Complex Argumentation in a Critical Discussion

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, it is explained that a dialogical approach to complex argumentation can be fruitful for solving two important problems concerning the analysis of the argumentation structure. First, such an approach makes it possible to clarify the distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation structures, and to identify clues in the presentation for each of these structures. Second, a dialogical approach can provide a basis for dealing more adequately with refutations of counterarguments.

KEY WORDS: argumentation structure, convergent argumentation, coordinative argumentation, counterarguments, indicators, linked argumentation, multiple argumentation, refutations

1. A DIALOGICAL APPROACH TO COMPLEX ARGUMENTATION

Until recently, argumentation structures have almost exclusively been studied from a more or less formal and monological perspective, in which attention is paid only to the structural aspects of complex argumentation as they manifest themselves in the product of the reasoning process. Since the beginning of the nineties, functional (or dialectical) approaches to argumentation structures have begun to be developed, in which the emphasis is on the process in which these structures arise and the functions the various argument structures fulfil in this process. One example is the approach advocated by James Freeman (1992, p. xiii), who claims that argument is basically dialogical, not monological, and who thinks that the structure of arguments *as products* can be properly understood 'through considering the various challenges which may arise in dialectical situations'. Modern dialectical approaches to complex argumentation can be seen as a continuation of the tradition prominent in the debate literature of viewing argument structures as the result of an arguer's attempts to deal adequately with an opponent's objections in a context of dialogue.

That argumentation should be studied in a dialogical context is also one of the main starting-points of the pragma-dialectical approach.[1] According to pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation is always part of an explicit or implicit dialogue in which one party attempts to convince the other party of the acceptability of his standpoint. In such a dialogical approach to argumentation, the discussion character of the proceedings is deemed to be

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reflected in the structure of the argumentation. The protagonist's argumentation is seen as a complex whole made up of statements put forward to deal with real or anticipated critical reactions from an antagonist.

In this paper I intend to show that a dialogical approach to complex argumentation can be fruitful for solving two important problems concerning the analysis of the argumentation structure.

The first problem has to do with the distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation structures, also referred to as the linked-convergent distinction.[2] When analysing argumentative discourse, it is often difficult to decide whether two or more arguments that directly support a standpoint are independent or interdependent. In the first case, the argumentation is multiple (or convergent), in the second case it is coordinative (or linked). In my opinion, by giving a dialogical characterization of these two structures the concepts of multiple and coordinative argumentation can be clarified. Furthermore, by starting from this dialogical characterization, clues can be identified in the presentation of the argumentation which make it possible to determine the argumentation structure.

The second problem concerns the analysis of argumentative texts in which an arguer himself mentions a counter-argument against his own argumentation and subsequently tries to rebut or refute it by advancing more argumentation. These refutations contain references to an opponent's criticism that are difficult to deal with in a monological approach. In such a monological approach, all statements that are made can only be ascribed to the arguer, so that it is not possible to account for the fact that the arguer may refer to criticism without subscribing to it. Counter-arguments are then a problem to the analyst of the argumentation structure, because an arguer who advances both arguments that support his standpoint and arguments that count against it seems to behave inconsistently. In a monological approach this problem can only be 'solved' by either excluding counter-arguments from the analysis, or by artificially including them in an argumentation structure to which they do not really belong.[3] As I hope to make clear, a dialogical characterization of complex argumentation structures can also provide a basis for dealing more adequately with refutations of counterarguments.

2. A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL MODEL OF COMPLEX ARGUMENTATION

In order to give a dialogical characterization of multiple and coordinative argumentation, it must be explained how these structures come into being in a critical discussion. Such an explanation amounts to giving a specification of the various types of critical reactions that require an argumentative response from the arguer resulting in multiple or coordinative argumentation.

According to the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure, the protago-

nist can defend his standpoint by performing an illocutionary act complex argumentation, and the antagonist can attack the standpoint by calling into question the propositional content of the argumentation or its justificatory or refutatory potential (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, p. 165).

The rules do not specify *which* defensive moves should be made in response to a particular critical reaction, nor do they specify for each response the argumentation structures in which the defence will result. A further elaboration of the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure is therefore required in order to establish which defensive moves in a critical discussion are an adequate sequel to which attacking moves, and in which argumentation structures these exchanges of moves will result. In a critical discussion, complex argumentation is advanced if the antagonist does not immediately accept the (single) argumentation that has been put forward in defence of the standpoint. If the listener makes it clear, by casting doubt on it, that he refuses to accept the argumentation advanced by the speaker, there can be two different kinds of impediments to his acceptance: he may doubt whether the propositions expressed in the argumentation are acceptable, or he may doubt whether the argumentation is an acceptable justification of the standpoint. In the first case, his doubts concern the acceptability of the propositional content of the argumentation; in the second case, they concern its relevance or sufficiency for defending the standpoint.

On the basis of the correctness conditions for argumentation, a speaker who advances an argument in defence of a standpoint is committed to assuming that this argument is acceptable to the listener, and that it will remove the listener's doubts regarding the standpoint. This assumption about the listener's reaction may prove to be wrong. In that case, the speaker has to decide which course of action to take: he can acknowledge that the listener's objections are valid, or try to answer his objections by advancing more argumentation.

If the speaker admits that the listener's criticism is justified, the consequence is that he can no longer regard his argumentation as an adequate defence of the standpoint. If he believes that an attempt to repair the deficiency will be of no avail, he may withdraw his argument. If the arguer withdraws his argument after an attack on the sufficiency, relevance or acceptability of his argumentation, and leaves it at that, he will have to withdraw his standpoint as well.[4] But he may also start a new attempt at defending the standpoint. This is appropriate if he concedes that the criticism of his argument is justified and considers it beyond repair, but thinks that his standpoint is nevertheless defensible. Since the arguer then undertakes more than one separate attempt to defend his standpoint, these attempts may be taken to constitute a *multiple* argumentation.

In a completely externalised discussion, in which each argument is advanced in response to a critical reaction, multiple argumentation amounts, in fact, to single argumentation, because it must be assumed that the

previous argument has been withdrawn: the arguer does not attempt to defend it against criticism. In an implicit discussion, where there is no antagonist present and the arguer can only anticipate an opponent's criticisms, it is clear that multiple argumentation may be advanced without any withdrawal of previous moves. If the arguer has undertaken more than one attempt to defend the standpoint, because he anticipated that one of these attempts might be unsuccessful, it may turn out later that all his attempts are successful so that there is no need to withdraw any argument.

Instead of admitting that the criticism is justified, the arguer can of course also disagree with this opponent. To convince his opponent that the criticism is not justified, he will then have to advance more argumentation. It depends on the type of criticism what kind of argumentative elaboration this should be.

If the criticism concerns the acceptability of the propositional content of the argumentation, the arguer can attempt to convince his opponent that the argument is acceptable by advancing a new argument *in support of it*, as in example (1):

(1) A He must have been swimming.
B Why do you think so?
A His hair was wet.
B Are you sure it was wet?
A Yes, I saw him drying it with a hairdryer ten minutes ago.

Taken together, the arguments 'His hair was wet' and 'I saw him drying it with a hairdryer ten minutes ago' constitute a *subordinative* argumentation.

If the opponent indicates that the argument does not provide sufficient support for the standpoint, the arguer can attempt to meet this objection by advancing a new argument which lends additional support to the standpoint:

(2) A He must have been swimming.
B Why do you think so?
A His hair was wet.
B Well, that doesn't say much.
A But he also smelled of chlorine.

By adding a new argument, the arguer implicitly admits that the original argument did not suffice to defend the standpoint. This admission does not lead to a withdrawal of the argument or the standpoint, since the arguer subsequently comes up with evidence that is to be added to the evidence already given. In combination, the arguments 'His hair was wet' and 'He smelled of chlorine' constitute a *coordinative* argumentation.

There is yet another situation that may give rise to coordinative argumentation. It occurs when the opponent, instead of merely questioning

whether the argument has sufficient weight, mentions a specific objection that can be seen as an argument in favour of his claim that the amount of support is insufficient. This type of critical reaction gives the arguer the opportunity to respond with a counter-attack: he may defend himself against the charge of insufficiency by arguing that the objection does not hold. Such a counter-attack is made in example (3):

(3) A He must have been swimming.
B How do you know?
A His hair was wet.
B Well, that might also be because he has walked in the rain.
A But it hasn't rained all day.

Again, the two arguments that are advanced by the arguer, 'His hair was wet' and 'It hasn't rained all day', constitute a *coordinative* argumentation. It is only by means of the combination of arguments that the arguer may be regarded as attempting to convince his opponent of the acceptability of his standpoint.

If the opponent indicates that he regards the argument as irrelevant to the standpoint, the arguer can try to convince him of its relevance by advancing an argument which makes it clear that the argument he has already given does indeed support the standpoint. This can be done by giving support for the unexpressed (major) premiss:

(4) A He is very likely to have bad teeth.
B What makes you think that?
A He has red hair.
B But that hasn't got anything to do with it, has it?
A Yes it has: people with red hair often have weak enamel.

The argument 'People with red hair often have weak enamel' can be seen as supporting the unexpressed premiss of the original argument: 'People with red hair are likely to have bad teeth'. This is, again, a case of *subordinative* argumentation, but this time the second argument supports the unexpressed (major) premiss.

In Figure 1, a model of *argumentative responses to criticism* resulting in complex argumentation is presented. In the model, the point of departure is the situation in which the protagonist has advanced a single argumentation in defence of his standpoint, and this argumentation has subsequently been criticized by his opponent.

The model specifies which types of argumentative response may be given if an argument meets with a particular type of criticism. The model is an extension of the pragma-dialectical rules for the argumentation stage: it provides further regulation of the protagonist's defence of his standpoint against critical reactions by the antagonist. At the same time, the concept

A	PROTAGONIST ACCEPTS THE CRITICISM, BUT MAINTAINS HIS STANDPOINT	
	Criticism by A	**Response by P**
	rejects argument as	
	(a) unacceptable	withdraws argument
	(b) insufficient	and advances new argument
	(c) irrelevant	(→ **MA**)
B	PROTAGONIST DOES NOT ACCEPT THE CRITICISM	
	Criticism by A	Response by P
	rejects argument as	
	(a) unacceptable	supports argument (→ **SA**)
	(b) insufficient	
	if A only expresses doubt:	1. advances additional argument (→ **CA**)
		or
	if A puts forward a counter-argument:	2. refutes antagonist's counter-argument (→ **CA**)
	(c) irrelevant	supports unexpressed premiss (→ **SA**)
	A = antagonist	
	P = protagonist	
	MA = multiple argumentation	
	SA = subordinative argumentation	
	CA = coordinative argumentation	

Figure 1. Model of argumentative responses to criticism in a critical discussion.

of complex argumentation is further dialectified: the various argumentation structures are defined as distinct means for overcoming different forms of doubt or criticism.

My explanation of the way in which multiple and coordinative argumentation come into being in a critical discussion provides a basis for a more precise characterization of these two argumentation structures. In a coordinative argumentation, the arguments taken together constitute a single attempt at defending the standpoint, because other arguments are added to the first argument to overcome the doubt or answer the criticism that it is insufficient. It is clear from the opponent's reaction that the first argument is in need of some repair. The second argument is designed to fulfil this

repairing function. Therefore, the arguments need each other to provide adequate support for the standpoint. In a multiple argumentation, the only connection between the first argument and the new argument is that each of them is advanced as a defence for the same standpoint. The arguments do not need each other to lend adequate support to the standpoint. On the contrary, the only reason for undertaking a new attempt at defending the standpoint is that the previous attempt has failed or that arguer expects that it might fail. If both attempts are successful, the arguer has made a superfluous move.

The conceptual clarification of coordinative and multiple argumentation thus obtained makes it possible to distinguish multiple from coordinative argumentation in argumentative discourse. If it is clear that one of the arguments that are advanced cannot serve as a means to make the other argument(s) a more acceptable defence of the standpoint, the argumentation must be multiple. If one of the arguments is to be regarded as a means to answer criticism of the sufficiency of the other argument(s), the argumentation is coordinative.

3. CLUES IN THE PRESENTATION OF COMPLEX ARGUMENTATION IN AN IMPLICIT DISCUSSION

In an implicit discussion, there is no antagonist present, so that the arguer can only anticipate criticisms and attempt to respond to those criticisms in advance. There are a number of words and expressions that can make it clear what type of dialectical situation the arguer is expecting and that can therefore serve as an indication that the argumentation that is advanced to deal with anticipated doubts or criticisms has a particular structure.

That the arguer anticipates the situation that typically gives rise to multiple argumentation, namely the situation in which he is required to give up one of his arguments, may sometimes be deduced from his use of certain expressions. One example of such an expression is 'leaving aside' which can be used to introduce an argument while at the same time making it clear that one does not really need the argument to support the standpoint, in other words, that one is willing to withdraw it. In the following example, in which Eric Flint defends his standpoint that it is not a good idea to let the proofreading be done by volunteers, Flint introduces his first argument by means of this expression:

(5) Has it ever occurred to you, in your solipsistic paradise, that such labor as proof-reading is done by real people – with bills to pay, just like you? What you propose, on one level, is that I substitute the systematic use of unpaid labor for theirs. **Leaving aside** the fact that doing so would be illegal (a major violation of minimum wage laws, for starters), I wouldn't do it in a

> million years anyway [. . .], because it would also be completely impractical. (*Prime Palaver* #5, *Letters to the Librarian*, Eric Flint, September 1, 2001)

After having put forward the argument that making use of volunteers would be illegal, Flint subsequently advances a new argument for not making use of volunteer proofreaders: it would be completely impractical. Taken together, the two arguments form a case of multiple argumentation.

There are also clues in the presentation that can make it clear that the arguer is anticipating the situation where he is required to defend the acceptability of the propositional content of one of his arguments by providing another argument for it, which typically produces subordinative argumentation. One type of clue that this is the situation anticipated by the arguer is a combination of juxtaposed indicators of argumentation, such as 'since because'. Such a combination of argumentative indicators is used in example (6):

(6) There is a growing and alarming trend in Africa of women trying to bleach their skin white to appear 'European'. As usual, it is the poorer ones who suffer most, since because they cannot afford the more expensive cosmetic products, more dangerous creams are used, some of which greatly increase the risk of cancer. (*On-line Pravda*, March 18, 2002)

The combination 'since because' is a sign that an argument will be given that is embedded in another argument.

In an implicit discussion, arguers can also make it clear that they anticipate the situation that their argument may not have sufficient weight to remove all their opponent's doubt by itself, so that more arguments should be given to convince their opponent. An example of such an indicator of coordinative argumentation is 'but this is only part of the reason'. In example (7) this expression is being used:

(7) When you have good traction, you're in control. **But this is only part of the reason** traction is so important to successful growing. With improved traction you save time, fuel and equipment while maximizing engine efficiency and drawbar load. (www.caterpillar.com/industry_solutions/agriculture/tracks)

Expressions such as 'whereas' or 'while' can be a sign that the arguer wants to rule out a possible objection to his first argument, a dialogical move that typically results in the second type of coordinative argumentation. The following argument is an example of this use of *whereas*:

(8) I wrote a letter to the administrative council, saying I can't tell you how much I appreciate the stipend. It has allowed me to

> dedicate so much of my time to SG, whereas otherwise I would have worked a campus job to pay the bills. (www.studentleader.com/sal_r.htm)

In the example, a student defends the standpoint that the stipend has been a great help, because it has allowed the student to dedicate a lot of time to SG. A critical opponent might wonder: but couldn't you have devoted that time to your studies even without the stipend? The arguer makes clear that this criticism does not hold, since otherwise he or she would have had to take a campus job to pay the bills.

Just like in the student-example, it is often the case that *whereas* or *while* are combined with expressions such as *otherwise* or *normally*. Especially in cases where the arguer is defending a certain positive or negative judgment or qualification, and needs to take into account that the opponent might come up with criticisms such as: 'But does your argument really justify that judgment?', Is the advantage or disadvantage that you mention in your argument not something that is always the case?', 'Isn't the positive or negative consequence you mention not an event that would have occurred anyway?' By indicating that otherwise things would have gone differently, or that normally something would not have been the case, the arguer can make it clear that these potential objections against the first argument do not hold and that therefore the positive or negative judgment is indeed justified.

4. THE ANALYSIS OF REFUTATIONS OF COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

Since there is a relation between the various types of argumentation structure and the critical reactions that are to be answered by the arguer, any indication of the kind of criticism that the argumentation is meant to remove also provides information about the way in which the argumentation is structured. As a matter of course, the dialogical character of argumentation put forward in a monological situation remains largely implicit. Yet even in such monological situations, more often than not, references are made to reactions by a critical opponent, whether this opponent is real or imagined. These references to the dialogical character of the argumentation can be used as a clue for reconstructing the structure of the argumentation.

As we have seen, there are a number of expressions that can serve as indicators of the different types of argument structures because they provide information about the anticipated dialogical situation. But there are more explicit references to criticism to be found in argumentative texts, such as acknowledgments and refutations of counter-arguments that have or might have been advanced by an opponent. In principle, all these references to criticism provide information about the dialogue in which the arguer is

engaged when developing his argumentation. The question is precisely what information they provide. And how this information can be used to reconstruct the arguer's argumentation.

If the arguer mentions a counter-argument against one of his arguments and subsequently refutes it, the structure of his argumentation as a whole will depend on the type of criticism involved in the counter-argument.[5] Once it has been identified which type of criticism is at stake, and how the arguer attempts to deal with it, the pragma-dialectical model of argumentative responses to criticism can be instrumental in reconstructing the complex argumentation structure of the speaker's defence of the standpoint. The model helps in determining how the refutation of the counter-argument is connected to the argumentation that supports the standpoint directly and thus in deciding what the resulting structure is.

If the counter-argument is a means for showing that the argument the arguer has given is *untrue* or *unacceptable*, the arguer's attempt to refute the counter-argument will result in *subordinative* argumentation, as in example (9):

(9) We are against building a café in the Sarphatipark, because it will take up too much space. They say that it will only be a small pavilion, but we're talking here about a 6 metre high building of 400 square metres.

In this example, the counter-argument that it will only be a small pavilion constitutes an attack on the acceptability of the arguer's argument that the building that is to be erected will take up too much space. The arguer refutes this counter-argument by arguing that the building at issue is a 6 metre high building of 400 square metres. With this second argument, the arguer tries to establish the acceptability of his first argument. Therefore, the arguer's argumentation as a whole is subordinative: the argument that the building will take up too much space is supported by the argument that it is a 6 metre high building of 400 square metres. This argumentation structure can be schematized as follows:

Structure of example (9)



If the counter-argument is an attack on the *sufficiency* of the argument as a defence for the standpoint, then the refutation of the counter-argument will form a *coordinative* argument in combination with the arguer's original argumentation in support of the standpoint. Example (10) is an illustration of this type of refutation:

(10) We want Dyer Street to be a play street, because we would then have a place where children can play without having to keep looking out for cars and bikes. 'Why is it so important that Dyer Street should be a play street?' you may ask. 'The kids can go into the park on the corner of Swan Street, can't they?' I would say to you: 'Just go and take a look!' It's one great pool of mud. And it's full of dog dirt. We can't let our kids play there.

The counter-argument that the children can go into the park on the corner of Swan Street is an attack on the sufficiency of the arguer's support for the standpoint that Dyer Street should be a play street. If Swan Street would be a good alternative, the need for turning Dyer Street into a safe place for children to play would be less obvious. The arguer refutes the counter-argument by arguing that the park on the corner of Swan Street is not a place where children can play: it is one great pool of mud and full of dog dirt. Taken together, the arguer's two main premisses, 'We would then have a place where children can play without having to keep looking out for cars and bikes' and 'We can't let our kids play in the park on the corner of Swan Street', form a coordinative argumentation: the argument that the park on the corner of Swan Street is no alternative, is a refutation of the opponent's objection that the first argument is insufficient to support the standpoint. The argumentation structure of this example may be schematized as follows:

Structure of example (10)



If the counter-argument constitutes an attack on the *relevance* of the arguer's argument, the argument by means of which it is refuted lends support to the *implicit premiss* of the attacked argument. An illustration of this type of refutation is example (11):

(11) A half-forgotten interview given three months before to Reader's Digest (. . .) exploded in Dr Carey's face when it appeared a week ago. (. . .) 'Fire and forget' is a good principle for missiles, a bad one for archbishops. (. . .) No politician would allow himself so little control over the publication date of such interviews. Dr Carey may object that he is not a politician but a pastor of souls. But Matthew 10:16 is a necessary text for a modern church leader: Be ye therefore wise as serpents . . .' (*The Times*, March 6, 1991)

The (implicit) standpoint that is defended here is: Dr Carey should have exercised more control over the publication date of his interview. In support of this standpoint, the arguer advances the argument that no politician would have allowed himself so little control over the publication date of such an interview. The implicit premiss of this argumentation is that, where interviews are concerned, Dr Carey is comparable to a politician. After having put forward his argumentation, the arguer anticipates a possible objection by Carey: that he is not a politician but a pastor of souls, and that the fact that politicians behave in a certain way in these matters is therefore irrelevant. The arguer subsequently refutes this counter-argument by pointing out that modern church leaders, like politicians, should watch their step when addressing the public ('Matthew 10:16 is a necessary text for a modern church leader: Be ye therefore wise as serpents'). The argument that modern church leaders should also watch their step when addressing the public, lends support to the implicit premiss that, with respect to interviews, Dr Carey is comparable to a politician. The argumentation is thus subordinative. Its structure can be schematized as follows:

Structure of example (11)



If the argumentation in favour of a standpoint consists of a combination of an argument that supports the standpoint directly and a refutation of a counter-argument against that argument, the resulting structure will, by definition, never be multiple, but always coordinative or subordinative. As the arguer's refutation of the counter-argument aims at making his argumentation acceptable, this refutation cannot be seen as a new, independent attempt at defending the standpoint. The arguer can, of course, undertake more than one independent attempt at refuting the counter-argument, but if that happens, only the subargumentation is multiple:

(12) We think it is a good idea to start this new talk show with Goedele Liekens, because she's a nice person who is very good at interviewing people. And if you say: 'But don't you already have a show of this type which is presented by a lady, Sonja Barend's talk show?', I say: 'Sonja is a different person from Goedele, it is as simple as that. And why shouldn't we have two of these light-informative programmes?' (Translated from a Dutch television guide)

Here, the arguer makes two attempts at refuting the counter-argument that a similar show already exists, so that there seems to be no need to start the new show with Goedele Liekens. First, he argues that the two programmes differ from each other in one important respect: the two presenters have different personalities. Next, by means of a rhetorical question, he argues that there is nothing wrong with having two similar programmes. This is a clear case of multiple argumentation, since the arguer indicates by means of his second argument that he considers his (sub)standpoint to be defensible even if his first argument should prove to be unacceptable to his opponent. The structure of the argument can be schematized as follows:[6]

Structure of example (12)



By way of these examples I have attempted to show that unlike in monological approaches, in a dialogical approach to argumentation refutations of counterarguments are not just an encumbrance to the analysis of the argumentation structure, but on the contrary, that they are an important source of information about the way in which the arguer is defending his standpoint, and are therefore useful clues for the way in which the argumentation structure is to be reconstructed.

NOTES

[1] The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation is proposed and developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992).

[2] For a discussion of problems concerning this distinction, see Conway (1991), Snoeck Henkemans (1992), Thomas (1986), and Yanal (1991).

[3] Govier (1988) is an example of an author with a monological approach: in representing counter-arguments in a diagram of the argumentation structure, she places the counter-arguments alongside the pro-arguments. Cf. Snoeck Henkemans (1992) for a more detailed discussion of Govier's approach to the problem of analysing counter-arguments.

[4] In a critical discussion the arguer is not allowed to *maintain* his standpoint after he has admitted that the criticism of his argumentation is justified, unless he undertakes a new attempt at defending his standpoint. Otherwise, he violates the rule for the concluding stage which states that the protagonist must be prepared to retract his point of view if the antagonist has attacked it sufficiently. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 174). By refusing to accept the consequences of his failure to defend the standpoint, the arguer hinders the resolution of the dispute.

[5] Instead of refuting a counter-argument against one of his arguments, the arguer may also attempt to refute a counter-argument against his standpoint (i.e. an argument supporting the opposing standpoint). In that case, the main argumentation, consisting of a direct defence and an indirect defense of the standpoint, is always coordinatively compound. By means of the indirect defense, the arguer makes it clear that he anticipates a situation in which his opponent will put forward an argument for the opposing standpoint, claiming that this argument is weightier than his argument, so that it can function as an attack on the sufficiency of the arguer's argument.

[6] The intermediate premiss 1.1b, in which an evaluation is given of the opponent's argument, is necessary because the second argument given by the arguer to attack the counter-argument contains an attack on its relevance, which would otherwise be meaningless.

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