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Mobilizing on the Extreme Right

Germany, Italy, and the United States

Manuela Caiani,
Donatella della Porta,
and Claudius Wagemann

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To all the victims of racism

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Abbreviations

ADL	Anti-Defamation League (USA)
AN	National Alliance (<i>Alleanza Nazionale</i>)
BBS	Bulletin Board Systems
BVS	<i>Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz</i>
CD	Christian Democratic Union, Germany
Cinefogo	Civil Society and New Forms of Governance
CSU	Christian Social Union of Bavaria
CV	<i>Camerata Virtuale</i>
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (USA)
DVU	German People's Union (<i>Deutsche Volks-Union</i>)
EUMC	European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
FN	<i>Forza Nuova</i>
G8	the Group of Eight
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRC	Internet Relay Chat
JN	Young National Democrats (<i>Junge Nationaldemokraten</i>)
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
LN	Northern League (<i>Lega Nord</i>)
LR	<i>La Repubblica</i>
MSI	<i>Movimento Sociale Italiano</i>
MSI/AN	<i>Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale</i>
MSI-FT	Social Movement-Tricolour Flame (<i>Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore</i>)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NBD	National Alliance Dresden (<i>Nationales Bündnis Dresden</i>)
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany (<i>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i>)
NSM or NSM88	National Socialist Movement (USA)
PEA	Protest Event Analysis
SMO	social movement organization
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany

Abbreviations

SPLC	Southern Poverty Law Center
Taz	<i>Tageszeitung</i>
UN	United Nations
VFS	<i>Veneto Fronte Skinhead</i>
WB	World Bank
WOTOC	World Church of the Creator
WTO	World Trade Organization

The Extreme Right and Social Movement Studies: An Introduction

On 19 April 1995, a bomb destroyed or damaged more than 300 buildings in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring about 700. Considered the bloodiest act of terrorism in the US before the September 11th attacks, the Oklahoma bombing was perpetrated by two activists of the American extreme right patriot militia movement. The attack was meant as revenge for the FBI's intervention against the Branch Davidian settlement in Waco two years earlier. More generally, it was conceived as an act of resistance against the federal government and against 'a global conspiracy by wealthy elites designed to subjugate the United States under the control of the United Nations' (Wright 2007, 4). When asked why he had not waited until the federal building was empty before detonating the bomb, Timothy McVeigh answered, 'because in order to really get the attention of the government ... there has to be a body count' (ibid., 5).

Milan (Italy), 17 March 2003: Three extreme right sympathizers, armed with knives and bars, met in front of a pub—a traditional meeting point for left-wing young people from centri sociali (squatted social centres), from radical left and punk groups. They wanted to take revenge for insults that one of them had received a few days before because of the name of his dog ('Rommel', after the 'infamous' Nazi official). When the two groups met, a fight developed in front of the pub. David Cesare, a 26-year-old activist in the left-wing squatted social center 'Bear', was wounded in the throat, face, and abdomen. A lethal stab wound bisected his carotid artery. Three other boys were seriously injured. The three neo-fascists escaped (La Repubblica, 10 March 2003).

In the Summer of 2007, during a city festival in the Saxon town of Mügeln, dozens of young Germans attacked eight Indians and hunted them through the streets. According to police reports, following a quarrel in the festival tent, the Indians escaped to a nearby pizzeria. A group of approximately 50 Germans, mainly young people, followed them and destroyed the door of the restaurant. Approximately 70 police officials blocked the attackers; eight Indians and four Germans were wounded. One of the Indian festival visitors and one German required medical treatment, and two policemen were injured. Many people watched the raid on the spot (Spiegel Online 19 August 2007. <<http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,500750,00.html>>)

These and other extreme right actions in Germany, Italy, and the United States contribute to rising concerns regarding the potential danger to democracy. They are considered to be part of a sort of third wave of right-wing extremism—the first being linked to the development of historical Fascism and Nazism, the second to the rise of extreme right organizations in the radicalized politics of the 1970s (Husbands 2002), and the third, from the 1990s on, linked to racist violence (von Beyme 1988).

In many countries, an increasing intensity of extremist right-wing activities can be observed in the last two decades. These activities may be connected to institutionalized politics—the electoral success of right-wing political parties in parliamentary elections and their successful recruitment of new party members (Merkel 2003; Ignazi 2006; Carter 2005; Norris 2005)—as well as to (violent and non-violent) protest incidents that involve right-wing activists. Alongside the success of political parties and movements of a new populist and xenophobic right, an underground subculture of racist and frequently violent young extremists has emerged, with their own symbols, myths, and language (Caldiron 2001, 321).

In 2006, German authorities counted no fewer than 17,597 politically motivated¹ right-wing extremist crimes (BVS 2006, 34).² Compared to 2005, this is an increase of 14.6 per cent; from 2004 to 2005 the growth was even more notable at 27.5 per cent. According to European official statistics, in the course of 2007, Italy observed an increase in activity by right-wing extremists. This increase manifested itself mainly in acts of vandalism and attacks against left-wing parties and organizations (TESAT 2007 38). In addition, the list of right-wing crimes compiled for 2006 by the Italian antidiscrimination office (UNAR) included twice as many racist incidents (rising from 3.5 to 7.4 per cent of the total number of cases of discrimination) than in 2005.³ During the last couple of decades, racist and right-wing groups have also emerged as an increasing threat in North America (Bjorgo 2006, 1).⁴ The Southern Poverty Law Center, one of the most prominent civil rights watchdog organizations in the US, counted 751 active US extreme right organizations in 2003, up from 708 the year before.

Clearly, extreme right mobilization is not limited to the institutionalized/political arena. As shown by the incidents reported above, contemporary

¹ A crime is classified as 'politically motivated' if the circumstances of the crime or the attitude of the criminal render it probable that the crime was motivated through the victim's political opinion; nationality; ethnic background; race; colour of skin; religion; ideology; origin; sexual orientation; capacities; physical appearance; or social status (BVS 2005, 32).

² Of these crimes, 5.9% (1,047) included violence against persons.

³ <<http://www.unar.it/>>.

⁴ The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, <<http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06hrights/WaronTerrorism/racial03.htm>>.

extreme right mobilization takes various forms and involves various actors. Many scholars argue that the electoral 'success' of extreme right-wing parties and the direct actions taken against ethnic minority groups are part of the same social and cultural trend (Gentile 1999, 228). Nevertheless, the extreme right is far from being a united family in any of these countries, presenting itself instead as a complex galaxy (Tateo 2005) composed of different ideological tendencies, mobilizing around different issues, and using distinct action repertoires. Groups range from radical right parties to extra-parliamentarian groupings, from neo-Nazis to revisionists and the extreme Catholic right. Some of them clearly support neo-fascist or even neo-Nazi positions, while others have reduced their neo-fascist aspects to a sort of 'right-wing socialism' with anti-globalist and anti-liberalist strains. In order to pursue their goals, these groups use violence as well as a broader range of action repertoires, sometimes borrowed from the left (e.g. boycott); they stage very localistic events (e.g. 'backyard' mobilizations) as well as mobilizations with supranational targets (e.g. international organizations or the US).

In Germany, most right-wing crimes are committed by so-called 'skinheads' (BVS 2006, 52, n. 2, 56ff.).⁵ According to the German *Bundesverfassungsschutz* intelligence agency (BVS), these can be distinguished from other extremist right-wing groups by their relatively simplistic ideological background and clear subcultural characteristics (BVS 2006, 51, n. 7). Especially attractive to young people, this subculture is also notable in terms of their public appearance, the aggressive music they favour, and their consumption of alcohol (ibid.). There are, however, also other, more politically oriented, right-wing groups.

In Italy, involvement in the extreme right ranges from activism in the various youth groups associated with the fascist Italian party, MSI, (such as 'Azione Giovani' and 'Azione Studentesca')—which make explicit references to the fascist past (Caldiron 2002, 80)—to the more recent squatted social centres (Di Tullio 2006). A broad range of 'young' and subcultural extreme right organizations includes *skinhead* groups, *politicized hooligans*, and *music groups*, with numerous contacts between them (Gnosis 2006).

In the US, according to several authorities, these extreme right groups are becoming more active in spreading propaganda, by distributing leaflets in neighbourhoods, holding public rallies, starting Web sites, and reaching out to like-minded activists overseas (Southern Poverty Law Center, SPLC).⁶

⁵ Increasingly, members of other (non-skinhead) groups are also involved in criminal acts (BVS 2006, 51, n. 7).

⁶ <<http://www.splcenter.org/>>.

Experts who monitor such groups underline that skinheads, neo-Nazis and white separatist right-wing groups, in particular, are increasingly expanding to urban areas (ibid.).

This radical activism notwithstanding, in comparison with the previous two waves mentioned above, the extra-parliamentary extreme right is of more limited size and action capacity in most countries. While the advent of fascist and Nazi regimes in Italy and Germany followed years of political turmoil that had produced thousands of casualties, and right-wing terrorism in the 1970s had produced hundreds of victims in countries like Italy, the third wave of extreme right mobilization has still serious, but more limited consequences in terms of 'body count'. Its potential danger comes more from the effects that racist attacks have had on the development of xenophobic tendencies in public opinion, as well as in the growth (and sometimes success) of radical right parties that support an exclusive conception of citizenship, often bridged with an anti-democratic, populist discourse.

This characteristic of the 'third wave' might explain why so much social science attention has been devoted to the analysis of these racist and populist parties, in an attempt to explain their differential growth. Less developed, however, has been research on the social movement side of the extreme right. While political party studies provide more and increasingly sophisticated analyses of radical right parties, social movement studies—which has traditionally focused on the progressive left-libertarian movements—has been slow to address the 'bad side' of social movement activism.

In what follows, we shall try to fill this gap, focusing on the social movement side of the third wave of mobilization of the extreme right. In this chapter, after defining the object of our analysis, we shall discuss how social movement studies might contribute to our understanding of right-wing radicalism.

1. Defining the extreme right

The object of our research is the extreme right in Germany, Italy, and the United States. The definition of extreme right is certainly not uncontested. Cas Mudde has found no fewer than 26 different definitions in the recent literature on the topic (Minkenberg 2000). Similarly, Peter H. Merkl has noted that 'experienced analysts still disagree on categorization, labels, and boundaries between its different manifestations' (2003, 4).

One of the difficulties regarding the definition of our research object is that the real meaning of 'right' is ultimately attributed by the public discourse, reflecting a general tendency to simplify the world (Ignazi 2006). As a result, we have to acknowledge that the term *extreme (or radical) right* has multiple facets, with the

common ideological cores being hierarchy and order; a state-centred economy; and the importance of authority (ibid.). Following Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2003, 401), however, we can agree that ‘two elements are central to the sociological concept of right-wing extremism: ideologies of inequality on the one hand, such as exaggerated nationalism, racist denigration, and totalitarian views of the law, are associated with varying levels of acceptance of violence on the other’. The two aspects are related: because they dehumanize opponents, ideologies of inequality are more prone to justification of violence (ibid.).

Recent academic contributions have converged on defining right-wing extremism based on some ideological characteristics (e.g. Carter 2005). Much attention has been paid to the presence of anti-constitutional and anti-democratic values, manifested in a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures, and institutions of the democratic state (hence the name *extremist*). In particular, a rejection of pluralism and egalitarianism has been observed—and often stigmatized—with emphasis often placed instead on militarism and the search for a strong leader. Linked to this is a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (thus the name *right-wing*). A political party does not qualify as part of the *extreme right* on the basis of its spatial location in the left-right continuum, but ‘because it rejects or undermines the democratic constitutional order in which it operates’ (Carter 2005, 19).⁷ The extreme right discourse is anti-democratic, and often anti-parliamentarist (Fennema 1997). Nowadays, populist versions of the radical right tend to reframe the anti-democratic tradition in order to make it resonant with the widespread criticism of representative democratic institutions and party politics (Rydgren 2005).

Ideological characteristics of the extreme right also include xenophobia, ethno-nationalism (rooted in a myth of an ancient past), sociocultural authoritarianism (law and order, abortion), as well as, more recently, anti-system populism. Within a conception of economic protectionism and welfare chauvinism, migrants are stigmatized as cultural threats, often criminal, and as consumers of scarce resources (housing, employment, and so on). Linked to this, nation-native ideologies have been considered as the new version of old extreme nationalism linked with ethnocentrism.

In this respect, the extreme right of the third wave inherited from fascism the quest for a rebirth of ultra-nationalism after a period of decadence (Griffin 1991) and the search for an holistic nation as a third way between capitalism and socialism in political economy (Eatwell 1996). Other parallels lie in the use of violence as well as in the critique of democracy (Eatwell 2003). Its nationalism encompasses both biological and cultural forms, usually coupled

⁷ On this basis, Carter singles out forty parties in fourteen Western European countries (2005, 19).

with the belief that the nation has fallen into decadence. The extreme right thus presents itself as protecting the nation against outsiders, such as anti-fascists, Jews, migrants, homosexuals, and women. New forms of racism do not assume hierarchy, with inferior and superior races, but an assessment of differences, with a quest for each race to live in its own space (Taguieff 1994). Additionally, the extreme right is anti-modern. From the cultural point of view, it has often been defined as an anti-individualist and anti-rationalist refusal of the Enlightenment, with reference to René Guenon's and Julius Evola's refusal of modernity, within an esoteric tradition (Ferraresi 1996; Ignazi 2002, 24).

Beyond ideology, the extreme right has also been defined by a preference for disruptive or even violent forms of action. Anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian frames have normally been accompanied by aggressive behaviour towards political opponents as well as ethnic, religious, or gender minorities. While research on political parties has often preferred the label of radical right (e.g. Norris 2005), our focus on social movement organizations, characterized by the use of (not exclusively, but also) violent forms of action is reflected in our preference for the label extreme right.

In our volume we will use the term 'extreme right groups' and 'right-wing groups' to refer to those groups that adopt this extremist ideology as well as radical forms of action. This definition deliberately includes actors other than political parties, such as political movement organizations, violent groups, local initiatives, politicized soccer fan clubs, and so on, that include violent activities as part of their repertoires of action.

2. The extreme right as a social and a social science problem

Notwithstanding its limited capacity in terms of members and mobilization, the extreme right is perceived as an increasing challenge even in established democracies. On delicate issues such as migration, nationalism, and religious practices, the extreme right has been successful in putting exclusive frames and practices on the agenda, often influencing moderate right-wing and even centre-left parties (Art 2007). In particular, in light of economic globalization and its negative socio-economic consequences, the extreme right is seen as capable of exploiting the dissatisfaction of the losers (Kriesi et al. 2008) through a revival of exclusivist nationalist discourses (Berezin 2009).

This perceived risk and increasing relevance of the extreme right has contributed to the creation of a consistent body of research, which has, however, focused on a restricted number of explanations. Traditionally, in sociology and political science, the extreme right has been addressed through so-called breakdown theories, while left-wing radicalism has been analysed from the

perspective of mobilization theories. For a long time, especially in the US, unconventional forms of collective action were identified as crisis behaviour. Considering collective phenomena as the sum of individual behaviours, psychologically oriented theories defined social movements as the manifestation of feelings of deprivation experienced by individuals, and the aggression resulting from a wide range of frustrated expectations. Phenomena such as the rise of Nazism, but also more contemporary movements, were in fact considered as aggressive reactions to frustrations resulting either from a rapid and unexpected end to periods of economic well-being and of increased expectations on a worldwide scale; or from status inconsistency mechanisms at the individual level (Davies 1969; Gurr 1970). In the tradition of the Frankfurt School (Adorno et al. 1950), right-wing extremism is linked to the authoritarian personality.

Lack of social integration was expected to produce individuals poor in intellectual, professional, and/or political resources, and especially vulnerable to the appeal of anti-democratic movements. In parallel, at the macro level, the emergence of political extremism has been seen as a consequence of the spread of a mass society in which traditional social ties—family, community—tended to lose the capacity to integrate individuals (Kornhauser 1959; Gusfield 1963). According to Wilhelm Heitmeyer, one of the main experts on the radical right, ‘Over the last few decades, rapid and far-reaching processes of social modernization, the redefining of the structures of the nation states, and powerful thrusts towards globalization among Western societies have provided the background to a highly diverse, variable, and self-contradictory increase in right-wing extremism and violence associated with it’ (2003, 399). Heitmeyer’s work emphasizes the dysfunctional effects of rapid social change, with particular attention to the disintegration of social ties.

All of these approaches still resonate with interpretations of the extreme right as unreflected reactions to social crisis and unsuccessful integration. Social science literature on the extreme right has in fact been characterized by a focus on either macro or micro pathological conditions, with more limited attention to the meso-organizational level.

At the macro level, much research on the extreme right has looked at the presence of specific *grievances*, usually measured based on indicators of structural social problems or of their public acknowledgement of those problems. The main social problems addressed within these structural explanations are unemployment and the presence of migrants—often filtered through a culture of fear (for example, the spread of the extreme right has been interpreted as the consequence of broad, long-term processes, such as modernization or globalization, but also of contingent crises related to unemployment, immigration, and economic trends [e.g. Williams 2006]). Among others, Lipset (1969) has considered the Ku Klux Klan as a product of the resistance of social

groups in moments of declining status due to modernization. More generally, the reference base of the extreme right has been identified among the 'once hads' (in contrast to the 'never hads' of the extreme left) (Lipset and Raab 1970). Looking at the recent emergence of right-wing populism, Kriesi et al. (2008) have pointed at the effects of globalization on the party system, with a growing focus on the debate around ethnic rather than class issues, as well as the increasing relevance of cultural (versus material) cleavages.

In order to understand how structural dimensions are filtered into individual consciousness, opinion polls have been used to measure the perception of ethnic threats, negative attitudes towards migrants, authoritarianism, anti-establishment sentiments, and insecurity (Mudde 2007). Preoccupation with criminality and social unrest are shown to be more likely among electors of new populist parties (Rydgren 2008).

When political issues are considered, the two main interpretations include the historical legacy of fascist regimes and current disaffection towards mainstream parties (considered too moderate, or unable to address new cleavages). Anti-pluralistic values are coupled with political discontent, so that 'The natural targets of anti-pluralism are parties at the political level and foreigners at the social level' (Ignazi 2002, 35). Piero Ignazi has thus pointed at the influence of the neoconservative cultural mood of the 1980s, with conservative parties shifting to the right; he writes that the extreme right parties 'are the by-product of a dissatisfaction with government policies on issues such as immigration and crime and, at a more profound level, an expression of uneasiness in a pluralistic, conflicted, multicultural, and perhaps globalizing society' (2002, 37). A main focus here has been on the mentioned ideological characteristics (anti-democratic, ultra-nationalist, anti-modernist) of the radical right parties (Mudde 2007; Eatwell 1996; Ferraresi 1993; Backes and Jesse 1993).

At the micro level, research has addressed the *psychological* and *sociographic* characteristics of the members (voters, sympathizers, activists) of extreme right groups (e.g. Weinberg 1995; Bjørge 1995; Heitmeyer 1993; Mayer 1999). From the psychological point of view, anomie, social breakdown, relative deprivation, loss of status, and ethnic competition have been considered, together with political discontent, as fomenting popular xenophobia (Rydgren 2007). Similarly, later on, researchers employed such concepts as status disorientation or discrepant status. Kornhauser (1959) saw extremism as linked to the lack of cross-cutting ties and the alienation of the masses. For Adorno et al. (1969) as well as Bettelheim and Janowitz (1964) and Allport (1958), ethnic prejudice is linked to authoritarian personality traits. Special attention has been paid here to status inconsistency (and relative deprivation), declining status, socio-economic problems (unemployment, poverty), young age, and psychological problems. In the 1990s, extreme right politics was defined as an anti-modern and counter-revolutionary reaction against

post-materialism, but also as the 'fear of the urban stranger', strengthened by isolation and anomie (Perrineau 1997).

Interestingly enough, several of these types of explanations re-emerge (readapted) in the various waves of extreme right activities and (related) social science research on the issue (see above).

3. The extreme right as a social movement

All of these studies have offered valuable insights in understanding the development of the extreme right. Nevertheless, there are also some weaknesses. Research on the contextual conditions has not always been able to explain the causal mechanisms that intervene between macro-causes and micro-behaviours. Also, some of the above mentioned causes emerged as neither necessary nor sufficient: for instance, the extreme right is not always strong where there is high immigration; conversely, it might be strong where there is no immigration (Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2002). The personality traits of the activists have been shown to vary, not only cross-nationally, across time and across groups, but also within the same groups. Various studies on the social backgrounds of radical right activists and voters have brought inconsistent results. In addition, the causal direction of some assessed correlations remained open: values could be causes, but also consequences of participation, being structured within specific milieus.

What is more, the focus on these potential causes has left other possible explanations unexplored. Writing about the dramatic growth of popular support for xenophobic parties in the last two decades, Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay (2002) have in fact lamented that literature on the extreme right tends to be society-centred, avoiding politics-centred arguments. The analysis of the meso-organizational level has also been limited to the political parties, with a selective attention to their strategic issue framing. When non-institutional activities of the extreme right entered the picture, it was mainly in the form of political violence.

Some of the missing aspects in research on the extreme right have instead become central in social movement studies. Rarely applied to the analysis of right-wing groups, research on social movements has developed some concepts that we also believe to have high heuristic capacity in this field. In particular, it has stressed political opportunities rather than social threats, organizational resources rather than grievances, frames rather than ideology, repertoire rather than violence, networks rather than individual pathologies, and relations rather than structures.

Building on this field of knowledge, in this volume we propose an analysis of the extreme right as a social movement. Using some of the main concepts

in the field, we will develop our analysis around the model presented below (Figure 1.1). As we will explain in more detail in what follows, we shall focus our attention on the action and the discourse of the extreme right in Germany, Italy, and the US. First, we shall describe them using the concepts of protest repertoires and frames. Additionally, we shall explain their characteristics by looking at the political opportunities available to them, along with their organizational resources and structures.

So-called breakdown approaches have been criticized and (by and large) abandoned in analyses of left-wing social movements that have conceptualized social movements as largely instrumental rational actors that mobilize on collective interests and/or identities. These approaches have in fact been opposed by *resource mobilization* ones, stressing that in historical situations in which structural strains and conflicts are always present, the emergence of collective action has to be addressed by looking at the conditions that enable discontent to be transformed into mobilization—that is, at how the resources necessary for collective action are mobilized. In this view, social movements are made up of actors acting in a rational way—or at least in as rational a way as those involved in conventional forms of political action. In fact, scholars such as Mayer Zald (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1987), Anthony Oberschall (1973, 1978), and Charles Tilly (1978) were among the first to define a social movement as a rational, purposeful, and organized action. Repertoires of action and frames are seen as deriving from a calculation of the costs and benefits, influenced by the political opportunities as well as by the presence of organizational resources.




Figure 1.1. Explanatory model

The deeds and discourse of oppositional actors are first of all influenced by a *political opportunity structure*, consisting of a formal, institutional aspect and an informal, cultural one (Kriesi 1989, 295). Cross-time and cross-national research on social movements has stressed the importance of political context for their capacity to mobilize, as well as the forms of their mobilization. Stable institutional characteristics such as the functional and territorial distribution of powers, as well as the contingent shift in the configuration of allies and opposition, have emerged time and again as important independent variables in explaining social movements' development. Beyond political opportunities, discursive opportunities play a significant role in influencing the potential acceptance of social movement claims within a broader culture. As social movements are political actors, they tend to be very sensitive to the opening of channels of institutional access, which in fact tends to facilitate protest but moderate its form. In contrast, closed (or closing) opportunities tend to produce radicalization of protest repertoires (see della Porta and Diani 2006, for a review). In research on the extreme right, electoral opportunities (in terms of electoral volatility and reduced competition) have been noted to limit the success of radical right-wing parties in some countries (Rydgren 2005). Discursive opportunities created by the political elites in defining migrants and asylum seekers as a social problem have been proven to be highly correlated with racist violence (Koopmans 1996). The specific national definition of citizenship also influences the discourse of the extreme right, with, for instance, exclusive conceptions in France facilitating the mobilization of xenophobic discourses (Koopmans et al. 2005, ch. 5). However, the presence of strong xenophobic political parties appears to have a moderating effect on the repertoires of action (ibid.)

Additionally, the type of (material and symbolic) resources available for social movement networks explains, at least to a certain extent, the tactical choices made by movements. Notwithstanding the criticisms of early versions of this approach as overemphasizing the rationality of collective action, most research on (left-wing) social movements still shares a vision of movements as part of the normal political process. A rational view of collective action is also found in research focusing on the political and institutional environment in which social movements operate.

Recently, two different theoretical developments have brought about a shift in perspective. On the one hand, there has been growing attention to the cultural and symbolic dimension of social movements (Jasper, Goodwin, and Polletta 2001; Flam and King 2005). While protest is a resource that some groups utilize to put pressure upon decision-makers, it should not be viewed in purely instrumental terms (see Taylor and van Dyke 2004). During the course of a protest, both time and money are invested in risky activities, yet often resources of solidarity are also created (or re-created) (Rochon 1998,

115). This, in turn, helps in the development of a sense of collective identity, which is a condition for collective action (Pizzorno 1993; see also Fantasia 1988). Furthermore, in social movements the means used are very closely tied to the desired ends (Jasper 1997, 237).

At the same time, on the other hand, a more dynamic vision of protest has been promoted, with attention paid to the causal mechanisms that intervene between macro-causes and macro-effects (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Here as well, in a critique of the 'structuralist bias' of previous approaches, attention moved towards the relational, cognitive, and affective mechanisms through which contextual input is filtered and acquires meaning. The effects of political opportunities depend in fact on the social construction of these opportunities by the relevant actors.

In our research, we approached the extreme right through an attempt at integrating the resource mobilization and political opportunities approaches with the most recent developments in social movement studies. In contrast to the breakdown approach, we shall look, first of all, at the organizational structure in the extreme right milieu, considering the complex interplay among various actors linked to each other in co-operative as well as competitive interactions. Similarly to other social movements, these are *networks* of more or less formal groups and individuals, and the extent and structure of these networks defines their mobilizing capacity.

Second, we assume that these networks use a broad *repertoire* of collective action. While research on the extreme right has usually focused either on electoral behaviour or on violent actions (with very few exchanges between the two fields of research), we want instead to analyse the different forms of protest used by the extreme right, addressing the ways in which the available resources and political opportunities do influence these choices. This would allow us to locate both violent or electoral behaviour within a broader repertoire of collective action. But protest is not only a dependent variable: as for the social movement organizations that have been studied in the left-libertarian movement family, protest action emerges also in accounts of the extreme right as 'eventful' in terms of its relational, cognitive, and emotional effects on the individual and collective actors that take part in it (della Porta 2008a).

Third, and in line with the 'cultural turn' in social movement research, we shall consider the ways in which the collective actors involved in the extreme right construct and communicate their (internal and external) reality. While some research has focused on the ideology of the extreme right, we considered that, as Snow and Byrd (2007) have recently observed with reference to Islamic terrorism, ideology is too monolithic a concept to address the ideological variations among our groups, lacking the flexibility required to link ideas, actions, and events. Located somewhat below the level of (broad and fixed) ideology, *frame* analysis better fits our interest in the ways in which

organizations bridge different, specific issues. It also resonates with our assumption that, similarly to other collective actors, extreme right organizations have to be considered as acting upon specific concerns and attempting to mobilize a potential base of sympathizers.

Within a relational approach, we shall pay particular attention to processes of interactions between the extreme right and other actors, both allies and opponents. In social movement studies, radical right groups have been addressed under the label of *counter-movements*. Counter-movements develop as a reaction to the successes of social movements, with a reciprocal symbiotic dependence during the course of mobilization. Used to address right-wing social movements, the concept of counter-movement focuses attention on the conflictual interactions between movement families. To use Rapoport's typology (1960), conflicts between social movements (usually identified with left-wing or progressive groups) and counter-movements (right-wing and conservative) resemble debates to the extent that they are based on an attempt to persuade opponents and authorities; they resemble games to the extent that they are based on rational calculations of costs and benefits. Sometimes, however, their interaction resembles far more a battle in which the objective is to annihilate the enemy. Interactions between movements and counter-movements lead to a strong sense of conflictuality and the prevalence of a Manichean view of politics (della Porta 1995). Moreover, the two tend to imitate each other, reciprocally adapting particular tactics and the choice of arenas in which to act (see, for example, Rucht 1991; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

To recap, in our research we shall use insights from social movement studies, looking at the ways in which radical right-wing organizations act and think—that is, looking at the protest events they stage and the frames they develop.

4. Framing right-wing concerns

The main tool for investigating the link between individual motivations at the micro level and environmental conditions at the macro level is the analysis of the activists' perceptions and of the organizational dynamics that intensify and radicalize their involvement. In order to understand radical politics—as other forms of politics—it is therefore important to investigate individual and group understandings of the external reality, as well as their position in it.

The *frame* is one specific concept developed in social movement research to address the symbolic construction of the external reality. Frames can be defined as the dominant world views that guide the behaviour of social

movement groups. They are very often produced by the organizational leadership, which provides the necessary ideological background within which individual activists can locate their experiences. As is the case for any collective actor, extreme right organizations have to motivate individuals to action, providing followers and potential followers with rationales for participating and supporting their organizations.

The social science literature on frames has taken two different approaches (Johnston and Noakes 2005). With a focus on individual cognitive processes, some authors have analysed the way in which normal people try to make sense of what happens by framing events into familiar categories (see Gamson 1988). Looking instead at the meso, organizational level, other scholars have considered the instrumental dimension of the symbolic construction of reality by collective entrepreneurs (Snow and Benford 1988). Research on extreme right parties has highlighted the bridging of ethno-nationalist xenophobia with anti-political establishment populism (Rydgren 2005), as well as the role of extreme right organizations in spreading those frames in the party system and in public opinion (Rygren 2003). In our project, we address this meso level by analysing the printed documents of radical groups, looking at the way in which radical groups use different frames in order to pursue different organizational aims.

Frame analysis focuses on the process of the attribution of meaning, which lies behind any conflict. There are three stages of this process, corresponding to the recognition of certain occurrences as social problems; the identification of possible strategies to resolve these; and the development of motivations for acting on this knowledge. Snow and Benford (1988) define these steps as the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational dimensions of framing.

a) *Diagnosis*: In the first place, appropriate interpretative frames allow for the conversion of a phenomenon (whose origins were previously attributed to natural factors or to individual responsibility) into a social problem, potentially the object of collective action (Melucci 1989a and 1989b; Snow et al. 1986). A crucial step in the social construction of a problem consists in the identification of those responsible for the situation in which the aggrieved population finds itself. As della Porta and Diani (2006, 76) have observed, '[t]he identification of social problems and those responsible for them is, inevitably, highly selective. . . . Cultural development places actors in the position of being able to choose, from among various possible sources of frustration and revenge, those against which they should direct all their energies and action, not to mention their emotional identification. The process can, in this sense, be seen as a reduction of social complexity. At the same time, however, once solid interpretative frames have been established, the possibility of identifying other potential conflicts becomes limited.'

b) *Prognosis*: Collective framing also involves the suggestion of potential solutions by identifying new social patterns, new ways of regulating relationships between groups, and new articulations on consensus and the exercise of power.

c) *Motivations for action*: The symbolic elaboration must also aim at producing the motivations and the incentives needed for mobilization. In order to convince individuals to act, frames 'must generalize a certain problem or controversy, showing the connections with other events or with the condition of other social groups; and also demonstrate the relevance of a given problem to individual life experiences. Along with the critique of dominant representations of order and of social patterns, interpretative frames must therefore produce new definitions of the foundations of collective solidarity, to transform actors' identity in a way which favours action' (della Porta and Diani 2006, 79).

In our frame analysis, we shall look at these different functions of frames and framing. Additionally, and particularly relevant given our specific interest in right-wing groups, we shall explore a further level of differentiation, namely the dichotomy between identity frames and oppositional frames, or, more briefly, the distinction of 'us-them' (Tilly 2003, 139). This becomes important not least because of the role of the group as such, since the discrimination against relevant 'out-groups' and the favouring of 'in-groups' have positive effects on social (and group) identity (Gaßebner et al. 2003, 40).

Therefore, we shall distinguish six types of frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames related to the us-category, and the same related to the them-category.

	Diagnostic frames	Prognostic frames	Motivational frames
Identity frames			
Oppositional frames			

We can differentiate this picture even further, considering more proximate and more remote identities. For example, the peer group of right-wing activists is a very proximate identity, whereas the German people as a whole (or the Nordic race or the occidental) are more remote identities. The same applies for different types of oppositional groups. There can be direct opposition (left-wing activists, the police, state authorities); the groups that are targeted by symbolic and physical violence (most classically immigrants, but also disabled

people, homeless people and homosexuals); and systemic opposition (such as the ruling political parties).

If the framing process has an instrumental component, however, the choice of frames is constrained. In our research, we shall analyse processes of articulation (connecting and aligning events), amplification (in terms of marketing), alignment (to audiences' cultural stocks), and bridging (linking frames) (Snow and Benford 1988). In developing their frames, organizations try in fact to make their discourses appealing to various circles of potential supporters—the culture of which therefore limits the range of potentially useful arguments. They aim at achieving resonance, which is a function of the consistency of the frame (that is, logical complementarity of various aspects of tactics, discourse, and so on); of its empirical credibility or cultural compatibility (that is, its capacity to make sense within the targeted audience's vision of the world resonating with society's cultural stock), and of the degree of centrality (or relevance) of addressed issues (how essential they are for the everyday life of the targeted audience) (Johnston and Noakes 2005). The organizational framing is constrained not only by the organizations' own culture, but also by some aspects of the general cultures in which radical groups develop. No matter how much radicals deviate from the shared values and meanings of their host countries and societies, they are still socialized into those values and tend to maintain some loyalty to them.

These are the main reasons why we have chosen to concentrate a part of our analysis on the framing of the extreme right, considering the cultural characteristics of right-wing actors as well as of the society at large as an important explanatory level for the discourses and actions of extreme right groups.

5. (Right-wing) repertoires of collective action

Looking at determinants of forms of action, research on social movements has considered *repertoires of protest* as based on a limited set of forms, learned from previous waves of protest at the national level, and adopted and adapted cross-nationally or cross-movement. The adoption of an action repertoire has been seen as relational, developing from the interactions between challengers and élites (Tilly 1978). Protest cycles, as moments of intensified and widespread protest, have been analysed to explain the development of political violence, frequently one (though not the only or the most important) of protest's outcomes. Research on such different cases as the Italian and German left-libertarian movement families in the late 1960s and early 1970s, or the ethno-nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Basque countries, showed in fact that violence escalated in much the same forms and according to much the same timing during cycles of protest,

involving different political and social actors. The forms of action were initially disruptive (because unconventional) but peaceful and the aims moderate, mainly involving claims for reform of existing institutions. Although remaining mostly non-violent, protest repertoires radicalized at the margins, especially during street battles with adversaries and police (Tarrow 1989).

During cycles of protest, in fact, the development of forms of protest actions follows a dynamic of reciprocal tactical innovation. Social movements change their tactics in order to be able to mobilize as their adversaries adapt their tactics to those of the movement (McAdam 1983). The process of innovation and adaptation is reciprocal, each side responding to the other. In Italy and Germany in the 1970s, in the course of experimentation with various tactics, radical right and radical left-wing groups tested 'hard' techniques, thus creating resources for violence (della Porta 1995). The same happened in Northern Ireland and the Basque countries—where mainly peaceful social movements met not only with state repression but also with the paramilitary activities of death squads—or to an even larger extent in weak democracies in Latin America (Waldman 1993; White 1993; Wieviorka 1988).

In line with social movement studies, we believe that the political violence of the radical right can be understood only if located within a broader repertoire of protest, of which it is part, but not the only part. Looking at the broad spectrum of actors in the right-wing milieu, we will therefore analyse their forms of action, their targets, and their issues of mobilization with the aim of understanding the differential use of violent versus non-violent forms of action. In particular, we shall observe that while the extreme right is active on a number of issues—deploying conventional as well as non-conventional, violent as well as non-violent forms—violent actions are overwhelmingly those targeting migrants, minorities, and political opponents. We shall therefore suggest that it is especially in the interactions with the constructed enemy that forms of action escalate. As research on the radical right in the 1970s in Italy has already indicated, it is in action that a battle spirit towards politics and a dichotomous view of 'us' as the heroes and 'them' as the villains develops (della Porta 1995, ch. 6). Organized violence—and the groups that specialized in violent repertoires—grew gradually at first, especially during the fights between right-wing and left-wing radicals as well as during interactions with the police.

In order to understand the extreme right, we cannot limit ourselves to looking at violent action, but must also consider less radical and more outwardly oriented protest actions, including, for example, the squatting of buildings in order to denounce housing problems in Italy, or the participation in marches against unemployment in Germany, or, in both countries, populist appeals against corrupt political elites. Although the commitment of the extreme right to these social and political issues is nothing new, our research

points at different forms of action that are carried out when addressing different issues, as well as at some different uses of them by the various types of actor that form the galaxy of the extreme right. Additionally, our research addresses the counter-cultural aspects of protest repertoires, given the important role for musical and/or sport events in right-wing mobilizations. Our protest event analysis also points at a mainly local repertoire of action that reflects a fragmentation of the radical right spectrum, understandable as organizational adaptation to (more) restrictive legal norms (for example against fascist/Nazi and xenophobic propaganda) as well as general societal trends.

Protest is therefore important not only for the effects it might have outside of the extreme right milieu (bringing issues onto the agenda, influencing moderate parties' positions, and so on), but also for the effects it can have on the right itself, by producing processes of radicalization in action, especially within movement-counter-movement dynamics.

6. This volume

We will assess our theoretical questions in a cross-country comparison of the extreme right in three countries: Germany, Italy, and the US.

Our empirical research in these three countries is based upon a methodological triangulation that combines methods of research developed within social movement analysis and rarely applied to the extreme right. As we will show in Chapter 2, three different empirical methods are used: social network analysis; frame analysis; and protest analysis. All of them shed some light on different characteristics of the extremist right: frame analysis looks at the *cognitive mechanisms* that are relevant in influencing organizational and individual behaviour; network analysis looks at the (inter-) organizational *structural* characteristics of the right-wing organizations; and, finally, protest event analysis allows for an empirical survey of the *actions* undertaken by right-wing extremists over the last decade. Thus, our triangulation strategy allows us to identify different properties of the life of extremist groups, attempting a complete representation (Tarrow 2004, 174, 178f; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006, 196ff.).

We will introduce the empirical situation in the three countries under research in Chapter 3. As often happens, our case selection implies a mix of similarities and differences. In particular, Germany and Italy were chosen within a 'most similar' logic (Przeworski and Teune 1970), where the cases under examination share similarities in most of their characteristics, but some differences in our set of dependent variables (the frames, networks, and actions of the extremist right), which are then explained by some contextual differences. Adding the rather different case of the US extreme right, we aim at

testing the generalizability of some descriptive and causal inferences that emerged in the previous comparison.

Our analysis starts with the structural characteristics. In Chapter 4, we identify, through a network analysis of Web-links as well as through a secondary analysis of existing sources, the main organizations for each country and investigate the characteristics of the relations among them.

Chapter 5 changes perspective to deal with the action repertoire of the extreme right within a cross-country, cross-time, and cross-group comparison. On the basis of a protest event analysis, the chapter presents the main characteristics of the (violent and non-violent) activities of the extreme right as reported in the press, looking at their forms, scale, targets, and issues, as well as at the presence of counter-mobilization.

The following chapters each deal with one main aspect of the discourses and activities of the extreme right. Keeping a cross-national and cross-group perspective they analyse framing and protest events addressing, respectively, the definition of the 'us' (Chapter 6), the struggle against modernity (Chapter 7), old and new forms of racism (Chapter 8), opposition to globalization (Chapter 9), and populism (Chapter 10).

In the concluding chapter (Chapter 11), we discuss our results in light of bodies of social science literature on both the radical right and social movements.

The years 2010s are beginning with some of the most dramatic instances of right-wing, racist violence. On July 22, 2011 an extreme right militant killed eight people in the bombing of governmental buildings in Oslo and there was a mass-shooting of another 69 people, mostly teenagers who were participating in a camp of the Workers' Youth League (AUF) of the Labour Party on the island of Utøya. In November 2011 the German authorities found evidence of the responsibility of a right-wing, clandestine cell in the killing of nine migrants (eight from Turkey and one from Greece) and a police woman—all committed in the last thirteen years. On December 13, 2011 a member of the extreme right-wing group, Casa Pound, shot and killed two Senegalese street vendors and wounded another there in two crowded markets in Florence. Two of the German right-wing militants as well as the Italian one were found dead by the police, apparently having committed suicide. Although we do not cover these events in our volume, we hope that our research can be relevant for future work on these threatening attacks to our societies, and the circumstances that have allowed for their development.

2

Methodological Choices in the Analysis of the Extreme Right: Research Design and Research Methods

Our research project is based on a small-N comparative analysis of three countries: Germany, Italy, and the United States. In the following chapter, we will present the three cases, discussing the mix of similarities and differences that guided us in our selection, as well as the limits our choice implied in terms of generalizing the results. In this chapter, we will justify the case selection, referring to the organizations we investigated in our research, and present the sources and the methods we used for both data collection and data analysis.

1. Triangulating approaches, sources, and methods

We can imagine various ways to empirically investigate social movements in general, and the extreme right in particular. Given our theoretical concerns, if we take up the classical (but also contested, Mahoney and Goertz 2006; della Porta and Keating 2008) distinction between qualitative and quantitative research, we would more likely opt for the qualitative version, which might allow us to better investigate the ‘case details’ and processes in which we are interested with a more precise focus on our research question. This positive decision for a more qualitative strategy can also be interpreted as a choice *against* quantitative methods, since a purely quantitative approach would be characterized by two fundamental difficulties. First, given the size of the phenomenon as well as the lack of large-N databases, the numbers with which we would have to work would not permit a more quantitatively oriented analysis, unless our question could be addressed by electoral and survey data. Second, the dimensions in which we are interested are very complicated

to operationalize and to standardize, even starting from the identification of the unit of analysis. In the end, the question could even be raised whether quantitative results would permit us to answer our main research question, which addresses variation in quality more than quantity.

While the methodological repertoire seems at first glance to be limited to two extremes—a qualitative in-depth strategy addressing single cases (biographies, events, and so on), and quantitative electoral research—social movement researchers have more recently enlarged their methodological toolkit, in terms of methods of data collection as well as data analysis. With regard to data collection, social movement research is already characterized by a great variety of techniques (as impressively demonstrated in the volume edited by Klandermans and Staggenborg in 2002). In addition, social movement researchers are now applying quantitative and qualitative data analysis, as well as more unconventional techniques such as social network analysis and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Mixed method designs and other combinations of methodological approaches are also increasingly used.

In our research, we have opted for what we can call, in multiple respects, a strategy of triangulation of various theoretical and methodological perspectives. Recalling in its original formulation (Campbell and Fiske 1959) the geometrical metaphor of a triangle in which a data point is ideally closed in, the term ‘triangulation’ has also been used in other ways. Following the glossary of Brady and Collier’s seminal methodological contribution, triangulation can be understood as a ‘research procedure that employs empirical evidence derived from more than one method or from more than one type of data. Triangulation can strengthen the validity of both descriptive and causal inference’ (Seawright and Collier 2004, 310).¹ This definition points to a combination of methods (without being explicit if this refers to data collection or data analysis methods, or to broader choices of quantitative or qualitative methods), but also to a variety of data, perhaps even data sources. In the same volume, Sidney Tarrow seems to suggest a more restrictive use of the concept when he states that ‘within a single research project, the combination of qualitative and quantitative data increases inferential leverage’ (Tarrow 2004, 174).² In his important contribution on design in social and political research, Philippe C. Schmitter contemplates the potential of ‘[using] alternative operationalizations and multiple potential indicators’ (Schmitter 2008, 282). In that volume, della Porta and Keating make a very helpful differentiation between a triangulation of ‘distinct epistemologies, ...

¹ Two other widely used (text)books on social science methodology (Gerring 2001 and George and Bennett 2005) do not contain an entry on triangulation in their indexes, although the actual texts mainly deal with these issues.

² Strictly speaking, Tarrow’s definition deviates from the triple aspect of triangulation, proposing a ‘biangulation’ of *two* aspects. However, later in his contribution, Tarrow seems to accept a broader definition of the term (2004, 178f.).

methodologies and . . . methods' (della Porta and Keating 2008, 34). Following them, methods can be triangulated more easily than methodologies; whereas it would be impossible to triangulate epistemologies (*ibid.*). Their main emphasis is on the aspect of complementary explanation in triangulate research designs. A complementary method or methodology comes in whenever different aspects of the research question/s would not be satisfactorily addressed using only one approach—or too few.

In our project, we have indeed triangulated various aspects. First, we used a combination of different methods in data collection and data analysis; second, we focused attention on multiple aspects of a phenomenon, such as formal organizational structures, membership, strategies, resources, or origins, effects, and consequences of specific processes; third, we used different types of explanations, combining investigations of the effect-of-causes with those of the causes-of-effect (to use the definition proposed in Mahoney and Goertz 2006) as well as the co-variational explanations proper to the statistical tradition and more case-oriented theoretical relationships. Additionally, we have used various sources (quality daily newspapers, documents of the radical right, websites).

In our research, we have in fact identified three broad sets of characteristics to which we would like to devote our attention: with a frame analysis, we look at the meaning of extremist right-wing communication strategies. With a social network analysis, we examine the inter-organizational structures within a net of comparatively densely connected actors which, however, are very exclusive with regard to outside organizations. Finally, within a protest event analysis, we collected information on the visible activities of right-wing activists.

With this methodological approach, we not only connect our research to three different aspects of the extremist reality, but also respond to the existence of three different types of audiences of the extreme right: whereas protest events receive greater public attention (both with regard to the general public and the activists themselves), belief systems (which we analyse in the frame analysis) are more important for followers and potential sympathizers. Finally, structural aspects within and between the organizations are the most internal component.

Consistent with this choice, the project also combines various methods of data collection. Our frame analysis is built on the grammatical and substantive analysis of written statements produced by the extreme right itself. In other words, it is based on primary documents. As for the protest events, we refer to secondary sources—that is, politically neutral or even left-wing newspapers. Finally, for the network analysis, we performed an analysis based on the Internet, using links between web pages as proxies for inter-organizational contacts. Thus, we apply three different methods of data collection.

Finally, all three methods embody qualitative and quantitative aspects: for the frame analysis, we used straightforward quantitative tools for an

exploratory data analysis, including simple descriptive statistics (sometimes even frequencies and percentages were rather telling), but also some inferential tools of cross-tabulation and monovariate χ^2 measures in order to assess the match between population frequencies and sample frequencies. Adding to this, we used qualitative tools, necessary for the attribution of meaning to the otherwise not very telling verbal statements, for the interpretation of the data, and finally for the aggregation of our units of analysis (single verbal statements) into broader frames that went beyond the single wording. In this sense, quantities tell us a lot about regularities and deviances in the data. Qualities, instead, refer to the actual sense of the (quantitatively summarized) data.

Network analysis is already per se an analytical tool that is hard to describe as either quantitative or qualitative. It is obvious that its reliance on graphs, numbers, and various visualization techniques suggests the predominance of quantitative approaches, but the interpretation and above all the construction of typologies that cannot be reduced to just geometrical (and therefore artificially constructed) distance measures add a powerful qualitative perspective to network analysis.

Finally, for the protest event analysis, we used the same exploratory data analysis tools that we applied to the analysis of frames. This qualitative analysis allows for the understanding of the symbolic meaning of the specific events. For example, a single march organized by German neo-Nazis through a Jewish district in Berlin has, of course, a much more dramatic impact than do ten of these marches by Italian or American right-wing activists through Jewish districts in Rome or Washington. Therefore, a simple tally of the events does not meet the methodological requirements for a protest event analysis that would make substantial sense.

Thus, we combine three different analytical approaches, which themselves refer to three different types of sources and apply within each single approach both qualitative and quantitative tools. The cross-national comparison strengthens the external validity of our data even further. In the rest of this chapter, we will present these three parts of our research in more detail, discussing some main choices in their implementation.

2. Frame analysis

A large part of our research is based on a frame analysis of statements found in documents of three types of organizations in each country. We believe this is the most original (and also time-consuming) part of our project.

Empirically, we have conducted a frame analysis of single statements that we took from three different types of sources for each of the three countries under research. If the production of meaning is an important part of their

organizational activities, and the frames represent resources as well as constraints for action, then the leading questions become: What are the principal issues (for example, economy, social system, culture, ethnic issues, values, religion, and so on) in the political discourse of the extreme right organizations? And, in particular, how are these issues presented as social problems? Which future scenarios do the activists build? And what are the solutions suggested to solve the identified problems? Furthermore, how do right-wing activists construct their own identity and the universe of their allies and opponents in relation to the topics? Who are the 'us' and the 'them'?

Of course, addressing these questions is nothing new. However, the scientific research on discourse and communication often suffers from an insufficient consideration of methodological issues. In order to address these issues, we have adapted an approach developed by the sociologist Roberto Franzosi (see 1997, 1999, 2004 for an analysis of newspaper reports on strikes), based on a (story) grammar (2004, 41ff.). In comparison with traditional text or content analysis, his proposal is more grammatically oriented and works at the semantic level, rather than at the text level. It allows us to carefully analyse the relationship between grammatical subjects, their actions (as manifest in the verb, which takes a special position in Franzosi's thinking; see *ibid.* 252ff.) and (in the case of transitive verbs) the grammatical objects. The grammar system that Franzosi has developed is also sensitive to further linguistic qualifiers, such as adjectives or adverb(ial)s. In this sense, it is very closely linked to a linguistic analysis without, however, being too formal. From the basic structure of a relational database (*ibid.* 66ff.), Franzosi derives the idea of reconstructing the analogously relational structure of text elements.³ His ideas about subject-action-object-connections especially inspired our process, not least because the grammatical system of a subject-object-relation (expressed by the verb, which stands for activity) exactly corresponds to the right-wing way of dividing the world into 'us' and 'them'.

We have, however, modified the pure form of Franzosi's methodology. There are two reasons for this decision: first, there was no standardized software ready for immediate use at the beginning of our coding (Franzosi 2004, 70, 130). Also, once PC/ACE, the software for conducting the coding, was introduced, the adaptation of a method for *narrative* data to mainly *ideologically inspired propaganda* would have required a completely reworked version of the software. Second, and connected to this, Franzosi explicitly mentions that his approach works best with narrative stories, whereas problems will be

³ If, for example, an analysis of the grammatical subject 'immigrant' is conducted, all relational information regarding the grammatical subject 'immigrant' and (a) possible actions that immigrants take; (b) possible objects *versus* which—following the propaganda of the extremists—the actions of immigrants are directed or should be directed; and (c) combinations from actions and objects can be revealed.

encountered with other types of texts (ibid. 16, 54f.)—such as the ones we used.⁴ Therefore, the decision to borrow from Franzosi's methodological repertoire instead of applying his method directly was not only methodologically reasoned, but also epistemologically supported.

In our database, single statements (sometimes single sentences, sometimes parts of sentences, sometimes more than a sentence—depending on where one single affirmation started or ended) were defined as units of analysis. We collected information about several dimensions.

Issue fields. Before starting the coding process, we identified 76 possible issue sub-fields (derived through an interactive pre-test). In a first step, we grouped the statements into the categories A for issues related to politics, B for issues related to the economy, C for issues related to the society and to history, and D for issues related to the internal life of extremist right-wing organizations. Within these four macro categories, we differentiated further, adding a two-digit code describing the issue sub-field more precisely. For example, A is the political category, A6 groups statements on aspects of immigration policy, and A64 is the code for all statements about the cultural effects of immigration (multicultural society, etc.). This proceeding also facilitated the re-aggregation of the individual highly differentiated issue sub-fields into broader issue fields. This re-aggregation was performed *after* the actual coding process and was both theoretically and empirically guided. We arrived at the main issue areas of Immigration, Globalization, Europeanization, Values/Identity, Politics in the narrow sense, Social/economic issues, and Internal life of right-wing groups. Only the latter new issue field (Internal life of right-wing groups) could be directly derived from the previous scheme; for all the other categories, complex recodings were necessary. In order to keep categories mutually exclusive, we selected the main issue addressed by taking into account, for every single statement, the context in which it appeared.

'Is/will/should'. We also included a category that recorded whether the statement described a situation in the present (or the past); whether the statement made a forecast for the future; or whether the statement was an (explicit or implicit) call for action, no matter what kind of action (this could include perfectly democratic aspects, such as proposals for voting behaviour, but also explicit calls for violence).⁵ 'Is' refers to actually occurring phenomena in the past or the present ('there are too many immigrants in our country'); 'will' to those statements that make a forecast for the future ('in a couple of years, the number of immigrants will exceed the number of native borns'); and, finally,

⁴ We took care of this point in the protest event analysis, which was performed on the basis of publications that had not been produced by the right-wing extremists themselves.

⁵ This distinction is similar to the one made by Snow and Benford (1988) among three stages of the process of framing—namely, the recognition of certain occurrences as social problems; possible strategies to resolve these; and motivations for acting on the basis of this knowledge.

Mobilizing on the Extreme Right

Table 2.1. Distribution of is/will/should by country

Type	Italy	Germany	US	Total
Is	72.3%	71.9%	70.4%	71.7%
Will	6.2%	11.8%	13.3%	9.5%
Should	21.5%	16.3%	16.3%	18.8%
	(2460)	(1353)	(1379)	(5192)
	$\chi^2 = 37.9^{***}$	$\chi^2 = 12.0^{**}$	$\chi^2 = 25.9^{***}$	

‘should’ to those statements that proposed that an action be taken (‘no foreigner should be let in’). Table 2.1 shows the distribution of this category in the whole sample, but also for every individual country. The χ^2 measures indicate how far the country-specific distribution deviates from the total distribution. We see that the Italian distribution deviates from the total sample in emphasizing more the ‘should’ and (to a lesser extent) the ‘is’ category, whereas the ‘will’ category scores lower than in the general sample. As for the US, the opposite phenomenon can be observed. In Germany, the differences from the total sample are more moderate, but follow the US model more than the Italian model, with the ‘is’ category being clearly in line with the overall finding.

Table 2.2 compares the overall distribution with the cross-source distributions. Political parties overemphasize the ‘is’ and ‘will’ categories at the expense of the ‘should’ category—indeed, there are good reasons to say that political parties are less oriented towards calls for action. As for political movements, the ‘is’ category is over-represented, whereas subcultural groups clearly concentrate on the ‘should’ (and to a lesser extent on the ‘will’ category), whereas the ‘is’ category has a much lower percentage than in the general sample. It is evident from this that the call for action (and action itself) is more important for subcultural groups than for other types of actors.

Actors. No fewer than nine variables were defined in order to examine the actors that were mentioned in a statement. First of all, we differentiated among subject actors, object actors, and ally actors. The terms ‘subject actors’ and ‘object actors’ refer mainly to the grammatical position of an actor within a syntax, describing respectively the actors who perform an action and those who undergo an action; ally actors are those actors who are mentioned as supporters of the subject actors (e.g. ‘the German government, together with big business’—in this case, the German government is the subject actor and big business the ally actor). As we were more interested in the real and substantive direction of the action than in the grammatical word order, we usually worked with the *active* version of a sentence.

Table 2.3 shows the distribution of subject, object, and ally actors, also differentiated by country. A significant deviation from the total sample can

Table 2.2. Distribution of is/will/should by source

Type	Political party	Political movement	Subcultural group	Total
Is	72.6%	75.4%	65.7%	71.7%
Will	12.0%	7.6%	7.6%	9.5%
Should	15.4%	17.1%	26.7%	18.8%
	(2289)	(1587)	(1316)	(5192)
	$\chi^2 = 140.4^{***}$	$\chi^2 = 11.5^{**}$	$\chi^2 = 55.3^{***}$	

Table 2.3. Distribution of actors by grammatical role, country comparison

Actor	Subject actors	Object actors	All actors	
Italy (all actors)	63.5%	30.6%	5.9%	(3589)
Germany (all actors)	65.6%	27.4%	7.0%	$\chi^2 = 1.2$ (n.s.) (1677)
US (all actors)	62.4%	31.3%	6.3%	$\chi^2 = 6.3^*$ (2030)
Total	63.7%	30.1%	6.3%	$\chi^2 = 1.5$ (n.s.) (7296)

be observed only for Germany, where the tendency is to emphasize subject actors over object actors.

Actors were also classified following a numerical coding scheme. All actors were attributed a three-digit code, ranging from 100 to 999. The categories from 100 to 499 were used for those actors who are potentially part of the identity frame of the right-wing activists ('us'), differentiating further the peer group itself (actors 100–199) from the wider (racial, national, and social) groups to which the activists belong (actors 200–399). The oppositional actors were coded with values ranging from 500 to 999, attributing the numbers from 500 to 599 to the most obvious enemy of the extreme right, the (variously called) foreigners; from 600 to 699 to adversaries from other societal groups (e.g. homeless, homosexuals, and so on); from 700 to 799 to domestic political actors; from 800 to 899 to international and foreign political actors; and from 900 to 999 to other societal actors, such as business, mass media, churches, and so on. For all types of actors, it was possible to add a more precise specification (for example, the name of a politician for the category of politicians) and a description (grammatical adjectives or phrases). This information was recorded as string variables.

In a subsequent step, the codings for the actors were also re-aggregated, with categories similar to those used for the re-aggregation of the issues.

Actions. The actions of the actors were also recorded with string variables. This made it possible to reconstruct the statement, linking together the subject actors, the object actors, and the actions. Since not all statements referred to true actions (for example, 'Italy is an evil place'), we also included a variable

to record non-actions. By definition, statements with an entry in the 'actions' category could not be entered in the 'non-actions' category.

For this part of our research, we selected three types of extreme right-wing organizations in each country. In all three country cases, we included an institutional party organization, a political non-party organization, and a subcultural (skinhead) one. Furthermore, we combined these three types of organizations with three different types of documents: we collected articles from newspapers; analysed online documents; and included contributions to Internet forums and guest books. We assumed that the newspapers and the online documents were directly produced by the right-wing actors (although referring to different readerships), whereas Internet forums and guest books contributed a grassroots perspective.⁶

In the Italian case, we selected Forza Nuova as the political party. It is broadly recognized to be the most rapidly growing, active, and determined extremist group of the extreme right Italian scene (Caldiron 2001). Linked to radical right-wing groupings, it also has some contacts with the institutional far right, especially at the local level, where it is in search of alliance especially with the Northern League for campaigns against immigration and Islam and for 'law and order'. The data was gathered from the party newspaper, *Foglio di Lotta. Notiziario del movimento Forza Nuova* (from 2000 to 2005, excluding 2004).⁷ We sampled two issues per year. All articles in the main section of the paper (the first three pages) were checked for statements containing frames, totalling about five or six per edition (including the editorial). The second group is the Veneto Fronte Skinheads, which is the main representative of the skinhead movement in Italy. Founded in 1985 as an organization for the promotion of cultural, musical, and sports activities, it is one of the most violent racist organizations (EUMC 2004). Here, we analysed the bi-monthly magazine-bulletin *L'Inferocito* (from 2002 to 2006).⁸ The third case source is the *Camerata Virtuale*, an online discussion forum (analysed for the years 2005 and 2006). From these sources, a total of 2,460 statements were coded.

For Germany, we chose the NPD (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, National Democratic Party of Germany) as an example of a radical political party. The NPD had some limited electoral success at the sub-national level in the 1960s, became very marginal from the 1970s onward, and surprised political observers through its growing success in eastern Germany in the 2000s. Although earlier extremist right-wing political parties had already

⁶ Even though we are aware that these contributions might also be highly manipulated by the group leadership.

⁷ The year 2004 is excluded from the analysis of Forza Nuova's magazine, since it was impossible to get any copies for this year from the organization.

⁸ Since this publication is more informally produced and printed, it is not always published in a bi-monthly rhythm, but sometimes more rarely.

gained seats in regional or European Parliaments (such as the *Republikaner* and the DVU, even peaking at around 15 per cent of the votes in some regional elections), in the 2000s the success of the NPD was even more significant, since it is known for its close contacts with the violent part of the extreme right in Germany. For the case of the NPD, we relied on its monthly party newspaper, the *Deutsche Stimme*, including the first article of every single edition in our sample (from 2002 to 2006). The NBD (*Nationales Bündnis Dresden*, National Alliance Dresden) is a non-party political organization. It is an example of many local initiatives in which right-wing forces address local political issues of high relevance. Very often they also act as shadow organizations for more established groups. The reason for this double identity is that the highly stigmatized right-wing political parties are not attractive to many German voters who would—in principle—share their opinions. Thus, non-party groups, especially if concentrating on local issues, present a welcome opportunity. In addition, in order to vary the type of sources, we included the contributions to the online guest book of the NBD in our sample (in 2003 and 2004). Whereas our first source, the *Deutsche Stimme*, reflects the official opinion of the NPD, the analysis of an online guest book gives us more insights into the rank-and-file perspective. The third source refers to violent groups, that is, skinhead groups. These groups are numerous in several regions. In order to geographically balance the choice, we opted to examine a western German skinhead group, since the NBD is an eastern German organization and the NPD is also strong in eastern Germany. Among the western German skinhead sites, we made a (nearly) random choice.⁹ Since no single website contained enough material for an analysis, we decided to code two groups, namely, the Kameradschaft Neu-Ulm and the Kameradschaft Hochfranken (website as of December 2006). Again, this helped us not only in adding a third type of group to our sample, but also a third type of publication, namely, websites, in addition to the *Deutsche Stimme* as a newspaper (whose online version is identical with the print version) and the guest book of the NBD. Taking all three German sources together, we arrive at a total of 1,353 coded statements.

In the case of the United States, given the electoral system, it was more difficult to find a proper political party. Thus, we looked for an organization that comes closest to a political party in terms of its structure, its goal, and its self-presentation online; is active at least at the local level; and defines itself as a political party. Following these criteria, we analysed the monthly newspaper *Stormtrooper* of the New York State branch of the political party National

⁹ The choice was not completely random, since we restricted our selection to those websites that contained at least some substance and were not limited to the announcement of events or similar minor content.

Socialist Movement 88, taking all issues from 2007 to 2009 and codifying the first two articles of every issue. For the political movements, we analysed the websites of three different movements belonging to the same part of the right-wing sector, namely, the White Aryan Christian-inspired hate groups. This includes, in our case, the websites of the White Aryan Resistance, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Creativity Movement. The latter is the most religiously inspired of the three groups. Furthermore, we analysed the online forum of the skinheads.net web page, the most central discussion forum for skinhead issues.¹⁰ The total number of statements codified for the US case is 1379.

3. Social network analysis

Part of our research is based on a network analysis of extreme right organizations. With it, we aimed at observing some fundamental characteristics of the organizational structure of the extreme right in the three countries, as well as collecting data that could be useful in selecting the information to be analysed in more detail in our frame analysis.

Social network analysis has been considered as particularly interesting for social movements, which are, indeed, networks, the formal characteristics of which have been referred to in the development of theories of collective behaviour (Rosenthal 1985; Snow et al. 1986; McAdam 1988; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Marwell 1988; Gould 1993; Diani 1995, 2003). Network analysis enables the researcher to emphasize the meso level of social analysis, filling the gap between structure and agency (Hayes 2001) and focusing attention on the connection between the micro and macro dimensions (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999). Scholars interested in social capital have emphasized the importance of social links as resources of individual actors that increase the probability of success of their own actions (e.g. Lin 2001). Networks are also seen as vehicles of meaning, crucial for the sharing of values, frames, and identities (Cinalli 2006). Finally, networks can be interpreted as configurations of a context (environment) of opportunities and constraints to collective action (e.g. Broadbent 2003).

In this book, we investigated networks as both resources and opportunities. This means that we analysed each sector of the extreme right in Italy, Germany, and the United States in terms of a set of actors who, through their mutual interactions, produce their own value orientations; have access to specific resources; and contribute to the shaping of the context of opportunities and

¹⁰ Our impression during the coding process was that the online forum was less controlled in the case of the US, since we could also find many real discussions on different standpoints, but also contributions that were critical to the reality of right-wing extremists in the US.

constraints in which they are embedded (Cinalli and Füglistner 2008, 9). Indeed, an advantage of network analysis is that it enables the researcher to address multiple (micro, meso, and macro) levels of analysis (Hanneman 2001). In our study we focused on the level of individual organizations, examining which types of organizations occupy a central position and which are more peripheral; we explored the formation of specific coalitions (of communications) between the various extremist groups, looking at their composition (for example, their homogeneity or heterogeneity) and the relations between them; and we characterized the overall configuration of the three virtual networks of the Italian, German, and American extreme right, asking how dense, how conflictual or consensual, how segmented or centralized they are.

Our analysis was based on web links. Usually, being volatile and often illegal or violent, extremist groups are very difficult objects for empirical investigation (Zhou et al. 2005; Burris et al. 2000, 3). The study of the Internet, used for an ever-increasing number of tasks, can contribute to overcoming these research problems. But the analysis of web links is not just a convenience choice: indeed, given their broad use by the extreme right, the analysis of their Internet infrastructure can help us to better understand the groups themselves (Zhou et al. 2005).

In using websites, however, we had to address some difficult problems in terms of sampling. As some researchers have stressed, website analysis is quite problematic because it is impossible to determine the real dimension and the nature of the population (Schafer 2002). The Internet is in a state of continuous change, and there is no exhaustive directory of websites. In order to perform our data web collection, namely to identify all Italian, German, and American extreme right organizations with a presence online, in our research we applied a snowball technique that led us to single out samples of approximately 100 organizations for Italy and Germany respectively, and 300 for the US (see the Appendix for a list of organizations included). Based on sources of various kinds, we first identified the most important extreme right organizations in the three countries. Then, starting from these and focusing exclusively on friendly links that were explicitly indicated by these organizations, we discovered the websites of minor and less well-known groups. The process was repeated to the point at which it became impossible to add new sites or organizations to our sample.

In order to identify the most important groups of the extreme right, we used various available databases. For the Italian case, we combined information given by 'watchdog' organizations, such as the Osservatorio Democratico, with analysis of secondary literature (see the recent contribution by Roversi 2006). In the German case, we started from the websites of the two political parties, NPD and DVU, and various online publications (*Deutsche Stimme*, *Deutsche Nationalzeitung*), adding a keyword search in Google. For the US

case, we mainly searched for extreme right organizations and URLs listed by one major watchdog organization, the SPLC.¹¹ Their list of radical right organizations is compiled using hate group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, field sources, and news reports. For 2008, the SPLC list included about 900 far right organizations and groups active in the US. We reduced that number (which was too high for network analysis) by a) keeping only those organizations that had been listed for at least three years (2008–2005), and b) collapsing chapters under the respective federations or umbrella organizations. We thus arrived at 277 organizations. We then manually searched the websites (URLs) related to each single organization, using as potential sources *The Hate Directory* (Franklin 2007), Google, and Wikipedia. In this process, we excluded those groups for which it was impossible to find a URL, either because they were no longer existent or because they were not active/not accessible (for example, some sites could be visited only by members). In this way, we arrived at a final sample of 134 US extreme right websites as basis for our analysis.¹² We then classified those organizations into broader categories¹³ and codified the relational patterns between them in a manual process.¹⁴ In all three cases, we excluded the use of more automatic and systematic techniques for the research of all the links that can be found on a web page, in order to (manually) select only those links on the pages of partner sites, assuming that these can be considered proxies for affinity relations and a measure of closeness between the organizations.

4. Protest event analysis

An additional part of our research used protest event analysis of information of extreme right activities retrieved from newspaper sources.

In order to create a dataset on the whole range of extreme right mobilization in the three countries in the last decade, we drew upon Protest Event Analysis (PEA) concepts and techniques. Following the pioneering work of Charles

¹¹ The Southern Poverty Law Center was founded in 1971 as a small civil rights law firm. Today, SPLC is internationally known for its tolerance education programs, its legal victories against white supremacists, and its tracking of hate groups. Through its 'Monitoring Hate and Extremist Activity' project, the Center monitors hate groups and extremist activities throughout the US and publishes a report listing all the right-wing groups active in the US, updated annually (see <<http://www.splcenter.org/intel/map/hate.jsp>>; <<http://www.splcenter.org/>>).

¹² Furthermore, some URLs were eliminated due to redundancy (e.g. two labels referring to the same website).

¹³ The classification of the extreme right organizations was based on the self-definition of the group and the predominant nature of the message conveyed through the website (Tateo 2005; Gerstenfeld et al. 2003, 32).

¹⁴ The right-wing websites' collection and links' codification was conducted for the Italian case in February–November 2007.

Tilly (1978), PEA has become a widespread research method in the study of collective action, protest, and social movements. Despite its limitations and imperfections (e.g. Franzosi 1987; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Mueller 1997), this method provides researchers with extensive and systematic sets of data on protest activities and their different components and dimensions. Datasets constructed on the basis of specifically selected press sources and/or archival databases—such as police and municipal records—allow both quantitative and qualitative aspects of protest actions to be studied over time and for large geographical areas (Rucht et al. 1999; Forno 2003). Indeed, PEA is a method that allows for the quantification of many properties of protest, such as frequency, timing and duration, location, claims, size, forms, carriers, and targets, as well as immediate consequences and reactions (for example, police intervention, damage, counter-protests, and so on) (Koopmans and Rucht 2002).

Antecedents to the research based on protest events are large-N comparative studies on political violence based on various databases for (usually hard) forms of violence (e.g. Gurr 1970); research on cycles of strikes as related to business cycles; and, especially, Charles Tilly's archive-based research on the historical transformations in repertoires (e.g. Tilly 1978). Turning to contemporary protest, a number of research projects have developed techniques for building databases on protest on the basis of newspaper coverage, including, for example, Tarrow's research on the Italian protest cycle of the late 1960s-early 1970s; the research group led by Hanspeter Kriesi that compared protest in the 1970s and 1980s in France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands; the large *Prodat* project led by Dieter Rucht on protest in Germany since the 1950s; Roberto Franzosi's analysis of protest in Italy in the pre-fascist period; and Susan Olzak's analysis on (inter)ethnic violence in the US.

These projects addressed the various problems of conceptualization (What is a protest? When does it start and end?), but (also and especially) of the selection biases. Controlled though other sources—such as local newspapers (Hocke 1998), police records (Fillieule 1996), and protest permits (McCarthy and McPhail 1996)—data from newspapers emerged as covering only a small percentage of protest events. Systematic biases were identified, as coverage tended to increase with the number of participants, the radicalism of the forms of action, and the innovative character of the protest. Even more disturbing, issue cycles were found to strongly influence coverage, and a declining newsworthiness (and therefore coverage) of protest was seen (e.g. della Porta and Diani 2004). Finally, even when covered in the press, the information on protest events tends to be superficial, with several relevant variables (for example, the protest organizers) often missing. Other mentioned problems are the descriptive bias (linked to the limited and not always reliable information included in newspapers) as well as the mainly descriptive

use of the results (given difficulties in linking them with other macro, explanatory variables).

These limits notwithstanding, protest event analysis has been considered as one of the few instruments that can be used to build up systematic, long-term databases on protest. With precaution and many interpretative caveats, press-based protest event analysis allows for controlling, if not the real amount and forms of protest, at least the associations among specific characteristics of protest repertoires, as well as very general trends. It is in this spirit that we decided to use this technique in our project.

To analyse the recent evolution of extreme right mobilization and measure the actual public activities of the extreme right in the three countries between 2000 and 2007, we used a standardized codebook and coded all political¹⁵ events initiated by an identified extreme right organization as well as those attributed to extreme right sympathizers. This means that, with regard to the definitional criteria that are used for the dataset, two aspects are important. The first concerns the range of forms of extreme right actions included in the dataset. Since we are interested in all forms of mobilization by the extreme right, the spectrum of events coded ranges from heavy forms of (physical) violence (against property or people, such as bombings, arson, and shooting), to forms of verbal violence (such as Nazi/racist graffiti or verbal abuse), to forms of legal and non-violent actions (such as demonstrations and press conferences).¹⁶ The only actions we did not take into account were those taking place within the parliamentary arena. The second aspect, strictly connected to the previous one, concerns the thematic focus of the covered events. Our dataset includes acts performed by the extreme right on any issue field (from immigration, to political life, to economics) and targeting any social groups (such as political adversaries, homosexuals, homeless people, the extreme right itself, and so on).

Our unit of analysis, the protest event, consists of the following elements (variables for coding): the actor who initiates the protest event; the form of action; the target at whom the action is directed; an object actor, whose interests are affected by the event; and finally the substantive content of the event, which states what is to be done (issue). We also paid attention to counter-mobilizations, coding the reaction of other political actors such as unions, left-wing movements, the ruling political class, civil-society organizations, and so on. Starting from these definitional assumptions, we conducted a

¹⁵ In order to be coded, actions/events must be political, in the sense that they relate to collective social problems and solutions, and not to purely individual strategies of coping with problems.

¹⁶ As has been noted indeed, protest itself has become a routine and conventional action form in contemporary societies. Thus, it is no longer self-evident that data limited strictly to protest events are a good indicator for the level of contention. For this reason, many scholars suggest including not only protest actions (Koopmans and Statham 1999, 4).

protest event analysis drawing our main empirical evidence from newspaper articles, searching the electronic editions with keywords, and eliminating redundant articles.¹⁷ For the Italian and the German cases, we used articles published in the quality national newspapers (including their regional editions) *La Repubblica* (LR) (centre left) for Italy and *Tageszeitung* (Taz) (leftist) for Germany.¹⁸ For the US case, we drew our main empirical evidence from articles published in the US Newspapers and Wires included in the database *LexisNexis*. The US Newspapers and Wires group source contains newspapers published in the United States and wire services in which more than 60 per cent of the stories originate in the United States. This database was chosen as particularly useful for our purposes because it includes various regional newspapers, thus offering coverage of events occurring at the national as well as the local level. Our protest event analysis is based on a total of about 1,200 protest events from 2000 to 2007 (368 for Italy, 364 for Germany, and 379 for the US).¹⁹

In order to limit the problem of selection, we have triangulated our data with those coming from official statistics and secondary sources. We have also tried to minimize the problem of description bias by using quality newspapers as well as explicitly basing the coding only on the factual coverage of events in newspaper articles, leaving out any comments and evaluations made by reporters or editors.

¹⁷ As for the sampling criterion, data were coded from CD-ROM versions of the newspapers (in the Italian and German cases) and the LexisNexis database (for the US case) using several keywords (e.g. 'skinhead*', 'neo-Nazi' or 'neonazi', 'white supremacis*', 'KKK') searched in 'Headline and in Lead paragraphs'. We used a reiterative process by searching with all keywords for each year, and then eliminating redundant articles.

¹⁸ We chose the *Tageszeitung*, rather than a centre-left daily, because it has local pages on several German cities. To control for the potential bias introduced by the different ideological leanings of the Italian versus the German sources, we codified two additional newspapers for the year 2007: for the Italian case, *Il Manifesto*, a left-wing newspaper, for a total of 62 coded events; and for the German case, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a quality centre-left newspaper, for a total of 27 coded events. The results did not show any important cross-newspaper differences in the relevant variables under analysis.

¹⁹ In this book, for the Italian and German newspaper sources we will use the following abbreviations: LR (*La Repubblica*); Taz (*Tageszeitung*). For the US case, we will use the entire name of the newspaper since we drew on the database *LexisNexis*, which includes more than 100 US Newspapers and Wires.

3

The Context of the Extreme Right

The extreme right is embedded in different contexts in the three countries under research, with a direct or indirect influence on discourses and protest activities. These contexts can be analysed through the concept of opportunity structure. In this chapter, we shall distinguish a stable set of opportunities and constraints that the three systems offer to right-wing actors. In social movement studies, this stable set of opportunities has been conceptualized mainly by looking at the number of access points that the institutions offer to unconventional actors (Kriesi et al. 1995). However, this conceptualization, already debatable and debated for mass movements (della Porta and Diani 2006, ch. 8), is of limited use for understanding the small and stigmatized extreme right. Thus, we instead focused our attention on the legal constraints upon two specific aspects relevant for the development of the extreme right's discourse and action: repression of the use of fascist and racist symbols and practices.

Among the more contingent opportunities, the configuration of power between allies and opponents (and especially the shifts in this configuration) has been considered as particularly relevant. We considered this dimension as important for the extreme right as well, especially regarding the availability of potential allies within representative institutions.

Finally, beyond political institutions, the cultural context is relevant in determining the potential resonance of social movement discourse. Not only are political opportunities filtered by the activists, but frames and actions are influenced by historically deeply-rooted values and visions, as well as by (more contingent) perceived trends in public opinion (Gamson 2004).

In this chapter, we look at these institutional, political, and discursive opportunities available to the extreme right in the three countries. We then give initial insights into the effects of these opportunity structures on the topics and actors that are frequently discussed in the three countries under research.

1. The legal situation

As research on political opportunities for social movements has progressed, it has added to an original set of dimensions that focused especially on the degree of openness of channels of access granted to institutions through functional and territorial differentiation. Although they share the status of advanced democracies, our three countries clearly differ with regard to the democratic model. On both the functional and the territorial dimensions, the US is the most open system, followed by Germany and then Italy.

As mentioned, however, we believe these general aspects to be of limited importance for the analysis of the extreme right. Therefore, following a recent trend in research on political opportunities, we aimed at singling out some more specific institutional conditions that might have greater relevance for the development of the extreme right. The legal constraints on the use of fascist and racist discourses and actions seemed particularly salient. As we will see, our three countries differ in this respect, with more open opportunities in the US—where freedom of speech tends to trump other concerns—than in the two European countries, where the fascist and Nazi experiences left legacies of legislation and policies concerning racist violence and crimes.

In Italy, the principle of non-discrimination is guaranteed by the Constitution and by criminal laws and specific legal provisions. The so-called Scelba Law (Law 645 of 1952) bans the ‘reorganization of any form of the dissolved fascist party’ (art. 1) and defines crimes of fascist apology (art. 4)—that is, the instigation and reiteration of typical practices of the regime which had been abolished, including racist discrimination and violence. In addition, enforcing the 1948 Convention against Genocide, Law 962 of 1967 punishes the partial or total destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group (art. 1); the public instigation and apology of genocide (art. 8); and the imposing of brands or distinctive signs on people on the grounds of their national, ethnic, racial, or religious group (art. 6) (*ibid.* 2004, 22–3). In the 1990s, a most important law in this respect was the Mancino Law (205/1993), which punishes with imprisonment any discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or race, and instigation to racist acts of violence. Those who openly show symbols of organizations that aim to incite discrimination and racist violence will be fined (EUMC 2004, 20). Measures were also taken to sanction violence in stadiums: for example, Law 45/1995 repeats in a more general way the sanctions established in the Mancino law.¹ In 2003, a Legislative Decree (No. 215)

¹ Articles 41 and 42 of Law 286/98 define the direct and indirect behaviour that represents a form of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination and mention the beneficiaries of the laws, granting them the possibility of suing and prosecuting.

approved the application of the European Directive (2000/43/CE) 'for the equal treatment of people independently of their race and ethnic origin'.

Despite the existence of specific anti-racist legislation, the political discourse, and, more generally, the political culture of some Italian political elites is not always in line with these principles (EUMC, 2004, 18–21), vesting racist and xenophobic behaviour and political choices under the label of 'free speech'. For example, in February 2003 in the European Parliament, Minister Castelli (LN) opposed measures designed to harmonize laws and sanctions on racism among European countries, declaring: 'There is something rotten astir in Europe: red Nazis are trying at all costs to deny freedom of speech and opinions to its citizens. But the League opposes and will always oppose these threats. We no longer want to see books burned in a square' (Sa. M., 'Castelli di razza', *Il Manifesto*, 2 March 2003).

The most important German legal regulation is the *Volksverhetzung* Law, which states: 'Whoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, denies or belittles an act committed under the rule of National Socialism . . . in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine.' This law was passed in 1985 (coincidentally at the time of President Richard von Weizsäcker's speech on the guilt of the German people), with the addition of an explicit Holocaust denial clause in 1994. Following the constitutional rule allowing the prohibition of undemocratic parties, Germany attempted to ban the NPD in 2003. However, the constitutional court suspended the hearings upon discovering that secret informants for the German authorities had worked as *agents provocateurs*, inciting racial hatred and recruiting violent neo-Nazis.

The *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* and its equivalents at the *Land* level are important actors in this respect. These public agencies, subordinate to the ministries of interior affairs, monitor, report, and execute actions against the enemies of German democracy—that is, extremists of all kinds. However, this is neither secret spy service nor political police, not a judicial actor nor simply an executive organ. It appears to be unique both within the German political system and in international comparison (perhaps only comparable to an Audit Court). These agencies publish yearly reports on extremist activity and provide an important point of reference in the discussion on extremism. Their effect on the public discussion is twofold: on the one hand, they monitor, report, and call on government agencies to react to the threats that extremists present for German democracy; on the other hand, they provide information and educational material to the public. In addition, most *Länder* have introduced representatives who address questions regarding right-wing extremism, even if not under a uniform title.

In the US, the legal situation varies a great deal from state to state, thus offering extremely fragmented constraints to right-wing extremists (Freilich

et al. 2009). Significant in this regard is the activity of the Supreme Court, which took several important decisions in cases concerning political extremism and in particular on the First Amendment of the American Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, including the expression of Nazi, racist, and anti-Semitic views. Despite this general freedom, the Klapprott case in 1940 led to a fundamental Court decision in the field of group defamation, stating that 'offensive attacks on individuals (e.g. speech that offends private citizens) could be handled through civil remedies such as libel and slander actions' (Michael 2003, 163). The *Teniello* sentence in 1949 represented an important step in the prosecution of anti-Semitic speeches. In the *Brandenburg vs. Ohio* decision, the Supreme Court declared the right of the state to proscribe the advocacy of violent means to affect political change (ibid. 163). Finally, the *Skokie* case was a very controversial decision in which, after a march of neo-Nazis in a Jewish suburb of Chicago was prohibited, the Court allowed the group to stage a series of demonstrations in the Chicago area. In this case, as has been noted, 'the Court expanded the scope of protected speech' (ibid. 165).

Investigations of the US intelligence services stress that 'many right-wing extremist groups perceive recent gun-control legislation as a threat to their right to bear arms and in response have increased weapons and ammunition stockpiling, as well as renewed participation in paramilitary training exercises' (DHS 2009, 5). During the 1990s, the implementation of restrictive gun laws—such as the Brady Law and the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, both of which limited access to and purchasing of firearms—provoked an increase in the hostility of American right-wing activists and groups towards the government. In 2008, laws were proposed mandating registration of all firearms.

2. Institutional allies

These legal constraints notwithstanding, the extreme right can find ways to influence politics by exploiting moments of electoral instability or through the emergence of potential allies. Our countries also vary in this respect. Italy has experienced an opening of (contingent) opportunity structures and right-wing parties in government (including a former radical right party), but in Germany we see only the occasional presence of extreme right parties in regional parliaments. In the US, while electoral law discourages the formation of extreme right parties, the Republican Party (in power for most of the period covered by our study) has taken over some of the concerns of the extreme right.

As for institutional allies, Italy is the first European country in the last 50 years in which the extreme right has reached full political and institutional

recognition, with a stable presence in centre-right governments after 1994 (Caldiron 2001, 15). In fact, the Italian extreme right (manifest in the National Alliance, AN, direct heir to the post-war neo-fascist party *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI); the strongly ethnocentric Northern League (LN); and the Social Movement-Tricolored Flames (MsFt) [Baldini 2001, 2]) has been increasingly accepted as a coalition partner. In the 1994 national elections, AN reached 13.5 per cent of the vote and LN 8.4 per cent, forming, together with Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi's right-wing coalition. In 1996, both the AN and the LN confirmed their electoral success, gaining respectively 15.7 and 10.1 per cent of the vote. Furthermore, the neo-fascists of MsFt, established in 1995 by individuals refusing to follow AN, obtained 0.9 per cent (Carter 2005). Both AN and LN occupied important ministerial positions in the Berlusconi government after the 2001 national elections, among them the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence. This also means that extreme right extra-parliamentary groups can call upon a potentially powerful political ally. In fact, 'right-wing extremist groups and rightist skinheads are closely associated with the MSI/AN and have often benefited from its support, despite contrary affirmation from party leaders' (Wetzel 2009, 327; Gnosis 2006).

The expected effect of party competition—namely, that the political space that established parties leave to radical-right actors affects the openness of a party system to anti-immigrant parties (Koopmans and Muis 2008; Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995)—is partly mitigated by the political relevance that AN was able to attain in the Italian political system (Carter 2005). Indeed, the case of Italy from 1993–2000 suggests that once a right-wing extremist party has passed the threshold of relevance, as for example in the cases of LN and AN, its electoral fortunes may depend less on the behaviour and ideology of its mainstream right-wing opponents (Caiani and Wagemann 2007). Italian extreme right parties may continue to experience success at the polls even if their mainstream right competitors undergo ideological radicalization (Carter 2005). Some scholars also suggest that extreme right-wing parties in Italy can also benefit from the impact of the growing mistrust in representative institutions, which is particularly high in Italy (Norris 2005; Morlino and Tarchi 1996); while anti-immigrant appeals that stimulate the salience of cultural protectionism (at least in the public political discourse) do not seem to be considered an element of extreme right-wing parties' success (*ibid*; see also Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese 2009). The (favourable) opportunity structure for the extreme right in Italy has also been related to the political crisis of 1992–1994, 'when the clientelistic rule by parties—the *partitocrazia*—dominated by the CD (Christian Democrats) since the late 1940s resulted in the *tangentopoli* corruption scandal' (Fella and Ruzza 2006, 180; Baldini 2001, 2). The collapse of all the governmental parties left an empty political space in the centre-right, offering the extreme right parties (in particular the MSI), which

were very marginally involved in the investigations, an opportunity to emerge from their political isolation (Baldini 2001, 3). It also provided them with strong credentials to distance themselves from the other parties (ibid.).

The situation is different in Germany, where, when discussing the political party spectrum, it is useless to focus on (formal or informal) government activity, since no other political party in Germany has ever seriously considered an alliance with right-wing extremists. This does not mean that right-wing political parties are not active or not represented in the German representative arena, since they can still participate in the (parliamentary) opposition. However, an electoral rule has also limited this form of presence in representative institutions: the federal electoral law and all 16 regional electoral laws require a political party to gain at least 5 per cent of the vote to be admitted to Parliament.² One can note that not only did this rule prevent right-wing extremist parties from entering the Parliaments in most elections, it also provided a visible sign of their success when they finally managed to pass the hurdle.

The right-wing extremist and Nazi parties were immediately (re-)founded after World War II. However, Allied control and a very strong judicial review process led to exclusion of these (weak) forces by the mid 1950s (Backes and Moreau 1994, 15ff.). The first right-wing political party to achieve temporary parliamentary representation was the NPD (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, National Democratic Party of Germany) in the late 1960s. Following the first economic recession in Germany after the boom years, and the collaboration of the two main political parties in a so-called grand coalition agreement at the federal level, the NPD managed to gain seats in several German regional (*Land*) Parliaments (Backes and Moreau 1994, 20). Internal party problems, a prospering economy, and the problem-solving capacity of the German federal government helped to terminate this electoral success rather quickly.

The next phase of right-wing electoral success came about in the late 1980s, when the right-wing Republikaner (originally a splinter group of the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democratic party) entered both the *Land* Parliament of the city of Berlin (7.5 per cent) and the European Parliament (7.1 per cent).³ The Republikaner achieved their biggest successes in the *Land* of Baden-Württemberg, where they won 10.9 per cent of the vote in 1992, repeated their success in 1996 (9.1 per cent), but did not manage to win any seats in 2001 (4.4 per cent).⁴

² The federal and some regional constitutions foresee the alternative that direct election in one or several electoral circumscriptions is equivalent to the 5 per cent hurdle. However, no extremist right-wing party has ever come close to such a result. Note that the rules might differ for the local level.

³ Calculating a separate result for Bavaria, the result even increases to 14.6 per cent.

⁴ Today, the Republikaner have disappeared from the Parliaments (but not as a party) and can be considered a right-wing populist, in certain respects still right-wing extremist, party.

This phase was followed by single successful campaigns by the DVU (Deutsche Volks-Union, German People's Union). Apart from the city *Land* of Bremen, where the DVU benefited from a different electoral law and won one seat in each of the 1987, 1999, and 2003 elections (without having to clear the 5 per cent hurdle), the party was successful in the Bremen elections of 1991 (6.2 per cent), in Schleswig-Holstein 1992 (6.3 per cent), in the East German *Land* Saxony-Anhalt in 1998 (12.9 per cent—the highest result ever for a German right-wing extremist political party), and twice in succession in the East German *Land* Brandenburg (5.3 per cent in 1999; 6.1 per cent in 2004). The autumn of 2004 not only brought about a confirmation of the electoral success of the DVU, but the NPD reappeared on the parliamentary scene and won 9.2 per cent of the vote in Saxony, and another 6.1 and 6.0 per cent in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania in 2006 and 2011, respectively. This was a particularly problematic result since the NPD—in contrast to the Republikaner and DVU—has many organizational and personal links to non-party extremist organizations, mostly through its youth organization, JN (Junge Nationaldemokraten, Young National Democrats) (Backes and Moreau 1994, 23; Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993, 58). The NPD has even managed to establish itself in local strongholds, reaching 20 per cent of the vote in local and *Land* elections and more in the South of Saxony. Comparing the DVU and the NPD, we can say that while they embrace the same brand of political extremism, the DVU has money, but no cadre, whereas the NPD has a cadre, but no money (Mudde 2000, 62).

In the meantime, the various regional elections held in Germany during the year 2009 have changed the landscape a bit: the DVU did not cross the 5 per cent hurdle in the 2009 Brandenburg election, and the NPD lost a considerable number of votes in Saxony (from 9.2 to 5.6 per cent) and only won half the number of seats in Parliament. Whereas this seems to indicate a certain decline, it also demonstrates that the NPD is not just an occasional protest party in Saxony but has established roots in society. There is also an opposite development: in the 2009 Thuringian election, where the NPD ran a highly contested campaign against a Christian Democratic candidate of African origin, it reached 4.3 per cent—not enough to get a seat in Parliament, but still a notable increase from 1.6 per cent in the 2004 election.

In contrast to the two European countries under study, the US extreme right does not have representatives in the parliamentary arena. Certainly, the first-past-the-post electoral system is an important factor in this. However, right-wing American movements have occasional points of reference and leverage among Republicans in Congress. There are some political movements that define themselves as political parties, such as the National Socialist Movement, which in the home page of its website welcomes visitors as 'the largest National Socialist Party operating in the United States of America today. We

are the political party for every patriotic American' (<<http://www.nsm88.org/aboutus.html>>). Founded in 1974, the group declined in 2007, when many members left to join the National Socialist Order of America, another neo-Nazi party led by 2008 presidential candidate John Taylor Bowles. However, the National Socialist Movement is still active in the political and social spheres.

For the US, some clarification of the empirical reference to the concept of the far right is also necessary. Broadly speaking, the right-wing extremist family in the United States is commonly divided into 'those groups, movements, and adherents that are primarily hate-oriented (based on hatred of particular religious, racial or ethnic groups), and those that are mainly anti-government, rejecting federal authority in favour of state or local authority, or rejecting government authority entirely' (DHS 2009, 2). It may also include single-issue groups and individuals that focus on a single issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration. The US mainstream conservative movements and the mainstream Christian right are potential allies for the far right.

3. Discursive opportunities

Social movements address political institutions, but also public opinion. They exploit issues that become temporarily 'hot', but also contribute to the thematization of certain problems. Social movement scholars employ the concept of discursive opportunities to refer to this potential resonance. Additionally, the analysis of political opportunities has included attention to (historically rooted) culture, referring to characteristics such as prevalent strategies to deal with opponents (Kriesi et al. 1995). On this aspect as well, our countries present a mix of similarities and differences.

In Italy, especially in the last decade, 'the far right has now become more visible. It appears as if its presence in the Italian political, cultural, and social fabric has gradually become normalized, accepted, certainly more tolerated than before' (Padovani 2008, 754). The cultural as well as the discursive opportunities that can determine a message's chance of success in the public sphere (Koopmans and Olzak 2004) seem to be favourable (Wetzel 2009, 327). The political right has gained not only electoral significance, but also societal importance. At the same time, the gap between the moderate and far right has been reduced (Caldiron 2001, 15). Despite being an advanced Western democracy, Italy carries many legacies of the past. Italian extreme right-wing militancy 'has maintained a clear link with fascism' (Milesi, Chirumbolo, and Catellani 2006, 67). Taking into account the cultural dimensions of extreme right-wing parties in Italy, Dechezelles (2008) shows that young Italian right-wing activists share collective cultural frames composed of an ideal model of society, a legendary narrative, and a symbolical territory, inspired by old

ideological references (ibid. 2). She stresses that the mechanisms that allow the appropriation of such old elements are driven by certain shared biographical, familial, and social experiences, through which intimate (family) memory and political commemoration are associated and transmitted, and/or topographical and historical inventions are developed in response to the thin family memory of young activists (ibid. 14).

In addition, the extreme right in Italy skilfully exploits the concerns of some of the population.⁵ Surveys show that the social problems that the citizens consider relevant are (in this order) unemployment, precariousness, and economic development (33 per cent), followed by criminality, security, and law and order (12.5 per cent), and then migration (5 per cent) (Itanes 2008, quoted in Biorcio and Vitale, 2010). The attitude of Italian citizens towards immigrants is seen as characterized by 'a formal tolerance and hostility at the same time' (EUMC 2004, 17). In addition, the television space devoted to immigrants is mostly limited to daily news programs (88.3 per cent). Immigrants usually appear as victims of misfortune (48.4 per cent) or as authors of a negative action (29.7 per cent). The coverage in general refers to criminality/illegal acts/clandestinity (75.2 per cent) (EUMC 2004, 18). This investigation stresses that nearly all Italians, when speaking of immigrants, resort to stereotypes (98.0 per cent). Immigrants are rarely invited on television as experts (in only 2.1 per cent of cases); at most, they are mentioned (64.9 per cent) or interviewed as being personally involved (18.6 per cent).

According to another study (Fondazione Censis 2002), this marginalization of immigrants in television and newspapers has important consequences for their role in public discourse: 'Whether male or female, a child, adult or elderly person, the role of the immigrant in 78 per cent of cases relates a negative event in which he is a hero or a victim. Therefore, the image of foreigners channelled by television varies between that of the "poor immigrant", victim of a range of negative events (criminal acts, discrimination, judicial errors, etc.) and that of the violent and/or criminal foreigner' (EUMC 2004, 18). A study promoted by the Union of the Italian-Jewish Communities⁶ of 2,200 youths between 14 and 18 years old reports that 50.9 per cent of the respondents declared that immigrants 'favour prostitution', make 'our life in our cities less secure' (47.8 per cent) and 'at this rate they will be more than we are' (46.5 per cent). Further, 37.3 per cent of the respondents are convinced that immigrants lead to 'the degradation of our neighbourhoods and the places where they live', and 32.8 per cent state that 'they take away homes

⁵ 'Far Right Attacks Reached New Record in Germany in 2007', 10 March 2008, *Spiegel Online*, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-540550,00.html>>.

⁶ Source: Union of the Jewish-Italian Communities, June 2003, *Il razzismo in Italia*, Rome.

and jobs from Italians'. For 24.1 per cent, 'they contaminate our traditions and culture', and for 21.2 per cent, 'they bring diseases' (EUMC 2004, 19).

As for the cultural context of German right-wing extremism, it is a given that this cannot be discussed without reference to the past. German Nazism has become a synonym for the Holocaust, the best-known state-ordered murder of millions of people. Today, a broad societal consensus in Germany holds that a disaster like the Holocaust must be avoided at all costs. Anti-Semitism and racism are not dominant feelings among the German public: only 3 per cent of Germans agree with the statement that Jews are somewhat or very unsympathetic, a rather low percentage in international comparison.⁷ Furthermore, a high level of public sensitivity towards these issues has emerged, and right-wing extremism is broadly refused and stigmatized as unacceptable (Kersten 2004, 186). However, this implies three important consequences, making Germany a special case for right-wing extremism. First, it is not easy to put right-wing topics on the political agenda without the risk of being accused of right-wing tendencies. Second, this societal consensus against right-wing extremism can also be abused by the activists themselves, who can present themselves as victims. Third, 'the nation's sensitivity about the historical past and German guilt have rendered the provocative potential of racist and anti-Semitic symbolism very high' (ibid. 180), something that can be easily abused by the extreme right. More generally, 'right-wing extremist subcultures and their lifestyle are marginal aspects of Germany's contemporary political culture' (ibid. 186). It is not possible to identify clearly definable social movement organizations (SMOs) in the strong sense (Minkenberg 2002, 253). However, attitudes on right-wing extremism as such, and the personal stance with regard to right-wing extremist topics, are not necessarily linked: one can be against hate crimes, but nevertheless have a right-wing stance on immigration. Data from the last wave of the World Value Survey (2005–2008, German sample as of 2006) shows that only 7.0 per cent of respondents think that 'everybody should be able to come to Germany' if (s)he wants to. A further 43.2 per cent would limit this as long as jobs are available. Nearly half of the respondents (45.1 per cent) would pose even stricter limits. A small minority (4.7 per cent) thinks that migrants should be prohibited from entering Germany.

Germany also represents a special case with regard to the definition of nation: Germany has always had difficulty defining itself as a nation in modern history, because of its religiously mixed society and its late nation-state formation, but also because of the territorial changes Germany has undergone since the early eighteenth century (Minkenberg 1998, 101f.).

⁷ See <http://www.ajc.org/upload/survey/Holocaust_Survey.pdf> p. 11.

However, not even reunification solved the issue of national identity; remaining is an 'absence of the nation state as a "model" of identity, and the subsequent utopian nature of German identity-formation' (Hewitt 2004, 35). German nationalism is oriented towards a German *Volkgemeinschaft* (however defined) and a fuzzy idea of nativism (ibid. 139). Right-wing extremists promote a 'revival of the idea of a German *Kulturnation*, including elements of a *völkisch*, or exclusively ethnic understanding of the German nation' (Minkenberg 2002, 264). Some scholars make use of the term *Heimat*, paraphrased as 'belongingness to the entire German nation' (Klein and Simon 2006b, 232). In this spirit, right-wing extremists long for a 'debate of national consciousness freed from the shadow of Hitler, since the ghost of National Socialism is seen as impeding the development of a healthy German patriotism and German *völkisch* identity' (Backer 2000, 96f.). This also includes historical revisionism. The death of six million Jews and of members of other ethnic and societal groups, as well as other historical facts dating back to the Third Reich, are doubted, and positive aspects of the Nazi period and above all of the heroism in the Second World War are praised.⁸ This is also linked to the claim for an end to the historical debates about the Nazi period. Indeed, 'behind the talk of German sovereignty and normalization lie historical revisionism on the one hand, which ultimately rejects any specific German responsibility for the Second World War and the Holocaust, and the anti-liberal philosophy of Carl Schmitt and colleagues on the other, which puts the collectivity of the German nation and its newly regained nation state above civil liberties and human rights' (Minkenberg 1997, 75).

Right-wing extremism also has a long tradition in the US. Various movements were present in different periods of American history, and their heritage can still be observed in subsequent far-right movements (Michael 2003, 40). Noteworthy are the Anti-Masonic Party of the early nineteenth century, which initiated the right-wing protest against economic crisis, conspiracy theories, and a strong focus on religion (ibid. 41), and the Know-Nothing movement, which arose a few decades later in reaction to waves of immigrants from Ireland and Germany. During the first three decades of the 1900s, the rise of fascism in Europe influenced the growth of similar movements in America, but 'despite their numbers, this plethora of groups was never really able to work effectively as a unified movement and ultimately failed to achieve their goals' (ibid., 43). Another favourable window of opportunity opened for the American extreme right during the 1950s, when the fear of communism offered an occasion to the

⁸ Note that right-wing extremists very often see the Second World War and the Nazi dictatorship as two different things. This enables them to praise the heroic military successes of German soldiers in the Second World War independently from the Holocaust and other aspects of the Nazi period.

US far right 'to return and regain respectability under the banner of McCarthyism' (ibid., 44).

Nevertheless, in spite of their poor electoral results and institutional constraints, the actual influence of extreme right groups and movements in the US is considered to be stronger than the number of adherents shows. This is in part because the world view of the American extreme right is also shared by many Americans outside its ranks: 'from FOX News to Sean Hannity's radio show, white-hot antigovernment rhetoric is filtering into what is commonly thought of as the mainstream' (SPLC).⁹ The discourse of the American extreme right seems to skilfully transform itself in order to resonate with frames and issues diffused in society: 'during the 1990s, radical groups keyed in on such issues as race, guns, immigration, abortion, homosexuality, and the power of the federal government. In the new century, at least some sectors of the extreme right are focusing on issues that also are of interest to the traditional left: the environment, animal rights and, above all, the spectre of growing economic globalization' (Intelligence Report, 92, 2000, 40, quoted in Potok 2004, 59).

However, recent waves of immigration and asylum seekers have been met with alarming amounts of violence (ibid.). A single-issue movement opposing immigration has helped to create fear and anxiety about immigration in the minds of many Americans. Ku Klux Klan groups have attempted to take advantage of that fear and uncertainty, using anti-immigration sentiments for recruitment and propaganda purposes, and to attract publicity (Anti-Defamation League, ADL). The current financial crisis has contributed to the resurgence of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories attributing the global economic recession to the Jews and Israel.¹⁰ Moreover, 'right-wing extremists have capitalized on the election of the first African American president, and are focusing their efforts to recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their scope and appeal through propaganda' (DHS 2009, 9).

A peculiarity of the US context is the strong tradition of civil liberties (Michael 2003, 2), as public discourse and the mass media attribute much importance to the principle of the individual 'freedom of expression' on which American society is based. This implies that, on the one hand, extremist and racist behaviour is condemned, but, on the other hand, the individual liberty to expose racist symbols and to leaflet racist messages is highly tolerated.

Connected to this is the idea of the right to self-defence. Indeed, 'weapons rights and gun-control legislation are likely to be hotly contested subjects of

⁹ SPLC, 'Antigovernment Rhetoric Spills into the Mainstream', Report <<http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?sid=450>>.

¹⁰ See the article, <http://www.adl.org/Anti_semitism/financialcrisis.asp>.

political debate in light of the 2008 Supreme Court’s decision in *District of Columbia v. Heller* in which the Court reaffirmed an individual’s right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the US Constitution, but left open to debate the precise contours of that right. Because debates over constitutional rights are intense, and parties on all sides have deeply held, sincere, but vastly divergent beliefs, violent extremists may attempt to co-opt the debate and use the controversy as a radicalization’ (DHS 2009, 6).

4. Opportunity structures

Summarizing, if we compare the three countries under research with regard to the various opportunities and constraints to which the extreme right is exposed (see Table 3.1), we can see that, with regard to potential *institutional allies*, Italy seems to be the most open country, since right-wing extremists even participate in national governments. The US and Germany seem equally closed to the admission of right-wing extremists, both because there are no other political parties with which the extreme right could align, and because the electoral law makes parliamentary representation of these actors highly improbable. Nevertheless, German electoral law rendered parliamentary representation of the radical right occasionally possible. Therefore, the institutional dimension is even less favourable in the US.

When it comes to legal regulations, the tendency is inverse. Right-wing extremists find the most flexible *legal situation* in the US, followed by Italy and finally by Germany, where legal prosecution of extremist right-wing activity is most rigid. Similarly, *discursive opportunities* vary: right-wing extremist statements can be seen as acceptable public opinion in the US; Italy occupies an intermediate position; and in Germany, right-wing extremist discourses are socially stigmatized.

Germany is therefore the most closed system with regard to right-wing extremism. Italy and the US are both partially open, but still very different countries: whereas Italy is open to institutional allies, the US provides an open system, both from the point of view of legal regulations and with regard to discursive opportunities.

Table 3.1. Overview of opportunity structures

	Germany	Italy	US
Institutional allies	Nearly closed	Open	Closed
Legal regulation	Closed	Intermediate	Open
Discursive opportunities	Closed	Intermediate	Open

5. Issue areas and actors in the discourses of the radical right

The various opportunity structures have notable effects on the various topics discussed in right-wing publications and discourses. Although we refrained from developing hypotheses of the relations between the different contextual aspects and the specific frames, given that we are moving here following a 'logic of discovery', we shall in this part illustrate the influence of various opportunities while presenting the general cross-country distribution of our frame analysis.

Looking at the issue areas of the statements we analysed (Table 3.2), politics is by far in the lead: 21.0 per cent of all statements refer to political class as such and the mode of current political (party) competition. Their critique on the ruling governmental system, although sometimes implicit, is very frequently present. This issue area is followed by a middle category of topics that are rather frequently discussed, but not as often as more general political issues. This concerns the self-image of the extremists (14.7 per cent) or more general questions of moral and societal values (14.4 per cent); migration (which combines immigration policy and the role of immigrants in a society) accounts for just 13.3 per cent of all statements; globalization (12.2 per cent); and social and economic issues (10.3 per cent). The issue of national identity follows (8.0 per cent), while EU topics are less frequently mentioned (of course, not at all in the United States).

There is some cross-national variance, which will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapters. For the moment, we can note that the situation in Italy is very similar to the overall picture, although with some increased relevance for EU integration (10.6 per cent), and, to a lesser extent, globalization topics. The broader resonance of the anti-European and anti-globalization critique in the political system and the very lively left-libertarian anti-globalization movements can account for this particular attention. The German distribution is slightly more deviant, with more attention to political class and political behaviour in general (29.6 per cent) and to self-description

Table 3.2. Distribution of issue areas by country

<i>Issue Area</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Total</i>
Politics	29.6%	19.8%	14.7%	21.0%
Us	18.3%	14.8%	10.8%	14.7%
Globalization	5.4%	14.6%	14.6%	12.2%
Social/economic issues	12.3%	10.2%	8.3%	10.3%
Values/identity	12.3%	12.1%	20.5%	14.4%
Migration	9.3%	11.6%	20.0%	13.3%
EU	4.6%	10.6%	0.0%	6.2%
Nation	8.3%	6.2%	10.9%	8.0%
	(1353)	(2460)	(1379)	(5192)

(18.3 per cent). The strong stigmatization of the extreme right we just mentioned can explain this high level of inward orientation. The distribution is more different for the US, where questions of values and identity (20.5 per cent), as well as migration (20.0 per cent), rank first, whereas they are at medium (or even low) levels in the other two countries. This corresponds to the discursive opportunity structures that exist in the US for the radical right, where topics such as traditional values and national identity are at the core of the mainstream centre-right discourse as well. By contrast, the importance of general political topics and of the self-understanding of right-wing extremists is more limited (14.7 per cent and 10.8 per cent in the US). Whereas the disregard of general political topics might be because, on the one hand, political participation in the US political system is generally low (as is party identification), on the other hand the model case of a fascist past that could inspire a potentially alternative system is also missing in the US. The low percentage for self-description is linked to the legal situation of hate groups in the US: many of their opinions are protected by the value of the freedom of opinion so that these groups—in contrast to their European counterparts—are not in danger of being banned. Making an issue of their own situation is therefore not relevant for groups in the US.

These results also show us the importance of opportunity structures in general. Indeed, the three countries present different realities, with Italy being a kind of typical case, mirroring the situation in the overall sample (at least with regard to the three countries selected for this study). Germany and the US deviate from this overall picture—Germany mainly with regard to the effect of the Nazi past on today's society, the US mainly with reference to the importance of value questions and topics of national (and sometimes even racial) identity.

Similar results emerge if we look at the actors that are mentioned (Table 3.3). Political actors are the most frequently mentioned (25.0 per cent), followed by actors related to national questions (such as the native people of a country; Christians; or the white race, as in the US case) (22.3 per cent). The third rank is occupied by the right-wing radicals themselves, with a certain numerical distance from the two previous actor categories (15.1 per cent).

Here as well, there are some cross-country differences, which can be explained by differing contextual opportunities. The German case study confirms the rank order from the overall sample, although with different percentages. Political actors are in the clear lead (34.4 per cent), confirming the importance of the political dimension which we had already identified above. National actors follow—with a notable distance—in the second position (19.0 per cent) and their own peer group in the third (18.8 per cent). Italy is, for these three positions, quite similar to the overall distribution with regard to the individual percentages, but their rank order is different: nation-

Table 3.3. Distribution of actors by country

<i>Actor</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Total</i>
Politics, populism	34.4%	20.9%	24.3%	25.0%
Extreme right, Us	18.8%	15.2%	12.0%	15.1%
Nation	19.0%	25.8%	18.8%	22.3%
Traditional values	5.2%	6.0%	12.7%	7.7%
Migration	8.1%	6.5%	21.4%	11.0%
Globalization	6.1%	10.4%	5.5%	8.0%
EU	3.2%	5.6%	0.0%	3.5%
Socio-economic	5.2%	9.6%	5.2%	7.3%
	(1677)	(3589)	(2030)	(7296)

related actors are more often mentioned (25.8 per cent) than are political actors (20.9 per cent); this is followed by the extreme right itself (15.2 per cent). In the US, the situation diverges a bit more: whereas political actors lead here as well (24.3 per cent), actors related to migration (that is, the migrants themselves, policymakers, and those whose life is somewhat affected by migration and migrants) are already in the second position (21.4 per cent), representing a strong difference from the other countries. This reflects the discursive opportunities that exist in the US with respect to these topics. National actors are third (18.8 per cent), and the extreme right itself receives only 12.0 per cent. The more flexible legal situation in the US renders the discussion of the extreme right about itself of rather limited importance.

With regard to the other categories, it is noteworthy that EU actors occupy the last position (3.5 per cent). This is on the one hand because they are not mentioned in the US case, but also due to the rather low values in the cases of Germany (3.2 per cent) and Italy (5.6 per cent). We can also see a certain deviance for actors from the socio-economic world, which are over-represented in Italy (9.6 per cent)—where the economic and social situation renders questions of economic governance more important than in the other countries—and for actors who are linked to traditional values in the US case (12.7 per cent), again corresponding to the US discursive opportunity structures.

6. Conclusion

Above, we have noted crucial differences among the opportunity structures offered by the three countries under research. Germany appeared to be the closest country to right-wing extremism, and Italy and the US could be identified as more open. However, their openness varies: whereas Italy is more open politically, the US allows for more radical discourses. This situation had interesting consequences for the discourses that right-wing extremists

emphasize. In Germany, strictly political topics and group self-description are at the centre of attention. The emphasis on group self-description certainly depends on the difficult legal and discursive situation in which the radical right finds itself in Germany. Furthermore, we see that German right-wing extremists position themselves very clearly in political topics. The partial openness of the political system gives them the ability to criticize the ruling political circumstances and to propose a radical alternative. In Italy, discursive opportunities seem to be more visible for topics related to the European Union and to globalization, in part also because of an already very vivid discourse on these topics among political elites and the general population. In the US, questions of national identity and traditional values are more intensively discussed, since other, more moderate right-wing groups also concentrate on these issues; by contrast, the legal and social situation of the extreme right hardly plays a role in the US.

The differentiation by type of organization shows that topics of self-understanding are more relevant for subcultural groups and political movements, since their own existence is often questioned. Political parties, by contrast, are often guaranteed by the constitution, making it very difficult to ban them. Instead, they concentrate more on directly political (and sometimes often rather complex) issues.

Therefore, we can see that different opportunity structures in different countries create different contexts for discourses and enable right-wing extremists to concentrate on different topics. Furthermore, a division of labour among various types of groups differentiates the national pictures even further.

4

Networking Online

... very numerous, these web sites have a faithful and presumably large public, constituted not by simply curious people, but by those who have built their relationship with the world on hate feelings, and who use the Internet in order to meet each other, to exchange information, to mobilize one another, to create fences, to build barriers, and to dig trenches ... (Roversi 2006).

1. Introduction

The Internet is generally regarded as an important vehicle for the diffusion of democratic principles, equality, information, communication, and the building of a 'global village' (McLuhan 1964). As with any means of communication, however, it can also be used for anti-democratic aims. Recent studies underline that extremist groups, among others, exploit the Internet for their mobilization strategies, specifically to 'secure control over resources needed for collective action such as communication, money, information, human assets, and specialization skills' (Zhou et al. 2005, 3). Transnational networks and domestic radical groups use the Internet to avoid national laws and police investigations, among other purposes (e.g. Lee and Leets 2002, Tateo 2005). According to the US organization Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), of the 926 active right-wing groups in the United States¹ in 2008, the majority had a presence online (Zhou et al. 2005, 2). In the same country, an online directory of extremist sites lists 1,280 websites, 42 racist blogs, 30 mailing lists, 33 Usenet newsgroups, 75 Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels, 231 clubs and groups on Yahoo! and MSN (Franklin 2007).² Even if, as has been noted, the

¹ SPLC Report, 'Hate Groups, Militias on Rise as Extremists Stage Comeback', 2004. <<http://www.splcenter.org/center/splcreport/article.jsp?aid=71>>.

² For other important databases tracking hate sites, see the US Anti-Defamation League (<<http://www.adl.org/learn/default.htm>>) and the Simon Wiesenthal Center (<<http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/pp.asp?c=fwLYKnN8LzH&b=242023>>).

extreme right in Europe has been slower than its American counterpart to make use of new technology, European groups were also (as early as ten years ago) becoming more skilled in the use of the Internet (Caldiron 2001, 335). The *Verfassungsschutzbericht* of the German Ministry for Interior Affairs pointed out recently the increased importance of Internet communications for German extremist groups (2006, 52),³ but this is true also in other national contexts such as Italy (see Tateo 2005; Roversi 2006).

However, more than the number of the websites, the role of the Internet within these radical right organizations has provoked rising scientific interest among scholars (Garret 2006). Research has pointed out that the Internet is not only used by these types of groups to spread propaganda, boost the use of violence, and facilitate recruitment of new members (Glaser et al. 2002; Hoffman 1996; Mininni 2002), but also to find and maintain contacts with other extremist groups, both at the national and the international levels, thus forming dense networks of organizations that can potentially sustain mobilizations and facilitate the construction of collective identity (Burris et al. 2000, 216). As Caldiron notes, many German neo-Nazi activists were able to survive (despite their ban) in the first half of the 1990s thanks to the series of BBS (Bulletin Board Systems) connected to the Thule net, which allows them to maintain reciprocal links and connections (2001, 335). Recent research based on 157 US extremist organizations (Gerstenfeld et al. 2003) has shown that most sites contain external links to other extremist sites (including international sites); according to the US Department of Homeland Security, the Internet 'has given domestic extremists greater access to information related to bomb-making, weapons training, and tactics, as well as targeting of individuals, organizations, and facilities, potentially making extremist individuals and groups more dangerous and the consequences of their violence more severe' (DHS 2009). In fact, the most significant acts of right-wing violence in the US, including the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, have been carried out by various 'lone wolves', often with only very loose affiliations to formal organizations but many contacts online (Michael 2003, xi–xii). In this sense, virtual communities based on online networking can be seen as important 'social arenas . . . with the potential to contribute to individual [and collective] involvement processes' (Bowman-Grieve 2009, 1003).

Literature on social movements has also often stressed the importance of inter-organizational ties (Diani 2003). On the one hand, research underlines the capacity of networks, including those created through the Web, to generate collective identities (Garret 2006). It has been shown that the Internet can

³ For the year 2006, the *Verfassungsschutzbericht* identified no less than 1,000 websites maintained by the German extreme right, but this number includes also websites managed by private individuals.

have an impact in facilitating the exchange of resources and information, thus creating solidarity and facilitating the sharing of goals and objectives (della Porta and Mosca 2006, 538). Moreover, studies on violent radicalization stress that isolated individual consumers can find a common identity via extreme-right websites, fostering the sense that they are not alone, but part of a community. On the other hand, as social movement scholars argue, social networks among activists, as well as organizations, can play an important role in the processes of collective mobilization by reducing the cost of communication among a large number of individuals (della Porta and Mosca 2006, 542) and facilitating the organization of transnational and even global demonstrations (Petit 2004). Social networks are crucial in political socialization, influencing individual behaviour and readiness to engage in collective action (Bowman-Grieve 2009, 1003). For example, many studies have found that friendship and family ties favour political participation (della Porta 1995). Research on terrorism and political violence is still unclear on whether the ability to communicate internationally online has contributed to the increase in terrorist violence; nevertheless, there is strong consensus that online activities substantially improve the capacity of such extremist groups to raise funds, attract new followers, and reach a mass audience (e.g. Conway 2006; Weimann 2006a, 2006b). Finally, the structure (shape) of a network has been related to the forms of action used by collective actors within a social movement sector. In particular, organizations within highly segmented networks are expected to use more contentious action forms than actors embedded in a densely connected network (Hadden 2008).

In this chapter, applying a social network analysis based on line links between organizational websites,⁴ we explore in a comparative perspective the organizational structure and characteristics of the Italian, German, and American extreme right on the Web. We argue that the analysis of how extremist groups use the infrastructure of the Internet can help us to better understand the groups themselves (Zhou et al. 2005). At present, despite the increasing use of the Internet by extremist right-wing groups and the evident reticular characteristics of the Internet (van Dijk 1986; Whine 2000), there are only a few empirical studies on these issues. The instruments of social network analysis have not been frequently applied to the study of this new medium, and even less so for its use by extremist groups. Studies on social movements and the Internet have so far mainly focused on left-wing organizations (Burris et al. 2000; Zhou et al. 2005) or on the US extreme right (among others, see the well-known investigation by Burris et al. 2000; for an exception on the Italian case, see Tateo 2005). Furthermore, comparative works are rare.

⁴ For our analysis we used the UCINET 6 software (see Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002).

In this context, we will examine the structure of the Italian, German, and American extreme right. We look at the structure of right-wing networks in each country, with the goal of identifying the configuration of power within which various actors operate, seeking to characterize the actors in terms of their relative centrality (or peripherality) in the given network. In line with a social-capital approach, we argue that networks represent the relational resources of actors (e.g. Lin 2001), but, as suggested by a political-process approach (Broadbent 2003; Diani 2003), they also represent a combination of ties and opportunities (on this point see Chiesi 1999; Cinalli 2006). Focusing at the level of individual organizations, we will examine, in each of the networks, which types of actors occupy a central position and which are more peripheral. We will then try to characterize the overall configuration of these three extreme right sectors, looking at how dense, how conflictual or consensual, how segmented or centralized they are (for specific social network measures used to characterize these notions, see below).

We expect that collective action will be easier in the presence of dense social ties, which facilitate the exchange of resources and the construction of a common identity; whereas weak links can lead to processes of pacification or laziness (Cinalli and Füglistler 2008). We also hypothesize that the overall configuration of the extreme right network/sector will vary across the three countries under study, depending on the offline political opportunity structures faced by extreme right groups in each national context. In this sense, we expect to find a very dispersed structure for the American extreme right due to historical and geographic opportunities conducive to fragmentation (Gerstenfeld 2003, 390), as well as fewer political-institutional opportunities (for example, an unfavourable electoral system for minor parties) in comparison to those characterizing the European cases. Conversely, because of more open possibilities for the extreme right to access the political system, we expect to find a denser and more concentrated network in the two European cases, although with some cross-country specificities related to the characteristics of the extreme right milieu in the two contexts: the German one, in which the sector is monopolized by only one political party (the NPD); and the Italian one, characterized instead by deep divisions between right-wing political elites, highly diversified and difficult to co-ordinate. We hypothesize that this can have an impact on the two extreme right communities on the Web.

In the remainder of this chapter, after offering some further details on the methods and data used, we will present an overview of the various types of organizations and sites that compose the online universe of the Italian, German, and American extreme right, discussing their structural properties at a macro (section 2) and a micro level (section 3). Then, in a macro and a micro analysis, we explore the various characteristics of the three extreme right sectors and link them to the offline reality of the respective national political

contexts. The chapter also highlights the function of websites that are not related to any specific group. Indeed, online ties might be of special importance for the extreme right as a political actor that is usually banned from dominant societal discourses (if not legally forbidden) (section 4).

For the classification of the organizations, which was based on the self-definition of the group and the predominant nature of the message transmitted through the website (Tateo 2005), we have relied on the most common typologies that have been proposed for the study of the extreme right (see, for instance, Burris et al. 2000, Tateo 2005), adapting them to the specificities of the Italian, German, and American contexts (for this case we referred to Michael 2003).

By applying a social network analysis to the online contacts between organizations, our goal is to explore the organizational structure of the extreme right, interpreting these Internet data in light of the information available offline. In this sense, in this study, we treat the Web links between organizations as 'potential means of co-ordination' (Burris et al. 2000, 215). Certainly, the analysis of Web links between these organizations does not mirror the 'real' relations between them. Nevertheless, this kind of study can shed light on 'an area of virtual activity and of social exchange between right-wing groups which use the Internet as an additional channel in order to construct their common identity' (Tateo 2005). Indeed, frames, as well as norms and values, are diffused through 'acts of communication', and the Internet is among the strongest communication tools available today. The online links can therefore be considered as good indicators of ideological affinity, common objectives, or shared interests between the groups (Burris et al. 2000; Tateo 2005).

2. The structure of the network

In this section, we will examine the extent to which the online constellation of the extreme right in the three countries under observation can be characterized as a cohesive field, or if cleavages between organizations can be identified. In order to do so, we use some of the most common measures in network analysis:⁵ the average distance between nodes in the network, the average degree, the overall density of the network, and its degree of centralization. The average distance between the organizations of a network refers to the distance, on average, of the shortest way to connect any two actors. It measures the cohesiveness of the network itself: the longer the distance, the more difficult the communication between the two nodes. The average degree (of nodes)

⁵ For a description of these and the following measures, see Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Scott (2000).

shows the average number of contacts the organizations in the network have. We expect that actors belonging to networks with a high average degree are more likely to collaborate, overcoming the distances that separate them (Cinalli and Füglistner 2008). The overall density indicates the proportion of ties that actually exists over the entire number of cases that can be activated in the network. In this sense it indicates the network's overall level of cohesiveness. Density values can vary between 0 and 1, where 0 and 1 represent the two ideal situations—respectively, a network without links and a network in which every actor is linked to every other. Finally, the measure of centralization indicates the extent to which a network is organized around one (or more) central actors and can be interpreted in terms of power unbalance within the network.

The galaxy of websites related to the Italian, German, and (especially) American extreme right is complex and includes various categories of groups (Figure 4.1a, 4.1b, 4.1c). The Italian network is composed of 79 organizations with 417 links; the German one consists of 78 organizations connected through 473 links; and the US network has 134 organizations with 169 links. These three networks include nodes that range from extremist right-wing political parties and movements,⁶ to neo-Nazi groups,⁷ nostalgic, revisionist, and negationist (Holocaust denial) organizations,⁸ cultural right-wing associations,⁹ publishers and commercial sites (militaria/memorabilia),¹⁰ and an extremely differentiated youth subcultural area composed of skinheads, music, and sports groups, as well as, in the Italian case, squatters' centres.¹¹ In

⁶ In the category 'political party and movements' we included groups defining themselves as political parties or movements, political journals, magazines, and reviews (e.g. for Italy, Movimento Sociale Italiano-Fiamma Tricolore, Fronte Sociale Nazionale, Forza Nuova, Libertà di Azione and Rinascita Nazionale).

⁷ These refer to the Third Reich and are apologists for Hitler and the German National Socialist ideology. Their sites contain Nazi symbols, references to the purity of the Aryan race, and racial hatred (Tateo 2005, 12).

⁸ These groups refer to the twenty years of the fascist regime in Italy and the Salò Republic, and are apologists for Benito Mussolini. The main difference from neo-fascist/neo-Nazi groups is that these websites do not refer to contemporary political events (Tateo 2005, 14). Holocaust denial groups are particularly present in the US case (Burris et al. 2000, 221).

⁹ These extreme-right organizations can be divided into two subgroups: traditional cultural associations, and 'New Age' and 'neo-mystic' groups (Tateo 2005, 15). Catholic traditionalist organizations are also included. In the German case we also gathered in this category (pseudo-) intellectuals who try to back right-wing ideologies with scientific debates. These debates include biological (i.e. racist) issues on the superiority of the Nordic race as well as historical (revisionist) and political (above all on state-ness and geopolitics) contributions. The most important publications of this branch are *Nation Europa*, *MUT*, and the *Junge Freiheit* (Minkenberg 1997, 74), whose status as right-wing publications is contested. The 'intellectual' literature is also increasingly linked to party newspapers such as *Deutsche Stimme* (the party newspaper of the NPD).

¹⁰ These organizations collect and sell military souvenirs (e.g. uniforms) or right-wing books.

¹¹ These groups find their main interests in music (which they define as 'antagonistic', Tateo 2005) and sport. Their websites are often characterized by fascist or Nazi symbols. Contacts between skinheads and soccer hooligan groups are very frequent in Italy (Gnosis 2006). Moreover, a rather atypical phenomenon has emerged since 2002: the occupation of buildings

addition to these types of groups, which are common to the Italian and German extreme right milieu, in the US context some additional types are present online: Christian Identity groups (which endorse strong racist and anti-Semitic positions based on religious argumentations);¹² white supremacists (which include a broad variety of groups supporting white nationalism and separatism, Gerstenfeld et al. 2003, 32);¹³ Ku Klux Klan groups (whose main beliefs are racial segregation and white supremacy, ADL);¹⁴ and militia and patriot organizations (consisting of armed paramilitary groups, both formal and informal, with an anti-government and conspiracy-oriented ideology, ADL¹⁵). The extreme right is far from being a united family in any of our three countries.¹⁶

The graphs of the three extreme right networks (Figure 4.1a, 4.1b and 4.1c) can be interpreted in terms of the centrality and distance between the organizations.

2.1. *The network of the Italian extreme right*

First, when looking at right-wing extremism, political parties are considered as a particularly relevant category because they maintain various links to violent activists (Minkenberg 1998, 50). The actual situation in Italy does not conform to this expectation: the virtual community of the extreme right appears highly fragmented, and it is not focused around a few central organizations that are able to monopolize the communicative exchange within the sector. As our analysis reveals, only some political parties (such as for example Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore and Forza Nuova) occupy central positions in the network; most are located on its periphery (see Fronte Sociale Nazionale, Azione Sociale and Rinascita Nazionale). Political party organizations and

by right-wing anarchists, leading to the emergence of various squatted social centres (Di Tullio 2006).

¹² See <http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Christian_Identity.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&item=Christian_ID>.

¹³ Although the main content of these sites/groups is racism and anti-Semitism, they also frequently use Nazi symbols and slogans. In contrast to neo-Nazi groups, however, white supremacist organizations have more frequent/stronger references to Christianity and to 'American patriotism and Constitutionalism, a right-wing ideology that views the original Articles of Constitution plus the Bill of rights... as the sole legitimate law of the land' (Burris et al. 2000, 222).

¹⁴ These websites are racist and anti-Semitic, advocating violence as a strategy to achieve their goals; see <http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/kkk/default.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&item=kkk>.

¹⁵ <http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Militia_M.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&item=mm>.

¹⁶ We are aware, however, that some of the categories used in our classification may be redundant; in the empirical reality, some extreme-right organizations can overlap among two or more categories. For example, according to many scholars, the white supremacist category can encompass neo-Nazi, skinhead, and KKK groups (e.g. Burris et al. 2000, 32; Freilich et al. 2009).

political movements emerge as split into different clusters within the net;¹⁷ they are not considered as the main points of reference (partners) for contacts with the other Italian extreme right organizations.¹⁸ Rather, the core of the network consists of neo-fascist/neo-Nazi organizations (such as for instance Kommando Fascista, Omaggio al Duce, and Italia Volontaria), and some nostalgic and revisionist organizations¹⁹ that have prominence in the network. The overall density of the network is 0.07, indicating that only 7 per cent of all possible contacts within the Italian online network actually exist.

Second, the overall network of the Italian extreme right is characterized by a loose chain (especially in comparison with the German case, see below) and a 'policephalous structure' (Diani 2003, 309; Caiani and Wagemann 2009)—that is, both centralized and segmented. According to our data, although most of the organizations participate actively in exchanges within the network (as evidenced by the numerous horizontal links between semi-peripheral organizations), many organizations at the periphery are not directly connected with the central ones. Therefore, many actors can only communicate with each other via long paths. The average distance between the organizations is 2.932, which means that—on average—the organizations of this network are three nodes (actors) away from each other.

Third, although no organization is completely isolated from the overall network, it is worth noting the marginal position of the subcultural youth organizations (for example, the websites of the squatters' centres and music groups Casa Pound, Casa Montag, Lorien), which together form a cluster in the left part of the graph. These types of organizations remain peripheral and are integrated into the network only with a very low number of ties. The impression of a segmented network is confirmed by the average degree, which is 5.3, indicating that every Italian organization has on average around five links with other organizations. Finally, the online network of the Italian extreme right has a moderate level of centralization: Freeman's measure of centralization, which expresses the degree of 'inequality' (or variance) of the actors, is 19 per cent. The level of segmentation in a network reflects the degree to which communication between actors is hindered by barriers. These may reflect ideological differences between various actors or may be due to varying levels of concern for a particular policy (Diani 2003, 306). In

¹⁷ For a detailed analysis of the 'cliques' (clusters of subgroups) within the Italian extreme right network, see Caiani and Wagemann 2009.

¹⁸ For instance, the relatively marginal position of the political party Azione Sociale is surprising, particularly since this actor has in recent past years tried to play a unifying role in the spectrum of the Italian extreme right, attempting to create a political alliance among the most important right-wing political parties for the 2004 elections.

¹⁹ For example, Il duce.net (<<http://www.ilduce.net/>>) with 15 incoming links, and Brigata Nera (<<http://it.geocities.com/brigatanera88/>>), Il RAS (<<http://www.ilras.tk/>>), and RSI, (<<http://www.italia-rsi.org/>>), all with 11 incoming links.

(a)




Figure 4.1 (a) The online constellation of the extreme right in Italy, Germany, and the US (Web links) (a) Italy

any case, this structural arrangement does not seem conducive to close co-operation among political parties, nor between the political party side of the Italian extreme right field and the new right youth subcultural side.

2.2. The network of the German extreme right

Turning to the overall configuration of the German extreme right online milieu (Figure 4.1(b)), in contrast to Italy this network revolves more clearly around a few central actors that constitute a reference point for the other organizations. The NPD stands in the most central part of the network, whereas its old enemy (and today's partner),²⁰ the DVU, occupies a peripheral position. The website of the *Freier Widerstand*, the most important among the 'free resistance' German sites, is in an even more central position, not being limited to just one geographical area. We may infer that this centrality of the Free Resistance compared to the NPD confirms that the party—although trying hard—has not yet become the true centre of the German extreme right. In fact, we observe that the websites on the periphery of the network all belong to less important groups or initiatives. These include the *Kameradschaften* (which can be classified as subcultural youth skinhead groups), which are limited to a specifically local context (Diani 2003, 311, for example cases like those of 'local heroes'); sites without any specific content; or those marginal groups (often revisionist) that discuss the status of Eastern Prussia or the enlargement of Germany to the 1937 borders.

However, it seems that the more militant components of the network (subcultural youth and political movements) do not want to engage in a more in-depth discussion (or exchanges) with the revisionist groups. The sites of the *Aktionsbüros*—that is, the offices (very often in a virtual sense) for the co-ordination of the activists' activities, dispersed in various *Kameradschaften* or similar groups—are located neither in the external parts of the network nor at its centre, but seem to fulfil an intermediary role among the various actors of the network. Indeed, the average distance between German organizations is lower than in Italy (2.45), and the overall density of the network is higher (0.08). Furthermore, as the average degree shows, each organization is connected to a higher number of other organizations compared with the Italian groups (6.1). Finally, the centralization measures indicate a higher concentration of power in the German network (21 per cent). This structure seems to come close to the ideal-type of a star. In the language of

²⁰ In 2004, the NPD and the DVU created an electoral alliance. Only one of the two political parties presents candidates in any given election. However, this alliance (considered by many commentators as being motivated by the financial resources of the DVU and its leader, Gerhard Frey, as a wealthy publisher) is not appreciated by the activists of the extreme right, who would prefer that only the NPD present candidates.

(b)




Figure 4.1 (b) Germany Online Networks of the Italian and German Extreme Right: An explorative study with social network analysis. *Information, Communication and Technology* vol 12 no 1 2009 pp. 66–109 <http://www.informaworld.com>

network analysis, this reflects a situation in which a high degree of centralization coincides with a low degree of segmentation. In sum, some central actors—such as the NPD, the free sites, and the organizations that aggregate the local groups—organize exchanges within the network and act as co-ordination points between the peripheral elements, which are rarely directly linked with one another. In the marginal areas of the network, we find some

sites that are barely connected with one another; but most refer ‘instrumentally’ (Diani 2003, 310) to the central actors of the network.

2.3. *The network of the American extreme right*

The US network is the most fragmented among the three analysed. The overall network of the American far right is characterized by an extremely loose chain, especially in comparison to the German and Italian cases (Figure 4.1(c)). The density of the network is very low (0.01), indicating that very few (only 1 per cent) among the total possible ties are actually activated. Moreover, there is strong variation in the extent to which organizations engage in building (online) contacts with other groups in the network. The majority of websites (56 per cent) have no external links to other organizations in our sample; around 10 per cent of the groups have one external link; while less than one third (24 per cent) have two or more outgoing links. This means that the different parts of the network (that is, the various sectors of the American extreme right) are not all sufficiently interconnected. Many organizations on the periphery of the network are not directly connected with the central organizations or, very often, with each other. It is therefore difficult to speak of a unified right-wing sector on the Internet. In fact, the American extreme right milieu appears strongly segmented.

Looking at the diagram (Figure 4.1(c)) in terms of the closeness and distance between the organizations, at least six main subgroups can be identified. On the bottom left side of the network we find the cluster of religious Christian Identity groups, represented by organizations such as Bible Gateway, National Christian Church, Restoration Bible Ministries, and Gospel of the Kingdom Mission. These groups, which are not densely connected to each other, emerge from our analysis as the most separate from the rest of the network, including, as the diagram shows, many organizations that are completely isolated (isolated nodes) from the network. The cluster of religious organizations is connected to the overall network and thus to the other areas of the far right field through just a few groups (for example the Church of True Israel).

Close to the Christian Identity groups, but loosely connected with them, are two other subgroups (in the bottom central part of the network) mainly consisting of KKK organizations (for example the Ku Klux Klan, Knights of the KKK) and patriot-militia organizations (for example, League of the South, Americans for Self-Determination, European–American Issues Forum, Council of Conservative Citizens, American Renaissance). Here we also find many single-issue organizations focused on very specific topics (for example, FAIR—Federation for American Immigration Reform). The structural closeness between these two subgroups confirms their ideological affinity, since many KKK groups ‘share white-supremacist ideas with the websites of new

confederate [militia groups] organizations in the southern US, which espouse a separatist ideology, promoting the establishment of an independent state in the south' (Michael 2003, 59).

A number of commercial sites and publishers as well as nostalgic and negationist organizations (for example, Issues and Views)—which together form another cluster located in the bottom central part of the diagram, above the KKK and patriot clusters—play a sort of brokerage between the KKK and militia groups on the one hand, and the organizations located in the centre of the network on the other.

A fourth cluster, composed of neo-Nazi and white supremacist organizations—quite densely connected with each other—occupies the bottom right side of the network. Here we find organizations such as Stormfront, Blood and Honour, SS Regalia, National Socialists, and Volksfront, which although in a somewhat peripheral position are nevertheless well connected—not only to each other but also with the centre of the network occupied mainly by white supremacist groups and political right-wing organizations such as the National Socialist party. The dense structure of contacts between neo-Nazi and white supremacist clusters can be related to the difficulty, stressed by many scholars, in tracing a clear distinction among the various types of organizations that compose the US far right, in particular among Christian Identity, white supremacy, and neo-Nazi groups (on this point see Burris et al. 2000; Perry 2000). Indeed, despite the fragmentation of the sector, 'many of them share leadership as well as membership... and most of them espouse more or less the same views' (Gerstenfeld et al. 2003, 39–40). For example, political white supremacist groups embrace neo-Nazi ideology and favour an authoritarian government (Freilich et al. 2009, 501). Neo-Nazi groups refer to Christian Identity ideology, as do the anti-government militia and sovereign citizen groups: 'despite its small size, Christian Identity influences virtually all white supremacist and extreme anti-government movements' (ADL).²²

Finally, an extended web of contacts exists among the organizations in the upper right section of the network, which converge into a cluster of skinhead and youth subcultural organizations (for example, Resistance Records, Hammerskins Hail Victory Skinheads, Bowery Boys, White Aryan Youth). In contrast to Germany and especially Italy, this youth subcultural cluster is well connected with the rest of the network, particularly with neo-Nazi subgroups such as the National Alliance (for example through the brokerage of well-

Nazi Pp; New Christ Crusade Church; New Cov Bible Church; New Order; North East White Pride; NSPublications; Robert Lee Soc; Scriptures America; Sons Liberty; South National Pp; SSAGNY Brigade; Stone King Ministries; Strike Force; Fitzgerald Griffin Found; Hated; Union Christ Church; Upfront Rec; Upper RoomIdentity; Watchmen Outreach Min; White Am Freedom Fight; White Brotherhood; White Order Thule; World Church Creator.

²² See <http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Christian_Identity.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&item=Christian_ID>.

known white supremacist organizations such as the Posse Comitatus,²³ Aryan Nation, and Final Solution). As has been noted, dense relations within a group of organizations, described in social network analysis as a clique configuration, can result from high levels of ideological and/or cultural closeness among the members of the network, as well as from other more pragmatic reasons such as a strong common interest in a specific issue (Diani 2003, 308). Such a configuration, as is present in the US case between skinheads and neo-Nazis, favours collective action (Diani 1992). On the other hand, the cleavage between youth subcultural skinhead groups and Christian Identity organizations can be related to the relative indifference of skinheads, who are more oriented towards paganism and Celtic myths (on this point see also Burris et al. 2000, 226). This cleavage is not conducive to a common collective mobilization.

This divide through cleavages is confirmed by the very low average degree value, which is 1, indicating that every US extreme right organization has on average just one link with other organizations. This creates holes within the network: the majority of the organizations cannot communicate with each other. The high level of fragmentation of the US network is further reflected in the value of the average distance between the organizations—2.3—which means that, on average, the organizations of this network are three nodes (actors) away from each other. Furthermore, there is a significant presence, not found in the German and Italian cases, of isolated nodes, representing organizations that are unconnected to any other. This low degree of connectivity is likely due to the large numbers of groups and their local rooting. True, the US extreme right organizations are considered to be ‘aware of the importance of

Table 4.1. Measures of cohesion of the Italian, German, and American extreme right (online) network

	<i>US</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Germany</i>
Number of organizations in the network	134	79	78
Average distance	2.325	2.932	2.495
Density	0.001	0.0677	0.0788
Average degree	1.002	5.278	6.064
Degree of centralization	11.923%	19.116%	20.965%

²³ The Posse Comitatus is a loosely organized and intermittently active group that supports survivalism and vigilantism, opposes the US federal government, and believes in localism. Posse members believe that there is no legitimate form of government above that of the county level. It sees Jews as the ‘synagogue of Satan’, blacks and other people of colour as subhuman ‘mud races’, and Northern European whites to be the ‘Chosen People’ of Biblical prophecy (The Nizkor Project 2009, <<http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/orgs/american/adl/paranoia-as-patriotism/posse-comitatus.html>>).

social networking online, with community members effectively using this online service to make contact with other supporters within their localities, forming both on- and offline communities and networks in support of the radical right' (Bowman-Grieve 2009, 1003). However, our analysis indicates that their capacity to co-ordinate is limited. Finally, the network of the US extreme right has a low level of centralization (Freeman's measure of centralization is 11 per cent). In sum, the US extreme right network can be described as a *segmented-decentralized* structure (Diani 2003, 312). Table 4.1 offers a synthesis of the measurements of cohesion mentioned.

3. Characteristics of the organizations

What types of organizations play an important role in the (online) network spheres of the Italian, German, and US extreme right today? Are party and political organizations exploiting their offline resources in order to reach crucial positions in the virtual arena of the Internet? Or are these core positions occupied by less institutionalized organizations with fewer resources? Are they the 'traditional' organizations characterized by the 'classical' ideology of interwar fascism, or are they new and youth right-wing organizations?

In this section, we will further specify our analysis at the level of individual organizations, examining which types of organizations occupy a central (and therefore potentially influential, Diani 2003, 107) position in the sector and which, *a contrario*, are more peripheral.²⁴ Although there are many ways of measuring the position of an actor in a network and, therefore, its potential influence, we use here the in-degree centrality measure. The in-degree counts how many contacts a certain actor receives from other actors, whereas the out-degree counts how many contacts depart from a certain actor. These connections can function as important communication channels through which information, goods, and other resources can be transmitted or exchanged, and they are considered to have a particular influence on flows of communication (Hanneman 2001, 68). Those actors who receive information from many sources are considered prestigious (Diani 2003, 107). Table 4.2 (a, b, c in the Appendix) shows the measures of in-degree and out-degree of right-wing organizations in the Italian, German, and US networks.

Regarding the network of the Italian extreme right (Table 4.2(a)), most notable is the significant centrality of some institutional right-wing actors such as the political parties Movimento Sociale Italiano-Fiamma Tricolore (MSI-FT) (with fifteen incoming links) and Forza Nuova (in-degree 14). The other party

²⁴ For these measures, see Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Scott (2000).

actors reach only an intermediate to low level of centrality, as is the case for Fronte Sociale Nazionale (with an in-degree of 8) and Azione Sociale and Rinascita Nazionale (both with an in-degree of 2). These latter political parties do not hold any seats in parliament. In contrast, the Fascismo and Libertà political movement shows a high degree of centrality (in-degree of 11). However, it is important to highlight that party organizations and political movements do not receive the highest number of contacts from other Italian extreme right organizations. Instead, the most central and prominent group is a neo-fascist/neo-Nazi organization called Kommando Fascista (in-degree 20). Other neo-fascist organizations (such as Omaggio al Duce and Italia Volontaria, in-degree 11) and some nostalgic and revisionist organizations²⁵ also reach a high level of centrality. Finally, publishers and organizations of antagonistic information (see for instance Noreporter and the book trader Orion Libri) play an important role in the Italian right-wing network, indicated as online partners by many types of right-wing groups (in-degree 10 for both).

In the Italian network, in contrast to the German and American ones (see below), the most powerful organizations in terms of in-degree are also those that show the highest values of out-degree. The out-degree, which counts how many contacts depart from a certain actor, is considered an indicator of a group's activism in a network, of its willingness to build contacts with other partners.²⁶ The other right-wing organizations, such as music groups and groups of sport fans, skinhead organizations, social squatted centres, political youth organizations, mystical and Celtic cultural associations, as well as many political journals, remain more marginal and are only integrated into the network with a very low number of contacts (low values of in-degree and out-degree).

In the German case, the most visible extreme right actor (at least in the virtual arena of the Internet) is the NPD (see Table 4.2(b)), which receives the highest number of links (in-degree 22).²⁷ This high in-degree reflects the party's high visibility and relevance in the offline world. Interestingly, the other political party, the DVU, receives only four links, probably because of its limited offline contacts. Indeed, this party, in contrast to the NPD, has no strong links with the non-party elements of the German extreme right sector. Instead, some young political movements related to parties, such as the Junge Nationalisten (JN, the youth wing of the NPD), play an important role of

²⁵ See Il duce.net with 15 links, and Brigata nera, Il RAS, and RSI, each with 11 links.

²⁶ The only exception is some nostalgic and revisionist organizations (for example Fascismo in Rete and Spedizione Punitiva) which, although not recognized as important partners by the other organizations (low in-degree), are highly active in sending outgoing ties (out-degree 28 and 24, respectively) across the various parts of the sector.

²⁷ In our analysis, *Deutsche Stimme*, the political newspaper of the party NPD, has been treated separately. Its in-degree is 10.

brokerage between the NPD and the sector of non-party groups (with an in-degree of 6), linking these separate parts of the German extreme right milieu through the ties they receive and send. It must also be pointed out that the Republikaner, often considered the third political party of the German extreme right, is not part of the network. In fact, the Republikaner are strongly criticized by other extreme right groups for not being part of the electoral alliance with the NPD and the DVU; for their distance from militant activists; and for their recently more moderate positions.

The second most prominent position is occupied by the organization Freier Widerstand (in-degree 21), a very informal group belonging to the youth subcultural area. The online prestige of this group is a consequence of the repression it experiences offline. German authorities tend to ban groups they consider as too extreme, contributing to the weak organizational structure of the German extreme right. Violent right-wing militants try to avoid visible and well-defined organizational structures that could be controlled by state authorities, instead basing their co-ordination on virtual Internet contacts. Similarly, activists created the Kameradschaften (extremely informal and unstructured organizations belonging to the youth subcultural milieu); these do not receive many contacts from the other organizations of the network (often only one or two links, in-degree 1–2).

The third group in terms of prestige is the Aktionsbüro Rhein-Neckar (in-degree 20), another very weak organization in the offline right-wing German milieu, but an important broker online. The activities of some local Kameradschaften are co-ordinated by aggregate structures, sometimes called Aktionsbüros. The Aktionsbüros also receive many links (for example, Thuringia 18, North 16, Saar 12, Center 10, and West 6; all well above the average). The picture emerging from these online links is that of a very hierarchical structure—since only the most institutionalized organizations receive many links. It is very telling that the individual Kameradschaften, which are extremely informal and fluid, have low in-degrees.

Another relevant group of the German extreme right is the Widerstand Süd (Resistance of the South, with an in-degree of 10). This group, which can be classified as subcultural skinhead, has been very present in the public debate since 2003, when its leaders planned a terrorist attack against the new Jewish Center in Munich. Yet other groups include Stoertebeker (7), a political movement critical of the dominance of the NPD; and the newspaper *Junge Freiheit*, which is right-wing, but not necessarily extremist (7). By contrast, the young women's group AK Mädel receives just one link. The high in-degree of the site Nationale gegen Kinderschänder (Nationalists against child molesters, 16) is also notable: this is a very relevant issue for the sector. Finally, there is a sort of division of labour among organizations: the groups most active in building contacts throughout the sector (see the column of out-degree values

in Table 4.2(b) are not the most powerful in terms of the number of contacts they receive (for example, NW Dortmund, AB Mitte, KS Weserbergland, WS Weimar).

In the network of the US extreme right, it is possible to identify two prominent organizations, or groups of organizations (Table 4.2(c)). The first is represented by the National Socialist Party/Movement, which with its relatively (for the loose US network) high in-degree (13) emerges as very popular within the American extreme right milieu. The National Socialist Movement (also called NSM or NSM88, or the American Nazi Party)—founded in 1974 by Robert Brannen, former American Nazi Party member—claims on its home page to be the largest and most active neo-Nazi organization in the United States. This is confirmed by some American watchdog organizations, which describe it as ‘a big pro-white political party in America’ that ‘shares many ideologies with other radical US third parties, such as the US secessionist group League of the South, and the Ku Klux Klan’ (SPLC). This can explain its high visibility in the online network.

The second most prominent actors in the US extreme right sector online are two Christian Identity organizations: the group Aryan Nations (in-degree about 9), which is also classified as a ‘hard core’ white supremacist organization (e.g. Burris et al. 2000, 235) and considered a ‘terrorist threat’ by the FBI (the RAND Corporation has called it the ‘first truly nationwide terrorist network’ in the US); and the organization World Church of the Creator, which is a white supremacist, Creativity group founded on the proposition that the white race is ‘nature’s highest creation’ and that ‘white people are the creators of all worthwhile culture and civilization’ (see the ADL report).²⁸

Finally, in a third position of centrality, we find some skinhead organizations, for example the group Keystone State Skinheads, which receives a considerable number of incoming links from the other organizations of the network (in-degree 7). A white supremacist neo-Nazi organization based in Pennsylvania, this group has chapters in Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Scranton, and other cities in the state. Again, the online popularity of this organization can be related to its actual influence in the offline reality of the American extreme right. Equally prestigious is the group Final Solution, a hard core, neo-Nazi, revisionist and negationist organization whose website welcomes visitors with images of Hitler, swastikas, documents on National Socialism, and an emphasis on the necessity to rewrite history.

Looking at the values of the out-degree, to an even larger extent than in Germany, the organizations that receive more ties are not the most active (with the exception of the Keystone State Skinheads) in creating ties across the

²⁸ <http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Christian_Identity.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&item=Christian_ID>.

network. In terms of dynamism in building contacts with other types of organizations, our data stress the prominence of Stormfront (out-degree 7), which is described by scholars as ‘the Internet’s first major hate site’ (ADL). Each of the three major branches of the US extreme right (the racist and violent KKK, the neo-Nazi and the skinhead areas) has one representative among the most central organizations in the network (represented respectively by Stormfront, the National Alliance, and the Keystone State Skinhead group); nevertheless, these organizations do not share the relational resources (or social capital) that they respectively possess in order to unify the network (as confirmed by the discrepancy between organizations with high numbers of incoming and outgoing links).

In terms of cross-country comparison, the measures explored reveal a higher concentration of power in the European cases than in the US. However, compared to the Italian organizations, there are more German associations with a high degree of centrality within the sector, showing the German network to be even more concentrated than the Italian one. The distance of the scores between these central actors and the more peripheral ones is also higher in the German case than in Italy. This means that important positions (at least with regard to the flow of communication) are less equally distributed in the German case. In the US, the high presence of many isolated organizations reveals a situation of extremely low concentration of power in the far right field.

4. Conclusion

The main goal of this chapter was to analyse the organizational structure of the Italian, German, and American extreme right online. We did so via social network analysis, focusing on hyperlinks between right-wing websites (considering them as ‘ties of affinity, communication, or potential co-ordination’ between organizations offline, Burris et al. 2000), and investigating the structural properties of connections among these groups.

First, our results confirm a general trend, also underlined by other studies in the field, of active use of the Web by extreme right groups. Indeed, our data point to a notable online presence of extreme right organizations, demonstrated by the high number of organizational websites found in all three countries. In this sense these political actors seem to manage quite well the inherently challenging features of the Internet: if they have traditionally looked to the past, they are now multiplying in their online presence and transforming themselves—as a representative of the right-wing Italian political party *Alleanza Nazionale* (National Alliance) explains—into ‘legionari (legionnaires) of the space’ (Caldiron 2001, 337, 338).

However, beyond this general pattern of similarity, the overall configuration of the extreme right virtual communities differs among the three countries. The Italian network appears to be very fragmented, highly diversified, and difficult to co-ordinate, whereas the German network is denser and much more concentrated on a few central actors. The US network appears even more fragmented and dispersed than the Italian one, with many isolated organizations.

Combining the elements that have emerged in our analysis, we can characterize the Italian extreme right structure on the Web as *policephalous*—that is, a structure that is both centralized and segmented. The German extreme right shows a *star* configuration, which in general corresponds to a centralized structure (Diani 2003). In contrast, the American network is extremely fragmented, little centralized, and with many organizations not linked to each other; that is, it resembles what in social network analysis is defined as a *segmented-decentralized* structure (Diani 2003, 312). Compared to the other two types, a policephalous network is partially segmented, as the distance between some actors is rather high, and the presence of horizontal links between the peripheral actors demonstrates a desire to participate actively in the political life of the milieu without relying exclusively on a small number of central actors. However, the network is also relatively centralized, since some actors engage in contacts more frequently than others and are, thus, in a better position to control the exchanges (relational, cognitive, and so on) within the network.

It is worth noting that the level of segmentation of a network reflects the limits imposed on communication among the actors. Thus, segmentation can be ideological whenever the relational distance between the actors increases with the differences in their respective (ideological) positions. Alternatively, it can be based on issues, whenever the factor that divides them is simply represented by differences in the level of interest for specific topics (Diani 2003, 306). In the star structure, fast and efficient diffusion of communication and information among the various actors is guaranteed (Cinalli 2006). On the other hand, in such a hierarchical structure it is unlikely that the actors occupying the peripheral positions can exert substantial influence over the entire network (Diani 2003, 311). Finally, while a segmented-decentralized structure might not favour collective mobilization, it does seem to fit well with the type of leaderless resistance action called for by some American far right leaders (Burris et al. 2000).

Although we acknowledge the limits of Internet links as empirical indicators of broader patterns of offline affinity and ideological closeness between organizations, our data seem to offer a reasonable representation of the inter-organizational structure of the current Italian, German, and US extreme right outside of cyberspace as well. Indeed, we can interpret the different

online configurations that emerged from our analysis with reference to the offline political opportunities offered by the organizational and political context of the extreme right milieu in the three countries.

We can observe that the organizational milieu of the American extreme right (offline) and its political opportunity structure are extremely conducive to fragmentation. Differently from Europe, the extreme right has been considered as an unacceptable participant in democratic elections, and the US electoral and governmental system contributes to its ongoing isolation in the political arena (Michael 2003, 91). Hence, in the US, in contrast to many European countries, the recent resurgence (post 1990) of the extreme right has not resulted in the mobilization of institutional actors (that is, extreme right political parties) around which the whole sector could organize and consolidate (*ibid.*).

Moreover, the American extreme right milieu is considered to be in a state of flux (Michael 2003, 91). The Southern Poverty Law Center counted 751 active US groups in 2003. In addition, the number of hate-related websites increased from around 400–500 in 2003 to around 800 in 2007 (<<http://www.splcenter.org/hatemap>>). However, this expansion is paralleled by an overall fragmentation that is well reflected online. The American extreme right is widely dispersed, with adherents in all major regions of the country. It consists mainly in three separate ‘areas’, which sometimes overlap in terms of memberships and leaders, but which also compete with each other for recruitment and popularity (Zhou et al. 2005, 14): the Christian patriot area; the revolutionary racist right (also called white supremacist); and the historical revisionist movement, which, as noted, has expanded to issues besides the Holocaust (Michael 2003, 40). Others add other two main areas to the US extreme right sector, identifying five different categories: the Christian Identity movement; the Ku Klux Klan; the Militia and the Sovereign Citizen movement (as well as the Tax Protest Movement) (ADL); the neo-Nazis; and the skinhead movement (Michael 2003, 2).

Similarly, the policephalous structure of the Italian extreme right online network can be related to the specificities of the offline organizational milieu, which has been described by many commentators as an archipelago of names, parties, groups, and movements, often influenced by divisions, splits, and long-lasting ideological diatribes (EUMC 2004, 17). It is no coincidence that, despite several attempts, the Italian desire to unite the various parts of the radical right into a single political force has never been fulfilled (Scaliati 2005). Italian right-wing extremism has thus been described as plural, including a variety of labels, political parties, groups, and movements, often characterized by scarce contact between them and divided by long-standing ideological battles (Caldiron 2001). In addition, the non-party component of the Italian extreme right is fragmented and undergoes constant changes (EUMC 2004):

previously well-known organizations have completely disappeared, exploding into a myriad of small groups that often operate at the city level or even at the city district level.

Finally, looking at the German online network we can retrace trends that characterize the offline extreme right political landscape, basically dominated by the NPD and its close allies, which exploit institutional resources derived from their electoral success. In addition, this dense and centralized structure online can be related to Germany's relatively restricted opportunities (in terms of laws and legal provisions against hate and fascist groups). As underlined in Chapter 3, the activities of the German extreme right are very much limited by existing regulation. This also has an effect on the organizational reality of the groups, for example in the difficulty in establishing real offices and headquarters. A more visible presence online that is centred around a few actors might help to overcome this lack of organizational capacity. Most German non-party groups go back to the aftermath of the parliamentary decline of the NPD in the 1970s (Backes and Moreau 1994, 23). Because of the constant danger of being forbidden by law, right-wing activists dissolved their previous rigid structures and became organized in rather flexible *Kameradschaften* (comradeships) (ibid. 35). They are, as it is said, 'organizations without organization' (Speit 2004, 19). These *Kameradschaften* are organized under only a few overarching structures, for example, the Northern German organizations *Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland* and *Nationales und Soziales Aktionsbündnis Norddeutschland*. The net of right-wing organizations becomes ever more densely woven, but their organizational structures make it increasingly difficult to identify them clearly. Websites can become substitutes for empirical organizational structures. This virtuality of the organizational structures helps the groups and activists to appear and disappear, thus avoiding legal restrictions on these groups—not least since the rule of law is not an important aspect of the Internet. The extreme right organizations thus remain visible, without risking prosecution.

5

The Action Repertoires of the Radical Right: Violence and Beyond

1. Introduction

While research on the extreme right has usually focused either on electoral behaviour or on violent actions (with very few occasions for exchanges between the two fields of research), we want instead to analyse the various forms of protest used by the extreme right, exploring the ways in which the available resources and political opportunities influence their choices. We shall do this by using some concepts and hypotheses derived from social movement studies.

Studies on political violence and the radical right have stressed the pathology of these behaviours, and sometimes even their irrationality. Looking at the individuals involved in extremist right-wing organizations, relative (or absolute) deprivation has been linked to psychological disturbances in explaining aggressive behaviours. Right-wing extremism in particular has thus been considered as anomic behaviour—at best, as a symptom of diffuse grievances. In breakdown theory, radical politics is explained by the weakening of norm-enforcing institutions (della Porta and Diani 2006, ch. 1). Looking at past European (and other) history, the spread of radical right-wing ideas has been linked to rising unemployment as well as economic crises and, more recently, rapid and large waves of immigration. From a political point of view, analysts refer to the incapacity to deal with these social conditions, as well as weak (or unstable) popular and elite support for democracy. This approach resonates with a mainly quantitative stream of research that has linked macro-environmental causes (poverty, unemployment, authoritarian regimes, ethnic divisions) to aggregated indicators of political violence.

While this approach has some merits in terms of identifying the general preconditions for violent behaviour, it also has limits that we try to overcome in our research. First of all, it focuses on just one part of radical right action—

certainly a relevant component for its often dramatic results, but not the only (or even the most frequent) type of action. Additionally, research on macro-conditions or micro-behaviour tends to leave unanswered the question of the causal mechanisms that intervene between conditions and effects (Coleman 1986). More attention to these mechanisms is (explicitly or implicitly) paid within the social movement approach. Rarely applied to the analysis of political violence in the past, this approach has been increasingly used in recent research, mainly in case studies on specific historical instances of radicalization of political and social conflicts (e.g. della Porta 2008b for a review), with some attempts at generalization (Tilly 2003). Even more rarely, however, social movement studies have inspired research on the radical right (for exceptions, see Koopmans et al. 2005, Koopmans and Statham 1999). As mentioned in Chapter 1, our research on the radical right in Italy, Germany, and the United States aims at filling this gap, empirically controlling for the heuristic capacity of some central concepts and hypotheses developed within social movement research in order to understand radicalization processes.

A first assumption we import from social movement research is that political violence stems from the radicalization of social and political conflicts. In this sense, it is the product of the interactions of a number of actors, within what organizational sociology calls the organizational field. Extreme right-wing groups interact with similarly ideologically oriented groups, either grassroots groupings or political parties. They confront opponents such as, for example, anti-racist groups or autonomous squatted centres. They also interact with political institutions, some of which can be perceived as allies (e.g. right-wing parties), some as adversaries. They might collaborate with secret services, have sympathetic support in the police forces, but also violently clash with the police on the street and be repressed by the courts.

For right-wing extremist groups, as for other political actors, the choice of repertoires of action is influenced by the available political opportunities. Political conditions influence their behaviours by determining the attitudes of potential allies and opponents, and therefore the chances of policy success as well as the degree and forms of repression. Institutional actors might certify—or give legitimacy to (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)—the groups' requests and/or values. But potential allies can also 'decertify' the radical groups, isolating them and even calling for their repression. In addition, more stable conditions—for example, the legal provisions for outlawing political groups, or the limitation of speech rights, but also the tradition of inclusion or stigmatization of the extreme right groups—have direct, structural effects on the extreme right's chances for survival as well as their forms of action. All of this confirms the strict connections between 'routine politics' and violence, to which scholars of riots as well as underground politics have pointed (Auyero 2007). Following the political opportunity approach, we

hypothesize that right-wing organizations would be more prone to use radical protest when dealing with closed political opportunities. To the contrary, we expect that the more open the opportunities of the political context, the less radical these groups' strategies of action.

In part, however, political opportunities are filtered through the visions that extreme right organizations and individuals have of them: that is, they define their strategies based on their appreciation of the potential support they can obtain. In this sense, they are not only structurally given, but also culturally constructed. Cognitive mechanisms are, therefore, relevant in influencing organizational and individual behaviour. Especially in closed counter-cultures, such elements as public opinion support or potential alliances (or the risks of non-action) are filtered through the group's construction of the external reality. Feelings of injustice, self-perceptions by the group, widespread myths, and dominant narratives all affect the construction of an 'imagined' reality. Structural effects are mediated by the militants' perceptions of the reality through which their political involvement develops.

In addition to cognitive mechanisms, normative mechanisms also play a role. As the resource mobilization approach has stressed for social movements, apparently anomic behaviours are often governed by inherent norms: this applies to crowds, as well as to such dissimilar forms of political action as social movements or terrorist organizations. Both individuals and organizations at the aggregate level justify their activities within a broader normative system, however deviant from the most commonly accepted one. Very often, they appeal to general norms that they feel have not been implemented, claiming that they act in order to stand in for institutions they perceive as too weak (e.g. Zemon Davis 1973). In this perspective, we expect that the more closed the political opportunity structure is perceived to be, the more radical the action repertoire.

Additionally, we expect that the different degrees but also forms of interactions between movements and counter-movements influence the tactics of extreme right groups. The rare social movement studies concerned with the extreme right have suggested viewing them under the label of counter-movements. As mentioned (chapter 1) Counter-movements arise in reaction to the successes obtained by social movements; the two then develop in symbiotic dependence during the course of mobilization. Although criticized as too narrow a frame to account for the complexity of right-wing social movements, the concept of counter-movement is useful in addressing on the conflictual interactions between different movement families, which might lead to a strong sense of hostility and the prevalence of a Manichean view of politics (della Porta 1995; Klandermans and Mayer 2006). Moreover, movements and Counter-movements tend to imitate each other, reciprocally adapting particular tactics and the choice of arenas in which to act (see, for example, Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

Finally, in contrast to the breakdown approach, the resource mobilization approach has stressed the organizational dynamics within social movements. Similarly to other social movements, right-wing ones are networks of more or less formal groups and individuals; the extent and structure of these networks defines their mobilizing capacity. We assume that different actors belonging to these networks use a broad and diverse repertoire of collective action. We shall, in fact, discuss here the organizational structure in the extreme right milieu, considering the complex interplay between actors linked to each other in co-operative as well as competitive interactions.

In this chapter, we shall therefore analyse the action repertoires of the extreme right mobilization in Italy, Germany, and the United States in the last decade, reflecting on the use of various strategies of action, including violence, by right-wing groups, according to the political opportunities available for them (section 2), as well as the symbolic and material resources of different types of right-wing organizations (section 3). In addition, we shall look at radicalization leading to violence, taking into account the issue fields around which violent and non-violent mobilization occurs, discussing the types of actors who initiate the events, their targets and their victims (section 4).

2. Political opportunities and action repertoires: country and time

Which action repertoires have characterized the mobilization of the extreme right forces in the three countries under study? Are the prevalent forms of actions used related to the political opportunity structures in the three different contexts? In this section, we aim to locate right-wing forms of collective action against the background of the right-wing milieus in the three countries.

In order to classify the action forms in our protest event analysis, we have distinguished six main categories, on the basis of increasing radicalness (for similar classifications see, for instance, Tarrow 1989; for an application to the extreme right, Gentile 1999):

- conventional actions, which are those political actions associated with conventional or established politics (e.g. lobbying, electoral campaigns, and press conferences);
- demonstrative actions, which are legal actions aiming to mobilize large numbers of people (e.g. festivals, street demonstrations, public meetings, and petitions; Gentile 1999, 242);
- expressive actions, which are legal actions focusing on right-wing activists and sympathizers, in order to reinforce in-group cohesion and identity;

- confrontational actions, whose aim is to disrupt official policies or institutions, and are therefore usually illegal (e.g. ‘blockades, occupations, illegal but non-violent demonstrations, and disturbances of meetings of political adversaries’; Koopmans 1993, 640); and finally,
- violent actions, which are illegal actions implying some form of symbolic or physical violence against things or people (ibid.), among which we distinguish light (symbolic and verbal acts) and heavy (physical acts) violent forms.

2.1. *Action repertoires of the extreme right in the three countries*

Political opportunities vary by country. In line with social movement research, we expect forms of action to be more radical where political opportunities are closed. While the first studies on social movements tended to conceptualize political opportunities for social movements in general, later research tended to specify them for specific actors. This is what we did in Chapter 3 for the radical right. On that basis, we would expect the repertoire of the radical right to be less violent in Italy—where in the covered period political opportunities are more open, given the presence of a right-wing, post fascist party in power—and more violent in the United States—where political opportunities are rather closed, at least in terms of potential access to institutions. Germany would occupy an intermediate position. The data presented in Table 5.1 seems to help specifying this hypothesis, which indeed holds but only if we consider heavy violence, while light forms of violence are higher in the Italian case.

When looking at the forms of protest events of extreme right mobilization in Italy, Germany, and the US (Table 5.1), we see a clear difference between the (more violent) mobilization of the US extreme right and the (more mixed and oriented both to demonstrative and conventional) forms of action used by the Italian and German extreme right.

Right-wing extremist mobilization in Italy is characterized by the use of a wide range of repertoires of action. Demonstrative actions, which account for

Table 5.1. Forms of action of extreme right mobilization in Italy, Germany, and the US

<i>Forms of action</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Total</i>
Conventional	18.5%	5.5%	6.6%	10.2%
Demonstrative	24.7%	64.0%	44.9%	44.5%
Confrontational	17.9%	5.8%	5.0%	9.5%
Light violence	17.9%	8.2%	12.7%	13.0%
Heavy violence	16.3%	6.9%	20.8%	14.8%
Expressive events (+online events)	4.6%	9.6%	10.0%	8.1%
Total	100.0% (368)	100% (364)	100.0% (379)	100.0% (1111)

Cramer's V = 0.29***

about one fourth of all covered events for this country, are the most important. However, another 18.5 per cent is represented by conventional actions such as electoral campaigning (e.g. presentation of a new candidate for political election,¹), political meetings and congresses (e.g. party congress,² electoral speech,³ or opening of a new political office by an extreme right group⁴); interviews with newspapers and radio.⁵ Another 17.9 per cent is constituted by confrontational actions, such as counter-demonstrations organized by right-wing groups against left-wing groups⁶ or other political opponents (e.g. Free Masons⁷). The category of demonstrative events is mainly constituted by marches. For instance, very frequent are commemorative demonstrations organized on important dates for right-wing groups, such as the 25th of April, which is the day of the country's liberation from the Nazi-fascist occupation and considered by right-wing extremists as the day of defeat.⁸ Also frequent are demonstrations organized by right-wing groups on various policy issues like abortion, gay issues, and family (e.g. anti-gay-pride demonstrations;⁹ anti-abortion initiatives¹⁰). Violence (both light and heavy) represents more than one third of the protest events covered in Italy. In the category of light violence, our protest events include mainly symbolic and verbal acts of violence by right-wing extremists such as insults and threats (e.g. letters of threats against political opponents¹¹) as well as racist, fascist, and anti-Semitic graffiti.¹² Heavy violence events mainly consist of direct violent acts, such as physical, individual, and collective attacks against people, such as immigrants or left-wing adversaries (e.g. attacks against squatted centres¹³); or violence against objects (e.g. damage to property, broken windows, graffiti¹⁴). In this category we also find acts of profanation of cemeteries, as well as bombs at offices of left-wing political parties and newspapers. Finally, 4.6 per cent of all covered protest events refer to expressive events, most of them concerts or cultural meetings (e.g. the Hobbit camp in Northern Italy, LR 13 September 2006).

In Germany, the extreme right uses mainly demonstrative actions (64 per cent). As much as 90 per cent of these demonstrative events are marches.¹⁵ The remaining percentage refers to other demonstrative actions, such as the public honouring of World War II soldiers.¹⁶ This very high figure reflects the German radical right's emphasis upon its public visibility, thus challenging

¹ LR 10 April 2001.

² LR 28 October 2000.

³ LR 25 March 2006.

⁴ LR 29 December 2000.

⁵ LR 12 July 2000.

⁶ LR 24 April 2002.

⁷ LR 21 January 2004.

⁸ LR 22 April 2002.

⁹ LR 01 July 2000.

¹⁰ LR 10 March 2000.

¹¹ LR 29 September 2007.

¹² For example, neo-Nazi banners on highways, on monuments, and on university buildings, LR 26 April 2001, LR 28 January 2003, LR 07 March 2001).

¹³ LR 21 January 2005.

¹⁴ LR 01 August 2000.

¹⁵ e.g. *Taz* 20 June 2005, 19 June 2000.

¹⁶ *Taz* 21 November 2000.

the high degree of social stigmatization. These demonstrations (particularly the marches) are very repetitive: usually, right-wing extremists arrive at the venue, start the march, show their symbols, shout their slogans, and depart from the venue (e.g. showing Nazi symbols in public).¹⁷ No less than 10 per cent of all events are violent attacks, sometimes causing injuries (e.g. injuring policemen;¹⁸ attacking a deaf person;¹⁹ damaging Jewish cemeteries and Döner restaurants²⁰). They are usually directed against foreigners (e.g. injuring two Iranians;²¹ injuring a Turk;²² attack against asylum seekers²³). Nearly 10 per cent of all protest events refer to expressive events, most of them concerts²⁴ (e.g. distribution of music to pupils²⁵), some even have a ritual character, such as the celebration of the Tag der Germanen (the Day of Germanics²⁶), the Thing (the assembly of male Germans), and the Julfest (with performance of ancient German rituals²⁷).

Right-wing extremist mobilization in the US in the period under analysis is also mainly characterized by demonstrative actions, which account for almost half (44.9 per cent) of all covered events. However, another third is represented by violent actions (light and heavy violence), among which the majority (20.8 per cent) are heavy violent actions. The remaining cases coded for the US are represented by a smaller portion of conventional (6.6 per cent) and expressive events (10 per cent). Confrontational events are much less frequent (5.0 per cent) than in the European cases (especially in Italy). Also in the US, demonstrative events organized by right-wing groups mainly consist of marches or demonstrations (e.g. counter-demonstrations for the anniversary of Martin Luther King's death),²⁸ as well as distribution of racist, anti-Jewish and anti-immigrants leaflets (e.g. leafleting by the National Alliance group at Universities;²⁹ anti-immigrant leaflets;³⁰ leaflets against Jews³¹).

Violence (in both light and heavy forms) is much more present and brutal than in the other two countries, including several assassinations. In the category of light violence, US protest events include mainly symbolic and verbal acts of violence by right-wing extremists, such as racist/neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic graffiti (e.g. KKK graffiti in university offices and classrooms;³²

¹⁷ *Taz* 30 November 2005. ¹⁸ *Taz* 23 April 2001. ¹⁹ *Taz* 28 October 2000.

²⁰ *Taz* 23 April 2001. ²¹ *Taz* 07 June 2001. ²² *Taz* 19 February 2001.

²³ *Taz* 08 January 2007.

²⁴ *Taz* 28 February 2000, 25 July 2000; 07 August 2000.

²⁵ *Taz* 03 September 2005.

²⁶ *Taz* 06 October 2003.

²⁷ *Taz* 11 December 2000.

²⁸ For examples of counter-demonstrations by KKK groups, see the articles published on *University Wire* on 21 January 2000; on *The Associated Press State & Local Wire* on 17 January 2004; on *The Associated Press State & Local Wire* on 15 January 2007, and so on.

²⁹ *University Wire* 15 December 2000.

³⁰ *The Associated Press State & Local Wire* 14 November 2007.

³¹ *Wisconsin State Journal* 29 December 2005).

³² *University Wire* 21 March 2000.

KKK graffiti on the house and car of an African-American family³³); displaying of Nazi/fascist symbols (e.g. swastikas on the walls of synagogues in the Bronx³⁴); insults and threats (e.g. racist and intimidating letters sent to Jewish organizations by a member of the National Socialist Party³⁵); as well as acts of profanation of cemeteries (e.g. against Jewish cemeteries;³⁶ Black cemeteries³⁷); and, finally, detention of firearms.³⁸ Heavy violent events are mainly composed of direct violent acts, such as physical aggression or punitive expeditions, mostly against ethnic minorities (e.g. immigrants,³⁹ African Americans,⁴⁰ Latinos,⁴¹ Muslims⁴²). For example, in March 2007, Associated Press Online reported an event in which groups of right-wing sympathizers wrote racist words on the body of a black student. In this category we find also the bombing of meeting points of ethnic minorities (e.g. an unsuccessful bombing attempt by a skinhead against a meeting point of Afro-Americans and Jews⁴³). Among the (fewer) expressive events are meetings and rallies (e.g. rallies for Hitler's 113th birthday⁴⁴), followed by concerts, and finally by social gatherings of organizations.⁴⁵ Subcultural expressive events can take very different forms: some are smaller gatherings, held in dancing or music clubs, in places as disparate as urban Orange County and small-town Wyoming.⁴⁶ Others are larger events, which are held annually, for example the Aryanfest organized by the organization Volksfront or the 'Volk the System' concert organized by the Sacramento unit of the National Alliance. Attendance at the larger concerts can number as many as 300–500 (ADL, *Neo-Nazi Hate Music: A Guide*).⁴⁷

Concerning online events, newspaper articles report on the use of American right-wing websites for propaganda and recruitment⁴⁸ or for incitement to hate actions,⁴⁹ as well as for the organization, through the Web, of offline actions and campaigns (e.g. the campaign 'Adopt a highway', launched

³³ *The Virginian-Pilot* 16 May 2000.

³⁴ *Daily News-New York* 18 April 2005.

³⁵ *Star Tribune* 06 June 2000.

³⁶ *Tulsa World* 03 September 2000.

³⁷ *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* 29 May 2002.

³⁸ *Spokesman Review* 20 November 2002.

³⁹ e.g. Chinese people, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 05 July 2000; Polish immigrants, *The Associated Press State & Local Wire*, 23 September 2003.

⁴⁰ *San Bernardino Sun*, 23 November 2001.

⁴¹ *The Washington Post*, 28 November 2000.

⁴² *The Boston Herald*, 25 September 2000.

⁴³ *The Boston Herald* 29 June 2001.

⁴⁴ *The Associated Press State & Local Wire* 20 April 2002.

⁴⁵ *The Associated Press State & Local Wire* 19 April 2001.

⁴⁶ *Associated Press Online*, 11 January 2004.

⁴⁷ <http://www.adl.org/main_Extremism/hate_music_in_the_21st_century.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_7>.

⁴⁸ e.g. *Associated Press Online* 16 July 2001.

⁴⁹ e.g. *U.S. Newswire* 10 November 2000.

through the Internet).⁵⁰ In our database we have also collected some examples of online actions, that is, actions performed directly online.⁵¹

According to our findings, in the covered events occurring from 2000 to 2007 in the US, 20 people were denounced, and the police were able to arrest and/or stop 210 people. In Italy, 2,334 people were denounced and the police arrested and/or stopped 125 people. In Germany, we count 1,171 arrests and 68 denounced persons.⁵²

We have to add that, in all countries, extreme right events involve mainly small groups of people. In the US, most of the events have very small or small numbers of participants, with around 50 per cent of the events not exceeding three to four participants. In the German extreme right mobilization, the number of participants is extremely skewed. Most events have very few participants (four to five) but there are a number of deviant cases that include a relatively large number of activists.⁵³ Similarly, in Italy, most of the events have very small or small numbers of participants, with around one third of the events (36 per cent) not exceeding five to six persons. About half of all covered events have no more than 20 participants.⁵⁴ Overall, in all three countries the smaller events are the most violent, whereas the largest ones are demonstrative actions.

Concluding, there is a clear prominence of violent acts and incidents in the US in comparison to the two European countries. This can be explained by the lack of radical right-wing parties in the US that can play a role as institutional allies for the extreme right milieu (see Chapter 3 on country cases description) and channel the extreme right mobilization into institutionalized party politics, thus contributing to a moderation of the action repertoires. However, the greater use of violence could also be related to the availability of material and symbolic resources of the US extreme right groups, which can exploit (including for non-democratic goals) the high degree of tolerance towards individual

⁵⁰ *Idaho Edition* 30 January 2005. See also Monday, 03 July 2006–Tuesday, 04 July 2006, Gathering organized by members of Stormfront, a hate website, with an open invitation to white supremacists.

⁵¹ e.g. a neo-Nazi group publishes on the Web the names and addresses of six black students accused of attacking a white student, calling for private justice, *The Roanoke Times*, 21 September 2007.

⁵² However, as for the number of people wounded or killed, these percentages have to be taken with caution since the rate of missing data is very high (missing data in 70% of cases).

⁵³ For example on 1 December 2001, 4,000 neo-Nazis (the source does not indicate the organizers) marched through Berlin to commemorate the Wehrmacht and to attack Jewish people. Another big event was a demonstration in Berlin on 10 May 2005, with 3,325 participants. This date is crucial, being two days after the 60th anniversary of the German unconditional surrender after World War II. Finally, in a march in Wunsiedel (Bavaria) on 19 August 2002, 2,500 participants remembered Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess, who is buried there.

⁵⁴ The average number of participants in the Italian case is 120. However, this is due to the presence of a number of deviant cases in which the protest events exceed this threshold, even reaching 1,000–3,000 participants. These outlier events are mainly marches to sacred places of the fascist period (e.g. the pilgrimage to Mussolini's tomb at Predappio, *LR*, 28 October 2002).

freedom of expression (even of hate and violent symbols), as well as the rights linked to the use of firearms. In Germany, however, the higher stigmatization of the extreme right, following the historical experience with Nazism, seems to have reduced the propensity towards violent forms.

2.2 Time

Political and discursive opportunities also change over time. During the analysed period we saw some changes in government in our individual countries, as well as some general transformations common to all three.

Since we expect political opportunities to be more open for the extreme right when right-wing parties are in government, we can expect more mobilization, but less violence in proportion in Italy than in the other two countries. However, we should also consider that protest might be less necessary when there is a 'friendly government' and (less visible) lobbying can indeed prevail over contentious forms of action. In terms of (especially electoral) political opportunities, they appear less conducive for the extreme right in the US than in the two European cases. In Italy, although some small extreme right parties, like Forza Nuova (FN) and Fronte Nazionale, have not obtained significant electoral success in the last decade (e.g. FN received less than 0.5 per cent of the vote in the 2001 national election; 0.7 per cent in 2006; and 0.3 per cent in 2008), other Italian parties usually associated with the extreme right (Baldini 2001, 1)—namely the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) and the Social Movement-Tricolour Flame (Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (MSI-FT)—have gained Parliamentary seats and even important governmental positions in the last few years. The rightist alliance constituted by Forza Italia (Go Italy!), Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale (MSI/AN), and Lega Nord (Northern League) won the 1994 national elections with 42.9 per cent of the vote. After the Fiuggi Congress (1995) and the split of MSI-FT (the direct heir of the old fascist party which opposed the transformation of the MSI into Alleanza Nazionale), AN continued to experience positive electoral results, acquiring ministerial positions. After the 2001 parliamentary election (with 12 per cent of the vote), it received several cabinet posts; in the 2006 election, won by the centre left coalition, it obtained 12.3 per cent of the vote (Baldini 2001). Currently, AN leader Gianfranco Fini is the president of the Lower Chamber. Although the Lega Nord's inclusion in the extreme right family is still under debate, this latter party, with its xenophobic attitudes and anti-immigration policies, has represented an 'ideal' point of reference (especially at the local level, EUMC 2004) for many extreme right activists and sympathizers (Wetzel 2009, 323), and it has experienced increasing electoral success over the years (from 3.9 per cent of the vote in the 2001 parliamentary election, to 4.6 per cent in 2006, to 8.3 per cent in 2008). In the June 2004

European parliamentary elections, the Lega Nord, headed by Bossi, gained two MEPs (4.9 per cent of the vote). Berlusconi lead centre right government between 2001–2006 and 2008–2011.

In Germany, in contrast, no right-wing extremist party has ever been included in a government since the end of World War II, whether at the national, regional, or local level. As mentioned (Chapter 3), at the local level (where no 5 per cent threshold applies), the radical right has been occasionally represented in city councils, but there has never been an attempt to include the extremist right in a government; the deputies from extremist parties have even been banned as far as possible from parliamentary activities. Very often, representatives from the extreme right are not even invited to participate in consensual meetings, although, due to a proportional system, they can head parliamentary committees. The NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, National Democratic Party of Germany) had a certain success in the late 1960s, followed by a phase in which the Republikaner, whose classification as right-wing extremist today is doubted (Klein and Simon 2006b, 267), and the DVU (Deutsche Volks-Union, German People's Union) were rather successful at the local and regional levels as well as in the 1989 European elections (but never in national elections), even peaking at 12.9 per cent (DVU Saxony-Anhalt 1998). In the 2000s, the NPD (and until recently the DVU) gained regional strongholds in eastern Germany, confirmed in the most recent elections in 2009 at least for the NPD.

In the US, where no party beyond the two major parties (Republican and Democratic) has ever accessed national power in recent times, numerous minor political extreme right groups have always existed—among them the US populist parties, which have experienced a certain support that nevertheless has never translated into electoral success. From 2000 to 2008, the US president was a Republican. In general, however, we might expect that increasing concern for migration and clash of civilization discourses would increase support for right-wing radicals. In fact, 'similar to communism, the influence of non-West-European cultures is perceived as a direct threat to the traditions, culture, and everyday life of native citizens' (Bjørge and Witte 1993, 121–2).

Overall, according to our data, violent actions by extreme right groups were stable until 2002 (representing a considerable portion of about 20 per cent of the total protest events covered). They increased in the following years, reaching 30–37 per cent of protest events covered between 2003 and 2007 (Cramer's $V = 0.13^*$). However, we see different trends in different countries (Figure 5.1).

In line with our expectations, in the US, violent acts committed by the extreme right are significant, although they fluctuate over time, generally showing an increasing trend and, in particular, almost doubling after 2002




Figure 5.1. Percentage of violent actions by the extreme right, per country⁵⁵(1a) Italy (1b) Germany (1c) the US

(from 25 per cent of all protest events covered in 2000, to 29 per cent in 2001, 22 per cent in 2002, and 41 per cent of all events in 2003).⁵⁶ Since Republicans were in government for the entire period under examination (2000–2008), it is difficult to attribute these oscillations to the impact of changes in government. More specifically, heavy violence decreased slightly in 2007, but this is

⁵⁵ The Cramer's V of the correlation between violence and time is 0.22* for Italy, 0.23* for Germany, and 0.20* for the US.

⁵⁶ Violence remains stable in 2003 and 2004, constituting 35–38 per cent of all covered events in those years; it increases during 2006 (56 per cent of all covered events) and decreases again in 2007 (28 per cent of all covered events).

compensated by an increase in the most recent years of forms of light violence. This radicalization can be attributed to a more intense politicization of the mobilization of the extreme right over time (see Bjørge 2006). However, the moderate strategy constituted by demonstrative action also remains consistently widespread during the period under examination (with the exception of a decrease in 2006), increasing even more in the most recent years (representing almost 70 per cent of covered events in 2007). According to our findings, in the US events covered from 2000 to 2007, 82 people were wounded. However, these numbers have to be taken with caution, since the rate of missing information for the mentioned variables is very high (missing data in 70 per cent of cases).

In Germany, heavy violence increased from 2000 (1.6 per cent) to 2007 (7.1 per cent), while expressive events declined in importance (at least in and for the press). The total of violent events (either heavy or light) decreased from 2000 (25 per cent) to 2006 (19 per cent),⁵⁷ then increased again from 2006 to 2007 (29 per cent).

Similarly in Italy, demonstrative action remained consistently widespread for the whole period under examination (with the exception of a decrease in 2003), increasing even more in the most recent years (34 per cent of covered events in 2006, year of the centre left government in power). In general, violent events (either light or heavy) increased constantly from 2000 to 2007 (years characterized by a centre right government in power until 2006), with the exception of 2006 (with a negative peak: 18.4 per cent in 2000, 26 per cent in 2001, 23 per cent in 2002, 41 per cent in 2003, 43 per cent in 2004, 53 per cent in 2005, 29 per cent in 2006, and 41 per cent in 2007). More specifically, as in the US case, heavy violence decreased in the most recent years (in particular after the peak of 30 per cent of covered violent events in 2004), while light violence increased (particularly beginning in 2004). In Italy, in the right-wing events covered from 2000 to 2007, 278 people were wounded.

Overall, therefore, the mobilization capacity of the extreme right seems to have remained quite stable over the period.

3. Organizational characteristics and violence

Beyond similar political opportunities, the action strategies of the different types of extreme right groups that mobilize in the three countries under study vary. In general, social movement studies have suggested that the use of

⁵⁷ Violent events are 18 per cent of all covered events in 2001, 4 per cent in 2002, 10 per cent in 2003, and 13 per cent in 2004.

violence tends to increase for groups that have fewer institutional and material resources (della Porta and Diani 2006). In what follows, we shall address these issues, looking at the type of groups involved in the extreme right protest, and their territorial level.

3.1. *Types of group*

As stressed in the Introduction, in all of our countries the extreme right is far from being a united family. Some groups operate as small underground organizations—as was the case for the neo-fascist Italian organization New Order in the 1970s (<www.transnationalterrorism.eu>, p. 14)—while others are large and mainly operate in all openness, as for instance the organization Blood and Honour, which is considered to have around 10,000 members (Smith 2005) and to be active in several countries (Europol 2007). Groups vary also in terms of action strategies, and the group scope (in number of members and countries) has a direct effect on the way they behave. Smaller groups are more frequently found using violence as an action strategy, for example murder and bombings (<www.transnationalterrorism.eu>, p. 16, see also START incident databases).⁵⁸ Larger organizations, instead, use their numbers and public exposure to publicize their cause.

In order to allow for coherence and communication between the two parts of the study, in our protest event analysis we have used the same specific categories (and the same classification into broader categories) for the variable type of extreme right actor we had singled out for frame analysis. In particular,

- In the category ‘political parties’, we have included groups that define themselves as political parties and openly partake in political activities (e.g. elections, political debates, policy issues).
- In the category ‘political movements’, we have included those less institutionalized groups that openly partake in political activities, but do not contest elections (e.g. political and cultural associations, neo-Nazi groups, nostalgic-negationist organizations, etc.). We have grouped here Christian Identity, white supremacist, neo-Nazi, and KKK organizations. Also included in this latter category are youth political associations.
- In the category ‘subcultural groups’, we included the categories Kameradschaften, skinheads, right-wing music bands or labels, and right-wing Ultras/soccer fans/hooligans, squatted social centres.
- In the (residual) category ‘not identified group/individual right-wing actor’, we have included those protest events for which it was not possible to determine any specific organization sponsoring or leading the action.

⁵⁸ <<http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/>>.

In addition, general references to activists from Italian/German/US groups, anonymous spokesperson(s) for organizations, right-wing organizations in general, and the residual category 'other' have been grouped here.

As shown in Table 5.2, subcultural skinhead groups (32.4 per cent) and individual and non-identified extreme right activists (58.9 per cent) are those more involved in violent actions (either light or heavy), whereas political party and political movement organizations are mainly involved in non-violent actions (89.8 per cent political parties and 74 per cent political movements). These include for political parties especially demonstrative (44 per cent) and conventional action (28 per cent), and for political movements above all demonstrative (48 per cent) and expressive actions (10 per cent).

The predominance of violent actions among the subcultural area and individuals/not identified activists is especially strong in the Italian case (violent actions represent 59.6 per cent of the events coded for the former type of actor and 63.3 per cent for the latter), less so in the US and Germany.⁵⁹ In Italy, political parties are involved mainly in conventional (32.6 per cent) and demonstrative (32.6 per cent) forms of action, whereas the subcultural area is especially involved (more than in Germany and in the US) in events that imply light violence (36.8 per cent) as well as heavy violence (22.8 per cent) (data not in table). Nevertheless, most incidents of heavy violence are committed by not identifiable groups, which, as mentioned above, are responsible

Table 5.2. Type of actor per type of repertoire of action

Type of actor	Type of action						Total
	Conventional	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Light violence	Heavy violence	Expressive events	
Party	28.0%	44.1%	15.0%	4.7%	5.5%	2.8%	100.0% (254)
Pol. movement	7.1%	48.3%	8.6%	13.7%	12.3%	10.0%	100.0% (350)
Subcultural area	3.2%	48.3%	6.9%	13.7%	18.6%	9.3%	100.0% (408)
Other ⁶⁰		16.8%	9.5%	29.5%	29.5%	10.5%	100.0% (95)
Total	10.2%	44.6%	9.5%	13.0%	14.5%	8.1%	100.0% (1107)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.25***

⁵⁹ The correlation between type of actor and form of action (violent/not-violent) is strong and significant in all three countries: Italy 0.48***; Germany 0.30***; US 0.17*.

⁶⁰ Actors not identified, generic reference to right-wing activists.

for about one fourth of all events coded in the Italian dataset (32.9 per cent). Subcultural groups (5.3 per cent) and especially not-identified extreme right actors and groups (11.4 per cent) are more frequently involved in the (few) expressive events. They are for the most part burial ceremonies of militants, commemorations (of past deaths of militants and leaders), pilgrimages to symbolic places (e.g. to Mussolini's grave), and concerts.

In contrast, in Germany, political parties (for example the NPD) perform the highest percentage of demonstrative actions (79 per cent), followed by conventional actions (13 per cent). While in Italy confrontational actions are initiated above all by political parties and movements (about 20–25 per cent each), in Germany those types of actions are mainly initiated by unidentified and individual right-wing activists (37 per cent). These latter actors are also those that more frequently organize events implying light forms of violence (25 per cent). Violence, especially heavy violence, is also an important form of action within the youth area (10 per cent).

In the US as well, different types of extreme right actors and organizations adopt different strategies of action, as confirmed by the high and significant value of the Cramer's V coefficient (0.26***). Organizations from the subcultural area are those mainly involved in violent actions: almost two thirds of the events that concern this category of actors (58.3 per cent) are violent, among which 48.8 per cent constitute heavy violent actions. In addition, non-identified activists are notably more involved than political parties and movements in events that imply either light or heavy violence (in 25 per cent of cases). Political movements, like white supremacist and KKK organizations, mobilize mainly with demonstrative forms of action (50.7 per cent of cases), while political parties use both demonstrative and conventional actions (about 36 per cent each).

The large presence of non-identified actors among those participating in high violence is not surprising. As observed by Tore Bjørgo (2006), the more spectacular acts of racist terrorism in Europe and the US during the 1990s were committed by persons and groups guided by a racial ideology. However, most of the violent acts against immigrants and ethnic minorities have been carried out by teenagers—frequently belonging to skinhead gangs or informal groups of friends without much organization, and only a skin-deep ideology (*ibid.* 3). Their mode of expression is often blatantly racist, even if what drives them may be a mixture of other motives—often a need to show off to their peers, a search for excitement and attention, and sometimes a wish to avenge negative experiences with immigrants or other perceived enemies. Thus, cases of anti-immigrant bombings and arson have revealed strikingly similar patterns in the events leading up to the attack: a discussion among a group of friends during which hostile feelings against immigrants or asylum-seekers are expressed, an implicit contest among the participants to outdo each other in reckless

proposals, a wish to ‘show off, plus a good measure of alcohol to quell second thoughts. Currently, one new element has been added to the situation commonly preceding violent sprees: the listening to aggressive White Power music’ (ibid. 4).

3.2 The local scope of protest

The spread of violent forms of action in subcultural groups—more common at the local level—is also confirmed if we look at the distribution of forms of protest by territorial level. Our data indicate, in fact, that violence occurs overwhelmingly at the local level (see Table 5.3).

The local level is in general very relevant for the mobilization of the extreme right (Table 5.3). In Italy, almost 69 per cent of coded events regard mobilizations that are organized locally, that is, by actors with a local scope.⁶¹ Another 4.8 per cent of covered events were initiated by actors organized at the regional level. Furthermore, the scope of the event is also mainly local (city 46.2 per cent; district 23.5 per cent; municipality 2.7 per cent). Yet despite its mainly local base, extreme right mobilization frequently has national targets (34.1 per cent vs. 25.8 per cent of national targets in Germany and 12.6 per cent in the US; Cramer’s V coefficient is 0.28***). The mainly local shape of

Table 5.3. Type of action by scope of actor who initiates the action

Scope of actor	Type of action		
	Non-violent	Violent	Total
Local	51.8% (259)	48.2% (241)	100.0% (500)
Regional	89.2% (99)	10.8% (12)	100.0% (111)
National	98.1% (203)	1.9% (4)	100.0% (207)
International	100.0% (9)	0.0% (8)	100.0% (9)
Total	68.9% (570)	31.1% (257)	100.0% (827)

Row percentages; Cramer’s V = 0.46***

⁶¹ The notion of scope refers to the organizational extension of the organization and/or institution. In our coding scheme the categories for the scope of the actor that initiates the event, and for the target, vary from local to international. The notion of scope of the event/ action refers to the scope of mobilization—that is, if the report mentions ‘extreme right organizations from different member states’, the scope is ‘European Union’. Here and in the other scope variables, the category ‘multilateral’ refers to actors from three or more countries (on a strictly intergovernmental basis, not in the context of a supranational or organization), and ‘bilateral’ to actors from two countries. The category ‘international’ includes national non-Italian, multilateral, European, and supranational.

Italian extreme right mobilization may be explained by the extreme fragmentation of the extreme right milieu, as also emerged from our network analysis (see Chapter 4). Similarly in Germany, the spectrum of right-wing mobilization is very local or regional (83.2 per cent for these two categories). Basically, this goes back to the (locally organized) Kameradschaften or the (regionally organized) Aktionsbüros as actors. Furthermore, the NPD has rarely appeared in our database as a national party, but more often in its regional (and even local) branches. However, although similarly to Italy the scope of the action/event is mainly local (44.7 per cent), here there is also a considerable number of events staged at the national level (32 per cent in Germany vs. 17.5 per cent in Italy and 9.0 per cent in the US; Cramer's V 0.40***). Finally, in the US, 71.4 per cent of coded events were organized locally, namely by actors with a local scope, while one third were organized at the national level (27.6 per cent). In addition, the scope of the event is very local (city level 81.5 per cent). As in the Italian and German cases, supranational or international right-wing actors are almost absent (1 per cent of coded events).

Focusing on the territorial/organizational level (scope) of right-wing actors, violence is most frequent at the local level (overall, 48.2 per cent of violent events are local, 10.8 per cent are regional) (Table 5.3). This is also the level at which the mobilization of the extreme right more frequently occurs in all three countries under analysis (Cramer's V coefficient is 0.20***). Overall, in all three countries, conventional (23.7 per cent) and demonstrative actions (51.2 per cent) are more likely to be organized at the national level (Cramer's V coefficient for the correlation between types of actions and territorial scope is strong and significant, 0.28***). The local scope of violent mobilization of the extreme right is particularly accentuated in the US, where more than half of

Table 5.4. Type of action per type of issue

<i>Type of issue</i>	<i>Type of action</i>		
	Non-violent	Violent	Total
Politics/Populism	58.6%	41.4%	100.0% (152)
Globalization	94.2%	5.8%	100.0% (52)
Migration	39.5%	60.5%	100.0% (176)
Conservative values/Nation	76.5%	23.5%	100.0% (226)
Extreme right/'Us'	83.9%	16.1%	100.0% (391)
Total	71.4%	28.6%	100.0% (988)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.38***

local actions are violent (55.2 per cent), as well as 13 per cent of regional actions (Cramer's V is 0.52***). Also in the Italian case, 47.6 per cent of local and 5.9 per cent of regional actions are violent (Cramer's V is 0.49***).

4. Radicalization in action: issues and interactions

A third type of explanation for radicalization links forms of action to situational characteristics, such as specific issues and targets, as well as interactions with different types of actors.

4.1. *Issues and targets*

Our data indicate that the repertoire of action used by the extreme right varies according to the issue at stake (Table 5.4).

Extreme right groups are particularly violent in their actions when they mobilize on political and migration issues. This is true in all three countries, with some specificities (the Cramer's V is 0.18* for Italy, 0.43*** for Germany, and 0.55*** for the US). Indeed, in Italy the extreme right tends to use violent forms of action when it mobilizes both on politics (in 41.6 per cent of cases) and on migration (46.9 per cent); in Germany and the US, violence is used especially in actions addressing immigration issues (respectively in 45 and 71 per cent of cases). Overall, extreme right groups use less violence when they mobilize on globalization issues and issues related to the internal life of their groups (for a detailed analysis of extreme right mobilization on these issue fields, see Chapters 7 and 11).

In Italy, actions directly related to political issues represent a large part (34 per cent) of all covered events initiated by the extreme right between 2000 and 2007 (data not in table). In particular, within this category the largest share of covered events refers to struggles against political adversaries of extreme right groups (competition between groups, 55.2 per cent of all coded events within the politics issue field), such as, for example, leftist social movements, squatted youth centres, other groups belonging to the global justice movement, anti-fascist organizations, and so on. This is also the sub-field more characterized by violent protest events (65 per cent). These battles between groups at opposite poles of the political spectrum generate spirals of violent episodes, especially in some cities of the north such as Padua, Brescia, and Verona (Viminale 2007), but also in the south—for example, in the Lazio region, violence escalated in 2006 as two young people hanging posters for a left-wing party were attacked; a local activist of the extreme right and member of an ultras soccer fan club was arrested (Viminale 2007, 405). Additionally, we found several instances of clashes between right-wing activists and left-wing

students at the university,⁶² assaults against political representatives of the left,⁶³ attacks on left-wing squatted centres and wounding of their activists,⁶⁴ and attempts at bombings of headquarters of left-wing political parties and unions.⁶⁵

In Germany, there was also a concentration on protest events related to the history of German fascism and World War II. Usually, this became manifest in honouring soldiers or well-known personalities from the Third Reich, or in performing largely visible marches in honour of the Wehrmacht. Sometimes, these demonstrations also referred to ordinary (that is, non-military) people, such as the Dresden urban population, which became the victim of Allied force's bombings at the end of World War II. The Wehrmachtsausstellung (see below), documenting crimes committed by German soldiers, also comes in here. However, there are also many events that are part of the more vaguely defined category of self-description, in which the right simply organized a march or other form of event under slogans such as 'We are strong'. This also includes those demonstrations focused on the relations between the judicial system and the right itself. Apart from single instances in which the right protested against treatment by judges or the police or against the arrest of popular right-wing leaders, this sees a certain intensification during the discussion of whether the NPD should be banned from the political arena. The activists present themselves as victims of a poorly developed freedom of speech since the law (or the executive's interpretations of the law) does not guarantee them the ability to speak about everything they would like to address. By contrast, explicitly xenophobic or racist demonstrations or other events do not occur very frequently. The same holds for actions on political life in general. Unemployment became important in the summer 2004, when the extremist right joined the protests against the social reforms of the social democratic Schröder government⁶⁶ organized by the moderate left, the more extremist left, and trade unions. Of course, the left-wing organizers of this protest did not appreciate the involvement of the extreme right and stopped the protests. Nevertheless, the right had participated and the figure for protests against unemployment rose. It should be noted, though, that most issues were defined very vaguely in the sources. It seems that most protest events

⁶² LR 03 April 2001.

⁶³ LR 22 March 2003.

⁶⁴ LR 04 June 2005.

⁶⁵ LR 27 December 2003.

⁶⁶ These protests had several political effects: first, the post-communist political party merged with a West German protest movement and became an important actor of the German political system. Second, it was the start of the fall of the Schröder government. Third, and most importantly for our topic, it can be seen as important reason why the Saxon NPD won seats in the regional Parliament in September 2004.

happened just for the reason of protesting. However, the strong tendency towards issues related to World War II is still obvious.

In contrast to the Italian and German cases, in the US, actions directly related to political issues do not represent the largest part of the covered events (only 4.8 per cent of all coded events in the US case), and are less characterized by violent forms of action, being mainly addressed via conventional actions (33 per cent). The (fewer with respect to Italy) violent events concerning politics refer mainly to clashes between right-wing groups (e.g. racist skinheads) and anti-racist groups (e.g. the anti-racist skinhead group Sharp⁶⁷). In the US, extreme right groups tend to use violence not only on immigration issues but also on conservative values and identity issues (see Chapter 10), where we found the same number of violent events as in politics (in each field, violent actions represent almost 50 per cent of events coded in the field).

On immigration issues, violent protest events organized by extreme right groups concern mainly race, ethnic, and religious relations. On these topics, in Italy, we found many cases of heavy violence often not related to an identifiable extreme right organization, such as, for example, attacks against homeless people and immigrants from Africa, as well as anti-Semitic actions. For instance, on 12 January 2000, in Cerveteri (Lazio region), radical right-wingers attacked the office of an African doctor, defiling the walls with Nazi swastikas and slogans such as 'niggers out' (Viminale, 2007). In June of the same year, in the centre of Rome, six young right-wing radicals attacked two South American people with barrels and a chain (*ibid.*). On 20 March 2000, four extreme right soccer hooligans threw a bomb in a subway in which East European immigrants were sleeping.⁶⁸ Similarly in Germany, protest events related to immigration and xenophobic issues are the most violent—for example in the attempt to kill a foreigner in Potsdam⁶⁹ or the hunting of several foreigners of Indian origin after a popular festival in Mügeln.⁷⁰

Even more so in the US, events concerning immigration issues tend to take violent forms. Many of them are threats, insults, or violent street attacks against immigrants, Latinos, or African Americans. For example, in 2001, in Springfield, Missouri, the leader of a local skinhead group attacked and stabbed two African Americans for racial reasons;⁷¹ in 2000, in Ocean Shores, a group of three Vietnamese people experienced a similar attack;⁷² in 2004 in New Jersey, a group of skinheads harassed 10 Mexicans for days, attacking

⁶⁷ *St Petersburg Times*, 01 March 2007.

⁶⁸ *LR* 01 May 2001.

⁶⁹ *Taz* 18 April 2006.

⁷⁰ *Taz* 23 August 2007.

⁷¹ Department of Justice Documents 10 April 2004.

⁷² *The Seattle Times* 01 August 2004.

them on the road and robbing them.⁷³ Light violent actions, although less shocking, are no less dangerous or effective in terms of hate diffusion and propaganda.

These results are confirmed by the data referring to the targets of right-wing mobilization. Forms of action tend to be more violent when they target political adversaries (politics) and ethnic minorities/migrants (migration) (Table 5.5). In particular, within this latter category, heavy violence is especially present when the target is 'foreigners' (28 per cent). This is true in all three countries under analysis.

In Germany, foreigners are by far the most frequent targets of violence from right-wing activists (53.8 per cent). Not only are they the subject of demonstrations and marches (which could sometimes also be defined as counter-events to previously occurring left-wing initiatives), but youth clubs and meeting centres of foreigners are also occasionally physically attacked and damaged. In the US as well, when the target is foreigners or immigrants, the actions of the extreme right are mainly physical attacks (46.8 per cent). Violent actions directed against African Americans account for 22.1 per cent

Table 5.5. Type of action by type of target

Type of target	Type of action		
	Non-violent	Violent	Total
Politics	61.9% (138)	38.1% (85)	100.0% (223)
Extreme right/'Us'	80.5% (62)	19.5% (15)	100.0% (77)
Nation	100.0% (21)	0.0% (0)	100.0% (21)
Traditional values/Nation	66.4% (79)	33.6% (40)	100.0% (119)
Migration	49.8% (127)	50.2% (128)	100.0% (255)
Globalization	82.0% (50)	18.0% (11)	100.0% (61)
EU	100.0% (4)	0.0% (0)	100.0% (4)
Socio-economic issues	66.7% (4)	33.3% (2)	100.0% (6)
Total	63.3% (485)	36.7% (281)	100.0% (766)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.27***

⁷³ *The Philadelphia Inquirer* 09 June 2005. In fact, commentators noted that, while racist skinheads have traditionally targeted largely Jewish Americans, now, with an increasing number of Americans blaming growing immigrant communities for crime and unemployment, hate groups are shifting their focus to an issue that works to their advantage (interview with Randy Blazak, 05 October 2007, Newhouse News Service).

of covered events; those against immigrants (without specification) account for 5.4 per cent; and Hispanics are targeted in 3.8 per cent of covered events. In Italy, racist actions include violence (e.g. physical attacks on foreigners or immigrant centres), but also demonstrative events (23 per cent of events regarding immigrants are demonstrative actions), such as demonstrations against the construction of mosques. Among others, in 2006, in Genoa, a demonstration targeted the construction of a new mosque; and militants of Forza Nuova marched in Tuscany (Colle Val D'Elsa) against the construction of an Islamic cultural centre.⁷⁴

Violence is also higher when actions target political adversaries—especially in Italy. Here, among protest events that target politicians, 45 per cent are characterized by violent forms of action, versus about 27 per cent of events targeting politicians in Germany and the US. Activists of the right-wing political party Forza Nuova have often been responsible for acts of intolerance against left-wing activists, which sometimes developed into violence (Viminale 2007), as in the aggression against a left-wing activist in Padua on 15 February 2006.

4.2. *Movements and counter-movements*

Extreme right groups do not mobilize in a vacuum, but are part of wider organizational fields that include a variety of institutional and non-institutional actors using disruptive and routine forms of action, both against and in defence of extreme right claims and interests. Previous research on protest events and radicalization indicates that violence tends to develop from clashes between rival political groups (della Porta and Tarrow 1986; della Porta and Reiter 2004). Our data allows us to control for the extent to which violence increases with the presence of counter-events, namely counter-demonstrations, as well as with police intervention. As counter-mobilization we coded an event that is provoked by the event initiated by the extreme right (Tarrow 1989), as for example a counter-demonstration by left-wing groups, the intervention of the police, and so on. In our analysis, in order to capture the social and political reactions against the extreme right actions, we used a simple dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of a counter-mobilization event for each event coded (Figure 5.2). Moreover, more qualitative information about the nature (and identity of the actors) of the counter-mobilization event were captured by using a string variable, and were recoded subsequently in the following categories indicating the identity of the type of actor of the counter-event:

⁷⁴ LR 17 December 2006. The correlation between the type of target and different repertoires of action is strong and significant for all three countries (Cramer's V is 0.24*** in Italy and the US; 0.47*** in Germany).




Figure 5.2. Type of action by presence of counter-events (all countries)⁷⁵

(1) the left (including squatted social centres), (2) civil society and social groups (e.g. anti-racist associations, religious groups), (3) police, (4) institutions (e.g. universities) and political parties.

According to our findings, counter-mobilizations are frequent. In Italy, in one third of the cases recorded there was some sort of counter-mobilization (35.2 per cent). Similarly in the US, counter-events occurred in 24 per cent of events initiated by the extreme right. In Germany the number of counter-events is higher (63 per cent of cases). As Figure 5.2 shows, the least violent actions are accompanied by a counter-event more often than are the more violent ones (48 vs. 23 per cent of cases). Demonstrative actions (in 60 per cent of coded events) and, secondly, confrontational actions (in 38 per cent of cases) are most often addressed through counter-demonstrations. However, this is especially true in Germany and the US (where in fact the correlation between violent action by the extreme right and the existence of a counter-event is strong and significant, respectively 0.40*** and 0.22***), whereas in Italy both violent and non-violent actions from the extreme right are linked to the reaction of society and politics with the same frequency (37 per cent each).

The counter-mobilization can take different forms and involve very different types of actors. In Italy, the most active counter-mobilization actor is the left (including left-wing squatted centres and the left-wing party Rifondazione Comunista) (in 62 per cent of counter-events). The second most frequent type of counter-event is represented by police intervention (in 25 per cent of cases

⁷⁵ Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.23***.

covered). The reaction to extreme right acts by civil society groups (e.g. anti-racist groups, the church, and so on) is more rare (in only 9 per cent of cases), as is the reaction from institutions or political parties (5 per cent).

In Germany, according to the (very scattered) information included in our sources, reactions come from citizens' groups. Usually, the organizers include political parties from the centre left (more rarely also from the centre right), social movement organizations, civil rights groups, Jewish groups, often the Catholic and Protestant Churches, and occasionally trade unions. This is complemented by a wide range of interested individuals, often forming ad hoc citizen committees.

In the US, in comparison to the two European countries, civil society groups mobilize much more often against racist/xenophobic attacks (74.8 per cent of attacks). Breaking down these civil society organizations, in 45.1 per cent of the covered cases they are informal, local groups of residents in the cities concerned; in 29 per cent they are watchdog organizations (such as for example the SPLC or the ADL),⁷⁶ civil and human rights groups, and anti-racist organizations. These types of groups mobilize in a more organized way, through demonstrations, but also via leafleting and the signing of petitions against hate groups, right-wing violent attacks, and incidents against social, ethnic, and religious minorities.⁷⁷ Religious and Jewish groups counter-mobilize against the extreme right in 5.5 per cent of cases. Finally, our data show the striking activism of institutions in counter-events (mainly universities, media, and judiciary institutions) (18.7 per cent). In fact, counter-events are often characterized by the activation of a mix of social and political/institutional actors. This was the case, for instance, in the large 2005 march in Portland, Oregon, against white supremacist and KKK groups and activities. On that occasion, 'Mayor Tom Potter and a constellation of political, religious, and neighbourhood leaders addressed an overflow unity rally at the Multnomah Center, while another 300 people at Gabriel Park protested against hate... Anti-hate protesters in Gabriel Park included members of the Freedom Socialist Party, Radical Women and the Portland State University Green Party. They called themselves the Ad-Hoc Coalition to Protest the Tualatin Valley Skins'.⁷⁸ More rare is police intervention (1.1 per cent),

⁷⁶ For over 90 years, the Anti-Defamation League has fought against bigotry and anti-Semitism by exposing on its websites information about hate groups and other extremists 'who seek to harm perceived enemies and to undermine our democracy' (see ADL home page). Today, the ADL's Center on Extremism pursues similar aims (<http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/>).

⁷⁷ For example, after a skinhead assault on an American Indian family at Spokane River beach, members of the Washington Human Rights Commission, the Spokane Human Rights Commission, and the Peace and Justice Action League of Spokane condemned the acts in a press conference (*The Spokesman Review*, Spokane, WA, 25 August 2005). The leaders of the peace and justice organizations asked that the community show their support for the family by attending the Riverfront Park powwow that weekend (ibid.).

⁷⁸ *The Sunday Oregonian* 09 January 2005.

commonly manifested as violent clashes between police and right-wing groups, as well as arrests—namely, repression against extreme right groups and activists by police.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter we analysed the characteristics of extreme right mobilization in Italy, Germany, and the US, focusing on and contextualizing the use of violence by right-wing groups. We looked at the opportunities available for these types of organizations in our three countries, at the different symbolic and material resources mobilized by different types of right-wing actors, and at the situational characteristics of the events.

First of all, our research indicated that political opportunities seem to affect the protest repertoire of the radical right—at least the ones we could reconstruct from newspaper sources. In fact, as expected, violence was higher in the US—where channels of access to political institutions are less present—and less violent in Italy, where potential allies bring about a (relative) moderation of the repertoires of action. The German case, with the largest presence of moderate forms, also indicates the relevance of other factors, such as the discursive stigmatization of the extreme right. These differences notwithstanding, right-wing action appeared as a stable presence in all three countries, and violence widespread (even if not growing).

Symbolic and material resources also seem to play a role in explaining the different repertoires of the different types of extreme right groups. In fact, as expected, violence was higher in the repertoires typical of subcultural groups, and in actions performed by groups with a local scope: in all three countries the local subcultural groups and single activists tend to frequently use a more violent repertoire of actions. US right-wing violent mobilization is strongly characterized by a high degree of personalization and spontaneity, where the main protagonists of right-wing activities are not organizations (as in the European cases, where political parties and movements, and subcultural youth groups prevail), but individuals or small cliques, or activists and sympathizers, very often not unidentified.⁷⁹ Both American and European extreme right violent mobilization is mainly staged at a local level. This finding can suggest a certain degree of organizational weakness, but also the existence, for this type of extremism as for other types (for example, religious

⁷⁹ Furthermore, according to our data, besides the focus on race and ethnic relations, US extreme right mobilization also has a very high level of symbolism. This means that some protest events are considered by extreme right groups as acts of protest in themselves. This is the case, for example, for those events that contain many rituals and almost 'pseudo-religious' aspects, such as concerts, rallies, honouring of important dates, and so on.

Islamic terrorism), of a (strategic) form of leaderless organizational structure that seems to represent an adaptation to legal constraints and to repressive strategies by the police.

We also noted that violence was more likely under some circumstances. In particular, actions on migration issues and targeting migrant groups emerged in all three countries as the most violent. Particularly in Italy, violence also spread in actions targeting political adversaries. Moreover, the action of the radical right tends to prompt societal reactions. However, counter-demonstration had different effects in the different countries, in some cases increasing, but in others reducing the likelihood of more radical forms of action.

6

Framing the 'Us': Identity Building in the Extreme Right

1. Identity building in the extreme right: an introduction

In social movement studies, identity is considered as particularly relevant, although not very often empirically investigated. In general, we can distinguish two main traditions in the analysis of collective identity. The European approach to New Social Movements (Melucci 1996; Touraine 1981) looks at the content of identity, considering which types of collective interests form which types of collective identities. The focus is on the building of collective identities in post-industrial societies, where the traditional class cleavage and, with it, class-based identity lose ground and other collective actors emerge. American sociologists, often within symbolic interactionism, have instead analysed the micro-dynamics of identity formation (Gamson 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1992; see Mueller 2003 for a very perceptive review).

More recently, the 'new social movement' debate has been revisited, addressing the growing spread of struggles for recognition as opposed to redistribution—sometimes with an opposition *tout court* between class-based (or interest-based) and identity-based politics (Hobson 2003). Even though this opposition has recently been contested (Fraser 2003; Phillips 2003), the debate has been useful in focusing attention on the interplay of different claims (of recognition and distribution) in several struggles, and the importance of the recognition of collective identities as an important dimension in protest. As Alessandro Pizzorno (1993) observed long ago, not only in the new, but also in the old social movements, identity (and recognition struggles) precede interests, being necessary to the very definition of collective interest and the negotiation of specific requests.

The debate about the increase in recognition conflicts is also relevant for the analysis of the extreme right. In particular, the recent (although uneven) electoral success of radical right parties has been explained by the (re)

emergence of exclusionary and isolationist attitudes in response to globalization, especially strong among the losers in globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008). In the past as well, research on the radical right has addressed identity issues when looking both at the meso level, at organizational ideologies, and at the micro level, at individual personality. This research has stressed the ambivalences of the extreme right identity, with tensions between the search for order and rebellion, traditionalism and vanguardism, Catholic values and esoteric rituals, emphasis on conformity and emphasis on diversity.

In this chapter, we want to discuss some aspects of identity building in the extreme right, looking at the ways in which the collective identity is presented and acted upon, and focusing on documents and actions that we coded as linked to the 'us'. In particular, we shall analyse expressive forms of action as well as those that are inwardly oriented. Moreover, we shall look at statements referring to the internal life of the organizations, as well as the framing of the 'us' and the extreme right organizational actors. As Alain Touraine has stressed in research on other social movements, the definition of the self is a most important component in the construction of a collective identity consisting of *Identité–Opposition–Totalité* (Touraine 1981).

We look at identity as a fluid and contingent social process that is context-dependent and constructed in ongoing relations with a number of different audiences (della Porta and Diani 2006; Mueller 2003; Jasper, Goodwin, and Polletta 2001; Melucci 1996). In this sense, identification is not only a process of self-assessment, linked to previously existing multiple identities, but is also contingently influenced by others, as it reflects stimuli coming from the outside. We consider the process of identification as bridging communitarian identity, organizational identity, and movement identity (Gamson 1992), in a process of boundary setting and recognition (Taylor and Whittier 1992) that is procedural and relational, mainly developing in action and interaction (della Porta 2008a).

Political opportunities—in terms of channels of access to authorities as well as potential allies—are supposed to influence the forms of these identities as well as the repertoire of participation by the individuals involved. In a cross-national perspective, we shall look in particular at the ways in which contextual opportunities, as well as the dynamics of movement-counter-movement conflict, affect identity building. We consider that they have an ambivalent effect, which passes through contradictory mechanisms of resonant bridging and boundary setting (see Figure 6.1).

From the empirical point of view, we want to investigate the extent to which action upon and framing of the 'us' varies cross-nationally and for the various organizations. As mentioned, the extreme right in Italy and Germany is strongly influenced by past experiences with authoritarian fascist regimes in both countries. In the US, instead, the radical right has been—so to speak—less ideological, and more focused on the defence of whites against




Figure 6.1. Explaining the construction of the 'us'

blacks (see also Chapter 8). We wish, therefore, to investigate whether these differences are reflected in a more ideological identitarian definition in the two European cases and, instead, a more racial one in the United States. Additionally, in the comparison of the German versus the Italian cases, we shall look at how and if the more open Italian political system is reflected in more flexible identities.

As for the cross-organizational differences, research on the extreme right has traditionally addressed two, apparently quite different, phenomena: a highly politicized and ideological one, and a subcultural, almost unpolitical one. These contrapositions of political versus non-political motivation are reflected in research on perpetrators of racist crimes, which have typically been distinguished as right-wing activists, ethnocentrist youth, criminal youth, and fellow travellers. These types vary in terms of degree of ideological commitment as well as police records, propensity to violence, and biographical characteristics: family of origin, private or employment problems, educational level, job training and job situations (tending to decline from the first to the third type) (Willems 1995). More generally, two—quite diverse—types of identities have been identified in the extreme right: a very ideological neo-fascist one, built upon the political legacy of fascism, and a subcultural one, less politicized and more emotionally oriented.

The politicized extreme right is strongly influenced by the experiences of authoritarian fascist and Nazi regimes. After the defeat of both, the post-war period was characterized by a nostalgic search for a definition of self. In Italy, as Marco Tarchi observed, 'it started the era of semi-clandestine meetings in anonymous rooms, that comes back again and again in the memories of the protagonists, of the endless discussions, with the constant repetition of the same formulas: ethical state, corporativist, socialization, of the futureless conspiracies' (1995, 25). This was in no way a unitary process: deep conflicts

immediately developed over several aspects of the past regime, opposing the supporters of the regime and those who criticized it, those who agreed with the choice of the war and the alliance with Nazi Germany and those who criticized them (ibid. 29). Resonant with the traditional tensions between fascism-as-regime and fascism-as-movement, disagreements also developed on the best strategy for survival: 'Dreaming of a revolutionary rebirth and preparing it through terrorist methods; working in a broader perspective, in order to build a political movement capable of legally claiming the inheritance of Fascism and celebrating its merits in the face of political opponents or rather devoting oneself to an aimed infiltration into the existing parties, in order to acquire influence and even influencing their actions' (ibid. 31). Similarly directed, although less visible, are the neo-Nazi groups in Germany.

Analyses of subcultural right-wing extremism have instead stressed its non-ideological character, addressing especially the skinheads as well as right-wing football hooliganism, which spread in the 1980s and 1990s. Skinheads are presented as a stereotypical image of the working class gone bad—Lout, Urchin, and Wild Boy (Hebdige 1982, 27). The self-definition of the skinhead has been linked to a sort of working class subculture, connected to 'Singing, dancing, drinking, having fun, being together, *Kanacken und Linken auf die Schnauze hauen*' (Farin and Seidel-Pielen 1993, 8), but also, in the German version, to '*Türken raus, Türken raus, Türken raus*' slogans (ibid. 80). Skinheads have in fact been described as territorially organized groupings (crews), focused on the defence of a certain territory and extreme white nationalism, expressed among others in the white power rock music (Marchi 1993). Research stresses the defence of a community perceived as being at risk, describing subcultural extreme right groups as mainly composed of young, white friends for whom: 'The square, the corner, the stadium take the sacred role of community centre, to defend against the attacks of the enemy' (Marchi 1994, 157; also Roversi 1992). Similarly, the politicization of soccer hooliganism during the eighties has been interpreted as follows: 'the emergence of the radical right in the soccer stadium seems to germinate more from adhesion to the most deteriorated themes of the sexist, violent and xenophobic style that characterizes the young ultras than from the success of neo-fascist propaganda, and in most cases it does not bring about a consequential political commitment' (ibid. 168).

In what follows, on the bases of protest event and frame analysis, we will observe which topics emerge as central when extreme right activists act and talk about themselves. In particular, we will compare the different types of organizations we have analysed in the three countries in order to see how the self is elaborated in deeds and discourses.

2. Producing identities in action

Protest is an activity in which resources are invested, but also in which identities are built. This happens also in our cases. All forms of protest have an identity-building dimension—even more so for actors that are highly stigmatized. The very act of demonstrating—with rituals and symbols—has an important role in setting boundaries. Indeed, it has been noted that, when extreme right organizations demonstrate, their aim is more to unite the militants than to display the strength of the movement to a wider public (Gentile 1999, 241).

Even more directly relevant for identity building are expressive events such as concerts and private parties, mentioned in Chapter 5 as part of the broad range of actions used by the extreme right. In all of our cases, the subcultural area is much more involved than political parties and other actors in expressive events (see Table 5.1). With an implicit division of labour, subcultural organizations engage in expressive events, strengthening the group identity, and organize violent events that strengthen group cohesion, but also contribute to a very brutal demarcation of the border between non-members/other communities and their own peer group.

The particular attention to expressive activities and the construction of exclusive identities in the subcultural milieu is also reflected in the issues addressed by protest events (Table 6.1 and 6.2). In general, the activities of subcultural organizations tend to focus more on the internal life of the group, and to be less oriented toward political issues. This is true in particular in Italy, where the subcultural area accounts for 63 per cent of events concerning the internal life of the extreme right. These vary from actions related to the organization of the extreme right group (e.g. occupations of buildings by extreme right organizations, *LR* 01 February 2005; logistical support for '*camerati*' in need, *LR* 08 January 2001) to events connected to the past history of the extreme right (11.7 per cent are occasions such as commemorations of historical dates of the Nazi-fascist period, counter-mobilizations or actions against the day celebrating the end of Fascism, 25 April, *LR* 21 January 2001), and other activities (e.g. concerts, *LR* 16 October 2001). In Germany, 30 per cent of the protest events carried out by the subcultural area refer to the internal life of the group. This is the case in particular for many demonstrations in which German neo-Nazis mainly show their presence to a wider public, wearing flags and shouting slogans. As the stigmatization of right-wing extremism alone makes every public appearance a widely discussed event, these acts contribute to the group spirit through joint participation in the contested acts. Similarly in the US, 43 per cent of events organized by subcultural extreme right groups refer to the internal life of the group. Subcultural expressive events take

Table 6.1. Issue of protest events by actor

<i>Type of actor</i>	<i>Issues</i>					<i>Total</i>
	Politics/Populism	Globalization	Migration	Traditional values/Nation	Extreme right/'Us'	
Party	26.9%	12.4%	11.5%	28.2%	20.9%	100.0% (234)
Political movement	10.0%	2.1%	17.9%	11.4%	58.7%	100.0% (341)
Subcultural area	6.4%	5.1%	22.6%	26.4%	39.5%	100.0% (314)
Other ¹	36.8%	1.1%	9.5%	33.7%	18.9%	100.0% (95)
Total	15.4%	5.4%	17.1%	22.4%	39.7%	100.0% (984)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.26***

1. Actors not identified, generic reference to right-wing activists.

Table 6.2. Issue protest events by actor, per countries

Country		Issues					Total
		Politics/Populism	Globalization	Migration	Traditional values/Nation	Extreme right/'Us'	
IT	Party	32.6%	11.0%	11.6%	26.0%	18.8%	100.0% (181)
	Political movement	42.6%	6.4%	6.4%	27.7%	17.0%	100.0% (47)
	Subcultural area	19.3%	5.3%	5.3%	7.0%	63.2%	100.0% (57)
	Other ²	44.3%	1.3%	6.3%	30.4%	17.7%	100.0% (79)
	Total	34.3%	7.4%	8.8%	24.2%	25.3%	100.0% (364)
DE	Party	7.1%	21.4%	11.9%	42.9%	16.7%	100.0% (42)
	Political movement	5.0%	15.0%	.0%	30.0%	50.0%	100.0% (20)
	Subcultural area	2.9%	7.5%	19.7%	39.9%	30.1%	100.0% (173)
	Other ³	.0%	.0%	12.5%	87.5%	.0%	100.0% (8)
	Total	3.7%	10.3%	16.5%	41.2%	28.4%	100.0% (243)
US	Party	9.1%	.0%	9.1%	9.1%	72.7%	100.0% (11)
	Political movement	4.7%	.4%	21.2%	7.3%	66.4%	100.0% (274)
	Subcultural area	4.8%	.0%	40.5%	11.9%	42.9%	100.0% (84)
	Other ⁴	.0%	.0%	37.5%	12.5%	50.0%	100.0% (8)
	Total	4.8%	.3%	25.5%	8.5%	61.0%	100.0% (377)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = Italy 0.24***; Germany 0.19**; US 0.13*

2. Actors not identified, generic reference to right-wing activities.

3. Actors not identified, generic reference to right-wing activities.

4. Actors not identified, generic reference to right-wing activities.

various forms, from small occasional entertainment events held in dance or music clubs, to the yearly celebrations of Nordicfest (by the Kentucky-based Imperial Klans of America), Hammerfest (by Hammerskins), and Aryanfest (by Volksfront).

A similar picture emerges if we look at the targets of extreme right actions, where we notice a larger focus on populism, traditional values, and economic issues by the radical parties, on migration for the subcultural area, and on self-identification for the movement organizations (see table 6.3 and 6.4). Here as well, however, we note cross-national differences. In Italy, the subcultural area disproportionately chooses political targets (often left-wing opponents) as well as self-oriented action. In Germany, the subcultural groups overwhelmingly target migrants, whereas the political movement organizations focus on political targets. This main target of subcultural groups corresponds very much to the public debate: whereas in Italy politics is often being portrayed as notably conflictual, migration is a very hot (but also stigmatized) topic in Germany. In both countries, subcultural groups choose topics which guarantee high visibility. Also in the US, subcultural groups focus especially on migration and very little on political targets. The Cramer's V indicates a medium-strength and statistically significant relationship on the total sample, which however is statistically insignificant in Italy and Germany and significant (but weak) in the US.

Concluding, protest event analysis shows that the subcultural groups in the right-wing milieu, besides being more violent in their forms of action (see Chapter 5), tend to focus more on expressive issues and the internal life of the groups, as well as targeting more often their political and ethnic adversaries. As for the social movement organizations that have been studied in the left-libertarian movement family, protest action also accounts for the extreme right as 'eventful' in terms of its relational, cognitive, and emotional effects on the individual and collective actors that participate in it (della Porta 2008a). However, for the extreme right, protest events as such also largely contribute to public visibility of the right-wing extremist sector which is—as shown above (Chapter 3)—publicly stigmatized to varying degrees in the countries under research.

3. Organizational forms and discourses

As we have seen, there is a certain division of labour among various types of groups when it comes to protest activities. Above all subcultural groups well reflect national stigmata and stereotypes. However, this group identity is also reflected in the different emphases in the discourses that the various types of groups pursue. As for the protest analysis, we differentiate among political

Table 6.3. Type of extreme right actor per target

<i>All countries</i>	<i>Target</i>								Total
	Politics/ Populism	Extreme Right/'Us'	Nation	Traditional values	Migration	Globali-zation	EU	Socio-economic	
Party	39.7%	5.0%	3.5%	19.9%	16.3%	10.6%	2.8%	2.1%	100.0% (141)
Political movement	18.2%	15.1%	4.4%	13.5%	39.6%	8.5%	.0%	.6%	100.0% (318)
Subcultural area	30.6%	8.3%	.9%	15.3%	38.0%	7.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0% (229)
Other ⁵	52.7%	4.1%	.0%	17.6%	20.3%	4.1%	.0%	1.4%	100.0% (74)
Total	29.3%	10.1%	2.8%	15.6%	32.9%	8.0%	.5%	.8%	100.0%
	(223)	(77)	(21)	(119)	(251)	(61)	(4)	(6)	(762)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.21***

5. Actors not identified, generic reference to right-wing activities.

Table 6.4. Type of extreme right actor* target by country

Country		Type of extreme right actor				Total
		Party	Political movement	Subcultural area	Other ⁶	
Italy	Politics/Populism	41.4%	56.4%	64.3%	63.3%	52.5% (135)
	Extreme right/'Us'	6.0%	5.1%	9.5%	.0%	5.1% (13)
	Nation	2.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.2% (3)
	Traditional values	19.8%	17.9%	2.4%	16.7%	16.0% (41)
	Migration	14.7%	15.4%	16.7%	15.0%	15.2% (39)
	Globalization	10.3%	5.1%	7.1%	3.3%	7.4% (19)
	EU	2.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.2% (3)
	Socio-economic	2.6%	.0%	.0%	1.7%	1.6% (4)
Total		100.0% (116)	100.0% (39)	100.0% (42)	100.0% (60)	100.0% (257)
Germany	Politics/Populism	35.7%	54.5%	34.6%	.0%	34.8% (48)
	Extreme right/'Us'	.0%	18.2%	3.7%	.0%	4.3% (6)
	Nation	.0%	.0%	.9%	.0%	.7% (1)
	Traditional values	21.4%	9.1%	17.8%	33.3%	18.1% (25)
	Migration	21.4%	.0%	30.8%	50.0%	28.3% (39)
	Globalization	14.3%	18.2%	12.1%	16.7%	13.0% (18)
	EU	7.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.7% (1)
Total		100.0% (14)	100.0% (11)	100.0% (107)	100.0% (6)	100.0% (138)

US	Politics/Populism	27.3%	11.2%	7.5%	12.5%	10.9% (40)
	Extreme right/'Us'	.0%	16.4%	13.8%	37.5%	15.8% (58)
	Nation	18.2%	5.2%	1.3%	.0%	4.6% (17)
	Traditional values	18.2%	13.1%	18.8%	12.5%	14.4% (53)
	Migration	27.3%	44.8%	58.8%	37.5%	47.1% (173)
	Globalization	9.1%	8.6%	.0%	.0%	6.5% (24)
	Socio-economic	.0%	.7%	.0%	.0%	.5% (2)
Total		100.0% (11)	100.0% (268)	100.0% (80)	100.0% (8)	100.0% (367)

Column percentages; Cramer's V = Italy 0.19 (n.s.); Germany 0.24 (n.s.); US 0.16*

6. Actors not identified, generic reference to right-wing activities.

Table 6.5. Distribution of issue areas by sources

<i>Issue Area</i>	Political party	Political movement	Subcultural group	Total
Politics	24.1%	20.4%	16.4%	21.0%
'Us'	8.7%	18.7%	20.1%	14.7%
Globalization	11.4%	15.8%	9.4%	12.2%
Social/economic issues	15.1%	6.5%	6.4%	10.3%
Values/Identity	13.1%	13.5%	17.6%	14.4%
Migration	8.6%	16.6%	17.4%	13.3%
EU	11.2%	2.5%	2.1%	6.2%
Nation	7.7%	6.2%	10.6%	8.0%
Total	(2289)	(1587)	(1316)	(5192)

parties, political movements, and subcultural (juvenile, violent, Skinhead) groups (see tables 6.3 and 6.4).

Political party sources deviate from the overall distribution in their emphasis on political issues (24.1 per cent) and social and economic topics (15.1 per cent)—which rank first for this type of source—as well as on EU topics (11.2 per cent), which represent nearly double the value of the overall distribution. When differentiating this analysis by country (tables for country-specific, cross-group analysis are not included), we can see that the emphasis on political issues can be confirmed for German and US political parties, but not for Italy. A reason for this can be that right-wing political parties are already integrated in Italian government alliances. With regard to EU topics, Italian political parties are outstanding (22.4 per cent), whereas there is hardly any cross-group difference in Germany (5.5 per cent for German political parties). By contrast, in all countries, topics of self-understanding (8.7 per cent) rank much lower for political parties than in the general distribution, although they are not completely absent. This is because political parties—being recognized political actors (in Germany even in constitutional terms)—are in less danger of prohibition than are violent subcultural groups. The identity of political parties is largely defined externally.

When it comes to political movements, the deviances appear a bit more moderate, apart from the very low value of EU topics (2.5 per cent), which do not have any notable importance for non-party groups since these might be less linked to EU affairs. This can be confirmed for all countries. In the case of German political movements, not a single EU-related statement could be counted. Questions of the group self-understanding (18.7 per cent) or of migration (16.6 per cent) are a bit more relevant for political movements than in the total sample, but the difference is not very large. Only German political movements underline the group self-understanding considerably

(27.4 per cent). Legal prosecution might play an important role here. German political movements are also notable with regard to political topics, where they score highest for all cross-country-cross-group data (39.0 per cent). If we add the 27.4 per cent of the self-image, we arrive at the conclusion that two thirds of their statements are concerned either with the political life in Germany or with the groups themselves. This can be seen as the attempt of German non-party groups to enter the political arena which—so far—has been difficult for them to access.

Finally, subcultural groups display some unique features in the comparison. Being under a permanent threat of being banned by law, they are the only type of group in which political affairs are *not* the most important topic, but group self-understanding is. They are also more active and more involved in socially deviant behaviour. Again, the German case stands out, since German subcultural groups refer to self-image in 33.4 per cent of all statements. In addition, questions of values (17.6 per cent) and migration (17.4 per cent) are prominent within these groups. Above all, migration topics might help to construct an image of a potential enemy. Migration is especially important for Italian subcultural groups (21.2 per cent), as is also confirmed by official sources which stress the closeness of the subcultural right and violent anti-immigrant xenophobic actions (EUMC 2004). Value topics can be related to the group's own society, claiming a loss of traditional values, but also to other forms of lifestyle that differ from the ways of life of the average right-wing extremist. For the US case, we have to add questions on the nation, which subcultural groups treat more frequently than other US groups (14.0 per cent). This is in line with the findings above about the discursive opportunities in the US, which permit discourse about these topics.

In brief, the findings from the analysis of the group discourses underline that the national context and the political and cultural opportunities offered by it play an important role in the self-presentation of the extreme right. The self-description predominantly occurs in the context of other important national characteristics. Furthermore, this trend is most visible for subcultural groups, since their identity is most weakly defined externally. Whereas political parties and political movements have clear roles in the political process, subcultural groups have to define their identity. They do this strongly in relation to those topics which are considered important in a national context.

We can also use cross-organizational differences in order to account for the distribution of mentions of actors in the discourses (see Table 6.6).

Political party sources emphasize actors from the political world more than the other sources do. This is most visible in the German case (political parties 41.4 per cent, political movements 25.9 per cent, subcultural groups 18.3 per cent; country-specific tables not shown). The closeness of milieus

Table 6.6. Distribution of actors by sources

<i>Actor</i>	Political party source	Political movement source	Subcultural group source	Total
Politics, Populism	29.3%	22.5%	20.0%	25.0%
Extreme right, 'Us'	10.8%	17.1%	20.8%	15.1%
Nation	21.6%	19.7%	27.1%	22.3%
Traditional values	6.6%	7.9%	9.4%	7.7%
Migration	9.9%	11.5%	12.3%	11.0%
Globalization	8.5%	9.1%	5.8%	8.0%
EU	5.3%	2.8%	1.0%	3.5%
Socio-economic	7.9%	9.4%	3.6%	7.3%
Total	(3252)	(2307)	(1737)	(7296)

Column percentages.

definitely plays a role here. Political parties are already part of the political reality, so that reporting about the political arena seems to be an obvious choice. Subcultural groups, on the contrary, often emerge from a cultural and more emotion-driven background; its supporters can also be suspected to be less interested in the complex interplay of political institutions. However, Italy deviates from this picture: political movements (22.9 per cent) and even subcultural groups (20.3 per cent) use the political actor category a bit more often than do political parties (19.3 per cent). Politics seems to be an important issue for right-wing groups regardless of their degree of institutionalization or their political role. As already observed for the issue areas, actors related to the extreme right itself are not so present in the political party source as in the political movement source or even the subcultural source. Also, when it comes to nation-related actors, we see that their actions are described in subcultural sources more often than in other sources. Whereas the Italian case confirms this finding with a very clear 33.5 per cent for the subcultural sources, Germany, however, is an outlier: actors related to questions of the nation are mainly treated by political movement sources (25.9 per cent), whereas they are less important for subcultural groups (18.3 per cent).

Actors related to traditional values are also more often discussed in subcultural groups than in the two other groups. In German subcultural groups, these actors account for 10.9 per cent of all the actors mentioned. Only in the US case do political movements concentrate more on actors operating on traditional values (15.0 per cent) than subcultural groups do (13.0 per cent). Indeed, the question of traditional values is also very much at the heart of the American political discussion, so that we can expect a mainly politics-oriented discourse to develop. Also, note that the political movements which we have analysed for the US case represent well the frequent combination of right-wing extremism with radical religious views.

Migrants and other actors linked to migration are more important for subcultural groups than for others. This is especially visible in Italy, where these actors account for 4.5 per cent of the actors in the political party source, 4.8 per cent of the actors in the political movement source, and 12.0 per cent of the actors in the subcultural groups. In Germany, however, migrants have a higher role in the political party source (9.3 per cent) than in the other sources. Indeed, the political discourse about migrants is highly politicized in Germany. In the US—where migrant actors already had a higher percentage of the general distribution—political movements emphasize migrant actors more than the other sources do (24.7 per cent). Again, the religious background and the ties of many political movement sources to traditional values plays a role here, since migration can of course be seen as a phenomenon which challenges national value systems and religious distributions.

Actors related to globalization are rather under-represented in all three countries as far as subcultural groups are concerned (5.8 per cent). The picture becomes a bit more differentiated when looking at the single countries: in Italy, we can confirm that these actors are less often discussed within subcultural groups (7.7 per cent), but we can make the additional observation that these actors are mainly mentioned in political movement sources (13.0 per cent). In Germany and the US, both political movement sources (Germany: 3.5 per cent; US: 3.3 per cent) and subcultural sources (both countries: 3.8 per cent) are low. Indeed, the relatively high share of globalization discussed in political movements for all countries under research (9.1 per cent) is due to the outlier case, Italy. The reason for this is that globalization is a more important and much more often publicly discussed topic in Italy than in the other countries. This is further enhanced through the presence of a very active left-libertarian anti-globalization movement in Italy. Therefore, an 'easy target' exists. For the other countries, we observe that globalization actors are mainly mentioned in the political party source, also since globalization is less a broadly discussed topic in the US and Germany, but belongs more to the political arena. Moreover, the left-libertarian anti- or alter-globalization movements are less strong, so that they do not offer themselves as good targets for discourses. This finding can be extended to EU actors, where the political party source is most important. EU actors are hardly mentioned in subcultural sources (1.0 per cent). The differentiated data for Italy and Germany confirm these findings. Finally, socio-economic actors are over-represented in the political movement source (9.4 per cent), but to a much lesser extent in the subcultural groups (3.6 per cent), with small differences among the three countries. Political movements might be closer to the real everyday problems of the people, so that it is very promising for them to debate socio-economic issues. They concern their followers directly.

4. Identity framing

Frame analysis showed that much attention is devoted to issues related to the internal life of the group, especially among the subcultural groups (Table 6.5). This is very visible in Germany (where the 'us' is addressed in 33 per cent of the statements of the subcultural group versus 11 per cent for the political party), and in Italy (19 per cent versus 9 per cent), and to a more limited extent in the US (11 per cent versus 4 per cent). In the following, we focus our discussion on those statements which refer to the 'us'.

First of all, we observe the use of high-value expressions for the description of the general spirit of the right-wing extremist groups. These groups 'win the hearts of everybody', 'do something good for others', 'do not just simply speak, but act', and 'find the solution'. When the internal life of the group is portrayed, it is said to 'give the feeling of comradeship', 'overcome loneliness' and 'live a good sense of community'. The necessity of 'fighting', 'working for the vision', and 'joining forces' is repeatedly mentioned in our sources. The language uses a positive vocabulary which is aimed at motivation and at a positive framing of otherwise stigmatized right-wing activity.

In all countries, political movements and subcultural groups are more inclined to use those statements in which the activists are asked to act ('should' statements rather than 'is' or 'will' statements): 57.5 per cent for German political movements are 'should' statements; 34.2 per cent for the Italian subcultural groups; 30.2 per cent for American political movements; and 39.5 per cent for the American subcultural groups, compared to only 18.8 per cent of 'should' statements in the whole population of all countries and groups. This confirms the higher need for symbolic incentives in the subcultural groups than in political parties. In fact, the political party is less inclined to frame its public discourses in terms of 'calls for action' for its activists (6.3 per cent in the German case, 6.0 per cent in the Italian case, and 15.0 per cent in the US case).

Considering the actors that make up the discursive frames, in all three countries right-wing subcultural groups are more focused than are political parties in their discourses on the self-identity category 'us', which indicates the extreme right itself and its peer group. In Germany, in particular, the political movement and subcultural groups mention their own groups much more often (35.5 per cent and 33.8 per cent, respectively) than do political parties (11.1 per cent). These self-descriptions include 'the only true Germans', with 'strong hearts', 'prepared for a civil war' and 'cannot even be stopped by state orders'—all expressions that reflect the inherent 'male hero' logic of right-wing extremism. The difference between political movements and subcultural groups on the one hand and political parties on the other is also

marked in Italy and the US, but to a lesser extent. In Italy, subcultural organizations focus on the 'us' in 16.7 per cent of all cases (political movements 16.2 per cent), compared to 13.1 per cent for the political parties. In the US, statements focusing on the definition of the self represent 17.4 per cent for the subcultural groups and 14.6 per cent for the political movements, compared to 6.3 per cent for the political parties. It is evident that above all the highly stigmatized German subcultural groups and social movements have a strong need to describe and also justify their own identity.

Often, the extreme right defines itself through opposition to the domestic political class. Indeed, it sees itself as 'naturally allergic to any form of power', 'loyal to the historic memory', 'thirsty for social justice'. The groups describe themselves as 'suffocated' by the political class, although they consider themselves to be the ones who should 'protect' the Americans from non-European races, capitalists, and various other hostile groups.

References to the analysed extreme right-wing parties differ among the three countries (see table 6.7). Remarkably, in Germany the NPD is quoted quite often, not only in its own sources, but also in those used for the subcultural organizations. Discussions, such as whether to forbid the NPD by law or not, or the high press coverage of the (limited) electoral success of the NPD in some *Land* level elections have of course raised attention levels for the NPD and often the political party stands as a synonym for the whole sector. In the US case a similar tendency of political parties to be more concrete in their references to the peer groups can be observed, although at a much lower level. Also in the Italian case, the same tendency can be observed. However, the striking unbalance between the sources as far as the explicit reference to the political party Forza Nuova is concerned (note that it is not mentioned a single time in the Veneto Fronte Skinhead press) certainly goes back to the fragmentation in the extreme right sector.

In Italy, 6.5 per cent of statements address the internal life of right-wing organizations. These types of frames vary from descriptions of the organizational form of the group (e.g. 'flexible, and near to the people against the bureaucracies that characterize the mainstream parties'), to its action strategies (e.g. 'taking to the streets'), main goals and characteristics, and basic information about events connected to the group, including entertainment (e.g. concerts, meetings) or political events (e.g. demonstrations, campaigns, marches). In a comparison between Italy and Germany, we can see that frames referring to self-description play a much more important role in the discourse of the German extreme right (almost three times as much as in the discourses of the Italian extreme right). Nevertheless, the trend of the distribution of 'self-descriptive' frames among the sources is similar in the two countries. In both, the self-description of the internal life of right-wing organizations plays a more limited role for the party organizations, whereas it has more

Table 6.7. The most important actors (selection) in the discourse of right-wing organizations, per country, and per type of organization

<i>Statements</i>									
<i>Type of actor</i>	<i>Germany</i>			<i>Italy</i>			<i>United States</i>		
	Subcultural organization	Political party	Political movement	Subcultural organization	Political party	Political movement	Subcultural organization	Political party	Political movement
'Us'	15.7%	0.2%	18.2%	2.6%	0.4%	1.3%	14.5%	3.9%	10.8%
NPD/Forza Nuova/ National Socialist Movement	5.6%	6.1%	0.6%	1.1%	10.8%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%	3.0%
Total		(1678)			(3589)			(2050)	

Column percentages

prominence in the two more informal groups. In the Italian case, the percentage for the Veneto Fronte Skinhead (VFS) (8.4 per cent) is double that of Forza Nuova (4.2 per cent), while the percentage for the discussion forum Camerata Virtuale (CV) is 6.9 per cent. Having to compete in the electoral arena, the political parties seem to more often address political issues, rather than remaining focused on themselves. This is also less needed, since the organizational form of a political party is well known. By contrast, the more informal and less visible groups devote significant energy to this aspect. We also have to add that for some organizations of the extreme right, especially those like VFS who are strongly stigmatized in public opinion, these types of frames serve as a strategy of re-legitimization and strengthening the identity of the group. Similar cross-organizational differences emerged in the US, where 9.0 per cent of the statements refer to the internal life of right-wing organizations, with a much lower 4.2 per cent for the political party but a high 12.3 and 10.7 per cent for political movements and subcultural groups, respectively. 'Us' is the most frequently quoted actor for the political movement sources (10.8 per cent) and, above all, for the subcultural groups' sources (14.5 per cent); while the political party source *Stormtrooper* counts 'us' only in the eighth position (4.0 per cent; the first rank is occupied by Jews with 6.3 per cent).

5. The 'us' for the extreme right

Notwithstanding the internal tensions, previous research on the extreme right identified some *topoi* that seem shared by its different wings. These *topoi* emerged clearly in our analysis of the way in which the 'us' is framed.

An actor was coded as 'us' whenever he or she was not specified more clearly, but was represented by the grammatical pronouns 'we' or 'us'. The 'us' defined in this way appears very frequently in the sources. Self-descriptive statements might be intended to inform members of the peer group about the activities of a group, but also to attract new members or voters, or—most simply—to communicate the goals, means, and activities of a group to potential (less visible) supporters.

The 'us' presented in the documents we analysed confirms some aspects of the traditional identity of the radical right, but also internal differences and tensions. As we will see below, our sources point at a self-description as a heroic (active) minority; the 'protection' of the (good part of the) nation to the exclusion of the rest; and the self-presentation as victims of the system. Within these common aspects, we observed a more inwardly oriented (community) identity framing for subcultural groups and a more outwardly oriented (organizational) one for parties, as well as different emphases for the three countries.

First, common to the various groups in the three countries is an emphasis on action per se, up to fascination with heroic death; an identification with the minority, refused by the mainstream society—‘proscribed, rejected’; the refusal of the *logos* and reason for the *mythos* (Ferraresi 1994). These common elements allow for (even if unstable) repeated convergences of the subcultural and political wings.

The ‘us’ is defined as oriented towards action. When looking at the German case, there are also a number of statements, not related to an explicitly mentioned object actor, in which the ‘us’ category is presented as a group of actors who ‘find the solution’, ‘unite those who think as they should’, and ‘do not just simply speak, but act’. With regard to the internal life, the peer group is presented as a group in which activists ‘help each other’, ‘live a good sense of community’, and ‘are an example for others’. Another important topic (in terms of action) is that the ‘us’ actor ‘preserves the customs of the ancestors in times of globalization’, even leading to a more transcendent ‘contact with the ancestors through living their tradition’. With regard to the means that should be applied, the necessities of ‘fighting’, ‘working for the vision’, ‘standing up’, and ‘joining forces’ are repeated several times. Certainly, the activists are also warned ‘not to exaggerate’, but at the same time they should start to change society, ‘because there is enough to do’. Summarizing the objectives of the activities of the ‘us’, we arrive at a ‘fight against globalization, mass immigration, and the currently prevailing interpretation of the German past’ (quoted directly in this order). Strength, selected virtues, and heroic ideals are omnipresent in these self-descriptions.

It is notable that most statements about the generic actor ‘us’ contain a reference to explicit action. The ‘us’ is not only described, but the high frequency of attributed actions shows that the ‘us’ actor is (will be/should be) very active. Of course, the quoted actions cover more or less the whole range of issues with which we associate the extreme right: first of all, the right presents itself as omnipotent, able to solve every problem. Second, the calls for action are relatively strong, presenting the right as an active and hard-working part of society. Third, classical virtues of Germanic nationalism, such as honour, nation, and comradeship, are overly emphasized. Fourth, the aim is the overcoming of the current societal and political systems. This means that the discourses effectively combine a somewhat romanticist, utopian ideal of a ‘pure’, solidaristic, and co-operative society with a rather strong call for overcoming the present situation. It also means that the ‘us’ actor, that is, the peer group, is a strong element of these processes. This aspect underlines the hierarchical character of the argumentation.

The emphasis on action is also visible if we look at the issue sub-fields with which ‘us’ (as a subject actor) correlates. While about 40 per cent of the statements refer to the self-descriptive category ‘We about us’—showing the auto-

referentiality of the group—the second most important issue sub-field is 'Form of state, revolution' (16.9 per cent), which is not so much concerned with daily politics, but with proposals of how to organize a state and achieve system change. This is partially related to the fact that this issue sub-field plays an important role in the two sources in which the 'us' is frequently mentioned (NBD guestbook and *Kameradschaften*), whereas it does not play a big role in the *Deutsche Stimme* (where the 'us' again does not play a role). However, it also means that the framing of identity—if it goes beyond issues of the group—is concerned with the revolutionary aspect of action. This can be understood as a call for action to arrive at a change in the general system. The third important issue sub-field is 'Organizational forms of right-wing extremists' (e.g. organizational strategies, organizational contacts between national extreme right groups and international groups, and so on) (9.6 per cent). This is again linked to the self-understanding of 'us'. After these three most important issue sub-fields, the next issue sub-field is the family (4.8 per cent). Here, a protective attitude seems to prevail, above all for young people and families (see below). The discussion is less about the factual situation of 'us' or about what 'us' effectively does. It is instead a look into the future (23 per cent against 12 per cent on the total) or—to an ever greater extent—a call for what the vague identity category of the 'us' *should* do (39 per cent against 13 per cent on the total; $\chi^2 = 46.14^{***}$, $df = 2$).

Let us now turn to the US case: here, as well, the 'us' is over-represented as the subject of the sentence (in 84 per cent of the cases, $\chi^2 = 39.78^{***}$, $df = 2$). The adjectives that are used point to the positive qualities of the 'us', sometimes in the form of virtues ('proud', 'honest', 'committed to history'), and sometimes more in the form of political preferences ('against illegal immigration'). Racism is explicitly admitted as a core feature of the self-definition of the 'us'. This is possible in the US context where speaking acts are not so much under public observation or under legal control as in other countries, such as Germany. Above all, the 'us' is seen as 'united by a common interest, common goals, and common literature'. It is also affirmed that the 'us' might be 'weak in numbers', but 'unbeatable in spirit'. For the future, two different scenarios are promoted: the 'us' is described as having 'blood on our hands', but there is also the (minor) vision of the 'us' being destroyed.

The call for action is also confirmed by the 'is/will/should' distribution, which is very significantly deviant from the total distribution ($\chi^2 = 286.65^{***}$, $df = 2$), with 66 per cent of the statements framed as 'should' (against 16.3 per cent for the total distribution). The 'us' is portrayed basically as an actor that *should* act. As seen above, the 'us' is called to act for America and above all for American children, under the idea of national identity, but also with regard to the self-understanding of the 'us' group. Part of this self-understanding is also oriented *against* certain groups (again, we find the 'should' dimension), namely, against foreigners and state authorities. The

group defines itself through its mission. With regard to 'should' statements, the 'us' is portrayed as 'born to pursue a mission'; it should be 'more active'. Above all, the adjective 'prepared' appears various times in the 'should' statements.

Finally, also in Italy, with regard to the internal life of the extreme right area, the peer group is presented as a group of activists 'motivated to do politics by passion', 'ready to run risks for their ideas', who 'treat each other according to honesty, values, and honour'. It defines itself as an 'antagonist right' that stresses its 'distance from the moderate right'. Calls for more unity within the extreme right area, as well as complaints about the present day division that weakens the right-wing front, are also common (for example, Forza Nuova 'should not have to struggle against other extreme right movements'). The party Forza Nuova is almost exclusively presented as the grammatical subject of the sentence (97 per cent of 63 statements, against 47 per cent on the total). This suggests the very active form of wording with regard to the auto-reference category, concerning the statements coming from the party newspaper—and, in general, the active image that the extreme right wants to offer of itself, with regard to the statements coming from the two other sources. This is also clear when looking at the previously mentioned attributes and expressions that are used to present Forza Nuova.

There are nevertheless some different emphases in the more political versus the more subcultural wing of the extreme right. Valerio Marchi noted a difficult interaction between the two extreme right areas: 'the original one, macho and chauvinist, with hooligan attitudes and consumptions linked especially to the characteristics of youth subcultures, and the politicized one, fascinated by the Nazi and Evola stereotype, linked to the tradition of the radical right, with militant attitudes. The Saturday night attacks, the rock concert, the passion for alcohol and soccer are expressions of the first sort; the political initiative, from marches to leafleting, from the meetings on negationism to workshops on anti-mondialism, are expressions of the second'. Some of these tensions have been linked to the different ages of the activists in the two areas: 'Age is an important variable in right-wing extremist violence. Violent activists of right-wing extremist groups with a strong ideological profile are often adults or even middle-aged. Most of the perpetrators of anti-foreigner violence in Europe are, on the other hand, very young and their ideological commitment is often limited to a rather unreflected hostility to foreigners and the use of racist slogans and symbols' (Bjørgo 1995, 11). Our research also confirms that the subcultural groups tend to put more emphasis on action.

These group differences are also visible at the country level. In Germany, for example, the self-description of the extreme right (16.3 per cent) is the second most important issue field. This is either related to the extreme right in general (and, therefore, to a very vague 'us') or—more concretely—to the group with

which the source can be connected, namely, the NPD, the NBD, or the *Kameradschaften*. Not very surprisingly, the percentage which the *Kameradschaften* devote to their self-description is more than double the total percentage (33.3 per cent), and the percentage for the NBD is at least 50 per cent higher than the total percentage (25.3 per cent). By contrast, the self-description of the internal life of right-wing organizations plays a more limited role in the *Deutsche Stimme* (8.4 per cent), ranking as only the fifth issue field for this source. As the press organ of a political party that has to compete for votes (less so for activists), it concentrates more on political issues than on speaking about itself. By contrast, the NBD and the *Kameradschaften*, which can be described as social movement organizations rather than political parties, strongly emphasize this aspect, in an attempt to keep their current activists and members and to recruit new ones.

The 'us' is the most often quoted actor (whether as subject, object, or ally of the subject, and in all of the three sources).⁷ This category describing their own peer group accounts for 5.4 per cent of all statements. Whereas 'us' is by far the most mentioned category in the NBD guestbook (with no less than 17.5 per cent) and for the *Kameradschaften* (14.4 per cent), it is clearly under-represented in the *Deutsche Stimme*, where it gets no more than 0.2 per cent of all mentions and ranks at only number 95 of all possible actors. The latter can be explained very quickly if we consider that, in the *Deutsche Stimme*, the leading category is the NPD, as the political party behind that newspaper which serves as a substitute for the rather vague expression of 'us'. The effect is the same. Additionally, in Germany as elsewhere, the 'us' is over-represented as the subject of the sentence, whereas it is clearly under-represented as the object or the ally actor ($\chi^2 = 16.50^{***}$, $df = 2$). This confirms the centrality of the 'us' as a truly acting actor. The attributes point to the positive qualities and even the virtues of the 'us', such as 'being present' and 'being disciplined'. Synonyms used are 'the only true Germans' and 'the power'. The main properties would be 'strong hearts' (a very telling combination of the myths of strength and emotional ties to the nation), which are 'prepared for a civil war' and 'cannot even be stopped by state orders'.

6. The protectors

A second *topos* emerges here: the protection of the (weak) people(s). The statements oriented to the definition of the self tend in fact to establish

⁷ It is clear that the total figure is quantitatively heavily influenced by the *Deutsche Stimme*, since most of the coded statements stem from this source. Therefore, the overall ranking has to be interpreted with caution. However, we also report the rankings within the single sources, which are more reliable estimators of the importance of a certain actor within a source.

paths of identification as well as opposition. In Germany, when the 'us' is presented as a subject actor, the most frequently corresponding object actor is the political class, meaning that the 'us' opposes the ruling politicians (for details on this point see Chapter 10). The actions that connect 'us' and 'the politicians' can be divided into two categories: either the 'us' should (or will) replace 'the politicians', or the need to defend the people against the politicians is emphasized. However, the subsequent object actors show yet another function of the use of 'us'. The other object actors to whom 'us' is linked are 'the Germans', 'the German people', 'young people', 'the family', and 'women' (for data see Chapter 10). These categories do not describe actors *against* whom the 'us' is active, but *for* whom. This means that the subject actor 'us' is connected not so much with a defensive, but more with a protective argumentation in the sense of taking advocacy for Germans. This protection ranges from a very emotional form (the 'us' 'will win everybody's hearts') over very vaguely formulated activities (such as 'to do something good for', 'give the feeling of comradeship', 'overcome loneliness') to very concrete promises (creating jobs, but also preparing women for their later role as mothers).

In the US as well, if an object actor is mentioned when talking about 'us', this is most often 'America'. This means that 'us' is positively defined, showing the contribution of the peer group for the nation of America. Indeed, the 'us' sees itself as called to 'make the fundament for a new America', to 'wake up America', to 'preserve America', and so on. Apart from white people and 'our race' (without any further specification)—for which we find similar statements as for 'America' as an object actor—children are frequently mentioned as object actors of 'us'. Also in this case, the direction of the statement is protective; indeed, the verb 'to protect' (or 'to help') is usually connected to the combination of the subject actor 'us' with the object actor 'children'. It seems to be a goal of the 'us' to work for children or in the interest of children. This even includes very explicit statements such as the need to feed children a healthy breakfast.

In parallel, negatively defined object actors for 'us' are foreigners and African Americans (confirming again our expectations about a more racist orientation of American right-wing extremists), and political institutions (plus the police). With regard to immigrants, the subject ('us') is called to 'eliminate' the object ('foreigners'), because there are 'problems'. With regard to political institutions, there is a plea 'not to believe' in them. In the few cases in which 'us' is seen as an object actor, the relevant subject actors are nearly exclusively negatively defined. In the lead, we find the police, for whom 'us' is an object, followed by state institutions other than the President.

Also in the US, looking now at the issue fields with which 'us' (as a subject actor) correlates, we observe that no less than 42.1 per cent of all statements with 'us' as a subject actor are in the self-description 'We about us'. This means

that rather than speaking about actions of the 'us' with regard to a specific *problématique* (such as the economy), the 'us' is mainly presented with a reference to itself. The second position is occupied by 'race' and 'racial relations' (11 per cent, far behind the first position). As no single race has been identified as an important object actor for the 'us', this second position mainly describes a definition of their own group as being part of the superior race, without explicitly mentioning the inferior ones. Finally, the third position is occupied by the revolutionary category of the form of state (7.9 per cent), which confirms our finding that the relation between the 'us' group and state institutions is a revolutionary one in which the state should be overthrown. In Italy, looking at the issue fields with which Forza Nuova correlates, the self-descriptive category 'We about us' (31.1 per cent of statements) is followed by the domestic economic system (14.8 per cent) (which confirms the high salience of economic issues for the discourse of the extreme right), by political life in general (9.8 per cent), and by two issues that suggest the importance of the internal life of the extreme right as an area of discussion: the organizational field of the extreme right (domestic and international contacts) (9.8 per cent) and political party competition in general (8.2 per cent). Concerning economic issues, the extreme right discourse stresses that Forza Nuova 'fights the antimondialist struggle', 'mobilizes for political and social problems', 'helps', 'wants to be the voice of' the less powerful groups, 'aims at re-evaluating the dignity of the work', but also 'wants to distinguish the workers who are really productive from the social parasites'.

7. The victims

A third element is the self-definition as 'victims' of the system as an accompaniment to the 'heroic' self-definition. On this point, scholars have stressed that the societal and political *consensus* against right-wing extremism is frequently exploited by the activists for their propaganda.

This emerged especially in the self-representation of the political parties. In general, the actions of police are described as 'acting against us', 'surveilling' us, or 'attempting to destroy us'. Similarly, government agencies are described as wanting to oppress or destroy the 'us'. This is the case in Germany with the category of the political party NPD (5.3 per cent of the total), ranking only slightly behind the general 'us'. Not very surprisingly, the NPD is the most important actor in the *Deutsche Stimme* (6.0 per cent), but also no less than the third most important actor for the *Kameradschaften* (5.3 per cent).⁸

⁸ The most quoted actor for the *Kameradschaften* is 'us' (14.4 per cent). This is followed by the explicit reference to the *Kameradschaften* themselves (7.3 per cent).

This element is especially present in the political parties. Looking at the issue sub-fields with which the NPD (as a subject actor) correlates, we see four important areas. First of all, we have to mention the 'Organizational forms of right-wing extremists' (24.0 per cent). This means that the NPD is a subject actor above all when it comes to the discussion of various forms of collaboration of right-wing organizations (usually political parties), for which the NPD is considered an important actor. The next issue is political life in general (22.0 per cent). As we know, the *Deutsche Stimme*, as the most important source for the NPD as a subject actor, also emphasizes these more general aspects of political life. The centrality of the NPD for the right-wing sector, which we have already seen in our previous analyses, is again confirmed. The third position is taken by 'We about us' (18.0 per cent). We see that the non-party groups recurrently discuss not only their own identities, but also the NPD as a political party. With a certain distance, EU politics in general occupy the fourth position (10.0 per cent) for the NPD as a subject actor. The NPD presents itself in these cases as the only actor able to protect the Germans from the negative consequences of EU politics.

If adjectives or more precise descriptions of the NPD as a subject actor are presented, they treat the NPD as a 'united group' that is 'convinced about itself'. More concretely, the NPD stands for 'clear ideas in economic policy', but also 'social justice' and 'full employment'. We can see that the NPD is presented in a more political way than the generic 'us'. More generally, the NPD as a subject actor is called an 'alternative to the system', a 'fundamental opposition', and an actor 'against globalization'. Other statements underline the 'historical responsibility' of the NPD. With regard to actions attributed to the NPD as a subject actor, the choice of words is much less accentuated than is the case for the general 'us'. Indeed, the NPD as a subject actor 'wins', 'disturbs', 'declines', 'controls', 'works for', and 'influences'. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the main action is less revolutionary, but that one of the coded statements just says that the NPD 're-models Germany into a new, a truly German and a socially fair Germany'. This is definitely a difference from the generic 'us', which was presented as a much more active and radical actor.

When the NPD is presented as an object actor, we see a certain over-representation of hostile forces as subject actors. Above all, a group of adversarial actors that can be called domestic political actors are frequently mentioned (50.0 per cent). The residual group of other hostile actors occupy another 18.8 per cent of the subject actors. This means that the NPD becomes the object actor above all when it has to be presented as a victim of the conventional political actors, certainly also inspired by the various attempts to legally ban it from the political arena. When the NPD is presented as the object actor, the subject actors are accused of 'restricting (hindering, etc.) the activities', 'prosecuting', 'offending', 'opposing', 'banning', 'neglecting', but also simply

'avoiding contact' with the NPD. Indeed, hostile subject actors try to spread lies about the NPD as a political party—very often in collaboration with the mass media or other important civil society sources. Voters and activists of the NPD would be stigmatized by a society that likes to present itself as free, democratic, and fair. The general opinion of being unfairly treated and of conventional political actors not being coherent in their activities against the NPD is recurrent. In one instance, a local *Bürgerinitiative* (a citizens' initiative against right-wing extremism) is even accused of using violence against NPD activists, inverting thus the public accusations against the very same NPD.

In addition, the NPD, over-represented as an object actor, tends to be presented as a victim of other political forces. As the 'is/will/should' distributions of both types of grammatical function (subject and object) show, the NPD in its self-representation will be an important actor (as far as the active actions are concerned) in the future, whereas its present status is more characterized by being an object (and therefore by being exposed to passive actions). As a subject actor, the NPD is presented as a moderate political party that is committed, but not (entirely) radical. By contrast, other subject actors for whom the NPD is the object actor are described as rather radical and unfair. With regard to the issue sub-fields, it is evident that the relation of the NPD to the rest of the political reality is frequently debated, but also the standing of the NPD in the system of right-wing organizations.

If adjectives or more precise descriptions of the NPD as a subject actor are presented, they treat the NPD as a 'united group' that is 'convinced about itself'. More concretely, the NPD stands for 'clear ideas in economic policy', but also 'social justice' and 'full employment'. We can see that the NPD is presented in a more political way than the generic 'us'. More generally, the NPD as a subject actor is called an 'alternative to the system', a 'fundamental opposition', and an actor 'against globalization'. Other statements underline the 'historical responsibility' of the NPD.

In Italy as well, the increasing success of the party is underlined, but also the need to defend itself against the mainstream parties. Forza Nuova is a group 'always under risk of repression', 'penalized for its young age and its paucity of financial resources'. Nevertheless, it is also stated that FN 'will expand its influence' (e.g. it will open territorial sections in several regions); indeed, it has already 'conquered its right to speak up' and 'has started to cause trouble for the other political forces'.

In Italy, among the 7.5 per cent of statements concerned with justice and home affairs, we find above all issues related to the activities of right-wing extremist groups. Indeed, statements about 'justice and home affairs' are largely oriented towards a discussion of the role of the police and the judicial system with regard to their behaviour vis-à-vis right-wing groups. Many statements are concerned with the actions of the judicial system against right-wing

groups and complain about a situation of corruption and (unjustifiable) persecution. Very frequent are complaints that extreme right groups receive worse treatment by the state and the judicial system than do extreme left groups.

8. Conclusion

In right-wing groups—as in other social movement organizations—many deeds and words are oriented towards the definition of the self. As we saw, first of all, the actions of the extreme right often perform an important role for the activists themselves. Rituals and performances are important for consolidating the unity of the group. Moreover, the more aggressive and risky the actions, the more effectively they serve to divide the in-group from the outside. These types of action emerge as particularly relevant for the subcultural groups, which in fact seem to assume a relevant role in the process of identification of extreme right-wingers.

However, actions perform certain functions only in connection with cognitive work, which is developed by the extreme right organizations. A relevant component of the statements we analysed refer in fact to the definition of the self, which emerges as particularly relevant for the non-party publications.

An in-depth analysis of the statements connected with the ‘us’ and the group identities confirmed the presence of some specific *topoi*. First, the definition of the self emerged as mainly oriented towards a nationalist type of identification, though with a more communitarian tone in the subcultural groups and a more political one in the party discourses. Additionally, the framing of the ‘us’ tended to stress an image of an heroic but stigmatized élite, with the self-appointed role of protecting some specific groups of the population (the autochthon, the whites, and so on) against the perceived menace of the others (blacks and migrants, but also communists). This dichotomous vision, especially widespread in the subcultural milieus, helps in setting boundaries between the self and the rest. The discourse combines an emotional—romanticist image of activity with revolutionary aspects of overcoming the system. The ‘us’ is presented as a strong actor, characterized by important virtues. In this argumentation, the internal life of right-wing groups plays as important a role as the form of the state and possible right-wing revolutions.

If these *topoi* emerged as common to all three countries, nevertheless some differences in the presentation of the self can be noted, with a more widespread ethnic framing in the US (where the white versus black opposition is still central), a nationalist one in Germany and additional references to socio-economic issues in Italy. The legacy of past developments in the extreme right can account for these differences.

Additionally, we noted some cross-organizational differences between the more political and the subcultural areas. These variations reflect different political strategies, as well as generational cleavages. Similar cleavages have been identified in the past. In fact, research on the extreme right in the 1970s already stressed the development of a generational cleavage in the 'politicized' wing, which opened it to more strict interactions with less politicized subcultures. This evolution has been studied in depth in the Italian case. Here, a sort of generational conflict between the nostalgic, neo-fascist leadership and some of the more rebellious youth emerged with the participation of right-wing dissident groups of the Fuan Caravella—the university branch of the MSI—in some episodes of student protest in 1968, while the MSI party leadership invited mobilization against the protest and even physically intervened (Tarchi 1995, 56–7). This generational tension deflagrated in the second half of the 1970s, with two main effects. On the one hand, there is 'an almost obsessive desire of revolutionary purity', an 'instinctive solidarity with whoever refuses the system, be it right-wing or also left-wing, Italian autonomist or Palestinian feddayin, Argentinean Montoneros and IRA terrorists'. On the other hand, there is the 'strategic choice of letting oneself be contaminated by the impact of modernity and of its unsolved questions, moving the commitments inside the civil society' (ibid. 61). The so-called Campi Hobbits, counter-cultural camps that imitated similar events organized by the radical left, are in fact seen with much suspicion by the party leadership, which the rebels defined as a 'gerontocracy' (ibid. 62). Named after Tolkien's heroes, the camps presented themselves as a 'liberating experience', with time devoted to consciousness-raising (Tarchi 1995). They reflected a sort of rebellion by the young generation against the old, expressed also by journals (such as *La voce della fogna*) and an interest in underground culture and rock music (Tarchi 1995).

If there are differences between the deeds and the discourse of the subcultural versus political wings of the extreme right, these should not be exaggerated. Notwithstanding the internal tensions, we indeed identified some *topoi* that seem to be shared by its different wings. These similarities in the presentation of the self reflect the organizational relations we noted in previous chapters (see, in particular, Chapter 4).

Fighting Modernity: The Extreme Right and Conservative Values

1. Introduction

Right-wing extremists often appeal to specific communities (Mudde 2000, 41; Winkler 1996, 26) that they see as endangered or even broken and destroyed in current societies (Merkel 1997, 20). In this sense, such groups are conservative, since they reject all external forces that might challenge the traditional social arrangements that they consider as pure. References to conservative values are therefore expected to find an important place in the discourses and actions of the extreme right. This interpretation is also suggested by the literature on the recent resurgence of the extreme right as a reaction against modernity and its values. Among others, Piero Ignazi (1994; 2006) underlines that the right can be defined by support for such values as 'political authority, superiority of the state, the nation or the Church, which supersedes the individual, roots and traditional values, order, harmony, adherence to social and natural inequalities within the social-political realm, the sense of belonging and organic communities' (ibid. 19). In this sense, the modern post-industrial extreme right is understood as a right-wing response to modernity: a movement seeking to radically change society, not by altering socio-economic relations, but by returning to traditional values to oppose liberalism, democracy, and capitalism. Indeed, fascism is seen as having brought about an ethical revolution much more radical than the traditional conservative policies, by imposing values such as authority, hierarchy, honour, loyalty, and especially the supremacy of the national community as a 'secular religion' (Ignazi 1994, 46).

In this chapter we seek to empirically explore the extent to which, in its political discourse and action, the extreme right (including beyond the extreme right party milieu) relies on conservative values, particularly on issues such as religion, moral values, national history, and national identity.

Additionally, we want to see if there are cross-national and cross-organizational differences in this approach, and, if so, to what degree they can be explained on the basis of specific political and discursive opportunities as well as legacies in the right-wing tradition.

Some recent developments seem to have increased the discursive and political opportunities in Europe and the US for right-wing actors to refer to traditional and religious values. Above all, religion has again become a central issue on the (geo)political agenda. Considered (at least in Europe) a memory of the past, at most playing a role in the Israeli-Arab conflict, religious tensions again became very visible during the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Religion came back in even more strongly with the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. In the ensuing debate, the term 'terrorism' has increasingly been qualified by the adjective 'Islamic' (or Islamist), clearly assigning a religious dimension to terrorist acts. The subsequent years have seen (and still see) a growing role of religion in politics, with fundamentalist wings developing within several religions.

Second, recent years have seen an intensification of discussions on value-oriented topics that are not necessarily always directly related to religion. Nevertheless, the last several years have been characterized by debates on gender roles, and on topics such as gay marriage, abortion, and birth control. More conventional ideas about family and family structure are increasingly challenged by social realities, which have overcome and changed traditional views on lifestyles. Policy preferences with regard to these topics have become more important on the political agenda in recent years.

Third, with globalization has come a revival of traditional national identities, with reference to the fatherland. In fact, 'the concept of nationhood is a central part of the "discursive opportunity structure" for the radical right' (Minkenberg 2002, 249). Right-wing extremists 'try to align [their own] identity with national identity' (Klein and Simon 2006b, 246). This 'renaissance of a largely imagined purity of the nation' (Prowe 2004, 131) creates a kind of nationalistic myth in the form of a populist and romanticist ultra-nationalism (Minkenberg 1998, 33) which also has quasi-religious aspects (Forndran 1991, 15; Minkenberg 1998, 41). Following some religious beliefs, '[the] category of nation [exists]... as a natural, God-given social entity' (Klein and Simon 2006a, 168; similarly Ignazi 2002, 24). This religiously driven origin of the formation and the definition of a nation also makes the issue of belonging to such a nation an important category for right-wing extremist identity formation. It leads to a 'collective identification in a great national destiny, against class or ethnic or religious divisions' (Ignazi 2002, 24f.). The right of people to create their own nation (or even nation state) and to live as a nationally homogeneous entity is very often also granted to the people of other nations. 'According to the ethnic nationalist tenet, *all* nationals have to live within the

state' (Mudde 2000, 43); but they have to live within *their* own state (Schönckäs 1990, 296).

The framing of nationalism has changed, however, as the nation is a dynamic concept. In the global village, the nation state and the identification with it have started to fade away. Globalization, but also developments such as international tourism and the diffusion of foreign languages, jeopardize nationalistic ideas that are strictly linked to the nation state. In the radical right as well, 'the traditional nationalism of the nation state... is now being replaced by a new "materialistic" nationalism that is easy to manipulate for domestic political purposes' (Heitmeyer 1993, 22). As a consequence, 'natural membership [to a group] has been replaced by achievement-dependent access' (ibid.). National identity goes back to a common history, common cultural references, or a common language (Klein and Simon 2006a, 166). Or, more normatively speaking, perhaps even in a rather romanticist mode, a 'nation [is] the place where all members should take care of each other' (ibid. 168). Then, in this logic, 'only members of the national community... should be entitled to the benefits of solidarity and social welfare' (ibid.).

In what follows, we look at the ways in which the references to conservative values—expressed in religion, family, and lifestyle oriented issues, and nationalism (or more illustratively, God, family, and the fatherland)—are framed in the discourses and actions of extreme right groups. In particular, we shall look at the presence of issues linked to conservative values in the protest events (section 2) and in the frames (section 3). We will show the differences and similarities among different countries and different types of right-wing organizations, linking them to the specific political and discursive opportunity structures.

2. The mobilization of the extreme right on conservative values: focusing on actors and strategies

Focusing on protest events, in the years covered by our analysis, the extreme right mobilizes on a wide variety of issues (see Chapter 5). Among them, actions directly related to conservative values represent a significant part of all covered events initiated by extreme right groups between 2000 and 2007, accounting for about 22.9 per cent of all the events registered. In a cross-country comparison, however, we notice that in the US, conservative value issues cover only 8.8 per cent of all the coded events. To the contrary, in Italy, protest events on conservative values account for 25 per cent and in Germany for almost twice that (41.6 per cent). If we differentiate this further, we find that the high German value is mainly due to events referring to the national past, a topic that is of less importance in Italy and, particularly, in the US.

With regard to other conservative values than those connected to the national past, Germany even ranks lower than Italy. Indeed, no less than 28.0 per cent of all German events are concerned with questions of the national past. Not only is the national past a frequently debated issue in Germany in general, but since the past refers to Nazis and nationalist ideologies, it is evident that the extreme right, as ideological successors to past forces, concentrate even more on this topic.

Looking at cross-time trends, however, our analysis makes clear that extreme right mobilization concerning conservative values fluctuated over the period under examination. It is concentrated within the central years covered by the analysis, reaching a peak in 2004–5 with 27.2 per cent of events organized by extreme right organizations on these issues. This decreasing presence of actions related to conservative values is especially evident in the US, where the events fall from 32 per cent in 2004–5 to 6.9 per cent in 2006–7.

When right-wing organizations mobilize on these issues, the topics most often mentioned are the national past (45.5 per cent of all protest events within the category, highly influenced by the percentage for Germany), gay issues (17.4 per cent), and religion (14.3 per cent). This represents the mentioned categories of God, family, and fatherland, with a clear emphasis on the latter. By contrast, topics such as ‘abortion, family and related issues’ (4.9 per cent), which correspond to rather complex ethical questions, are more rarely treated in extreme right mobilization, and hardly at all in comparison with the overall sample.

There are, however, some cross-country differences, confirmed by the high and significant value of the Cramer’s V coefficient (0.47***). First, there is a notable difference between the US and the two European cases. In the US, the focus is mostly on religion (53.2 per cent within the category); in Germany, mainly on national history (62.0 per cent); and in Italy, on family and related issues (41.3 per cent; eventson gay issues account for 32.6 per cent, and abortion and gender for the remaining 8.7 per cent). With regard to our categories, the US emphasizes God, Italy the family, and Germany the fatherland. This goes back to the main topics of the national discourses: in America, religious and ethical questions have been very intensively discussed, not only, but above all during the Bush era (which greatly overlaps with our period of analysis). In Italy, the last decade saw the sometimes very harsh public discussion on new forms of family life, from same-sex marriages to patchwork families. Traditional family structures are increasingly questioned, and the dominant opinion leadership of the church is shrinking. The high German value on the national history instead, does not derive from recent changes: history has been part of the national self-understanding since WWII. Thus, in all countries, the differences can be explained through attention cycles: right-wingers concentrate their action on what fits the public discourse best.

Mobilizing on the Extreme Right

Table 7.1. Specific sub-issues of extreme right mobilization on conservative values¹

<i>Sub-issues</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Total</i>
Gay issues	3.0%	32.6%	18.8%	17.4%
Family, abortion, and gender	1.0%	8.7%	6.2%	4.9%
Modernity and crisis of society	22.0%	5.4%	12.5%	13.8%
Religion	6.0%	9.8%	53.1%	14.3%
National identity	6.0%	3.3%	0.0%	4.0%
National history	62.0%	40.2%	9.4%	45.5%
Total	(100)	(92)	(32)	(224)
<i>Conservative values (on all issues)</i>	41.6%	25.0%	8.8%	22.9%

The German extreme right organizes its events connected to the national past in basically two forms. The most frequent type consists in the honouring of political and military personnel, but also of ordinary people of the Third Reich era—for example, the birthdays and days of death of leading Nazi personalities, including Adolf Hitler himself, are celebrated with public marches or pseudo-religious rituals, but the unknown soldier is also regularly celebrated, with expressed pride. Along the same lines, many protests addressed the ‘*Wehrmachtsausstellung*’, an exhibition that depicted the German army during World War II (the *Wehrmacht*) not just as an executer of the will of their generals, but rather as actively involved in war crimes. The German demonstration with the highest number of participants in our database also referred to the *Wehrmacht*. On 1 December 2001, a demonstration of 4,000 neo-Nazis marched through Berlin to remember the *Wehrmacht*, even traversing a Jewish quarter in Berlin. The event with the second-highest number of participants (3,325) was a demonstration dedicated to the memory of the German soldiers of World War II, again in Berlin on 10 May 2005, two days after the 60th anniversary of the German unconditional surrender after World War II. The third demonstration took place in Wunsiedel (Bavaria) on 19 August 2002, when 2,500 participants remembered Adolf Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, who is buried there.

In Italy (Table 7.1), the data point to intense activism of the political party Forza Nuova on family and related issues, including, above all, gay issues,

¹ In the category ‘Family, abortion, and gay issues’ we have included the following specific sub-issues from our codebook: family policy (including gay issues), abortion and related issues, schooling, family in the society, gender, education and child raising, sexual life of society/deviances. In the category ‘law and order’ we have grouped: justice and home affairs, crimes, drugs, law and order (understood as the claim for a stronger observance and/or control of the law and general attitudes of severe application of existing laws) and role of police. In the category ‘modernity and crisis of society’ we have included: society in general, social stratification, crisis of society, urban life, rural-urban cleavage, and modernity. In the category ‘mass media’ are grouped: mass media (understood as their status and role in contemporary societies) and freedom of opinion. Finally, ‘national history’ includes history in general and history related to WWII/fascism. In the protest event analysis, the categories ‘law and order’ and ‘mass media’ were empty of cases.

abortion, and paedophilia. The extreme right in Italy traditionally 'upholds traditional values against permissive policies and feminism by intensively mobilizing against abortion' (Ignazi 2007, 107). In 2006, for instance, the party promoted a campaign against the Netherlands, accused of not fighting paedophilia adequately (*LR* 7 June 2006). On 28 June 2006, twenty Forza Nuova activists (among them the regional and provincial leaders) tried to block the Gay Pride demonstration in Catania (*LR* 26 September 2006). The Italian extreme right is also concerned with the perceived decadent life in cities, referring to the alienation, violence, and degradation in post-industrial cities. For example, on 28 October 2006, Forza Nuova organized a demonstration for the restoration of the quality of life in the run-down districts in Padua, in which around 500 persons participated. Many of these value-oriented events are violent (see next section) and often not attributed to an identifiable extreme right organization (e.g. threats or violent attacks against homosexuals). Official sources confirm our results, underlining that Forza Nuova has continued in the most recent years to actively support its traditionalist opinions about the defence of the family (*Viminale* 2007, 406).

Whereas there is little mention of religion itself among conservative values in the actions of the Italian and German extreme right, the US extreme right mobilization evidences a strong focus on religious issues. Examples of organized events on these issues are marches or demonstrations (e.g. religiously inspired anti-gay demonstrations, *Associated Press State & Local Wire* 22 May 2004) or public speeches (held, for example, by white supremacist leaders at universities, *The State Journal-Register* 17 February 2000, *United Press International* 29 February 2000). As research stresses, right-wing extremist activists in the US see politics as a vehicle for their religious goals—as 'they literally seek the battle at the end of time. Some see Adolph Hitler as a biblical prophet akin to Elijah and view the Nazi Holocaust as the initial lost battle of the Tribulations preceding God's new millennial dispensation' (de Armond 1999, 3). In fact, in the US, the mobilization on conservative values is often linked to race and ethnic relations, becoming a sort of holy war (Roversi 2006). For instance, a former member of the white supremacist National Alliance, who was convicted in 2005 of civil rights violations, justified its action in terms of 'waging a "race war" and planned the beatings of several non-whites in the Salt Lake area to spread a message of fear and to recruit others to share their views... National Alliance members would gather and talk about "Ra-Ho-Wa" or "Racial Holy War"... Ra-Ho-Wa is the ultimate goal, the holy grail of the white power movement, to throw non-whites out of the country and overthrow the government' (*States News Service* 05 May 2005). This is also explained by one right-wing leader during the 2005 convention in Alabama of the 'Aryan Nation', according to whom the purpose is 'to unite all groups who respect Christendom and the white race' ('Supremacists gather in Alabama',

17 September 2005 *Chattanooga* [Tennessee] *Times Free Press*). The goal of these events is, as explained by the leader of 'Teen Mania movement', a local group from San Francisco, to 'recall Christian values...to provoke a young generation to passionately pursue Jesus Christ and to take His life-giving message to the ends of the Earth!' Through their protest events, these groups condemn 'Hollywood, the music industry, advertisers, and even the mainstream media, which subject young people to [an] average 14,000 sexual scenes and references each year; the Internet's "point-and-click pornography"; and corporate America, [which] does everything it can to grow brands and profits without any regard to the moral decay of a generation' (*Richmond* [Virginia] *Times Dispatch*, 31 March 2006).

We can assume that these topics are not equally salient for all different actors of protest events. Therefore, the question becomes which right-wing actors actually mobilize on these topics. Is this limited to the traditional organizations of the extreme right milieus, such as radically Catholic, revisionist, and nostalgic groups, or are the right-wing subcultural youth organizations also active on these issues? Similarly, for the German case, how far can historical topics, dating to seventy years ago, be interesting for German subcultural groups, which mainly recruit their activists from a generation for which World War II is very far away? Furthermore, German reunification has notably altered the discussion about national identity: the German question is no longer 'open'. Therefore, the national question could be considered as not so imminently relevant for subcultural groups today.

Our data show that the covered events are mostly organized by unidentified groups (18.9 per cent), where no organization claimed responsibility and police were not able to find the perpetrators. Frequently, only a small number of right-wing activists or even only one activist are indicated (see Chapter 5).

In any case, we can observe a division of labour between the groups in all countries, since the mobilization of different types of actors varies with regard to specific sub-issues of the more general category of conservative values (Figure 7.1).

Subcultural groups and, in second place, right-wing political parties, organize their events mainly around issues related to national history (59.0 per cent and 43.9 per cent). Religious issues are addressed above all by political movements (35.9 per cent)—certainly depending very much on the US case where many political movements often have an explicit religious background—and, secondly, by unidentified activists (15.6 per cent). The mobilization on gay issues is characterized by a mix of spontaneous and institutionalized actors, including, above all, political parties and unidentified activists (25–30 per cent). Finally, all sectors are equally involved regarding urban societies, modernity, and education (with a particular attention to these topics by subcultural groups, 19.3 per cent). In Italy, the most active




Figure 7.1. Mobilization on sub-issues within conservative values, by actor type

organization, especially on religious issues, is the political party Forza Nuova. In the US, our data points to the KKK and white supremacist organizations which primarily define themselves through their standing on these issues. In Germany, the most frequent organizers are either the various *Kameradschaften* or local (and regional) NPD branches as the most important actors in the sector; this attributes a special salience to the issue.

Looking at the main strategies (Table 7.2), demonstrative (50.0 per cent) and violent actions (23.7 percent: light violence 11.6 per cent; heavy violence 12.1 per cent) are dominant in actions on conservative values. However, while violence hardly plays any role (light violence 8.1 per cent; heavy violence 1.8 per cent) in events referring to the national past, where, on the one hand, a clearly identifiable target is missing and which, on the other hand, can be very well represented in more expressive forms such as honouring dead soldiers, it is instead more present during events on conservative values.

In different countries, very different strategies of action are adopted, as confirmed by the high and significant value of the Cramer's V coefficients (Cramer's V = IT 0.26***, DE 0.37***, US 0.29***). Conservative issues are addressed mainly through demonstrative forms in Germany (65.6 per cent), as compared to Italy (19.2 per cent) and the US (27.6 per cent), where these issues are mainly characterized by violence (38.5 per cent in Italy, 62.1 per cent in the US, but only 15 per cent in Germany). This can depend on the high public

Table 7.2. Action forms in protest events related to conservative values

	<i>Action form</i>						Total
	Conventional	Demonstrative	Confrontational	Light violence	Heavy violence	Expressive events*	
Conservative values	6.7%	50.0%	14.7%	11.6%	12.1%	4.9%	100% (224)
Total	11.0%	41.2%	10.2%	13.2%	15.5%	8.9%	100% (988)

* Online events are included in this category. Row percentages are shown; Cramer's $V = 0.28^{***}$

control of right-wing activities in Germany, but also on the fact that German protest events mainly concentrate on the national past, whereas, as we have observed above, demonstrative action seems to be the most appropriate form of protest.

In the US, the mobilizations assume the most radical form of heavy violence (42 per cent). In Italy, many of the frequent violent events, often not related to an identifiable organization, are acts of threat or street attacks against homosexuals. Examples of violent and non-violent actions include sit-ins and leaflets against gays (LR 06 June 2000), anti-gay demonstrations (LR 03 March 2006), slogans on city walls (LR 01 June 2003), street attacks against gays and transgendered people, damages to offices of gay and lesbian associations, threats against their representatives (LR 06 July 2003), and petitions against the gay pride and other initiatives (LR 10 May 2007). In the US, heavy violent events are mainly direct violent acts, such as physical, individual, and collective aggressions or punitive expeditions against individuals. But there are also expressive events concerning conservative value mobilization, such as cultural meetings, rallies, concerts, and congresses of organizations (e.g. the yearly Nordicfest of a Ku Klux Klan group, the Kentucky-based Imperial Klans of America, and the Hammerskins, organized by Hammerfest (ADL 2004).

The targets of (especially violent) protests linked to conservative values are marginal groups (e.g. homeless people, and prostitutes, drug and alcohol addicts, and so on; 39.4 per cent), but also homosexuals (29.2 per cent). Protest events that have religious targets (in sum 22.3 per cent) are especially directed against Jews (17.2 per cent), without, however, being on explicitly religious topics. While in Italy and Germany, social minorities and marginal groups are the most important target groups (57 per cent in Italy; 22 per cent in Germany), in the US, Jews are the most common (45 per cent), also relating to the general emphasis on religion in the US case. Indeed, when it comes to national history and national identity, the Jews take on a prominent position, since protest events that deal with the Nazi time will necessarily target them.

Table 7.3. Statements related to conservative values^[2] by country

<i>Sub-issues</i>	<i>Statements</i>			
	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>All countries</i>
Family, abortion, and gay issues	20.8%	20.3%	19.2%	20.7%
Law and order	8.2%	23.6%	16.6%	17.4%
Modernity and crisis of society/decadence	9.0%	22.3%	9.1%	13.4%
Religion	0.4%	0.0%	13.1%	5.0%
Mass media	21.3%	0.0%	7.4%	7.8%
National identity	16.6%	4.2%	17.5%	12.1%
National history	24.1%	29.7%	17.2%	23.6%
% of statements/events related to value issues on total database	20.6%	18.3%	31.4%	22.4%
	(1353)	(2460)	(1379)	(5192)

Column percentages

Thus, Jews are not only a target when it comes to racism or to religion, but also with regard to the national past.

3. The discourse of the extreme right on conservative values: focusing on God, family, and nation

In this section, we look at the frames that are constructed in order to address conservative values issues (Table 7.3). In parallel to what we observed in the protest event analysis, we also find here a prominence of religious references in the US (God); of family issues in Italy (family); and of national history and nationalism in Germany (fatherland). In the following, we present the distribution of the various sub-issues, differentiated by country:

As can be seen, topics related to national history are most important when looking at all countries jointly (23.6 per cent). They also rank first in Italy (29.7 per cent) and in Germany (24.1), but not in the US (17.2 per cent).

In the German case, this category deals nearly exclusively with the period of German National Socialism, World War II, and the post-war reactions. It is less a glorification of the historical Nazi period (which would be forbidden by German law) than a discussion about its consequences for Germany. Allied occupation after WWII and the situation of the semi-sovereign Germany are presented as unjustifiable consequences of the Nazi period. This is also extended to the idea that Germany and the Germans should no longer feel guilty and responsible for the Holocaust.

² The definitions of the single categories correspond to those used for Table 7.2. For the frames analysis, gay issues were grouped with 'Family, abortion and gay issues' instead of being separated, since they were not of equal importance to the protest event analysis.

In Italy, the frames about national history look nearly exclusively at the period of fascism and World War II and the last fascist institution, namely, the so-called *Repubblica di Salò*. Although not so prominent in the right-wing discourse as compared to other issues, these frames resonate with the continuous existence of the Italian Social Republic nostalgic organizations. Their main difference from neo-fascist groups is that they usually do not intervene in the contemporary political agenda (Tateo 2005, 14). The historical frames very often contrast the glorious past, 'a golden age' (in terms of politics, economy, and culture and society), to the decadence of the present day. The percentages for the single sources (6.7 per cent for Forza Nuova, 2.7 per cent for VFS, and 8.4 per cent for the online forum CV) show a clearly lower presence of historical frames in the discourse of the VFS group. This result can be explained by a generational cleavage, since the Veneto Fronte Skinhead is a group representing the juvenile subcultural area of the extreme right.

In the US, there is also a strong emphasis on World War II history, although the perspectives vary. Anti-German statements praising the American forces for their victory over Hitler can be found alongside revisionist statements about the Holocaust. Additionally, some statements treat the Third Reich independently from the war. Above all in the political party newspaper, important actors of Hitler's regime (ministers, military officers, and so on) are explicitly named. However, differently than in the European cases, where WWII can be seen as the most important historical event, the discussion of the national history is not limited to WWII and Hitler. Aspects from the Cold War, but also of earlier American history (going back to the times of settlement) are frequently debated, usually praising the 'good old times'. Since WWII and Nazi issues do not affect the US directly, it is not surprising that violent groups are less interested in historical topics (3.6 per cent). More proximate issues, such as the loss of jobs, social security, the continuous threat from (Muslim) terrorism, or racial tensions in everyday life seem to be much more interesting for activists organized in American violent groups.

Another frequently covered category is family issues, including gay rights and abortion. In the German case, when the right discusses family issues, the documents usually underline the threat that natural-born Germans will 'die out' (*Deutsche Stimme* February 2006). This decline in family structures is held responsible for problems of the economic and social system, also because there would not be any 'payers for the pensions any more' (*Deutsche Stimme* November 2003). The influx of foreigners is seen as further worsening the demographic situation (they have 'more children and more wives than the Germans'; *ibid.*). Consequently, extreme right groups present themselves as the 'saviours of family structures and values' (NBD guestbook, entry 69). Thus, this is less about the family itself and, instead, more related to the fact that framing the arguments as family issues helps to add yet one more perspective

to the discussion on immigration and on the future of the welfare state. Another interesting topic in Germany is child rearing: teachers from the '68 generation would induce children into future unemployment and foster 'drug-addiction, disorientation, and frustration' (*Deutsche Stimme* January 2006). These issues are usually illustrated with descriptions of violent biographies of children and adolescents.

In Italy, important sub-issues are 'family, abortion, and gay issues' (20.3 per cent), 'Law and order' (23.6 per cent) and 'modernity and crisis of society/decadence' (22.3 per cent). Regarding family issues, many statements refer to topics such as the loss of traditional family institutions; the decrease in the birth rate; the (too liberal) sexual behaviour of the society which puts the traditional family at risk; the opposition to abortion, drugs and gay issues in general (many statements refer to the 'unhealthy behaviour' of gay people). Interestingly, in the Italian case, the European Union is frequently mentioned when talking about family (as well as religion). It is argued that the EU 'does not protect the family'; 'does not make policy oriented to increase the birth rate'; 'sets the Catholic religion equal to other religions'; 'protects sexual deviances'; or 'legitimizes unions between homosexuals'. As a consequence, the extreme right presents itself as a social force against this moral and social decadence of current societies. FN 'struggles for the defence of life against abortion', 'defends the values for a wealthy society', 'fights for what is according to nature and against what is not natural (e.g. against abortion, homosexuals, and artificial fertilization)', and 'fights for the national and religious identity'. Additionally, in Italy, the sub-issue of the crisis of society is more present than in the other countries (22.3 per cent), deriving from this general preoccupation with moral values.

Moreover, although the specific topic of religion is never explicitly mentioned, in Italy these issues are often discussed with reference to religious arguments. This is evident in the discourse of Italian extreme right organizations about the cultural effects of modernity. According to their arguments, modernity, in the sense of the post-industrial society, represents above all the triumph of universalism and of values of hedonism and mass consumption. Moral concerns are particularly present. Modernity is a threat to the nation state, based on tradition, family, authority, and faith. Young people are the main victims of this absence of values. The solution proposed in Italy is a return to the traditional values, which are at the basis of a healthy society. Extreme right sources often stress in their motivational statements that 'the Italians should be more interested in and committed to the creation and maintenance of the good of society' (e.g. 'should denounce and do something against the dangers of the society, like drugs, immigrants'). The solutions to change the situation are identified in a mythic return to 'an organic and

structured community', 'based on the natural family', but no explicit religious argument is given (such as conversion or more church attendance).

In the US, the traditional family, composed of two people of opposite sexes and (several) children, serves as the model. Children are frequently mentioned as objects to be protected. This even includes such very specific statements as the need to feed children a healthy breakfast. More precisely, the idea is to protect American families from capitalists, police, homosexuals, Jews, and so on.

Law and order topics rank third in the all-countries list. Contrary to what we expected, they do not seem to play a strong role in the discourse of the German extreme right, although the political and cultural context could seem conducive (Caldiron 2002, 115), while they appear much more frequently in Italy and the US.

There are also interesting deviances from the overall distribution in single countries. In the discourses of the extreme right in the US, we see a prominence of purely religious topics (13.1 per cent) which do not exist as such (or just rarely) in Italy and Germany. This again underlines the importance of religion as such in the US, where religion is also part of the public discourse. These statements usually affirm the superiority of the Christian religion, but also condemn the practice of (above all) the Catholic Church of seeking more collaboration with other religions. This means that the trichotomy of God, the family, and the fatherland is also visible in the discursive statements, although the national differences are less visible than in the protest event analysis. Religion (God) can be clearly attributed to the US, but family and national issues are equally important for all three countries under research.

In Germany, we can furthermore see a strong concentration on mass media issues (21.3 per cent). In a certain sense, this high percentage for mass media makes up for the low percentage in law and order topics. German right-wing extremists do not portray themselves so much as prosecuted by legal and judicial forces, but rather by the mass media, which report in a very critical and hostile way on their actions. This is frequently connected to the argument that such reporting does not guarantee freedom of opinion. In a very subtle way, the argument is conveyed that those who accuse the right of wanting to suppress freedom of opinion are themselves failing to respect this principle. The following table looks at the differences among the various groups.

As we can see in table 7.4, some topics are more prominently covered by political parties, others by political movements, and still others by subcultural groups.

Political parties look more to family and historical issues; perhaps these are also less appropriate, too complex, and too abstract for subcultural groups and political movements. Political movements seem to be more concerned with modernity and the crisis of the society on the one hand, and religious questions on the other. Both topics have in common that they are the most fundamental topics of our list, for which belief systems, faith, and utopian

Table 7.4. Statements related to conservative values by type of actor

<i>Conservative Values</i>	<i>Statements</i>			
	Political parties	Political movements	Subcultural groups	All groups
Family, abortion, and gay issues	26.2%	16.9%	16.7%	20.7%
Law and order	9.0%	13.1%	31.5%	17.3%
Modernity and crisis of society/ decadence	11.3%	19.5%	11.1%	13.4%
Religion	4.2%	11.2%	0.8%	5.0%
Mass media	12.3%	7.7%	2.2%	7.8%
National identity	9.0%	11.2%	17.0%	12.1%
National history	28.0%	20.4%	20.8%	23.6%
% of statements/events related to value issues on total database	20.8%	19.7%	28.2%	22.4%
	(2289)	(1587)	(316)	(5192)

Column percentages

(and other) ideas about the future play the most important role. Also, consider that most right-wing movements of the US are very closely linked to religion. As already said, a huge part of the right-wing extremist religious sector in the US is covered by political movements, and not so much by political parties or subcultural groups. Finally, subcultural groups emphasize topics of law and order and national identity, that is, ideas of a strong state. This also means a confirmation of the division of labour between the groups, which we had already confirmed elsewhere.

4. Conclusion

The extreme right has often been cited for its defence of traditional values and interpreted as a reaction to post-materialism and pluralism, modernity, and secular values. In this chapter, we have analysed extreme right discourses and actions on conservative values (such as family and gender issues, abortion and gay issues, religion, and the national past), in order to look at the novelty of the extreme right, but also its rootedness in traditional forms of the extreme right. While anti-modernism may be a typical feature historically found in the extreme right, other dimensions have emerged from our analysis as extremely new in the discourse and mobilization of the contemporary extreme right on conservative values, such as, for instance, the reference to law and order.

Notwithstanding the religious revival, religion, a core dimension of conservative values, has not emerged as a direct, prominent concern. Frames and protest events are nevertheless linked to religious discourses in more complex ways. There is attention to some traditional values (the family in Germany,

anti-abortion discourses in Italy). More particularly, we observe violent actions against homosexuals in Italy, which reflect traditional homophobic attitudes in the right-wing spectrum, also resonating with the mobilization in defence of the natural family (and against unnatural homosexuality, gender equality, and civil rights), especially by the Catholic Church. In the US, religion plays a much more important and more direct role in the discourse and actions of the extreme right, but it is also connected with xenophobic argumentation and aspects.

Law and order emerges as a relevant topic (more in the discourses than in the actions), but with cross-country specificities. If it clearly comes out as an important topic in the US, this happens more indirectly in the European cases, where these topics are instead treated in terms of protection of children, women's security, and so on.

In short, conservative values play an important role in Italy and Germany as far as the actions of the extreme right milieu are concerned, while in the US this is more true for the discourse. Additionally, in each of the three countries under study, the extreme right focuses on (and emphasizes) different aspects of conservative arguments and issues that can be assimilated to God in the US, the family in Italy, and the nation in Germany. This differentiation is more easily possible for protest events than for discourses. These results can be linked to the different *political and cultural opportunity structures* offered by the three contexts.

It is not difficult to understand the extreme right mobilization on conservative and traditional issues in the US if we consider that such issues actually dominate the national (mainstream) political agenda (at least during the period of our analysis). Indeed, surveys confirm that one of the most reliable indicators of party affiliation in the US is not income, but church attendance; also, American culture is far from secular (Michael 2003). The family values argument also often turns into a religious anti-abortion crusade in the US. Furthermore, the mainstream right adopts these values, being also very well organized, well funded, and brain-powered. Several prominent think tanks have direct access to the White House under conservative rule.

In Italy, where conservative values are also notably mobilized by the extreme right, this seems to resonate with the legacy of the Italian right. For instance, survey data on delegates at the AN party conference show that the political attitudes of mid-level elites were still very close to the traditional MSI, both in terms of authoritarian values and in the evaluation of the fascist regime (Milesi, Chirumbolo, and Catellani 2006, 67). Appeals to conservative values also resonate with the value orientations of part of the Italian population (Biorcio and Vitale 2010). Moreover, the electoral campaign of 2001 saw a return to an emphasis on traditional themes such as the need for a strong executive and tough law and order policies (Ruzza and Fella 2009, 186). The

(mainstream) political public discourse has strongly focused on law and order and conservative values in recent years (Ruzza and Fella 2009). Furthermore, extreme right groups could build on important allies in the political core of the country (e.g. the Northern League party, *ibid.*). Forza Nuova, although a militant movement organization, nevertheless has many contacts with the institutional far right, especially with the Northern League at the local level, where it constantly looks for joint action in campaigns against immigration and Islam and in favour of law and order principles (EUMC, 24). In addition, the Catholic Church, especially in Italy, has intensified its activism, intervening often in the political public sphere on issues that are not directly religious (Giorgi 2007).

Questions linked to the national past are of enormous importance in Germany. Furthermore, most German protest events focus on these topics. It is no surprise that these topics are more relevant for German extreme right actors than for their Italian and American counterparts. On the one hand, the German history is particularly difficult and significant; on the other, the German nation—up to today, when the German question seems to be resolved—has always had difficulty defining itself. As for the frequent references to national history, the issue of a German national pride is related to a past in which nationalistic principles are seen as more predominant than in the present society. ‘Images of self-identification by young right-wing males hark back to the Second World War, such as to the foreign units of the German *Waffen-SS* in the Russian campaign, veterans of the winter war, and other images far from contemporary adversaries such as today’s anarchists, left-wing activists, the rising crime rate, and the police’ (Merkl 1997, 38). As far as issues such as abortion or gay rights, but also national identity, are concerned, they are certainly also frequently discussed within German moderate right-wing parties. However, although anti-abortion, anti-gay, and nationalist stances do exist, there has never been a close connection with the extreme right, such as an electoral alliance. Moderate right-wing politicians with a hard-core opinion on these topics (such as Martin Hohmann), or even anti-Semitic opinions (such as Jürgen Möllemann), are considered unacceptable in centre-right political parties. Similarly, the religious organizations in Germany, such as the Churches, do not seem to be as profoundly rooted in conservative values as their Italian and American counterparts are. In the end, German history remains as an emotionalized topic that can be used and abused by every political force for its own purposes. Thus, the very specific German past, the difficulty of defining unifying (religious and other) values, and the exclusion of the extreme right from the daily political discourse shape the extreme right’s view on history, mass media, family, and law and order topics.

Racism: Old and New Forms?

In January 2003, a group of Forza Nuova militants makes a raid on a TV channel during a live broadcast where the leader of the Muslim Union of Italy, Adel Smith, appears as a leading figure, attacking him violently. The protagonists of the raid—about fifteen young people led by the Veneto secretary of Forza Nuova—are arrested and charged with acts of incitement to racial hatred in accordance with the Mancino law (La Repubblica 11 January 2003).

‘Without Juda, Without Rome—Tomorrow We Build Germania’s Dome’. This was chanted by Pagan nationalists during their excursions in the eighteenth centuries. The ‘Faith Community of the Germanic Species’ considers itself as heirs of this movement. In the year 2000, their ‘Gefährtschaft Nordmark’ invites for ‘an excursion through the Heide for tomorrow. . . . A “Thing” will be held and the new “Gode” (‘leader’) will be elected. . . . Their most important task is the “conservation and renewal of the white human species”’ (Taz 09 September 2000).

1. Introduction

A central element in the ideology of the extreme right has traditionally been an exclusive definition of the nation, combined with an aggressive attack on—or even denial of—the ‘other’, often defined in ethnic or religious terms. This Manichean distinction of us-them allows for the definition of the in-group via the out-groups (Taggart 2002). Ethnic minorities and migrants are therefore represented as the classical enemy. Similarly, a main aspect of right-wing terrorism has been seen in the delegitimation of an ‘inferior community’ (Sprinzak 1995).

Racism has been consistently addressed as one of the ideological traits of the radical right and its members. The German extreme right, for example, expresses an attitude of hatred towards weak and foreign people—together with insecurity, identification with power, excessive orientation to obedience,

tendency towards prejudice, orientation towards hierarchy, black-and-white thinking, conventionalism and conformism, and incapacity to deal with conflictual situations (Stoess 1989, 231). Racism has also been central for the various components of the American extreme right, with Christian Identity supporting the doctrine of the two seeds, with whites descending from Adam and Jews from the seduction of Eve by Satan (Kaplan 1995). Even in Italy, where anti-communism was dominant, the fall of the Berlin Wall was defined by one of the extreme right leaders, Franco Freda, as a turning point: 'Before, the fight was ideological. There were the Communists that, together with the fascists, and with us, National -Socialists, wanted the Homo Novus. We were for sure different from each other, but nevertheless the primitive cultural roots were near, anyhow European. Today, the Communists are no longer there and the huge European migrations developed. From the social issue, we shift to the racial issue. The era of the European civil war is over, the one of the racial war is going to begin' (in Marchi 1993, 137).

While racism is a constant, the social science literature has also identified other frames. In this direction, Peter Merkl (1997) talks of waves of anti-foreign violence in the European extreme right:

There are certain basic rationales to each wave and culminating events of anti-foreign violence. Each scenario, whether it is a pogrom, a race or anti-foreign riot, or other form of minority discrimination or persecution, begins with the symbolic construction of a macro-political (sometimes even cosmic) reality: right-wing governments or parties spread a nationalist ideology, or an interpretation of a major historical event such as a lost war, to set the stage. The ideological interpretation often may have been around for a long time and may be part of a national mythology that gives meaning to the events. In any case, it also singles out the target, the scapegoat minority or the foreigners within the walls and may set them up for the attack by isolating them in ghettos, marking them for discrimination and persecution, and perhaps also disarming them (99).

In addition, the specific framing of exclusive identities changes in space and time. First, the traditional forms of racism in the right-wing milieu have targeted mainly the Jews in Europe and African American citizens in the United States. Even in Europe, relevant cross-country differences have been identified in racist framing. While anti-migrant discourses have been central in the development of the French and the British right, the Italian right has been more oriented towards anti-communism than towards anti-migration frames. In addition, the relevance of religious references as a basis for discrimination varies cross-country. As Tore Bjørgo observed,

One of the striking differences between various violence-prone racist and right-wing extremist traditions is seen in the role played by religion. In most Western and Northern European countries, racism, right-wing extremism and fascism are

predominantly secular movements. This contrasts strongly with militant American racism, which is highly influenced by religious movements, in particular Christian Identity, an anti-Semitic and rather unconventional (to say the least) reinterpretation of the Bible (1995, 9).

Second, racist actions and frames tend to evolve—at least to a certain extent—over time. On the one hand, the targeted groups appear to change. While the contemporary extreme right has maintained the focus on Jews and blacks, others—especially migrant groups—have increasingly become targets of aggressive language and behaviour. The ‘clash of civilization’ frame tended to target one specific religion—Islam—and its followers as the main ‘ethnic other’. On the other hand, social science research has identified a shift from hierarchical racism, stressing the subordination of one race to the other, to differentialism, emphasizing the need to keep different races separate. While nobody denies that racism is still a main component of the extreme right identity, some hypotheses have been advanced about how and to what extent right-wing radicals have adapted, not only in their targets but also in their framing of race in order to make them discursively more appealing.

In this direction, for instance, studies of white power music have suggested that, in order to make the music attractive to potential recruits, especially young people, the British National Front used it ‘to reframe its message from one of overt hate (typically of immigrants, Jews, blacks, and ethnic minorities) to one of self-love and collective defence of the white race in an effort to draw in new adherents’ (Corte and Edwards 2008, 6). While emphasizing a rebellious message (including their self-representation as an alternative to commercial music), the songs’ lyrics affirm a promotion of white culture against a multicultural conspiracy (including the alleged Jewish-led diffusion of decadent values through MTV).¹ More generally, Cas Mudde, in his research on right-wing populist parties, has identified nativism as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia: ‘an ideology which holds that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native groups (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation state’ (2007, 19).

Racist appeals can also be framed differently, with an emphasis on economic rather than cultural issues. Immigrants might be addressed in economic terms, defined as false refugees that exploit the welfare state, or they can be defined as culturally dangerous, destroying Western civilization or national values. For instance, in the 1990s, 79 per cent of the members of

¹ In fact, white power music frames the message in ‘an appealing, readily defensible and somewhat ambiguous way’, so that it can not only circumvent legal restrictions but also ‘be accessible to a broader range of youth’ (ibid. 13–14). In the US, the KKK moved from traditional racism against an ‘inferior race’, to a ‘love for White Race’ (Kaplan 1995, 49).

the Movimento Sociale Italiano mentioned birth rates among migrants as a threat to national identity (versus 14 per cent as a cause of criminality), and about half expressed the belief that some races are inferior (Ignazi 1994). Later, the defence of national culture remained central, but the frame of migrants being criminal also spread.

Research has also stressed some tensions within the frames of the extreme right, sometimes combining racism with anti-imperialism, anti-Semitism with anti-Islamism. For some extreme right groups in Italy (such as Base Autonoma), mass migrations are defined as dangerous for Europe, but there is at the same time an anti-imperialist frame—with the open problem of ‘how to combine the hate for the black, the Arab, the Muslim with the anti-mondialist internationalism that characterizes the entire nebula of the radical right? How to combine the hate for the immigrant and the favour towards Iraq and Saddam Hussein, Iran and Hamas fundamentalists?’ (Ferraresi 1994, 173). Also for the Veneto Fronte Skinhead, together with communism and capitalism, ‘third-mondialist immigration, and the ensuing *imbarbarimento* of our race are more and more weakening and destroying the white Europe’ (ibid. 174). At the same time, ‘particularly among Western European populist radical parties, Islamophobia seems to have led to a new emphasis on the Christian essence of Europe (or the Occident). In addition, they stress the alleged incompatibility of Islam with the basic tenets of the European or native culture’ (Mudde 2007, 85). Paradoxically, anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism tend to overlap, even though the stereotypes may be rather different: Jews, clever and cunning, as personifying the evil of modernity; Muslims as barbarian and violent.

If an exclusivist nationalism, linked with racism, is therefore typical of the extreme right, there are also different forms in different times. In what follows, we shall observe, on the basis of protest event and frame analysis, both the relevance of racism in the extreme right deeds and discourses, and the specific balance of traditional and new forms of racism, looking at hierarchical versus differential frames, as well as at the (economic versus cultural) justifications of anti-immigrant action and propaganda.

2. Racism in deeds and discourses

Racism emerges as central in the deeds and discourses of the extreme right on issues of immigration. The category on migration is in fact well represented in both our protest event analysis and our frame analysis. As much as 17.0 per cent of right-wing protest events and 13.3 per cent of statements can be classified as racist. More specifically (see Table 8.1), right-wing protest events on immigration issues are most present in the US (25.5 per cent), then in Germany (16.5 per cent), and finally in Italy (8.7 per cent). A similar distribution can be seen for the

Mobilizing on the Extreme Right

Table 8.1. Protest events related to immigration issues by country

<i>Protest events related to immigration issues by country</i>					
	Race and ethnic relations	Immigration policy; policies against xenophobia; immigration in general	Economic & cultural situation in host countries	Security situation in host countries	Total
<i>Germany</i>	0.0%	65.0%	15.0%	20.0%	32
<i>Italy</i>	25.0%	50.0%	15.6%	9.4%	40
<i>US</i>	96.9%	1.0%	0.0%	2.1%	96
Total	60.1% (101)	25.6% (43)	6.5% (11)	7.7% (13)	100.0% (168)

Row percentages; Cramer’s V = 0.63***

Table 8.2. Statements related to immigration issues by country

<i>Statements related to immigration issues by country</i>					
	Race and ethnic relations	Immigration policy; policies against xenophobia; immigration in general	Economic & cultural situation in host countries	Security situation in host countries	Total
<i>Germany</i>	0.0%	51.6%	25.4%	23.0%	284
<i>Italy</i>	0.7%	62.3%	24.6%	12.3%	126
<i>US</i>	72.5%	12.0%	5.4%	10.1%	276
Total	29.4% (202)	40.1% (275)	17.1% (117)	13.4% (92)	100.0% (686)

Row percentages; Cramer’s V = 0.40***

statements: 20.0 per cent in the US, 11.6 per cent in Italy, and 9.3 per cent in Germany represent xenophobic frames.

We can further unpack the racist discourses, looking inside this component of extreme right deeds and discourses (see Tables 8.1 and 8. 2). First of all, most protest events on immigration issues address race itself, while the percentage drops in the statements that are more concerned with immigration policies. There are, however, very notable cross-country differences.

In Germany, immigration and related issues are much more visible in protest events than in written documents—especially for the skinhead groups—while the proportion is reversed for the party newspaper.² The situation is similar for the US, although at somewhat higher levels: American

² In the party newspaper, 9.9 per cent of the statements address migration, versus 6.2 per cent in the political movement guestbook and 5.7 per cent in the websites of the violent groups. As for the protest events, 12 per cent of those organized by political parties refer to this issue; 5 per cent of those organized by a political movement; and 20 per cent of those organized by the violent youth spectrum.

extreme right organizations mobilize very frequently on immigration issues—much more than the extreme right in the two European countries—and they talk more about immigration than do their European counterparts. In contrast, the Italian extreme right organizations seem to deal with immigration issues more in their political discourse than in their actions.³ They talk more about immigration than German right-wingers do, but less than US activists, and they act less on these topics than the German or US extreme right organizations.

Over time, there was an increase in the focus of right-wing protest events on the security situation in the host countries (from almost no events on this specific aspect before 2004, to 12 per cent of events in 2005, to 37 per cent in 2007). The opposite trend has emerged for events on immigration policies, which decreased from 2000 (55 per cent of events) to the most recent years (about 20 per cent in 2007) (data not shown). This means that the protests have become more focused, also because the security aspect has been more and more underlined in the public discourse.

The use of racist frames also varies by type of actor (see Table 8.3). In all countries, the rhetoric of political parties is less based on frames containing openly racist arguments. This can be interpreted as a conscious strategy to avoid accusations of racism by their opponents, resulting in delegitimization in the political scene. Moreover, the specific issues treated in right-wing protest events vary considerably according to the type of actor who initiates and organizes them (see table 8.3 and 8.4). Political parties are more interested in immigration policies, policies against xenophobia, and the economic and cultural situation of the host country—that is, predominantly political issues—whereas the neo-Nazi and subcultural skinhead groups are more prone to act on issues of race and ethnic relations.

Table 8.3. Xenophobic discourses by country and organizational types

	Political party	Political movement	Subcultural group	Total
<i>Germany</i>	8.9% (875)	7.5% (146)	11.1% (332)	9.3% (1353)
<i>Italy</i>	4.2% (932)	13.0% (937)	21.2% (591)	11.6% (2460)
<i>US</i>	16.4% (482)	25.8% (504)	17.0% (393)	20.0% (1379)

³ Immigration issues are the third most frequently recurring topic in the discourse of Italian extreme right organizations, occupying the second position in the discussion forum Camerata Virtuale (21 per cent of all statements) and the third for the Veneto Front Skinhead (11.6 per cent). They play a less important role for Forza Nuova (4 per cent).

In Germany, protest events tend to target especially immigration policy and policies against racism and xenophobia (65 per cent). This usually includes demonstrations against immigration policy—as when about 150 people marched in Siegburg in May 2001 or in Lüneburg in December 2003—but also physical attacks against foreigners, such as the one by a group of skin-heads in Magdeburg on 25 April 2001 against an Algerian, or the mob led by right-wing extremists against immigrants in Mügeln in August 2007 (*Taz*).

In Italy, the extreme right often mobilizes against Italian immigration policies (50 per cent), but events concerning race and ethnic relations are also frequent (25 per cent). The latter generally imply light or heavy violence, as well as symbolic actions such as the racist slogans stamped on euro bills in Florence (*LR* 15 May 2002) or graffiti against the housing centres for homeless migrants in Bologna (*LR* 11 January 2003). Actions concerning immigration policies mainly took the form of demonstrations and conventional events—very often organized by right-wing political parties and movements—such as the demonstration against homeless and nomads' camps (accused of spreading viruses) organized in Rome by Azione Giovani (*LR* 04 November 2007), or the one organized in Genoa by Forza Nuova activists from various cities protesting the proposal of the secretary of the right-wing Alleanza Nazionale to recognize voting rights for migrants (*LR* 23 November 2003).

In contrast, in the US, almost all (97 per cent) of the covered events concerning immigration are represented by actions on ethnic and racial aspects. These mainly include heavy violence, such as in the armed attacks against African American boys in Chicago (Associated Press 23 September 2003) and girls in Trumbull (*Connect* 25 September 2003), or against Polish tourists in Palm Springs (Associated Press 23 September 2003), in the burning of a cross in the yard of an African American pastor (Marysville, Washington 26 April 2004), in racist leafleting by the National Alliance in Denver (Denver newspaper 24 March 2004), or in various protests against the Martin Luther King commemorative day (Newport, Tennessee; Associated Press 17 January 2004).

In all three countries, immigrants are the most frequently recurring target of extreme right mobilization, representing 33 per cent of all covered events in the period of our analysis. This is especially true in the US, where migrants represent almost half (47 per cent) of the targets of the coded events. Migrants are also often targets of the extreme right mobilization in Germany, being—after political targets—the most frequent target in the covered events (28 per cent of all coded events), and finally in Italy, where they represent 16.5 per cent of all the targets in the coded events. Moreover, the targeting of migrants is consistently high in the whole period of our analysis, oscillating between 27 per cent of events targeting migrants in 2000 to 32 per cent in 2007 (data not shown).

Table 8.4. Specific issues concerning immigration by actor type

<i>Type of Actor</i>	<i>Issues</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>Race and ethnic relations</i>	<i>Immigration policy; policies against xenophobia and immigration in general</i>	<i>Economic and Cultural situation in host countries</i>	<i>Security situation in host countries</i>	
Party	11.1%	51.9%	22.2%	14.8%	(27)
Political movement	91.8%	4.9%	.0%	3.3%	(61)
Subcultural area	52.1%	32.4%	7.0%	8.5%	(71)
Other (not identified)	55.6%	33.3%	.0%	11.1%	(9)
Total	60.1% (101)	25.6% (43)	6.5% (11)	7.7% (13)	100.0% (168)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.34***

Table 8.5. Targets concerning migrants

<i>Country</i>	<i>Migration target</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>Ethnic others</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Jews</i>	
Germany	76.9%	5.1%	17.9%	(39)
Italy	39.5%	27.9%	32.6%	(43)
US	71.1%	1.2%	27.7%	(173)
Total	66.7% (170)	6.3% (16)	27.1% (69)	100.0% (255)

Row percentages; Cramer's V = 0.30***

Cross-country differences also emerge if we distinguish different categories within the protest events addressing migrants, looking at the targeting of 'ethnic others', in general, and more specifically at Muslims and Jews (Table 8.5). If ethnic others (in general) are very present in the right-wing protest activities addressing migration issues (66.7 per cent, with an especially high 77 per cent in Germany), this is not framed within a religious discourse. Whereas swastikas are often painted on German Jewish cemeteries, only one reported and coded protest event deals with the desecration of a mosque. Although the issues that are debated would allow for inclusion of the religious dimension, this does not explicitly happen.

In Italy, Muslims and Jews are frequently targeted (in 28 and 32 per cent of events on migration, respectively). Indeed, in Italy, religion is more present in the society than in Germany so that it is easier to frame anti-immigrant or racist issues. Although not necessarily violent, these actions symbolically

threaten the presence and identity of Muslims in the country, as well as their rights (e.g. to profess their religion). Forza Nuova, in particular, promotes traditional Christian and Western values in its demonstrations, as in the case of one event in Rome, which included a sit-in and leafleting against the Islamization of the EU due to immigration from Arab countries (LR 13 January 2002). In fact, Islamophobia has been identified as a main factor in the propaganda and xenophobic acts of some extreme right organizations (EUMC 2004, 32), mainly in order to vest the traditional topic of racism in the seemingly appealing mode of religious interpretation.

Similarly to Germany, in the US the actions of the extreme right groups focus mainly on ethnic others (71.1 per cent). Looking more in detail at the events concerning this category (table not shown), while 38 per cent of events addressed foreigners in general without any specification (or at least none reported), almost half of them targeted black people, 8.2 per cent Hispanic people, and 2.8 per cent Native Americans. As US democratic organizations have recently stressed, 'low-income Latino immigrants in the South are routinely the targets of wage theft, racial profiling and other abuses driven by an anti-immigrant climate that harms all Latinos regardless of their immigration status' (New SPLC Report Documents Rampant Discrimination).⁴

With regard to both their mobilization and their discourses, the German extreme right addresses immigration policy above all, that is, political responses to immigration (65.0 per cent and 51.6 per cent, respectively). However, foreigners are also perceived in their cultural and economic dimension (15.1 per cent in the protest event analysis and 25.4 per cent in the frames analysis). The analysed frames point at cultural differences as becoming ever more visible, also since the religious dimension has recently entered the political discourse again. Muslim violence is explicitly mentioned in only one case—as violence to which the state has to respond (*Deutsche Stimme*, December 2005). Instead, national identity and ethnic (racial) criteria are mentioned in warnings against multicultural societies. In Italy as well, immigration policy and immigration in general are the most recurring topics in the discourse of extreme right organizations (62.3 per cent). The effects of immigration on the cultural and economic situation in Italy are more frequently underlined (24.6 per cent) than 'immigration and security issues' (12.3 per cent). In the US, 72.5 per cent of the frames concentrate on race and ethnic relations—confirming a similar finding from the protest event analysis, in which 96.9 per cent of the events related to immigration concentrated on

⁴ Watchdog association sources identified the assassination of an Ecuadorean man in New York (NY, 9 December 2008), killed while walking home with his brother. *Latinos in South Targeted for Abuse* (ADL, see <http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/intrep.jsp?iid=48>).

racial differences. Immigration policy—the most important topic of the discourses in the other two countries—is of only minor importance in the US case (12.0 per cent), also because all other topics are overshadowed by the race issue. The idea of ‘race’ as such is not so prominent in the European discourses.

In what follows, an in-depth analysis of the specific framing on the categories of migrants, Jews, and blacks will help us in investigating racist frames.

3. Immigrants as the problem

First of all, immigrants are considered as a problem. In the definition by the extreme right, the economic as well as cultural consequences of their (supposedly) increasing presence are stigmatized. Moreover, we find both new differential as well as old hierarchical forms of racism.

In Germany, immigrants are the third most frequently recurring actor in the discourses, with 4.2 per cent of all statements (and few differences among the three sources). This is also the highest ranking ‘oppositional category’ among the actors mentioned that cannot be attributed to the political arena in the narrow sense. Muslims as a religious category are mentioned in only 0.1 per cent ($n = 2$) of all statements, compared to 1 per cent in Italy. Both values are low, but point to a more religiously characterized possibility for discourses in Italy. In addition, we find little reference to the religious dimension in the adjectives used by the extreme right to describe ‘immigrants’. Foreigners (in general) are mentioned in 2.8 per cent of all statements in Germany. Furthermore, the specific category of Turks, which has characterized the German image of an ‘immigrant’ for a very long time and is often even used as a synonym for ‘immigrant’, ranks 31st (1.0 per cent) in Germany.

In the statements in which immigrants and foreigners are subject actors, this is accompanied by an object actor in only 25.4 per cent of the cases. If there is an object actor, then the Germans are most frequently mentioned (33.3 per cent). This means that immigrants and foreigners are basically seen as somewhat independent subject actors or as actors who ‘do something’ to the Germans. More in general, they are accused of ‘wanting to exploit the social state’ or, at least, of ‘wanting to benefit from the social state’. They are said to have many children (sometimes also more than one wife) so that they benefit more than ordinary Germans from the social security system. This is often exemplified with regard to the healthcare system, and immigrants and foreigners (and above all their family members) are characterized as ‘health tourists’. Implicit in such an argumentation is the fear of a kind of ‘take-over’ after which foreigners would be more numerous than natural-born Germans. Immigrants are described as brutal, criminal, armed, and having a clear mind but a cold heart. With regard to the activities that

they perform, the chosen language is also very explicit. Foreigners are associated with verbs such as 'to occupy', 'to commit crimes against', 'to threaten', 'to knock off', and even 'to murder'. A cultural conquest of Germany and its social institutions is feared due to various aspects, such as immigrants continuing to live according to their own cultural principles. Indeed, immigrants are accused of 'not remaining just guests'. Sometimes, the argumentation goes into specific detail: in one example (on a *Kameradschaften* website), foreigners are accused of abusing children's playgrounds as their meeting point, thus depriving German children of their natural living spaces. The is/will/should distribution shows that immigration is mainly portrayed with regard to how the situation actually is (in 82 per cent of the cases, against 72 per cent for the whole sample). This means that the right-wing activists take into account that immigration is an everyday phenomenon to which people are frequently exposed. Right-wing extremists assume that descriptions of the current situation are already motivation enough for action.

In Italy, immigrants occupy the third position among quoted actors: 4.2 per cent of statements, with few cross-source differences. As in Germany, this is the first oppositional category that cannot be attributed to the political arena in the narrow sense. Immigrants are more often cited as an object actor than are other actors, usually as the object of a call for action against them (e.g. 'the politicians should expel irregular immigrants') or as illegitimate 'beneficiaries' of goods at the expense of Italians. Again, the attributes for immigrants are all strongly negative. They are portrayed as criminals, irregulars, multiracial gangs, arrogant, predatory, 'not caring about the rules of the civil society'. In the discourse of Forza Nuova, moreover, migration is characterized as a challenge to the religious (Western and Christian) values the extreme right organizations claim to defend (see Chapter 7). The violence of the expressions used to describe the immigrants varies across sources, reaching a peak in the online discussion forum. Here as well, the proposed solutions are much more brutal, recalling terms and practices of the Nazi-fascist past. The extreme right-wingers talk of the need to gas [the immigrants], to eliminate, shoot, clean out [the immigrants]. In addition, a 'final solution' is called for.

When the actor 'immigrants' is present in the discourse of the Italian extreme right, the most frequently recurring issue fields are migration in general (19.6 per cent); the effect of immigration on the security situation in Italy (16.5 per cent); immigration policy (15.5 per cent); European integration (10.3 per cent); and the issue field concerning the effects of immigration on the cultural situation in Italy (10.3 per cent). In particular (and this is different from the German case), the EU is accused of producing a multi-ethnic—and therefore multi-conflictual—society, in order to weaken nation states

(see Chapter 9 on globalization). Foreigners are in fact seen from a security, a cultural, as well as a political perspective.⁵

When the immigrants are presented as object actors, then, the most frequent corresponding subject actors are the domestic political class (20.8 per cent), the impersonal pronoun (e.g. 'it is needed') (13.2 per cent), the important category of identification we/us (7.5 per cent), together with right-wing forces (7.5 per cent) and the party Forza Nuova (3.8 per cent). This is a summary of all those who should (as the domestic political class) or are actually going to act (as the right-wing forces) against immigrants. There is also another important category correlated with immigrants as object actors, namely the church (1.9 per cent), which is often criticized by the extreme right as being too humanitarian and generally supportive of immigrants. The church is said to justify them on any occasion, with the rhetoric of colonialism and neocolonialism and the ultimate goal of integration. It goes without saying that such a presentation is only possible in a country where the church as a dominant religious actor plays an important and monopolized societal role—this happens in Italy much more than in the always more secularized Germany or the pluri-religious United States of America.

As for the actions that connect the other above-mentioned actors to the immigrants, we see two main patterns of discourse. On the one hand, there are criticisms of the domestic political class,⁶ which lets immigrants enter, protects them, does not make the right policies against them, gives them rights, opens the borders to them; or appeals to the domestic political class to do something to solve the calamity of immigration. On the other hand, there are statements concerning the extreme right groups that define themselves as 'totally against any sort of immigration', expressing their support for foreign extreme right leaders (e.g. Haider) and their 'clear position against immigration'. They also call on militants and sympathizers (should statements) to 'fight immigration'. In fact, the is/will/should distribution shows a relatively low number of portrayals of immigration with regard to how the situation actually is, with frequent recommendations as well as pictures of future scenarios ('will and should' dimensions both above the general average).

In the US, the category of foreigners/immigrants is mentioned in 4.5 per cent of all statements—to which references to African Americans (4.5 per

⁵ The security perspective resonates with widespread feelings in public opinion, where according to a 2007 Eurisko survey for *La Repubblica*, almost one out of two people (46 per cent) saw immigrants as a danger to public safety and order; 28 per cent as a threat to employment; and one person out of four as a danger to our culture and identity. Overall, 33 per cent agree with the law that requires all immigrants to provide fingerprints.

⁶ On this point, it is interesting to note that the criticism of the moderate right is much more frequent than that against leftist politicians.

cent), Hispanics (1.4 per cent), Muslims (1.1 per cent), and Native Americans (0.4 per cent) must be added which, in the other countries, do not play any (or at least not a notable) role in the public discourse. Also, consider the high percentage for Jews (5.5 per cent), who are certainly not precisely immigrants, but who—from a right-wing logic—belong to the same stigmatized category of the ethnic other. Foreigners and immigrants are mentioned most often in the forums of the subcultural groups (8.0 per cent), versus 3.6 per cent on the websites of political movements and 3.2 per cent in the political party newspaper—again a clear division of labour, where the subcultural groups are mostly occupied with easily communicable issues. With regard to the grammatical role of foreigners/immigrants, there is hardly any deviance between the sub-set of foreigners/immigrants and the whole sample. However, very similarly as in the German case, most of the descriptions lack an object actor (73.9 per cent). The statements do not so much refer to what foreigners and immigrants do to somebody, but rather to what they do (without an object actor) or how they are. Immigrants are not presented in relation to their action, but to their properties. It seems to be the immigrants' properties which render them different from the native. In cases in which an object is present, frames refer to foreigners and immigrants as stealing land from Americans or even killing them, betraying the nation and even raping it savagely, and spoiling the children's future.

The adjectives used to describe foreigners and immigrants include 'sick', 'disobedient', but also (repeatedly) 'illegal'. Furthermore, immigrants are referred to as a security threat: they are everywhere in the streets. The issue fields with which foreigners and immigrants as subject actors are connected include immigration policy in general (15.6 per cent), but even more the security situation (23.4 per cent) (plus another 6.3 per cent for terrorism), followed at distance by the economic situation (9.4 per cent) and the cultural dimension (multicultural society, etc.) (3.1 per cent). The high value for the security situation (plus the percentage on terrorism) shows in how far the anti-Islam propaganda in the era of international terrorism has spread in the US.

4. Traditional and new anti-Semitism

Contemporary right-wing extremism cannot be discussed without references to the historical precedent of the Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust in Germany, or fascism in Italy. Over the years, the term 'Holocaust' has been used to define the persecution and mass assassinations of European Jews (Longerich 2002, 178). According to the Pew Research Center, overall, in Europe as well as in the US, 'there is a clear relationship between anti-Jewish

and anti-Muslim attitudes: publics that view Jews unfavourably also tend to see Muslims in a negative light'.⁷

Although the term 'Jew' clearly points to a religious dimension, the historical Nazi definition went beyond that, since those Jewish-born people or descendants who had given up their religion or even converted to Christianity were also defined as full Jews (ibid. 200). Nonetheless, the religious dimension of anti-Semitism cannot be denied: Jews have been stigmatized as the people who never accepted Jesus Christ as the Messiah, and even killed him; they have always been seen as the 'other', with ever more variants of anti-Semitism.⁸ The Nazi regime is one of the clearest examples for racial persecution, with a racial category originally constructed around a religious difference.

Although in Germany there is no explicitly anti-Semitic group (at least as far as the name of the group is concerned),⁹ many hate crimes can still be defined as anti-Semitic (43 were counted in 2006; see *Amt für Verfassungsschutz* 2006, 33).¹⁰ Indeed, anti-Semitism is one of the binding links among the various, very different groups of the German extremist right-wing milieu (ibid. 51). Generally, although reported to be less explicit in the discourses of the German right (also for legal reasons), anti-Semitism takes two different forms. With regard to the past, the Holocaust is either denied (claiming that it was just an invention by the Allies) or presented as limited in scope and effects (usually, the numbers of Jews prosecuted and killed are questioned). With regard to our times, a Jewish world conspiracy is often identified. In fact, we found most anti-Semitic references in the category of frames referring to national history and identity. In Italy, where only 35,000 Jews live, there has been an increase in anti-Semitic incidents since the 1990s, although usually limited to verbal abuse, graffiti, and so on. Anti-Semitism is also still rampant in the extreme right in the US, where Jews represent about 1.7–2.2 per cent of the total population.¹¹

When looking at the actors mentioned in the frames of the extreme right groups under observation in our three countries, the State of Israel is named much more often than Jews in general, or even than the US in the German case (1.7 per cent). In both Italy and Germany, Israel is regularly portrayed in a dual way: as an occupying warlord, oppressing the Palestinian locals, and also

⁷ Report at <<http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262>>.

⁸ It is recalled that some parts of the Bible (Letters and Acts of the Apostles) frequently point to the otherness of Jews (for more on Christian-driven anti-Semitism, see Flannery 1985 and Moore 1985; for a history of German anti-Semitism in general, see Pfahl-Traugher 2002). Note that this long time span is also one of the reasons that anti-Semitic feelings did not automatically disappear with Hitler's dictatorship (Fattah 2002, 975).

⁹ Note for the US case the existence of the World Church of the Creator (WOTOC) (Heitmeyer 2002, 509). Generally, religious aspects play a greater role in the US than in Europe, as far as racism is concerned (Björge 2002, 991).

¹⁰ There were many more hate crimes against foreigners (484) or left-wingers (302).

¹¹ <<http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/09s0076.pdf>>.

as responsible for unhindered economic and financial globalization from which only the rich benefit, whereas ordinary citizens are deprived of their wealth. In Italy and Germany, Israel is frequently mentioned in connection with the United States and big multinationals, banks, and international economic institutions (such as the WTO, the IMF, or the World Bank). Thus, the Jew continues to be the evil, as in many instances of past anti-Semitic propaganda, although nowadays not so much because of typical Jewish 'properties', but because individual Jews are seen as representative of the state Israel and as a synonym for financial globalization. Such a negative presentation also deprives Israel of the moral right to complain about the Holocaust and implicitly questions not only the legitimacy of these complaints, but also their factual correctness.

In Germany, protest events concentrate even more strongly than the written sources do on issues of national history and identity. As mentioned before (Chapter 7), these protests become manifest in honouring soldiers or well-known personalities from the Third Reich, or in performing largely visible marches in honour of the Wehrmacht. Although not directed against Jews as such, these protests refer to the issue of the German past in general, focusing on WWII and the Holocaust and consequently also on the Jewish question. In fact, there is hardly any difference between the treatment of WWII, the Holocaust, Jewish people, contemporary Israel and world finance. This is all combined in a very vague negative account of Jewish life.

In Italy, today's anti-Semitic mobilization of the extreme right is mainly expressed in the form of threats, insults, and verbal aggression against Jewish people. When Jews are targets of extreme right groups or activists, they are victims not so much of physical, but rather of symbolic and verbal violence. Indeed, most anti-Semitic events recorded in the period of our analysis are verbal or written expressions of anti-Semitism (in books, articles, graffiti, public speeches, threatening letters, and so on), but also more virulent destruction of or damage to Jewish graveyards and cemeteries. In our data (see Table 8.4 above), 32 per cent of events refer to Jews, to specific leading representatives of Jews, or to Israel as a target. Our results seem consistent with government data, which have stressed a recent increase in anti-Semitic propaganda (Viminale 2007, 405).

Anti-Semitism is also prominent in the American case, where Jews are the third most frequently mentioned actor in the written documents of the extreme right groups analysed (5.5 per cent).¹² Indeed, Jews are the most frequently mentioned category in the political party newspaper

¹² Note that separate categories exist for leading representatives of Jews (0.05 per cent); Jewish institutions (0.1 per cent); and Zionists/Zionism (0.9 per cent). These values slightly increase the percentage for Jews as a category.

(6.3 per cent)¹³ and the second most frequently cited actor for the political movements (7.4 per cent)¹⁴ (but only number 20 in the rank order for the violent groups, at 1.2 per cent). A rather high χ^2 value, which is also clearly significant, indicates that the distribution of the Jewish category with regard to its grammatical position is very deviant from the distribution in the total sample. Jews are in fact much more frequently mentioned as an ally actor than are other actors, as they are usually seen as being part of conspiracies: many actors who commit an act have the Jews as allies. This also attributes a certain key position to the Jews which goes beyond the actual figures of their mentions. In fact, it suggests that there are many actions for which Jews are behind the scenes, although they do not come to the fore and cannot be defined as the real subject actors. In half of the cases in which the Jews are the ally actor, American political institutions are the subject actor, with a stated collaboration between American political institutions and the Jews.

With the use of very traditional stereotypes, when the Jews are the subject actors, America is most often quoted (8.9 per cent), as the Jews are accused of 'suffocating the very existence and the right to national self-determination' of America, (repeatedly) to destroy and influence America, and to bring the American economy down. They are even accused of committing hate crimes against whites. Even more stereotypically, the adjectives used to portray Jews include 'sinister', 'wealthy', 'assimilationist', and 'greedy', with a high group consciousness after being kicked out of any civilized nation, but also as puppets, even as unwashed with a large nose and dark, swarthy features—repeating the Nazi caricatures.

Looking at the issue fields with which Jews as subject actors correlate, it is not very surprising that 46.1 per cent of these statements deal with race and racial relations. This means that the discourse about Jews is explicitly racist and does not hide behind issues such as religion, national identity, or foreign policy. This is followed by historical references to World War II (15.9 per cent), usually from a revisionist perspective, even praising Hitler for having found the correct way to deal with the Jews. Finally, Jews are related to the domestic economic system (12.9 per cent), which shows the usual stereotype of Jews dominating and influencing the economy.¹⁵ The is/will/should distribution, with a clear dominance of the category (90 per cent) both when Jews are the subject and the ally actors, indicates that the discourse is oriented to confirm stereotypes. The statements on Jews that refer to Germany are treated with

¹³ The President is second, not very far behind the Jews (6.0 per cent).

¹⁴ The generic 'us' is the most frequently quoted actor in this source (10.8 per cent). As mentioned, the distribution is much more skewed in the case of the political movements, compared to the political parties.

¹⁵ Savings banks and Jews are often mentioned in a single statement.

regard to two issues: on the one hand, there are various statements about the Nazi time, which is glorified and presented as an example for state organization. On the other hand, the way in which today's Germany deals with its past is highly criticized. This is made manifest with regard to bans on Holocaust denial and on publications such as *Mein Kampf*. These rules are compared to the Nazi policy of burning critical books.

In Italy, in the few (17; 0.6 per cent) statements concerning Jews, they are presented mainly as a subject (in ten statements). When present, attributes are always negative: they are fake, infamous, thieves and profiteers, as well as *tziganos* and liars. Here as well, they are presented as allies of the government who support laws against anti-Semitism, 'do not want to get integrated', 'lie about the Nazi extermination' and the Holocaust, 'exploiting the historical moment in order to live a comfortable life as fake heroes'; they produce anti-Semitism themselves, and they 'tell stories about what happened in the concentration camps'.

5. The 'black' and 'white' opposition

Even though anti-Semitism is prominent in the American extreme right, the us-them opposition here focuses more on the exclusion of African Americans (Table 8.5). For obvious reasons, this issue is not strong in the two European countries. These are in fact the fifth most quoted actors in the discourse of the US extreme right organizations we analysed (4.5 per cent), with rather similar percentages in the three sources.

In general, the term 'African Americans' is replaced by less politically correct ones, such as (frequently) blacks, Negroes and niggers, and in some documents even aliens. When African Americans are subject actors—not very surprisingly—whites are the most frequently mentioned object actor (38.7 per cent). When they are object actors, the most frequently quoted actors are whites (28.0 per cent of all cases), followed by the generic 'us' category (12.0 per cent). With regard to the relations between African Americans and whites, the accusation can be abstract (e.g. African Americans hate whites) or quite concrete—African Americans are accused of attacking and violently assaulting, even raping, killing or shooting down whites; they would steal belongings from whites, especially their land, instead of being grateful to them.

The attributes and descriptions (and synonyms) that are used for African Americans are straightforward and clearly racial. Described as 'violent', 'destroyers', or 'hot-headed' (repeatedly, also as incapable of keeping their temper or of 'not being responsible for their actions'), they are seen as 'nothing good', 'inferior', 'not able to sustain themselves', 'not respecting the legal system', and even as a 'disease'. They are called 'spoiled children' or 'talking monkeys'.

Not at all surprisingly, when African Americans are subject actors, this is related to the issue of racial relations in 73.6 per cent of all cases. In other words, the discourses are exclusively racist. In another 10.1 per cent of the cases, African Americans are subject actors for the issue area of crimes. Of course, this is also motivated by racist thinking, but it adds some concreteness, compared to the purely racist statements that refer exclusively to assumed basic characteristics of African Americans (such as being violent). In addition, when African Americans are object actors, the leading position of racial relations in general is confirmed, although at a lower level (53.8 per cent).

References to whites do parallel those in the opposite category to African Americans. As we have seen, whites are often the object actors when African Americans are the subject actors, whereas African Americans become object actors for the whites as subject actors. In other words, the two actor categories are complementary. Therefore, it is no surprise that whites rank immediately after African Americans (sixth position, 3.9 per cent). In addition, the relative importance in the different sources is similar to the distribution of African Americans. As mentioned above, African Americans are important subject actors, when whites are the object actors (for examples of the actions, see above). Indeed, these two actors are related in 42.9 per cent of the cases in which whites are the object actors. Of course, the logic behind these two categories is different: whereas the 'us' will wake up the whites and prepare them for the future, the blacks are accused of being against the whites and even of committing hate crimes against them. When the whites count as subject actors—apart from more general statements, such as that the whites want to get rid of African Americans—these statements seem to concentrate on recommendations in the 'should' perspective: whites are asked to move physically away from African Americans (in the sense of moving to racially pure neighbourhoods), but also to carry guns in order to defend themselves against them. It is even stated that whites have lost their houses and their towns to African Americans.

It is interesting to see that hardly any adjectives are used to describe whites. The rare instances include 'blessed' and 'morally higher standing' or the characterization of white people speaking the truth and being equipped with long-term vision. With differential racist frames, whites are also presented as a global minority that would be overrun by other races. Quite naturally, white people should, therefore, be hostile to a multicultural society. When whites are subject actors—again, not at all surprisingly—this correlates with racial relations as issue area (58.1 per cent); also, racial relations are the dominant issue area in no less than 78.7 per cent of cases in which whites are the object.

6. Racism and the extreme right: some concluding remarks

Concluding, immigrants and foreigners are seen from a political perspective, both with regard to immigration policy but also as the traditional scapegoats of the radical right—Jews and blacks—continue to be the targets of violent deeds and words. Usually, the current situation is portrayed, using a very clear and a very negative vocabulary that stigmatizes both the cultural and economic consequences. Our research indicates that both hierarchical and differentialist discourses exist, but linked to different types of enemies. Immigrants are especially targeted within an instrumental discourse that points at economic competition, within redistributive types of conflicts and with the use of differential racist frames. The immigrants are said to compete on the labour market and for welfare goods, also decreasing the quality of life of natives through high levels of criminality. Whites (Europeans or Americans) are therefore called to defend themselves. While references to cultural inferiority are not absent from the discourse on immigrants, they emerge more and more strongly when in reference to the traditional targets of extreme right racism: Jews, African Americans, and (less yet) Muslims (see Figure 8.1).

In a cross-national perspective, the discourse on immigration seems relatively more widespread in Europe than in the US, where the extreme right relies more on the traditional opposition between whites and blacks (categories extended to include all non-whites). The racism of the extreme right also seemed more prone to develop into brutal violence in the US, remaining more restrained in the two European countries, where (especially in Germany) extreme right political parties seemed more occupied with building up consensus on widespread feelings of insecurity and xenophobia, leaving the more brutal deeds and frames to the subcultural groups, as the new forms of racism




Figure 8.1. The racist discourses of the extreme right

seem resonant with growing ethnocentric attitudes that are on the rise in Europe.

While some references to a clash of civilizations emerged, path dependency seemed to reduce the capacity to adapt to new trends. Religious values have been put at the bases of the clash of civilization interpretation of these conflicts that tended to contrast Western, Christian values with Islam. Islam in this case represents immigration in general. Beyond the debate on this general (and contested) account of the evolution of our societies, a religious revival has been noted as being in sharp contrast with secularization trends that had been considered as fundamental not only for 'second' or 'late' modernity, but even for first (basic) modernity, as well as for liberal democracy. Religion per se does not play much of a role in the discourses and actions of the extreme right, as it is rarely mentioned or acted upon. This might also be due to the resilience of the traditional discourse and/or the uneasiness of political groups in relating to religion.

Frames and protest events are, however, linked to religious discourses in more complex ways. Although Islam is not directly addressed as a religion in order to define the enemy, verbal and physical attacks against migrants still involve a particular stigmatization of Islam (and mosques) as endangering Western values. Similarly, although Judaism is rarely discussed in its religious content, anti-Semitism is kept alive by references to a heroic past and national pride (with, especially in Germany, references to the Nazi history). In all cases, discussions on such issues as immigration are framed by those on Muslims, and those on national identity with those on the Jews, thus acquiring and exploiting a religious dimension. Especially in the case of Judaism, racism fades into religious discrimination.

The Other 'No Globals': Right-wing Discourses on Globalization

1. Globalization and the extreme right: an introduction

The extreme right and globalization are repeatedly associated in the scientific and journalistic debate (for example, see Mudde 2004a). Identifying the main features of right-wing forces in Europe today, French political scientist Guy Hermet stresses their principal characteristics as opposition to immigration, and the defence of the nation state against the processes of globalization (Caldiron 2001, 14). Although globalization has become a fashionable term in our time, an agreed-upon definition is lacking (Brose and Voelzkow 1999, 9; Crouch 2003, 195; Meyer 2000, 233–42). We also find various synonyms, such as internationalization, liberalization, universalization, westernization or modernization, and re-spatialization (in the sense of a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions) (Scholte 2005, 16). All of these notions point at a process that enlarges social relations (in the broadest possible sense) beyond the borders of the classical nation state (ibid. 19).

We can identify various dimensions of globalization. In probably most of the cases, globalization is referred to in an economic context, pointing to the internationalization of financial transactions and business activities and to the creation of a global market, including all the negative and positive consequences of trade liberalization and the free movement of capital and goods. However, political globalization is also important, as there is a perceived need for new ways of global governance, as well as the factual reality of the shifting of power from nation states to supranational governmental institutions (e.g. WTO, WB, IMF, UN, G8, as well as the EU). Globalization can also be defined at a cultural level, that is, multicultural settings emerge with the continuous dismantling of borders, whether as a by-product of immigration or due to consciously promoted processes such as the diffusion of movies,

books, languages, art, and so on. Finally—and probably always more importantly—globalization can be technologically driven.

Globalization, in its different meanings, has been contested by various types of opponents. The anti-WTO protest in Seattle in 1999 marked the emergence of a cycle of protest against neo-liberal forms of globalization, carried out by what came to be known as a global justice movement (della Porta 2007). While these left-wing protests have been increasingly researched, only a few empirical studies have investigated the 'other no-global'—that is, the contestation of globalization processes by the extreme right (for important exceptions see Mudde 2004a, 2007; Simmons 2003).

Nevertheless, there is good reason to ask how the extreme right responds to the challenge of globalization, not least since internationalization processes of all kinds challenge the central myths of the right—racism, nationalism, and national identity. Indeed, globalization is indicated by several scholars as an important explanation for the recent dynamism of right-wing extremism in many Western democracies (e.g. Hermet 2001; Mény and Surel 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008). In fact, a new wave of radical right politics has developed in a social and political context characterized by two correlated processes: economic globalization, and the legitimacy crisis of politics (Mény and Surel 2002). Indeed, the electoral success of extreme right parties, as well as the mobilization of extreme right movements in Europe, has been linked to the process of globalization and denationalization (see Loch 2009). Globalization has in fact restructured social and cultural cleavages, developing an opposition between 'the positions of trans- and supranational integration to those of national demarcation' (ibid. 2), with extreme right parties and movements standing on the side of the defence of positions of 'demarcation' through economic and cultural protectionism (ibid. 23; Kriesi et al. 2008).

This chapter addresses the ways in which the critiques of globalization are framed by these 'other no globals'. If the production of meaning is an important part of organizational activities, and frames represent resources as well as limits for action, our leading questions with regard to our specific interest in globalization are: How important is globalization in comparison with other topics in the political discourse of extreme right organizations? To which specific issues does globalization refer? What are the solutions suggested against globalization? Furthermore, who are the 'us' and the 'them' according to right-wing extremists in relation to globalization?

First of all, we will explore the extent to which elements that are considered as typical for right-wing ideology re-emerge in the globalization discourses of our organizations. Secondly, if frames and discourses are at the centre of our focus, we also expect the framing process to be affected by the *contextual conditions* in which actors and organizations are rooted, and by the *political discursive opportunities* available for them. We assume that the embeddedness

of radical political action in political and cultural structures, and the distinctiveness of organizational forms of radicalism (political parties, political movements, violent groups, and so on), account for differences in the dominant world views. Looking at these questions, we will assess the differences between countries and between groups, linking them to the context in which they are embedded. In order to grasp these various aspects of globalization, in our empirical data collection we have conceptualized 'globalization' as a polysemic phenomenon/issue referring to economic globalization (including socio-economic issues such as healthcare, pension, unemployment, and taxes; domestic economic system and international economic system), political globalization (including European integration issues and the shift of power from nation states to supranational organizations and international and geopolitical affairs), and cultural globalization (concerning issues related to the cultural effects of an increasingly globalized world, including Americanization).

2. Extreme right facing globalization

The attempt to exploit widespread fears vis-à-vis a rapidly changing world by accusing globalization and processes of transnationalization (such as European integration, as a regional form of globalization) is indeed relevant in the discourse of the extreme right (especially in Italy) (Table 9.1). In the Italian dataset, a notable number of statements refers to globalization (35.5 per cent of all statements, versus 22–23 per cent in Germany and the US), with some differences among the sources used: globalization is of particular interest for political parties, which refer to related topics in almost half of their statements (49.6 per cent); secondly for political movements (35 per cent); and less for skinhead groups (14 per cent). In contrast, in Germany and the US, issues related to globalization are a concern both for political parties (although to a lesser extent than in Italy)—which address this topic in respectively 27 per cent and 34.4 per cent of statements—and for skinhead groups (18.1 per cent in Germany and 23.4 per cent in the US).

In the examined sources, globalization is framed in several different ways in the extreme right discourse, with richness of content and references to the economical, cultural, and political as well as technological aspects of the phenomenon. Indeed, using the words of the extreme right, 'the globalization of the market' not only has 'economic consequences', but also 'influences the socio-cultural and political context' (*FN* May 2002) (Table 9.1).

Table 9.1 shows the several sub-topics addressed in the discourse of the extreme right organizations in Italy, Germany, and the US, distinguishing among economic, political, and cultural globalization. In Germany, globalization is most often framed in terms of economic aspects (in 65.2 per cent

The Other 'No Globals': Right-wing Discourses on Globalization

Table 9.1. Aspects of globalization in the discourse of the extreme right by country

<i>Statements</i>					
<i>Globalization and socio-economic issues</i>	<i>All countries</i>		<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>US</i>
<i>Economic globalization</i>	(2127)	47.3%	65.2%	43.5%	40.4%
Domestic economic system	(834)	18.6%	13.6%	18.2%	24.6%
International economic system	(564)	12.6%	18.3%	17.8%	7.0%
Socio-economic issues (health, pension, unemployment and tax issues)	(729)	16.1%	33.3%	7.5%	8.8%
<i>Political globalization</i>	(2001)	44.7%	32.9%	46.0%	52.4%
Transatlantic and international relations	(681)	15.2%	12.0%	11.3%	29.0%
Terrorism (war in Iraq, etc.)	(351)	7.9%	0.3%	4.8%	23.4%
European integration (general)	(882)	19.7%	12.0%	29.6%	-
Political integration (European Constitution, relation btw nation states and the EU, etc.)	(87)	1.9%	8.6%	0.3%	-
<i>Cultural globalization</i>	(345)	7.7%	1.6%	10.4%	6.0%
Cultural globalization and Americanization	(345)	7.7%	1.6%	10.4%	6.0%
(N)	(4473)	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Globalization and socio-economic issues in the overall database (%)</i>		28.7%	22.2%	35.5%	23.0%

Column percentages are shown. Percentages within category are shown

of statements referring to globalization), with special attention to socio-economically related issues such as health, pensions, and unemployment. To the contrary, both the economic and the political sides of the process are emphasized in the US (for the skinhead subcultural group, particularly the economic one). The cultural aspects of globalization emerge as particularly important in Italy (10.4 per cent), with a strong stigmatization of the Americanization of the country.

In spite of these differences, several similarities among the countries emerge when looking at the identity and oppositional frames through which right-wing organizations construct themselves and the universe of their allies and enemies related to globalization (Table 9.2).

First of all, in the construction of the social collective self identity (the 'us') and the identification of the allies and the enemies (the 'them'), globalization is portrayed and explained with several references to conspiracy theories, as typical of the extreme right ideological framework (e.g. Tateo 2005; Simmons 2003). In general, in all three countries, the statements about globalization often refer to a poorly specified 'mysterious' or 'powerful oligarchy'—spelled out as 'global elite', 'lobbies of globalization', 'mondialist sponger'. Globalization is in fact portrayed as 'a strategy for the domination of the world', 'a plot to mix and destroy races' (VFS June–July) and as an 'obscure system' (e.g. 'master of the world'), with the goal of creating 'an undifferentiated, atomized, consumer society'. Its main objective is to 'destroy the country' to 'annihilate national identities and local traditions' (FN September 2003). In particular, a 'secret political-economic conspiracy' is often identified.

Indeed, economic and political actors recur most often in the discourse/statements of the extreme right groups when they talk about globalization. 'Business/the economy', together with 'multinationals', recurs in about 15 per cent of all globalization statements in Germany. Similarly in Italy, strong attention is paid to actors such as 'banks' (4.7 per cent), 'other corporate actors from the business world' (3.4 per cent), and 'Business/the economy' (2.7 per cent), which recur among the twelve most important actors out of 200 actor categories (Table 9.2). In these statements, the agents of globalization are above all *economic actors* such as 'high international finance', 'big economic powers', 'strong powers', 'financial interests', 'big trusts', 'international speculators', and 'international merchants'. The 'economy' gets its competitive advantage by excluding 'the people' from wealth. Indeed, 'the economy' aims at destroying the naturally grown unity of 'the people'. More concretely, the German right-wing discourse identifies a conspiracy between foreign governments and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—a 'collaborative network of international politicians and businessmen'. With regard to the still open question (in the extremist right-wing discourse) of Germany's external borders, 'the economy would do everything to prevent a truly united German people' (*Deutsche Stimme*

Table 9.2. The twelve most important actors in the discourse of right-wing organizations about globalization¹ by country

<i>Rank of the actors in statements referring to globalization and socio-economic issues</i>									
Rank	Germany			Italy			US		
	Actor			Actor			Actor		
1	Business/the economy	(24)	9.1%	The US	(86)	9.3%	US President	(36)	7.8%
2	Israel	(21)	8.0%	The People	(57)	6.2%	Israel	(36)	7.8%
3	The people	(14)	5.3%	Domestic political class	(47)	5.1%	Americans	(32)	6.9%
4	Multinationals	(14)	5.3%	'we'/'us'	(45)	4.9%	US political institutions	(29)	6.3%
5	Germany	(13)	4.9%	Workers	(44)	4.8%	Other countries	(29)	6.3%
6	The US	(10)	3.8%	Banks	(43)	4.7%	Jews in general	(23)	5.0%
7	Germans	(8)	3.0%	Italy	(34)	3.7%	Police	(18)	3.9%
8	Elderly people	(8)	3.0%	Other corporate actors from business world	(31)	3.4%	We ('us')	(16)	3.5%
9	Unemployed people	(8)	3.0%	Europe	(28)	3.0%	Palestinians	(16)	3.5%
10	Foreigners	(8)	3.0%	Business, the economy	(27)	2.9%	Muslims	(14)	3.0%
11	SPD party	(7)	2.7%	Friendship countries	(26)	2.8%	Multicultural society	(13)	2.8%
12	Palestinians	(6)	2.3%	'Them'	(25)	2.7%	Workers	(10)	2.2%
	All actors in discourses on globalization	(264)	100%		(921)	100%		(462)	100%
	All top 12 actors in discourses on globalization		53.4%			53.5%			58.9%

The percentages of the 12 most important actor categories (out of 200 categories) in extreme right documents, when the selected issue is 'globalization', are shown.

¹ In order to allow for comparison among the three countries, for the following analyses we excluded from the calculation the sub-issue 'European integration', since it is not present in the US case.

December 2005). Furthermore, the agents of globalization are very often described with terminology related to one of the central concepts of extremist right-wing ideology, namely, the 'nation' (as 'mondialists', 'cosmopolitans', 'international', 'stateless'). In the US and Germany, references to foreign countries and people are particularly frequent (foreigners are mentioned in 3 per cent of statements in Germany; foreign countries and Muslims in, respectively, 6.3 and 3 per cent of statements in the US) (see Table 9.2).

Secondly, in all three countries, when talking about globalization, the extreme right groups frequently name the domestic political class (both from the left and from the moderate right, for example the party *Alleanza Nazionale* in Italy), the *politicianti nostrani*, and the *Kartellparteien*, which, similarly, are considered as manipulated by and/or in agreement with the globalizing forces ('they only follow the orders of the USA', *VFS* 2005). In the Italian case, the domestic political class is the third most cited actor (9.8 per cent of statements referring to this issue). In Germany, the political elites are identified more specifically with the SPD party, which recurs among the ten most frequently quoted actors (2.7 per cent of statements). The globalization discourse of the German extreme right is especially focused on the domestic political class, 'the collaboration of German institutional representatives with criminal or foreign forces' (website *Kameradschaft Neu-Ulm*, article 4). Instead of defending the 'national interests' and the people, national elites are said to opt for neo-liberal policies, opening the borders to multinationals directed against domestic businesses, and to immigrants who damage the national traditional culture. For instance, by presenting the example of the Schröder government, German right-wing extremists underline that nothing can be expected from the political left, which would not even defend the interests of its own electorate against globalization.

The main problem, according to the right-wing sources (in a very similar way to the antiglobalization movement from the left), is that the multinationals and international institutions are not democratically accountable. This perspective even goes so far as to state that political parties or the EU are equipped with the adjective 'globalized'. In particular, in the Italian case, the centre-right Italian coalition is strongly criticized by the radical right for its behaviour in transatlantic relations, aimed at maintaining 'good relations with the enemy USA' and thus 'favouring' a 'subordinate position of Italy'. In the US, the American president is the first actor blamed when extreme right groups talk about globalization (in 7.8 per cent of statements referring to this topic), as well as the US governmental institutions (6.3 per cent of statements). Such statements underline 'a sinister conspiracy' which has 'penetrated the American government' and 'sabotaged its policies', and which will lead the United States towards 'a capitulation to internationalist socialism' if it is not stopped (Rupert 2000, 97).

Other members of the globalization conspiracy are generally considered to include the American capitalists, especially in the discourse of the Italian extreme right (9.3 per cent of all globalization statements), and even the Jews, above all in the discourse of the American extreme right (about 13 per cent; specifically, Israel in 7.8 per cent and Jews in general in 5.0 per cent), but also in Germany (Israel is the second most frequently quoted actor in globalization statements, 8 per cent of cases). By the Italian and German extreme right, the *United States* is considered to be the 'main forces', the 'logistic base', the 'armed arm' of globalization, the 'Zionist elite', the (only in Italy) 'protestant elite', the 'overseas speculators' who assist the entrepreneurs of globalization in achieving their hegemonic goals (VFS May–June 2004). In Italy, following more traditional conspiracy theories, Jews are replaced by another actor that frequently recurs in the discourse on globalization: the Freemasons ('Anglo-Saxon Freemasonry').

Moreover, in all three countries, further enemies (the 'them') are identified at the international level. The forces of globalization, indeed, are said to have allies at the national as well as the international level (for the French Front National, see Simmons 2003, 16). *International organizations* like the IMF, WTO, and World Bank are characterized as 'anonymous criminals without country and nation' (FN March 2003), whose influence on nations makes them into a 'means of control used by the enemy in order to dominate and starve the people of the world'. Particularly in Italian globalization discourses, the extreme right organizations very often refer to the *European institutions*, the 'technocratic Europe of Maastricht', the 'bureaucratic-financial oligarchy eager for power', and (especially in Italy) the 'Freemason and relativistic' Europe. These are—again—under the control of international financial powers and the US and support, through their policies, the masters of globalization in destroying the specificities of the European nations (only in the Italian case does 'Europe' appear among the twelve most frequently recurring actors in the extreme right discourse, in 3 per cent of all globalization statements).

Specifically for the Italian extreme right, *unions* are also considered to be allies of the forces of globalization that, together with left-wing political parties, would completely abandon the workers under the negative effects of economic globalization. Finally, the *global justice movement protesters* are actually defined in the Italian extreme right discourses as 'puppets' and 'allies' of the globalization forces, even though they also criticize globalization.² These groups propose the wrong solutions against globalization, namely, 'they talk about a globalization of individual rights'; they have 'too many international

² Indeed, they are described as being in 'cultural and operational symbiosis with the strong international financial powers' and as serving their 'dirty interests' (FN 2002).

and clearly anti-national ideologies'; they are a 'false and not dangerous opposition', perhaps created 'just by the same multinational and oligarchic powers that are leading globalization'. The German right avoids the issue of global justice movement protesters. Only once is the left accused of praising the 'nice new world of globalization'. In a similar way, other (not right-wing) German politicians are accused of collaboration with big business (see above), or their general ideology is said to be neo-liberal. In the US case as well, the history of the country seems to influence the current political discourse of these forces, and the communists are included as actors in the conspiracy ('communist globalization') (*Stormtrooper*, June 2008).

The third and final similarity among our three countries is the topic of the nationalists, namely the extreme right itself—the only true opponents of globalization, in all case studies and types of organizations. Particularly in the Italian and US cases, the extreme right ('we') appears among the most frequently recurring actors when these groups refer to globalization issues (in 4.9 per cent and 3.5 per cent of all globalization statements). Indeed, the extreme right presents itself as 'the only force that manages to protect the victims of the conspiracy and globalization' (*VFS* June 2005). Also in Germany, calls for 'action' are relatively strong, presenting the extreme right as 'actively fighting against globalization'. In the US, extreme right groups (which define themselves as 'patriots') interpret globalization as an 'alien tyranny' harming the country 'through a nefarious conspiracy' that erodes 'American identity', subordinating Americans to a 'tyrannical' 'one world government' (Rupert 2000). In this view, 'globalization is profoundly threatening the American people', and 'acts of resistance' are 'necessary'.

The frames concerning globalization are not merely *descriptive* (offering us a picture of how the extreme right sees and interprets the phenomenon). They also include a strong motivational component (*prescriptive frames*) in which the activists are asked to act ('should' statements).

3. Economic globalization and its losers

The assumed effects of globalization can be framed with reference to the several aspects (economic, political, cultural, and technological) we have mentioned. Regarding the economic aspect, some scholars have stressed the existence of a relationship between economic globalization and the electoral results of the extreme right parties, underlining that such parties experience electoral success in times of high economic insecurity (e.g. high unemployment) and strong reductions of welfare benefits (Zürn 1998; van der Eijk et al. 2005; Loch 2009, 9).

Our study shows, first of all, that *economic globalization* (including socio-economic issues such as health, pensions, unemployment, and taxes) is strongly stigmatized in right-wing discourses (especially, as mentioned, in Germany; see Table 9.1),³ with serious concerns for the survival of national economies and the protection of national interests. Indeed, extreme right documents stress that in a globalized market, 'international forces control the world economic system' and 'the creation of the debt', and thus 'can influence the nations'. They are said to 'provoke wars and destroy freedom', to 'conquer the markets through under-cost products', and, in general, to be 'very dangerous for national interests'. The US extreme right is also concerned with the economic aspects of globalization, but it 'frames' them by focusing on the domestic sphere (24.6 per cent of statements concerning economic globalization refer specifically to the domestic economic system), whereas the European extreme right links them to an international economic context. For example, in the American right-wing discourse, more than economic international forces, it is the domestic political class—often described as 'greedy' (*Stormtrooper* October 2008, p. 2)—that is blamed in relation to economic globalization. Frequently accused of being 'in favour of Communist globalization' (*Stormtrooper* June 2008, p. 1), they 'export jobs to the Third World' (*Stormtrooper* November 2007, p. 1). According to the extreme right discourse, thus, 'foreigners deprive the Americans of jobs' (*Stormtrooper* August 2006) and as a result, 'white people are job outsourced' (*Stormtrooper* May 2008, p. 2). Politicians, but also very often immigrants, big business, and bad management are held responsible for the effects of globalization on the domestic economy.

In Italy, economic globalization, and above all the socio-economic issues related to it, is a special concern in the political party and movement discourse (15.7 per cent and 9.2 per cent of cases), while skinhead groups treat this aspect less often (3.4 per cent of cases). In contrast, in Germany and the US, economic globalization is very frequent both in the discourse of political party organizations (respectively, in 15.9 per cent of political party statements on globalization in Germany and 12.7 per cent in the US), and in the discourse of skinhead groups (in 6.6 per cent of subcultural skinhead statements on globalization in Germany and 10.7 per cent in the US).⁴

Particularly in the Italian extreme right frames on economic globalization, the European Union is referenced: globalization is seen as pursuing the goals of 'converting the EU into a free trade area in which an unlimited neo-liberal

³ In Germany, 'multinational' represents the most important actors cited when the extreme right refers to globalization (about 19 per cent of all coded statements, see Table 9.2).

⁴ In both countries, political movement sources seem less interested in socio-economic issues, treated in 3.4 per cent of their frames in Germany and 2.4 per cent in the US.

economy is installed'. The European economies thus 'will be effectively weakened', and the United States, considered by the extreme right documents as 'the driving force behind the liberalization of the EU', 'will be the winner of the world economic competition'. In general, the extreme right organizations also criticize the NAFTA-GATT agreements and the agenda of liberal globalization that lay behind them. Resistance to globalization is presented as the only solution to maintaining a stable identity, strongly under threat in a complex and changing globalized world (Rupert 2000). As is frequently stressed in the US extreme right documents, 'capitalism destroys Americans' (*Stormtrooper* January 2009).

In the two European cases, the economic effects of globalization are framed above all in terms of social and employment security ('which would be lost in times of globalization'), and the arguments used resemble those of the left-wing global justice movement.⁵ Flexibility of work, the free market, increasing instability of the labour market, the rise of workers' exploitation, delocalization of firms, and precarious labour—even solidarity towards Third World people, who are exploited by the multinationals—can be found in extremist right-wing discourses. Globalization is said to 'impoverish and steal from the people', 'influence economic policies in favour of multinationals', 'provoke the privatization of goods of the state', and 'provoke economic crisis'; in a word, it is 'anti-social'. The IMF is accused of 'criminal behaviour' and of 'making a neocolonialist politics with the exploitation of the means of the foreign debt' (*FN* May 2002). The recommendation is to protect 'social justice and full employment'. A similar solution is suggested when the extreme right urges prioritizing the workers' interests over those of the shareholders.

Nevertheless, the extreme right tries to combine (economic) antiglobalization issues with its nationalist ideology: the solutions proposed (the *motivational indications*) against globalization are based on economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism (Mudde 2004a). Indeed, they are claimed in the name of and for 'our people'. The victims of economic globalization are not only the national economy and the workers, but (with clear echoes from both the Italian and the German variants of fascism) in particular the 'national small businesses', the 'little artisan enterprises', the 'traditional family' (with the problem of demographic decrease), and consequently the 'traditional communities' with their 'traditional values and ties'. In particular, in the Italian extreme right discourse, the most frequently quoted object actors in terms of globalization and its effects are: ordinary people (13.4 per cent of statements), workers (10.7 per cent), Italy and the Italians (both categories 5.5 per cent), and European peoples (6.5 per cent). Similarly, in Germany, the most

⁵ The NPD claims to stand for 'clear ideas in economic policy', 'social justice', and 'full employment'.

frequently recurring actors negatively affected by or in need of protection against globalization are the people (13 per cent), Germans (7.8 per cent), unemployed people (3.9 per cent), and Europe as a geographical entity, not political institutions (3.9 per cent). Finally, in the US we have the Americans in 8.5 per cent of the statements (see also Table 9.2). National solidarity is even asked for. More precisely, globalization would be best controlled if the national economies were kept separate from each other and not internationalized. In the Italian extreme right discourse (especially that of parties), the focus is on the protection of the middle class ('flower of the Italian society', *FN* March 2003), corresponding to the German *Mittelstand*—as well as the defence of the agricultural sector ('economic as well as moral base of the nation'); calls are made for protectionist policies for Italy and even for a self-sufficient state. Representatives from small- and medium-sized enterprises should be more integrated in the economic system (the Italian right frequently speaks about the fascist guilds). In the German right-wing framing, a 'sustainable economy' should replace the profit-oriented economy.

As is the case for some studies of extreme right political parties (e.g. Mudde 2004a), our study on political party and non-party extreme right organizations confirms that the discourse on the economic effects of globalization is bridged with that on immigration. Foreigners (and particularly Muslims for the American case) are among the ten most cited actors when the German and US extreme right talk about globalization (both present in 3 per cent of statements on globalization, see Table 9.2). Here, the right-wing antiglobalization statements must be most clearly differentiated from left-wing antiglobalization opinions. Following the right-wing argumentation, the exploitation of the so-called Third World countries through the dominant neo-liberal market economy causes international migration. Consequently, immigrants forced into immigration are abused in Western Europe (or, more precisely, in Germany and Italy) as a kind of modern slave (Mudde 2004a) without even basic freedom rights.

This approach to the issue of migration could, at first view, appear similar to the left-wing one. However, the difference becomes clear when examining the issue in further detail. Indeed, this modern slavery is not stigmatized in terms of the human rights of the immigrants, but with regard to its effects on the country and its native people. Immigrants are accused of putting social security and employment even further at risk than is already the case due to economic globalization. In this sense, foreigners are not only seen as victims of globalization, following what has been seen as an anti-capitalist tradition present above all in some old extreme right parties. Rather, they have a competitive advantage as cheap labour vis-à-vis the local workers. This is seen as enhanced by the specific characteristics of the immigrants, who are described as 'completely oriented towards money', characterized by 'strange

psychological attitudes', and 'egoistic'. They would even resort to violence in order to reach their financial goals. In sum, they are not only slaves, but also among the beneficiaries of a globalized economy. The implicit contradiction between the statements of migration as modern slavery, and the migrants who exploit the side effects of globalization for the sake of their own interests, is never clearly resolved in the radical right documents.

4. The invasion of the 'other': cultural globalization (and Americanization)

When considering the cultural aspects of globalization to explain the recent revitalization of the extreme right, most scholars focus on the problem of national identity. In this sense, the success of some extreme right parties has been variously linked to high levels of immigration in a given country and related processes of de-socialization of the workers' milieu, and to high levels of individualization of 'modernity' (Loch 2009, 10). The *cultural effects of globalization* are much more frequently addressed in the Italian right-wing extremist discourse; however, the German and the American extreme right also appear as building their anti-globalization discourses on this aspect (see Table 9.2). In the Italian and German cases, cultural globalization is mainly interpreted as Americanization (e.g. in Italy, almost half of the total 11.2 per cent of statements concerning cultural globalization refer explicitly to Americanization, see Table 9.1). According to our data, the argument is that globalization would destroy existing cultures and lead to the affirmation of the American model of society (with Europe as a sort of 'cultural colony of the US'). Indeed, globalization is said to bring about the 'cultural homogenization of the European people', the creation of one 'single world government', namely a 'single set of values' (based on 'individualism-egalitarianism', 'universalism') spread all over the world and serviceable to the absolute power of the forces of globalization. In addition, the US extreme right warns of the risks of homogenization brought about by globalization, often stressing that 'corporate actors from the business world' have the goal to 'build one world'.

For the extreme right in Germany and Italy, the projected future scenarios are dramatic. The goal of globalization can be reached only by 'destroying ethnic, cultural, and religious differences among the peoples of the world', and thus by their 'complete annihilation'. In the discourse of Italian right-wing organizations (above all the parties), ethical and religious concerns are particularly present. In addition to fear of the homogenization of cultures, the German and Italian extreme right-wing discourses also emphasize that globalization favours the spreading of a 'wrong culture' (see also Mudde 2004a, 11). Americanization is described as an 'arrogant' and 'imperialistic power',

the 'root of several dangers for the world', and the wrong culture imposed by globalization. Presented as a culture of 'modern senselessness values', 'violence and moral decadence', based on 'values of materialism', 'entertainment and the TV', 'drugs' and 'mass consumption', it is opposed to the 'natural values' based on 'tradition, family, authority' and (especially in the discourse of the Italian party Forza Nuova) on the 'healthy values of the Catholic religion'. In Germany, by contrast, the attention is more focused on the cultural influence from the US as depriving Germany of its national identity. This aspect of cultural globalization might even be shared with left-wing ideologies, but certainly excluding, in the latter case, the reference to national identity.

Here another enemy is often quoted, namely, the *media and television*, which largely contribute to the diffusion of these senseless values (or non-values) in society. 'Young people' would be the main victims of this 'cultural invasion'. The solution proposed in Italy is a return to the 'traditional values' (as well as 'traditional customs and usages'), which are at the base of a 'wealthy society' (see also Chapter 7). In the motivational frames of the German right-wing groups, the religious references are not present, but there is a similar call to their activists (and in general the German people) to 'react against' cultural globalization. Here, the focus is on the protection of the 'nation'. Italian skinhead groups present themselves as the 'wealthy youth', able to 'wake up' the society, slave of mass consumption.

Cultural globalization is also addressed by the American extreme right, but with different tones from those just described for the European case. It is not anti-Americanism that is underlined in the frames of the US extreme right, but rather the defence of American exceptionalism. Processes of transnationalization and internationalization are presented as threats to the identity of the American people, who are described as 'white' and 'Christian'. Indeed, they claim that a 'multicultural society is not intrinsic to Western culture' (guestbook skinhead.net, accessed March 2009). In other words, the US extreme right also relates globalization directly to the loss of the typical (according to the far right) American identity and interprets it as a serious threat for the 'American nation' and for the 'America of the "fathers"'. In this sense, as has been underlined, 'the far right antiglobalists tap the most individualistic strains of American common sense, articulated often, but not always, with religious, masculinist, nativist and/or racist understandings of "Americanism" ... Americanist ideologies authorized resistance to globalization' (Rupert 2000, 96).

The cultural effects of globalization are very frequently linked to immigration and, in the European case, to the threat of a multicultural society.⁶

⁶ According to the right, the cultural conquest of Germany as a host country expresses itself through various aspects such as 'foreigners continuing to live according to their own cultural principles'.

Indeed, our data confirm that the extreme right tends to an 'ethnicization of social problems' (Loch 2009), linking globalization issues to nationalist and racist discourses and frames. The issue of the threat coming from a multicultural society is especially at the core of skinhead antiglobalization frames. On the one hand, globalization is used as an argument when the extreme right itself speaks about racism and xenophobia, stating that globalization would inevitably lead to a climate in which xenophobia and racism would easily grow. On the other hand, mass immigration is considered a consequence of globalization, or, at other times, a tool in the hands of globalization's agents. The 'liberal capitalist globalizers' would follow precise and previously planned migration policies. A Germany or an Italy invaded by immigrants would follow the United States of America in increasing oligarchization, mass poverty, and an explosion of crimes. The major threat of cultural globalization is, however, a 'multiracial society'. Indeed, the multi-ethnic society would actually be 'multi-conflictual', 'multi-racist', and even 'mono-cultural' (a society in which only the culture of market and consumerism prevails). It would lead to the loss of traditional ties and would consequently be more conducive to criminal behaviour. Finally, this 'ethno-masochist' utopia would create an 'a-racial' society (in which the concept of 'race' would no longer play a role), an idea of society that would necessarily fail, as the recent French disorders (very often cited, in both the Italian and the German extreme right discourses) testify. In the words of one Italian right-wing organization: 'France represents for us, Europeans, the ghost of all the contradictions and failures of the model of the multiracial society... a society without roots, that the mondialist elite wants to impose on all the world' (*VFS* January–March 2006). The American extreme right organizations are particularly focused in their discourse on the threats coming from a 'multicultural society', which is described as 'not a culture' (guestbook skinhead.net, accessed March 2009) but 'a disease from within' which, according to them, 'should be blamed for the world's ills'. The anti-multicultural claims are often coupled with anti-Semitic accusations, since, according to these organizations, 'Jews favour multicultural society' (*ibid.*).

5. Political globalization and European integration

Apart from cultural and economic aspects, globalization has also been related to the crisis of political representation in contemporary Western democracies (especially the European ones). In this sense, the political protests against globalization, including those carried out by the extreme right, would criticize (and be motivated by) the incapacity of political elites and traditional parties to respond to the social challenges of globalization (Loch 2009, 12). In fact,

quantitative analyses link the electoral success of extreme right parties in a given country to its level of integration in international organizations, such as for instance the European Union (Zürn 1998). Other scholars deny such an influence. In any case, the presence of Eurosceptical attitudes towards European integration in a given country is cited as a favourable demand-side factor for the extreme right (Perrineau 2007; Loch 2009, 11). Our study reveals that when the extreme right talks about *political globalization* (see Table 9.1), especially in Italy, the issue of European integration is prominent in its discourse (accounting for 29.6 per cent of statements in Italy and 12 per cent in Germany)⁷ (see Table 9.1). The political aspects of the European integration process (e.g. the relations between the nation states and the EU) emerge as a special concern for the German extreme right (where they are treated in 8.6 per cent of statements concerning political globalization), while the Italian extreme right groups refer to a wider variety of issues referring to European integration, including moral and ethical concerns related to the EU.

Indeed, according to the extreme right, globalization not only leads to the 'loss of identities of the peoples', but also brings about 'limitations to the sovereignty of the national states' (FN May 2002). Europe is considered a 'totalitarian super state', a sort of 'dictatorship', an 'intrusive body', a 'distant and oppressing power' (very often mentioned in opposition to 'the European peoples'), and a 'centralizing state'. More specific references to the European policies describe a 'market oriented' EU that conditions national political and economic choices, serving the interests of international finance rather than the real interests of the nations. For instance, according to the extreme right, at the national level, the EU 'increases unemployment', 'damages the competitiveness of small businesses', will 'lead to the closure of many domestic businesses', 'to the invasion of foreign goods' and 'provoke the development of financial crimes'.

In Italy, the topic of European integration seems completely monopolized by the political party discourse (22.4 per cent of all party statements on political globalization, versus about 2–4 per cent of cases in the political movement and skinhead discourses), while in Germany it is equally important for the political party and skinhead groups (treated in, respectively, 5.5 and 4.2 per cent of their statements on political globalization), although not treated at all in the political movement sources. Frames on European integration were not found in the discourse of the American extreme right, regardless the type of group analysed.

Nevertheless, in spite of its opposition to the European Union, the current extreme right does not reject the idea of Europe, according to a position that

⁷ In the US, no statement related to the issue of European integration was found.

(at least for the Italian extreme right) goes back to post-World War II neo-fascist parties (Tarchi 2009). Quite to the contrary, in their *motivational frames*, our organizations call for the rebuilding of a 'new Europe', 'based on its traditional glorious history' (i.e. the Roman imperium in the Italian right discourse, while in Germany there are frequent references to 'the nations of the past'). They idealize a Europe that is 'big and strong, independent from the USA', 'with a single own European army'—which could itself become a force of defence against globalization and the American enemy (VFS May–June 2004). This reflects an abstract and mythical idea of Europe as the centre of civilization and a third power between the two materialist empires, USA and USSR (Tarchi 2009). Building upon this tradition, the 'post-1989 scenario has strengthened in these political groups the aspiration to embody an autochthonous and "authentic" Europe, in contrast with the cosmopolitan tendencies of globalization' (ibid. 1). However, again, this new Europe is framed through the lens of national identity. In this sense, the Italian and German extreme right groups seek a 'Europe of the European peoples', a 'Europe of sovereign states', a Europe 'new and different from the EU, which unites nations only economically with free trade and a stateless coin!' (FN September 2003). The general call for action is to 'save, by any means, the millennial history, culture, and tradition of Europe against foreign interferences'. The model presented by the extreme right is thus based on a 'micro-nationalism of regional small native countries opposed to a statist and centralist nationalism of the great nation' (EUMC 2004, 16).

Even if extreme right groups are strongly opposed to political globalization and European integration (although they speak of a Europe of the people), they become entrepreneurs of a sort of transnationalization of the right-wing movement itself. Indeed, in order to resist globalization and protect the nation state against the depredations of the United States, they frequently propose to unite the forces of the 'European nationalist movements' (yet another 'us' to be added to the list of the allies already mentioned), or the 'European patriotic movements'; they ask for contacts with other European 'national oppositions'; and they launch concrete initiatives to create international networks among extreme right movements. The impression of an increasing transnationalization of the European extreme right (at least in its political discourse, as it emerged from our data) is confirmed by other sources that stress the tendency of the extreme right to organize cross-nationally (Europol 2007, 7), as well as to appeal to an international audience (Gerstenfeld et al. 2003; Caiani and Parenti 2009). As has been noted for leftist social movements (della Porta and Caiani 2009), the European and international institutions, beyond being the target of an increasingly critical discourse, provide occasions for the creation of supranational networks and identities even for the extreme right. However, this transnationalization process is only central for the Italian

extreme right. The priority of the German discourse is more the unity of the national milieu than looking beyond the national borders. As for the US extreme right, the political aspect of globalization is framed through the lens of international relations, with numerous statements referring to transatlantic and international relations (29 per cent of statements concerning political globalization) and terrorism (23.4 per cent of statements concerning political globalization) (see Table 9.1).

The topic of foreign politics very frequently recurs in the American right-wing discourse (especially for political parties: 8.8 per cent of their statements on political globalization), covering issues such as terrorism (and the 'war on terrorism'), the war in Iraq, but also Israeli-Palestinian relations (with a stigmatization of both Jewish and Arab-Muslim actors). In general, when talking about 'the other countries' (which recur among the most cited in the discourse of the US extreme right; 6.3 per cent of all statements, see Table 9.2), the American extreme right underlines the links of the American and the foreign economies, or describes differences between America and the rest of the world. In particular, the most frequently mentioned country in the discourse of the US extreme is Iran (recurring in 19.6 per cent of all statements, Table 9.2). The attitude of the Bush administration with regard to Iran is criticized, and President Bush is accused of wanting to add yet another lie to his misinformation concerning the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Furthermore, the Bush administration is suspected of preparing for another Gulf War, this time in Iran. This would again cost the lives of many American soldiers. Indeed, one of the most recurring adjectives used by the US extreme right when 'America' is the subject of sentences referring to globalization is 'imperialist'.

Our data show that extreme right organizations talk much more than they mobilize on issues related to globalization. Protest events on globalization (including the mobilization of extreme right actors concerning, as for the frame analysis, political globalization and EU integration, cultural and economic globalization, and socio-economic issues) represent the smallest group in our database of right-wing actions (accounting only for 5.4 per cent of all identified events). The Italian and German extreme right mobilize more on this issue than the American one does (in 7.3 per cent and 10.3 per cent of cases, respectively, in Italy and Germany, versus 0.3 per cent for the US).⁸ Political party actors monopolize the initiatives on globalization (as the organizing actor in 12.4 per cent of events, versus 1–5 per cent for other types of extreme right actors).⁹ Examples of such events, mainly expressed through demonstrative actions (in 76 per cent of cases of events on globalization) are

⁸ The Cramer's V of the correlation between the country and the issues mobilized is 0.41***.

⁹ The Cramer's V of the correlation between the type of actor and the issues mobilized is 0.26***.

political campaigns in defence of domestic goods (e.g. the 'Buy Only Italian' campaign of the Italian extreme right, or the 'Italian Christmas' initiative, for collective gifts for children from poor families in Rome, *FN* 2003). They may also address social precariousness and housing problems (e.g. the 2006 campaign for the 'Mutuo Sociale', social mortgage, organized by a network of Italian right-wing organizations to provide home ownership for Italians who cannot afford market rates) or mobilize against the US (i.e. the European campaign for the boycott against multinational American goods, *FN* March 2003).

6. Conclusion

Summarizing our results so far, we can now come back to our main questions about the place of globalization in the political discourse of right-wing organizations and the way in which they frame the globalization debate. As we have seen from our data, the issue of globalization is clearly present in the Italian, German, and US right-wing discourses, with some similarities but also notable differences. In all three countries, it is addressed in its various aspects, from the global(ized) economic system, to international migration and the emergence of multicultural societies, to the threat of globalization for traditional values as well as societal, cultural, and political changes in the nation states themselves. The interpretation of globalization through the lens of conspiracy theories allows the extreme right to carry on a (rather abstract) antagonistic and rebellious discourse against the powers.

Some prognostic frames appear at first sight similar to those mobilized by the left-wing discourses on globalization—such as the generally critical attitude towards the main patterns of globalization; the increasing importance of business actors (and the simultaneous weakness of the state in the economic arena); and the hegemonic position of the US and the international (non legitimated) institutions (e.g. the WTO) in international politics. However, there are also notable differences between the two camps. Most prominently, right-wing activists differ from left-wingers in their proposed answers to globalization, namely, a new strengthening of the nation state and of the original national, cultural, ethnic, and religious identities of a country, and a retreat from international collaboration. Whereas left-wingers have often been characterized as 'new globals' who seek to advance an alternative type of globalization, right-wingers are the true 'no globals'. Indeed, the extreme right is engaged in the new debate on globalization, using old schemata related to its traditional ideology, focused on aspects such as nationalism, identity, conspiracy, and the obsession with immigration and security (the immigration topic is used for a criticism of both economic and cultural globalization). Thus,

the extreme right has entered the rhetorical territory of globalization and antiglobalization fears as a rather novel field, but it has done this by bridging it with its traditional discourses and frames.

Although striking similarities can be seen in cross-national comparisons among the three case studies, differences are also observable, mainly referring to the important role of political and discursive opportunities in the articulation of political opinions. First of all, our analysis showed that issues linked to globalization are more present in the Italian extreme right than in the German and the US cases—although it seems increasingly important in Germany as well (Virchow 2009). Given that indexes of social and economic globalization are lower in Italy than in the other two countries (on KOF index of globalization, see Loch 2009, 13), this means that the objective contextual opportunities conducive to fostering mobilization and discourses against globalization are not sufficient explanations.

Second, and strongly linked to the previous point, it emerges from our study that the extreme right in the three countries tends to emphasize, and mobilize around, different aspects of globalization. In the German case, the emerging conflicts linked to economic and cultural globalization (Loch 2009) seem to be activated by the extreme right rhetoric, but with a predominance of economic frames. In contrast, in the US, the political issues related to globalization predominate. In the Italian case, new cultural and economic cleavages related to globalization emerge as important, along with the political one related to the process of European integration. Although the American extreme right is composed of different sectors that do not share a unified political program, globalization is a common topic addressed by many far right movements, and 'a conspirational world view underlines the various far right narratives of globalization' (Rupert 2000, 97). Also in the German and US cases, an ethnization (Loch 2009) of social problems related to globalization is more visible than in the Italian case.

Some main explanations for these differences can be found in the cultural and political sphere, especially in the political and discursive opportunities. If the *diagnosis* and the description of the globalization is often similar between Italy and Germany for the several dimensions of globalization (economic, political, cultural, etc.), nevertheless, the *prognostic frames* through which the call for action is made are different. Indeed, while in Italy the reaction (and the solutions proposed) against globalization are carried out and framed with many references to the most traditional and Catholic values (the natural family, the rural community, etc.—especially in the documents of the party Forza Nuova), this is not the case in Germany, where the focus is much more on the purity of the nation and the German race. The German right-wing extremism, in fact, often 'points to a kind of resurgence or "rebirth" in order to create a new revolutionary order, a new society, and even a new man. This

goal cannot be achieved except through a general, collective, unitary effort by the whole nation. . . . The idea of resurgence from a dark period; the emphasis of the nation as a collective, organic body; the projection into a glorious and beaming future' (Ignazi 2002, 24). The activists 'envision the "good old days" in wildly unrealistic ways. . . . The Germans call it the image of the *heile Welt* (a world intact) and, as compared to it, the world today and in the immediate past is always found wanting or *kaputt* (broken)' (Merkl 1997, 20). Additionally in the German extreme right discourse, problems like unemployment, loss of social security, and multicultural societies are often framed under the general idea of the 'health' and 'purity' of the nation rather than explicitly referring to globalization.

In the US as well, globalization is linked to economic crisis and economic losses. American neo-Nazis and white supremacists sense 'downward mobility and economic uncertainty' and are 'emasculated by big money and big government' (Wright 2002, 1). They accuse 'the American government for killing the American dream, leaving people scrounging to pay their bills' (ibid.). However, it is also stressed that, overall, the American far right tends to more loosely tie its grievances to modernization and globalization, in comparison to American left-wing organizations such as environmental groups and unions (ibid.). In the US, the specific form of the extreme right opposition to globalization, mainly focused on national identity and cultural threat, can again be explained with reference to the characteristics of the political culture. As has been noted, the American extreme right resistance to globalization is a response to changing socio-economic circumstances, a response that also draws on the cognitive resources available in the US context. In this sense, far right critiques against globalization are framed in terms of the need to defend American exceptionalism in a changing world (Rupert 2000, 95). The most individualistic elements of American culture are used in the right-wing discourse against globalization with a mix of references to religious, nativist, and racist argumentation—offered as the unique solution for the American people to preserve a stable identity in the complex and changing globalized world.

Political globalization also seems to play a more important role for the Italian than for the German extreme right, and this can be linked to different discursive opportunities. In Germany since 1945 there has been no political legitimacy for anti-European nationalism, and thus no tradition of Euroscepticism (Loch 2009, 27). In fact, all of the mainstream parties support European integration (except for some Eurosceptical elements in the Bavarian CSU and in the left 'Die Linke', Loch 2009), and explicit anti-European and nationalistic discourse are only found among the extreme right parties, which are marginal in the political arena. Additionally, there is a predominance of pro-European attitudes among German citizens (Eurobarometer). To the contrary,

in Italy, in spite of the assumed traditional pro-Europe-ism of the political elites, anti-Europe attitudes are expressed at both the governmental and the oppositional levels (see the Northern League, as well as in some periods the party Forza Italia [Go Italy!]).

Even the identity frames used in the three countries seem to be influenced by the different political and cultural opportunities offered by the three contexts. For example, in Italy, the frames elaborated by extreme right organizations also pass through the opposition to the left-wing movements; this opposition is very important for Italian right-wing groups to define their role and identity concerning the new topic of globalization. The left-wing global justice activists are presented in the Italian case as helpless promoters and representatives of antiglobalization (as a 'them'), since they would implicitly sustain the main actors of globalization. In Germany and the US, by contrast, this is not the case. These findings can be related to the movement-counter-movement dynamic between the extreme right and other political actors. Indeed, as the political process approach claims, the behaviour and the strategies of the actors in a political system are closely interrelated and mutually dependent. The configuration of actors and context are fundamental in this respect (della Porta 1996). In particular, the structure of the global justice movement in Italy, as well as the longer tradition of movement-counter-movement interactions, might explain this difference. Not least, the G8 protests in Genoa 2001, which contributed a great deal to the public discussion about antiglobalization (not only in Italy), happened in Italy. The first European Social Forum (with no violent clashes, but with a high level of anxiety among the general public before the event) was held in the Italian city of Florence. Instead, no such important meeting has yet been held in Germany, and the global justice movement has not developed (e.g. numerically) as in Italy. Thus, the Italian right was able to embark on a publicly diffused issue of left-wing no-global protesters, whereas the issue was simply absent in the German case.

Generally speaking, the *diagnosis* of economic globalization extreme right discourses shares many points with left-wing critiques of neo-liberal globalization, and even the same enemies, such as certain corporations and multinationals (i.e. Nike, General Motors). Sometimes even the same means of protest are used (like the boycott of multinationals' goods). This is, however, not the case for the *prognostic* and the *motivational frames*, where the references to traditional (especially fascist, in the Italian case) right-wing ideologies are central.

The Extreme Right, Populism, and Politics

1. Introduction

Recent academic attempts to define the (new) extreme right have tended to shift attention from old fascism to populism. If the old extreme right was identified with ultra-nationalism, the myth of decadence, the myth of rebirth (anti-democracy), and conspiracy theories (Eatwell 1996; Merkl 1997; Ignazi 1997; Nolte 1966), today's extreme right is associated with populism (Mudde 1996). In short, in recent years there has been a confluence of research on right-wing radicalism/extremism and the definition of a new actor in the political arena, the populist radical right parties (Loch 2009)—that is, parties (form) with a specific ideology (subject matter). The ideology of such parties has been mainly identified with nativism (nationalism/racism) and authoritarianism (Mudde 2007, 11–31), economic ambiguity, and populism (Loch 2009, 4). In turn, populism has been conceptualized as a 'thin' ideology that singles out two homogeneous and antagonistic groups—the pure people and the corrupt elite—arguing that politics should be the expression of the 'general will' of the people (Mudde 2004b, 11ff.). However, the conceptualization of populism is still open, and several definitions are proposed (for an exhaustive review see Norocel 2009), linking it to radical right parties (Mudde 2007; Kitschelt 2007), the new populist right (Laycock 2005; Mudde 2004b), anti-immigration populist parties (Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2007), right-wing populism (Helms 1997; Laclau 2005), right-wing radicalism (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007), radical right populism (Rydgren 2003), or simply populist parties (Abts and Rummens 2007; Ruzza and Fella 2009).

In this chapter, we shall address the question of the conceptualization of *radical right populism*, investigating the re-emergence in the (current) extreme right discourses of elements that are considered as typical for older extreme right ideology and rhetoric, as well as the presence of neo-populist frames. In particular, we shall explore how present are the neo-populist frames, and with which other frames they are bridged.

We expect to find that populism is framed differently in the three countries and in the different groups. Indeed, in a cross-national comparison, we hypothesize that the populist frames of the radical right involve more criticism of the corruption of the political elites in Italy—where the wounds of the political scandals of the early 1990s are not yet healed—than in Germany, where we expect to find a stronger emphasis on the (racial) definition of the people. We expect to find a similar emphasis on a racial (as well as religious) definition of the people in the US, where populist appeals might also rely on the traditional defence of individual liberties vis-à-vis the state (Michael 2003).

Beyond this, however, we also expect organizational framing to be constrained not only by the general cultures in which radical groups develop, but also by the organizations' own culture. In developing their frames, organizations try in fact to make their discourses appealing for different circles of potential supporters—the culture of which therefore constrains the range of potentially useful arguments. On the basis of the existing literature (Zimmermann 2003; Merkl 1997), we can expect to find different configurations of frames concerning the concept of populism, depending on the type of right-wing organization. In particular, we expect to find a more political type of populism among extreme right political parties, and a more militant and elitist one in the non-party subcultural organizations.

In sum, analysing the discourse of different types of extreme right organizations, the chapter shall shed light on the concept of populism when applied to the extreme right, looking at the way in which the concept of the people is bridged with nationalism as well as anti-establishment and traditional right-wing concepts (section 2). We argue that the extreme right frames about 'the people' contain a rather *exclusive* vision that refers to a strongly *hierarchical and elitist* conception of society. Indeed, not only corrupt political elites but also other groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, political adversaries, supranational actors) are excluded from 'the people'. In this sense, our analysis looks at the bridging of populism with nationalism (at least in the Italian, German, and American extreme right organizations studied) (see also Norocel 2009). The specificities of the 'populist' paradigm are analysed and linked to other issues of extreme right discourse (section 3). We then investigate the conceptual homogeneity of the people, the dichotomous relationship between the people and the elites, and the concept of popular sovereignty and subsequently that of charismatic leadership, underlining similarities and differences between various extreme right groups (section 4). In the conclusion (section 5), we discuss the concept of populism, arguing that it can be interpreted as a frame, which can be present to different extents and with different characteristics in various groups and movements. Only in some of them does it become a

meta-frame, which bridges different frames, discourses, and issues (such as patriotism, traditions, and so on; Mény and Surel 2002).

2. The 'people' in the discourse of the extreme right

Definitions of the populist discourse generally converge in seeing as a core aspect of populism the attempt to create a direct connection between the people and the political power, bypassing the electoral process (Ruzza and Fella 2009). Indeed, people's aspirations are seen as betrayed by corrupt political elites (Ruzza and Rydgren 2008, 1). According to the populist paradigm, politics should be an expression of the *volonté general* of the people (Mudde 2004b; Rydgren 2007). The charismatic leader is the one who embodies the will of the common people and is able to speak on their behalf.

There are, however, some tensions in the concept of *populism* when it is applied to the extreme right. In particular, if the concept refers to a direct relationship between the pure people and the leader (against the corrupt elite), it seems crucial to reflect upon (a) who are the pure people in the radical right-wing vision of the society, and (b) what kind of relationship does the extreme right see between the people and the leader. Investigating the frames in written documents of right-wing extremist organizations in Italy, Germany, and the United States, these are the questions we will explore in this section.

Politics is a very prominent issue in the discourse of the extreme right in both European countries, without strong differences among the different types of organization (with the exception of a minor interest in politics for subcultural groups in Germany). According to our data (see Chapter 3), political issues (including sub-topics such as the institutional system, the role of the state, political party competition, corruption, and so on) are treated respectively in one fifth (19.8 per cent) and almost one third (29.6 per cent) of all the codified statements in Italy and Germany.¹ In the US, although still prominent, politics occupies a slightly less important role (about 15 per cent of all codified statements). When looking at the main identity and oppositional frames that the extreme right organizations use in order to construct their identity and the universe of their allies and enemies (Table 10.1), a clear picture emerges from our data which characterizes the pure people as an exclusive (in terms of ethno-national characteristics) and non-pluralist (in terms of pluralism of opinions) category.

¹ As for a comparison between different types of extreme right organizations, political issues recur in about 19–20 per cent of statements found in the documents of all three extreme right organizations in Italy. In Germany, they are present in 33–39 per cent of all statements coded in the discourse of the political party and movement organizations and in 16 per cent of cases for the skinhead sources.

Table 10.1. The ten most quoted actors (identity and oppositional frames) in the documents of the Italian, German, and American extreme right

Germany			Italy		
Rank	Actor		Rank	Actor	
1	The extreme right ('We')	5.4%	1	The domestic political class	6.4%
2	NPD	5.3%	2	The European Union	4.5%
3	The people	4.2%	3	The immigrants	4.2%
4	The Germans	3.4%	4	The US	4.0%
5	The politicians	3.3%	5	'Them'	3.2%
6	Political parties	3.0%	6	Italy	3.1%
7	Individual CDU politicians	2.9%	7	The people	2.9%
8	Individual SPD politicians	2.8%	8	<i>Forza Nuova</i>	2.7%
9	Foreigners	2.8%	9	Corporate actors from the business world and banks	2.7%
10	Mass media	2.2%	10	The Italians	2.4%
	All 10 first actors (1353)	35.3%		All 10 first actors (2460)	36.1%
		100%			100%
<i>US</i>					
Rank	Actor				
1	The extreme right ('We')	9.1%			
2	The Americans	5.8%			
3	Jews	5.5%			
4	Political institutions/the government	5.3%			
5	African Americans	4.5%			
6	Whites	3.9%			
7	The US president	3.5%			
8	Police and military	2.9%			
9	Immigrants	2.9%			
10	Foreign countries	2.5%			
	All 10 first actors (1379)	45.9%			
		100%			

First of all (Table 10.1), we see that, in *the populist approach of the extreme right*, the category 'people' (or the category 'Americans' for the US) represents in all three countries an important component of these organizations' identity frames, being, among 200 categories of actors, the third and the seventh most quoted actors respectively in Germany and Italy and the second in the US (accounting for 4.2, 2.9, and 5.8 per cent of all codified statements). In the Italian case, 'the people' is equally prominent in the discourse of the political party group (representing the eighth most recurring actor categories in its documents, 3.2 per cent of statements) and of the subcultural skinhead organizations (the tenth most important actor category, 3.7 per cent of statements), while it plays a slightly less important role in the discourse of the political movement group (1.2 per cent). Differently, in the German case, the identity category 'the people' is more emphasized in the political extreme

right (parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, recurring in 4.8 and 5.3 per cent of statements, respectively, in the political party and political movement documents), than in the discourse of subcultural organizations (being only the eleventh most important category in the documents of the *Kameradschaften*, with 2.3 per cent of statements). Finally, in the US, the category 'Americans' is definitively emphasized in the discourse of the subcultural violent skinhead groups. It is the second most frequently cited actor for these groups (recurring in 9.2 per cent of all statements), whereas it occupies the third position for political parties (5.8 per cent) and only the seventh position for political movements (3.6 per cent).

Together with the people, other specific categories of more proximate and more remote actors are quoted among the most important identity frames—offering further clarification of who 'the people' really is for the radical right. These categories of actors are *territorially*, *ethnically*, or *culturally* specified. The similarities among Germany, Italy, and the US are striking in this respect. In the German extreme right organizations, the categories that recur most frequently in the right-wing discourse are the extreme right itself, the NPD, and the Germans. For the Italian extreme right, these include Italy, the Italians, and Forza Nuova itself. Finally, for the US, we find the whites and, again, the category referring to the extreme right. This seems to suggest that these categories of actors form a specific cluster of 'identity' frames in the conceptual map of right-wing discourse.

Many other statements stress the *exclusive character of the people*. In the discourse of the German extreme right, 'the people' is mainly characterized as those who 'want to be Germans also in the future' (NPD July 2005), that is, 'they do not want to be deprived of their (national) identity' (NPD May 2006). In the Italian discourse, a number of expressions emphasize the national identity of the people, 'who are characterized by Italian culture and traditions' (FN September 2003). In the US, the Americans are often described as 'having a superior history', being the 'most visible agent of Western culture', a nation of 'pioneers, homesteaders, tradesmen, frontiersmen', and also very frequently as 'white' (in the sense of skin colour). In contrast, when US extreme right groups identify the country as a 'multicultural society', America is portrayed as 'non-white', 'insane', or a 'cancer to the Aryan world'. Furthermore, the possessive pronoun 'our', together with 'America', can be found regularly. In sum, it appears from our data that extreme right groups in all three countries refer to ethno-national characteristics to identify 'the people' with the (ethnic) nation (Norocel 2009).

Thirdly, the political elites are, in all three countries, the main oppositional actors in the discourse of the extreme right organizations analysed: the domestic political class is mentioned in 6.4 per cent of all codified statements in Italy; the politicians in 3.3 per cent of all codified statements in Germany; the

political institutions (together with the Jews) in about 5.5 per cent of statements in the US. However, the opponents of the extreme right and the people are not only represented by the domestic establishment, but also by supranational and non-national actors and institutions, stressing the centrality of the dichotomy *national–non-national* for the identification of the out-group and in-group. This is especially evident in the Italian right-wing discourse (where the European Union is the second most quoted oppositional actor), as well as in the US (where foreign countries are among the ten most important actors), but less so in Germany.

Finally, and most importantly, a process of frame bridging (Snow and Benford 1988), through which different frames are related to each other, seems to be at work in the discourse of the extreme right organizations analysed, linking *populism* with the *ethno-nationalism* typical of the (old) radical right. This emerges when looking at the other most frequently mentioned oppositional categories (e.g. foreigners in Germany, 2.8 per cent; immigrants in Italy, 4.2 per cent; Jews and African Americans and various variations of the term in the US, 5.5 and 4.5 per cent). These groups, along with politicians, are grammatically opposed to the people—as we shall see below—in right-wing frames. In addition to political elites (national and supranational), political adversaries in general, as well as other religiously defined groups and ethnic minorities, are excluded from the in-group composed by the extreme right and the people.

An exclusive interpretation of ‘the people’ is confirmed when looking more in detail (with our grammar analysis and analysis of adjectives) at the way in which extreme right organizations describe themselves, the people, and their relationship with the people (Table 10.2). Although in the discourse of right-wing organizations the extreme right is *identified with the people*, at the same time, the frames used also point at a *rather hierarchical relationship with it*. The pure people, identified as sovereign, is opposed to the (corrupt) political elites.

The radical right identifies itself with the people (‘we are the people’, *FN* September 2004), but, at the same time, within an elitist vision of society, presents the people as rather ‘stupid’ and in need of a guide (explicitly indicated as the right itself). Indeed, in terms of attributes, the people is frequently defined as being ‘hopeless’, ‘powerless’, ‘subjugated by the invaders’, ‘reduced as simple producers-consumers’, ‘desperate’, ‘unhappy’, ‘angry’, and ‘poor’, ‘with no more vitality, values and spirit’, ‘betrayed’ (this is repeated in several statements), ‘exploited’, ‘neglected’, ‘prosecuted’, ‘not respected’, even ‘robbed’ (via taxes and inflation), ‘perceived as things and not as human beings’ by the political and economic establishment, and ‘excluded from the processes of production and wealth’ (*Stormtrooper* October 2008, p. 2). The people is said to be strongly ‘dissatisfied’ and ‘critical’ of the domestic political

Table 10.2. The people in the documents of the Italian, German, and American extreme right

<i>Statements description</i>	
<i>The people</i>	
<i>Grammatical position</i>	(in all 3 country cases) Mainly as 'object actor' (passive role)
<i>Adjectives</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (Germany and Italy) 'hopeless', 'powerless', 'reduced as simple producers-consumers', 'with no more vitality, values and spirit', 'unhappy', 'angry', and 'poor', 'not heard' [by politicians]. ✓ 'sovereign', 'naturally free', 'who have the right to rebel', but also as 'ingenuous', 'illiterate', who 'are not aware of their own condition', 'easily manipulated', 'in need of a guide'. ✓ (US) 'oppressed', 'jailed', 'poor', 'good', 'unarmed' ✓ (all countries) They are 'dissatisfied' with the domestic political class and 'critical' of it, they 'will react', 'will rebel', 'still timorous', 'needing to be encouraged in this direction'. ✓ The people who 'want to be Germans also in the future'; 'are characterized by [Italian] culture and traditions'; 'are white' (US)
<i>Subject actors (%)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (Germany) 'The domestic political class' (13.6%), 'political parties in general' (8%), 'we/us' (9.1%) ✓ (Italy) 'The domestic political class' (13.4%), 'right-wing organizations' (6.3%) (e.g. Forza Nuova) ✓ (US) 'the extreme right' (9.1%), 'American political institutions' (9.1%), 'Jews' (8%), 'immigrants' (5.7%)
<i>Actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (all countries) (people as object actor) [people are] 'betrayed', 'exploited', 'neglected', 'prosecuted', 'not respected', 'given promises', 'not helped', even 'robbed', 'destroyed', 'told lies', 'not respected', 'not defended' ✓ (people as subject actor) 'the people should wake up', 'should get out of the flock', 'should start the struggle', 'take back its sovereignty', 'take back its power', 'determine own future' ✓ (US) 'want to impeach' (the American president), 'complain about' (domestic bureaucracy, Obama, etc.), 'should look for other leaders'

class. It 'ineffectively asks' the political class for 'urgent interventions'; it 'calls for help', but receives none.

In fact, the people is also presented as an actor who is 'naturally free', 'who has the right to rebel' in order to improve its life situation; nevertheless, it is also described as timorous and as 'needing to be encouraged'. It is considered by extreme right organizations to be 'ingenuous', 'illiterate', 'unaware of their own condition', 'easily manipulated'; it is 'in need of a guide', and its 'moral and intellectual level is decreasing day by day'. It is not a case that, in all three countries, the people is mainly presented as an object of action (in 53.3 per cent of statements in the German case, in 44.1 per cent in the Italian case, and in 40.5 per cent in the US case), less so as a subject, suggesting a rather passive role of this actor in the discourse of right-wing groups. Among the actions that are attributed to the people as subject actor, we find many calls ('should' statements) that invite the people to 'wake up', 'get out of the flock', 'start the struggle', 'take back its sovereignty', 'its power', and 'determine its own

future'.² In the Italian case, they 'should go against' the political class and 'should reduce the power of the political class'. In the discourse of the American extreme right organizations, we also quite often find revolutionary frames that envisage a 'new political system'—although always very vaguely described—led by the extreme right itself. Indeed, speaking about the current state of American democracy, extreme right groups frequently underline that 'the government destroys the Americans' (*Stormtrooper* May 2008, p. 1). For this reason, in a more radical proposal, the existing political institutions 'should be replaced' (website of the Ku Klux Klan).

However, the discourse about the people is very often combined with yet another aspect, namely the action of resistance of the extreme right groups. The role of ordinary people in the envisaged change/revolution is very limited, namely to a supportive role, whereas the actual actions are undertaken—in a rather elitist style—by right-wing activists. A frequently recurring idea in the extreme right documents is that an 'historical change' (e.g. a 'new phase in the history of Italy') will happen; the extreme right organizations themselves are seen as the novel political actors able to lead the country towards this change, and 'should speak on behalf of the people' (website of the Ku Klux Klan). Following this line of argument, the extreme right presents itself as the 'only force that manages to protect the victims of the complot' (*FN* May 2004). A potentially revolutionary change is presented as a result of the present day 'desperate condition' of the people, and their need for a 'guide' to lead this change is suggested. Indeed, some issue fields are often related to the people (as subject actor of the statements). In the Italian extreme right sources, these include the form of the state, revolution (e.g. dictatorship versus democracy) (in 11.1 per cent of statements), the domestic and international economic system (11.1 per cent), and the crisis of the society (8.3 per cent). Similarly in Germany, the topics that most frequently recur when the people appear as subject of the statement are political life in general (37.1 per cent), followed by form of state and revolution, and national identity (both 14.3 per cent). In the US, the most frequently recurring issues for Americans as subject are national identity (in 23.8 per cent of statements), history/nation (11.1 per cent), and foreign policy and international relations (7.9 per cent).

3. Linking populist and anti-establishment frames

In line with an *anti-establishment interpretation of the new extreme right*, when Italian, German and American extreme right organizations talk about the

² Future scenarios of a lack of reaction by the people are also often presented: they will be 'a simple aggregation of individuals ruled only by the laws of consumerism'.

domestic political class, they characterize politicians for their misbehaviour in relation to politics, as well as moral norms and values. Political elites (from both the left and the moderate right) are portrayed as corrupt and only focused on their own personal (or political parties') interests, not really caring about the country and ordinary people. Traditional conspiracy theories, which are typical of the extreme right ideological framework (Simmons 2003), are referred to when presenting the political class as part of a secret economic-political agreement whose goal is to dominate the country, make money, and subjugate the people. The opposition between extreme right organizations and politicians is also evident grammatically, since, when the extreme right is presented as a subject actor (as in the majority of the statements), the actions are mainly of two types: either protective (for the people), or reactive-defensive (against the ruling political class). Indeed, the most frequently corresponding object actor when the extreme right groups are subjects of the statements are, on the one hand (various categories of) the people, and on the other hand the domestic political class (Table 10.3).

In fact, the political elite has a strongly negative connotation. In term of adjectives, politicians are described as 'cartel politicians', 'behaving improperly', 'only oriented towards power', 'highly paid', 'alien to the people', 'not credible', 'not linear', 'not courageous', 'corrupt' and 'easily corruptible', 'interested only in money', 'rich', 'afraid of saying the truth', only 'devoted to the politically correct' (with a negative connotation), the class of the 'forbidding to forbid', and even, in the most critical statements, 'anti-German/Italian/American'.³ Politicians are described as 'telling lies' to the people (e.g. about Iran, *Stormtrooper* December 2008, p. 1; about Iraq, *ibid.* December 2008, p. 1); as 'not helping' the ordinary people (*ibid.* May 2008, p. 2); as 'not defending Americans' (website of the Ku Klux Klan); as 'leading the people to unsafe wars' (*Stormtrooper* July 2008, p. 2); in summary, as 'working against the best interest of the US' (website of the Creativity Movement). In addition, the domestic bureaucracy is portrayed as 'betraying Americans' (*ibid.* June 2008, p. 1), 'not caring about', 'not informing', and even 'destroying' them, and 'fighting against' the American people (e.g. *ibid.* January 2009, p. 1). From the point of view of their political action, especially in the Italian right-wing discourse, politicians are characterized as 'cowards', 'short-sighted', and 'narrow-minded'. They 'systematically break the laws', 'tell lies', 'do not think about the problems' [of the Italians], 'destroy the country', 'create social tensions consciously', 'sleep', 'celebrate the cult of being guilty' [with regard to the Holocaust]' (particularly frequent in the German case), 'latently dissolve

³ 'The domestic political class neglects the well-being of the Americans' (*Stormtrooper* June 2008, p. 1), 'does not defend Americans' (website of the Ku Klux Klan), and 'is only able to raise taxes against the American people' (guestbook of the website *skinhead.net*, 2007).

Table 10.3. The politicians (in Italy, Germany, and the US)

Statements description	
<i>The Politicians</i>	
<i>Grammatical position</i>	Mainly as subject actor (active role)
<i>Adjectives</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (Germany + Italy) 'corrupt', 'only interested in power', 'focused on money', 'rich', 'highly paid', 'a caste', 'an oligarchy', 'cowards', 'short-sighted', 'narrow-minded', 'electoral tricksters', 'scribblers and gas-bags', 'cartel politicians', 'behaving improperly', 'alien to the people', 'not credible', 'not linear', 'not courageous', 'corrupt', 'afraid of saying the truth', 'do-gooders', 'responsible for social deprivation', 'anti-German/Italians' ✓ (US) 'run by Jews', 'working against the best interest of the US', 'telling lies', 'not defending'
<i>Objects actors (%)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (Italy) the Italians (19.1%), Italy (10%), the ordinary people (6.4%), the workers (3.6%) ✓ (Germany) the people (17.3%), the Germans (6.2%) ✓ (US) immigrants (16.2%), 'we/us' (10.8%), the 'Americans' (8.1%)
<i>Actions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ (Germany and Italy) 'break laws systematically', 'tell lies', 'do not ask', 'do not help', 'do not think of the problems' [of the Italians], 'move [the people] away from politics', 'give false information', 'profit' from the people, 'destroy', 'create social tensions consciously', 'profit', 'sleep', 'celebrate the cult of being guilty (with regard to the Holocaust)', 'latently dissolve democracy', 'destroy the country systematically', 'sell the [German] people to Turkey' ✓ (US) 'tell lies', 'not defend', 'lead into unsafe wars', 'betray', 'raise taxes', 'not respect', 'should help', 'do not care about', 'do not inform', 'fight against' (the Americans), 'not listen to', 'do not make money for (the people)', 'make useless promises', have sexual deviances (e.g. are gay, molest adolescents), are 'against whites', are 'communist'

democracy', and [in the German case] 'sell the people (to Turkey)'. They are said to 'only follow the orders of the US'. The behaviour of politicians is attacked, referring to their private 'scandals' or their private lives in general (e.g. 'drug addicts', *ibid.* April 2008, p. 2). The already seen emphasis on the racial characteristics of the people against the political elites is confirmed when the extreme right criticizes American President Obama for 'being against the whites', also coupling the ethnic and the religious definition of the true American people (e.g. 'Obama does not like Catholics', *ibid.* December 2008, p. 2).

Political parties are said to be 'decoupled from the people's will', 'not interested in finding solutions', and 'responsible for social deprivation'. We frequently find expressions such as 'cartel parties', in which the qualifier is meant to underline how closely mainstream political parties collaborate with each other in order to exploit their clients, that is, the electorate. In a very negative tone, it points to the inappropriate behaviour of political parties, which is aimed at enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary people. In the German extreme right discourse, we also frequently find the term 'block party', assimilating the party system in the Federal Republic of Germany with

that of the German Democratic Republic: all parties collaborate with each other (in exploiting the people); their ideological differences are becoming meaningless. Political parties, in both the Italian and German cases, are also often identified as 'old parties', indicating that the currently existing model of a political party is a matter of the past, and that those old political parties should be replaced by new ones—of course, the implicit reference is to the extreme right. According to the (mainly German) extreme right, a central problem for party democracy is that political parties suffer from a loss of trust, and they are increasingly de-legitimized because of continuous losses in elections. They 'make useless promises' (guestbook of the online forum *skinhead.net*, 2005) and do not listen to the people (*Stormtrooper* December 2007, p. 1). The government led by Democrats is described as a 'communist cabinet' which 'attacks the US' (*Stormtrooper* January 2009, p. 1), and 'the left' in power is said not 'to help' American citizens (guestbook of the online forum *skinhead.net*, 2006). In the American right-wing discourse the conspiratorial component is underlined when extreme right groups talk about the US political class and institutions. Attributes used for qualifying political institutions include 'irresponsible', 'conspiratorial', 'internally divided', and 'ignorant', but also 'Jewish-run'; political institutions are even called a 'threat to life'. The US right-wing conspiratorial interpretation of politicians and politics is also evident when it comes to statements dealing with the relations between political institutions and right-wing organizations. Here, the perspective is very future-oriented. In general, the American political institutions are accused of acting against the advantage of America, even to destroy it. In the recent economic crisis, government authorities are accused of controlling the money supply. However, the argument is also indirectly connected to right-wing organizations, stating that political institutions would deprive America of the right to self-defence.

The important role attributed to the extreme right in defence of the people against the political elite is reinforced and confirmed by the adjectives used to describe the extreme right when political issues are at stake. They all stress positive qualities, clearly distinguishing the extreme right actors from the political class and, above all, from the negative connotations commonly attributed to the political class by the populist rhetoric. Indeed, the extreme right characterizes itself as an actor 'naturally allergic to any form of power' and as a 'political movement'—in opposition to the stalemate of the political class. Their main characteristics are to be 'passionate in politics', 'present and disciplined', and 'prepared for a civil war'.

In line with the picture that the extreme right constructs in its discourse by linking, logically, the poor people to the corrupt political elite to a needed guide, the calls for action concerning the extreme right are relatively strong (e.g., 'there is the need for national movements that provoke a radical change

for Italy', we 'will re-model Germany into a new, a truly German and a socially fair Germany'), presenting the extreme right as an active and hard-working part of society. In the Italian case, in the discourse of the political party Forza Nuova on political life (another issue field frequently correlating with the extreme right as subject, 9.8 per cent), the emphasis is put on the novelty and modernity of FN against the traditional parties. FN is presented as an organization that 'also accepts [as sympathizers] people that are little politicized and little ideological', 'aggregates the discontent that emerges from the country and in the other parties', 'is the only true opposition', and 'wants to be a militant structure, always in movement', 'in order to form a new political elite for the country'. More in general (especially in the skinhead source), it is said that Italy needs someone who can carry on 'a politics characterized by big aims', launching 'a project of national rebirth at 360° for Italy'. The extreme right will fight for these purposes; they 'will fight for the common good'. Once again, the right presents itself as the only force that can 'save' the country from the corrupt political elites currently in power. The revolutionary aspect of the (political) action is stressed. A call for action is made, in the sense of longing for a change in the general system. The intention is to 'overcome the system'.

One characteristic of the fascist rhetoric was to define the fascist party not as a generic party, but as a 'new epoch' (Härmänmaa 2002, 897). The extreme right organizations studied also spread the idea that an historical change (a 'new phase in the history of Italy') is coming and they are the novel political actors, able to lead the country towards this change. In Italy this is even stronger than in Germany and takes the form of criticism of the mainstream political parties (both from the moderate right and the left). In Germany, the populist paradigm is adopted by right-wing actors, and combined more often with references to national history and identity, which are perceived as not adequately defended by the domestic political class. As we will see in the next section, in the US, a racial, as well as a religious, definition of the people is prevalent.

4. The 'American' variant of populism: blaming domestic politics in the light of international affairs

In contrast to the European cases, in the US right-wing discourses (domestic) politics is criticized not only, and not as much, for the misbehaviour of politicians regarding the internal political life and the domestic economy, or for the deficiencies of the (internal) representative democracy and or party system, but above all through the lens of international politics. In this sense,

the US extreme right criticism against politics and American political life focuses mainly on the American president and his international policy.

The president of the United States occupies the seventh position among the ten most frequently cited actors in the discourse of the US extreme right (our sampling covers the terms of both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama), accounting for 3.5 per cent of all statements. However, there are notable differences among the sources. Not very surprisingly, this actor ranks second (6.0 per cent) in the political party newspaper (after the Jews, 6.3 per cent), while just eighteenth (1.9 per cent) in the political movement websites and fourteenth (1.8 per cent) in the skinhead forum. The issue fields for 'President' as subject actor are above all political issues, among which we observe high percentages for terrorism and the war on terrorism (34.0 per cent), general political questions (26.0 per cent), and foreign politics (16.0 per cent). 'Other countries' are the most frequently mentioned object actors when the president is the subject actor (25.9 per cent), and this category always refers to Iran, apart from one case (Great Britain). In other words, the actions of the president with regard to this object actor are mainly framed in terms of the relations with Iran. The president (in this case Bush) is accused in nearly all the statements (though with different wording) of wanting to militarily attack Iran. These initiatives are negatively assessed: Bush is accused of collaborating with the Israeli Prime Minister (Olmert at the time) and lying about Iran. Other actors (such as important representatives of the military) are cited for their criticism of Bush's Iran policy. Bush and his administration are criticized for their dishonest accusations against Iran, above all regarding Iran's involvement in international terrorism.

The second most important object actor after Iran is—not surprisingly—America/Americans (11.1 per cent of all cases). The president (or, more precisely, Bush) is accused of lying to America, about both Iran and Iraq. Following this deep criticism, the suggested solution for President Bush's and also Vice President Cheney's future is impeachment or even death. As far as President Obama is concerned, the emphasis is less on his actions (therefore, he is rarely related to any object actor), but more on his characteristics, as the 'first mixed-race president'. Furthermore, his ethnic origins are repeatedly underlined. The extreme right groups present him repeatedly as the president born in Kenya. His citizenship status is unclear. It is doubtful if he could be even elected American President, since he holds Indonesian citizenship. Even his grandmother is mentioned. With regard to his political preferences, he (along with foreign minister Hillary Clinton) is characterized as a communist. Furthermore, Obama is accused of 'jellyfish positions', above all with regard to the threat of terrorism. He is described as not really being informed about the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Reacting to the broad expression of enthusiasm about

his election, the sources also call him 'Obamessiah', or 'El Presidente', given his support from voters of Latin American origin.

5. Conclusion: the extreme right and the populist paradigm

The recent rise and electoral successes of extreme right movements around Europe have often been explained by the crisis of representation suffered by many Western European democracies as well as, on the supply side, the ability of populist radical right parties to exploit it and build populist discourses against the elites (Loch 2009). Our study has shown that the populist discourse is present to varying extents and assumes varying tones in different countries and extreme right organizations. If the corruption of the political class is the diagnosis, the prognosis is not to return the power to the people, but to reassign it to an exclusive (more or less heroic) elite.

'The people' is indeed often referred to in the discourses of various extreme right organizations, either party or non-party ones, in Italy, Germany, and the US (where the people is identified with the overall country America/Americans)—with particular interest in this concept by the extreme right subcultural area in the US and the political party sector in Germany. Our analysis showed that in the framing of the people by the extreme right, there is a rather exclusive vision that refers to a strongly hierarchical and elitist conception of society. Indeed, not only corrupt political elites but also other groups such as particular ethnic minorities and political adversaries (both national and non-national) are excluded from what is considered as the true people according to the extreme right.

Second, although the populist, anti-elite appeal is present in the discourse of the extreme right in all countries under investigation, thus representing a core aspect of the concept, it is 'bridged' with different frames in the three countries. In Germany, the ethno-nationalist component is prevalent in populist claims; in the US, we can speak of a 'racial populism' in which the anti-establishment criticism is framed assuming racist tones (as in the case of critiques against Obama); and finally, in Italy, frames referring to elite and party corruption prevail. Further, in the US, right-wing criticisms against the political elites are also framed in light of their action in international and foreign politics. German populist appeals are framed with the blaming of politicians for the stigmatization of Germany for its past/history and the wish to rehabilitate the country.

We argue that these differences can be traced back to the differing political and discursive opportunities. In particular, concerning the lower degree of populism found in the discourse of the German extreme right (with respect to Italy), we can mention that the level of mistrust towards the political class is

lower in Germany than in Italy (Loch 2009, 27). Furthermore, the anti-corruption emphasis in Italy resonates with the severe shocks of Tangentopoli and the 'clean hands' investigations. As for the US, the resurgent right-wing forms of populism borrow from several well-established American traditions, such as 'producerism', which stresses the idea that the true Americans are hard-working people 'fighting against parasites at the top and bottom of society' (Berlet 2009, 26). This also resonates with 'anti-elitism' and 'anti-intellectualism', as well as 'majoritarianism', according to which 'the will of the majority of people has absolute primacy in matters of governance, sacrificing rights for minorities' (Berlet 2009, 26). Finally, we see moralism and, most importantly, Americanism as a form of 'patriotic nationalism, often promoting ethnocentric, nativist, or xenophobic fears that immigrants bring alien ideas and customs that are toxic to our culture' (ibid. 2009, 26).

Some differences also emerged from the comparison of different organizations, with more references to the people and specific criticism of the establishment in the political parties and more emphasis on the heroic action of the extreme right in the subcultural groups.

In sum, we could observe some tensions in the conceptualization of populism when applied to the extreme right. Indeed, the frames of the extreme right regarding politics, the leader, and the people are still characterized by some elements that resonate with the discourse of the old fascism (e.g. conspiracy theory, revolutionary dimension). On the one hand, there is a hierarchical (elitist) and exclusive conception of the people, according to which the extreme right identifies itself as with the people ('We' are the people, the people are 'sovereign') but allocates to itself the task of protecting a passive people. Within an elitarian vision of the society, the 'pure' people is in fact presented as unable to (re)act politically, and in need of a 'guide' (explicitly indicated in the right itself). The extreme right discourse on the people is not only elitist, but also exclusivist, as not only corrupt political elites but also other groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, political adversaries, supranational actors) are excluded from it. On the other hand, the strong criticism of the existing elites recycles the traditional anti-establishment frames of the old extreme right.

The Extreme Right: A Conclusion

There has been in recent years a revival of research on the extreme right. Although offering important knowledge, this wave of research has been selective, focusing especially on radical right parties. More generally, research on the (non-party) extreme right has followed a 'breakdown' approach, identifying societal, political, and cultural dysfunctions and pathologies as causal preconditions for the growth of the radical right (Stoess 1989; Heitmeyer 2005; Backes and Jesse 1993; Willems 1995). Explanations for the electoral success of the populist right have stressed the frustration of the autochthons in response to economic distress and massive migration (Perrineau 1997; Mayer 1999), as well as economic globalization. As in previous waves of research on the extreme right, frustration (regarding economic crisis, unemployment, and so on) is perceived as bringing about fear and rage, which is then channelled towards radical parties, favouring anomie as the basis of xenophobic scapegoating.

Recent research has also indicated the extreme right as a successful social movement of the losers that reacts against economic but especially cultural globalization and related competition (Kriesi et al. 2008).¹ Reactions to globalization take different forms: 'The radical left opposition to the opening up of the border is mainly an opposition to economic liberalization and to the threat it poses to the Left's achievement at the national level. The populist right's opposition to the opening up of the borders is first of all an opposition to the social and cultural forms of competition and the threat they pose to national identity' (ibid. 18). The success of the extreme right in its 'mobilization of the losers', at least in some party systems, is considered as responsible

¹ In fact, 'the likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community' (Kriesi et al. 2008, 8).

for a shift of centrality from a economic dimension in the 1970s, to a cultural one today (*ibid.* 265).

In this volume, borrowing some of the main concepts of social movement studies, we started with the observation that grievances alone are not sufficient to explain either the extreme right mobilization or its characteristics. The understanding of these mobilization processes requires us to consider the availability of resources to be mobilized and of actors that mobilize them, as well as the opening of political and discursive opportunities. In order to understand the development of social movements of the extreme right, we have therefore looked at their cognitive framing, their repertoires of action, and their capacity for networking.

In this conclusion, we shall summarize our results, stressing our original contributions to the two main fields of social science literature on which we draw: social movement studies and extreme right studies. We shall structure our presentation around some main concepts, concluding with some perspectives for future research.

1. Framing: cognitive work in the extreme right

Research on the extreme right has traditionally linked its development to social and economic crisis, and their political reverberations. While the emergence of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Italy and Germany has been connected to the economic crisis and unemployment of the post-World War II period, today there is more of a focus on the social and economic uncertainties brought about by economic globalization. Unemployment and street crime are considered as real social problems to which the extreme right proposes an exclusivist solution, targeting migrants as scapegoats. At the individual level, social and economic crises are seen as responsible for the development of psychopathologies, which favours recruitment into the extreme right.

Our research cannot tell us much about the links between the extent (or even the perceived extent) of economic and social problems and the growth of the extreme right. Protest event analysis (see Chapter 5) is too biased by newspaper selectivity to represent a reliable indicator on the action capacity of the extreme right; while our web-based link analysis tells us about the form but not the size of the organizational resources of the extreme right in the three countries. What we can tell, however, especially on the basis of our protest event and frame analysis, is that the extreme right attempts to adapt to growing fears and even contribute to them. In fact, through words and actions, it bridges emerging concerns to old ideological elements, propagating a specific set of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames.

The extreme right has often been studied as an ideological actor. The characteristics of the fascist ideology have been looked at in historical research, while the study of extreme right political parties has pointed at the linkage of ideology and rhetoric. In our research we preferred to talk about frames, looking at the discursive elements that are located below the ideology, in so far as they do not require high levels of abstraction and coherence. At the same time, frame analysis is interested in the content of the message more than in its rhetorical format.

Our research confirmed that the extreme right of today has a complex discourse, with a large presence of frames addressing broad political issues, although with a large attention to the presentation of the self-identity (see Chapter 3). As mentioned, extreme right organizations still build upon some traditional conceptions that are deeply rooted in their own historical traditions. At the same time, however, old frames are bridged with emerging concerns. In our empirical research, this emerged with reference to the four main aspects of the discourse and actions of the extreme right as:

- Anti-modernism
- Racism
- Anti-capitalism
- Authoritarianism

The extreme right criticism of modernity is rooted in its historical development as a reaction against the illuminist principle of equality, along with widespread anti-intellectualism (e.g. Tarchi 1995). The French revolution is traditionally considered as a crisis of civilization (ibid.). In fact, anti-modern decadence, aristocratic elitism, and the refusal of the reason and the *logos* have been considered as typical *topoi* of the extreme right: 'The enemy is the modernization of the society, the institutionalization of rational models, a universalist egalitarianism among peoples and groups' (Ferraresi 1994, 151). In our research, these traditional elements emerged as bridged with some 'neocon' concerns, with what has been defined as a backlash against the moral revolution of the new social movements in terms of women's rights, gender rights, and civil rights in general (Chapter 7). Although selectively and unequally, the 'religious revival' has given new emphasis to the defence of traditional family values, which had already characterized the rhetoric of the fascist regimes (e.g. Caldiron 2002, 71 ff.).

Racism as exclusion of the other is another traditional frame in the old fascist discourse that has been inherited by today's extreme right. In right-wing political parties, it emerges as bridged with nativism, defined as 'an ideology which holds that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native groups (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state'

(Mudde 2007, 19). For the groups we studied, Jews and ‘blacks’ are still the main ethnic targets of the most traditional racist discourse, even if anti-Muslim frames are emerging. Following increasing stigmatization of discourse of ethnic superiority, old racist-supremacist frames are also accompanied by a new discourse of defence of ethnic purity through separateness (Ch. 8). Also, especially in the counter-cultural groups, a more ‘spontaneous’ form of racism has emerged.

Anti-capitalism—although accompanied by the promotion of national (and capitalist) economic interests and corporatist anti-class discourses—also belongs to the ideological toolkit of the extreme right. While the political and economic elites are seen as traitors to the nation, the economic and social discourse is ambivalent, with a rejection of neo-liberalism and a sort of appeal to a ‘fair market economy’ (Mudde 2007), with welfare chauvinism and particular attention to the small (traditional) business. This emerged also in our research, together with anti-globalization frames that represent a sort of updating of the traditional extreme right discourses on economic issues to the neo-liberal era, with the proposal of a sort of exclusivist welfare.

Finally, our extreme right groups clearly follow authoritarian, anti-democratic political conceptions, with a cult of an heroic elite. However, this is now framed within a populist discourse, in which elitarianism is bridged with the protection of the people against a corrupt political class (Ch. 10). In this sense, the extreme right critique of democracy is strategically adapted to resonate with declining general trust in representative institutions.

We can summarize these results using some more specific categories of frame analysis.

First, we can observe that *identity* frames present the extreme right as a (persecuted) elite that aims at protecting the (weak) people, which are racially defined.

Second, *oppositional* frames define the (powerful but corrupt) outsiders that range from the holders of modern values to ethnic minorities defined as barbarian.

Third, *prognostic* frames can be summarized as the cultural, social, and political consequence of modernity, in the new version of a globalized society.

Fourth, the *diagnostic* frames aim at a return to the old and pure traditions, mixing revolutionary motivational appeals with more pragmatic pressures upon the moderate right.

As in previous times, framing processes develop in precarious equilibrium from deeply rooted tensions in the radical right: between traditionalism and ‘futurism’, anti-capitalism and anti-class discourses, authoritarianism and rebellion (the representation of fascism as the movement of the youth, which destroys the old), anti-Judaism and anti-Islamism.

Additionally, the capacity to adapt old discourses to new (perceived) threats is limited by a strong resilience of old frames. In particular, the resilience of the old (fascist and/or racist) ideology seems to constrain the appeal of these groups (Ch. 6). A vicious circle seems then to develop: the image of an heroic elite is used to justify the extremely small size of the movement, and this in turn contributes to its limited mobilization capacity.

2. Repertoires of protest beyond voting and violence

Research on the extreme right has traditionally looked at two main forms of political participation (or collective behaviour): voting for radical right parties, and performing actions of political violence. Borrowing from social movement studies a concept such as 'repertoire of protest' allowed us to go beyond these two (relevant but particular) forms, including a broader range of tactics that constitute important parts of the activity of the radical right.

Research on social movements, focusing on left-wing groups, has stressed their use of protest either in a logic of numbers, trying to convince decision-makers of the popular support for some claims; in a logic of witness, using moral shocks through the strength of one's own commitment; or in a logic of damage, with actions that are particularly threatening to public order (della Porta and Diani 2006, ch. 7).

Our research indicated that the extreme right is nowadays weak in terms of numbers, mobilizing at best a few thousand activists, while the logic of witness is barely used, being highly dissonant with the political discourse of the extreme right. Certainly relevant, even more than in other social movements, is the use of violence, in the form of physical force against both objects and people. This is selectively applied in actions against either ethnic or religious minorities (including homosexuals), or against the political adversary.

Beyond violence, however, a broader repertoire of collective action is used, including theatrical performances, the squatting of public spaces, leafleting and marches. An analysis of these actions pointed at their important role in strengthening internal solidarity.

Both violent and non-violent (but symbolically disruptive) actions point at the role of protest, not only towards the outside, but also towards the inside, as several extreme right performances are oriented to or at least have the effect of strengthening the collective identity, especially through a construction of an insider-outsider border. As in other social movements, the repertoire of action of the extreme right therefore emerged as diverse and multiple, involving both inwardly and outwardly oriented activities. And as in other social movements,

it developed relationally, through interactions with other actors—especially through reciprocal tactical adaptation to the movements of the left (Ch. 5).

3. Networking in the extreme right

Traditionally, research on the extreme right has looked at specific organizations. In line with the hierarchical visions spread in the extreme right has been the formation of vertical organizations, of which the fascist and Nazi parties of the totalitarian regimes are the best—and most threatening—examples. Even much smaller, or even tiny extreme right groups have been looked at as unified, hierarchical actors. In parallel, however, the widespread image of the radical right is one of fragmentation, with ideological as well as personalistic divisions, but also strong tensions between the political and the counter-cultural wings.

In contrast, social movement studies have developed various concepts oriented to capturing competition, but also co-operation among complex—or plural—actors. Not only are social movements defined as networks of individual and organizations, but concepts such as social movement family are designed to capture the distinct actors sharing similar world views and endowed with reciprocal ties that often co-operate in protest campaigns.

These concepts were revealed to be, once again, particularly helpful in going beyond the dichotomy between a vision of the extreme right as an homogeneous and unitary actor and an image of many and fragmented pieces, capturing a more nuanced picture. In fact, our research has shown an extreme right that—like other social movements—involved actors that differ in terms of organizational structures, strategic preferences, and discourses. As in the past, bitter struggles emerge within the extreme right, with the most politicized groups despising the anti-political stand of skinheads and (right-wing) football hooligans, political parties strategically using more populist claims, social movement organizations more oriented to action, traditionalist Catholics stigmatizing the followers of esoteric rituals, and so on. For instance, tensions between the political and counter-cultural wings were clearly expressed by the Italian radical right leader Franco Freda, who defined the skinheads as folkloristic and plebeian, writing, ‘They have to study . . . they do not reflect. And we need instead disciplined soldiers’ (cited in Marchi 1994, 175). More generally, internal differences have been considered so great that identifying one concept of a radical right appeared elusive (Bjørge 1995, 2).

We have indeed noted several differences between the radical right parties, more influenced by party political dynamics in their actions and frames, and skinhead, counter-cultural groups, more local and more violent. In particular, violence seems to be particularly dominant in the activity of skinhead groups,

and especially in actions against political adversaries and ethnic minorities (Ch. 5).

This does not mean, however, that the various factions of the extreme right only fight with—or at best ignore—each other. We also noted a capacity for networking, although with variable degrees of intensity in different contexts and times. Moreover, an innovative trend—in part a by-product of repressive policies—is the growing reliance of the extreme right upon network structures, with autonomous cells connected through new media.

4. Political and discursive opportunities for the extreme right

While all these aspects emerged as widespread in all three countries, our cross-national analysis also allowed us to discern country-specific evolutions within these general trends. The concept of political and discursive opportunities, developed to explain the strategies and frames of social movements in general, proved useful to analyse cross-national differences. Even very small and very ideological groups, such as the ones we have studied, seem capable of adapting, to some extent, to external opportunities, rather than demonstrating unreflected reactions to crisis. Even if very inwardly oriented, our groups appeared as political actors, aiming at influencing politics and policies. Even if historical legacies limited the capacity to exploit external changes, some adaptive capacity to changing times did emerge.

As for the framing, different national peculiarities emerged on each of the main frames we have identified. In general, socio-economic issues linked to globalization were particularly central in Italy, while religious and traditional values emerged more often in the US, and referenced to past history in Germany (Ch. 3). The definition of the self as an heroic but persecuted elite is bridged with a racist identity (as white) in the US, a national one in Germany, and social belonging in Italy (Ch. 6). If the fight against modernity emerged as relevant in all three countries, we saw a dominance of the defence of family values in Italy, the fatherland in Germany, and religion in the United States, which reflected the discursive and political opportunities for each of the three topics in our three countries (Ch. 7). The criticism of globalization was framed in socio-economic terms in Italy, in conjunction with a defence of the purity of the nation in Germany, and as linked to the international position of America in the US (Ch. 9).

Racism is still a main characteristic of radical right nativism, but with more significance in the United States in the form of the opposition of the superior whites to the inferior blacks, while the stigmatization of a discourse of open racism is reflected in more moderate tones in the two European countries (Ch. 8).

While populist framing was used in all three countries, it assumed specific characteristics in Italy, influenced both by the widespread stigmatization of the political class in light of the political corruption scandals that exploded in 1992 but also remained endemic later on, and by the availability of political allies, which made political claims more central. This was not the case in Germany, where *Politikverdrossenheit* is more limited in the period under investigation, as is the right-wing stigmatization of the Cartel parties. In the United States, instead, populism tended to be bridged with the anti-state sentiments of an extreme right that was never in power, even if it at times had resonance among the elites as well as in a broader individualistic culture.

Finally, the 'no-global' framing was common to the extreme right in all countries, but with a traditional anti-American tone in the two European countries, and instead a sort of American pride in the US. In Italy, a frequent use by the extreme right of anti-globalization frames seemed to reflect the influence of the left-wing global justice movement and its attention to the same topic.

Political and discursive opportunities also impacted upon the repertoires of action and organizational structure of the extreme right. In line with research on other social movements, also from our research it emerged that violence was more widespread in the US where, on the one hand, the political opportunities were more closed but, on the other, violence tended to be less stigmatized. The decentralized politics in the US might explain the extreme fragmentation of its extreme right, even though the network of (federalist) Germany appeared as more dense and centralized than the one in (unitary) Italy (Ch. 5).

5. Where do we go from here? Caveats and perspectives

Using concepts from social movement studies, as well as extending attention beyond parties, seems to have proved fruitful in shedding light on the empirical reality of the extreme right in Italy, Germany, and the United States.

Additionally, as is always the case when importing concepts developed on (partially) different phenomena, our research can be useful for reflecting on the necessary adaptation of those concepts. On the one hand, framing, repertoires, and networks made slightly different sense empirically when investigating the small-scale reality of the extreme right. Also, the instrumental approach prevalent in social movement research had to be balanced with the less-than-instrumental evolution of the extreme right, where we noted a strong path-dependency, although with some capacity to adapt. Political and discursive opportunities seemed to play a role, but the past also proved very resilient (more than is usually recognized in research on other

social movements). On the other hand, research on ‘distasteful’ movements can help in disentangling some implicit normative claims in social movement studies (usually focused on progressive movements), instead bringing to light the ‘dark side’ of the mobilization ‘from below’.

However, we also have to recognize some limits in our research. First, empirically, we had to struggle not only with the well-known informality of social movements (and the challenging implications it has for research—e.g. the lack of known lists of the universe, selectivity of archives), but also a particularly secretive culture that limited our choices of sources. This also had implications in terms of a limited capacity to interpret cross-organizational similarities and differences.

As mentioned, we can say little about the extreme right’s successes and failures. We certainly observed some indicators of a small mobilization capacity (e.g. in public protest), as well as organizational fragmentation in mainly local groups. An elitist, heroic, revolutionary definition of the self (see Ch. 6) is probably not so resonant with contemporary values in the three countries, where a dominant stigmatization of the racist and anti-democratic appeals of the extreme right seems to be still effective. However, studies based on different research designs would be needed in order to check the extent to which the extreme right is able to play an agenda-setting role—as its stigmatization might increase the attention paid to what right-wing radicals do and say.

In addition, we could develop some hypotheses on trends, but not test them, as the range of years we covered proved too narrow to allow any clear evolution to emerge. The effects of neo-liberal globalization or the clash-of-civilization ideology on the extreme right are still to be observed in longitudinal studies. Also still to be seen is to what extent there is, over time, a transnationalization of the extreme right.

In terms of geographical coverage, our research is not only limited to the northern hemisphere, but also already met with some challenges in extending the focus from the most-similar Italian and German cases to include the more (if not most) different United States. Here, in fact, several concepts developed on the European experiences—among them the classification of different types of extreme right groups—did not travel easily.

These limitations notwithstanding, we are confident that our research confirmed the relevance of concepts and methods developed in social movement studies for an understanding of the extreme right, and hope that it will stimulate further research in the field.

APPENDIX

Tables:

Table 4.2(a) In-degree and out-degree of the Italian extreme right organizations

		1	2	3	4
		Out-degree	In-degree	NrmOut-deg	NrmIn-deg
25	ItaliaVolontaria	26.000	10.000	33.333	12.821
10	FascismoInRete	22.000	8.000	28.205	10.256
27	BrigataNera	22.000	10.000	28.205	12.821
7	KommandFascista	20.000	20.000	25.641	25.641
26	SpedizionePunitiva	19.000	5.000	24.359	6.410
24	OmaggiaolDuce	18.000	11.000	23.077	14.103
9	IlDuce.net	14.000	15.000	17.949	19.231
39	IlForoMussolini	11.000	3.000	14.103	3.846
38	PensieroNonConform	11.000	1.000	14.103	1.282
65	Raido	10.000	4.000	12.821	5.128
40	StoriaDuce	10.000	4.000	12.821	5.128
37	Controstoria	10.000	5.000	12.821	6.410
22	IlPopoloD'Italia	10.000	4.000	12.821	5.128
46	Destra2000	10.000	5.000	12.821	6.410
70	AssCultGentedeuropa	9.000	2.000	11.538	2.564
45	PadroniDiRoma	9.000	5.000	11.538	6.410
18	FronteSocialeAreaNazionalPopolare	9.000	3.000	11.538	3.846
53	Perimetro	9.000	4.000	11.538	5.128
15	IlRas	8.000	11.000	10.256	14.103
4	FedNazCombattentiDellaRSI	8.000	11.000	10.256	14.103
52	SocialismoNazionale	7.000	2.000	8.974	2.564
36	GioventNazionaleLittoria	7.000	7.000	8.974	8.974
68	DonneTradizione	7.000	3.000	8.974	3.846
34	Lorien	7.000	7.000	8.974	8.974
23	NuoviOrizzontiEuropei	7.000	4.000	8.974	5.128
57	FascioLibero	6.000	1.000	7.692	1.282
35	NoReporter	6.000	10.000	7.692	12.821
77	LaRuna	6.000	5.000	7.692	6.410
63	zetazeroalfa	6.000	6.000	7.692	7.692
62	mutuosociale	5.000	3.000	6.410	3.846
42	DecimaMas	5.000	7.000	6.410	8.974
31	FasciLict	5.000	6.000	6.410	7.692
8	CuoreNero	5.000	2.000	6.410	2.564
48	MuseoDiviseFasciste	5.000	4.000	6.410	5.128
33	RSI	5.000	9.000	6.410	11.538
74	BoysRoma	5.000	2.000	6.410	2.564
64	ciaoEuropa	5.000	7.000	6.410	8.974
55	LeoniMorti	5.000	2.000	6.410	2.564

20	OrionLibri	4.000	10.000	5.128	12.821
41	Unc Rsi	4.000	5.000	5.128	6.410
21	Aurora	4.000	7.000	5.128	8.974
13	IlDuce	4.000	8.000	5.128	10.256
60	casapound	4.000	6.000	5.128	7.692
11	ItaliaLibera	4.000	5.000	5.128	6.410
47	AssCultNuovoMsi	3.000	1.000	3.846	1.282
58	LeBrigatenere	3.000	2.000	3.846	2.564
3	FrontSocialNazional	2.000	8.000	2.564	10.256
50	MovimentoNazionalPopolarePerUnitaArea	2.000	5.000	2.564	6.410
67	ZioBenito	2.000	2.000	2.564	2.564
43	Avanguardia	2.000	9.000	2.564	11.538
29	Vip	2.000	4.000	2.564	5.128
28	PaviaTricolore	2.000	3.000	2.564	3.846
71	Compagnia anello	1.000	3.000	1.282	3.846
12	LegioneTagliamento	1.000	5.000	1.282	6.410
19	RinascitaSocialeItaliana	1.000	2.000	1.282	2.564
73	GliIrriducibili	1.000	1.000	1.282	1.282
75	TradizioneDistinzione	1.000	1.000	1.282	1.282
1	FN	1.000	14.000	1.282	17.949
17	MovFascismELibert	0.000	11.000	0.000	14.103
2	il presidio	0.000	8.000	0.000	10.256
14	AAARGH	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.282
5	MSI-FT	0.000	15.000	0.000	19.231
44	VFS	0.000	2.000	0.000	2.564
6	AzionSocial	0.000	2.000	0.000	2.564
61	casaditalia	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.846
66	Rinascitarivista	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.128
30	NeriOnline	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.282
59	casamontag	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.128
69	BigaAlata	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.282
51	UomoLibero	0.000	8.000	0.000	10.256
32	Regno76	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.282
72	grupppMusic270bis	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.846
54	LibreriaEuropa	0.000	5.000	0.000	6.410
16	ParoleDalTerzoReich	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.282
56	Benito.Net	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.128
76	CentroStudiAraldo	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.128
49	MilitariaSouvenir	0.000	5.000	0.000	6.410
78	NobisDomine	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.846
79	Skoll	0.000	2.000	0.000	2.564

Appendix

Table 4.2(b) In-degree and out-degree of the German extreme right organizations

		1	2	3	4
		Out-degree	In-degree	NrmOut-deg	NrmIn-deg
70	WS Weimar	27.000	2.000	35.065	2.597
20	Holsteiner WS	26.000	13.000	33.766	16.883
31	NW Dortmund	24.000	4.000	31.169	5.195
29	freier Widerstand	22.000	21.000	28.571	27.273
5	AB Mitte	22.000	10.000	28.571	12.987
39	KS Weserbergland	21.000	7.000	27.273	9.091
49	ks berg	17.000	12.000	22.078	15.584
8	NWBB	17.000	18.000	22.078	23.377
37	SNBP	16.000	4.000	20.779	5.195
6	Festungsstadt	15.000	9.000	19.481	11.688
65	KS Moselland	15.000	1.000	19.481	1.299
68	WS Minden	13.000	2.000	16.883	2.597
45	KS Schoenebeck	13.000	1.000	16.883	1.299
28	AB West	12.000	6.000	15.584	7.792
77	KS Zella-Mehlis	12.000	1.000	15.584	1.299
25	KS Grossdtd.	11.000	8.000	14.286	10.390
12	Ruf der Freiheit	11.000	14.000	14.286	18.182
72	KS Augsburg	10.000	0.000	12.987	0.000
75	KS Rheinland	10.000	2.000	12.987	2.597
36	KS Stuttgart	10.000	4.000	12.987	5.195
33	KDS	9.000	7.000	11.688	9.091
13	WS Thueringen	9.000	8.000	11.688	10.390
32	AG Wuertt	9.000	4.000	11.688	5.195
78	WS Süd	8.000	10.000	10.390	12.987
27	Meckl.AF	8.000	8.000	10.390	10.390
23	AB Rhein Neckar	8.000	20.000	10.390	25.974
62	Frontstadt	7.000	2.000	9.091	2.597
17	AB Saar	7.000	12.000	9.091	15.584
47	Nibelungensturm	7.000	4.000	9.091	5.195
15	BI Hildesheim	6.000	3.000	7.792	3.896
73	KS Hof	6.000	2.000	7.792	2.597
67	NB Dresden	6.000	2.000	7.792	2.597
16	NB Erfurt	6.000	7.000	7.792	9.091
56	JLO Sachsen	6.000	5.000	7.792	6.494
24	Smash Zog	6.000	5.000	7.792	6.494
34	die kommenden	5.000	14.000	6.494	18.182
41	WS Mainfranken	4.000	3.000	5.195	3.896
14	WS Nord	4.000	14.000	5.195	18.182
46	NB Halle	4.000	6.000	5.195	7.792
74	Nordforum	4.000	1.000	5.195	1.299
66	AG Bergstrasse	3.000	2.000	3.896	2.597
52	Nazis HH	3.000	2.000	3.896	2.597
55	JLO BaWue	3.000	2.000	3.896	2.597
50	Leverkusen	2.000	8.000	2.597	10.390
63	Freie Nationalisten	2.000	2.000	2.597	2.597
1	NPD/DS	2.000	10.000	2.597	12.987
64	Autonome Nat. KA	2.000	3.000	2.597	3.896
22	FNC	2.000	2.000	2.597	2.597
9	Lunikoff	1.000	4.000	1.299	5.195
4	DVU	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.195
3	JN	0.000	6.000	0.000	7.792
21	Eine Bew	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.195
2	NPD	0.000	22.000	0.000	28.571
11	GGSOBB	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.896

42	b-f-j	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
19	AB Thueringen	0.000	18.000	0.000	23.377
30	Stoertebeker	0.000	7.000	0.000	9.091
58	Nationaljournal	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
40	Junge Freiheit	0.000	7.000	0.000	9.091
60	Lausitz	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.896
61	FK Halbe	0.000	2.000	0.000	2.597
43	BGD	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
44	Nationalisten Altmarkwest	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
7	AB Nord	0.000	16.000	0.000	20.779
26	Neues Freiburg	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.896
57	Fritz	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
48	AK Maedel	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
10	Heimatschutz	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.896
69	KS Herne	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
51	NW Jena	0.000	10.000	0.000	12.987
71	WS Schwaben	0.000	3.000	0.000	3.896
53	Tollwuetige Woelfe	0.000	2.000	0.000	2.597
54	JLM Ostpreussen	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.195
35	Schutzbund	0.000	2.000	0.000	2.597
18	Ngk	0.000	16.000	0.000	20.779
76	KS Neu-Ulm	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.299
38	Unabh.Nachr.	0.000	15.000	0.000	19.481
59	dritte Front	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.195

Appendix

Table 4.2(c) In-degree and out-degree of the US extreme right organizations

		1	2	3	4
		Out- degree	In- degree	NrmOut- deg	NrmIn- deg
125	Stormfront	9.000	7.000	6.767	5.263
55	Keystone State Skinheads	6.000	10.000	4.511	7.519
122	Issues and Views	5.000	0.000	3.759	0.000
120	American Border Patrol	5.000	0.000	3.759	0.000
121	Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)	5.000	0.000	3.759	0.000
65	Minute Men Association	5.000	0.000	3.759	0.000
15	Blood and Honor	5.000	0.000	3.759	0.000
128	Tightrope	5.000	0.000	3.759	0.000
84	Nordwave	5.000	0.000	3.759	0.000
89	Resistance Records	5.000	1.000	3.759	0.752
129	The Zundelsite	5.000	2.000	3.759	1.504
66	National Alliance	5.000	1.000	3.759	0.752
117	White Revolution	4.000	0.000	3.008	0.000
76	National Vanguard	4.000	1.000	3.008	0.752
93	Sigdrifa	4.000	0.000	3.008	0.000
123	Vdare	4.000	0.000	3.008	0.000
64	Micetrap Distribution	4.000	0.000	3.008	0.000
56	Kingdom Identity Ministries	4.000	0.000	3.008	0.000
38	Final Solution	4.000	10.000	3.008	7.519
9	Aryan Nations	4.000	12.000	3.008	9.023
130	Bible Gataway	3.000	0.000	2.256	0.000
39	Final Stand Records	3.000	8.000	2.256	6.015
133	Militaria	3.000	0.000	2.256	0.000
134	Until the End records	3.000	0.000	2.256	0.000
127	Vanguard News Network	3.000	0.000	2.256	0.000
132	Wake up or Die	3.000	0.000	2.256	0.000
1	American Renaissance/New Century Foundation	3.000	7.000	2.256	5.263
124	Folk and Faith	3.000	1.000	2.256	0.752
131	New Nation News	3.000	1.000	2.256	0.752
71	National Socialist Movement	2.000	17.000	1.504	12.782
94	Social Contract Press	2.000	4.000	1.504	3.008
16	Bowery Boys	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
70	National Socialist Front	2.000	1.000	1.504	0.752
113	White Aryan Resistance	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
126	eXileMM	2.000	2.000	1.504	1.504
36	European American Issues Forum	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
19	Christian Defense League	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
25	Church of Jesus Christ	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
46	Hammerskins	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
8	Aryan Brotherhood	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
37	European American Unity and Rights Organization	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
32	Council of Conservative Citizens	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
28	Church of True Israel	2.000	13.000	1.504	9.774
52	Institute for Historical Review	2.000	2.000	1.504	1.504
24	Church of God	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
54	Jewish Defense League	2.000	0.000	1.504	0.000
107	Virginia Publishing Company	1.000	0.000	0.752	0.000
110	Westboro Baptist Church	1.000	0.000	0.752	0.000
6	Artisan Publishers	1.000	0.000	0.752	0.000
5	Army of God	1.000	0.000	0.752	0.000

68	National Christian Church	1.000	0.000	0.752	0.000
12	Aryan Wear	1.000	4.000	0.752	3.008
59	Laporte Church of Christ	1.000	1.000	0.752	0.752
53	International Ku Klux Klan	1.000	0.000	0.752	0.000
50	Imperial Klans of America	1.000	1.000	0.752	0.752
2	Americans for Self Determination	1.000	1.000	0.752	0.752
118	Women for Aryan Unity	1.000	0.000	0.752	0.000
41	God's Remnant Church	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
14	Association of the Covenant People	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
48	House of David	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
20	Christian Fellowship Ministries	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
44	Gospel of the Kingdom Mission	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
30	Confederate Crusaders	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
31	Confederate Society of America	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
49	Hypatia Publishing	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
13	Asatru Folk Assembly	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
11	Aryan Renaissance Society	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
35	European American Heritage Foundation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
69	National Organization for European American Rights	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
29	Committee to Restore the Constitution	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
4	Arizona Patriots	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
7	Aryan Army	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
73	National Socialist Vanguard	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
3	Angry White Race	0.000	4.000	0.000	3.008
75	National Socialist White People's Party	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
10	Aryan Racial Loyalist Party	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
45	Hail Victory Skinheads	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
78	Nationalist Strike Force	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
79	Nazi Party USA	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
47	Heritage and Destiny	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
81	New Covenant Bible Church	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
42	Gospel Broadcasting Association	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
83	New Order	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
18	Central Connecticut Crusaders	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
85	North East White Pride	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
86	NS Publications	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
21	Christian Israel Fellowship	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
72	National Socialist Party	0.000	17.000	0.000	12.782
23	Christian Survivalists of America Network	0.000	2.000	0.000	1.504
74	National Socialist White Action Party	0.000	2.000	0.000	1.504
91	Robert E. Lee Society Invisible Empire	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
92	Scriptures for America	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
77	Nationalist Movement	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
27	Church of the Son's of YhvH	0.000	4.000	0.000	3.008
95	Sons of Liberty	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
96	Southern National Party	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
97	SS Regalia	0.000	3.000	0.000	2.256
82	New National Socialists	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
33	Covenant Church of Our Redemer	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
34	Day of the Rope Productions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
101	The Fitzgerald Griffin Foundation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
102	The Hated	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
103	Unholy Records	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
104	Union Christian Church	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Continued

Appendix

Table 4.2(c) *Continued*

		1	2	3	4
		Out- degree	In- degree	NrmOut- deg	NrmIn- deg
105	Upfront Records	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
106	Upper Room Identity Fellowship	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
40	Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
108	Volksfront	0.000	3.000	0.000	2.256
109	Watchmen Outreach Ministries	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
43	Gospel of Christ Kingdom Church	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
111	White Alliance	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
112	White American Freedom Fighters	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
80	New Christian Crusade Church	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
114	White Aryan Youth	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
115	White Brotherhood	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
116	White Order of Thule	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
17	Catholic Defense League	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
119	World Church of the Creator	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
87	Posse Comitatus	0.000	12.000	0.000	9.023
88	Power of Prophecy	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
22	Christian Patriots	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
90	Restoration Bible Ministries Inc.	0.000	3.000	0.000	2.256
57	Knights of the KKK	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
58	Ku Klux Klan	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
26	Church of the Holy Word	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
60	League of the South	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.752
61	Lone Star State Skinheads	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
62	Lord's Covenant Church	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
63	Lord's Work	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
98	SSAG/NY Brigade	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
99	Stone Kingdom Ministries	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
100	Strike Force	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
67	National Aryan People's Party	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

List of extreme right organizations/websites included in the analysis:

(a) Italian organizations

Name of the group	URL
AAARGH (Associazione degli Anziani Amatori di Racconti di Guerra e di (H)olocausto)	http://www.vho.org/aaargh/ital/ital.html
Associazione Culturale gente d'Europa	http://www.geocities.com/gente_europa/
Associazione culturale Nuovo MSI	http://members.xoom.alice.it/nuovomsi/
Associazione Culturale Raido	http://www.raido.org
Aurora	http://aurora.altervista.org/
Azione Sociale- Alessandra Mussolini ¹	http://www.libertadiazione.net/
Benito.net	http://www.mussolinibenito.it/homepage1.htm
Boys Roma	http://www.boysroma.it
Brigata Nera	http://it.geocities.com/brigatanera88/
Carpe Diem	http://www.carpe-diem.it/
Casa Montag	http://www.casamontag.com
Casa Pound	http://www.casapound.org
Centro Studi l'Araldo	http://www.araldo.info/
Centro Studi la Runa	http://www.eleuteros.org/
Ciao Europa- Quindicinale di Vita e Cultura Europea	http://www.ciaoeuropa.it/
Comunità Politica Beppe Nicolai	http://www.beppepiccolai.org/
Comunità Politica d'Avanguardia	http://avanguardia.altervista.org/index.htm
Controstoria	http://www.controstoria.it/
Cooperativa Biga alata	http://bigaalata.freeweb.supereva.it/
Cuore Nero	http://www.ilcuorenero.it/
Decima Mas	http://www.decima-mas.net/
Destra 2000	http://destra2000.interfree.it/
Donne e Tradizione	http://spazioweb.inwind.it/alternativa_al_sistema/mioweb/index.htm
Editrice Orion libri	http://www.orionlibri.com

Continued

¹ Lists of (small) parties or political groups connected to the party 'Azione sociale', that act only at local level

AZIONE SOCIALE NUCLEO 'FRANCO ASCHIERI'

<http://www.alternativasocialeschio.splinder.com/>

AS MANZOCIRO

<http://www.manzociro.it/pagine/index2.htm>

AZIONE SOCIALE FIRENZE. AS PER FIRENZE E PROVINCIA

<http://www.azionesocialefirenze.org/>

CIRCOLO ORGOGLIO AZIONE SOCIALE - ROMA

http://xoomer.virgilio.it/orgoglio_as/

FEDERAZIONE REGIONALE E PROVINCIALE GRAZIANO 'RINGO' BERTINELLI

<http://xoomer.virgilio.it/grazianobertinelli/>

LIBERTA' D'AZIONE - ALTERNATIVA SOCIALE, COORDINAMENTO REGIONALE MARCHE

<http://www.alternativasociale.marche.it/>

CIRCOLO MOVIMENTO SCALIGERO - LIBERTA' D'AZIONE VERONA

<http://www.libertadiazioneverona.it/>

URBE SOCIALE - FEDERAZIONE ROMANA DI AZIONE SOCIALE

<http://www.urbesociale.org/>

Appendix

Continued

Name of the group	URL
Fascio Libero	http://www.xoomer.alice.it/
Fascis Lictorii	http://www.fascislictorii.too.it/
Fascismo e Libertà	http://www.fascismoeliberta.it/
Fascismo in Rete	http://www.fascismoinrete.cjb.net
Federazione Nazionale Combattenti della Repubblica Sociale Italiana	http://fncrsi.altervista.org/
Foro 753	http://www.753.it/
Forza Nuova	http://www.forzanuova.org/
Fronte della Nuova Gioventù	http://www.fdng.org/sito_fdng_content.html
Fronte Sociale Area Nazional popolare	http://members.xoom.alice.it/mse/PrimaPagina1.htm
Fronte Sociale Nazionale ²	http://www.frontenazionale.it/
FUAN Destra Universitaria	http://associazioni.polito.it/fuan/intro.html
Gioventù Nazionale Littoria	http://utenti.lycos.it/gnlittoria/
Gli Irriducibili (Lazio Ultrà group)	http://www.irriducibili.com/
Gruppo musicale Compagnia dell'anello	http://www.compagniadellanello.net/
Gruppo musicale Non Nobis Domine	http://digilander.iol.it/nonnobisdomine
Gruppo musicale Skoll	http://www.skoll.it/
Gruppo musicale 270bis	http://www.270bis.com
Gruppo musicale Zetazeroalfa	http://www.zetazeroalfa.org/
Holy War	http://www.holywar.org
Kommando Fascista	http://www.mussolini-hitler.com/
Il Duce	http://www.ilduce.altervista.org/
il Duce.net	http://www.ilduce.net/
I Leoni Morti	http://www.ileonimorti.it
Il Ras	http://www.ilras.tk/
Il Foro Mussolini	http://foroitalico.altervista.org/secondapagina.htm
Il Popolo d'Italia	http://www.popoloditalia.it/
Il Presidio	http://www.ilpresidio.org/index.html
Italia Libera	http://xoomer.alice.it/ilfasciolibero/base.htm
Italia Volontaria	http://web.tiscalinet.it/cadutiperlapatria/index.htm
La Storia del Duce	http://freeweb.supereva.com/storiadelduce/index.htm?p
Le Brigate Nere	http://brigtenere.cjb.net
Legione Tagliamento	http://www.mussolini-hitler.com/link.asp?url=http://www.legionetagliamento.com
Libreria Europa editrice	http://www.libreriaeuropa.net
L' "Ordine Sociale" -settimanale di politica e cultura	http://ordinesociale.altervista.org/associazione.htm
Lorien Archivio storico della musica alternativa	http://www.lorien.it/
Militaria Collection	http://www.militariacollection.com/
Militaria Souvenir	http://www.militariasouvenir.com/

² Local sections across Italy of the party mentioned above, or political groups connected to it:
 FRONTE SOCIALE NAZIONALE ROMA
<http://www.frontenazionaleroma.org/>
 FRONTE SOCIALE NAZIONALE VITERBO
<http://frontesocialenazionalevt.vze.com/>
 FRONTE SOCIALE NAZIONALE COORDINAMENTO NORD ITALIA
<http://freeweb.supereva.com/frontenazionalenord/index.html?p>

Movimento Nazionale Popolare per l'Unità dell'Area	http://orientamenti.altervista.org/
Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore	http://www.fiammatricolore.net/
Movimento Tradizionale Romano	http://www.lacittadella-mtr.com/index.htm
Museo delle divise fasciste	http://www.littorio.com/home-i.htm
Mutuo Sociale	http://www.mtuosociale.org
Namau	http://www.namau.it
Neri Online	http://www.nerionline.tk & webmaster@nerionline.tk
NoReporter	http://www.noreporter.org
Nuovi Orizzonti Europei	http://www.nuoviorizzontieuropei.com/
Omaggio al Duce	http://spazioinwind.libero.it/mussolini/index2.htm
Padroni di Roma (Lazio Ultrà group)	http://www.padronidiroma.it
Parole dal Terzo Reich	http://www.paroledalterzoreich.com/
Pavia Tricolore	http://libreopinion.com/members/paviatricolore/
Pensiero Non Conforme	http://www.nonconforme.altervista.org/
Perimetro	http://www.perimetro.com/
Regno 76	http://web.tiscali.it/regno76
Rinascita (Magazine)	http://www.rinascita.info
Rinascita Sociale Italiana	http://www.rinascitasocialeitaliana.it
Roma Ultras (Tradizione&Distinzione)	http://www.asromaultras.it/fedayn.html — tradizione http://www.tradizionedistinzione.it
RSI (Repubblica sociale italiana)	http://www.italia-rsi.org/
Sito del Coordinamento delle OSA (Occupazioni a scopo abitativo)	http://www.casaditalia.com
Socialismo Nazionale	http://socialismonazionalebs.splinder.com
Sodalizio del cerchio antico	http://utenti.tripod.it/sodalizio/indice.htm
Spedizione Punitiva	http://www.spedizionepunitiva.tk/
TabulaRasa	http://tabularasa.altervista.org/
Uomo Libero	http://www.uomo-libero.com/
UNC RSI(Raggruppamento nazionale combattenti e reduci della rep. Sociale italiana)	http://www.uncrsi-torino.it/UNCRSITORINO.htm
Veneto Fronte Skinheads	http://www.venetofronteskinheads.org
V.i.p.	http://www.mvip.tk
Zio Benito	http://www.dililander.libero.it/ziobenito

(b) German organizations

Name of the group	URL
Aktionsbüro Mitte	http://www.aktionmitte.de/aktionmitte/index.php
Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland	http://www.widerstandnord.com/aktionsbuero/
Aktionsbüro Rhein-Neckar	http://www.ab-rhein-neckar.de
Aktionsbüro Saar	http://www.aktionsbuero-saar.de
Aktionsbüro Thüringen	http://www.aktionsbuero.org/seite
Aktionsgruppe Württemberg	http://www.aktionsgruppe-wuerttemberg.tk
Bund freier Jugend	http://www.b-f-j.de
Bund für Gesamtdeutschland	http://www.bgd1.com
Deutsche Stimme	http://www.deutsche-stimme.de
Die Kommenden	http://www.die-kommenden.net
Dritte Front	http://dritte-front.net
DVU	http://www.dsz-verlag.de
Festungsstadt	http://www.festungsstadt.com
FK Halbe	fk-halbe.net
Freie Nationalisten	http://www.freie-nationalisten.com
Freier Widerstand	http://www.freier-widerstand.net/index.php?x=startseite

Continued

Appendix

Continued

Name of the group	URL
Fritz	http://www.osten.da.ru
Frontstadt	http://www.frontstadt.tk
Gesinnungsgemeinschaft Berlin- Brandenburg	http://www.ggsobb.tk
Heimatschutz	http://www.heimatschutz.org
Holsteiner Widerstand	http://www.widerstandnord.com/howi/frame14.htm
JLO Baden-Württemberg	http://www.jlo-bw.de
JLO Sachsen	http://www.jlosachsen.de
Junge Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen	http://www.ostpreussen.org/jlo/index.htm
Kameradschaft Augsburg	http://www.ksaugsburg.de
Kameradschaft Bergstraße	http://www.ks-bergstrasse.de/index2.html
Kameradschaft Großdeutschland	http://www.ksgrossdeutschland.de
Kameradschaft Herne	http://www.kameradschaftherne.de
Kameradschaft Hof	http://www.ks-hof.com
Kameradschaft Neu-Ulm	http://www.ksnu.de/Startseite.htm
Kameradschaft Rheinland	http://www.kameradschaft-rheinland.de
Kameradschaft Stuttgart	http://www.ks-stuttgart.tk
Kameradschaft Weserbergland	http://www.autonom.biz/~kswbl
Kameradschaft Zella-Mehlis	http://www.kameradschaftz-m.de
Kampfbund Deutscher Sozialisten	http://www.kds-im-netz.de/index.html
Leverkusener Aufbruch	http://www.leverkusener-aufbruch.com/index01.html
Lunikoff	http://www.dielunikoffverschwoerung.de
Nationale gegen Kinderschänder	http://www.ngk.info
Nationaler Beobachter	leni.gsb-online.com/nb-halle
Nationaler Widerstand Berlin- Brandenburg	http://www.nwbb.org/index1.php
Nationaler Widerstand Dortmund	http://www.nw-dortmund.tk
Nationaler Widerstand Jena	http://www.n-w-j.de
Nationaljournal	http://globalfire.tv/nj/deutsch.htm
NB Dresden	http://www.nationales-buendnis.de
Neo-nazis Hamburg	http://www.widerstandnord.com/nazis-in-hamburg/hauptseite.htm
Neues Freiburg	http://www.neues-freiburg.info
Nibelungensturm	http://www.nibelungensturm.org
Nordforum	http://www.nordforum.com
NPD	http://www.npd.de
Ruf der Freiheit	http://www.rufderfreiheit.net
Smash Zog	http://www.smash-zog.tk
Soziales und nationales Bündnis Pommern	http://www.snbp.info
Störtebeker-Netz	208.55.185.209
Tollwütige Wölfe	http://www.tollwuetige-woelfe.de/wbb2
Unabhängige Nachrichten	http://www.fk-un.de/UN-Nachrichten/Inhalt/start.htm
Widerstand Aschaffenburg	http://www.widerstand-mainfranken.de/aschaffenburg/startseite.htm
Widerstand Minden	http://www.widerstand-minden.de/seite
Widerstand Süd	http://www.widerstandsued.de
Widerstand Weimar	http://www.libreopinion.com/members/jungsturm

(c) American organizations

Name of the Group	URL
American Border Control	http://americanborder.com/
American Renaissance/New Century Foundation	http://www.amren.com/
Americans for Self Determination	http://attackthesystem.com/americans-for-self-determination/
Arizona Patriots	http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/orgs/american/adl/paranoia-as-patriotism/arizona-patriots.html
Army of God	http://www.armyofgod.com/
Artisan Publishers	http://hoffmanprinting.ixwebhosting.com/catalog/
Aryan Army	http://www.apfn.org/apfn/ara_okc.htm
Aryan Brotherhood	http://www.insideprison.com/prison_gang_profile_AB.asp
Aryan Nations	http://www.aryan-nations.org/index-2.htm
Aryan Racial Loyalist Party	http://www.loyalistparty.com/
Aryan Renaissance Society	http://zyqeragu.isuisse.com/aryan-renaissance-society.html
Aryan Wear	http://aryanwear.com/
Asatru Folk Assembly	http://www.runestone.org/
Association of the Covenant People	http://www.associationcovenantpeople.org/
Bible Gateway	http://www.biblegateway.com/
Blood and Honor	http://www.bloodandhonour.com/
Bowery Boys	http://theboweryboys.blogspot.com/
Catholic Defense League	http://cdlmn.org/Main_Page/
Central Connecticut Crusaders	http://goholycross.cstv.com/sports/w-softbl/recaps/042809aaa.html
Christian Defense League	http://www.cdreport.com/
Christian Fellowship Ministries	http://www.christianfellowshipministry.com/
Christian Israel Fellowship	http://www.christianisrael.com/
Christian Patriots	http://www.cpforld.org/home.htm
Christian Survivalists of America Network	http://www.kelticklankirk.com/Christian_Survivalists_Alliance_index.htm
Church of God	http://www.churchofgod.org/
Church of Jesus Christ	http://www.lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=e419fb40e21cef00VgnVCM1000001f5e340aRCRD
Church of the Holy Word	http://www.holywordchurch.com/main/welcome.php
Church of the Son's of YhvH	http://www.churchofthesonsofyhvh.org/
Church of True Israel	http://www.churchoftrueisrael.com/
Committee to Restore the Constitution	http://committeetorestoretheusconstitution.com/
Confederate Crusaders	http://semjaza777.livejournal.com/
Confederate Society of America	http://www.deovindice.org/
Council of Conservative Citizens	http://cofcc.org/
Covenant Church of Our Redeemer	http://www.rctulsa.org/
Day of the Rope Productions	http://dayoftherope.blogspot.com/
European American Heritage Foundation	http://www.americanheritage.org/about_ahef.html
European American Issues Forum	http://www.eaif.org/
European American Unity and Rights Organization	http://www.whitecivilrights.com/
eXileMM	http://www.exilemm.com/
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)	http://www.fairus.org/site/pageNavigator/homepagenew.com/
Final Solution	http://www.finalsolution.88.com/
Final Stand Records	http://www.finalstandrecords.com/
The Fitzgerald Griffin Foundation	http://www.fgfbooks.com/
Folk and Faith	http://www.folkandfaith.com/
Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints	http://www.flds.com/

Continued

Appendix

Continued

Name of the Group	URL
God's Remnant Church	http://www.remnant-church.net/
Gospel Broadcasting Association	http://www.gospelbroadcasting.org/
Gospel of Christ Kingdom Church	http://www.gospelofchrist.org/
Gospel of the Kingdom Mission	http://ukgm.org/
Hail Victory Skinheads	http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Barracks/5354/
Hammerskins	http://www.hammerskins.net/
The Hated	http://fly.to/thehated
Heritage and Destiny	http://heritagendestiny.wordpress.com/
House of David	http://www.houseofdavid.us/
Hypatia Publishing	http://www.rahowa.com/hypatia/
Imperial Klans of America	http://www.kkkk.net/
Institute for Historical Review	http://www.ihr.org/
International Ku Klux Klan	http://www.kkkk.net/
Issues and Views	http://issuesandviews.com/
Jewish Defense League	http://www.jdl.org/
Keystone State Skinheads	http://www.kss88.com/
Kingdom Identity Ministries	http://www.kingidentity.com/
Knights of the KKK	http://www.kkk.com/
Ku Klux Klan	http://www.kkk.com/
Laporte Church of Christ	http://www.laportechurchofchrist.org/lpchurch/index.asp
League of the South	http://sclos.org/
Lone Star State Skinheads	http://www.skinheads.net/forums/showthread.php?p=540254
Lord's Covenant Church	http://www.covenantchurch.org/
Lord's Work	http://www.biblebelievers.com/moody_sermons/m12.html
Micetrap Distribution	http://www.micetrap.net/shop/catalog/default.php
Militaria	http://militaria.com/
Minute Men Association	http://nationalminutemen.com/
National Alliance	http://www.natvan.com/
National Aryan People's Party	http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/orgs/american/national-socialist-white-peoples-party/
National Christian Church	http://www.nationalcitycc.org/pages/page.asp?page_id=19735
National Organization for European American Rights	http://www.whitecivilrights.com/
National Socialist Front	http://www.nationalsocialist.net/
National Socialist Movement	http://www.nsm88.org/
National Socialist Party	http://www.nsm88.org/
National Socialist Vanguard	http://www.nationalsocialistvanguard.com/#
National Socialist White Action Party	http://www.americannationalactionparty.com/
National Socialist White People's Party	http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/orgs/american/national-socialist-white-peoples-party/
National Vanguard	http://www.kevinalfredstrom.com/
Nationalist Movement	http://www.nationalist.org/pages/home/home.html
Nationalist Strike Force	http://www.myspace.com/nsfknight
Nazi Party USA	http://www.americannaziparty.com/
New Christian Crusade Church	http://newchristiancrusadechurch.com/
New Covenant Bible Church	http://www.newcovenantbible.org/NCBC/
New National Socialists	http://natsoc.blogspot.com/
New Order	http://www.theneworder.org/frontpage/frontpage.htm
Nordwave	http://nordwave.net/index/
North East White Pride	http://www.newp.org/
NS Publications	http://www.nspublications.com/
Posse Comitatus	http://www.posse-comitatus.org/
Power of Prophecy	http://www.texemarrs.com/

Resistance Records	http://www.resistance.com/
Restoration Bible Ministries Inc.	http://netministries.org/see/churches.exe/ch35148
Robert E. Lee Society Invisible Empire	http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/Robert_E_Lee_Biography.htm
Scriptures for America	http://www.scripturesforamerica.org/
Sigdrifa	http://www.sigdrifa.net/
Social Contract Press	http://www.thesocialcontract.com/
Sons of Liberty	http://www.sonsoflibertynow.com/
Southern National Party	http://www.southernparty.org/
SS Regalia	http://www.sregalia.com/
SSAG/NY Brigade	http://www.dmna.state.ny.us/arng/27bct/27bct.php
Stone Kingdom Ministries	http://www.stonekingdom.org/
Storm front	http://stormfront.org/
Strike Force	http://www.strikeforce.com/index2.html
Tightrope	http://www.tightrope.cc/catalog
Unholy Records	http://www.unholyhorde.com/
Union Christian Church	http://www.unionchristianchurch.org/
Until the End Records	http://untiltheend-records.com/
Upfront Records	http://www.upfrontrecords.com/
Upper Room Identity Fellowship	http://www.urf.org/
Vanguard News Network	http://vanguardnewsnetwork.com/
Vdare	http://vdare.com/
Virginia Publishing Company	http://www.richardhoskins.com/
Volksfront	http://www.volksfrontinternational.com/
Wake up or Die	http://www.wakeupordie.com/
Watchmen Outreach Ministries	http://www.watchmanoutreachministries.com/
Westboro Baptist Church	http://www.godhatesfags.com/
White Alliance	http://www.natvan.com/
White American Freedom Fighters	http://www.freedomfightersforamerica.com/president_john_fkennedy_picture_gallery
White Aryan Resistance	http://www.resist.com/
White Aryan Youth	http://www.freewebs.com/anyacm/about.htm
White Brotherhood	http://www.greatwhitebrotherhood.com/
White Order of Thule	http://www.thulean.org/
White Revolution	http://www.whiterrevolution.com/
Women for Aryan Unity	http://www.crusader.net/texts/wau/index.html
World Church of the Creator	http://www.churchofthecreator.org/

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