board in 1977

⁶⁵ See footnote 1.

⁶⁶ Vancouver City Planning Department, *op. cit.*, footnote 29, p. 1.

⁶⁴ *Vancouver Province*, *op. cit.*, footnote 63.

Mayor Volrich noted "that we can easily identify financial institutions as being a very desirable kind of business to encourage, and technological industries and many other 'clean' industries."⁶⁷ White collar employment would be welcomed but not polluting industries. While park acreage has increased substantially, four hundred acres of industrially zoned land was rezoned to other uses between 1968 and 1976.⁶⁸ By the latter date park acreage in Vancouver covered an area twenty-five percent larger than industrial land use.

These land use changes were reflections of an ideology that was believed to be disinterested and favoring a broader public interest. Certainly TEAM did not see itself as a pro-development lobby. Its position toward traditional growth boosterism was unreservedly hostile, toward entrepreneurial interests equivocal at best. From the beginning, one of its populist objectives had been the containment of the development industry and its aggressive power plays. The Planning Director, a TEAM appointee, consistently supported citizens rather than business interests in rezoning controversies; he resisted granting a redevelopment permit to one proposed residential tower in a high amenity central location on the grounds of it being "unneighborly" in its intrusion on existing properties, a social criterion unthinkable before earlier NPA councils.⁶⁹ The assault on high density living and particularly high rise developments was conducted with vigor and in four years council had achieved residential downzonings in every major apartment district in the city.⁷⁰ In almost every instance the downzonings were supported by local citizens' groups and opposed by the land development industry. Nor were downtown commercial interests more successful in gaining council backing; repeatedly their viewpoint was rebuffed at public meetings in the council chamber.⁷¹

Linked to its coolness toward entrepreneurial interests was TEAM's policy of open gov-

ernment, in marked contrast to the highly centralized and secretive decision-making of the nonpartisan era. Numerous practical steps were taken to heighten public awareness of civic issues, disseminate information, and draw citizens into the process of public decision-making.⁷² The most controversial element of TEAM's populism was its advocacy of representative government. This included a commitment to some form of electoral reform leading to partial ward representation, though in two separate plebiscites (in 1973 and 1978) a proposal for a partial ward system failed to receive substantial endorsement from the electorate. This initiative for representative government was thereby thwarted by local residents, leaving Vancouver the only major Canadian city with a totally at-large council.⁷³ Success was equally frustrated with the other major political reform, decentralized local area planning. Participation had always been an important springboard of TEAM policy; in its 1976 paper on planning and development policy, for example, the first of eight points was "to encourage participation in the planning process of persons and organizations," while a later item was "to give to the occupants of neighbourhoods as strong a voice as possible" in formulating neighborhood policies and by-laws. But after some difficult early experiences in the implementation of local area planning, TEAM aldermen withdrew from their initial strong endorsement to a more limited model of consultation.⁷⁴

The Redevelopment of False Creek

The False Creek redevelopment is perhaps the most dramatic landscape metaphor of liberal ideology, of the land use implications of the transition from industrial to postindustrial society, from an ethic of growth and the production of goods to an ethic of amenity and the consumption of services (Fig. 2). False

⁶⁷ Mayor Volrich, speech to the Vancouver Real Estate Board, October 19, 1977.

⁶⁸ Vancouver City Planning Department, *Understanding Vancouver* (Vancouver, 1977), pp. 7-9.

⁶⁹ *Vancouver Sun*, November 5, 1976.

⁷⁰ *Vancouver Sun*, September 3, 1976.

⁷¹ For example, the downtown retail lobby was frustrated by council over issues of commercial tax levies, downtown traffic plans, and by council support for competing retail development outside the CBD.

⁷² Among the reforms leading to more open government were the holding of council meetings at more convenient hours, the publication of aldermanic voting patterns, the dissemination of public information magazines by the planning and social planning departments, and the advertising of development permit applications to aid community knowledge of potential land use changes.

⁷³ Donald Higgins, *Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), p. 249.

⁷⁴ Walter Hardwick and David Hardwick, "Civic Government: Corporate, Consultative or Participatory?" in David Ley, ed., op. cit., footnote 52, pp. 89-95.



FIG. 2. Planning the livable city: the False Creek Redevelopment.

Creek was a major industrial site in the zone in transition adjoining the downtown core, covering five hundred acres of land on each side of a tidal inlet. It included sawmills and other lumber-related industries, metalworking, marine industries, and on its northern side a large railyard. By the late 1960s leases on a number of the industrial sites were near expiry and the NPA council determined to continue to plan for False Creek as an industrial area.

In contrast TEAM development policy in 1968 included an innovative proposal to transform False Creek "from purely industrial use to a combination of residential, recreational and 'clean' industrial uses." By 1972 TEAM was looking forward to False Creek as "inner city living at its best," while "the waterfront should be a continuous system of parks and marinas for all the people to enjoy."⁷⁵ The False Creek redevelopment was to be the largest inner city project undertaken in Canada, covering an area larger than the existing downtown, and housing when completed up to thirty thousand people. It provided a per-

fect *tabula rasa* for the concretization of liberal ideology, "a beautiful addition to Canada's most beautiful city"; it would be, of course, "a place for people."⁷⁶ This transition is the more remarkable in as much as ten years earlier False Creek was described as "a garbage dump, a sewer outlet for the city of Vancouver. It is, first and foremost, the industrial heart of the city."⁷⁷ In the change process, as was so often the case with TEAM urban strategy, social and aesthetic priorities eclipsed economic reasoning. In the opinion of the most detailed review of the False Creek project: "rather remarkably, the general objective of creating a quality, livable environment seems to have taken a distinct priority for some time over any of the financial aspects of redevelopment."⁷⁸ And this for a redevelop-

⁷⁶ False Creek Development Group, *False Creek: South Shore* (Vancouver: City Planning Department, 1977).

⁷⁷ Jane Fukui, *A Background Report on False Creek for the Vancouver Board of Trade* (Vancouver, 1968).

⁷⁸ Ruth Rodger, *Creating a Livable Inner City Community* (Vancouver: Ministry of State for Urban Affairs

⁷⁵ *Vancouver Province*, October 5, 1972.

ment whose first fifty acre phase alone was estimated to have a capital cost of over \$57 million.

False Creek is a microcosm of the livable city vision. The objective advertised in 1974 was for design teams to develop workable proposals to "reflect [TEAM's] False Creek policies, provide excitement and innovation, quality, a high degree of livability, be acceptable to the potential residents and the general public and be a practical concept in economic terms."⁷⁹ False Creek was envisaged as a quality environment, set up from the beginning as a "livable community," a development committed to heighten the urban experience of residents. That experience was to have both physical and social components, as many of TEAM's urban strategies were given landscape expression. The car was to be relegated to peripheral and underground locations, while the curving interior streets would be pedestrian precincts; a fundamental policy was that False Creek would be "a non-automobile orientated environment."⁸⁰ A new bus service would be introduced and the development would face not the land but the water where a seawall would provide a continuous pedestrian, jogging, and bicycle route. Jane Jacobs' views on the advantages of mixed land uses were firmly taken up: "The most important message from my experience is: create diversity, don't segregate functions, and provide lots of reasons for lots of people to converge and use spaces."⁸¹ Diversity was to extend to house types, which would include low rise, high rise, townhouses and live-aboard boats and also to architectural design and materials. False Creek was a conscious reaction against unimaginative urban design, while keeping densities substantially below conventional inner city standards. Parks and landscaping were important design features and included in the first phase of development a sixteen acre park, a waterfall and lake, a garden of native plants, and a sixty-foot wide land-

scaped pedestrian overpass, broader than a normal residential street. Aesthetics were reflected in the quality and diversity of construction materials, extensive design features to control noise pollution, and the height and arrangement of buildings which were located to optimize views of the mountains, waterfront, and downtown skyline.⁸²

More significant yet were the social components of design. In 1968 TEAM's policy on public housing had been critical of the traditional "low income housing ghetto TEAM believes public housing which segregates people does not work." The most dramatic component of the vision for False Creek was to be social mixing of lifestyles, income groups, and tenure types. The 865 units of the first phase were to include housing for families, couples, the elderly, and singles; the income mix was to reflect the metropolitan area with approximately one-third low income, one-third middle income, and one-third high income; tenure types included substantial proportions of subsidized rentals, cooperatives, and market condominiums. The cooperative sponsors included service clubs, an ethnic association, a physically handicapped society, and a floating homes society. False Creek was to celebrate plurality. Here liberal ideology could not have been more explicit: "Communities which offer little social and physical diversity are unhealthy . . . health in any form is invariably connected to diversity."⁸³ Yet for diversity to be expressed a supportive milieu was necessary "to support rather than destroy the vast mosaic of subcultures."⁸⁴ The design solution was for small circular enclaves to be constructed to shelter homogeneity within a broader development of heterogeneous enclaves. This strategy would also aid in creating neighborhood character and a sense of resident identity and control, regarded as important features of livability.⁸⁵ Nothing was left to chance; even street names would evoke continuity rather than transience with names

and City Planning Department, False Creek Development Group, 1976), p. 23.

⁷⁹ Rodger, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 17.

⁸⁰ Rodger, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 12.

⁸¹ Hardwick, op. cit., footnote 39, p. 205. Hardwick, an urban geographer, was the front-ranking TEAM alderman from 1968 to his retirement from council in 1974. He is widely regarded as one of the major architects of the False Creek Redevelopment; see Rodger, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 32.

⁸² The preference for quality materials was illustrated by the decision to surface the pedestrian areas with quartzite, expensive to maintain and with a purchase cost four times greater than concrete and ten times greater than asphalt.

⁸³ Rodger, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 8.

⁸⁴ Rodger, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 9.

⁸⁵ False Creek Study Group, *False Creek Proposals, Report 4 and 5* (Vancouver: Thompson, Berwick, Pratt and Partners and City Planning Department, 1972).

like Foundry Quay and Sawyer's Lane sustaining a theme of False Creek's industrial and maritime heritage.

The management of the redevelopment was equally innovative. Public participation and consultation were ongoing; indeed it was negative public response to council and planning department proposals in 1968 and 1969 which gave momentum to TEAM's redevelopment strategy. A Citizens Advisory Panel was set up and public response from 1,200 questionnaires was an ingredient of the final design decision. Senior levels of government showed an unusually creative response to the challenges False Creek presented to conventional forms of administration. Finally, the project sought out creative and innovative design strategies. The design team utilized Christopher Alexander's pattern language, a qualitative program of systematized intuition, for design and planning. Pattern language, devised at Berkeley and Oregon over the past decade, followed principles of use-based design and had not previously been used in a major Canadian development.⁸⁶ The planning ideas of liberal social scientists including Herbert Gans and particularly Jane Jacobs were promoted by the academics on city council. TEAM's leadership was critical, but it was part of a broader social movement, a tide of changing social values which shaped the design principles in 1970, and brought TEAM to power in 1972 to implement them. False Creek is a product of "positive public reaction . . . political dynamism and professional innovation."⁸⁷ It is a landscape testimony to a social movement advocating pluralism and the virtues of self-actualization in the residential environment, while pursuing the canons of good taste (Fig. 2).

CRITIQUE: LIBERAL IDEOLOGY IN RETROSPECT

The False Creek redevelopment represented the major achievement of livable city planning, demonstrating what could be accomplished on public land by creative political initiatives. Market interests were laggardly in their contribution; major developers refused to become involved and mortgage lenders were slow to participate. But this vacuum was

filled by support from the housing departments of senior governments. During the critical 1972-75 period the provincial government was controlled by the sympathetic left of center New Democratic Party. At the federal level because False Creek fell within the constituency of a senior Liberal minister it received priority attention at Ottawa. Subsequent proposals for Granville Island, an area of federally owned land in False Creek, have shown a common development philosophy between the ideology of TEAM and federal Liberalism.⁸⁸

Where its control was more limited and constraints were greater livable city planning was far less successful, however. This was particularly the case in the private housing market. The promotion of the culture of consumption, the quality of urban life, had unfortunate side-effects. In an era when amenity is a significant factor not only of personal migration but also of industrial and office location, TEAM's livable city strategy helped to inflate housing demand pressures in center city while at the same time its development policies and those of the provincial and federal governments contributed to limit housing supply.⁸⁹ Property owners and developers capitalized on this bottleneck and land prices sky-rocketed; from 1972 to 1974 during the tenure of the first TEAM majority council, Vancouver house prices doubled. In contesting the city efficient TEAM had not inaugurated the age of urban equity; indeed in the private land market liberal ideology promoted a new if unintended elitism.

These relationships may be illustrated briefly by three examples where TEAM urban policy has precipitated undesirable social consequences. Its plan to beautify Granville Street, the main downtown shopping avenue, and

⁸⁸ Granville Island is to change "from an industrial site to a predominantly "'people-place' . . . a place of 'recreation' in the fullest sense." With mixed uses including open space, experimental theater, an art college, and a Montessori school, the mood of "exhilarating, joyous festival" (footnote 1) continues to be celebrated. Vancouver Planning Department, *The Redevelopment of Granville Island* (Vancouver, 1977). Symptomatically, the proposal has been opposed by downtown businessmen: *Vancouver Sun*, March 17, 1978.

⁸⁹ The details of the housing market and government intervention are complicated, but briefly we might note the effects of municipal downzonings and development delays, a provincial rent freeze, and the federal removal of tax concessions on apartment development.

⁸⁶ Christopher Alexander, *A Pattern Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

⁸⁷ Rodger, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 32.

transform it to a pedestrian mall was at first resisted by a number of shopkeepers. Their resistance was justified, for soon after the facelift landlords raised store rents substantially and a number of small retailers were forced to relocate. A second issue was TEAM's support for the development of a fifty-five acre botanical garden on the site of a former golf course in Vancouver's most prestigious residential district. In 1977 the park lost \$430,000; if houses compatible with the neighborhood's tone had been built, they would have contributed \$600,000 to the city in taxes.⁹⁰ Finally, the False Creek redevelopment itself has had external effects which have removed low and middle income housing in the adjacent neighborhood of the Fairview Slopes. This district contained modest and in some instances dilapidated housing for the workers who had previously manned the industries along the Creek below. But redevelopment of False Creek has replaced a noxious area by a highly desirable one, and the old residences of the Fairview Slopes have been demolished and replaced by expensive townhouses. In each instance an action stemming from liberal ideology has disfavored a vulnerable income group and favored the more privileged.

The unintended elitism of livable city policies pointed to the biased distribution of TEAM's power base and the interests it represented. In no civic election did TEAM aldermanic candidates win half the popular vote. The remainder of the vote was divided between the conservative Non-Partisan Association and the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE), a left-wing party also founded in 1968. TEAM policies aggravated the constituencies of both of its rivals. The NPA represented business interests and conservative groups among the lower middle class and elderly; as an essentially free enterprise party it reacted against TEAM's active intervention in urban issues and particularly its slighting of the business lobby. COPE represented poorer segments of the working class immigrant community and tenants; these groups were critical of TEAM's social policies, claiming that insufficient attention was paid to housing and welfare problems.

With TEAM's energetic program for urban

development impinging on the interests and convictions of the other involved parties, the decade from 1968 to 1978 was politically volatile. Between 1973 and 1975 alone, ninety-eight land use conflicts were reported in the city's major newspaper.⁹¹ In only ten of the controversies was a majority of the TEAM controlled council aligned with the business lobby. But on the other hand TEAM's activism in issues was geographically localized. While council policies initiated fifteen conflicts in westside planning districts, its electoral source of strength, it initiated only three conflicts in the working-class eastern districts. Inevitably COPE sympathizers charged TEAM with an elitist program neglectful of the needs of the underprivileged. Those charges had some substance. In the field of housing, rental vacancy rates were extremely low, affordable housing was scarce, and by 1978 twenty-five percent of the city's households were spending excessive amounts (over thirty percent of income) on shelter.⁹² Such failings of the livable city ideology led eventually to the dismembering of TEAM as two of its aldermen concerned with welfare and housing issues left the party in protest against the low priority these problems received. But by the mid-1970s TEAM nonetheless remained more liberal than the population at large over social questions; in 1976 the electorate turned down a five year capital budget for a variety of programs including subsidized housing. Indeed TEAM's collapse was confirmed in its 1978 convention when party members urged more liberal policies upon their elected representatives; two more TEAM council members, perceiving the conservative shift in the electorate, resigned and fought the 1978 civic election as quasi-NPA candidates. The tensions inherent in a reform coalition, the retirement of a number of leading figures, and the changed circumstances of the late 1970s all led to TEAM's fracturing as a discrete reform movement.

The shift to the right in the electorate indicated by the rejection of the 1976 capital budget favored the fiscally conservative NPA. Just as a surge of reform sentiment had en-

⁹¹ David Ley and John Mercer, "Locational Conflict and the Politics of Consumption," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 56 (1980), in press.

⁹² Vancouver City Planning Department, *Quarterly Review*, Vol. 6 (July, 1979), p. 15.

⁹⁰ *The Courier* (Vancouver), August 3, 1978.

dorsed TEAM's vision of the livable city in the early 1970s, so a popular conservative movement in 1978 contributed to its downfall. The specter of expensive government during an economic downturn challenged vulnerable members of the middle class and lower middle class. The threat to consumption standards reinstated a concern with growth and fiscal conservatism by government. In 1974 one of TEAM's aldermen had embroidered its expensive urban program with the hope that Vancouver might "grow" from the third largest to the tenth largest Canadian city! By the late 1970s neither the expense of the urban program nor the qualitative definition of growth it presented satisfied a majority of voters.

A livable city ideology and an ideology of equity are only coincidental in special cases where economic strength is assured, public intervention is active, and private interests are constrained. The severity of these requirements suggests that the ideologies will often be incompatible. In free market conditions an urban strategy favoring a high level of consumption with style will only serve to attract the wealthy and penalize social groups with limited market power. The solution would appear to be countervailing intervention by government, but this solution may in turn alienate business interests and vulnerable middle class groups, especially as inflationary demand pressures raise costs and taxes (including housing costs and the costs of public services). Moreover, the growth of government bureaucracy may have its own shortcomings. Aside from the sense of alienation often accompanying big government is the perception of decreasing economic efficiency, leading to the fear of a further reduction in personal consumption standards, and translated predictably into a political movement for free enterprise. A critical factor then becomes the strength of the economy, for it is during an economic downturn that tensions and vulnerabilities are bared, and the legitimacy of government policy is challenged. The harmonizing of goals of efficiency, equity, and the quality of life are profound problems of national administration; it is not surprising that they reappear to present a crisis of management in the postindustrial city.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps it would be pressing the parallels too far to note that six months after TEAM's

collapse in the 1978 Vancouver municipal elections Pierre Trudeau was also deposed from office at the national level. And yet, given the interconnections we have suggested between local and national policy, between urban planning and societal context, the coincidence may not be too surprising. The liberal ideology of both municipal and national administrations was characterized by an emphasis on government intervention coupled with a relative neglect of economic relations in favor of social, cultural, and political initiatives. The threat of recession made fiscal conservatism, free enterprise, and limits to government control important issues in both city and national elections, so that political platforms endorsed in 1968 had lost their historical momentum a decade later.

A number of the theoreticians of the May, 1968, student riots had seen in the technical, professional, and intellectual cohorts a class in ascendancy in postindustrial society that might theoretically replace the working class as an agent of change; indeed the theoretical significance of this emergent class continues to be keenly pressed.⁹³ Vancouver presents an interesting laboratory for examining this class in action. With a white-collar service and professional workforce and a commitment to a leisure- and consumption-oriented lifestyle, Vancouver met the criteria of a postindustrial city. These objective conditions were consolidated by the emergence of TEAM, a liberal reform party, which self-consciously appropriated a postindustrial identity for the city. In this convergence of objective and subjective conditions, the meeting of theory and ideology, TEAM developed a critique of the urban strategy directed by a centralized administration sympathetic to business interests and the city efficient, the categories of the "engineering mind." It was to counter the practical results of this excessively rationalist ideology and reestablish the primacy of people and a "livable city" that the reform movement in Vancouver was founded in 1968. TEAM was not an apologist for technical solutions or economic interests as was evident from its

⁹³ Poster, op. cit., footnote 1. For a contemporary discussion, see Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Seabury Press, 1979). The professional, technical class has always proven a difficulty for marxian theorists: P. Walker, ed., *Between Labour and Capital* (Hassocks, England: Harvester Press, 1979).

policies and its actions. It institutionalized the values of a social movement of professionals and senior white collar workers who were drawn toward issues of meaning and the quality of experience in urban life—Maslow's higher needs. Fundamentally TEAM was for an active view of man. Its promotion of socio-cultural values was revealed most successfully in public development, most notably in the creativity of the False Creek redevelopment. But in its interaction with private interests, particularly in the land market, the reform movement was perhaps too naïve, not recognizing that its humane philosophy might be coopted by the calculus of the market place and lead to an inequitable outcome where the vulnerabilities of the poor would be exposed. For in what Hirsch has called the positional economy of contemporary advanced society, wherever scarcity is becoming social rather than material the promise of an enhanced quality to consumption in an environment designed to maximize livability will lead to a predictable market response.⁹⁴

TEAM's commitment to pluralism, open government, and the livable city overlooked, or perhaps presupposed, the achievement

both of equity and also economic security. In the union that it forged between cultural and political realms there was the conceptual and also political failure to treat economic relations, the third leg of our theoretical framework, as problematic. A development boom followed by an economic downturn exposed this weakness with a vengeance. At this critical juncture council failed to respond adequately, frustrated by a conservative turn in the electorate, its own bias toward noneconomic issues, and the character of the Canadian constitution whereby economic power is delegated to the provinces rather than to local government.⁹⁵ As a result TEAM policies were able to promote the conditions for a livable city more easily than they could equitably allocate the ensuing benefits.

⁹⁴ Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). The first resales of False Creek condominiums in 1978 showed substantial capital gains for vendors.

⁹⁵ This conclusion assumes that TEAM had the political will to achieve a more just allocation. Again the question is complex, but it could be argued that until October, 1975, and the beginning of the withdrawal of its left of center alderman, TEAM's policies were in advance of public opinion on social justice issues. Suggestive are its firm stand on progressive policies of social housing and social mix in False Creek, its funding for the left-wing Downtown Eastside Residents Association, and its support for a partial ward system. The economic weakness of the city administration relative to provincial and federal governments is documented by their relative contributions to public expenditure in Vancouver. Data are reported in, Vancouver City Planning Department, *Quarterly Review* Vol. 5 (October, 1978), p. 18.