



Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist

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As I said, there is a nice problem here. For I think the problem raised by cases of Case Four is the same as the problem I mentioned earlier.

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THOMAS HOBBS: MORAL THEORIST *

THAT Thomas Hobbes is the greatest of English political philosophers is a commonplace claim. That he is the greatest of English moral philosophers is not a commonplace. But it is true.

I

The problematic of modern moral theory is set by three dogmas which philosophy receives from economics. The first is that value is utility—a measure of subjective, individual preference. The second is that rationality is maximization: the rational individual “will maximize the extent to which his objective is achieved.”¹ The third is that interests are non-tuistic: interacting persons do not take “an interest in one another’s interests.”² Modern moral theory determines the possibility of morality in relation to these dogmas.

The majority of moral theorists have, of course, sought to establish the possibility of morality by rejecting one or more of the economists’ suppositions. They have offered alternative accounts of value, or reason, or interest. But the dogmas remain, and the bolder course is to embrace them. This is what Hobbes does, establishing a place for morality as a conventional constraint on our natural behavior. The *tour de force* in his theory is the reconciliation of maximizing rationality with constraining morality. How can one be rational in accepting the constraints of the laws of nature, and so not exercising one’s full right of nature? The answer requires Hobbes’s account of right reason. For his true moral theory is a dual conventionalism, in which a conventional reason, superseding natural reason, justifies a conventional morality, constrain-

* To be presented in an APA symposium on Hobbes, December 29, 1979; Bernard Gert will comment; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 559–561.

¹ D. M. Winch, *Analytical Welfare Economics* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: publisher, 1971), p. 16.

² John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1971), p. 13.

ing natural behavior. And this dual conventionalism is Hobbes's enduring contribution to moral theory.

Or so I shall claim. First I shall establish Hobbes's acceptance of positions essentially equivalent to the three dogmas. Next I shall trace the argument from nonmoral nature to moral convention. Then I shall raise the objection of Hobbes's Foole, who "hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice" (L 15).³ To this point I shall traverse familiar and, in my view, uncontroversial although not uncontroverted ground. But I shall then strike out in a new direction, by-passing my former comments on the subversion of Hobbes's moral theory by his psychology⁴ and his rather lame response to the Foole. For Hobbes has a better response, although, one must admit, he seems unaware of it. The elements of my presentation are all to be found in Hobbes, but what I shall present is the theory he never gave.

II

Hobbes's conceptions, although embodying the core of the economists' dogmas, lack the precision of contemporary formulations. He speaks, not of utility and preference, but of good and desire. But his position is clear:

. . . whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth *Good*: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, *Evill*; And of his Contempt, *Vile*, and *Inconsiderable*. For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves (L 6).

Where the contemporary value subjectivist says that utility is the measure of individual preference, Hobbes says rather that "private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill" (L 15), thus exchanging measure and measured. But it is evident that both treat value as dependent on choice or appetite.

Hobbes's general conception of reason identifies it with "*Reckoning* (that is, Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts" (L 5). We reason so that we may do what we will. Thus deliberation, which terminates in the will to do or omit some action, is but reasoning about particulars, based on desires and values

³ References to *Leviathan* are shown by 'L' with the chapter number; similarly for *De Cive*, with 'C'.

⁴ In my book, *The Logic of Leviathan* (New York: Oxford, 1969), especially pp. 93-98.

(L 6). The instrumental role of practical reasoning in Hobbes's account is thus emphasized in his discussion of the reasonableness of justice, in which he identifies what is "against reason" with what is "against . . . benefit" (L 15). The measure of the reasonableness of an action is the extent to which it conduces to the agent's ends. What is this but the maximizing conception of rationality?

That persons are conceived to take no interest in one another's interests is implicit in Hobbes's account of the value of a man, which is

. . . his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgment of another (L 10).

A man's concern with his fellows is with their power. He takes pleasure in being valued highly by them, for this is a sign of his superiority. If their powers stand in the way to his goals, he considers them enemies (L 13). He may have to accommodate their interests to attain his own, but in themselves their interests are not his concern.

III

The natural condition of mankind, Hobbes insists,

. . . is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. . . . To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. . . . Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. . . . They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude (L 13).

Natural relationships among human beings are determined entirely by might, not right, and the consequence is unlimited conflict.

That Hobbes denominates force and fraud as the cardinal virtues of man's natural condition in no way contradicts his insistence that right and wrong have there no place, for force and fraud are simply those qualities of greatest value to their possessors. Their goodness is purely subjective. What may be thought a greater problem is Hobbes's ascription to each person of the right of nature—"the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature." That Hobbes does ascribe this right to men in the state of nature is made clear by his insistence that "in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body" (L 14).

But the right of nature is not in itself a moral conception. Consider first Hobbes's definition of 'right' in *De Cive*:

It is . . . neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right. Neither by the word *right* is anything else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason (C I.7).

This passage makes very clear the two main features of Hobbes's conception of right, only one of which is mentioned in *Leviathan*. What is right is what accords with reason, and the connection between right and reason is found in the crucial conception of *right reason*. We shall return to this conception; here we need note only that, in the natural condition of mankind, each man must take his own reason for right reason, and so each considers acts according with his own reason to be right. The right of nature is thus introduced as a rational, not a moral, conception.

The second feature, stated explicitly both in *De Cive* and in *Leviathan*, is that the right of nature is a *liberty*. It is not correlative with duty; my right of nature constitutes a license for me, and not a fetter on you. It determines what I *may* do. Now Hobbes holds that one may do whatever accords with reason, which implies, as we have seen, that one may do whatever conduces to one's ends. He asserts this explicitly in *De Cive*—"in the state of nature profit is the measure of right" (C I.10). Since in this natural condition anything may be conducive to one's ends, "Nature hath given to *every one a right to all*." The right of nature is an unlimited permission, a blank check.

An unlimited permissive right implies the absence of all obligation or duty—of all moral constraint. In taking profit as the measure of right, Hobbes treats right as redundant; there are no *moral* distinctions within the state of nature. To suppose that men in their natural condition possess the right of nature is to view that condition from a different vantage point—from the social condition of mankind. In society right is not unlimited; it is neither what accords with each person's own natural reason, nor what is measured by consideration of each person's profit. Viewed from society, the state of nature appears as the effect of removing all limitations on right, and so as a condition of entire liberty. But it

is the perspective of society, and not the condition of nature itself, which determines this appearance.

IV

The natural condition of mankind is a state of war, and this war is licensed by the right of nature. But this war is unprofitable; it lessens each person's prospect of maintaining his own life, which is his principal end. Of course, this does not show war to be irrational; the natural condition of mankind exemplifies the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, in which individual maximizing behavior, which is by definition rational, leads to a mutually disadvantageous, sub-optimal outcome.

But if man's natural condition is unprofitable, then the unlimited right of nature, which licenses this condition of war, is equally unprofitable. Thus Hobbes insists that "as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, . . . of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live" (L 14). And so we come to the second law of nature, the cornerstone of Hobbes's account of morality:

That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe (L 14).

To lay down some portion of one's originally unlimited right, is to introduce a constraint on what one may do. A permissive right creates no obligation, but the laying down of such a right is the assumption of an obligation, so that a man is

. . . said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: . . . and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being *Sine Jure*; the Right being before renounced, or transferred (L 14).

To lay down a right is to distinguish between what is done with right and what is done without right, between acts that are right and acts that are wrong. At this point morality enters Hobbes's account. In laying down right, man transforms his condition.

The laws of nature are the grounds of this morality. But they are not themselves moral principles:

A LAW OF NATURE, . . . is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved (L 14).

The very word 'law' is misleading, as Hobbes himself admits (L 15). But the laws of nature differ from mere advice, in their necessity and generality; they state what one *must* do, in the pursuit of one's chief end, preservation, and they state what *each* must do, since each seeks the same end, self-preservation, in the same conditions, a war in which all have equal hope of success. So conceived, the laws of nature provide for the rational introduction of a morality that is neither individual nor natural, but mutual and conventional.

I shall define a *convention* as a regularity *R* in the behavior of persons *P* in situations *S*, such that part of the reason that most of these persons have for conforming to *R* in *S* is that it is common knowledge among *P* that most persons conform to *R* in *S*, and that most persons expect most (other) persons to conform to *R* in *S*.⁵ We may distinguish between *descriptive* and *normative* conventionality; the former concerns the explanation of behavior, the latter concerns the justification of behavior. It is of course in the normative sense that Hobbesian morality is conventional. Thus my claim is that obligations, or restrictions on right, constitute regularities, and that the rationale for adherence to these regularities includes the common knowledge that most persons both adhere to and expect others to adhere to them.

The regularities in question are spelled out in the detailed list of the laws of nature which Hobbes provides. If the rationale for adherence to them is to rest on the knowledge that adherence is both usual and expected, then two conditions must be satisfied. First, each person must have reason to prefer that most persons adhere to the laws of nature, rather than that most ignore the laws; otherwise the convention would be *pointless* for those who lacked such reason. And second, each person must have reason to prefer that he or she ignore the laws of nature, given that most others ignore them; otherwise the convention would be *redundant*, since each would have reason to adhere whether others did so or not. The laws of nature are not pointless, since mutual adherence to them is necessary to bring men from a condition of war to one of peace. And they are not redundant as conventions, since, as Hobbes insists, no one has reason to adhere to them unless others do (L 15).

Since in Hobbes's view the laws of nature afford the only means to peace, we may say that morality constitutes a uniquely dominant set of conventions, or regularities of behavior, for men who, seek-

⁵ My account of convention owes much to David Lewis, although there are differences which I shall not seek to justify here. See Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1969), especially pp. 42, 78.

ing their own preservation, must seek peace. Thus

. . . the Science of them [the laws of nature], is the true and onely Morall Philosophy. For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is *Good*, and *Evill*, in the conversation, and Society of mankind (L 15).

Values are subjective, but peace is a common instrumental good, since it is a necessary means to each man's chief good, his own preservation. Reason is instrumental, but the laws of nature, which prescribe the means of peace, are addressed equally to each man's reason, and so are rational for all. Interest is non-tuistic, yet each man must give up some of the right with which he pursues his own interests, since this is the basis of the laws of nature. Thus morality, a set of conventions constraining each man's maximizing activity, and distinguishing right from wrong, is established.

v

But a major difficulty confronts Hobbes's conception of morality. The laws of nature provide a set of conventions which is dominant, and neither pointless nor redundant. But is this set *stable*? That is, given common knowledge that most persons conform to the laws of nature and expect others to conform, does each prefer that he or she also conform rather than ignore the laws? Or may not each person reason that, since peace is assured by the constraints on right accepted by others, he does best for himself by accepting no such constraints?

Hobbes faces both a *rational* and a *motivational* problem. A convention is rationally stable if and only if each person has reason to adhere to it, provided others do; it is motivationally stable if and only if each is usually moved to adhere to it, provided others do. Motivational stability is the central problem of Hobbes's political theory; our concern is rather with rational stability. And Hobbes is well aware of this concern.

The device by which we effect the mutual laying down of right required by the second law of nature is *covenant*, a "mutuall transferring of Right" in which at least one party is to perform in the future "and in the mean time be trusted" (L 14). The third law of nature then requires "*That men performe their Covenants made*: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre" (L 15). Adherence to this law is justice. The question of rational stability is then the question whether justice

is always rational, and this is what Hobbes's Foole denies:

The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether Injustice, . . . may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; . . . This specious reasoning is neverthesse false (L 15).

Why is the Foole's reasoning false? He need not deny that the natural condition of mankind exemplifies the Prisoner's Dilemma, so that universally peaceable behavior is better, for everyone, than universally warlike behavior, but warlike behavior is nevertheless each person's best reply to the others, whether they be warlike or peaceable. What the Foole maintains is that the Dilemma recurs in considering whether to adhere to the laws of nature. In the natural condition of mankind, anticipatory violence—seeking to forestall others by dominating them—is licensed by the right of nature. Since mutual anticipation creates war, Hobbes holds that it is rational for each person to lay down the right to anticipate, provided others do so as well. But however true this may be, it does not change the advantage inherent in anticipation, which still maximizes each person's prospect for survival and so is rational. If violating one's covenant enables one to anticipate one's fellows, then it is rational. Hence, if the rational man seems to lay down some portion of his right, it can only be to take it up again as the occasion may suggest. But then morality is indeed in vain. Each may pretend peace, but only the better to anticipate his fellows. The laws of nature in themselves offer no escape from the ills of our natural condition. The Foole's reasoning seems sound.

In his reply to the Foole, Hobbes claims that the rationality of an act depends not on its actual outcome, but on its expected outcome, that the rational reaction of others to the covenant-breaker is to cast him out of society, and that, although others may err in letting the covenant-breaker live in peace, such error cannot be rationally expected (L 15). However, Hobbes does not challenge the Foole's contention that, could covenant-breaking be expected

to be advantageous, then it would be reasonable, however unjust one might call it.

Is this reply adequate? To answer this question, we must first distinguish three ways in which, in contractual situations, the respective advantages of mutual adherence and unilateral violation may be related. First, mutual adherence may be in itself better than unilateral violation for each person. Second, mutual adherence may be in itself worse than unilateral violation for some persons, but better for each in virtue of external enforcement. And third, mutual adherence may be worse than unilateral violation for some parties, all things considered.

Now Hobbes does not suppose, and it is surely not plausible to suppose, that making only those covenants in which mutual adherence is better in itself for everyone than unilateral violation will prove sufficient to enable men to escape from the natural condition of war. He does, however, suppose that men can escape by making covenants in which external enforcement renders mutual adherence better for everyone than unilateral violation. If he is wrong about this, then his reply to the Foole is clearly inadequate. If he is right, then although he may claim that the Foole's objections do not show peace to be unattainable, yet he may not deny that in the attainment of peace real benefits must be forgone. External enforcement is necessarily costly;⁶ so the parties to a beneficial covenant in which mutual adherence is not in itself better for each person than unilateral violation, would do better were they nevertheless to adhere without external enforcement. Hobbes must ignore this because he does not challenge the Foole's insistence that covenant-breaking, to be irrational, must be expected to be disadvantageous. And he thereby sacrifices the real point of his, or of any, conventional moral system, as introducing a constraint on taking the maximization of advantage to be the aim of rational individual behavior.

But could Hobbes avoid this sacrifice? The Foole's reasoning contains an argument seemingly fatal to moral conventionalism. If morality is to be a rational and conventional constraint on natural behavior, then it must be rationally stable, and this requires that each have reason to follow it provided others do. Since reason

⁶ As Hobbes recognizes, "But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. . . . not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other" (L 18).

enjoins the maximization of advantage, morality is rationally stable only if it is most advantageous for each to follow it provided others do. But if this holds, then in what sense is morality a *constraint*? If each person's good is best furthered by some course of action, then each, rationally exercising his or her unlimited right of nature, will follow that course of action. No laying down of right is needed. The role of so-called "moral" conventions can then be not to constrain our behavior, but rather to enable us to coordinate that behavior to maximal advantage, effecting, like the perfectly competitive market, the harmony of non-tuisms. The conception of morality as a rational and conventional *constraint* has thus no place. On the other hand, if each does worse, in terms of advantage, to follow morality provided others do, then, although morality constitutes a constraint on our natural behavior, the constraint is irrational. And so again, the conception of morality as a *rational* and conventional constraint has no place.

VI

But "this specious reasoning is nevertheless false." Hobbes has another, and better, reply to the Foole, in his account of right reason. To pass between the horns of the apparent dilemma set by stability—that morality is either not a constraint or else an irrational constraint on individual behavior—we must embrace a further element of conventionalism. Not only morality, but rationality as well, must come within its ambit. And Hobbes shows us what is required:

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump

on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand (L 5).

In this passage we find the germ of Hobbes's real answer to the Foole, as well as his fundamental argument for the necessity of a civil Sovereign, not as absolute enforcer, but rather as arbitrator, whose primary task is to provide the conventional standard of right reason required to uphold the laws of nature. The Foole, in appealing to natural reason in support of injustice, falls into inconsistency, through his failure to appreciate the tight conceptual connection between right and reason which is necessary to Hobbes's thought. The right of nature expresses right reason. If one lays down some portion of that right, then one also renounces the rationality that was the basis of the right laid down. If one lays down some portion of one's right to do whatever seems conducive to one's preservation and well-being, so that one may find peace, then one renounces preservation as the standard of reason, in favor of peace. The Foole appeals to that reason which dictates to every man his own good—to natural reason, so that he may show injustice to be rational. But injustice is a violation of covenant, and, in covenanting, in laying down one's right, one has renounced natural reason as the court of appeal, in favor of a reason that dictates to every man what all agree is good.

When Hobbes considers the need for a conventional standard of reason, he argues from our susceptibility to error. In the practical affairs of men, it is not error, but the subjectivity of our natural end, which renders natural reason inadequate. Each man takes his own conservation for trump, rather than peace. But this grounds the unlimited right of nature, and so the natural condition of war. Only insofar as each man takes peace as trump are the laws of nature upheld, so that war gives way to peace.

One may paraphrase Hobbes's argument for the second law of nature, as an argument for replacing natural reason, directed to individual preservation, with a conventional reason directed to peace. As long as each person appeals solely to his natural reason, there can be no security to any man of living out the time that nature ordinarily allows. Thus a man must be willing, when others are so too, as far as he shall think it necessary for peace, to lay down natural reason, and be contented with a standard of reason which allows him so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.

That this standard is conventional follows from the fact that

each person has ground for accepting it only insofar as it is common knowledge that most persons both accept and expect others to accept it. Basing reason on peace, rather than on individual preservation, is mutually beneficial, but against each person's interest should others not accept it. Thus the convention is neither pointless nor redundant. And it is rationally stable; adherence to a standard of reason based on peace is itself rationally required as a means to peace.

The problem of motivational stability is, of course, not resolved by replacing natural with conventional reason. We may grant the Foole that each person would prefer to violate the laws of nature, given that others adhere. Since men tend to be ruled by passion rather than reason, Hobbes requires the Sovereign, not only as arbiter, whose reason, accepted by all as right reason, prescribes the means to peace, but also as enforcer, whose power, authorized by all, is exercised to maintain peace. But this problem of motivation is not peculiar to Hobbes' conception of morality and does not threaten to undermine his conventionalist theory.

VII

I have now made good my initial claims. Hobbes's moral theory is a dual conventionalism, in which a conventional reason, superseding natural reason, justifies a conventional morality, constraining natural behavior. Hobbes has succeeded in demonstrating the possibility of morality, while accepting the three dogmas of the economists which define the modern moral problematic—the subjectivity of value, the instrumentality of reason, and the non-tuism of interest. If he is not only the first, but, as I believe, the only moral philosopher to have accomplished this task, then he is surely the greatest of English moral philosophers.

But if, on this three-hundredth anniversary of his death, we can recognize that Hobbes constitutes a permanent part of the heritage of moral theory, we can also recognize the difficult tasks his theory leaves us. The morality that Hobbes establishes is minimal; it represents the weakest of constraints on natural maximizing behavior—that set by considerations of mutual advantage. It is only because each person has an interest in peace that each has grounds to accept the conventional reason and morality which together override the straightforward maximization of subjective value. Much of traditional morality will not be accommodated by Hobbes's theory; must it be sacrificed? Or may we establish a stronger morality by a well-grounded relaxation of one or more of the economic dogmas assumed by Hobbes?

The most promising candidate for relaxation is the dogma of non-tuism. Not that we should abandon it, for it surely holds in many of the contexts in which persons interact. Indeed, it makes possible economic life as we know it. But we may insist that it does not constitute the whole truth about human beings, and that where it does not hold sway, a richer morality may be established on the basis of sympathetic interests—not, of course, a fictitious universal sympathy, but real particular sympathies. Most important, we may suppose that without these sympathies, and the richer morality and genuine sociability which they make possible, human society as we know it would disintegrate into something approaching Hobbes's nightmare vision of the natural condition of mankind.

Hobbes shows us that moral and social relationships are possible among persons in contexts in which they take no interest in one another's interests. Properly understood, this is one of the great liberating insights on which a free and democratic society is based. But Hobbes's absolute Sovereign stands as an awful warning to those who, like Hobbes himself, suppose that human society needs *no* basis in sympathetic interests. The task left to the moral and social theorist today is to establish the proper bounds of the moral and rational conventionalism that was first conceived by Thomas Hobbes.

DAVID GAUTHIER

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HOBBS'S ACCOUNT OF REASON *

I agree with Gauthier that Hobbes is the greatest English moral philosopher. I do not agree, however, with his account of Hobbes's moral philosophy. I do agree with most of his actual description of Hobbes's views, but I think he pays insufficient attention to his own description and hence attributes flaws to Hobbes which he then feels compelled to remedy.

Gauthier claims that Hobbes is a "value subjectivist," that value is solely a matter of subjective preference with no limit on what an individual can prefer. This is true if we do not confine our attention to rational individuals, but then it is an uninteresting view

* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Hobbes, December 29, 1979, commenting on a paper by David Gauthier; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 547–559.