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DIALOGICAL HERITAGE AND SUSTAINABILITY

Introduction

I have suggested that one of the main challenges to World Heritage and the concept of 'universal' heritage value has been the test of maintaining its very universality, meaning that it was forced to take seriously the claims to represent the various different ways of conceptualising heritage which it met as a result of the globalisation of heritage in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In Chapter 6, I suggested that it was the creative 'friction' between the particular set of Euro-American ideas about heritage embodied in the World Heritage Convention and alternative Indigenous and non-Western concepts of heritage that gave rise to the introduction of the concepts of cultural landscapes and intangible heritage, and their introduction into the work of the World Heritage Committee. However, I argue that the concepts of intangible heritage and cultural landscapes adopted as a result of this process are fundamentally at odds with the Indigenous ontological position on which UNESCO and other heritage professionals have often claimed to draw in broadening the definitions of heritage to include these categories, maintaining instead a modern set of Cartesian dualisms that hold nature and culture, and matter and mind, to be separate. In this chapter, I want to consider the final of the series of conceptual crises that I have suggested emerged for heritage in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, in the form of the Indigenous ontological challenge to the concept of heritage expressed in the World Heritage Convention. In particular, I want to explore what it might mean to take seriously this ontological position, and the definition of heritage that emerges from it, as an alternative truth claim that might help us look at heritage and the world in a different way. In doing so, I propose a relational or dialogical model, which sees heritage as emerging from the relationship between a range of human and non-human actors and their environments. I suggest that this relational, dialogical model of heritage not only might be relevant in helping us to understand the friction between World Heritage

and particular local traditions with which it comes into conflict, but also might help us connect heritage with broader issues of environmental, political and social concern. Further, I suggest it represents a way of thinking about heritage that might transform our troubled late-modern relationship with memory (Chapter 8) and allow us to emancipate and use heritage in more creative, transformative ways in the future. In developing these ideas, I draw particularly on the work of anthropologists Deborah Bird Rose and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, and the symmetrical perspectives on culture and materiality that emerge from actor–network and assemblage theory and a consideration of heritage as apparatus or *dispositif*. I also argue that this dialogical model of heritage implies the employment of more dialogical models of heritage decision-making, drawing on Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe's work on hybrid forums to suggest new procedures that challenge the traditional separation of specialists, politicians, bureaucrats and stakeholders in the identification, conservation and management of official heritage.

Modernist binaries: 'the Great Divide'

In Chapter 2, I suggested that the idea of heritage as it was expressed in the 1972 World Heritage Convention was an outcome of the experience of modernity and a particular way of thinking about the world that owed its origins to post-Enlightenment emphases on rationality, scientific reasoning and the concept of the public sphere. Fundamental to this way of thinking and being 'modern' are modes of ordering that rely on a pervasive series of opposing dualisms that are considered to structure the world (Law 1994). In *We Have Never Been Modern*, Bruno Latour (1993) summarises this way of thinking as the introduction of a philosophical 'Great Divide' between humans and non-humans, nature and culture, and mind and matter. The mind/matter divide derives from the work of French philosopher René Descartes (hence 'Cartesian dualism'), who suggested that the mind is a non-physical substance that is separate from the body. The human/non-human dualism was important in the development of early anthropological thinking, and was advanced particularly in the work of Sir Edward Tylor, who contrasted primitive 'animism' with modern 'scientific rationality' in his theory of the origins of religion (see further discussion in Harvey 2005). Animism was defined by Tylor as the belief that beings or things other than humans had 'souls'; hence it is an ontology in which the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter does not exist, as there is no separation between the spiritual and material world. The nature/culture divide derived from the same constellation of Enlightenment thinking about what it meant to be 'modern' and 'human'. Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau contrasted civilised 'culture' with the uncivilised 'state of nature'; this characterisation was fundamental to the development of unilinear theories of cultural evolution, which suggested that human cultures could be ranked according to their technology and culture from most primitive to most civilised (e.g. see Bennett 2004). Although Romanticism constructed itself as a reaction against the scientific rationalisation of nature, it nonetheless contributed to the construction of the divide between nature and culture in expounding a notion of wild,

untouched and uninhabited 'wilderness', which was contrasted directly with industrialisation, civilisation and 'culture'. This series of modern dualisms are integrally bound up in the Euro-American notion of official heritage that developed over the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that ultimately found expression in the 1972 World Heritage Convention (see Chapter 3).

These dualisms expressed themselves most directly in relation to the distinct categories of natural and cultural heritage which were to be assessed using separate criteria in the World Heritage Convention. While the concept of cultural landscape was introduced in part to answer an Indigenous critique of the nature/culture dualism (Chapter 6), it could be argued that it actually continues to reinforce this dualism through its maintenance of the separation of 'cultural' and 'natural' landscapes—in other words, the 'really natural' landscapes are separated from the 'cultural' ones. Similarly, the concept of intangible heritage was developed by UNESCO to address criticism of the emphasis on 'monumental' heritage to the detriment of non-monumental heritage, including the forms of traditional cultural practices that exist in small-scale and Indigenous societies, and are integral to their sense of heritage and identity. The introduction of a new category of 'intangible' heritage nonetheless preserved the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter through its separation and opposition of the concepts of 'tangible' and 'intangible' heritage. While these concepts reflect changes that were brought about in response to an Indigenous, non-Western or minority critique of the concept of universal heritage, they did not fundamentally transform the Cartesian dualisms that underpinned it, but simply introduced a new series of concepts that could be accommodated by its overarching 'modern' perspective. I've suggested that it was forced to do this to maintain its illusion of universality. We might recall Mary Douglas's (1966) work on categorisation (Chapter 2) and her description of the way in which typological systems have two options when faced with examples which are ambiguous and fall between existing categories, either to make them disappear through rendering them mythological, or to reorganise the categories to accommodate them. The introduction of the concepts of cultural landscape and intangible heritage thus did not represent a fundamental overhaul of the system itself, but simply represented a reorganisation of the categories used to describe heritage as either a material or social phenomenon.

I want to pause at this point to consider what it might mean to take seriously the non-modern worldviews and perceptions of heritage that gave rise to the concept of cultural landscapes and intangible heritage as a way of reforming the concept of World Heritage itself. Having undertaken to broaden the recognised categories and definition of heritage to accommodate an Indigenous or non-modern worldview, what would 'World Heritage' look like if we took this process to its logical conclusion? I will draw closely on the work of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro on Amerindian ontological perspectivism to do this, as he has been one of the scholars to most eloquently advance this non-modern ontological perspective and its theoretical implications for understanding the relationships between people and the world. I should say at this point that I recognise a great deal of variability in the worldviews and philosophical systems of Indigenous people globally, and it is not my intention to characterise their

ways of being and thinking as homogenous or easily reducible to simple principles. Nonetheless, in speaking of Indigenous ontologies in general, and animism and totemism (Harvey 2005; see further discussion below) in particular, there are certain fundamental ways of thinking about 'being in the world' that emerge which are relevant to this discussion. So, in the same way that it is reductionist but often useful to speak about 'modern', Western worldviews and 'Euro-American' models of heritage, as I have done in several places in previous chapters, it is also helpful at times to gloss particular fundamental ways of thinking about being in the world as 'Indigenous ontological perspectivism'. I will explore this worldview in a more systematic way later in this chapter, but before I do, I want to make a short anecdotal detour to consider the path that has led to my posing these questions in this particular way, as it will help frame the discussion which follows.

Natural and cultural heritage: an artificial separation

I would like to draw on some anecdotal accounts that will not only help explain my approach in this section, but will also demonstrate the difficulties inherent in having to work with a heritage system that is premised on these modernist dualisms for Indigenous people, or those who hold what I have characterised as more 'continuous' traditions of heritage in a contemporary, globalised world. Since the mid-1990s, and particularly over the decade between 1996 and 2006, I have worked intensively on a range of cultural heritage projects with Indigenous Australians in a number of different urban and rural settings across the country, from the urban south-east to the remote north-western deserts, north-eastern rainforests and offshore islands. Over this time, I have been extremely lucky to work with a number of articulate and profoundly intelligent Aboriginal people who have taken the time to teach me about aspects of their culture and cosmology. My roles over this time have been diverse—I have worked variously as an independent researcher, a consultant to Aboriginal organisations and resource development companies, and as a government heritage manager and bureaucrat. In most cases, I have been employed as an archaeologist and engaged in the process of helping different projects comply with heritage planning and environmental impact legislation or guidelines. This sort of compliance work is very much the 'bread and butter' of contemporary heritage 'experts', and is a product of the intensive professionalisation and bureaucratisation of heritage that occurred over the course of the twentieth century, which I discussed in Chapter 3 (see also Smith 2006). This compliance activity would be familiar to a broad range of heritage specialists, including ecologists, architects, planners, engineers, public historians, interpretation specialists, geographers, biologists, and many others who are caught up in the apparatus of modern heritage management.

Much of the bureaucratic machinery of heritage in Australia (as it is elsewhere) is focused on the preservation and conservation of 'tangible' heritage (buildings, objects and landscapes), and for this reason the focus of most of my work was on 'archaeological' remains and their 'scientific' significance. And yet it became very quickly obvious to me, as it had to many of my colleagues, that most of what was of concern

to the Aboriginal people whose interests I was at least partially supposed to be representing, was happening on the margins of the archaeology. It was in the process of walking through and visiting country that was known from childhood but had now become largely inaccessible. It was in hunting and gathering wild food resources on the surveys, and in recounting the stories, both religious and secular, that animated the countryside and bound together members of the community, both those still living and those who had passed. Sometimes it was in firing and 'cleaning up' the country to regenerate plant and animal species; at other times it was in undertaking ceremonial activities that aimed to do the same. Stories about historical events were often interspersed with 'Dreaming' narratives (see further discussion in relation to the concept of *Tjukurpa* in Chapter 6) or bush lore. Time and again, with all of the different Indigenous people with whom I worked, a consistent theme emerged of the interconnection of culture and the natural world. As a result of this, heritage was considered to be one of a number of broader 'regimes of care' (cf. Haber 2009) within which humans were implicated in their relationships with the natural and cultural world.

It was clearly impossible to distinguish between 'natural' heritage conservation and the processes of recording 'cultural' heritage in which I was engaged; these consistently formed part of the same discussions, and impacts on one would be impossible to distinguish from the other. While many aspects of the histories, cultures and traditional practices differed across the various Aboriginal communities I worked with, this was one consistent, overarching issue that arose in almost every situation I was involved in. For Indigenous Australians at least, 'natural' and 'cultural' heritage were inseparable, and their separation in contemporary heritage management practices was not only false and misleading, but was profoundly disempowering and undermined their capacity to fulfil their obligations to 'country' (see further discussion of this concept below), which they perceived as central to their heritage.

I was able to explore some of these questions regarding the ways in which archaeological heritage was intimately intertwined with contemporary political, social and economic issues and with natural heritage concerns in a more considered way as part of my Ph.D. research with Indigenous Jaru language speakers from Halls Creek in north-western Australia (Harrison 2002; see also Harrison 2005). I worked with a group of former pastoral labourers and their families who had moved in the 1970s into the town of Halls Creek from an Aboriginal pastoral labour camp on a cattle-ranching property at Old Lamboo Pastoral Station. When I started working with them in 1997, they had recently lobbied the federal Indigenous Land Corporation to provide financial support to their representative body, the Ngunjawirri Aboriginal Corporation, to lease Lamboo Pastoral Station for their community to operate. At the same time, members of the group were involved in preparing an Indigenous land claim that covered much of the historic property. Their sense of identity as a group was very much caught up in a heritage that fused traditional patterns of life with the seasonal rhythms of cattle-ranching work. So while we were engaged in remote archaeological field survey for weeks or months at a time, there was constant concern over the management of the station, which had become run down. Wells and water sources were running dry, and cattle stocks were low. There was concern that the

younger men should be learning about the operation of the station from their fathers and uncles. The country's degradation was seen to be a direct result of the scattering of the families who had traditional custodianship for it. One of these custodians, Jimmy Button, noted in 1999:

> See these old people want their country back, so if me and my group of family from the Jaru tribe can get together, well, we'll soon have the country back … but see, we [are] all scattered everywhere. That's why I wanted [my brother] to come to a meeting, every fortnight or so, so we can get the place back that belongs to these old people. Doesn't matter who can manage the place, as long as we can get our family together.

The 'health' of the station was considered to be directly related to the well being of the country and its people. Another Jaru language speaker, Stan Brumby, explained the hybrid responsibilities of the Aboriginal pastoralists to their traditional country, saying the country made him 'sorry' because he was responsible for its management, but struggled against the bureaucratic machinery of government and the impacts of colonialism which had deprived him and his people access to it in the first place.

> How I got to get this country back, with the government? I bin get Lamboo. We gottem. That's Aboriginal station now. My country we got something, I got something bigger there, in that country, there. I don't want to losem, I got something there … That country make me sorry. Today. Today, make me sorry. I still thinking for my people, what bin happen langa my people. Today I think a lot. You know that people listen—while we standing, me and Jack [Ryder, his brother], we listen … I'm looking after that area … [1]

For Stan, it was important for him not only to ride horses through the country, to clear out the bores, and to stock the country with cattle, but also to fire the country so that wild flora and fauna are regenerated.

> Today, you got a book, bank book. Today. You got money in the bank now, today. You looking at television. You drive motorcar, today. Not me. I still walking foot. No motorcar. I can get motorcar, but my life is horse. I want to buy a horse, big mob horse, couple of horse. That's my life. I can fixem horse. Shoem up horse, breakem horse, that's my life. Me. Not motorcar. I can't fixem motorcar. I can't read and write. I never went to school, from start. I don't know what ABC. Gardiya [white person] callem ABC [laughs]. I want to take all this kid, takem out bush, teach [them] properly … story, word, country. Bushtucker, that's the good life for you, you never get sick … I light all the fire in my country. Burnim grass for goanna, and that frog, we callem *Gnangu*, *Gurnimganna*. Good beef [meat] that one. Cookem in the hot coals, that the good beef, sandfrog.

Understanding and revisiting the past was a way for this group of people to address contemporary issues about the running of the Lamboo lease, while reasserting their traditional and historical links to country. Country was understood dynamically as a concept that anchored past, present and future generations, and 'cultural' traditions concerned with maintaining the 'health' of the 'natural' environment were integrated with the contemporary responsibilities of pastoral land management. The basis of life and learning was in country, and in return for undertaking the activities that were necessary to maintain it, it would provide sustenance and knowledge. Working on the 'archaeological' project was as much a chance for them to fulfil their obligations to country as it was to record 'cultural' heritage sites (Harrison 2002, 2005).

These were not particularly unique observations, and they emerged as central issues over the period in which I subsequently worked for the Cultural Heritage Division of the former New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), during which time it instigated a number of different projects aimed at exploring the connections between natural and cultural heritage and their 'social' values to both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in New South Wales (English 2000, 2001; Byrne et al. 2001; Veale 2001; Rose 2003; Rose et al. 2003; Harrison 2004; Byrne and Nugent 2004; English and Gay 2005). The NPWS was unusual in employing a number of Aboriginal staff, who were engaged in a process of trying to bring about structural and philosophical change within the organisation to acknowledge Aboriginal people's worldviews and explore how they might be used to transform the work of the organisation and its dual responsibilities for natural and cultural heritage management (some of this work is discussed in English 2000; Rose 2003; Rose et al. 2003; Kijas 2005 and Harrison and Rose 2010). During my time working for NPWS over the period 2000–04, I was fortunate enough to work on heritage projects with a number of Aboriginal sites officers and various Aboriginal community members, a process which convinced me that there were elements of Indigenous Australian cosmologies that had important implications for understanding and approaching heritage in an integrated, relational way, which might be beneficial not only to Indigenous Australians themselves, but more generally in approaching the question of the role of heritage in a contemporary, globalised world.

Typical of this work was a project undertaken by my colleague Anthony English to explore the role of wild resources in the social and economic lives of Gumbaingirr Aboriginal people at Corindi, a small town on the mid-north coast of NSW, where the collection of wild resources plays an integral role in the community (English 2001). This project involved interviewing members of the community about their use of wild food resources and medicines, recording oral accounts and mapping the locations of favoured wild resource gathering places. What emerged from the study was the way in which Gumbaingirr people associate 'cultural' value with the health of the environment. Social health and 'well being' is linked explicitly with environmental health, and access to wild resources is thus directly connected with cultural heritage issues (see also Rowlands and Butler 2007 and Butler 2011 on heritage and well being). The act of collecting wild resources is undertaken within a complex web of social and cultural practices that, while contemporary, have clear links to the past.

In mapping and recording wild resource-use places, frequent reference was made to their association with old camping places and other 'archaeological' sites, as access to particular wild resources had often ceased as a result of interlinked historical processes. While the values associated with collecting wild resources are generally what we would consider to be 'economic' values, the values of collecting wild resources to this community are also 'social' and 'cultural' ones, and lie in the way in which country and people, land and culture, are united through these uses of the landscape. My own work, undertaken with Muruwari and Dhan-gadi Aboriginal people in north-western and north-eastern New South Wales over this period, similarly challenged the idea that individual archaeological 'sites' could somehow be divorced from the significance of the landscapes in which they existed, suggesting that the management of 'cultural' heritage sites needed to be considered within a broader context of 'natural' landscape management (Harrison 2004).

For Aboriginal Australians, attachments to landscape form the basis for familial connections between humans and non-humans. Anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose has written of the work she undertook on a contractual basis for the NPWS over the period in which I was employed there, which aimed to explore the widespread concept of 'kinship' with the natural world that was held by Aboriginal people throughout New South Wales, and its implication for the work of 'natural' heritage management (Harrison and Rose 2010; see also Rose 2003; Rose et al. 2003). The concept of 'kinship' for Aboriginal people in New South Wales describes the individual and collective familial relationships that people have with particular plant and/or animal species as part of an overall system that organises relationships between all sentient beings, both human and non-human, in the world. Anthropologists generally refer to this concept as 'totemism'. While there are many different variations on the form of totemism throughout Australia and the world, with much variation even in contemporary New South Wales (Rose et al. 2003), individual and group totemism is

> expressive of a worldview in which kinship is a major basis for all life, in which the natural world and humans are participants in life processes. Relationships are based on the kin-concepts of enduring solidarity, responsibility and care.
>
> *(Rose et al. 2003: 3)*

One of the implications of this worldview is that humans are connected by bonds of kinship with particular plant and animal species, and with the 'natural' environment more generally. This explains why it becomes impossible to disentangle the 'cultural' from the 'natural'. Rose uses the term 'ecological connectivity' to describe this relationship. This is a term that is more often used in natural heritage management to describe the open space that surrounds ecosystems and links together different ecotones, but here it is broadened to include the 'social' relationships between people and the natural world. Totemism or 'kinship' relationships are closely linked with animism in Australian Indigenous ontologies through the concept of 'country'. Kinship structures the system of connection between people, group and country; but country is not only a place or an object, but is also a subject (or 'agent', see Chapter 2) in its own

right. Indeed, it is perhaps the most important agent, as it is the source of the overarching principles that govern the world and the people in it. Elsewhere, Rose describes country as a 'nourishing terrain', 'a living entity with a yesterday, today and tomorrow, with a consciousness, and a will toward life. Because of this richness, country is home, and peace; nourishment for body, mind, and spirit; heart's ease' (Rose 1996: 7).

Rose (Harrison and Rose 2010) suggests that Indigenous Australian ontologies present a profound challenge to the idea of 'intangible' heritage and the definitions of heritage inherent in the World Heritage Convention more generally (see also Rose 2008, 2011). She begins by noting that, in their most abstract form, Indigenous ontologies destabilise Western anthropocentrism in its treatment of humans as pre-eminent over, or separate from, 'nature'. We have already noted the opposition between nature (the non-human) and culture (the human) as one of the underpinning dualisms or 'Great Divides' of modern, post-Enlightenment thought. She suggests that, within an Indigenous ontology in which 'culture' is everywhere, not only is there no boundary between nature and culture, there is no mind–matter binary. This contrasts with a modern Cartesian dualism, which sees the mind and body as separate, and the mind itself as non-physical. Rather than mind being a strictly human property, leaving matter and nature 'mind-less', she notes that Indigenous Australian ontologies hold consciousness and sentience to be widespread amongst humans and non-humans, some of which would be classed as 'living' in a modern, post-Enlightenment way of thinking, but many of which would not. To illustrate this point, she cites a former colleague of mine, Phil Sullivan, a Ngiyampaa man and NPWS Aboriginal Sites Officer. He explains:

> The 'natural' and 'cultural' heritage of National Parks is not separate. This is an artificial white-fella separation. They are still boxing the whole into sections, we need to integrate management into a holistic view of the landscape.
>
> *(Harrison and Rose 2010: 251)*

In saying this, she suggests that Phil and other Indigenous Australians challenge the idea that heritage meaning is made only by humans. Indigenous ontologies challenge the tangible–intangible dualism that is fundamental to the definition of intangible heritage. Within this binary structure, she suggests that tangible matter is thought to be made meaningful by being brought into a world of intangible meanings that are the property of human culture and experience. In contrast, she suggests that Indigenous ontologies propose a philosophy of 'becoming', in which life and place combine to bind time and living beings into generations of continuities in particular places (Harrison and Rose 2010: 250). These generations are not only human; they also involve particular plants and animals, objects, and, indeed, whole ecosystems. These are associated by webs of connection that are not randomly patterned, but are structured by principles of kinship and established as part of the 'Law' or 'Dreaming'.

She goes on to quote another Ngiyampaa man, Paul Gordon, who explains the implication of this kinship system for the ways in which land management bureaucracies go about managing and protecting endangered plant and animal species. He uses the

term 'meat' in place of 'totem' to refer to the 'flesh' that one 'is' as a result of being a member of a multi-species kin group. He notes:

> Some animals can't just be classified as fauna. Pademelon [a small, kangaroo-like marsupial] is my meat. They are my people, my relations … If National Parks has something going with pademelons, they should talk with us—it's our family.
> *(Harrison and Rose 2010: 252)*

The implication of this familial relationship with pademelons is that management decisions made with regard to pademelons will also affect Paul Gordon and other Ngiyampaa people whom pademelons recognise as kin; similarly, the connection between pademelons and other plant and animal species may mean that decisions made with regard to their management might also affect other entities that recognise them as kin. This connection between all things (remembering that some 'things' that might not be classed as 'living' in Western philosophies might be subjects in their own right, defined as such by their animation with spirit and ability to act on other 'persons') makes operating within a system of heritage management that separates natural and cultural heritage not only incredibly frustrating, but ultimately impossible for Indigenous Australians.

Indigenous ontological pespectivism and dialogical models of heritage

Eduardo Viveiros de Castro is one of a series of scholars whose work has been part of a broader 'ontological turn' (see discussion in Alberti and Bray 2009), which is at least partially related to the widespread discussion of the symmetrical or non-hierarchical approaches of actor–network theory and the recent interest in object-oriented ontologies in philosophy and the social sciences (Harman 2002; Olsen 2010; Bryant et al. 2011). He is one of many scholars who are involved in presenting Indigenous ontologies as serious alternatives to Western philosophies in understanding the nature of 'being in the world', as significant philosophical statements that might be the source for critical readings of modern, Western philosophies in their own right. His work on the question of subjects and objects in Amerindian ontology is directly relevant to this discussion of the implications for heritage of taking Indigenous ontologies seriously, and for this reason I want to work through it in some detail here, focusing principally on his article 'Exchanging perspectives: the transformation of objects into subjects in Amerindian ontologies' (Viveiros de Castro 2004). In particular, I want to focus on what he has to say about the various Western, modern mind/matter, nature/culture and human/non-human dualisms to help develop an alternative, dialogical model of heritage that emerges from the 'connectivity ontology' (see below) of Indigenous ontological perspectivism. Note that there are certain differences between Indigenous Australian and Amerindian worldviews (and, similarly, an enormous set of differences between these and actor–network theory and other symmetrical models of culture), which I do not intend to deny here, but there are

also clear similarities that make their consideration together worthwhile in pursuing this goal. The point in this section is to consider the possibility that the world is patterned in quite different ways from those we have come to believe as a result of our reliance on Western dualisms, and to explore the ways in which alternative worldviews open up creative possibilities for thinking about heritage differently.

Viveiros de Castro (2004) begins by explaining that a fundamental Amerindian notion (as in Indigenous Australian worldviews) is an original state of non-differentiation between humans and non-humans, in which the common condition was one of humanity, rather than the other way around. Animals and other non-human agents are thus 'ex-humans', and for various reasons have come to acquire a bestial (or vegetable) form that conceals a common, human, socio-cultural core. Amerindian mythologies are thus concerned with the process by which animals (and other non-human agents) came to distinguish themselves from their original state of humanity—how spirits of the original jaguar-persons who had the bodies of humans, for example, came to inhabit the bodies of jaguars. The implication of this is that relationships between humans and non-humans come to be viewed as what we might otherwise term 'social' relations. These relationships are similar to the totemic or 'kinship' relationships with the natural world amongst Aboriginal people in New South Wales, discussed above. In Viveiros de Castro's example, cultivated plants might be conceived as blood relations of the women who tend them, game animals might be approached as relatives by marriage, and so on. Having once been people, non-humans continue to exist as people behind their everyday corporeal facade, thus reality is perceived from distinct points of view that are the product of the material perspective of the body.

> Animals see their food as human food (jaguars see blood as manioc beer, vultures see the maggots in rotting meat as grilled fish); they see their bodily attributes (fur, feathers, claws, beaks) as bodily decorations or cultural instruments, they see their social system as organized in the same way as human institutions are.
>
> *(Viveiros de Castro 2004: 466)*

Viveiros de Castro refers to this as a 'multi-naturalist', as opposed to a 'multi-culturalist' ontology.

> Where the latter are founded on the mutually implied unity of nature and multiplicity of cultures—the former guaranteed by the objective universality of body and substance, the latter generated by the subjective particularity of spirit and meaning—the Amerindian conception presumes a spiritual unity and a corporeal diversity … culture or the subject is the form of the universal, while nature or the object is the form of the particular.
>
> *(Viveiros de Castro 2004: 466)*

This derives from an animist perception of the spirit as the universal quality that is held in common by all 'animate' things (see also Harvey 2005). It follows that 'reflexive selfhood, not material objectivity, is the potential common ground of all

being' (Viveiros de Castro 2004: 467). It is the perspective or point of view that transforms the object into subject and gives it 'agency', as the perspective is a product of an embodied way of 'being in the world'. Differences are thus bodily (perspectival) differences, not 'cultural' ones. Animals perceive the world in the same way as humans, and in this sense we all share the same 'culture'; what varies on account of their different ontological state of being is the *world* that animals inhabit (2004: 472).

Viveiros de Castro goes on to explore the implications of this perspectivist ontology for understanding the relationship between artefacts and humans, drawing on shamanism, or the intentional crossing of ontological boundaries, as an example. While animism holds that non-humans are conscious subjects, they are not naturally perceived as such in everyday life, and it is necessary to *personify* them in order to know how to perceive them as persons. Personhood is defined as the capacity to occupy a particular point of view or perspective. This is why shamen, as humans who are able to cross ontological boundaries, hold such an important position of knowledge—they hold the power to assume different ways of *being*, which allow them to conceptualise and communicate with other animate object-persons as if they were human subjects. However, personhood is not a given, and is not evenly distributed throughout the world. Thus, in some cases, artefacts might be 'object-persons' or they might equally exist as 'material embodiments of nonmaterial intentionality' (2004: 471). Personhood, or 'perspectivity' is a matter of context and degree, and not an absolute (2004: 470).

The reader may feel that we have now moved a long way from the World Heritage Convention, and be wondering what the relevance of animism and ontological perspectivism might be to understanding heritage in the contemporary, globalised world. The first thing to note is that this is not simply a 'theory', but a worldview that insists on being treated seriously. To do so means to acknowledge it on equal terms with other ways of conceptualising being in the world. In this sense, it provides a profound challenge to the idea of Cartesian dualisms as universal, and thus to the modern notions that underpin the universal values of World Heritage. While this might be reason enough to acknowledge Indigenous ontological perspectivism as an important counter to the World Heritage Convention's universalism, it also suggests an alternative way of thinking about the relationship between 'nature' and 'culture', which has significant implications in shifting the focus of heritage to the active relationships between humans and non-humans, none of which are necessarily privileged as the origin of meaning making, and all of whom are collectively involved in this 'dialogue' in different ways. We might also think here of the 'flat', symmetrical models of social and material relations that characterise actor–network theory, and the heterogeneous groupings of humans and non-humans of assemblage theory, as similarly describing alternative models of 'social' collectives, which include human and non-human agents or a 'federation' of actants, in which all material and non-material things are participants, which have been proposed as alternatives to tradition Cartesian dualisms (see Chapter 2). This way of thinking about being in the world has also been described as a 'connectivity ontology', a concept that draws on traditions from the humanities, ecology, philosophy and political theory, which suggests that

> being is inherently, inescapably, and necessarily relational. An ontology of connectivity entails mutual causality: organism and environment modify each other. Relations between organism and environment are recursive, meaning that 'events continually enter into, become entangled with, and then re-enter the universe they describe'.
>
> *(Rose and Robin 2004)*

This connectivity ontology finds resonance in a range of other contemporary thinking. For example, Karen Barad (2007) has shown how quantum physics provides the basis for models of reality in which matter and meaning are fundamentally entangled. Her theory of agential realism suggests that the world is composed of phenomena that are natural–cultural processes, which arise as the result of 'intra-acting' agencies of humans and non-humans. New models of the fundamental connectivity of natural and cultural phenomena, which suggest that both people and 'things' are entangled and equally involved as agents in their production, are emerging from a number of different disciplines, including science studies, ecology and the humanities. Ontological perspectivism and its accompanying questioning of Cartesian dualisms thus provides us with some interesting angles from which to explore new relational models of heritage that have the potential to fundamentally challenge the underlying philosophies of the World Heritage Convention, rather than simply reorganising its existing principles to take account of new categories, as has previously been the case.

It is impossible to rethink the social or 'cultural' aspects of heritage without rethinking the natural. So what are the implications of Indigenous ontological perspectivism or a connectivity ontology for remodelling our ways of thinking about a 'universal' notion of heritage? One point that emerged from the review of Viveiros de Castro's work was the focus on perspective or 'relationality' as the basis for communication or dialogue. His articulation of Amerindian multinaturalism posits a common 'culture' as universal, and 'being' as the seat of difference. Drawing on similar concepts, Deborah Bird Rose suggests that Australian Indigenous ontologies propose that heritage is 'dialogical' (Harrison and Rose 2010: 264)—it is produced as part of a conversation between multiple subjects, some of whom might be human, but many others not. I have already described heritage as a process and a particular set of relationships with the past in the present (Chapter 2). This pushes the definition further by suggesting that the production of heritage emerges from the relationship between people, 'things' and their environments as part of a dialogue or collaborative process of keeping the past alive in the present.

> A dialogical concept of heritage suggests that heritage making is interactive—meaningfulness arises out of encounter and dialogue among multiple subjects, some of whom are human. Place (construed interactively) may also be a subject in its own right … Communication runs through living systems, including land and people. The processes and practices of keeping the past alive in the present, like the practice and processes of keeping the future alive in the present, is collaborative.
>
> *(Harrison and Rose 2010: 264-5)*

This idea of heritage as a relational dialogue between multiple subjects, positioned according to their particular embodied perspective, none of which is necessarily wholly privileged in dictating the terms of the conversation or in controlling the meanings attributed to the discussion, resonates harmoniously with a view of 'social' relations as distributed amongst human and non-human collectives and a broader 'connectivity ontology'.

Rose also notes the way in which such a view profoundly challenges what I have characterised as the 'discursive turn' in heritage studies.

> indigenous ontologies push us to rethink, and to move outside of, the tangible–intangible boundary. Rather than imagining a process by which human meaning makers engage in heritage practices by making meanings in or through physical realities, we are rather pushed to imagine that humans and other sentient beings bind time collaboratively. Heritage is thus both tangible and intangible, embodied, material, and equally mindful and emergent … Defining heritage modestly as the processes and practices of keeping the past alive in the present, an indigenous perspective shifts the focus to local multi-species relationships that bind time, place and generations.
>
> *(Harrison and Rose 2010: 265)*

This criticism might be broadened to what I have suggested is the present dominance of questions of the politics of representation within the interdisciplinary field of critical heritage studies (Chapter 5) and within interdisciplinary museum studies (Harrison in press a). Heritage is not a world of images and texts, but a fundamental quality of experience of the material (and hence, social) world (cf. Olsen 2010). Heritage is not the inscription of meaning onto blank objects, places and practices that are produced in this process, but instead is produced as a result of the material and social possibilities, or 'affordances', of collectives of human and non-human agents, material and non-material entities, in the world. It is not primarily an intellectual endeavour, something that exists only in the human mind, but is one that emerges from the *dialogue*, or practices of people and things.

Dialogical heritage, environmental ethics and sustainability

A dialogical model of heritage pushes us to consider the relationship between heritage and other social, political and environmental issues, as it does not insist on seeing these various fields as separate, arguing instead that they are interconnected in fundamental and complex ways. In particular, it foregrounds issues of sustainability and the role of 'cultural' heritage conservation as part of a broader environmental agenda (see also Dibley 2011; Cameron 2010, 2011a, 2011b on the relationship between museums and climate change). Importantly, in the same way that I have argued that 'cultural' heritage issues are connected with 'natural' heritage concerns, 'the environment' comes to be seen as a 'social' issue as much as it does a 'natural' one. I want to explore briefly here some of the ways in which this opens up debates around the

environment, global warming and 'natural' heritage conservation in challenging and potentially important new ways, and also to consider the question of ethics that is invoked by this discussion.

We live in an era in which 'environmental concerns' relating to anthropogenic activity dominate the media. Issues as diverse as climate change, land and soil degradation, species extinction, pollution, over-population and dwindling energy resources influence the lives of every human (and non-human) on the planet. A connectivity ontology implies not only connection between individual humans and non-humans, but also a level of connection that includes all of them as a natural-cultural assemblage. A flat notion of the social implies that all 'being' is interactive, and that all actors are simultaneously produced by other actors. Hence any damage to part of the world assemblage also damages other parts of it. This forces us to broaden the traditional scope of notions of the economic and political sphere to develop a more inclusive sense of ethics that acknowledges not only the universal rights of humans, but also those of non-humans—a category in which I include animals, plants, objects, places and practices—who must also be seen as having rights, which we have obligations to attempt to uphold. While it may not yet be clear what those rights precisely are, as we are not always attuned to communicating with these other non-humans as actors in their own right, it nonetheless forces us to consider how rights and interests in one sphere relate to, and interact with, rights and interests in another.

Bruno Latour (2004) argues that the concept of 'nature', not understood as a Cartesian opposite to culture or a specific domain that is used by way of contrast to construct another, but instead as a collective notion involving the whole community of humans and non-humans in their varied states of 'being' in the world, provides the basis for assembling a political order that breaks down our modern division of 'nature' and 'society'. He develops a notion of political ecology that sees 'nature' not as external, but as the basis for defining a multinaturalist 'social' collective composed of a number of insistent realities, rather than a multiplicity of idealised political and social models. This notion of multinaturalism (as opposed to multiculturalism) was similarly developed in Viveiros de Castro's (2004) work, discussed above as an alternative to the Cartesian nature/culture and mind/matter dualisms in which multiple lifeworlds or states of being are acknowledged in preference to a single state of being and multiple cultural 'takes' on it. The boundaries that are introduced in this concept between lived realities or worldviews require the introduction of a diplomat, who stands in the same position as Viveiros de Castro's shaman, to uphold the necessity of negotiation across worlds, which is required to maintain the unity of the collectives. Latour notes:

> To give new meaning to political ecology, we need to abandon Science in favour of the sciences conceived of ways of socializing non-humans and we have to abandon … politics … for politics defined by the good common world … [which is] the provisional result of the progressive unification of external realities.
>
> *(Latour 2004: 235–9)*

Natural heritage issues thus become cultural heritage ones, and the natural sciences become a way of communicating across different states of being to address issues of common concern. 'Environmental problems' are thus expanded and perceived simultaneously as natural and social issues requiring communication across multiple species and multiple states of being. Similarly, 'social problems' become 'environmental' ones. Such a position of multinaturalism also dismisses the questions that arise in relation to universal and relative values and multiculturalism raised in Chapter 7, as the question of the relativity of cultures disappears when the notion of an absolute 'nature' is removed. The diversity of 'culture', understood as multiple embodied ways of being, comes to be the rule rather than the exception, and is no longer something that has to be either 'worked at' or 'resisted'.

An ontology of connectivity is thus a call for action that empowers parts of the natural–cultural collective to influence the whole. It also requires an acknowledgement of our own vulnerability to changes that affect other parts of the collective. But this does not mean we are unable to act and that all things must be instinctively conserved 'just in case'. This is rather the situation I have argued we have found ourselves in with regard to the late-modern crisis of the accumulation of memory (Chapter 8) as a result of contemporary conservation policies, in which more and more objects, places and practices are listed and conserved, and little attention is given to whether we still agree with the cumulative impact of our past decisions to do so. Instead, connectivity ontologies and their accompanying dialogical model of heritage encourage us to take *action* and to consider the circumstances of each issue or problem on a case-by-case basis. As Rose argues, 'connectivity ethics are open, uncertain, attentive, participatory, contingent. One is called upon to act, to engage in the dramas of call-and-response, and to do so on the basis of that which presents itself in the course of life' (2011: 143). If certain objects, places and practices become important at particular times and in particular places for the maintenance of the past in the present, it follows that they may, like humans, come and go, live and die, pass from one state to another. This does not mean we should take an indiscriminate attitude to the conservation of things from the past for the future, but rather that we should develop more discerning and sustainable policies that consider heritage objects, places and practices as part of a range of actors in our environment, which we nurture and which in turn nurture us; that we recognise change as equally important as stasis. The notion of individual humans as part of a greater collective living system recognises the need for plural and diverse forms of knowledge and new modes of decision-making with which to take account of them (see further discussion in relation to dialogical democracy below).

Sustainability can be defined as the capacity to endure. A connectivity ontology and dialogical model of heritage helps us to characterise sustainability as an issue that is not simply concerned with the maintenance of human quality of life. The concept of sustainability has been important in broadening the 'environmental' field to consider a wider range of economic, social, political, ecological and 'cultural' issues. An ontology of connectivity forces us to broaden this field even further to include not only the endurance of our own species, but also the endurance of a range of other

non-human actors. In relation to heritage, it forces us to question not only the capacities of various material heritages to persist, but also whether the pasts we are actively creating in the present could, or should, endure into the future.

Once again, we return to the relationship of forgetting to remembering, and the need actively to prune and cultivate heritage rather than to allow it to accumulate randomly. In thinking about this issue, I was reminded of a story I read recently in the newspaper on a cryogenic storage facility in Michigan, in which pet owners were paying to have their dead pets stored in cryostasis in the hope that some means of bringing them back to life might be found in the future. Thinking sustainably in relation to heritage not only means thinking about the connections between heritage and other environmental, social, economic and political issues, but also thinking sensibly about the pasts we produce in the present for the future. We should not think of heritage like a cryogenic freezer, in which we indiscriminately store things that we once valued but that have subsequently become redundant; instead, we should be active in cultivating and pruning the pasts we produce in the light of our obligations to the assemblage of actors with whom we share a common world in the present. This notion of obligation opens up the more specific question of our ethical obligations and responsibilities *to* heritage. What responsibilities and obligations arise from a consideration of heritage as something that is produced in the relationship between a series of human and non-human actors, who work together to keep the past alive in the present and to collectively build a common world? Such questions require urgent consideration in rethinking the sustainability and ethical practice of heritage-making in the contemporary world (Dibley 2011; also see Meskell 2010: 854 on the notion of obligations to heritage).

Museums, dialogical heritage and the ethical weight of 'things'

While I have been discussing heritage in broad terms, it seems apposite to consider the implications of this dialogical model of heritage to museum objects in particular, which, as 'inert' objects, might seem somewhat abstract from these broadly inter-species-based 'environmental' issues and the discussion of the nature/culture divide. I would like to frame this discussion by posing two questions that arose as part of an Advanced Seminar I co-organised at the School of Advanced Research in 2010 (see Harrison et al. in press). What are the curatorial responsibilities that emerge from a serious consideration of Indigenous ontologies, in which museum pieces might be considered to be 'object-persons'? And what are the implications of a dialogical model of heritage and an increased sensitivity to the 'ontology of things' (Olsen 2010), or to the alternative ways of 'being' implied by a flat notion of a social/material collective involving humans and non-humans, to contemporary museum practices more broadly? I consider the implications for the management of Indigenous museum objects first, then broaden the discussion out to consider the issues for museums and heritage more generally.

While debates between Indigenous peoples (and their supporters) and museums have often been perceived to centre on repatriation and issues of ownership (see Chapter 5),

these debates have more often been about the need to fundamentally reform curatorial practice in relation to things held in museum collections (Isaac 2009; this section after Harrison in press a). Thus a major part of the Indigenous critique of museum practice has involved a critique of the categorisation, management and storage of things in ways that are not only foreign to Indigenous ontologies, but that are also potentially offensive, or even dangerous (Henry 2004; Sully 2007) from the perspective of museum pieces as object-persons. Recently, museums have begun to acknowledge Indigenous categories and curatorial practices as equal forms of expertise with those of museum curators (Chaat Smith 2008; Chavez Lamar 2008; Singer 2008). In many instances, Indigenous viewpoints about objects have been given their own space in museum catalogues and databases (see chapters in Sleeper-Smith 2009). However, while this is obviously an important step in acknowledging Indigenous knowledge-practices and forms of expertise, and emphasises the museum itself as a space for reconciliation and social reform (Kelly and Gordon 2002; Mpumlwana et al. 2002; Allen and Hamby 2011), this does not necessarily reform the system itself, as the original categories and underlying values on which they rest often remain in place. This is directly analogous to the situation with the introduction of cultural landscapes and intangible heritage as categories of World Heritage, which, while introduced as a concession to non-modern worldviews, nonetheless have simply maintained the Cartesian dualisms and underpinning philosophies of the Convention.

So, while the critique of museums and the incorporation of Indigenous categories within them have emerged as part of a project of reforming these categories, one could argue that it is necessary to go further in drawing attention to the very nature of the categories themselves and the forms of authority on which they draw, and which they subsequently reproduce. Part of this process involves an acknowledgement that classification and ordering can only ever be partially realised (cf. Law 1994), and that any attempt to categorise will always produce anomalies (Douglas 1966). By revealing the process of categorisation to be partial and incomplete, we undermine the universalising mission of the museum (Bennett 1995), and draw attention to the ways in which the categories they employ are not 'natural', but are actively formed out of particular systems of value. Such an approach contains the potential for a radical reconceptualisation of objects in museum collections and their relationships with people. For example, we might ask what would happen if we were to consider objects in museums as 'kin', as many Indigenous people do (see Hays-Gilpin and Lomatewama in press)? How would this transform curatorial practices and modes of ordering and classification within the museum, and in heritage practice more generally?

One of the key outcomes of the Advanced Seminar was a consideration of the ways in which a sense of curatorial responsibility arises from the 'weight' of things in museums (Harrison et al. in press). In making reference to the 'weight' of things, we mean not only the physical bulk of collections, which occupy vast storage facilities behind the scenes of museums around the world, but also their political and affective 'weight'. In speaking of the affective weight of things in museums, we have in mind the charismatic (Wingfield 2010) or enchanting (Gell 1998; Harrison 2006) qualities of objects, their ability to engage the senses (Edwards et al. 2006: 12), as well as their

ability to act in ways that are both integral to, and generative of, human behavior, or even in ways that are person-like (either in conjunction with, or independently of, persons themselves; Jones and Cloke 2008; Olsen 2010). Things also have a political weight, in the sense in which they come to represent or stand in for various imperial and colonial processes that underlie their presence in museum collections. In addition to reminding us of varied imperial and colonial histories, things speak to the contemporary political and ethical issues of ownership of culture and its products.

The notion of 'curatorial responsibility' carries within it two concepts—'care' and 'responsibility' (see Harrison in press a). It implies certain responsibilities or obligations to things themselves, which may be separate from our obligations to those individuals and groups (Indigenous or otherwise) outside the museum who relate to these things in some way (for example, as descent communities). If we are to assume less hierarchical models of social interactions and dialogical concepts of heritage, in which objects can behave in ways that are 'person-like', should they also be treated as 'persons'? What would it mean to open a dialogue with museum objects and allow them to 'speak' for themselves?

As truth claims, which integrate radically different concepts of time and space and which demand to be taken seriously, connectivity ontologies are beginning to have a renewed impact on heritage practice in the integration of Indigenous and Western conservation practices (Sully 2007; see Hays-Gilpin and Lomatewama in press; Knowles in press). A model of heritage as emplaced, creative production, involving a number of human and non-human agents, shifts our focus to the regenerative aspects of heritage production. Heritage emerges not as a process concerned with the past and present, but a future-oriented, emergent, contingent and creative endeavour. It is not a process of meaning-making that exists only in the human mind, but one in which multiple actors, both humans and non-humans, are equally implicated in complex processes that bind them across time and space (Harrison and Rose 2010). It becomes a symmetrical process, in which curation involves not only protecting an object, place or practice for future generations of people, but also protecting people for future generations of an object, place or practice (and indeed, for past generations of both). In seeing heritage not as a discourse or process of symbolic meaning-making, but as an emergent property of the relationship between humans and non-humans, in which the creative actions of 'things' are recognised as existing in a mixed or shared relationship of symmetry with humans, the objects that form part of museum (and heritage) collections take on new forms of significance and agency in their ongoing, creative relationships with humans in the present. In part, they draw on their power as objects from the past, but similarly, they exist as part of a meshwork of relationships (both material and social) in the present. The challenge for museums, and the process of heritage management more generally, thus becomes one of finding ways of engaging creatively with these objects so as to facilitate their ongoing relationships with people and the other objects around them in the future. This means opening up a dialogue with heritage objects, places and practices as actors in their own right, rather than perceiving them merely as props that stand in for human cultures from the past, in the present.

Dialogical democracy: dialogical heritage and dialogical decision-making processes

A dialogical model of heritage also pushes us to consider more dialogical models of decision-making in the identification, listing and management of heritage. As a result of the professionalisation and bureaucratisation of heritage practice over the course of the twentieth century (see Chapter 3), 'ordinary' laypersons and communities have been increasingly locked out of involvement in decisions about what heritage to conserve and how to conserve it (Carman 2005; Smith and Waterton 2009b). Smith (2006) has described the ways in which a set of bureaucratic knowledge/power effects employed by heritage 'experts' has worked to alienate the public from an involvement in heritage, whilst simultaneously producing the expertise on which their privilege is established. However, a notion of heritage as inherently dialogical opens up the possibility of more dialogical models of heritage decision-making processes. Drawing on Michel Callon et al.'s *Acting in an Uncertain World: An Essay of Technical Democracy* (2011), which considers controversies that arise as a result of uncertainties in the science and technology arena, I refer to this as a notion of 'dialogical democracy'. I suggest these concepts of dialogical decision-making and dialogical democracy flow directly from a notion of heritage as dialogical.

Callon et al. (2011) show how 'hybrid forums', in which experts, non-experts, ordinary citizens and politicians come together, can help undermine the antagonistic bureaucratic divide between laypersons and experts. They suggest two poles along which laypersons are traditionally isolated from the production of knowledge and the decision-making processes based on that knowledge. The first pole concerns the division between specialists and laypersons, while the second concerns the separation between ordinary citizens and those who are elected to represent them (Callon et al. 2011: 35). We might think of these dualisms as another set of Cartesian coordinates, which are challenged by dialogical thinking and ontologies of connectivity. Hybrid forums, which are generally formed in the space of uncertainty that arises from the discovery of a new controversy (in the science and technology field, for example, the imminent failure of a nuclear reactor), see these asymmetries removed, as groups and individuals with a direct interest in the issue at hand are forced together with experts and politicians to come to an informed decision about how to act. Hybrid forums are defined as

> open spaces where groups can come together to discuss technical options involving the collective, hybrid because the groups involved and the spokespersons claiming to represent them are heterogeneous, including experts, politicians, technicians, and laypersons who consider themselves involved.
>
> *(Callon et al. 2011: 18)*

These might also be considered 'hybrid' forums because they simultaneously address themselves to questions and problems at a variety of scales and from a wide range of different domains, from ethics and economics to applied and theoretical technical knowledge. Importantly, mirroring issues we have considered in relation to breaking down the nature/culture divide, these forums simultaneously address themselves

to technical, political, environmental and social issues, opening up a space for a consideration of the relationships between these various fields.

One of the most powerful aspects of this work on hybrid forums is the way in which controversy comes to be perceived not as a 'social' or 'political' problem to be managed, but as a mode of exploration in its own right, which has the potential to generate important new insights and forms of knowledge on issues of critical concern to the various actors involved. They are not consultative forums that are simply concerned with gaining 'consent' (see Greer et al. 2002 for a similar clarification regarding the difference between reactive or 'consent-based' research and 'community-based' research in archaeology), but are involved in the co-production of new knowledge and new ways of seeing, thinking and acting. Because such hybrid forums are generally produced spontaneously as a result of conflict and uncertainty, it is difficult to formalise them. However, Callon et al. suggest several ways in which the dialogic procedures of such forums can be characterised and hence utilised more broadly in decision-making processes. They suggest three criteria, each with two subcriteria, which allow for an assessment of the depth of dialogue which different forms of hybrid forum facilitate—the *intensity* of dialogism (how early laypersons are involved in the exploration of possible worlds and the degree of intensity of concern for the composition of the collective); the *openness* of dialogism (the degree of diversity of groups consulted/degree of independence *vis-á-vis* established action groups and degree of control of representativeness of spokespersons of groups involved in the debate); and the *quality* of dialogism (degree of seriousness of voice and degree of openness of voice) (Callon et al. 2011: 160). In addition, they add three criteria to evaluate the implementation of procedures—the equality and conditions of access to debates, the transparency and traceability of debates and the clarity of the rules organising debates (Callon et al. 2011: 163). They use these criteria to assess a number of different forms of hybrid forum, including 'focus' or discussion groups, public inquiries, consensus conferences and citizens' panels. In assessing these varied forms of hybrid forum against their criteria, they argue that no single form is likely to produce more dialogically democratic outcomes, suggesting instead the need for constant reflection and debate on the procedures, their implementation and outcomes (Callon et al. 2011: 188).

Given the role that the question of minority representation has played within heritage and critical heritage studies more generally (see Chapters 5 and 7), it seems important to consider how the representation of minorities is addressed within such hybrid forums. The authors show how hybrid forums not only assist in the question of the representation of minorities because they work to close the gap between the represented and the concerned layperson, but also constitute arenas for the emergence of new identities. They note three particular lessons from their cases studies with regard to the representation of emergent minorities, which can be summarised as follows:

1 minorities are better represented when their spokespersons are involved in discussion from the outset and in a continuous and productive way;
2 interested groups and individuals have an important role to play in generating their own forms of knowledge which can contribute to specialist knowledge, and

this 'rebalancing' of interests in hybrid forums better serves the security of the representation of emergent minorities; and

3 general principles need to be relativized in order to deal with specific issues which are always necessarily local and singular so that the specificities of interests, concerns and competences of individual groups (including minorities) might be appropriately considered in each case.

(Callon et al. 2011: 252–3)

These general principles, and the notion of the hybrid forum, form the basis for modelling more dialogical procedures in a heritage arena, in relation to specific debates and controversies as well as more general procedures relating to the identification, listing and management of heritage in contemporary society. We might imagine circumstances in which decisions over the listing of endangered heritage sites, for example, might be made by hybrid forums that include not only experts and bureaucrats, as is often the case, but also those who would be directly affected by the conservation and/or loss of the site in question. This would allow those with an interest in the conservation of the site to speak directly with those who are involved in assessing the site, and those who make the decisions about its future. This would not simply involve community consultation or the acceptance of community submissions by expert panels, but would directly involve interested laypersons in negotiated decision-making processes. Similarly, States Parties might also form hybrid forums for the drawing up of tentative lists, and UNESCO might involve interested groups directly in their own decision-making processes regarding nominations to the World Heritage List. Decisions might be made on site in the places under discussion, so that these places might also form part of the dialogue and communicate for themselves.

The hybrid forum provides a new set of instruments for heritage decision-making, based on a model of heritage as inherently dialogical, and has important implications for the future of heritage as more open, inclusive, representative and creative. It also has the potential to overcome traditional problems in the production of static identities through heritage by providing opportunities for the continuous expression of changing and emerging identities. The various regimes and modalities of discussion outlined above have the potential to reorganise relationships between experts, politicians, bureaucrats and laypersons, which, rather than suppressing conflicts, make use of the overflows and controversies that emerge as a result of conflict and uncertainties over heritage in productive and innovative ways. Hybrid forums can structure and help foster collaborative and consultative research processes and the co-production of knowledge by experts and interested stakeholders. Dialogical heritage must be dialogically democratic, and the hybrid forum provides an important model for increasing democracy through dialogical decision-making processes.

Conclusion

While I have suggested that one of the major sources of transformation in relation to the definitions and models for the management of global heritage has developed as a

result of the expansion of the categories of heritage in relation to the World Heritage Convention in the light of its claims to represent a universal set of categories of heritage, in this chapter I have explored what it might mean to take such challenges to their logical conclusion in breaking down the Cartesian dualisms and modern philosophies on which the Convention rests. Drawing on Australian and Amerindian Indigenous ontological perspectives and a broad ontology of connectivity, I have suggested that a dialogical model of heritage as relational and emergent in the connection between people, objects, places and practices not only better describes the ways in which most people think about and experience heritage as a quality of lived experience in the contemporary world, but also pushes us to consider the relationship between heritage and other social, political and environmental issues. In particular, it foregrounds issues of sustainability and the role of 'cultural' heritage conservation as part of a broader environmental agenda. Importantly, the environment becomes a 'social' issue as much as it does a 'natural' one. This opens up debates around the environment, global warming and 'natural' heritage conservation, in challenging and potentially important new ways. Thinking of heritage not as a set of tangible 'things', nor as intangible expressions and practices, but instead as relational and emergent in the dialogue between people, objects, places and practices also has implications for how we think about and manage heritage in the future. It implies notions of obligation, responsibility, care, curation and ethics, but also suggests that conservation is as much a 'social' process as it is a physical or technical one—that conservation of an object, place or practice for future generations of people also requires a symmetrical consideration of the conservation of people for a future generation of objects, places or practices of heritage. A dialogical model of heritage based on an ontology of connectivity not only flattens the hierarchies of relationships involved amongst the various heterogeneous actors, human and non-human, that bind time and place to keep the past alive in the present, but also suggests important dialogical models of heritage decision-making in hybrid forums, which break down the conventional barriers between experts, politicians, bureaucrats and interested laypersons or stakeholders. Dialogical models of heritage provide an important basis for thinking productively and actively about heritage in the future.